Re: [tor-bugs] #17961 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Evaluate CONIKS as an authenticator

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17961: Evaluate CONIKS as an authenticator
+-
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 This is underway as part of GSoC.  Most of the work so far is happening
 here https://github.com/coniks-sys/coniks-go

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace disconnect with duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19735: replace disconnect with duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by f451022):

 About startpage statement of tor we can learn those:
 [https://support.startpage.com/index.php?/Knowledgebase/Article/View/288/0
 /how-does-startpage-interact-with-tor]
 [https://support.startpage.com/index.php?/Knowledgebase/Article/View/294/0
 /startpages-use-of-captchas]

 stupid statement...

 I say Let's go duckduckgo!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace disconnect with duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19735: replace disconnect with duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Thanks f451022. We've tried to use StartPage in the past, but they started
 captching Tor users before.

 FYI, I pushed the changes for 6.5-alpha to add an optional HTML DDG .onion
 to the omnibox, but make the HTTPS Javascript the default. StartPage is
 also still in there for folks who want to switch.

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[tor-bugs] #19789 [User Experience]: always the same exit-node 5.255.61.130 (USA)-normal?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19789: always the same exit-node 5.255.61.130 (USA)-normal?
-+-
 Reporter:  toro |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Very often creating new circle, always 5.255.61.130 (USA) is the exit-
 node. Normal? How to change?

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[tor-bugs] #19788 [- Select a component]: always the same exit-node even when creating new identity very often

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19788: always the same exit-node even when creating new identity very often
--+-
 Reporter:  toro  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Very often creating new circle, always 5.255.61.130 (USA) is the exit-
 node. Normal? How to change?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12595 [Core Tor/Tor]: Finalize design for improved guard-node behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12595: Finalize design for improved guard-node behavior
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  assigned
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-guard, TorCoreTeam201606,|Version:  Tor:
  028-triaged, mike-can, prop259, tor-guards-|  0.2.7
  revamp | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * cc: andrea, yawning (added)


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[tor-bugs] #19787 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: ImportError: No module named Bridges, no BridgeSplitter class

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19787: ImportError: No module named Bridges, no BridgeSplitter class
--+--
 Reporter:  mikefrompluto |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I obtained copies of BridgeDB from two different soruces (one
 https://git.torproject.org/bridgedb.git, the other
 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bridgedb/) and after running the setup, I
 recieved errors such as "ImportError: No module named Bridges"  and
 "ImportError: cannot import name Bridges". Furthermore, in the main.py
 file, the project tries to create a BridgeSplitter (for example  hashring
 = Bridges.BridgeSplitter(crypto.getHMAC(key, "Hashring-Key")), however,
 using a code search tool, there does not appear to be a BridgeSplitter
 class in the code base

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12595 [Core Tor/Tor]: Finalize design for improved guard-node behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12595: Finalize design for improved guard-node behavior
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  assigned
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-guard, TorCoreTeam201606,|Version:  Tor:
  028-triaged, mike-can, prop259, tor-guards-|  0.2.7
  revamp | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-must
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:40 nickm]:
 > Proposal 271 now exists.  I think we can start breaking it down to
 implement.

 And here is an initial implementation plan for prop271:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-July/011234.html

 If someone does a basic sanity check on the implementation plan, I can try
 splitting it in tickets or sth.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by RainerSchmidt):

 Thanks, I tried your recommendation but failed, still getting the same
 problem.
 After successful running

   git clone ​​https://git.torproject.org/nickm/tor.git

 I changed to the tor directory and run

   git checkout solaris_warnings_028

 This seemed successful, so I run:

   sh autogen.sh

 and got the same warnings/errors then before (please see:
 
''[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/19767/solaris_warnings_028.log.tgz
 solaris_warnings_028.log.tgz]''[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor
 /raw-attachment/ticket/19767/solaris_warnings_028.log.tgz ​)]
 Any help is appreciated

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19769: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.???
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, dns,   | Resolution:
  TorCoreTeam201607  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove a fallback directory in 0.2.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19782: Remove a fallback directory in 0.2.8
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallbacks |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 cherry-picked to maint-0.2.8!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19777 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-gencert should warn nicely when PEM passphrases are too short

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19777: tor-gencert should warn nicely when PEM passphrases are too short
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gencert   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think those messages come from openssl.  We could switch to use
 readpassphrase instead, I guess.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 You're almost there!  But you're on the master branch, and you need to
 switch to the 'solaris_warnings_028' branch.  To do that (assuming you
 have a halfway recent git) just run "git checkout solaris_warnings_028".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:9 iwakeh]:
 > I attached a patch simplifying the configuration setting.

 Oh, that looks indeed simpler.  Thanks, will apply that.

 > It would be good to create methods for the various list manipulations
 instead of the repeated loops over the descriptor line lists (i.e. more
 readable and shorter class file in total).

 Agreed.  That's what I meant by providing even more non-test methods and
 helper classes that will in turn simplify the actual test methods.  Will
 simplify things there.

 > And, some helper classes instead of private inner classes TarballBuilder
 and the different *DescriptorBuilders would make the test class a little
 shorter.

 Not so sure about this one.  The advantage of making them inner classes is
 that they can access the outer classes' attributes.  Making them separate
 classes would lead to even more code overall.  But let's see how things
 evolve.

 > I'm sort of wondering if the supply of the tests descriptor tars should
 be more direct? But that's a bigger change in this huge test class.

 Can you be more specific what change you have in mind there?

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace disconnect with duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19735: replace disconnect with duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by f451022):

 I create a thread on duckduckgo forum:
 https://duck.co/forum/thread/22939/duckduckgo-quoted-as-a-possible-
 default-of-tor-bro

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19781 [- Select a component]: proxy settings and black bar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19781: proxy settings and black bar
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  HTTPS-E 3.3
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by f451022):

 thinking about it, I think it could be related to Torbutton

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19786 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Full Internal Transparency

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19786: Full Internal Transparency
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Please have a look at the mailing lists at
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/emailLists
 You'll find several lists where full and immediate transparency is
 counterproductive and even a threat to our users (think of a 0day sent to
 tor-security@).

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[tor-bugs] #19786 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Full Internal Transparency

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19786: Full Internal Transparency
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 I believe the widespread community concerns about the trustworthiness of
 the Tor Project are rooted in Tor's secret internal politics.

 Tickets #1971 and #19690 both show that these internal politics are
 spilling over into the technical realm, too.  This needs to stop.

 I suggest a new strategy: full transparency for all internal operations.
 Everything about the Tor project should be immediately and publicly
 visible.  Complete archives of lists like dir-auth should also be made
 available

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[tor-bugs] #19785 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Agree and Prepare Formal Procedure to Add/Remove DirAuths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19785: Agree and Prepare Formal Procedure to Add/Remove DirAuths
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  dirauth
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 We need:
 * a formal procedure for making the final decision (e.g. "Roger initiates
 a vote on ; dirauths have 3 days to vote yes or no via PGP-
 signed email; a quorum of 7 votes is sufficient to make a decision; lack
 of quorum => no change")
 * a formal procedure for removing dirauths (rules will be different to
 accommodate excluding the instant dirauth from voting)

 We also need a more inclusive and transparent discussion and voting
 process that in some way includes community input.

 See also ticket #19271.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I attached a patch simplifying the configuration setting.

 It would be good to create methods for the various list manipulations
 instead of the repeated loops over the descriptor line lists (i.e. more
 readable and shorter class file in total).

 And, some helper classes instead of private inner classes TarballBuilder
 and the different *DescriptorBuilders would make the test class a little
 shorter.

 I'm sort of wondering if the supply of the tests descriptor tars should be
 more direct? But that's a bigger change in this huge test class.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19778 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Bridge descriptor sanitizer runs out of memory after 13.5 days

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19778: Bridge descriptor sanitizer runs out of memory after 13.5 days
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Certainly.  I just attached a tiny tarball with three commits based on
 050a88ffcf2b205a63741d4848951ce91c0bd02f and the `collector.properties`
 file.  Thanks for looking!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19778 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Bridge descriptor sanitizer runs out of memory after 13.5 days

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19778: Bridge descriptor sanitizer runs out of memory after 13.5 days
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I might be easy to infer, but could you add the commit id of the CollecTor
 you were using and a brief list of settings changed from the default
 config file of this commit?

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19687 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Permit push access to atlas.git for irl, remove push access for phw

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19687: Permit push access to atlas.git for irl, remove push access for phw
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19784 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: bridges.torproject.org certificate changed to let's encrypt and wrong tlsa record

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19784: bridges.torproject.org certificate changed to let's encrypt and wrong 
tlsa
record
-+
 Reporter:  Ricky_Martin |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB => Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team


Comment:

 fixed the TLSA record.

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[tor-bugs] #19784 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: bridges.torproject.org certificate changed to let's encrypt and wrong tlsa record

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19784: bridges.torproject.org certificate changed to let's encrypt and wrong 
tlsa
record
--+--
 Reporter:  Ricky_Martin  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
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 bridges.torproject.org moved to new server, I think issue related with
 server moving. Also bridges.torproject.org give two bridges instead three
 at a time now. Will be good if certificate change will be posted in some
 service Notes. Since It a bit freaky, first thought was that government
 took bridges.torproject.org.

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Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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