[tor-bugs] #21408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser auto resize broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21408: Tor Browser auto resize broken
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When I resize the browser window, nothing happens

 Tested with Tor Browser 6.5 on Debian, Whonix and Tails running under
 VirtualBox

 However it still works fine on Windows

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21406 [Core Tor/Tor]: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21406: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21405 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify "address" in man page: IPv4, IPv6, hostname?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21405: Clarify "address" in man page: IPv4, IPv6, hostname?
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21406 [Core Tor/Tor]: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21406: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 In fact, the only time we use CREATE_FAST consistently is when
 bootstrapping.
 See #21407.

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[tor-bugs] #21407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the usecreatefast default 0 in tor to match the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21407: Make the usecreatefast default 0 in tor to match the consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.23
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  security
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #9386 we made clients use CREATE_FAST less, and changed the value in
 the consensus to 0. But we still use the default of 1 when bootstrapping
 (because there is no consensus).

 We should change this default to 0.

 Sticking this in 0.3.1 because it's a security hole for the reasons
 mentioned in #9386. (I'd go for 0.3.0, but that's frozen, and this change
 could introduce bootstrapping bugs.)

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[tor-bugs] #21406 [Core Tor/Tor]: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21406: The channel is_client flag is inaccurate
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The channel_t is_client flag is inaccurate: relays set it when the other
 end uses a CREATE_FAST cell, but usecreatefast is set to 0 in the
 consensus.

 This means that the only time CREATE_FAST is used is when a relay gets an
 extend request *without* an ntor key, and the purpose of the circuit is
 *not* one of the hidden service purposes where TAP is allowed.

 See should_use_create_fast_for_circuit() for details.

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[tor-bugs] #21405 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify "address" in man page: IPv4, IPv6, hostname?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21405: Clarify "address" in man page: IPv4, IPv6, hostname?
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  doc easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The DirAuthority line only takes an IPv4 address as an "address".
 But other torrc options take IPv6 addresses or hostnames.

 We should clarify what we mean when we say "address".

 Reported by Andrew Smith:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2017-February/011876.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19213 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build failure on mingw-64 (was: Build failure)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19213: Build failure on mingw-64
--+
 Reporter:  bc348 |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  028-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21390 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keypress events are not getting spoofed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21390: keypress events are not getting spoofed
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I added `z` and `Z` test cases as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17903 [Core Tor/Tor]: router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl should distinguish between fallbacks and authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17903: router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl should distinguish between fallbacks 
and
authorities
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by attila):

 I just attached a patch for this to complete the coding task portion of
 the Core Developer interview process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21309: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > Are you referring to the following two patches?
 >
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-45.7.0esr-7.0-1=773b70c590a5897de9a87c4ffb8b844f5eeb519b
 >
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-45.7.0esr-7.0-1=b839017ae214ec42cf203b711d371ab90bdc959b

 Sorry, I somehow missed this patch. Yes, the implementation patch needs to
 be fixed. I think the testing patch may still work.

 Mozilla changed their search engine list format so I am currently
 grappling with that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21268: e10s compatibility for New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * parent:   => #21201


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21267 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21267: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > Are you going to enable that long-standing untested unaudited still
 buggy e10s in ff52-esr?!
 > > Don't you think it requires separate task "switch to multi-process
 mode" after audit?
 >
 > Maybe.  In any case, we want to prepare for the possibility of enabling
 multi-process mode, which means making sure our code is compatible with
 it.
 >
 > > (Isn't content sizer code moving to Firefox?)
 >
 > I am not sure.  Arthur?

 Sorry I missed this question. I think we do eventually want to move it to
 Firefox, but that's kind of a big task, so it maybe makes sense to fix it
 in torbutton for now, if it's not too hard.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21267 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21267: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * parent:   => #21201


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21201 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21201: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #20680   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > Kathy and I also noticed that the circuit display code triggers a crash
 in our debug build when e10s is enabled. This happens because GetProxyInfo
 is not implemented by HttpChannelChild (the
 getSOCKSCredentialsForBrowser() function tries to access
 `channel.proxyInfo`; on the browser side, see:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-
 browser/blob/20680%2B2/netwerk/protocol/http/HttpChannelChild.cpp#L2395).
 >
 > Should I file a new ticket for this issue or will it be covered by this
 ticket?

 I will look into this here and if turns into a big issue I can open a new
 ticket.

 > Also, here is a related question: should we make this the parent bug for
 #21267 and #21268 or do we want to track e10s issues separately?

 Seems reasonable to make this the parent bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: resource:// URIs leak information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8725: resource:// URIs leak information
-+-
 Reporter:  holizz   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-rebase-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-testcase, tbb-firefox-patch,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201607R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That shipped in 6.5. We are done here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21308: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702 => ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201702R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch for review:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/tree/21308

 To explain this patch a little:

 In private browsing mode, calling
 {{{
 var req = window.indexedDB.open("anydbname")
 }}}
 returns without throwing an error, but results in
 {{{
 req.name = "InvalidStateError".
 }}}
 Whereas dom.indexeddb.enabled = false, `var req =
 window.indexedDB.open("anydbname")` throws an `InvalidStateError` instead.

 The Modernizr script fails to handle the latter case. So this patch
 changes the behavior of the code when dom.indexedb.enabled = false so that
 no error is thrown, but instead `window.indexedDB = null`. This is
 correctly handled by Modernizr, and also matches the convention where the
 use of a JS API is preceding by checking for its presence, e.g.:
 {{{
 if (window.indexedDB) {
   var req = indexedDB.open(...)
   // More indexedDB usage
 }
 }}}

 I also tested this with Twitter and it appears to get it working properly
 again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Splitting the build of each components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17380: Splitting the build of each components
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The meek and obfs4 pluggable transports and the linux sandbox have been
 added.

 The parts still missing are:
 - obfsproxy 3 (python version)
 - fteproxy
 - the hardened version (whose future is currently discussed on tbb-dev)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 6.5a4 anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20905: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 
6.5a4
anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, |
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > Also Gentoo XFCE after upgrading to 6.5a5. The default new window size
 changed from 1000x1000 px to 1000x900 px.

 I have an update to this. I have two displays with different resolutions.
 The lower resolution (1600x1050) display was considered primary by the OS.
 I ran Tor Browser on the higher resolution display (1920x1200). Today I
 unplugged the smaller display and the Tor Browser window went back to
 normal size 1000x1000. It's like TBB was initially resizing the window
 based on the primary (lower resolution) display size, instead of which
 desktop the window was opened on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13790 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor and add comments to new_route_len()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13790: Refactor and add comments to new_route_len()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  026-deferrable,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I can confirm that nickm is right, the 3 cases mentioned are the one where
 we need at least 3 hops that tor picked.

 Replying to [comment:11 catalyst]:
 > Which is worse: a path that should be 4 hops becoming 3 hops, or a path
 that should be 3 hops becoming 4 hops?  I would think the first is worse
 because it could compromise anonymity, while the second wastes resources,
 increases latency, and decreases reliability.  Does that sound right?  Or
 does using a longer path than is necessary introduce some security risk
 that I'm missing?

 A circuit that was suppose to be 4 hops but is 3 hops is _bad_. A 3 hops
 that instead become a 4 hops is "OK" but . Actually, that can happen in
 the code with circuit cannibalization which is when tor look for an
 existing circuits and then just re-extend to a 4 hops to the endpoint it's
 trying to connect (intro point, Exit, rendezvous point, ...).

 I believe tor has a hard limit of 8 hops for a circuit (`#define
 MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8`). I'm not aware of security risk of
 having long circuits like that but it definitely is very bad on the user
 experience and overall load of the network.

 Finally, to your question in comment:8, consider 1 hop to be 1 relay to go
 through. So if a client wants to open a circuit to an Exit node for
 instance (most common use case), you'll count Guard -> Middle -> Exit thus
 3 hops.

 For an hidden service connecting to a rendezvous point, you count Guard ->
 Middle -> Middle -> RP. The service picks 3 hops and then extends to a
 fourth one.

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[tor-bugs] #21404 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Run the Tor Browser testsuite on rbm based nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21404: Run the Tor Browser testsuite on rbm based nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance   |Version:
  and Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #17379
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #21286 some nightly builds have been added. We should run the testsuite
 on those nightly builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have some nightly builds using the new build process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21286: Have some nightly builds using the new build process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 boklm]:
 >
 > I still need to add an option to sign the sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt
 file, and send an email when the build fails.

 The `sha256sums-unsigned-build.txt` file is now signed if the
 `RBM_SIGN_BUILD` environment variable is set.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Neat!

 I think some content elements will go away (like parsing libraries), but
 that's a different discussion.

 Regarding the menu: could the menu bar just be moved to the top menu?
 (That's where metrics.tp.o has 'News' etc.)
 That way the buttons would move up a little.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21027 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816: entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion !(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (o

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21027: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816:
entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion
!(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.0.0
-alpha-dev 8b75261b6dc341de)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-guards-revamp,|  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20718 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop271 -- Resolve all 'XXXX prop271' items

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20718: Prop271 -- Resolve all ' prop271' items
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20822 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 I fixed some of these the other week, but there are more to go.  My
 current plan is that I'll try to identify any that are critical for 030
 and open tickets for those, and any that are important for 031 and open
 tickets for those.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17193, #20832

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17193, #20832 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: 0.3.1.x-final

Comment:
Deferring these to 0.3.1.x as nonbugfixes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13790 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor and add comments to new_route_len()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13790: Refactor and add comments to new_route_len()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  026-deferrable,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Which is worse: a path that should be 4 hops becoming 3 hops, or a path
 that should be 3 hops becoming 4 hops?  I would think the first is worse
 because it could compromise anonymity, while the second wastes resources,
 increases latency, and decreases reliability.  Does that sound right?  Or
 does using a longer path than is necessary introduce some security risk
 that I'm missing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by RaBe):

 Just to have something that we can start talking about, I merged the
 metrics and collector page into this: collector.cc-ltd.net. I also added
 the design to the file list (just use one of the two buttons...).

 I moved the anchor links to the main navigation, which is common for "one
 pagers". The icons are pretty random for now... I did not alter the
 content, it's mainly copy :)

 Let me know what you think!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21394 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21394: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability
+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton breaks Session Manager addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21396: Torbutton breaks Session Manager addon
-+-
 Reporter:  HolD |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702, GeorgKoppen201702|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression, TorBrowserTeam201702 =>
 tbb-6.5-regression, TorBrowserTeam201702, GeorgKoppen201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox >= 48 ships with an ICU pre-compiled blob

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19181: Firefox >= 48 ships with an ICU pre-compiled blob
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18530: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18831 [Applications/Tor Browser]: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18831: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21239 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Linux Firefox descriptor for ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21239: Adapt Linux Firefox descriptor for ESR 52
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21340: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20761 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20761: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20989 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser sandbox profile too restrictive on OSX 10.12.2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20989: browser sandbox profile too restrictive on OSX 10.12.2
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201701R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21240, #21267, #21268

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21240, #21267, #21268 by gk:
sponsor to Sponsor4

Comment:
Sponsor4 as well

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18820, #18101, #20221, #17509, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18820, #18101, #20221, #17509, #18925, #20683, #21249 by 
gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201702

Comment:
Moving my tickets as well

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6119, #16010, #21147, #17380, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6119, #16010, #21147, #17380, #19048, #20680, #20683, 
#21201, #21286, #21308, #21309, #21328 by gk:
sponsor to Sponsor4

Comment:
This is Sponsor4 work

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21403 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement HS descriptor fetching

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21403: prop224: Implement HS descriptor fetching
-+
 Reporter:  haxxpop  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17242   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21403 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement HS descriptor fetching

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21403: prop224: Implement HS descriptor fetching
-+
 Reporter:  haxxpop  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17242   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+

Comment (by haxxpop):

 The code is here https://github.com/haxxpop/tor/pull/3/files

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21403 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement HS descriptor fetching (was: prop224: Implementation HS descriptor fetching)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21403: prop224: Implement HS descriptor fetching
-+
 Reporter:  haxxpop  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17242   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+

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[tor-bugs] #21403 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation HS directory fetching

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21403: prop224: Implementation HS directory fetching
---+
 Reporter:  haxxpop|  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #17242
   Points:  parent |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 Before the client actually can connect to the service, it has to fetch the
 descriptor first. As already specified in prop224 section 2.1 and 2.2.6

 The client needs to parse the service's master public key from the onion
 address, derive the blinded public key, and then use that blinded public
 key to fetch the descriptor from the HSDir.

 (Note that, this ticket doesn't implement how to pick the HSDir)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21403 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implementation HS descriptor fetching (was: prop224: Implementation HS directory fetching)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21403: prop224: Implementation HS descriptor fetching
-+
 Reporter:  haxxpop  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17242   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17615 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser sets network.proxy.socks_port in an inappropriate way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17615: Tor Browser sets network.proxy.socks_port in an inappropriate way
--+--
 Reporter:  infinity0 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Another person encountered this problem and mentioned it here:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2017-February/042907.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21402 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The sandbox git tag is not checked with gpg

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21402: The sandbox git tag is not checked with gpg
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702R, tbb-gitian  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702R => TorBrowserTeam201702R, tbb-gitian
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, fixed on `master` with commit
 917d38c1d58c8cb11ff5b016054d2589d313882e.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21402 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The sandbox git tag is not checked with gpg

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21402: The sandbox git tag is not checked with gpg
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702 => TorBrowserTeam201702R


Comment:

 The branch `bug_21402` in my git repository should fix this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21402

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21039: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  ordex
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20822   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ordex):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21039: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  ordex
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20822   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ordex):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:   => ordex


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21039: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20822   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by ordex):

 A potential solution for this ticket has been implemented and uploaded on
 guthub in my "ticket21039" branch (5 patches in total):
 https://github.com/ordex/tor/commits/ticket21039 .
 The branch is based on the current master.

 On top of what the ticket is asking, I also tried to simplify and restyle
 circuit_send_next_onion_skin() as a whole.

 In the last patch I implemented a new unittest for the
 circuit_send_next_onion_skin() function. However, being this my first
 experience with the tor unittest code, I am not sure I did it right :)
 feedback is welcome!

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[tor-bugs] #21402 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The sandbox git tag is not checked with gpg

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21402: The sandbox git tag is not checked with gpg
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201702
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 During the Tor Browser build, we are using in `gitian/descriptors/linux
 /gitian-sandbox.yml` a git clone of `sandboxed-tor-browser`, but we don't
 check that the git tag we are using is gpg signed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21401 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Sandbox exits and fails to launch firefox on fedora 64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21401: Sandbox exits and fails to launch firefox on fedora 64
--+---
 Reporter:  glassbox  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is probably a duplicate of #21077, which is a Xen specific Linux
 kernel bug.  If you aren't using Xen, then please re-open it.

 Supposedly unmounting `/proc/xen` exists as a workaround, but may break
 other things.

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[tor-bugs] #21401 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Sandbox exits and fails to launch firefox on fedora 64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21401: Sandbox exits and fails to launch firefox on fedora 64
--+-
 Reporter:  glassbox  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Running on a fedora 64 virtual machine:

 [jammy@my-vm sandbox]$ ./sandboxed-tor-browser
 2017/02/06 11:21:55 launch: Starting.
 2017/02/06 11:21:55 launch: Connecting to the Tor network.
 2017/02/06 11:21:56 tor: Feb 06 11:21:56.776 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.9 (git-
 56788a2489127072) running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.22-stable, OpenSSL
 1.0.2j and Zlib 1.2.8.
 2017/02/06 11:21:56 tor: Feb 06 11:21:56.776 [notice] Tor can't help you
 if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 2017/02/06 11:21:56 tor: Feb 06 11:21:56.776 [notice] Read configuration
 file "/home/amnesia/tor/etc/torrc".
 2017/02/06 11:21:56 tor: Feb 06 11:21:56.782 [notice] Opening Control
 listener on /home/amnesia/tor/data/control
 2017/02/06 11:21:56 tor: Feb 06 11:21:56.782 [notice] DisableNetwork is
 set. Tor will not make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting
 down all existing connections.
 2017/02/06 11:21:56 tor: Feb 06 11:21:56.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4
 file /home/amnesia/tor/etc/geoip.
 2017/02/06 11:21:57 tor: Feb 06 11:21:57.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6
 file /home/amnesia/tor/etc/geoip6.
 2017/02/06 11:21:57 tor: Feb 06 11:21:57.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%:
 Starting
 2017/02/06 11:21:57 tor: Feb 06 11:21:57.000 [notice] Delaying directory
 fetches: DisableNetwork is set.
 2017/02/06 11:21:57 tor: Feb 06 11:21:57.000 [notice] New control
 connection opened.
 2017/02/06 11:21:57 tor: Taking ownership of the tor process
 2017/02/06 11:21:57 tor: Feb 06 11:21:57.000 [notice] Opening Socks
 listener on /home/amnesia/tor/data/socks
 2017/02/06 11:21:58 tor: Feb 06 11:21:58.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%:
 Connecting to the Tor network
 2017/02/06 11:21:58 tor: Feb 06 11:21:58.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%:
 Finishing handshake with first hop
 2017/02/06 11:21:59 tor: Feb 06 11:21:59.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%:
 Establishing a Tor circuit
 2017/02/06 11:22:00 tor: Feb 06 11:22:00.000 [notice] Tor has successfully
 opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working.
 2017/02/06 11:22:00 tor: Feb 06 11:22:00.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%:
 Done
 2017/02/06 11:22:00 tor: Opened SOCKS passthrough listener: 127.0.0.1:9150
 2017/02/06 11:22:00 launch: Starting Tor Browser.


 Everything is fine until:

2017/02/06 11:22:00 firefox: Can't mount proc on /newroot/proc:
 Operation not permitted
2017/02/06 11:22:00 launch: Complete.
2017/02/06 11:22:01 tor: Feb 06 11:22:01.000 [notice] Catching signal
 TERM, exiting cleanly.
2017/02/06 11:22:01 failed to accept control conn: accept unix
 /run/user/1000/sandboxed-tor-browser/control: use of closed network
 connection
2017/02/06 11:22:01 failed to accept SOCKS conn: accept unix
 /run/user/1000/sandboxed-tor-browser/socks: use of closed network
 connection

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6119 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Create our own instance of Panopticlick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6119: Create our own instance of Panopticlick
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #5292| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21268: e10s compatibility for New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr => tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21267 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21267: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr => tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21309: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21308: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21201 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21201: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #20680   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr => tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  None
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security => ff52-esr, tbb-gitian,
 tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201702


Comment:

 We should start banging our head against this wall.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21240: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702


Comment:

 To get back to the status quo we need to fix the accessibility issues.
 Currently the build breaks with `stdole2.tlb` not being found which is due
 to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1288199.

 We probably need Jacek's
 https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mailman/message/35635327/ being
 properly checked-in. It might be the case that we get a new binary blob
 that way. If that's the case we want to find a way to build that .tlb from
 source. I tried a bit but failed so far.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18530: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20814: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201702  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201702


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton breaks Session Manager addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21396: Torbutton breaks Session Manager addon
-+-
 Reporter:  HolD |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression => tbb-6.5-regression, TorBrowserTeam201702


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13017, #18820, #18101, #19857, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13017, #18820, #18101, #19857, #20221, #20905, #21147, 
#15988, #17380, #17509, #17662, #18292, #18925, #19048, #19741, #20254, #20680, 
#20683, #20892, #20949, #21224, #21286, #21328 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201702

Comment:
Moving our tickets to Feb 2017.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18022, #20761, #21323

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18022, #20761, #21323 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201702R

Comment:
Moving review tickets.

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