Re: [tor-bugs] #22285 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Announce new list of fallback directory mirrors in 0.3.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22285: Announce new list of fallback directory mirrors in 0.3.1
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 This is done:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-May/012285.html

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[tor-bugs] #22285 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Announce new list of fallback directory mirrors in 0.3.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22285: Announce new list of fallback directory mirrors in 0.3.1
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 The rebuilt list of fallbacks in #21564 was merged into 0.3.1 (and
 backported to 0.2.8 onwards).

 I should send an email to tor-relays about this very soon.

 I used to BCC all the operators, but I'm not sure if that's worth the
 effort any more. Now we have a 90 day stability requirement, I think I
 just want to do a quick rebuild every release.

 To avoid a mass mail-out of operators before the next rebuild, I'll add a
 note to the announcement saying: "want to be on this list next time? email
 me with your relay fingerprint and I will put your relay on the list of
 potential fallbacks".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activate mixed content blocking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21323: Activate mixed content blocking
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by legind):

 Note that in the transition to the WebExtensions version of HTTPS
 Everywhere, we will no longer have access to browser prefs.  See:
 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebExtensions/FAQ#Will_I_have_access_to_about:config_or_the_preferences.3F

 Because of this we won't be able to tell from prefs whether mixed content
 blocking is enabled or not, and setting the above-mentioned pref will be
 ineffective.

 One possibility is setting a localStorage variable
 ''enable_mixed_rulesets'' and setting that to the desired value within the
 HTTPS Everywhere extension scope at browser startup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process (was: Frequent OOM kills of tor precess)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor precess

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor precess
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I found this part interesting:

 {{{
 31592017-05-13 23:22:01  3931  0   3931
 31602017-05-13 23:23:01   3786   1852   1934
 0 66518
 31612017-05-13 23:23:01  3931  0   3931
 31622017-05-13 23:24:01   3786   2217   1569
 0 66518
 31632017-05-13 23:24:01  3931  0   3931
 31642017-05-13 23:25:01   3786   2335   1451
 0 66518
 31652017-05-13 23:25:01  3931  0   3931
 31662017-05-13 23:26:01   3786   2527   1259
 0 66496
 31672017-05-13 23:26:01  3931  0   3931
 31682017-05-13 23:27:01   3786   2952833
 0 66496
 31692017-05-13 23:27:01  3931  0   3931
 31702017-05-13 23:28:01   3786   3020766
 0 66496
 31712017-05-13 23:28:01  3931  0   3931
 31722017-05-13 23:29:01   3786   3110675
 0 66496
 31732017-05-13 23:29:01  3931  0   3931
 31742017-05-13 23:30:01   3786   3023763
 0 66496
 31752017-05-13 23:30:01  3931  0   3931
 31762017-05-13 23:31:01   3786   2694   1091
 0 66496
 31772017-05-13 23:31:01  3931  0   3931
 31782017-05-13 23:32:01   3786   2338   1448
 0 66496
 31792017-05-13 23:32:01  3931  0   3931
 31802017-05-13 23:33:01   3786   1893   1893
 0 66496
 31812017-05-13 23:33:01  3931  0   3931
 31822017-05-13 23:34:01   3786   1614   2171
 0 66496
 31832017-05-13 23:34:01  3931  0   3931
 }}}

 It looks like memory load went up, but not enough to kill it, and then
 went down again on its own.

 So it looks like it is not always following the pattern of "grow forever
 until it's too big".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Thanks for finding that!  I'll probably cherry pick the macro fix
 individually and then put the rest of your #7869 patch in a separate
 commit, unless you want to split the commits yourself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16120 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect if the network goes down

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16120: Detect if the network goes down
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network, tor-guards-revamp,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12377 [Core Tor/Tor]: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are internal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12377: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are 
internal
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, 026-triaged-1,|  Actual Points:
  026-deferrable, 027-triaged-1-out, |
  isaremoved, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Good find!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I had thought, as a short term hack, to assign the current options we're
 testing, if the global options is null, and also to add a boolean
 "in_validation", and then have get_options() warn when it returns an
 options set that has in_validation true. That would turn the current
 asserts into warns.

 I'm not sure if that hack fixes enough to be worthwhile though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:22 mcs]:
 > see ticket:21886#comment:16 for a patch that tries but fails to fix this
 problem.

 I cherry-picked this patch onto `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1-build1`
 (`454a231f2b76a8857748d93f666bb93199f4b963`), built tor-browser.git, and
 added NoScript and torbutton. The patch worked for me (with e10s active)
 -- I saw the confirmation prompt and was able to cancel or download files.
 I used gdb to check the return values of Suspend() and Resume() and they
 both returned NS_OK.

 So I'm wondering if something might have been patched in the latest
 version of 52ESR? I haven't checked on Windows yet but it seems like this
 patch might actually be OK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22269 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22269: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap
--+
 Reporter:  leakedwiki|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


Comment:

 So yeah.  Installed ewwbuntu in a VM, and it crashes on startup
 intermittently.  Adding debugging instrumentation makes it crash less
 (race conditions are dumb).  It's not calling the xcb extension query
 routines at all from what I can tell, and it is calling my versions of the
 xlib ones.  So I have no idea why firefox (or one of it's dependencies)
 thinks it's ok to use `MIT-SHM`, when the X server doesn't appear to
 support it.

 I can't tell if anything I've tried to get it to not crash actually fixes
 the problem because behavior is intermitent.  If someone that's not me[0]
 gets a usable stack trace from when it aborts, then forward progress can
 happen here, otherwise I think this will languish in the bug tracker
 forever.

  * Forcing `layers.offmainthreadcomposition.enabled` to `false` may help.
  * Rejecting more extensions (DRI, GLX, SGI-GLX) may help.

 [0]: One upon a time I had a branch of the sandbox code that let me run
 gdb/get stack traces, but that's long since rotted, and it was a huge
 mess, that I'm not willing to clean up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+--
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Do you mean 7.0a3 or 7.0a4?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a proper wiki page for trove severity guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22284: Make a proper wiki page for trove severity guidelines
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 When we do the transition, we might want to work on the phrasing of "any
 means to impersonate a relay", since we had a case where a seized relay
 was in the fallbackdir list, but in that case if a bad guy got the
 identity key and pretended to be the relay (and assuming we blacklisted
 the fingerprint from the network), all the bad guy could do would be to
 serve directory answers to clients, and that's not really so bad.

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[tor-bugs] #22284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a proper wiki page for trove severity guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22284: Make a proper wiki page for trove severity guidelines
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There are these two pages:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TROVE
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2016SummerDevMeeting/Notes/SecurityIssuePolicy

 But that second one isn't really a great long term resource for people
 wondering what the trove is, or what should count as a thing that should
 be in the trove. It would be nice to have a page that looks like it's
 actually an in-place policy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  implemented =>


Comment:

 I found a bug on these macro definitions while working on #7869:

 If you look closely at the following macros:

 {{{
 #define BASE64_NOPAD_LEN(n) (CEIL_DIV((n) * 4, 3)
 #define BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(n) (CEIL_DIV((n) * 8, 5)

 #define BASE64_NOPAD_BUFSIZE(n) (BASE64_NOPAD_LEN(n) + 1))
 #define BASE32_NOPAD_BUFSIZE(n) (BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(n) + 1))
 }}}

 You will notice that BASE64_NOPAD_LEN and BASE32_NOPAD_LEN are missing the
 closing parentheses.
 Also, BASE64_NOPAD_BUFSIZE and BASE32_NOPAD_BUFSIZE have one extra closing
 parentheses.
 If you use only BASE64_NOPAD_BUFSIZE and BASE32_NOPAD_BUFSIZE everything
 will be fine as both errors cancel each other out.

 Here is my fix: https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/tree/baseXX-macro-
 fix-21872

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I followed your suggestion to use base64_encode_nopad() and changed the
 names of the constants to match the pattern used in #21872.

 By the way, I found an interesting bug on #21872. If you look closely at
 the following macros:

 {{{
 #define BASE64_NOPAD_LEN(n) (CEIL_DIV((n) * 4, 3)
 #define BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(n) (CEIL_DIV((n) * 8, 5)

 #define BASE64_NOPAD_BUFSIZE(n) (BASE64_NOPAD_LEN(n) + 1))
 #define BASE32_NOPAD_BUFSIZE(n) (BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(n) + 1))
 }}}

 You will notice that BASE64_NOPAD_LEN and BASE32_NOPAD_LEN are missing the
 closing parentheses.
 Also, BASE64_NOPAD_BUFSIZE and BASE32_NOPAD_BUFSIZE have one extra closing
 parentheses.
 If you use only BASE64_NOPAD_BUFSIZE and BASE32_NOPAD_BUFSIZE everything
 will be fine as both errors cancel each other out.

 I fixed this on my branch too but it should probably be fixed in a
 separate commit.

 The branch with all my changes merged into the current master is here:
 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/tree/remove-padding-fix-7869_squashed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16576 [User Experience/Website]: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16576: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by Samdney):

 * cc: contact@… (removed)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16576 [User Experience/Website]: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16576: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by Samdney):

 * cc: contact@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16576 [User Experience/Website]: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16576: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by Samdney):

 Replying to [comment:4 mrphs]:

 > And which ones are supposed to be highlighted?

 Suggestion:

 We can circulate which one(s) is/are highlighted.

 For a fixed period project A and then for the next period project B etc.
 ...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22283 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not exist."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22283: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not
exist."
---+-
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by mcs):

 To prevent this problem, we can modify the code that removes lines from
 torrc to remove Unix domain socket lines even when Tor Launcher is going
 to use TCP for the ControlPort and SocksPort. To try to avoid removing
 torrc lines that the user may have added themselves, the code should check
 that the path in the ControlPort and SocksPort lines matches what Tor
 Launcher would use if it were configured to use Unix domain sockets by
 default.

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[tor-bugs] #22283 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not exist."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22283: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not
exist."
---+-
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 After Tor Browser 7.0a3 is updated to 7.0a4 on Linux, it fails to start
 up. The problem is that the code we wrote for #20761 to remove
 `ControlPort` and `SocksPort` lines from the user's torrc only removes
 Unix domain socket lines if the browser is configured to use Unix domain
 sockets, which it is not in 7.0a4. This means that after updating to
 7.0a4, Tor Launcher starts tor so that TCP is used for the control port
 and SOCKS port, but lines like the following are left behind in torrc:
 {{{
 ControlPort unix:/run/user/1001/Tor/control.socket
 SocksPort unix:/run/user/1001/Tor/socks.socket IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6
 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth
 }}}

 Unfortunately, the parent directory (in this example,
 `/run/user/1001/Tor`) does not exist because Tor Launcher removes it when
 it exits and does not create it because it does not think Unix domain
 sockets are being used.

 A similar problem occurs on OSX, but the parent directory is always
 `.../TorBrowser-Data/Tor` which happens to exist for other reasons (i.e.,
 that's where torrc is located), so on OSX Tor Browser starts up and there
 are both TCP and Unix domain socket listeners.

 One workaround is for users to edit their torrc and remove the
 `ControlPort` and `SocksPort` lines manually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16596 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Change database queries towards making only a single query per request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16596: Change database queries towards making only a single query per request
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by rose):

 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22234 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Disconnect Search from search engines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22234: Remove Disconnect Search from search engines
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by i139):

 two alternatives how can we use to replace disconnect
 https://www.ixquick.eu/ based in Yandex and Gigablast
 https://www.qwant.com/ based primarily in Bing

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10399 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should be visually distinguished from Firefox to prevent user error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10399: Tor Browser should be visually distinguished from Firefox to prevent 
user
error
--+--
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by i139):

 this will be useful on orfox, I had some problems about if some time ago

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[tor-bugs] #22282 [- Select a component]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+-
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 using the shortcut keys of new identity multiple times, TBB crash and also
 pocket icon appear when reopen

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22252 [Core Tor]: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22252: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT
---+---
 Reporter:  stze   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22105 [Core Tor/Tor]: define a more generic LIBFUZZER = ... in Makefile.in

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22105: define a more generic LIBFUZZER = ... in Makefile.in
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 To note: this class of bugs affects us not only when first starting Tor,
 but also when we're moving from one configuration to another: instead of
 causing crashes in that case, bugs like this cause us to look at facets
 configuration when we should be validating the new configuration, and
 therefore to report inaccurate information.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22252 [Core Tor]: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22252: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT
---+---
 Reporter:  stze   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22252 [Core Tor]: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22252: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT
---+---
 Reporter:  stze   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:   => 029-backport 030-backport


Comment:

 Fix in branch `bug22252_029` of my public repo should apply to 0.2.9 or
 later.  I've opened another ticket (#22281) to fix this pattern of bug in
 0.3.2.

 An additional observation here -- maybe nobody sets
 LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0?  If they did, we would have had a report of
 this a long time ago.

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[tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #22252 and elsewhere, we hit a problem with calling a function that
 called get_options() -- both directly and via
 networkstatus_get_latest_consensus() -- before the options were fully
 assigned.

 We ought to do something to eliminate this pattern of bugs.

 One possibility might be to 'fill in' the new options before they're
 completely validated.  But we'd want to be able to roll back to the old
 options as needed if the new options _didn't_ validate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21519 [User Experience/Website]: Tor Project FAQ

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21519: Tor Project FAQ
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10399 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should be visually distinguished from Firefox to prevent user error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10399: Tor Browser should be visually distinguished from Firefox to prevent 
user
error
--+--
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: nim01 (added)


Comment:

 #22250 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21593 [User Experience/Website]: drop tor2web from the website lists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21593: drop tor2web from the website lists
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21593 [User Experience/Website]: drop tor2web from the website lists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21593: drop tor2web from the website lists
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by linda):

 I've noted this for designing the new website.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22252 [Core Tor]: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22252: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT
--+
 Reporter:  stze  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 4d9d2553baa6856b1d85ec26baa1ac3d2c24832a would appear to be the offender.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22250 [Applications/Tor Browser]: create one Tor Theme for Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22250: create one Tor Theme for Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  nim01 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That's a duplicate of #10399.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10399 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should be visually distinguished from Firefox to prevent user error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10399: Tor Browser should be visually distinguished from Firefox to prevent 
user
error
--+--
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22252 [Core Tor]: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22252: get_options_mutable: Assertion global_options failed; SIGABRT
--+
 Reporter:  stze  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 git-bisect results: This bug was introduced in 0.2.9.3-alpha, with one of
 these:
 {{{
 There are only 'skip'ped commits left to test.
 The first bad commit could be any of:
 c43211fd6cbb82a8016fcc0f81b309c6172e93d2
 07d32d2e68daa6ef1ba03d8121998f619c409ff5
 4d9d2553baa6856b1d85ec26baa1ac3d2c24832a
 3e4a401ead701750218146edde939ef74ce8a5d0
 831cf6d1d8a01e0538a4f1eeadc99455237325fb
 0285f4f34d72b2b77f36fd55fa46216f6b54efc4
 e5ad00330c7e4f63898a15ab6a4d833b732601a2
 41f96078c23e3ef1c39a853841332cac3e133a94
 75ebbed5576d402ef2929ee043ab2170bff5cc2b
 65b2d34c9cb3434c26be71de6f72524824a7
 b560f852f220f5630f6bf5a300d15b40c9c235cf
 a4f46ff8ba43b1e635bc5a8543b9354e6de02e14
 We cannot bisect more!
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22266 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix the jump-to-80% issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22266: fix the jump-to-80% issue
---+
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #14389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14389: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16576 [User Experience/Website]: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16576: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17400 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide how to use the multi-lingual Tor Browser in the alpha/release series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17400: Decide how to use the multi-lingual Tor Browser in the alpha/release 
series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-stoppoint-wizard,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201608   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: lnl (removed)
 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20843 [User Experience]: Tor Browser: How do we help users to use higher security?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20843: Tor Browser: How do we help users to use higher security?
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20842 [User Experience]: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20842: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 I'm sorry, after I looked at the patch while more awake I realized that
 the NULs were to overwrite the `=` padding.  `base64_encode_nopad()` seems
 like it would be a better option, though.  I think it's kind of inelegant
 at the moment and requires that the destination buffer be large enough to
 hold the padded (and NUL-terminated) encoding, but using it here would
 eliminate some code duplication.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22266 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix the jump-to-80% issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22266: fix the jump-to-80% issue
---+
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 dcf]:
 > I was one of the people who helped with the study. As I understand it,
 the problem has more to do with Tor Launcher than with tor. I don't think
 the problem has to do with cached directory information. Rather, it is
 that Tor Launcher resets the state of the progress bar to 0% every time
 the progress screen is displayed, even though the tor process's (hidden)
 percentage is greater than 0%.

 Indeed, this is what Tor Launcher does. When we wrote the code, we assumed
 that progress would occur reasonably quickly when things were going to
 work (which means that tor would send another bootstrap status message to
 Tor Launcher soon, so starting at zero would not matter much). If instead
 there is a long wait before the next bootstrap status message, things will
 not look good to the user.

 > Imagine you start bootstrapping and watch the progress bar get to 60%,
 then you get impatient and hit Cancel. (tor is in fact still bootstrapping
 in the background even though the GUI doesn't reflect that.)

 We tried to address that in #11879 by changing Tor Launcher to do `SETCONF
 DisableNetwork=1` when the user cancels. But note related tickets #15713
 and #15715.


 > You fiddle with the configuration and try to bootstrap again. At this
 point, the progress bar misleadingly shows 0%, even though the tor process
 is still at 60%. Now, as soon as tor makes a little more progress (say to
 65%), the progress bar will immediately update itself to the new value,
 giving the effect of a jump from 0% to 65% when it should have been from
 60% to 65%. What users found misleading was the progress bar going back to
 0% after they changed the configuration; even though in reality the
 percentage hadn't changed or had even increased, they assumed that their
 configuration changes had caused bootstrapping to make negative progress.

 Based on your description, it seems like this behavior violates most
 people's "mental model" of what is happening underneath the covers. I
 think it would be okay to reset the progress to zero if progress was then
 made at a rate similar to when the previous configuration settings were
 used (to the user, this is an "everything starts from scratch" model). Or
 picking up where things left off, e.g., at 60%, would also be okay with
 most users, although if there is a lengthy stall there they may still give
 up. Finer-grained progress reporting would help.

 > I thought that the solution would be to have Tor Launcher either cache
 its last seen progress percentage, so it can reinitialize the progress bar
 properly, or else have some background listener that tracks the percentage
 status even when the progress bar is not actually on screen.

 Here is a question for the Network Team: would it be safe for Tor Launcher
 to cache the progress value? Will things ever move backward? I don't think
 adding caching to Tor Launcher would be difficult at all, and Tor Launcher
 is monitoring the bootstrap status events even when its progress window is
 not open so in theory it could always know the current progress value.

 > > When bootstrapping with existing directory information, we should
 rescale the progress numbers so they advance on something resembling a
 linear time scale, which is probably closer to what users expect to see.
 >
 > Does that mean that if bootstrapping got to 60%, was cancelled, and then
 restarted, that the progress bar would visually reset back to 0%, but that
 the remaining 40% would be stretched to fit a 0–100 scale? E.g. 60%→0%,
 70%→25%, 80%→50%, 90%→75%, 100%→100%?

 I have to say that I don't much like they idea of "rescaling" the
 progress. I think it would be better to promote a model to the user that
 lets them know that half way across means the same thing every time, in
 every copy of Tor Browser, whether it is their own browser or that of a
 friend they are trying to help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22217 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Parse new padding-counts lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22217: Parse new padding-counts lines
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Great, thanks!  Cherry-picked/squashed, and pushed to master.  Closing!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21847 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update copy for security slider to be consistent with the mobile experience

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21847: Update copy for security slider to be consistent with the mobile 
experience
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-security-slider  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability => tbb-usability, tbb-security-slider


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22280, #22279

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22280, #22279 by iwakeh:
milestone to metrics-lib 1.8.0

Comment:
Good candidate for 1.8.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22217 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Parse new padding-counts lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22217: Parse new padding-counts lines
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Added tickets #22279 and #22280.

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[tor-bugs] #22280 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: check tests and parsing for duplicate keys and empty keys exceptions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22280: check tests and parsing for duplicate keys and empty keys exceptions
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 This was discovered in #22217 in ExtraInfoDescriptorTest's padding-count
 tests (comments 6,7).
 Check other tests in ExtraInfoDescriptorTest and other test classes for
 similar issues and fix these

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[tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  metrics-help
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods and tests in
 ExtraInfoDescriptorTest accordingly. Cf. #22217 comments 6 an 7.  This
 includes a minor code clean-up and raising exceptions when duplicate keys
 are encountered.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22275 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec.txt to reflect prop278.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22275: Update dir-spec.txt to reflect prop278.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21554| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22217 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Parse new padding-counts lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22217: Parse new padding-counts lines
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 iwakeh]:
 > > Please find four commits in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh
 /metrics-lib.git/?h=task-22217 my repo branch].
 >
 > Looks good.  Merged into mine together with a few whitespaces fixes and
 after prefixing instance method calls and references to instance variables
 with `this.` to be consistent with the other code.

 Thanks!

 >
 > > Open topics I noticed in other parts of the code:
 > > The empty key issue seems to also apply to comma separated key-value
 pairs and maybe others.  Similarly repeated keys.  New ticket?
 >
 > I included a fix and tests for empty keys.  I briefly pondered adding
 checks and tests for duplicate keys, but I'd rather want to postpone that
 discussion in order not to de-stabilize master this close to the release.
 Maybe we can combine that with a minor code cleanup where we're
 duplicating less of that parsing code.  Want to create that new ticket?
 >
 > > It would be good to add the check for the correct exception string
 also to other test methods in ExtraInfoDescriptorTest.  Another ticket?
 >
 > Yes, new ticket sounds good.  Mind creating one?

 I'll create the new tickets, sure.

 >
 > If you like [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22217 these changes], I'll merge that branch into
 master and start preparing the release.  Thanks!

 Looks fine; checks and tests pass. => merge ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22278 [Core Tor/Tor]: Is anything undocumented from proposals 158, 162?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22278: Is anything undocumented from proposals 158, 162?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21554| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #22278 [Core Tor/Tor]: Is anything undocumented from proposals 158, 162?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22278: Is anything undocumented from proposals 158, 162?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21554
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 These proposals are marked "FINISHED", meaning that they are implemented
 but not completely merged into the specs:
 {{{
158  Clients download consensus + microdescriptors [in 0.2.3.1-alpha]
162  Publish the consensus in multiple flavors [in 0.2.3.1-alpha]
 }}}

 What, if anything, did we not merge there?  I think that most of this
 stuff actually is documented.

 We should merge whatever got implemented that still remains, and close
 these proposals.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inventory proposals that need merging into specs ; merge them.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21554: Inventory proposals that need merging into specs ; merge them.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201703  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've made child tickets for all the "finished" proposals that were
 implemented in 0.2.9 or later, on the theory that those are the most
 urgent and the least forgotten. Let's work through this backlog.

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[tor-bugs] #22277 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure RSOS is documented in specifications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22277: Make sure RSOS is documented in specifications
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21554
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We merged the rend-spec implementation, but we haven't marked the proposal
 closed. What does it add that isn't documented in rend-spec / dir-spec
 now? We should make sure to document that, to keep our specs up to date,
 and mark proposal 260 as closed.

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[tor-bugs] #22276 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge prop220/prop244 to tor-spec/dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22276: Merge prop220/prop244 to tor-spec/dir-spec
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21554
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 These were finished in 0.3.0.x, but have still not gotten into tor-spec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22276 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge prop220/prop244 to tor-spec/dir-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22276: Merge prop220/prop244 to tor-spec/dir-spec
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21554| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22233 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reconsider behavior on .z URLs with Accept-Encoding header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22233: Reconsider behavior on .z URLs  with Accept-Encoding header
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:   => ahf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22275 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec.txt to reflect prop278.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22275: Update dir-spec.txt to reflect prop278.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21554| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:   => #21554


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[tor-bugs] #22275 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec.txt to reflect prop278.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22275: Update dir-spec.txt to reflect prop278.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4  |
--+
 Before we can call prop278 closed, we need to merge the relevant portions
 into dir-spec.txt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  implemented
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mvdan):

 Great to hear! Thanks for finally getting it merged :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inventory proposals that need merging into specs ; merge them.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21554: Inventory proposals that need merging into specs ; merge them.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201703  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:10 arma]:
 > How are we doing on these (for 0.3.0)?

 I'll take another look over the list.  I think we're going to have to
 start tracking people down and begging them to merge these and/or update
 the statuses.

 > Are we about to have another pile of them waiting for us with 0.3.1?

 I hope not; I think I've been more careful than we've been in the past
 about "make sure there is a spec patch."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inventory proposals that need merging into specs ; merge them.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21554: Inventory proposals that need merging into specs ; merge them.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201703  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22264 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove old cached_dir_t code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22264: Remove old cached_dir_t code
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Actually, we can't do this yet, so long as we still use cached_dir_t to
 store and serve votes.  Maybe later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22217 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Parse new padding-counts lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22217: Parse new padding-counts lines
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 iwakeh]:
 > Please find four commits in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh
 /metrics-lib.git/?h=task-22217 my repo branch].

 Looks good.  Merged into mine together with a few whitespaces fixes and
 after prefixing instance method calls and references to instance variables
 with `this.` to be consistent with the other code.

 > Open topics I noticed in other parts of the code:
 > The empty key issue seems to also apply to comma separated key-value
 pairs and maybe others.  Similarly repeated keys.  New ticket?

 I included a fix and tests for empty keys.  I briefly pondered adding
 checks and tests for duplicate keys, but I'd rather want to postpone that
 discussion in order not to de-stabilize master this close to the release.
 Maybe we can combine that with a minor code cleanup where we're
 duplicating less of that parsing code.  Want to create that new ticket?

 > It would be good to add the check for the correct exception string also
 to other test methods in ExtraInfoDescriptorTest.  Another ticket?

 Yes, new ticket sounds good.  Mind creating one?

 If you like [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22217 these changes], I'll merge that branch into
 master and start preparing the release.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  implemented
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It's all merged and seems to be working! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22172 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: What to do when a diff fails to apply?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22172: prop140: What to do when a diff fails to apply?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #13339 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21564 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.1 or 0.3.2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21564: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.1 or 0.3.2
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.12
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 030-backport,  |  implemented
  029-backport, 028-backport |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.8 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22268 [Core Tor/Tor]: TROVE-2017-003: Impersonation of a single fallback directory mirror

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22268: TROVE-2017-003: Impersonation of a single fallback directory mirror
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21564| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 The impact here is that whoever currently controls the IP and keys will
 enumerate the IP addresses of about 0.7% of the users connecting to the
 network for the first time.  They won't get to see any user traffic or
 user activity.  I think this should be classified as "low severity",
 though I think our security policy may need clarification on the point.

 Teor, I believe that this IP got removed as a fallback as I merged your
 fallbacks-201705-028 branch.  Please let me know if that's not the case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20913 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Increase fallback stability, flag percentage, and bandwidth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20913: Increase fallback stability, flag percentage, and bandwidth
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21564   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 merged in 0.3.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21121 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21121: Update fallback whitelist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21564 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 merged in 0.3.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22270 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix the usage message in the fallback directory script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22270: Fix the usage message in the fallback directory script
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20546 [Metrics/CollecTor]: implement CleanUtils

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20546: implement CleanUtils
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  Samdney
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-help   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20518 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by Samdney):

 * owner:  iwakeh => Samdney
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22269 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22269: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap
--+--
 Reporter:  leakedwiki|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:5 yawning]:
 > After thinking about this for a bit, I probably should also include code
 that hooks libxcb's extension query calls, assuming they're getting
 called.

 They are, but it doesn't appear to be the culprit here, the only XCB
 extension queries I see are something checking if the `BIG-REQUESTS`
 extension is supported.  Oh well, I don't have a Ubuntu VM anymore, so
 there isn't an easy way to check if the behavior is any different.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16404 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review WebGL2 spec for fingerprinting issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16404: Review WebGL2 spec for fingerprinting issues
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, GeorgKoppen201705,   |
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  None
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tbb-team => gk


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20685 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure the first party isolation patches in ESR52 behave as they should

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20685: Make sure the first party isolation patches in ESR52 behave as they 
should
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705, tbb-7.0-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tbb-team => gk


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #20685, #21431, #22267

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #20685, #21431, #22267 by gk:
priority to High

Comment:
Raising prio.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22000 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update OSX browser sandbox profile for e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22000: update OSX browser sandbox profile for e10s
-+-
 Reporter:  brade|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  sandboxing, tbb-e10s, TorBrowserTeam201705 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing, tbb-e10s,
 TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must
 => ff52-esr, tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing, tbb-e10s,
 TorBrowserTeam201705


Comment:

 Nothing for 7.0 stable, thus removing the keyword.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, GeorgKoppen201705|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 GeorgKoppen201705, tbb-7.0-must
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 GeorgKoppen201705


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21766, #16010, #16341, #16404, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21766, #16010, #16341, #16404, #18599, #21609, #21746, 
#21756, #21762, #21861, #21886, #21982, #16285, #18530, #20685, #21431, #21432, 
#21689, #21727, #21850, #21851, #21862, #21999, #22000 by gk:
keywords to tbb-7.0-must

Comment:
We are beyond the alpha testing. Moving tickets for `tbb-7.0-must`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22274 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Explain when multiprocess mode in Tor Browser gets disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22274: Explain when multiprocess mode in Tor Browser gets disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-e10s  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: linda, arma (added)


Comment:

 If somebody here can tell us all the scenarios where it gets disabled, we
 can provide recommendations on how best to tell the users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18530: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:19 gk]:
 > Looks good to me. I'll update the `config.yml` accordingly. It seems we
 need (to check) two further things in this bug:
 >
 > 1) A proper text explaining what's going on for OS X users < 10.9.
 Should we link to some Mozilla article? I looked a bit at
 https://support.mozilla.org/t5/Install-and-Update/Firefox-support-has-
 ended-for-Mac-OS-X-10-6-10-7-and-10-8/ta-p/32725 but that might not be
 that helpful in our context.

 Having that in the blog post for Tor Browser 7.0 seems enough to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a plan on how to deploy e10s in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21432: Make a plan on how to deploy e10s in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  e10s, TorBrowserTeam201705 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, the ticket for explaining when e10s is disabled in Tor Browser is
 #22274. Closing this one.

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[tor-bugs] #22274 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Explain when multiprocess mode in Tor Browser gets disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22274: Explain when multiprocess mode in Tor Browser gets disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-e10s
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Multiprocess mode (e10s) in Tor Browser is disabled under various
 conditions which could be surprising to users. While we follow Mozilla
 here it might not be obvious to Tor Browser users what this entails. We
 might want to think about an FAQ entry or some other blurb explaining when
 e10s gets disabled and when not.

 This might not be something for the Tor Browser manual, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, GeorgKoppen201705|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,
 TorBrowserTeam201705, GeorgKoppen201705
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 GeorgKoppen201705


Comment:

 That's important but won't make it into 7.0, alas.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement improved hidden service protocol (prop224)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12424: Implement improved hidden service protocol (prop224)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, term-project-ideas  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by believe77):

 Replying to [ticket:12424 nickm]:
 > This is a parent ticket for implementing proposal 224-rend-spec-ng.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22269 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22269: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap
--+--
 Reporter:  leakedwiki|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 It's a race condition so behavior will be non-deterministic.

 After thinking about this for a bit, I probably should also include code
 that hooks libxcb's extension query calls, assuming they're getting
 called.  Alternatively I could allow MIT-SHM to work, but that to me is
 "punching holes in the sandbox to work around other people's mistakes", so
 I'd rather not.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22273 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: 'Candidate' object has no attribute '_badexit' exception in fallback script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22273: 'Candidate' object has no attribute '_badexit' exception in fallback 
script
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by teor):

 This only happens for me in check_existing mode.

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[tor-bugs] #22273 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: 'Candidate' object has no attribute '_badexit' exception in fallback script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22273: 'Candidate' object has no attribute '_badexit' exception in fallback 
script
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 This probably happens due to the early returns in add_uptime(), we should
 set all the attributes to default values before we return:
 {{{
 WARNING::Exception 'Candidate' object has no attribute '_badexit' when
 checking if fallback is a candidate
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22272 [Metrics/Atlas]: Remove logging to the console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22272: Remove logging to the console
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22269 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22269: TBB Sandbox crashed after finishing bootstrap
--+-
 Reporter:  leakedwiki|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by leakedwiki):

 Replying to [comment:3 arma]:

 > leakedwiki: what version of libcairo comes with your ubuntu 17.04?

 {{{libcairo2 is already the newest version (1.14.8-1).}}}

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[tor-bugs] #22272 [Metrics/Atlas]: Remove logging to the console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22272: Remove logging to the console
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Atlas contains calls to `console.log()` which are FWICT meant for
 debugging purposes. These calls shouldn't be present in production code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21564 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.1 or 0.3.2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21564: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.1 or 0.3.2
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.12
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 030-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.3
  029-backport, 028-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fallback => fallback, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.8.12
 * actualpoints:   => 0.3


Comment:

 I closed #21283, and did a quick rebuild to get 151 fallbacks instead,
 using my branch fallback-inputs (commit 09cd78886).

 I didn't check for new potential fallbacks (I'll do that in #22271), but I
 will need to contact all the new operators.

 I have attached the log from the fallback generation script.

 This is in my branch fallbacks-201705-028.

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[tor-bugs] #22271 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.2 or 0.3.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22271: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.2 or 0.3.3
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 This involves:

 * checking for new relays
 * contacting potential fallback operators
 * rebuilding the list
 * contacting all fallback operators

 See detailed instructions here:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors

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