Re: [tor-bugs] #22291 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22291: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first 
use
--+-
 Reporter:  6h72Q484AddGha8H  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 This is also basically fixed by https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser
 /sandboxed-tor-
 browser.git/commit/?id=fc3475761427977cd63dfaa0351809174b147eb5

 I was told that the `update_2` stuff will be valid for a while, but
 apparently not.

 I could also just force an update check on first launch after an install
 or something.  Maybe I'll do that anyway because it's easy to do

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22291 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22291: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first 
use
--+-
 Reporter:  6h72Q484AddGha8H  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 One thing that would be a permanent fix would be to write a MAR unpacker
 and use the non-incremental MARs instead of the tarball + signature, since
 the XML resources and MARs will always be up to date.

 Patches accepted, I'm not going to do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22291 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22291: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first 
use
--+-
 Reporter:  6h72Q484AddGha8H  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 I'm not sure what you expect me to do about this since I have nothing to
 do with uploading the metadata.

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[tor-bugs] #22291 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22291: Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first 
use
--+-
 Reporter:  6h72Q484AddGha8H  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Tor Browser Sandbox 0.6 downloads an old version of Tor alpha on first use

 Utilizing sandbox release 0.6, the first startup asks which channel to
 utilize. If selecting alpha, Tor Browser 7.0a3 is downloaded instead of
 the latest 7.0a4. This appears to be because the JSON published URLs are
 not kept up to date. This has been a bug in past too with respect to
 outdated or wrong JSON listings. This should probably be fixed so that
 users are not put in jeopardy of downloading a vulnerable version in the
 future.

 install: Metadata URL:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/alpha/downloads.json

 As you can see, the metadata URL is not updated and therefor the older
 version is downloaded, putting the Tor user potentially at risk due to
 running and outdated or insecure older release.

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[tor-bugs] #22290 [Metrics/Atlas]: Atlas Bandwidth and Uptime columns sort by text not value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22290: Atlas Bandwidth and Uptime columns sort by text not value
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 When I sort the Atlas relay table, it seems to sort some columns by their
 textual values, not the underlying numeric values.

 This is a particular issue with the bandwidth and uptime columns, because
 1d sorts next to 1h, and 1MB sorts next to 1kB. It also seems to affect
 the IP column.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:19 s7r]:
 > Thinking some more about this, maybe we can forget about descriptor
 priority downloads because on the longer term we won't need it and it will
 just complicate stuff for us. If I recall correctly (please confirm) atm
 we are trying to make '''all relays directory servers using BEGIN_DIR on
 ORPort''' which means Guard == DirGuard, so clients can first of all,
 download the guard descriptor directly from the guard itself and all this
 whole dance is avoided.

 Operators can explicitly disable DirCache, and can also disable it by
 setting various other options (like AccountingMax), or by having low RAM
 or bandwidth. Also, DirCache was only introduced in 0.2.8, and we support
 relays back to 0.2.4.

 So while it is true that most guards are DirCaches, not all guards will
 be, even in the future.

 Also, this might enable an attack/issue where a guard posts one descriptor
 to the directory authorities, and another to its clients. (This is avoided
 by using microdescriptors, because their hashes are in the consensus.)

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[tor-bugs] #22289 [- Select a component]: Kelebihan yang Akan Didapat Ketika Mencuci Pakaian dengan Deterjen Cair

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22289: Kelebihan yang Akan Didapat Ketika Mencuci Pakaian dengan Deterjen Cair
--+---
 Reporter:  aanbae|  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  deterjen cair terbaik
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Satu hal yang akan sering dilakukan oleh ibu rumah tangga yang ada di
 rumah adalah kegiatan mencuci pakaian. Kegiatan tersebut dapat dilakukan
 dengan dua cara yaitu secara manual dan juga dengan cara modern
 menggunakan mesin. Dengan cara manual adalah ibu-ibu dapat untuk mencuci
 pakaian dengan tangan sehingga akan menghasilkan hasil yang biasanya lebih
 bersih. Sedangkan cara selanjutnya adalah dengan mesin cuci yang juga
 mempunyai keunggulan dan kelemahannya sendiri.

 Ada hal yang wajib disiapkan ketika mencuci pakaian baik menggunakan
 tangan maupun mesin cuci. Hal tersebut adalah Deterjen yang dapat untuk
 membersihkan noda di pakaian dan juga banyak yang sekarang ini juga
 menyediakan jenis yang bisa digunakan untuk pengharum sekaligus. Adapun
 jenis deterjen yang ada di pasaran dan dapat dipilih oleh konsumen adalah
 sebagai berikut:

 - Deterjen colek adalah sabun yang biasanya digunakan untuk mencuci
 pakaian sekaligus juga dapat dipakai untuk mencuci piring. Jenis ini
 merupakan jenis yang paling awal digunakan dan mempunyai harga yang sangat
 terjangkau. Akan tetapi sekarang ini jenis deterjen colek sendiri sudah
 banyak ditinggalkan oleh orang-orang yang beralih pada deterjen jenis
 lainnya.

 - Deterjen bubuk merupakan jenis yang paling sering digunakan oleh banyak
 orang. Deterjen ini terdiri dari butiran-butiran yang dapat dipegang dan
 tersedia banyak kemasan dari yang kecil hingga yang besar.

 - Deterjen cair merupakan jenis terbaru dan banyak disukai oleh
 masyarakat. Seperti namanya, jenis ini merupakan Deterjen dalam bentuk
 yang cair dan dapat digunakan untuk mencuci pakaian secara konvensional
 maupun dengan menggunakan mesin cuci.

 Deterjen cair adalah jenis Deterjen yang saat ini banyak digunakan oleh
 masyarakat. Ada banyak keunggulan yang ditawarkan oleh jenis Deterjen cair
 ini, antara lain:

 - Menggunakan [http://www.solusiibuattack.com/product Deterjen cair] akan
 lebih hemat. Hal ini sudah banyak dirasakan oleh ibu rumah tangga maupun
 anak kost yang mencuci pakaian sendiri. Jenis Deterjen cair ini mempunyai
 busa yang lebih banyak sehingga tidak perlu untuk menuang Deterjen ke
 pakaian dalam jumlah yang banyak.
 - Menggunakan Deterjen cair tidak memerlukan pewangi karena sudah ekstra
 pewangi di dalamnya.
 - Dapat mencuci lebih cepat karena noda mudah hilang.
 - Cocok digunakan dengan cara mengucek dan juga dapat digunakan di mesin
 cuci.
 - Tidak menimbulkan iritasi untuk kulit tangan yang sensitif ketika harus
 mencuci manual dengan tangan.

 Karena banyak keunggulan tersebut, sekarang ini banyak sekali jenis
 Deterjen cair yang bisa dibeli oleh masyarakat. Salah satu merek yang
 menawarkan varian Deterjen cair tersebut Attack yang menawarkan Deterjen
 cair konsentrat jenis Plus Softener dan Clean Maximizer. Jenis Deterjent
 dari merek Attack ini sangat cocok digunakan untuk mencuci pakaian karena
 lebih bersih dalam menghilangkan noda dan juga wangi yang lebih tahan
 lama.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21894 [Core Tor/Tor]: Base32_encode: *actually* allow inputs of odd sizes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21894: Base32_encode: *actually* allow inputs of odd sizes
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  030-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  029-backport 030-backport => 030-backport
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 If nothing in-tree actually calls base32_encode with an odd size, it
 probably doesn't need backporting to 0.2.9.  Feel free to reopen if you
 disagree.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22088 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: pluggable transport specs need to be more consistent about quoting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22088: pluggable transport specs need to be more consistent about quoting
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, pt |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: isis (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 I'm back after some time away from this; I can confirm the situation never
 heals - From May 6th when one daemon started showing the issue, to May
 17th when it is still complaining that `I learned some more directory
 information, but not enough to build a circuit: We're missing descriptors
 for some of our primary entry guards`

 Can I be of assistance with testing ideas?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22194 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate selfrando into tor-browser-build.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22194: Integrate selfrando into tor-browser-build.git
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is done with commit 16d87451179ed55fd6422cd09988a99f5ee886b7.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Thank you for your input. We have a pretty similar situation here, with
 the big difference being that we're using a separate repository. I
 actually looked at firefox when thinking about how we might do it. Our
 solution for the annoyance you describe is to have a configure switch that
 can toggle the --frozen switch and source replacement on and off (that's
 the biggest chunk of the complexity) to aid local dev while allowing
 internet access.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R, tbb-7.0-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash, TorBrowserTeam201705R,
 tbb-7.0-must
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Determining when to call Suspend() was a little more difficult than we
 expected, but here is the new patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug21766-02=ead6d27079482708ddd3a1c748effe408a817a97

 Kathy and I tested it on Linux64 only. Based on previous experience, I
 expect it to work fine on OSX (we are out of time for today to test it
 there, unfortunately). Windows is the big unknown, but I am optimistic!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22249 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22249: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Cool!  Merged. :)  Thanks!  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8770 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Verify that @font-face fallback fonts can't be probed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8770: Verify that @font-face fallback fonts can't be probed
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-firefox-patch => tbb-fingerprinting-
 fonts
 * severity:   => Normal
 * parent:   => #18097


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16312 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Limit font queries per URL bar domain (was: Limit font queries by URL bar domain)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16312: Limit font queries per URL bar domain
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


Comment:

 Is this a way to go?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:32 mcs]:
 > Update: The fix works for Kathy and me on Linux as well, unless the file
 being downloaded is so small that the network traffic is finished before
 we try to call `Suspend()` (Kathy and I happen to have a tiny 344 byte zip
 file that we were testing with among other larger files). We are now
 trying to modify the patch so that it only suspends if necessary.
 >
 > Any takers for testing on Windows, or should we simply wait for a
 nightly build? Kathy and I don't have a good standlone (non-gitian)
 Windows build setup, or at least we have not tried to build an ESR52-based
 browser there. But we should be able to do a gitian-based build if
 necessary.

 I can run a test on Windows today -- let me know when you have the
 modified patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:31 mcs]:

 > > I cherry-picked this patch onto `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1-build1`
 (`454a231f2b76a8857748d93f666bb93199f4b963`), built tor-browser.git, and
 added NoScript and torbutton. The patch worked for me (with e10s active)
 -- I saw the confirmation prompt and was able to cancel or download files
 on Linux. I used gdb to check the return values of Suspend() and Resume()
 and they both returned NS_OK.
 >
 > Interesting. Did you test with an optimized build or a debug build?

 This was a debug build. I can try an optimized build, but it sounds like
 you have maybe tracked down the issue in comment:32.

 > I am creating a debug build now with the patch applied to the tip of
 tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1 (7bbd69956bd1a30051599a1dd4bf615bc40e55e8, aka
 tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1-build2). I want to be sure to test with the
 #22254 fix in place. But you must have fixed that manually?

 Actually, I didn't. I don't know offhand why I didn't run into that
 problem. But I was able to manually install torbutton and NoScript. I
 didn't do a full rbm build though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5423 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No Characters Showing Up On 'Check Page'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5423: No Characters Showing Up On 'Check Page'
--+--
 Reporter:  DasFox|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  erinn => tbb-team
 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * parent:   => #18097


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22090 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename channel client functions for clarity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22090: Rename channel client functions for clarity
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  toby
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by toby):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:   => toby


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Re: [tor-bugs] #5666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hook MediaElement for Full Screen Mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5666: Hook MediaElement for Full Screen Mode
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-bounty, tbb-torbutton => tbb-
 fingerprinting-resolution
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTML5 fullscreen API makes TB fingerprintable, disable it!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12609: HTML5 fullscreen API makes TB fingerprintable, disable it!
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  linkability|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution => tbb-fingerprinting-
 resolution, tbb-linkability
 * component:  TorBrowserButton => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Trackers now send back every change of resolution, so that in conjunction
 with timers it can be used to defeat FPI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by s7r):

 OK asn cooking with your branch `bug21969_debug`. I have attached the
 initial bootstrap log, as you can see at 62% bootstrapped it has the
 descriptors for primary guard 1 and 3 but not for 2. Also, the descriptor
 for the first primary guard wasn't downloaded in the first ~40% of
 bootstrap - no priority logic.

 Let's give it some time and I will let you know what it says when there's
 that cutoff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18234 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Font fingerprinting defenses broken on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18234: Font fingerprinting defenses broken on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Looks like a duplicate of #16672.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by s7r):

 Thinking some more about this, maybe we can forget about descriptor
 priority downloads because on the longer term we won't need it and it will
 just complicate stuff for us. If I recall correctly (please confirm) atm
 we are trying to make '''all relays directory servers using BEGIN_DIR on
 ORPort''' which means Guard == DirGuard, so clients can first of all,
 download the guard descriptor directly from the guard itself and all this
 whole dance is avoided.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready


Comment:

 Oops, missed that you already had a branch with only the macro fixes in
 it.  Also I'm very amused at the bugs canceling each other out.

 Looks good to me; setting to merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22249 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22249: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:1 karsten]:
 > Please find a start in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-22249
 my branch task-22249], which however doesn't make all deprecation warnings
 disappear.

 The branch looks fine and passes tests and checks.

 > In this context we might also want to fix the deprecation warnings
 related to `TimeFactory#getTime()`.

 While reviewing I came up with ideas for solving the above.
 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/onionoo.git/commit/?h=get-rid-
 of-TimeFactory=db7377faa0b5398fe88e6dd83fec61956b992ce5 this branch],
 which also makes it a little more obvious where ime is tweaked for
 testing.  Now all compile warnings are gone.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default bowser window is unusably small on Hi-DPI screens

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18045: Default bowser window is unusably small on Hi-DPI screens
--+---
 Reporter:  zorlaguzellikolmaz|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-usability => tbb-usability
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 This is the default fingerprinting defense. There is nothing to fix from
 the browser's side.

 Workarounds are:
 1. reduce screen resolution (quick, but "converts" Hi-DPI into standard
 DPI)
 2. use "magnifying glass"
 3. use "helper" that doubles or triples the app's size on the screen (but
 doesn't change detectable resolution as your workarounds)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22070 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check whether we need to update our font whitelist for ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22070: Check whether we need to update our font whitelist for ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting-fonts   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 panopticlick detects Helvetica, Wingdings 2, Wingdings 3, which are not in
 the whitelist.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5293 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Neuter fingerprinting with Battery API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5293: Neuter fingerprinting with Battery API
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff52-esr-will-   |  Actual Points:
  have   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting, ff52-esr-will-have
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Also
 {{{
 pref("dom.battery.enabled", false); // fingerprinting due to differing OS
 implementations
 }}}
 is no longer needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash, tbb-e10s


Comment:

 OP set to "Never ask me again" and fires hotkeys again and again :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19645 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB zooms text when resizing browser window

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19645: TBB zooms text when resizing browser window
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff52-esr-will-   |  Actual Points:
  have   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting, ff52-esr-will-have
 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18376 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Accessibility APIs in Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18376: Accessibility APIs in Firefox
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22137: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18283 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting-resolution
 * parent:   => #18283


Comment:

 17px look good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Update: The fix works for Kathy and me on Linux as well, unless the file
 being downloaded is so small that the network traffic is finished before
 we try to call `Suspend()` (Kathy and I happen to have a tiny 344 byte zip
 file that we were testing with among other larger files). We are now
 trying to modify the patch so that it only suspends if necessary.

 Any takers for testing on Windows, or should we simply wait for a nightly
 build? Kathy and I don't have a good standlone (non-gitian) Windows build
 setup, or at least we have not tried to build an ESR52-based browser
 there. But we should be able to do a gitian-based build if necessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22288 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Use newly recognized OnionPerf keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22288: Use newly recognized OnionPerf keys
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/log/?h=task-22288 my branch task-22288].

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[tor-bugs] #22288 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Use newly recognized OnionPerf keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22288: Use newly recognized OnionPerf keys
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 In metrics-lib 1.7.0 we added support for six new Torperf keys added by
 OnionPerf (#22122).  Let's switch from the workaround that went through
 `getUnrecognizedKeys()` and use the new methods instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22248 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22248: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Great, thanks for the review!  Merged, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22248 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22248: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 No deprecation warnings and clean compile.
 Looking fine and ready for merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22283 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not exist."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22283: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not
exist."
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > To try to avoid removing torrc lines that the user may have added
 themselves, the code should check that the path in the ControlPort and
 SocksPort lines matches what Tor Launcher would use if it were configured
 to use Unix domain sockets by default.

 Because of the way the code is organized inside Tor Launcher, checking the
 path will be messier than Kathy and I would like. We can do it if
 necessary, but would it be acceptable to remove '''all''' of the Unix
 domain socket ControlPort and SocksPort lines if Tor Launcher is now using
 TCP for those things? The risk is that we would remove extra Unix domain
 socket ControlPort and SocksPort lines that were added by a user. But I
 suspect very few people have done that, and we could ensure that the extra
 cleanup we do would only affect alpha users.

 Another question: will 7.0a5 use Unix domain sockets by default or TCP? If
 the answer is Unix domain sockets, then we have another transition back
 from TCP to Unix domain sockets to worry about. I think we will be okay
 with the existing code in that case, except we will want to ensure that
 the "one time" (ha) torrc cleanup code runs a second time on the alpha
 channel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22247 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22247: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks for looking!  Merged, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22247 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22247: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 All deprecation warnings are gone, checks and tests pass.
 Ready for merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by tedmielczarek):

 Just for reference, in Firefox we decided to vendor our dependencies into
 our main repository using the `cargo vendor` command[1]. They're in
 `third_party/rust` in mozilla-central[2]. We added a `mach vendor rust`
 command to our mach build interface to run vendoring with the right
 parameters[3]. We do a number of checks there, including checking license
 compatibility of vendored crates and checking that we're not accidentally
 committing huge files contained in vendored crates. Our build system
 writes out a `.cargo/config` file[4] in the object directory after running
 configure that uses cargo source replacement[5] to point cargo at the
 directory containing vendored crates instead of crates.io. We then build
 our Rust code by passing `--frozen` to cargo[6], which ensures that cargo
 doesn't fetch anything from the network.

 One annoyance here is that this makes local development that adds new
 dependencies from crates.io a little more frustrating, as developers have
 to vendor new deps before building. We could omit `--frozen` in builds
 done outside of automation, but that would mean that developers would wind
 up with cargo fetching crates from crates.io when the crates they need are
 sitting right there in the repository, and that seems silly. I opened a
 cargo issue[7] a while ago to ask for some way to better support this
 workflow but I haven't pushed on getting it fixed.

 1. https://github.com/alexcrichton/cargo-vendor/
 2. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/third_party/rust
 3. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 
central/rev/41958333867b0f537271dbd4cb4ba9e8a67a85a8/python/mozbuild/mozbuild/vendor_rust.py#276
 4. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/.cargo/config.in
 5. https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/blob/master/src/doc/source-
 replacement.md
 6. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/41958333867b0f537271dbd4cb4ba9e8a67a85a8/config/rules.mk#911
 7. https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/issues/3066

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by s7r):

 OK switching on that branch as of now on some machines and will get back
 with comments.

 This will help us understand the problem from comment:13 where the cutoff
 time is > ~1 hour (one consensus period). What do you think we should do
 in regards to the problem described in comment:1 where it complains only
 for few seconds (much much less than an entire consensus period)? I think
 it might be because:
 - we have many relays in the consensus (over 7000), the number is growing
 and it takes more and more time for clients to download and process
 descriptors, therefor having few seconds of lag here
 - we have no feature to download with priority descriptors we are
 interested in (primary guards, when/if they are available), maybe even try
 simultaneous download from all 3 DirGuards at once and close the rest of
 connections once one finishes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:30 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:22 mcs]:
 > > see ticket:21886#comment:16 for a patch that tries but fails to fix
 this problem.
 >
 > I cherry-picked this patch onto `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1-build1`
 (`454a231f2b76a8857748d93f666bb93199f4b963`), built tor-browser.git, and
 added NoScript and torbutton. The patch worked for me (with e10s active)
 -- I saw the confirmation prompt and was able to cancel or download files
 on Linux. I used gdb to check the return values of Suspend() and Resume()
 and they both returned NS_OK.

 Interesting. Did you test with an optimized build or a debug build?

 I am creating a debug build now with the patch applied to the tip of tor-
 browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1 (7bbd69956bd1a30051599a1dd4bf615bc40e55e8, aka
 tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1-build2). I want to be sure to test with the
 #22254 fix in place. But you must have fixed that manually?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22287 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Switch from custom CollecTor downloader to metrics-lib's DescriptorCollector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22287: Switch from custom CollecTor downloader to metrics-lib's
DescriptorCollector
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-22287
 my branch task-22287].

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[tor-bugs] #22287 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Switch from custom CollecTor downloader to metrics-lib's DescriptorCollector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22287: Switch from custom CollecTor downloader to metrics-lib's
DescriptorCollector
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 I noticed the other day that Onionoo still parses CollecTor's Apache
 directory listings to download descriptors.  We should switch to metrics-
 lib's `DescriptorCollector` which uses CollecTor's `index.json` for this
 purpose by default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22286 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add coverage markers to LZMA and Zstd compression backend

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22286: Add coverage markers to LZMA and Zstd compression backend
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Please review: https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/13

 There's no feature changes in this branch - only LCOV markers, a minor
 whitespace fix, and a test addition.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22249 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22249: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please find a start in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-22249
 my branch task-22249], which however doesn't make all deprecation warnings
 disappear.

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[tor-bugs] #22286 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add coverage markers to LZMA and Zstd compression backend

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22286: Add coverage markers to LZMA and Zstd compression backend
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4  |
--+
 The LZMA and Zstd compression backend lacks coverage markers in some
 paths. For example: where encoder/decoder initialisation fails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22248 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22248: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-22248=b3410f7f74df36042b3c061ddc66202a35f0dad2
 this commit in my task-22248 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by i139):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 >"Doing that 5 times in a row is always crashing"?
 Around this, and also new identity is so slow and odd in this new serie.
 Another anomalie TBB has asked me to confirm close using new identity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22247 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22247: Remove deprecation warnings as soon as metrics-lib 1.7.0 is released
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 db.git/log/?h=task-22247-2 my branch task-22247-2] which is equivalent to
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-db.git/log/?h=task-22247
 task-22247] except that it contains an upgrade to metrics-lib 1.7.0 before
 actually using methods that are first contained in that release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16576 [User Experience/Website]: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16576: Add a 'community projects' list (separate page?) to the website
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by i139):

 And also for similar projects, like I2P and Freenet?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by i139):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > What platform are you on? I tried that on Linux and I did not see any
 crashes. Is this reproducible, like "Doing that 5 times in a row is always
 crashing"?
 Microsft Windows 10 SL 1607 (14393.1198) 64-bits

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by i139):

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > Do you mean 7.0a3 or 7.0a4?
 I has wrote X as one incognito because this occur with both the versions,
 7.0a3 and 7.0a4 and probably previous

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 I added this line to the torrc of both processes:

 {{{
 MaxMemInQueues 3000MB
 }}}
 Since then (about 13 hours ago) all stable. Lets see how it works out

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 I checked this time slot. No OOM kill there. So you are right. The process
 is not always killed.
 However yesterday we hat 4-5 OOM on this machine with two tor processes

 Replying to [comment:11 arma]:
 > I found this part interesting:
 >
 > {{{
 > 31592017-05-13 23:22:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3160  2017-05-13 23:23:01   3786   1852   1934
 0 66518
 > 3161  2017-05-13 23:23:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3162  2017-05-13 23:24:01   3786   2217   1569
 0 66518
 > 3163  2017-05-13 23:24:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3164  2017-05-13 23:25:01   3786   2335   1451
 0 66518
 > 3165  2017-05-13 23:25:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3166  2017-05-13 23:26:01   3786   2527   1259
 0 66496
 > 3167  2017-05-13 23:26:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3168  2017-05-13 23:27:01   3786   2952833
 0 66496
 > 3169  2017-05-13 23:27:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3170  2017-05-13 23:28:01   3786   3020766
 0 66496
 > 3171  2017-05-13 23:28:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3172  2017-05-13 23:29:01   3786   3110675
 0 66496
 > 3173  2017-05-13 23:29:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3174  2017-05-13 23:30:01   3786   3023763
 0 66496
 > 3175  2017-05-13 23:30:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3176  2017-05-13 23:31:01   3786   2694   1091
 0 66496
 > 3177  2017-05-13 23:31:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3178  2017-05-13 23:32:01   3786   2338   1448
 0 66496
 > 3179  2017-05-13 23:32:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3180  2017-05-13 23:33:01   3786   1893   1893
 0 66496
 > 3181  2017-05-13 23:33:01  3931  0   3931
 > 3182  2017-05-13 23:34:01   3786   1614   2171
 0 66496
 > 3183  2017-05-13 23:34:01  3931  0   3931
 > }}}
 >
 > It looks like memory load went up, but not enough to kill it, and then
 went down again on its own.
 >
 > So it looks like it is not always following the pattern of "grow forever
 until it's too big".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:13 s7r]:
 >
 > To take an informed decision, let's log some more information in a
 custom branch:
 > - all primary guards in their order (first, second, etc)
 > - the primary guard(s) for which we are missing descriptors only
 > - the status of all primary guards in the current consensus (running /
 not running)
 > - attempts to fetch the missing descriptors and status of this operation
 (success / failure).
 >

 Please check my branch `bug21969_debug` which adds the logs you asked for
 and will help debug the non-bridge case!

 The branch does all the above items except the last one (log guard desc
 fetches) because that was pretty hard to do properly, and would require
 non-trivial hacking time. I think the current logging branch has enough
 info to help us understand if the theory from comment:15 is what's causing
 trouble in the non-bridge case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 What platform are you on? I tried that on Linux and I did not see any
 crashes. Is this reproducible, like "Doing that 5 times in a row is always
 crashing"?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activate mixed content blocking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21323: Activate mixed content blocking
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705R => TorBrowserTeam201705R,
 GeorgKoppen201705


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