Re: [tor-bugs] #22266 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix the jump-to-80% issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22266: fix the jump-to-80% issue
---+
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 dcf]:
 > > I was one of the people who helped with the study. As I understand it,
 the problem has more to do with Tor Launcher than with tor. I don't think
 the problem has to do with cached directory information. Rather, it is
 that Tor Launcher resets the state of the progress bar to 0% every time
 the progress screen is displayed, even though the tor process's (hidden)
 percentage is greater than 0%.
 >
 > Indeed, this is what Tor Launcher does.

 It seems like rather than resetting to 0%, tor launcher should ask tor
 what its current bootstrap progress is, and then use that for starters.
 That is, the simple bug here is that Tor Launcher puts the progress bar
 back to 0, and then waits for Tor to tell it a new progress number, yet
 Tor will only emit an event when it's made further progress beyond what it
 told you about in the last event.

 So yes, Tor Launcher should either remember the current level of progress,
 or if it wants to be stateless (maybe that's more elegant?), do a getinfo
 to fetch it whenever you're going to reset the progress bar.

 > Based on your description, it seems like this behavior violates most
 people's "mental model" of what is happening underneath the covers. I
 think it would be okay to reset the progress to zero if progress was then
 made at a rate similar to when the previous configuration settings were
 used

 Agreed, but then you need to update it to the amount of progress that Tor
 thinks it has told you it's made. Tor doesn't know that you reset the
 progress bar, so it can't know that it needs to send you another
 (redundant, from its perspective) bootstrap event.

 > Here is a question for the Network Team: would it be safe for Tor
 Launcher to cache the progress value? Will things ever move backward? I
 don't think adding caching to Tor Launcher would be difficult at all, and
 Tor Launcher is monitoring the bootstrap status events even when its
 progress window is not open so in theory it could always know the current
 progress value.

 That's a great question. I will let the network team decide on their
 future answer, but as for what the code does right now, bootstrap_percent
 never moves backwards, and Tor tries to avoid emitting any bootstrap
 progress events unless the new number is bigger than the number from the
 last event.

 (Should Tor Launcher be doing the getinfo anyway, on startup, in case it
 missed a few bootstrap events before it connected to the control port?)

 > I have to say that I don't much like they idea of "rescaling" the
 progress. I think it would be better to promote a model to the user that
 lets them know that half way across means the same thing every time, in
 every copy of Tor Browser, whether it is their own browser or that of a
 friend they are trying to help.

 I agree. (But I am open to being overruled by Linda et al if they can help
 us do better. :)

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[tor-bugs] #22330 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 6.5.2 crash in socket thread on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22330: Tor Browser 6.5.2 crash in socket thread on macOS
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor Browser crashed when I command-clicked a link to
 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bumpversion to open it in a background tab.

 The crash does not seem to be reproducible.

 I am running macOS in a VM.

 I'll attach the log to this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22297 [Metrics/Atlas]: show graphs in "table" format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22297: show graphs in "table" format
---+-
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by Hello71):

 for smaller screens it should degrade like "two column" layout, with the
 lists on top of each other.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:  Normal => Major


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Is there any commonality between versions reporting this issue?  Is it all
 0.3.0? Is it all one operating system?

 Is anybody able to build with some heap profiling tool (such as the one in
 gperftools) to see where all the memory is going?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21509 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fuzz v3 hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21509: Fuzz v3 hidden services
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fuzz, prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> If we want the fuzzer to effectively fuzz v3 hidden services, we need to:
> * fuzz GET requests: #21476
> * fuzz POST requests: #21478
> * add v3 GET and POST requests to the fuzzing corpus
> * disable the encrypted connection check when fuzzing (we should do this
> for v2 services as well)
> * create a v3 descriptor fuzzer
> * add v3 descriptor examples to the fuzzing corpus

New description:

 If we want the fuzzer to effectively fuzz v3 hidden services, we need to:
 * fuzz GET requests: #21476
 * fuzz POST requests: #21478
 * add v3 GET and POST requests to the fuzzing corpus
 * add tokens from v3 GET and POST requests as new fuzzing token lists
 * disable the encrypted connection check when fuzzing (we should do this
 for v2 services as well)
 * create a v3 descriptor fuzzer
 * add v3 descriptor examples to the fuzzing corpus
 * add tokens from v3 descriptors as a new fuzzing token list

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22302 [Core Tor/Chutney]: test-network.sh uses a deprecated arithmetic syntax

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22302: test-network.sh uses a deprecated arithmetic syntax
--+-
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>


Comment:

 The bash thing will continue to haunt me until I switch my default sh.

 This is the only instance of this pattern in chutney.

 {{{
 $ grep -r --exclude-dir .git --exclude-dir net --exclude '*~' '$[[]' .
 ./tools/test-network.sh:  n_rounds=$[n_rounds+1]
 }}}

 I think this is fine to merge, is there any reason it is WIP on gitlab?

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[tor-bugs] #22329 [Metrics/Onionoo]: add support for relays-only / bridges-only onionoo instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22329: add support for relays-only / bridges-only onionoo instances
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 The goal is to allow the instance operator to only enable needed
 functionality for more specific onionoo instances to avoid processing (and
 downloading) data that the operator does not need.
 (or run them separately on dedicated system)

 I would envision two new cli parameters:
 {{{
 --relays-only: ignores bridge related documents (does not download or
 process them)

 --bridges-only: ignores relay related documents (does not download or
 process them)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22229 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Compile Linux 64bits versions of Tor Messenger with Selfrando?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9: Compile Linux 64bits versions of Tor Messenger with Selfrando?
+-
 Reporter:  blockflare  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by blockflare):

 Replying to [comment:1 arlolra]:
 > Sure, but let's say it depends on #22194
 It has been integrated now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 Please see Mailinglist tor-rel...@lists.torproject.org

 Several Exit Operators suffer with this problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
---+--
 Reporter:  i139   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Sometimes, just before the crash of the chrome process, an error alert
 like the following is displayed:
 {{{
 [JavaScript Application]

 Torbutton: Unexpected error on new identity: TypeError:
 this.tabs is undefined
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
---+--
 Reporter:  i139   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 With a debug build that is very similar to Tor Browser 7.0a4, I can
 reproduce this on OSX when e10s is enabled but not when running in single
 process mode. After setting `extensions.torbutton.confirm_newnym` to
 false, I need to quickly press Cmd+Shift+U several times (usually about 5
 will cause a crash). I will attach some log output and a stack trace
 (mWidget is NULL in the last stack frame).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22279 my task-22279 branch] for a first try in this
 direction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I experience the same problem on 3 non-exit relays. It started on
 2017-05-18 (running debian 8, 0.3.0.5-rc at the time)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16285 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16285: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff59-esr, tbb-linkability,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R,
 tbb-7.0-must
 => ff59-esr, tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705
 * owner:  gk => tbb-team
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 Thanks. Applied to `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1` (commit
 100fea0348ed02fd181080fbc2b131994adaab4b,
 e948ae5d404321a1ed0316ffb97baf45ee0163a5, and
 ba7cbd186c5692267ba80eb6a998c7abab2a76a9) and `tor-
 browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2` (commit 62546181d759aaf44216e6f32a79c89e55335c4e,
 46d6d3a534c8f8c56194415c0839a4a90d17049b, and
 726b6d699e101570b14e3eb091ec94e9d5ee1946). Moving this ticket off our
 esr52 radar to the one for esr59.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R, tbb-7.0-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:43 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:42 gk]:
 > > Another thought: Do we care about FTP downloads? It seems your patch
 does not address those but they are affected as well (just tested with
 ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gcc/). Leaving this ticket open for that question
 for now. We can solve this in a fixup commit if needed.
 >
 > I think we should care about FTP, at least a little. So far I cannot
 connect to ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gcc/ over Tor (I consistently get a "425
 Bad IP Connecting" error).  Kathy and I did test the patch last week with
 a large FTP download (ftp://speedtest.tele2.net/50MB.zip).  Aside from
 sometimes getting a "Bad IP" error with that server as well, it worked
 okay.  But I just tried with a small file
 (ftp://speedtest.tele2.net/1KB.zip) and got an assertion failure while
 running a debug build on OSX:
 > {{{
 > Assertion failure: ((bool)(__builtin_expect(!!(!NS_FAILED_impl(rv)),
 1))) || rv == NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE, at
 /.../netwerk/protocol/ftp/FTPChannelParent.cpp:646
 > #01:
 
mozilla::net::FTPChannelParent::SuspendForDiversion()[/Users/.../Desktop/tb.app/Contents/MacOS/XUL
 +0x80503e]
 > ...
 > }}}
 >
 > We will need to debug this. Georg, what behavior do you see?

 I had not tested a build with your patch applied. I just encountered a
 crash while testing a 7.0a4 bundle downloading `binutils` via FTP and
 realized that your code is not touching anything in netwerk/protocol/ftp
 while it does in a bunch of other protocols. So, it's more a
 hunch/question I had. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21746 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have a closer eye on FlyWeb regarding proxy bypass

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21746: Have a closer eye on FlyWeb regarding proxy bypass
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201705|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201705
 * owner:  tbb-team => gk
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean-up system extensions shipped in Firefox 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21431: Clean-up system extensions shipped in Firefox 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * owner:  tbb-team => mcs
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Taking ownership of this ticket.

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[tor-bugs] #22328 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check if we can remove OSX clang PIE wrappers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22328: Check if we can remove OSX clang PIE wrappers
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In the fix for #20439, we added clang wrappers to add the `-fPIE` flag,
 and avoid a build error when the `-fPIE` flag is explicitly set in the
 FLAGS.

 After the switch to esr52, we should check if using those wrappers is
 still needed, or if they can be removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: First party isolation of Page Info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22327: First party isolation of Page Info
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must TorBrowserTeam201705R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-7.0-must TorBrowserTeam201705 => tbb-7.0-must
 TorBrowserTeam201705R


Comment:

 Here's a patch for review:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/22327

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21762 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check new Firefox favicon code for first-party isolation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21762: Check new Firefox favicon code for first-party isolation
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > In Page Info
 > {{{
 > [...] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/images/favicon.ico via
 --unknown--:8cb660b4e3a184328e50ad46b98d88ec
 > }}}

 I opened #22327 for this issue.

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[tor-bugs] #22327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: First party isolation of Page Info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22327: First party isolation of Page Info
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201705
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 First party isolation is not properly enforce in the Page Info window in
 ESR52. First reported in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21762?replyto=4#comment:4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22324: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, applied to `master` with commit
 78de9734135f21077410d295b689751d60727592.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22232 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: gather info on how Tor Launcher uses bootstrap status messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22232: gather info on how Tor Launcher uses bootstrap status messages
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: isabela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22265 [User Experience/Website]: write high-level overview of bootstrap process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22265: write high-level overview of bootstrap process
-+--
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: isabela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22266 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix the jump-to-80% issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22266: fix the jump-to-80% issue
---+
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  usability, ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: isabela (added)


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[tor-bugs] #22326 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Error in psychcentral.com-rule

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22326: Error in psychcentral.com-rule
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Hey there!
 For the http to https conversion, you need to exclude URLs to port 3
 of forums.psychcentral.com - thats the chat system, and they do NOT allow
 https-connections.

 all URLs regarding this start with:

 http://forums.psychcentral.com:3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22192 [User Experience/Website]: Update tor-mirrors.csv / mirror site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22192: Update tor-mirrors.csv / mirror site
-+---
 Reporter:  Samdney  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  task | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by Samdney):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * type:  defect => task
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Update of one entry.

 See: https://github.com/Samdney/tormirrors/blob/master/entries/mirrors.csv

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22324: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=brade, r=mcs
 The patch looks good and seems to fix the problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16285 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16285: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-linkability,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R,  |
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=brade, r=mcs
 This looks good to us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R, tbb-7.0-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:42 gk]:
 > Another thought: Do we care about FTP downloads? It seems your patch
 does not address those but they are affected as well (just tested with
 ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gcc/). Leaving this ticket open for that question
 for now. We can solve this in a fixup commit if needed.

 I think we should care about FTP, at least a little. So far I cannot
 connect to ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gcc/ over Tor (I consistently get a "425
 Bad IP Connecting" error).  Kathy and I did test the patch last week with
 a large FTP download (ftp://speedtest.tele2.net/50MB.zip).  Aside from
 sometimes getting a "Bad IP" error with that server as well, it worked
 okay.  But I just tried with a small file
 (ftp://speedtest.tele2.net/1KB.zip) and got an assertion failure while
 running a debug build on OSX:
 {{{
 Assertion failure: ((bool)(__builtin_expect(!!(!NS_FAILED_impl(rv)), 1)))
 || rv == NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE, at
 /.../netwerk/protocol/ftp/FTPChannelParent.cpp:646
 #01:
 
mozilla::net::FTPChannelParent::SuspendForDiversion()[/Users/.../Desktop/tb.app/Contents/MacOS/XUL
 +0x80503e]
 ...
 }}}

 We will need to debug this. Georg, what behavior do you see?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22305 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't send accept-encoding on anon http requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22305: Don't send accept-encoding on anon http requests
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 lgtm; merging

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22283 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not exist."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22283: Linux 7.0a4 broken after update: "Directory /run/user/$uid/Tor does not
exist."
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Why is that an issue? There are no `ControlPort` or `SocksPort` lines
 written to `torrc` anymore thanks to `__ControlPort` and `__SocksPort`
 being used. So, switching back and forth should be no problem anymore. Or
 are you envision some corner cases here due to the bug in the patch for
 #20761?

 The latter. Because we did not successfully remove all of the problematic
 ControlPort and SocksPort lines, we need to perform the cleanup one more
 time (with patched code, coming soon). So I think we are all in agreement
 here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22302 [Core Tor/Chutney]: test-network.sh uses a deprecated arithmetic syntax

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22302: test-network.sh uses a deprecated arithmetic syntax
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 oops, forgot to set needs_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22305 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't send accept-encoding on anon http requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22305: Don't send accept-encoding on anon http requests
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Proposed patches in https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/14

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22297 [Metrics/Atlas]: show graphs in "table" format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22297: show graphs in "table" format
---+-
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I don't think the proposed layout would be intuitive. Furthermore, how
 would this look on smaller screens? The current layout places the graphs
 underneath each other so their order stays the same which is intuitive.

 Regardless, I do think descriptive headings should be added. This could
 also be done in combination with moving the graphs to tabs (similar to the
 metrics website) where the tabs would be the descriptive heading.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22293 [Metrics/Atlas]: revert black 'not recommended' icon to red

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22293: revert black 'not recommended' icon to red
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18100 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/or/connection_edge.c typo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18100: src/or/connection_edge.c typo
---+---
 Reporter:  jirib  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21953 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dealing with Tor hardening on Windows properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21953: Dealing with Tor hardening on Windows properly
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-backport 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20270 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Descriptor is missing an ntor curve25519 onion key" message too noisy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20270: "Descriptor is missing an ntor curve25519 onion key" message too noisy?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, triage-out-030-201612  |  Actual Points:  .1
  TorCoreTeam201705 029-backport 030-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Logic error with monthly accounting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22245: Logic error with monthly accounting
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22325 [Core Tor/Tor]: "we're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards" while using bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22325: "we're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards" while
using bridges
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22314 [Metrics/Atlas]: Ignore git mergetool backup files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22314: Ignore git mergetool backup files
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I'll give this a try.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22294 [Metrics/Atlas]: improve 'not recommended' tooltip text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22294: improve 'not recommended' tooltip text
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 Thank you, and thanks for making it even smaller!

 I've made a new child ticket (#22325) for tracking the bridge bug in
 particular. In that ticket, I've merged this patch and marked it for
 backport to 0.3.0.  I'll leave this one open for the non-bridge-using
 case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22325 [Core Tor/Tor]: "we're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards" while using bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22325: "we're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards" while
using bridges
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I've merged asn's branch `bug21969_bridges` into master.  If nothing
 explodes, we should take `bug21969_bridges_030` in maint-0.3.0.

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[tor-bugs] #22325 [Core Tor/Tor]: "we're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards" while using bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22325: "we're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards" while
using bridges
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  030-backport
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21969
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Opening this ticket to track the bridge-using case of #21969.  Leaving the
 parent ticket open since there seems to be a case for non-bridge users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1922 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc.d-style configuration directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1922: torrc.d-style configuration directories
-+-
 Reporter:  aa138346 |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, intro,   |  implemented
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #1922 [Core Tor/Tor]: torrc.d-style configuration directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1922: torrc.d-style configuration directories
-+-
 Reporter:  aa138346 |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think you're right there; it's not great, but let's reopen if needed, or
 open a new ticket if we come up with a better solution.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16285 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16285: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-linkability,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R,  |
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 tbb-7.0-must
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-linkability, GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R,
 tbb-7.0-must
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_16285_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_16285_v4) has three patches that adapt our code to
 the EME changes done between esr45 and esr52. The major change is that we
 don't have a switch for not compiling the code in in the first place
 anymore. Instead everything is bound to preferences now (even though
 `--disable-eme` is still available and should set the proper defaults).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by asn):

 OK, I have an 0.3.0 branch on `bug21969_bridges_030` and a fresh force-
 pushed 0.3.1 branch on `bug21969_bridges`. Both of them should contain
 changes file.

 BTW the whole problem ended up being the missing guard state, so I didn't
 actually have to do part (2) of comment:29, since we already ignore
 unreachable bridges:
 {{{
   SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *,
 guard) {
 entry_guard_consider_retry(guard);
 if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
   continue;
 n_considered++;
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22305 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't send accept-encoding on anon http requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22305: Don't send accept-encoding on anon http requests
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => ahf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22296 [Core Tor/Tor]: add handshake terminology to torspec glossary

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22296: add handshake terminology to torspec glossary
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20909 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20909: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:15 teor]:
 > Since the fallbacks are just a sample of the high-uptime, high-bandwidth
 relays in the network, we should check the entire network to be sure.

 Agreed!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20509 [Core Tor/Tor]: Directory authorities should reject relays with #20499 bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20509: Directory authorities should reject relays with #20499 bug
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-backport, easy,  |  implemented
  TorCoreTeam201612, review-group-15 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor, arma   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 cherry-picked to 0.2.9 and merged forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 I want to take this in 0.3.1.1-alpha is possible, but it needs a changes
 file, and it needs to be based on maint-0.3.0 for a possible backport if
 it works in 0.3.1.1-alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22297 [Metrics/Atlas]: show graphs in "table" format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22297: show graphs in "table" format
---+-
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by irl):

 +1

 I like this. We could even have a descriptive heading.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by irl):

 I've not looked at this yet, but I think I'm going to find that having
 things grouped by presentation as opposed to content is less than
 optimal...

 (I've closed #22160 as this is being done here and only affects this bug
 anyway.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22160 [Metrics/Atlas]: Display address lists better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22160: Display address lists better
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * parent:  #22147 =>


Comment:

 Clean up #22147.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22294 [Metrics/Atlas]: improve 'not recommended' tooltip text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22294: improve 'not recommended' tooltip text
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Nice. (:

 Will merge later today. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22303 [Metrics/Atlas]: Add an offline mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22303: Add an offline mode
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 You can always set up an Onionoo instance yourself and use that for
 testing/development.

 https://dist.torproject.org/onionoo/4.0-1.2.0/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22314 [Metrics/Atlas]: Ignore git mergetool backup files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22314: Ignore git mergetool backup files
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks good to me. Will probably add Vim swap files into this when I
 merge.

 Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:25 asn]:
 > Discussed comment:24 with Nick on IRC. He points out that primary guards
 need to be listed on the consensus, and hence the top half of the
 suggested comment:24 fix is not valid anymore. Nick suggests that to fix
 the bridge case of comment:24 we can check the `is_reachable` field of the
 bridge guard, and ignore it if it's not reachable and missing a
 descriptor.
 >
 > Still waiting for pathological logs from s7r/alec to learn more.

 I think the bridges-case approach where we check `is_reachable` before
 counting a guard towards the "needs descriptor" block is possible.
 However, with the current codebase it's not as easy as checking
 `is_reachable` at the time of
 `guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits()`.

 That's because we don't actually notify the guard subsystem when a bridge
 descriptor fetch fails. And that's because in
 `launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch()` we never set the `guard_state`
 on the directory request, so `entry_guard_chan_failed()` doesn't update
 the guard state when the fail happens.

 Seems like the correct bridges-side fix here involves the following two
 steps:
 1) Add guard_state to bridge descriptor directory request in
 `launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch()`.
 2) Don't count unreachable primary bridges towards the
 `guard_selection_have_enough_dir_info_to_build_circuits()` descriptor
 block limit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20792 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Add more options for changing the install process behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20792: Add more options for changing the install process behavior
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > The bundle, where your initial download is large and then it just works,
 seems like the more pleasant approach in the face of a complicated
 network.

 I basically agree here.

 To make this happen:

  * There to be a consistent, documented and maintained method to extract
information from  an installed bundle to replace the metadata acquired
from the `downloads.json` file on first install.

 `{"version":"6.5.2","architecture":"linux64","channel":"release","locale
 ":"en-US"}`

  * Write code to use files at a fixed location relative to the `sandboxed-
 tor-browser`
binary as the tarball/signature for the install.

  * Modify the descriptors to package the current bundle and signature with
   `sandboxed-tor-browser`.

 nb:

  * "You can parse https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20792#comment:2>
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Re: [tor-bugs] #22205 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Figure out how to fix `crypto/tls`.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22205: Figure out how to fix `crypto/tls`.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This is totally terrible, but doesn't matter as much for the sandbox.

 There's easier ways to deny installation/withhold updates, and the defense
 in depth tinfoil hattery means adversaries can't abuse this to install
 subverted bundles or updates.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Referrer not hidden when comming from a .onion address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22320: Referrer not hidden when comming from a .onion address
-+-
 Reporter:  pege |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pege):

 Yes, using `spoofOnionSource` does the trick. `hideOnionSource` would
 appear to be the more accurate name though. Doesn't look like anything is
 spoofed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22324: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,
 TorBrowserTeam201705R


Comment:

 `bug_22324` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_22324=78de9734135f21077410d295b689751d60727592)
 has a fix for review.

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[tor-bugs] #22324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22324: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff52-esr,
  |  tbb-7.0-must
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4  |
--+
 This is a spin-off of comment:17:ticket:21766.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
---+--
 Reporter:  i139   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity (was: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity on Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity
---+---
 Reporter:  i139   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Actually, I tried a bit harder on my Linux box and got the browser to
 crash as well with
 {{{
 ###!!! [MessageChannel][Child][/home/debian/build/tor-
 browser/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp:520] Assertion
 (mCxxStackFrames.empty()) failed.  mismatched CxxStackFrame ctor/dtors
   MessageChannel 'backtrace':
   [(0) in async PCompositorBridge::Msg_DidComposite(actor=2147483647) ]
   remote Interrupt stack guess: 0
   deferred stack size: 0
   out-of-turn Interrupt replies stack size: 0
 [Parent 5334] ###!!! ABORT: mismatched CxxStackFrame ctor/dtors: file
 /home/debian/build/tor-browser/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp, line 2381
 [Parent 5334] ###!!! ABORT: mismatched CxxStackFrame ctor/dtors: file
 /home/debian/build/tor-browser/ipc/glue/MessageChannel.cpp, line 2381
 }}}
 in the terminal.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19607 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: avoid repeated keyword strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19607: avoid repeated keyword strings
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Looks good!

 I fixed a tiny bug where a space character got lost:

 {{{
 @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ public class RelayNetworkStatusConsensusImpl extends
 NetworkStatusImpl
private void calculateDigest() throws DescriptorParseException {
  try {
String ascii = new String(this.getRawDescriptorBytes(), "US-
 ASCII");
 -  String startToken = "network-status-version ";
 -  String sigToken = "\ndirectory-signature ";
 +  String startToken = Key.NETWORK_STATUS_VERSION.keyword;
 +  String sigToken = "\ndirectory_signature ";
if (!ascii.contains(sigToken)) {
  return;
}
 }}}

 And I added two more commits in an attempt to make it look even better and
 possibly even save memory by storing everything in `EnumSet` rather
 than `Set`.  Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-19607-3 my branch task-19607-3] carefully!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity on Windows
---+---
 Reporter:  i139   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb7.0-must => tbb-crash, tbb-e10s,
 tbb-7.0-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22282 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity on Windows (was: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22282: TBB 7.0aX crash after multiple new identity on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-e10s => tbb-crash, tbb-e10s, tbb7.0-must
 * cc: mcs, brade, arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 Seems to be pretty easily reproducible on Windows 7 as well. I wonder what
 happens on macOS...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5423 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No Characters Showing Up On 'Check Page'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5423: No Characters Showing Up On 'Check Page'
--+
 Reporter:  DasFox|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Our site has changed since then and the language dropdown menu does not
 show the same issues. Thus, closing as `WORKSFORME`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5293 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Neuter fingerprinting with Battery API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5293: Neuter fingerprinting with Battery API
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff52-esr-will-   |  Actual Points:
  have   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Good idea. Removed with commit 885479878d591ce61fa573912eae4ea062dc54c6
 and 886808dc4e21eef3595fa1042f792927bb898193 on `tor-
 browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2` and `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18376 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Accessibility APIs in Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18376: Accessibility APIs in Firefox
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22234 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Disconnect Search from search engines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22234: Remove Disconnect Search from search engines
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #21363.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21363 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disconnect is defaulting back to DuckDuckGo which we already have as default search engine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21363: Disconnect is defaulting back to DuckDuckGo which we already have as
default search engine
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 #22234 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to download a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21766: Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s enabled crashed while trying to
download a file
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-crash,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R, tbb-7.0-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Another thought: Do we care about FTP downloads? It seems your patch does
 not address those but they are affected as well (just tested with
 ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/gcc/). Leaving this ticket open for that question
 for now. We can solve this in a fixup commit if needed.

 I applied the latest patch to `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1` (commit
 4a4285cbd06a825e5f2277d12a2e5165eab59837) and `tor-
 browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2` (commit
 1d1fdea85218586354a1294cb94026279e74a0e3).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Referrer not hidden when comming from a .onion address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22320: Referrer not hidden when comming from a .onion address
-+-
 Reporter:  pege |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)
 * keywords:   => ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201705R


Comment:

 It seems to me the Firefox patch is wrong. What we want to have is
 `network.http.referer.spoofOnionSource` and not
 `network.http.referer.hideOnionSource`. `bug_22320`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_22320=c3a849a2b5f57a4860c16975be9c12fed22ed910)
 in my public repo fixes that.

 pege: Does adding that preference fix the problem for you as well?
 Arthur: Assuming I am right could you open a Mozilla bug correcting the
 patch ("(use target URI as referer)" in `all.js` is wrong as well)?

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[tor-bugs] #22323 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Catch and handle socket errors in chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22323: Catch and handle socket errors in chutney
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 If Tor dies before chutney runs verify, I get several pages of output that
 end in 'error: [Errno 32] Broken pipe'.

 We could be smarter about this. But it's not a bug deal.

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