Re: [tor-bugs] #22439 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot shows black screen in Replicant with llvmpipe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22439: Orbot shows black screen in Replicant with llvmpipe
+---
 Reporter:  JeremyRand  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Forgot to say, this is on a Samsung Galaxy S3 i9300.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22439 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot shows black screen in Replicant with llvmpipe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22439: Orbot shows black screen in Replicant with llvmpipe
+---
 Reporter:  JeremyRand  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by JeremyRand):

 * cc: jeremy@… (added)


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[tor-bugs] #22439 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot shows black screen in Replicant with llvmpipe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22439: Orbot shows black screen in Replicant with llvmpipe
+---
 Reporter:  JeremyRand  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+---
 == Orbot version ==

 15.2.0-RC-8-multi

 == OS ==

 Replicant 6.0 0001

 == Steps to Reproduce ==

 1. Enable llvmpipe in Replicant.  Instructions for this are at
 https://redmine.replicant.us/projects/replicant/wiki/Graphics#Enabling-
 llvmpipe-as-software-renderer .
 2. Run Orbot.

 == Expected Results ==

 Orbot should display normally.

 == Observed Results ==

 Orbot only renders a black screen.  The context menu provided by the
 hardware "Settings" button does display properly, as do the "QR Codes" and
 "About" dialogs available from that context menu.  Orbot's non-graphical
 functionality seems to be working fine.  Orbot seems to be able to read
 the touchscreen fine (I'm able to start/stop Tor by clicking blindly).

 == Other Notes ==

 Compatibility with llvmpipe is important because llvmpipe is the only
 renderer available on Replicant that runs Orfox properly; Orfox (like all
 other Fennec-based apps) crashes with the default Android software
 renderer.  So, right now, in order to change Orbot settings, I need to
 disable llvmpipe and reboot the phone, change the Orbot settings, and then
 re-enable llvmpipe and reboot the phone again before I can resume using
 Orfox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specific URI loads some resource that freezes Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22438: Specific URI loads some resource that freezes Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 This happens when I 'allow all' JavaScript, but doesn't happen when I only
 allow fonts, and doesn't happen when I only allow JS from
 cdn.theatlantic.com. It appears to be some ad/tracker JS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specific URI loads some resource that freezes Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22438: Specific URI loads some resource that freezes Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 This does not appear to happen in High Security mode in my macOS 10.12.5
 VM, so maybe it's JavaScript related (or some other resource we disable in
 high security mode).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bridge: Add Lisbeth IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22429: bridge: Add Lisbeth IPv6 address
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => tbb-bridges
 * cc: dcf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22369 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Increase of users in Ukraine due to block of Russia-based services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22369: Increase of users in Ukraine due to block of Russia-based services
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block ua  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 The blckd.json file changed on 25 May, changing http URLs to https ones.
 Different versions of blckd.json are (so far) identifiable by their `Last-
 Modified` header.
 ||`Last-Modified: Tue, 23 May 2017 23:36:12 GMT` ||attachment:blckd.json
 ||
 ||`Last-Modified: Thu, 25 May 2017 16:58:04 GMT`
 ||attachment:blckd-20170525165818.json ||

 Here is a `decode` script that reads from stdin or a file:
 {{{
 #!/usr/bin/env python
 import sys
 def decode(data):
 return "".join(chr((ord(c) ^ 1234567890) & 0xff) for c in
 data.decode("utf-8"))
 f = len(sys.argv) == 2 and open(sys.argv[1]) or sys.stdin
 sys.stdout.write(decode(f.read()))
 }}}

 The difference between the `Tue, 23 May 2017 23:36:12 GMT` and `Thu, 25
 May 2017 16:58:04 GMT` versions is that the http URLs changed to https.
 {{{
 $ diff -u4 <(./decode blckd.json | jq .) <(./decode
 blckd-20170525165818.json | jq .)
 --- /dev/fd/63  2017-05-29 19:33:00.962827420 -0700
 +++ /dev/fd/62  2017-05-29 19:33:00.962827420 -0700
 @@ -1,59 +1,59 @@
  {
"records": [
  {
"host": "vk.com",
 -  "endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
"hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
  },
  {
"host": "vkontakte.ru",
 -  "endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
"hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
  },
  {
"host": "vk.me",
 -  "endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
"hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
  },
  {
"host": "vk.cc",
 -  "endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
"hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
  },
  {
"host": "ok.ru",
 -  "endpoint": "http://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
"hash": "526aabc2501699fdcfe5c58f98db82eed849c904"
  },
  {
"host": "odnoklassniki.ru",
 -  "endpoint": "http://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
"hash": "526aabc2501699fdcfe5c58f98db82eed849c904"
  },
  {
"host": "odnoklassniki.ua",
 -  "endpoint": "http://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
"hash": "526aabc2501699fdcfe5c58f98db82eed849c904"
  },
  {
"host": "ok.me",
 -  "endpoint": "http://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://ok.ru/google55e918a7d2970a76.html;,
"hash": "526aabc2501699fdcfe5c58f98db82eed849c904"
  },
  {
"host": "vk-cdn.net",
 -  "endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
"hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
  },
  {
"host": "userapi.com",
 -  "endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +  "endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
"hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
  },
  "mail.ru"
],
"defaults": {
 -"endpoint": "http://vk.com/ping.txt;,
 +"endpoint": "https://vk.com/ping.txt;,
  "hash": "b5b607d573e6a901ef215db6b1247404c92bb9ce"
}
  }
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #22438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specific URI loads some resource that freezes Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22438: Specific URI loads some resource that freezes Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This link appears to reliably freeze Tor Browser 6.5.2:

 https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/racist-history-
 portland/492035/?utm_source=twb

 After about 3-4 seconds, the whole browser just seizes up, and I need to
 `kill -9` it. Tested in a freshly created Fedora 24 Qubes VM. Alex tested
 it on MacOS and had the same result.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Please don't copy and paste configs. Instead, re-use the config in hs.tmpl
 like this:
 {{{
 ${include:hs.tmpl}
 HiddenServiceVersion 3
 }}}

 I think we will also want variants with:
 * IPv4 and IPv6 and dual-stack (like hs-only-v6.tmpl and hs-use-v6.tmpl)
 * Exits and no Exits in the network (like hs-min)
 * Single Onion Services and 3-hop Onion Services (like single-onion*.tmpl)

 We should do this as part of testing v3 hidden services.

 We will also want to add an IPv4 and an IPv6 variant to make test-network-
 all in tor, see #22437.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22437 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HSv3 chutney networks to tor's make test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22437: Add HSv3 chutney networks to tor's make test-network-all
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs, prop224


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[tor-bugs] #22437 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HSv3 chutney networks to tor's make test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22437: Add HSv3 chutney networks to tor's make test-network-all
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Once we merge #22430, and the relevant hidden service client code, we'll
 want to add an IPv4 and an IPv6 HSv3 to make test-network-all.

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[tor-bugs] #22436 [Webpages/Blog]: Some blog users have blogger role, and others don't?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22436: Some blog users have blogger role, and others don't?
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22013
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 On the https://blog.torproject.org/admin/people page it turns out some
 people have the "blogger" role, and other people don't.

 There are now two intermediate roles, "authenticated user" and "blogger".
 I guess that was true on the old blog too, but I don't think we had
 anybody in the "has an account but doesn't have the blogger role" there.
 Somehow some of the users lost that role in the transition. Or maybe we
 did have that distinction, but the people without the blogger role could
 still blog, edit comments, etc on the old blog. I'm not sure.

 I just went through and added the blogger role to most people, so it isn't
 an urgent issue now.

 Is there a downside to merging the two roles, that is, simplifying by
 making everybody who has an account into a blogger?

 I guess we could go the other way too, which is letting ordinary people
 make accounts on our blog, so they can be the same human each time they
 comment, and maybe even so they can bypass captchas and stuff. Is there a
 downside to that? :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test integration of Minion (out-of-order data transmission thing) with Tor relays (was: Test integration of Minion with Tor relays)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7679: Test integration of Minion (out-of-order data transmission thing) with 
Tor
relays
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 (did we get a patch here?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check if a stream could send a cell but the circuit hasn't asked it to

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7678: Check if a stream could send a cell but the circuit hasn't asked it to
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-insight bugproofing  |  Actual Points:
  protocol   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay needs-insight bugproofing protocol
 * points:   => 4
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7660 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor circuit cannibalization into one place

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7660: Refactor circuit cannibalization into one place
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client codethulhu refactoring|  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client codethulhu refactoring technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7593 [Core Tor/Tor]: Limit outgoing connections when Network seems to be failing horribly?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7593: Limit outgoing connections when Network seems to be failing horribly?
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Prop271 tries to do a better job here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7590 [Core Tor/Tor]: [PATCH] New option LocalOutboundBindAddress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7590: [PATCH] New option LocalOutboundBindAddress
-+-
 Reporter:  ac   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-hs hs-integration |  Actual Points:
  hs-app-support |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client tor-hs hs-integration hs-app-support
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Distribute Tor Browser version and other information through consensus and internal mapaddress + JSON/XML object

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7583: Distribute Tor Browser version and other information through consensus 
and
internal mapaddress + JSON/XML object
-+-
 Reporter:  proper   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, needs-proposal,  |  worksforme
  mike-0.2.5 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I believe we already replaced this with a couple of mechanisms, including
 prop227 (which afaik hasn't seen much use?) and the auto-updater.

 Tor Browser folks, please reopen kick this back over to me if there's more
 to do in Tor here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make relay crypto run on multiple CPU cores

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7572: Make relay crypto run on multiple CPU cores
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, term-project-ideas, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  dos multithreading performance cpu |
Parent ID:   | Points:  4.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, term-project-ideas, tor-dos => tor-relay, term-
 project-ideas, tor-dos multithreading performance cpu


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7483 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update default torrc with new entries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7483: Update default torrc with new entries
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-relay documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > This ticket should close; the items enumerated in this ticket should
 either go into torrc.sample.in, or torrc.minimal.in-staging, or both.

 So, closing it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7553 [Core Tor/Tor]: [simple patch] Expose ISO_STREAM via isolation flag config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7553: [simple patch] Expose ISO_STREAM via isolation flag config option
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, small-feature maybe- |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea needs-debate  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, small-feature => tor-client, small-feature maybe-
 bad-idea needs-debate
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7486 [Core Tor/Tor]: Divergent behavior for over-long length on begin cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7486: Divergent behavior for over-long length on begin cells
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay protocol easy spec-|  Actual Points:
  compliance |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay protocol easy spec-compliance
 * points:   => .5
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7509 [Core Tor/Tor]: Publish and use circuit success rates in extrainfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7509: Publish and use circuit success rates in extrainfo descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  mumble-feature, tor-relay needs- |  Actual Points:
  design statistics metrics  |
Parent ID:  #5456| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  mumble-feature, tor-relay => mumble-feature, tor-relay needs-
 design statistics metrics
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7532 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7532: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, term-project-ideas maybe-  |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea needs-discussion  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  research, term-project-ideas => research, term-project-ideas
 maybe-bad-idea needs-discussion


Comment:

 Other privacy-preserving collation mechanisms may wind up replacing this.
 I still think it's a fun idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7536 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple warn on startup; seems to be openssl related.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7536: Multiple warn on startup; seems to be openssl related.
--+--
 Reporter:  aagbsn|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 No responses in 4 years

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22420 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mysterious "XXXX RD This is a bug, right?" comment from Nick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22420: Mysterious " RD This is a bug, right?" comment from Nick
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21861 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure new mDNS code is disabled in ESR 52-based Tor Browsers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21861: Make sure new mDNS code is disabled in ESR 52-based Tor Browsers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 This looks okay to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21972 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21972: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 I did not test the patch, but it cannot do any harm and I trust your
 testing of it ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6877 [Core Tor/Tor]: Finally replace all char[] buffers with uint8_t[] buffers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6877: Finally replace all char[] buffers with uint8_t[] buffers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay refactoring |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt lots-of-work|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 This [https://gist.github.com/jibsen/da6be27cde4d526ee564 gist] goes
 through a very similar train of thought, and includes many references to
 interesting background material.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21617 [Applications/Tor Browser]: RWX page observed on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21617: RWX page observed on Windows
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr52/search?q=PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE=false
 > What about disabling ctypes?

 This was a good suggestion. I tried it but the RWX page was still present.
 My next plan is to systematically check all the allocate and reprotect
 calls. Possibly this is best done by hooking the system calls, especially
 because this might be the result of a library call.

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[tor-bugs] #22435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB in Fedora stops responding on theguardian.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22435: TBB in Fedora stops responding on theguardian.com
--+--
 Reporter:  jiminycricket |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hi,

 I use Tor Browser 6.5.2 on medium security mode in Fedora 24 with the
 GNOME Wayland desktop.

 When I try to read The Guardian (theguardian.com), Tor Browser frequently
 stops responding. The whole browser crashes.

 I prevent this from happening by switching to High security mode.

 When it does happen, I have to "force quit" as the browser becomes useless
 until it is closed and restarted again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14356 [Core Tor/Stem]: Pre-test activities to speed integ tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14356: Pre-test activities to speed integ tests
---+-
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  testing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Finally had success on this front:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=3fc6234

 I might use this trick elsewhere too, but static checks were the best
 candidate for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Your patch is broken on e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22434: Your patch is broken on e10s
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 `on-datatransfer-available` is fired by Mozilla's code, we are just
 observing it. If you think Mozilla should not fire that one, please open a
 bug at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/. And mouse move while left button
 down is the classical definition for dragging things. So, it seems to me
 we don't break anything here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17933 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser does not isolate the pdf 'download' (via the download button) to URL bar domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17933: Tor Browser does not isolate the pdf 'download' (via the download 
button)
to URL bar domain
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > > arma, it seems to be fixed on alpha?
 >
 > That's not clear yet as the download is still broken, see
 comment:45:ticket:21766 (at least with e10s enabled).
 The download is fine (just set the checkbox ;)
 The main problem is that the entire pdf doc is cached now, and saves
 without any network requests. (But try to open 100 MB pdf, and you'll be
 surprised :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6877 [Core Tor/Tor]: Finally replace all char[] buffers with uint8_t[] buffers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6877: Finally replace all char[] buffers with uint8_t[] buffers
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay refactoring |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt lots-of-work|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Things get really hairy once you consider the possibility that uint8_t can
 be different from unsigned char (on a CHAR_BIT==8 system).  Unfortunately,
 compiler developers have apparently seriously considered this in the past.

 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/16138237/when-is-uint8-t-%E2%89%A0
 -unsigned-char#16138470
 https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66110
 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/26297571/how-to-create-an-uint8-t
 -array-that-does-not-undermine-strict-aliasing

 An additional direction is having (void *) parameters for functions that
 read or write byte arrays.  In that case, a pointer to any type can be
 passed in so the implementation of those functions must use a can-alias-
 anything byte type like unsigned char internally.

 (Also if uint8_t is an extended integer type, it looks like nothing in C99
 guarantees that its bits will even be in the same order as those of an
 unsigned char.  I think it might be feasible but annoying to test for that
 at compile time once we detect that they're different types.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Your patch is broken on e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22434: Your patch is broken on e10s
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Are you starters? O_o
 It's your dran'n'drop patch which is triggered by every mouse move with
 left button down, because it's incompatible with e10s.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22414: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Is that in the main process or is that web content?
 Main, after enabling e10s by removing add-on :(
 > What do you do to create those?
 Nothing, just browsing.
 > Which operating system are you on?
 Win 7.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17933 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser does not isolate the pdf 'download' (via the download button) to URL bar domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17933: Tor Browser does not isolate the pdf 'download' (via the download 
button)
to URL bar domain
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > arma, it seems to be fixed on alpha?

 That's not clear yet as the download is still broken, see
 comment:45:ticket:21766 (at least with e10s enabled).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Your patch is broken on e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22434: Your patch is broken on e10s
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Could you be a bit more verbose? For starters it would be good to know
 which patch you are talking about. Then what exactly does not work anymore
 would be good to know as well. Finally, which operating system and which
 Tor Browser are you using? How can we reproduce your problem?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22414: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > This situation is greatly improved on alpha, some blobs are removed
 right after tab closing, but after New Identity some of them are still
 observable
 > {{{
 > 2 (100.0%) -- file-blob-urls
 > └──2 (100.0%) -- owner unknown
 >├──1 (50.00%) ── blob:null/29449f13-5207-45d3-84df-2923a6b089de
 >└──1 (50.00%) ── blob:null/e0ea787a-7e20-4037-8d47-71b7019a44b3
 > }}}
 Is that in the main process or is that web content? What do you do to
 create those? Which operating system are you on?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open (cartoon page + 4 cartoons)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22406: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open
(cartoon page + 4 cartoons)
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mwolfe):

 I downloaded the latest alpha version 7.0a4 and 'installed' it by dragging
 it into my Applications folder. I opened Guardian Cartoon, then clicked on
 one cartoon, and Torbrowser hung (see torhang picture, 'Not responding'
 and this lasted one hour before I killed the process). I tried to go back
 to my old Tor version, but I only get an error 'Tor could not start.'

 So I am accessing trac.torproject.org with 7.0a4, which has no trouble
 with the torproject site.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Remove the f*cking popup without questions! :)
 You don't ask about disabling your other security/privacy/etc protections.
 Why is this a special case?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 As a Tor Browser user i always ignore the warning (the warning fatigue has
 set in a long time ago) and click on the webpage to make it disappear.
 With this behavior I'm assuming Tor Browser does the (IMO) right thing by
 disallowing image data extraction through the canvas by default.

 I'm treating the canvas protection like NoScript. As i mostly run Tor
 Browser on the highest security level I assume everything is disabled it
 by default. When i notice something breaking i optionally enable
 JavaScript or lower the security level. I've never disabled the canvas
 protection through the warning dialog and I'm unsure whether lowering the
 security level automatically disables it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22414: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 This situation is greatly improved on alpha, some blobs are removed right
 after tab closing, but after New Identity some of them are still
 observable
 {{{
 2 (100.0%) -- file-blob-urls
 └──2 (100.0%) -- owner unknown
├──1 (50.00%) ── blob:null/29449f13-5207-45d3-84df-2923a6b089de
└──1 (50.00%) ── blob:null/e0ea787a-7e20-4037-8d47-71b7019a44b3
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser Console stops auto-scrolling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22431: Browser Console stops auto-scrolling
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED: Component returned failure code: 0x8000
 (NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED) [nsIProgressEventSink.onStatus]  network-
 monitor.js:314
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17933 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser does not isolate the pdf 'download' (via the download button) to URL bar domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17933: Tor Browser does not isolate the pdf 'download' (via the download 
button)
to URL bar domain
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 arma, it seems to be fixed on alpha?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7479 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace more linked lists with queue.h implementations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7479: Replace more linked lists with queue.h implementations
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay refactoring easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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[tor-bugs] #22434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Your patch is broken on e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22434: Your patch is broken on e10s
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When press and move the scroll-bar
 {{{
 [05-29 18:33:33] Torbutton INFO: The DataTransfer is available
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
--+
 Reporter:  rransom   |  Owner:  Jigsaw52
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15599 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Range requests used by pdfjs are not isolated to URL bar domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15599: Range requests used by pdfjs are not isolated to URL bar domain
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 And its OCSP requests too:
 {{{
 [05-29 18:16:40] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS: http://ocsp.usertrust.com/ via
--unknown--:acc796c227a065d5b876d251f00beb87
 }}}
 Replying to [ticket:15599 gk]:
 > Works even in a third party context with
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/misc/range-request-test.html (your
 security slider level needs to be below medium-high in this case).
 {{{
 Security Error: Content at
 https://kpdyer.com/publications/usenix2014-fte.pdf#disableRange=true may
 not load data from https://people.torproject.org/~gk/misc/range-request-
 test.html.
 Load denied by X-Frame-Options:
 https://kpdyer.com/publications/usenix2014-fte.pdf#disableRange=true does
 not permit cross-origin framing.  (unknown)
 }}}
 Hrm, does PDF.js support Private Browsing Mode?

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[tor-bugs] #22433 [Core Tor/Tor]: Options for hidden services to choose nodes.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22433: Options for hidden services to choose nodes.
+-
 Reporter:  NorbertSzczybelski  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 What when somebody start 10 000 relays? This will compromise whole Tor
 network? And publish IP addresses of hidden services?

 I don't see any options for hidden service to choose relays of one or
 couple organizations.

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[tor-bugs] #22432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser doesn't stop "loading" when Tor gave up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22432: Tor Browser doesn't stop "loading" when Tor gave up
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-
  |  usability
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tor logged something like "Tried to load [scrubbed] for 120 sec. Giving
 up.", but nothing changed on a tab. (e10s?)

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[tor-bugs] #22431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser Console stops auto-scrolling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22431: Browser Console stops auto-scrolling
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-
  |  usability
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It happens randomly, often after some error has appeared in console.
 E.g.
 {{{
 "Handler function threw an exception: TypeError: this.transport is null
 Stack: send@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js ->
 resource://devtools/server/main.js:1465:5
 NEA_addSecurityInfo@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js ->
 resource://devtools/server/actors/webconsole.js:2217:5
 
NetworkResponseListener.prototype._getSecurityInfo<@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:488:5
 exports.makeInfallible/<@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:101:14
 
NetworkResponseListener.prototype.onStartRequest@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:429:5
 Line: 1465, column: 5"  ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:80
 TypeError: this.transport is null[Learn More]  main.js:1465:5
 TypeError: aPool is null[Learn More]  webconsole.js:499:5
 }}}
 So, some breakage in DevTools now affects auto-scrolling. (e10s?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge => tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.0.6


Comment:

 Just started my TBB 7.0a4, exited yesterday, and got:
 {{{
 Tor NOTICE: Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 Tor NOTICE: Our directory information is no longer up-to-date enough to
 build circuits: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry
 guards
 Tor NOTICE: I learned some more directory information, but not enough to
 build a circuit: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry
 guards
 Tor NOTICE: New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Tor NOTICE: New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Tor NOTICE: We now have enough directory information to build circuits.
 }}}
 It looks like Tor is using old info during bootstrap. (No bridges, FWIW.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The commit message has a typo (`s/temlate/template/`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7869 [Core Tor/Tor]: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7869: ntor-onion-key is padded with an equal sign
--+
 Reporter:  rransom   |  Owner:  Jigsaw52
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, easy, intro => tor-relay, intro


Comment:

 Thanks for the updated patches!  We were talking about this ticket on IRC
 and concluded that it still needs additional work, which I'll try to
 summarize.  (nickm, please correct me if I got any of this wrong!)  This
 work includes making a new consensus method, which means updating `dir-
 spec.txt` and the consensus method logic in `dirvote.c`.  The sole changes
 in the new consensus method would relate to padding of base64-encoded
 ed25519 public keys.

 Different directory authorities might create diverging consensus votes if
 they make different choices about including `=` padding in `ntor-onion-
 key`.  This could be considered an existing ambiguity in `dir-spec.txt.`.
 The new consensus method would require the absence of padding in `ntor-
 onion-key`, while older ones would require its presence.  Any changes to
 `test_microdesc.c` should not change any of the reference `ntor-onion-key`
 lines for the older microdesc formats.

 I'm sorry if this is turning out to be more work than you expected.  I'm
 removing the "easy" keyword but keeping "intro" because it's clearly no
 longer an "easy" task but it does touch a lot of different stuff in a not-
 too-complicated way and therefore is a good way to get to know the Tor
 code base better.  Please feel free to continue revising your patch, or
 alternatively some of us could work on it after 0.3.1 is closer to
 release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 We'll have to represent the case of an empty key-value list somehow.  For
 example `"dirreq-v2-reqs "` contains zero key-value elements, which we
 want to represent somehow.  And it's different from an omitted
 `dirreq-v2-reqs` line.  I mean, we could imagine doing this differently in
 the future, but I tried to leave the current behavior unchanged for now.
 What did you have in mind here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Hmm, when looking at the commit I have the following question:
 Could/should a valid `validatedString` really be empty or is this just a
 testing tweak?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


Comment:

 Raising awareness for the UX-people. FWIW: We had requests as well to add
 an "not ever" option (#18027). Might be time to give the whole warning
 dialog a bit more thought: What options do we really want to have there?
 What is meaningful to users at all? And how do we convey the options? And
 of course: Does it make sense at all to have such a doorhanger given
 warning fatigue etc.? And if not, what could/should we do instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Oops.  Please look again now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Looking at the zstd history, it seems like `ZSTD_CStream` (which seems to
 be part of a streaming compression API that the consensus compression code
 uses) is new in zstd-1.1?  Also `ZSTD_VERSION_STRING` looks like it is new
 in 0.6.1.

 We should probably check for a minimum version (1.1?) at configure time.

 This is probably relevant to deciding what new compression libraries to
 support for Tor Browser builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open (cartoon page + 4 cartoons)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22406: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open
(cartoon page + 4 cartoons)
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, thanks. The first thing you could do is testing whether the current
 alpha release, 7.0a4, solves the problem for you. It is based on ESR52 and
 we are about to release Tor Browser 7.0 with that new ESR series. You can
 find bundles on https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.0a4/.

 In case you hit a Mozilla bug which is solved in 7.0a4, then we are good.
 If the crashing continues let us know. In that case I'll create a debug
 build for you with instructions on how to use it to help us better
 understand and hopefully solve your problems.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * cc: teor (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see branch `bug22430` in `https://github.com/asn-the-goblin-
 slayer/chutney.git`.

 (I made a chutney repo at: https://github.com/asn-the-goblin-
 slayer/chutney)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22401 [Webpages/Blog]: Pictures don't load in blog posts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22401: Pictures don't load in blog posts
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 Oh.

 On the blog text, we have:
 {{{
 https://extra.torproject.org/blog/2013-09-11-lifecycle-of-a-new-
 relay/lifecycle.png">
 https://extra.torproject.org/blog/2013-09-11-lifecycle-of-a-new-
 relay/lifecycle.png" alt="The phases of a new relay" width="100%">
 }}}

 And in the actual html of the resulting page, we have:
 {{{
 https://extra.torproject.org/blog/2013-09-11-lifecycle-of-a
 -new-relay/lifecycle.png" rel="nofollow">
 }}}

 So something in the template is not understanding how to translate the
  tag properly.

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[tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We need a networks file and a torrc template for hs-v3 in chutney.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21972 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21972: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,
 GeorgKoppen201705, TorBrowserTeam201705R


Comment:

 `bug_21972` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_21972=4776721222c287d71975abec58092906a3b71108)
 has a null-check that avoids this issue and shows all the mixing
 information to me. Probably something we can/should upstream.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22411 [Webpages/Blog]: Comments are not shown at all to users who aren't logged in

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22411: Comments are not shown at all to users who aren't logged in
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks like it's resolved? I'm going to close -- please reopen if I'm
 mistaken. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22401 [Webpages/Blog]: Pictures don't load in blog posts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22401: Pictures don't load in blog posts
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 Hm, Maria managed to get it to work for her in
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/state-internet-censorship-indonesia

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22401 [Webpages/Blog]: Pictures don't load in blog posts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22401: Pictures don't load in blog posts
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arma):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22419 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent access to file://

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22419: Prevent access to file://
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have => ff52-esr-will-have, TorBrowserTeam201705


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22404 [Webpages/Blog]: I can't add comments to blog posts released before the migration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22404: I can't add comments to blog posts released before the migration
---+
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 I think that comment editing menu was not there a few days ago. :) But,
 great, it is there now. Awesome, thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22419 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent access to file://

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22419: Prevent access to file://
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr-will-have
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That's fixed with the switch to ESR52. 7.0a4 shows "Security Error:
 Content at http://mftbug.surge.sh/ may not load or link to
 file:///C:/$mft/123" in the console and the icon is not showing up.

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[tor-bugs] #22429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bridge: Add Lisbeth IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22429: bridge: Add Lisbeth IPv6 address
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Turns out my obfs4 bridge in Tor Browser has an IPv6 so here it is:

 Addr: 2001:470:b381:bfff:216:3eff:fe23:d6c3
 Port: 443

 Current bridge line for reference is:

 Bridge obfs4 192.95.36.142:443 CDF2E852BF539B82BD10E27E9115A31734E378C2
 cert=qUVQ0srL1JI/vO6V6m/24anYXiJD3QP2HgzUKQtQ7GRqqUvs7P+tG43RtAqdhLOALP7DJQ
 iat-mode=0
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJZLB6wAAoJEELoaioR9I02JMcH/1Sbyi6L+MgiKS0DZDHL53nl
 VMKlGw/DdyOEy6zX+/W37Oyj6tQnWpoeo//JFlEqK6M/6Uf/WzQ+lPC0DRmQu7pu
 n424WolCW+C9u+abb+CU6ETwdJPslRLpfiaM2VRl35gfu1Js+3GCKu7aeCmPRE9t
 PUailXwHaWZIDRDfuNU0xeoa0nb1noGVebHIc0Yifd4DWAtLI6u3bQkSOv003alb
 q+zsnC8JNyhz8DcWpguNXiT76RGAJYsPpSBrmAHovnmg1roQ0gkWDgQy470PruY0
 7V3UX3OwzD7vznyUDNXpQ83nTjSe8RNpHZR3p+puo2yrYZcNGz62HzIe/jr1S9k=
 =h1TJ
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add webstats module to collector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: add webstats module to collector
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * owner:  metrics-team => iwakeh
 * status:  needs_information => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add webstats module to collector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: add webstats module to collector
---+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Could some weblog samples (clean and real) be made available under NDA?
 This involves a bit regex tweaking and I need examples for tests.

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[tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add webstats module to collector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: add webstats module to collector
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Port the python code for sanitizing weblogs and add a webstat module to
 collector.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22414: Object URLs are not revoked, even after New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  tbb-newnym => tbb-newnym, tbb-regression, tbb-6.0-issues


Comment:

 It seems this regression got introduced with Tor Browser 6.0. However,
 testing an ESR52-based Tor Browser does not show the same problem for me.
 Could you test with a recent alpha
 (https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.0a4/) and report whether the
 problem is solved for you as well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21932 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Stop relying on the platform's default charset

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21932: Stop relying on the platform's default charset
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 There, I started splitting up this huge commit into several smaller ones
 that are easier to review.  Please find
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-21932-2 my task-21932-2 branch] with four commits that
 are ready for review and a fifth (and last) commit with the remaining
 changes.  If you'd like to review the first four commits, I'd merge them
 to master and work more on the fifth commit later today or tomorrow.
 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Though hm, that doesn't make it clear that it is a site-specific choice.

 More thinking required.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 "Never for this session" would be my first choice.

 But I'll also note that Linda was excited on other tickets to help with
 user-facing phrases like this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21972 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3 (was: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3 on Win 7)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21972: about:support is partially broken in 7.0a3
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 That's not Windows related.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22279 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22279: simplify and avoid repetition in ParserHelper methods
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I only added a RuntimeException in a code part that according to its
 comment shouldn't be reached:
 {{{
 --- a/src/main/java/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ParseHelper.java
 +++ b/src/main/java/org/torproject/descriptor/impl/ParseHelper.java
 @@ -333,6 +333,8 @@ public class ParseHelper {
new String[]{ validatedString }, 0, 0, ",", Integer.class,
 result);
  } catch (DescriptorParseException e) {
 -  /* Should have caught in earlier validation step. */
 +  throw new RuntimeException("Should have been caught in earlier
 validation "
 +  + "step, but wasn't. ", e);
  }
  return result;
}
 }}}

 and made the tests fail:
 {{{
 ...
[junit] Testcase: testDirreqStatsValid took 0.009 sec
 [junit] Caused an ERROR
 [junit] Should have caught in earlier validation step, but wasn't.
 [junit] java.lang.RuntimeException: Should have been caught in earlier
 validation step, but wasn't.
 [junit] at
 
org.torproject.descriptor.impl.ParseHelper.convertCommaSeparatedKeyIntegerValueList(ParseHelper.java:336)
 [junit] at
 
org.torproject.descriptor.impl.ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.getDirreqV2Ips(ExtraInfoDescriptorImpl.java:1005)
 [junit] at
 
org.torproject.descriptor.impl.ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.testDirreqStatsValid(ExtraInfoDescriptorImplTest.java:1307)
 [junit] Caused by: org.torproject.descriptor.DescriptorParseException:
 Line '' contains an illegal key in list element ''.
 [junit] at
 
org.torproject.descriptor.impl.ParseHelper.parseStringKeyTValueList(ParseHelper.java:436)
 [junit] at
 
org.torproject.descriptor.impl.ParseHelper.convertCommaSeparatedKeyIntegerValueList(ParseHelper.java:332)
 [junit]
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18605 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Consider including fallback directory mirrors with multiple IP addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18605: Consider including fallback directory mirrors with multiple IP addresses
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Fallback Scripts


Comment:

 So that puts this in 'Fallback Scripts', not 'Tor'/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open (cartoon page + 4 cartoons)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22406: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open
(cartoon page + 4 cartoons)
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mwolfe):

 My Macbook was crashing occasionally when watching videos in the original
 OS, Snow Leopard. I finally upgraded to El Capitan, and it began crashing
 several times a day, so I checked, and found that the NVIDIA graphics card
 was the problem, all my crashes say 'graphics panic'. The solution was to
 install gfxCardStatus that blocks the NVIDIA discrete graphics and uses
 the Intel CPU integrated graphics.

 gfxCardStatus shows whether the Macbook is using integrated or discrete
 graphics. When I start Safari, the Macbook remains in integrated graphics
 mode, but some graphics cause Safari to switch to discrete graphics and
 crash the Macbook. Torbrowser starts in discrete graphics mode, and, if I
 don't immediately quit, will soon crash the Macbook with a 'graphics
 panic'.

 With gfxCardStatus installed and set to block discrete graphics,
 Torbrowser often crashes. It depends on the site, the complexity of the
 graphics, and how many taps I have open.

 When reading a news site, I keep the home page in the left-most tab, and
 the articles I'm reading in other tabs. Likewise when I'm checking the
 comics for the day. If I open enough tabs, Torbrower crashes.

 If running a debug version might help, I'd be happy to do it.

 I think there must be a few others running older Macbooks and Torbrowser.

 I don't have a copy of Firefox without Torbutton installed. If I don't
 care who knows what I'm looking at (or who's making comments to articles
 with which I think it might be dangerous to be associated), I use Safari.

 Again, if you don't have an older Macbook, I understand Macbooks made
 after 2012 don't have the problem and would not be able to reproduce my
 crashes.

 You might be able to reproduce my crashes if you had gfxCardStatus
 installed to prevent Torbrowser from accessing the discrete graphics chip,
 but I'm not sure. I just know I have an older Macbook with a problem, a
 kludge I use to get around the problem, and not enough cash to replace the
 Macbook.

 Anything I can do to help the Torproject, I'd be very happy to try.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Tor Browser with its default settings behaves as you are expecting: new
 identity/browser restart blows your canvas related settings away. Not sure
 what a better phrasing would be "Not for this session" maybe? Or "Not
 until I close the browser"/"Not until the browser gets closed"? (We are
 sort of closing the browser during New Identity as well, so this should
 not be a problem)

 One thing to keep in mind is the case where users enabling disk history.
 It could be that "never" then really means "never". It's not nothing we
 really support, but hey, still worth testing for I guess.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21687 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure prefetch in the network predictor adheres to design guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21687: Make sure prefetch in the network predictor adheres to design guidelines
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff59-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must => ff59-esr


Comment:

 Flipping the pref back to `false` as https://hg.mozilla.org/releases
 /mozilla-esr52/rev/c6897adc4037 did prevents `mPrefetches` from getting
 populated which effectively results in prefetches in the predictor being
 disabled. Thus, move this to ff59-esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activate mixed content blocking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21323: Activate mixed content blocking
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:18 legind]:
 > > This is another issue entirely, partially mitigated by `upgrade-
 insecure-requests`, see https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/upgrade-insecure-
 requests.
 >
 > No, it is not. See:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=878890#c3. If the content
 policy (which Mixed Content Blocking (MCB) relies on) would have been
 called after all the redirects would have taken place we would not have
 this discussion now. :) But as I said above, while Mozilla did not fix the
 underlying problem they solved it differently for the MCB case.

 Actually, I have not checked whether it can still be the case that
 resources loaded over HTTP that would have been rewritten by an HTTPS-
 Everywhere rule (but are not due to MCB) would still be blocked by MCB
 before that could happen. If so, then the bug is still open for a good
 reason (and our #13033) as well. What I just meant was that redirects are
 taken into account now, so that the HTTPS -> HTTP downgrade issue is not a
 problem anymore.

 > Alright, after going over all the arguments I think it is okay for us to
 activate mixed content blocking. I won't do that by setting the pref to
 `true` as Arthur did but just by removing that entry in our `000-tor-
 browser.js`, which means we are using the default Firefox provides (which
 is enabling the mixed content blocker) from now on.

 This is done with commit c1a5e1abf6ee05b0b1d3b1462b3c9e1c180b153e and
 29b34b444229fd09fcf7741a206230385e843fde on `tor-browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2`
 and `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activate mixed content blocking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21323: Activate mixed content blocking
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Thanks for your reply, legind, this was really helpful.

 Replying to [comment:18 legind]:
 > Replying to [comment:17 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:7 arthuredelstein]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > > >
 > > > I had further discussions with legind and I think he makes a pretty
 good argument that we should be blocking active mixed content nonetheless:
 > > >
 > > > > I think for the sites that will have their rulesets disabled by
 flipping the "mixedcontent" bit, their security will be downgraded a
 little.  But their security is already compromised by the fact that active
 mixed content is being loaded on the page, which seems a huge downside.
 > >
 > > I don't understand that: those 5-6% of sites not being redirected to
 HTTPS because the Mixed Content Blocker kicks in means that users are
 staying effectively on HTTP pages with all the side effects. Not sure what
 "downgraded a little" means in this context. But why is their security
 already compromised with HTTPS-Everywhere redirecting *everything* to
 HTTPS? The problem here is that the MCB is interfering too early and
 basically denying the load not knowing that it would not get delivered as
 a HTTP request but an HTTPS one due to HTTPS-Everywhere rewriting it.
 Thus, there is no security compromise for those 5-6% of sites in Tor
 Browser as there is no active mixed content loaded in the first place.
 >
 > The problem is that HTTPS Everywhere ''doesn't'' redirect *everything*
 to HTTPS for mixed-content rulesets.  The attribute
 `platform="mixedcontent"` means that for browsers that do block mixed
 content, insecure content ''will'' be blocked on the HTTPS endpoint and
 result in disruption of the user experience in some substantive way.
 Conversely and necessarily, for browsers not blocking mixed content, an
 HTTPS site ''will'' be loading resources insecurely.  The purpose of that
 flag is to ensure that the user experience is not disrupted in either
 case, allowing users to get at the content they need either way.  In the
 case of mixed-content-blocking browsers, allowing them to access the HTTP
 endpoint.  In the case of non-mixed-content-blocking browsers, having
 insecure content loaded on the HTTPS endpoint.
 >
 > This is what I mean by ''downgraded a little''.  In this context, it
 that the 5% of sites with `platform="mixedcontent"` HTTPS Everywhere
 rulesets in mixed-content-blocking browsers will be loading an HTTP page
 with HTTP includes, rather than an HTTPS page with HTTP includes.  In
 either case, it's insecure - any 3rd party script can completely rewrite
 the contents of a page.  It just requires a little more work than directly
 rewriting an HTTP page.

 Well, sure, if websites governed by `mixedcontent` rules include third
 party resources (over http) that do not have a respective HTTPS-Everywhere
 rule then those are loaded over HTTP and you don't get much benefit from
 the `mixedcontent` rule. I am  not sure how prevalent this kind of pattern
 is but my assumption was that a lot of `mixedcontent` rules don't follow
 that one.

 > >
 > > > > And for sites that aren't included in HTTPS Everywhere, ensuring
 active mixed content is not loaded on the page is a big win
 > >
 > > In what regard? JS loaded over HTTPS can easily redirect to JS loaded
 over HTTP and Firefox will happily execute it as the MCB does *not* kick
 in in that case. And that's just one of the problems.
 >
 > This is just not the case.  If active mixed content is blocked, even if
 an HTTPS resource redirects to HTTP, it will ''not'' be executed.

 Oh, this got fixed in the meantime then, good. I was a bit confused as the
 related bugs like  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=878890 and
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1006881 are still open. But
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=418354 solves the problem and
 thus Firefox users since 36 (or 38) are not effected anymore by it.

 > The coverage of HTTPS Everywhere is, despite the name, far from 100%.
 This is more true now, with the availability to deploy 

Re: [tor-bugs] #22406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open (cartoon page + 4 cartoons)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22406: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open
(cartoon page + 4 cartoons)
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, regarding the crashes when you disable the NVIDIA chip? Can you
 reproduce those reliably? We might be able to help you when we look at
 that issue first? Does a normal, unmodified Firefox (ESR 45) crash in this
 case as well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22030 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo shows old IPv6 Exit ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22030: Onionoo shows old IPv6 Exit ports
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Indeed, looks like a bug in Onionoo.
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/commit/?h=task-22030=47abfdbe09f6560039150674370a8ee8e357f142
 Here's] a potential fix that is yet untested.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open (cartoon page + 4 cartoons)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22406: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open
(cartoon page + 4 cartoons)
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I wonder what we can do to help you. How frequent are those crashes? Would
 you be willing to run a special debug build if we gave you instructions on
 how to capture useful information for us? So far it seems you are the only
 one coming to us with this kind of crashes. But maybe that does not mean
 anything and other users just don't report them and think Tor Browser is
 broken (which would be bad)...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22098 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PulseAudio alert banner leads to a 404 page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22098: PulseAudio alert banner leads to a 404 page
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr


Comment:

 Let's keep it in our bug tracker. Tor Browser users might look for it and
 file new tickets if they don't find anything. But we can take it from our
 `tbb-7.0-must` group.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22409 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Difficulty using with vision impairments

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22409: Difficulty using with vision impairments
--+---
 Reporter:  wbaxter37 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: view-source requests hit the network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1: view-source requests hit the network
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-linkability,  |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr-will-have |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability => tbb-usability, tbb-linkability, ff52-esr-
 will-have
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Nice find. We don't care so much about those requests hitting the network
 (stopping that would have been a convenient solution to the first party
 isolation problem). So, closing this as it is fixed in 7.0a4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22415 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Format error in our pipeline patch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22415: Format error in our pipeline patch
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied to `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1` and `tor-browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2`
 (commit 7aa5a5c8565273ea41a0c003160226f3229373f6 and
 e404251e7a4e86981a33be035e7fdb0b7ed42c3b), thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21684 [Applications/Tor Browser]: AMO has access to installed extensions with window.navigator.AddonManager in ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21684: AMO has access to installed extensions with 
window.navigator.AddonManager
in ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R, GeorgKoppen201705   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Fixed and applied to `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1` and `tor-
 browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2` (commit 9de9d5a74472423e5a7e5754f5d93b2d89103dfe
 and e5da14c4ae6e3917928b3004bca7bd49e972089e).

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