Re: [tor-bugs] #20909 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20909: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis maybe-it-   |  Actual Points:
  went-away-when-we-werent-looking   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Ok, that seems reasonable: 0.2.9, 0.3.0 and 0.3.1 seem no worse than 0.2.7
 and 0.2.5, and the overall incidence is very low (~0.1% of relays).

 It is unlikely any client would choose 3 of these relays as directory
 guards (~1/10^9).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20909 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20909: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis maybe-it-   |  Actual Points:
  went-away-when-we-werent-looking   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi teor, script finished after 511 minutes. Results are...

 {{{
 % grep -v currrent /tmp/results.txt
 2F8153E85A628D20416691082D58F95676719C14 (0.2.9.11): consensus expired at
 2017-07-09T18:00:00
 A3F68B3413BD4C83B7315B550AE84BABEB0F0CAF (0.2.9.10): consensus expired at
 2017-06-26T12:00:00
 7552AE46D6271D22B2EF0B12C96BA075FC0DC573 (0.2.7.6): consensus expired at
 2017-07-10T08:00:00
 5A044604030A3B0C45C5D1A96C8096026A9C1766 (0.2.5.14): failed (timed out)
 4518985BA8BD859EE3C46D51CF07E9C14BD5BC17 (0.3.0.9): consensus expired at
 2017-07-10T01:00:00
 3FFCDAAC784C9FB66E502490A787B5B8AFC69E28 (0.3.1.4-alpha): consensus
 expired at 2017-07-10T14:00:00
 06D0FB9C6860E8D7FB99EA310A016707AFAA71CE (0.2.9.11): consensus expired at
 2017-07-06T08:00:00
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10306 [Metrics/Compass]: Show relays by nickname substring

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10306: Show relays by nickname substring
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Compass  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arma):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Karsten said he'd be happy to review a patch, and now there is one? :)

 I guess another alternative would be to close the ticket on the theory
 that not as many people use compass nowadays. But I bet quite a few relay
 operators do.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10025 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 3.x's ChangeLog pretends the world started at TBB 3.0a1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10025: TBB 3.x's ChangeLog pretends the world started at TBB 3.0a1
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-3.0, needs-triage |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arma):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Still a useful documentation step I think?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20221 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hardened Tor Browser does not produce stack traces.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20221: Hardened Tor Browser does not produce stack traces.
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-hardened, TorBrowserTeam201702,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201702  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Close because there is no more hardened browser? Or keep open and move to
 be about one of the other tor browser builds?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Many users seem to be failing incremental updates to 4.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16028: Many users seem to be failing incremental updates to 4.5.1
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-updater   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Is this still an issue? Is there anything to be learned now from our
 experiences with 4.5.1?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5730 [Archived/Vidalia]: tbb's vidalia's "about" window says The Tor Project doesn't have an opinion on Vidalia's "quality, suitability, or anything else"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5730: tbb's vidalia's "about" window says The Tor Project doesn't have an 
opinion
on Vidalia's "quality, suitability, or anything else"
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  chiiph
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Vidalia  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I'm going to close this ticket, since it's now in a component named
 "archived".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #7997 [Archived/Ooni]: Ooni documentation does not adequately explain Twisted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7997: Ooni documentation  does not adequately explain Twisted
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hellais
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Ooni  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I'm going to close this ticket, since it's in a component called
 "archived/ooni" so nobody's ever going to deal with it. If you read this
 commit mail, feel free to do something smart. :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9521 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "new identity" leaks memory in eventSuppressor.suppressEventHandling()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9521: "new identity" leaks memory in eventSuppressor.suppressEventHandling()
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, interview, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton, ff45-esr, tbb-performance-leaking   |
Parent ID:  #18047   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Did this ticket get left behind?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22878 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Trunnel needs a debug mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22878: Trunnel needs a debug mode
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Trunnel  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 I'm trying to diagnose a bug that occurs in trunnel/tor code, but it only
 occurs in shadow. Trunnel returns error strings, but doesn't log them,
 making it hard to work out which part of the code is causing the issue.

 What I'd like to be able to do is define a macro when compiling to
 activate debug logging.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22877 [Core Tor]: Tor Software Error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22877: Tor Software Error
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Just slavishly following our machines of loving grace:

 Tor Software Error - The Tor software encountered an internal bug. Please
 report the following error message to the Tor developers at
 bugs.torproject.org: "circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay
 cell sent from ../src/or/relay.c:737 has n_chan==NULL. Dropping. (on Tor
 0.3.0.9 22b3bf094e327093)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22876 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: The cypherpunks account can be deleted by everyone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22876: The cypherpunks  account can be deleted by everyone
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:   => qbi
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Internal Services/Service - trac


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22876 [Webpages/Website]: The cypherpunks account can be deleted by everyone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22876: The cypherpunks  account can be deleted by everyone
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Cause the password and username of the anonymous account "cypherpunks" are
 public, everyone is able to delete or change the account settings.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22875 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Wi-Fi Sign-in impossible with enabled Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22875: Wi-Fi Sign-in impossible with enabled Add-on
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 If you connect to public Wi-Fi, you often have to accept their terms of
 use which are stored in a local (router) website. To access this site you
 can open a tab with an equivalent URL. HTTPS Everywhere tries to grab the
 SSL Certificate from the server which is not accessible at this moment so
 an error occurred and the page fails to load. This can be manually fixed
 by simply deactivating the Add-on for the time while you accept the hoster
 terms.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22782 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Change domain front for snowflake to something that isn't blocked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22782: Change domain front for snowflake to something that isn't blocked
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: dcf (added)


Comment:

 We can solve this by first doing #22874 (standalone broker).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22874: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)
---+-
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/tree/broker?id=bfea72b50e9277be0abae1b696431c28faef681c
 Currently] the broker code is implemented only for App Engine; i.e. it
 doesn't have a `main` function and relies on being invoked using the App
 Engine APIs.

 Instead, the broker should run as a standalone HTTPS server somewhere, and
 App Engine should only be a dumb request/response forwarder (we can steal
 the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/tree/appengine?id=451320610020753ccaee2d533972a6ae5a1873c0
 forwarder code from meek]). That will make it possible to easily add
 domain fronts other than Google (#22782), and any secret data we handle on
 the broker won't have to be revealed to Google.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22782 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Change domain front for snowflake to something that isn't blocked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22782: Change domain front for snowflake to something that isn't blocked
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22362: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a 
website
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, GeorgKoppen201707, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201707   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Please check 5.0.7rc1, thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21074 [Core Tor/Tor]: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21074: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  OSX Sierra setrlimit, tbb-wants  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by fink):

 Temp fix for the issue:



 {{{
 sudo launchctl limit maxfiles 1 1
 }}}
 Need to check if this fix is long-term.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22787 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fontconfig warning: remove 'blank' configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22787: Fontconfig warning: remove 'blank' configuration
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => tbb-fingerprinting


Comment:

 Here is the upstream commit (2015-06-17):
 
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/commit/?id=46b2c62faa64250eec3981ee816e91a9a3dee857

 But before that (2015-02-17), they had removed `` from the
 default fonts.conf and made the blanks be hardcoded in the library:
 
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/commit/?id=d6a5cc665a1d7e91332944353e92c83ad114368c
   https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79956

 I am sure that when I set up fonts.conf for Tor Browser initially, I
 cargo-culted most of the config from somewhere, including the ``
 section. I don't really know what it does.

 
[https://cgit.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/tree/fonts.dtd?id=d6a5cc665a1d7e91332944353e92c83ad114368c#n59
 According to fonts.dtd], the `` section is optional, so I would
 guess that we can remove it without causing crashes on old versions of
 fontconfig.

 But we may have to deal with this as a new fingerprinting vector (whether
 we remove the `` or not). If we are using the system fontconfig,
 and the system fontconfig has a built-in set of blanks that varies across
 systems (it looks like they update it with new Unicode versions), and it's
 possible for a web page to detect the difference, then it could be used
 for fingerprinting.

 The set of built-in blanks isn't even under version control, because they
 have a makefile that fetches [http://unicode.org/cldr/utility/list-
 unicodeset.jsp?a=%5B%3AGC%3DZs%3A%5D%5B%3ADI%3A%5D=on=on== a
 list] from unicode.org at build time :( So it's likely to be whatever
 randomly happened to be there when someone built a release.

 To test, we could repurpose the fontfp code and replace the list of code
 points with the unicode.org list.
   !https://repo.eecs.berkeley.edu/git-anon/users/fifield/fontfp.git

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22856 [Webpages/Website]: Add a "We're hiring!" link to homepage when we are hiring

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22856: Add a "We're hiring!" link to homepage when we are hiring
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * type:  defect => task
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 hiro merged the patch. Thanks!

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > There's a lot of space it seems between "We're hiring! »" and the
 "Download Volunteer Donate" buttons.

 That's true. I think I'll leave it as is, because it's fairly temporary
 and I need to focus on other things now. But if someone wants to work on
 polishing this, I would be supportive.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17670 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mac OSX mistakes Tor as Firefox default browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17670: Mac OSX mistakes Tor as Firefox default browser
--+--
 Reporter:  patrickbateman|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 teor]:
 > Do you want to close this ticket, mcs or arthuredelstein?

 Yes, I think we are done here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20105 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Selecting Open With TorBrowser on a Mac Opens the File in Default Browser Instead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20105: Selecting Open With TorBrowser on a Mac Opens the File in Default 
Browser
Instead
--+--
 Reporter:  hdub  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17670| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > I think an extra window is something we can live with: it's not a
 security issue any more, because opening links and documents with Tor
 Browser as the default browser works in 7.0.1.
 >
 > Do you want to close this ticket, mcs?

 Yes, and done.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (I'm going to leave this open so people can look at the other
 memcmp/strcmp stuff for a while)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 looks good; I have cherry-picked this to maint-0.3.1.

 (The original branch was based on master, which would be right for a
 feature ... but a bugfix should be on the corresponding maint branch.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22873 [Core Tor/Tor]: more details about maint- vs release- vs master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22873: more details about maint- vs release- vs master
---+
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to master!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SSL Auth broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22855: SSL Auth broken
--+---
 Reporter:  bugster   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bugster):

 Yes, only this:

 {{{

 'mytorwebsite.onion:443 uses an invalid security certificate.

 The certificate is not trusted because it is self-signed.
 The certificate is not valid for the name mytorwebsite.onion.
 The certificate expired on 05/18/2017 08:15 PM. The current time is
 07/10/2017 05:10 PM.

 Error code: SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER

   (unknown)'
 }}}
 But in browser window i see:

 {{{

 Secure Connection Failed

 An error occurred during a connection to mytorwebsite.onion. security
 library failure. Error code: SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE

   The  page you are trying to view cannot be shown because the
 authenticity of  the received data could not be verified.Please contact
 the website  owners to inform them of this problem.
 }}}


 It's my test website and self-signed certificate. 6.* still works fine.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22866 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22866: Default language
--+---
 Reporter:  masser|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22866 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22866: Default language
--+--
 Reporter:  masser|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * status:  reopened => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22866 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22866: Default language
--+--
 Reporter:  masser|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  not a bug =>


Comment:

 Depending on what exactly the user means this could actually be a bug.
 masser: How do you choose your language? Which bundle locale are you
 using?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20909 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20909: Tor 0.2.9.5-alpha still delivers outdated consensuses
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis maybe-it-   |  Actual Points:
  went-away-when-we-werent-looking   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi teor, no problem. Kicking off a run of the script mentioned in the
 other ticket. Last time it took 639 minutes to run so I won't have results
 until tomorrow at the earliest.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SSL Auth broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22855: SSL Auth broken
--+---
 Reporter:  bugster   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 If you open the error console (Ctrl + Shift + J) do you get errors when
 you want to use the certificate? If so which?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22872 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV crash in TorBrowser 7.5a2 on OSX 10.11.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22872: SIGSEGV crash in TorBrowser 7.5a2 on OSX 10.11.6
--+---
 Reporter:  heywoodj123@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Normal => Major
 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 Thanks for the report. Do you have any more context that could give us
 ways to reproduce your problem) Like the website you had open while this
 happened? Whether you changed the security slider level? etc.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't open AF_INET/AF_INET6 sockets when AF_LOCAL is configured.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22794: Don't open AF_INET/AF_INET6 sockets when AF_LOCAL is configured.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201707   |
Parent ID:  #20775   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22857 [Webpages/Website]: Orbot project box is broken on homepage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22857: Orbot project box is broken on homepage
--+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 hiro merged this patch. Thank you! :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pastly):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 >
 > What versions of macOS does this fail on?
 > (We should test on it more often.)
 >

 10.11.6 (I'm calling it OS X on purpose :p)

 > On macOS 10.12.5, Xcode 8.3.3, clang 3.9.1 I see:
 > {{{
 > consdiff/base64cmp: OK
 > }}}
 >
 > But I also see in the macOS memcmp man page:
 >
 >  The memcmp() function returns zero if the two strings are
 identical, oth-
 >  erwise returns the difference between the first two differing bytes
 >  (treated as unsigned char values, so that `\200' is greater than
 `\0',
 >  for example).  Zero-length strings are always identical.  This
 behavior
 >  is not required by C and portable code should only depend on the
 sign of
 >  the returned value.
 >
 > Whereas strcmp is ambiguous:
 >
 >  The strcmp() and strncmp() functions return an integer greater
 than,
 >  equal to, or less than 0, according as the string s1 is greater
 than,
 >  equal to, or less than the string s2.  The comparison is done using
 >  unsigned characters, so that `\200' is greater than `\0'.

 The behavior I saw was definitely more in line with what you've quoted for
 memcmp.

 I'm very weak on OS X/macOS development. I don't seem to have Xcode
 installed. `clang --version` says

 {{{
 Apple LLVM version 8.0.0 (clang-800.0.42.1)
 Target: x86_64-apple-darwin15.6.0
 Thread model: posix
 InstalledDir: /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools/usr/bin
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22873 [Core Tor/Tor]: more details about maint- vs release- vs master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22873: more details about maint- vs release- vs master
---+
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22873 [Core Tor/Tor]: more details about maint- vs release- vs master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22873: more details about maint- vs release- vs master
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  documentation
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Update doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md with some more advice regarding how
 to branch off of tor.

 See git-branch-use on my gitweb repo.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22869 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22869: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control
interface
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 That was probably overly harsh, but the UI should be totally redone, and
 resources to do so are non-existent.  While I'm thinking about this, all
 the options except perhaps the circuit display should get the `(UNSAFE)`
 tag because they concretely increase either attack surface, or
 fingerprinting risks in some way or another.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Are there any other instances of this pattern in the codebase?
 I just checked, we very rarely do anything other than:
 {{{
 !strcmp()
 strcmp == 0
 strcmp()
 }}}
 and all the instances where we do > or < seem ok.

 What versions of macOS does this fail on?
 (We should test on it more often.)

 On macOS 10.12.5, Xcode 8.3.3, clang 3.9.1 I see:
 {{{
 consdiff/base64cmp: OK
 }}}

 But I also see in the macOS memcmp man page:

  The memcmp() function returns zero if the two strings are identical,
 oth-
  erwise returns the difference between the first two differing bytes
  (treated as unsigned char values, so that `\200' is greater than
 `\0',
  for example).  Zero-length strings are always identical.  This
 behavior
  is not required by C and portable code should only depend on the sign
 of
  the returned value.

 Whereas strcmp is ambiguous:

  The strcmp() and strncmp() functions return an integer greater than,
  equal to, or less than 0, according as the string s1 is greater than,
  equal to, or less than the string s2.  The comparison is done using
  unsigned characters, so that `\200' is greater than `\0'.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19871 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crypto operation counters are unused and obsolete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19871: Crypto operation counters are unused and obsolete
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed technnical-debt dead-   |  Actual Points:
  code easy  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor3-can


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18896 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test supposedly constant-time crypto primitives to verify that they are in fact constant-time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18896: Test supposedly constant-time crypto primitives to verify that they are 
in
fact constant-time
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing crypto constant-time side-   |  Actual Points:
  channel disaster-waiting-to-happen |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3-can
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 I [https://github.com/isislovecruft/ctgrind-valgrind revised agl's ctgrind
 patch for the latest valgrind]. Next we'd need to make tests which
 exercise the crypto code with the secrets poisoned in memory.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22872 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV crash in TorBrowser 7.5a2 on OSX 10.11.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22872: SIGSEGV crash in TorBrowser 7.5a2 on OSX 10.11.6
--+--
 Reporter:  heywoodj123@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18896 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test supposedly constant-time crypto primitives to verify that they are in fact constant-time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18896: Test supposedly constant-time crypto primitives to verify that they are 
in
fact constant-time
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing crypto constant-time side-   |  Actual Points:
  channel disaster-waiting-to-happen |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * sponsor:  SponsorS-can => Sponsor3-can


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16671 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Design a new Bridge Distributor for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16671: Design a new Bridge Distributor for Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-dist, tor-browser-wants  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22872 [- Select a component]: SIGSEGV crash in TorBrowser 7.5a2 on OSX 10.11.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22872: SIGSEGV crash in TorBrowser 7.5a2 on OSX 10.11.6
--+-
 Reporter:  heywoodj123@… |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Unexpected crash in TB 7.5a2 on 10.11.6. All the debugging info I could
 see when it happened is attached below as a plain-text file.

 -HJ

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22871 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Implement backend for moat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22871: Implement backend for moat
+--
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorM, bridgedb-captcha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15967 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Separate BridgeDB's CAPTCHA into another service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15967: Separate BridgeDB's CAPTCHA into another service
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-https captcha tor-launcher  |  Actual Points:
  ooni-probe |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22789: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current
-+-
 Reporter:  fredzupy |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.4-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor, crash, inet_pton, c99,  |  Actual Points:  3
  openbsd, 024-backport, 025-backport,   |
  026-backport, 027-backport, 028-backport,  |
  029-backport, 030-backport, review-group-20|
  trove-2017-007 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorV


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22781 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Unify link specifier API/ABI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22781: hs: Unify link specifier API/ABI
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs => prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-must => SponsorR-can
 * parent:  #21888 =>


Comment:

 This is not prop224 groundwork afterall.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16671 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Design a new Bridge Distributor for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16671: Design a new Bridge Distributor for Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-dist, tor-browser-wants  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by isis):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Related: #22871
 Required prerequisite work: #15967

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure directory_initiate_request handles pluggable transports correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20532: Make sure directory_initiate_request handles pluggable transports 
correctly
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge-client, bridge-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorM


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9074 [Archived/ttdnsd]: Remove ttdnsd from deb.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9074: Remove ttdnsd from deb.torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/ttdnsd  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  debian   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * owner:  isis =>
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Not sure why I own this ticket

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22871 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Implement backend for moat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22871: Implement backend for moat
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:   |Version:
  Obfuscation/BridgeDB   |   Keywords:  SponsorM, bridgedb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  captcha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We'll need to finish #15967 and also the following:

  - change BridgeDB to request captchas from the new server
  - create an API for handing captchas to Tor Launcher

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22788 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22788: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > > Isn't this expected since JIT is disabled in those higher security
 settings? Or should there be a whitelist for anything `pdf.js` (at least
 for the Medium security setting)?
 > >
 > > No, this seems to happen to *other* tabs only while the PDF is
 downloading, and not once it's loaded. I don't see why other tabs should
 be affected in 7.0.1 / multiprocess at all. But it seems worse than the
 6.0 series, not better.
 >
 > With "downloading" do you mean getting the external helper app dialog
 and then downloading the file to disk or do you mean just loading the file
 into your browser over the Internet? Do the two scenarios behave
 differently for you?

 Yes. I only see the issue when loading the file into the embedded PDF
 viewer.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22788 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22788: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > Isn't this expected since JIT is disabled in those higher security
 settings? Or should there be a whitelist for anything `pdf.js` (at least
 for the Medium security setting)?
 >
 > No, this seems to happen to *other* tabs only while the PDF is
 downloading, and not once it's loaded. I don't see why other tabs should
 be affected in 7.0.1 / multiprocess at all. But it seems worse than the
 6.0 series, not better.

 With "downloading" do you mean getting the external helper app dialog and
 then downloading the file to disk or do you mean just loading the file
 into your browser over the Internet? Do the two scenarios behave
 differently for you?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22736 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Update spec wrt overlap behavior of HSes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22736: prop224: Update spec wrt overlap behavior of HSes
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #21888 =>


Comment:

 Also, this is not prop224 groundwork.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22735 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HS desc overlap period func uses absolute times instead of slots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22735: prop224: HS desc overlap period func uses absolute times instead of 
slots
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 prop224-extra tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #21888 =>


Comment:

 Also, this is not prop224 groundwork.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SSL Auth broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22855: SSL Auth broken
--+---
 Reporter:  bugster   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bugster):

 Unmodified tor browser (both versions, 6.* and 7.*), but
 'security.nocertdb' option changed to 'true' for enable custom certificate
 importing and saving (in both versions too).

 https://arcweb.co/securing-websites-nginx-and-client-side-certificate-
 authentication-linux/ example of client-side certificate authentication
 settings.

 Until 7.0 version it worked fine.
 Reinstalling the browser also does not solve this problem.

 Sorry for my English

 Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: us-u.openx.net URL saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as part of the browsing history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22867: us-u.openx.net URL saved in the Tor Browser places.sqlite database as 
part
of the browsing history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-disk-leak


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SSL Auth broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22855: SSL Auth broken
--+---
 Reporter:  bugster   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Interesting. Could you give us a bit more detailed steps to reproduce your
 problem? Is that happening with an unmodified Tor Browser in its default
 settings?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity doesn't force kill window if there's a tab with a text box.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22849: New Identity doesn't force kill window if there's a tab with a text box.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-newnym, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-newnym, tbb-
 regression => tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-newnym, tbb-regression, tbb-e10s


Comment:

 Seems to be e10s related.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Old description:

> Once I get a ticket number, the branch will be on: user/pastly/tor.git
>
> strcmp on most platforms returns -1 for "less than 0" and 1 for "more
> than 0" but +/- 1 isn't required. Today I learned that OS X is one of
> those platforms that follows the standard but not the convention.
>
> Introduced in tor-0.3.1.1-alpha

New description:

 See gitweb user/pastly/tor.git branch ticket22870

 strcmp on most platforms returns -1 for "less than 0" and 1 for "more than
 0" but +/- 1 isn't required. Today I learned that OS X is one of those
 platforms that follows the standard but not the convention.

 Introduced in tor-0.3.1.1-alpha

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22870 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiff test fails on OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22870: consdiff test fails on OS X
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Once I get a ticket number, the branch will be on: user/pastly/tor.git

 strcmp on most platforms returns -1 for "less than 0" and 1 for "more than
 0" but +/- 1 isn't required. Today I learned that OS X is one of those
 platforms that follows the standard but not the convention.

 Introduced in tor-0.3.1.1-alpha

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Tuned window size, it really doesn't changes per recved dozen KB if you
 allow to use dozen MBs. Still, can't trigger test win7 in VM to send more
 bytes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22821 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Truncated tor-browser-linux32-7.5a1_tr.mar file on mirrors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22821: Truncated tor-browser-linux32-7.5a1_tr.mar file on mirrors
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with the 7.5a2 release.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22869 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22869: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control
interface
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Further documenting an interface that should be rewritten, for a project
 that is getting no development (that people probably shouldn't be using)
 doesn't feel great to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > peers promotes huge tcp window 500K - 1M

 And no change, how possible?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22813 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Multiprocess Firefox hangs! (on Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22813: Multiprocess Firefox hangs! (on Windows)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Do you have a particular setup to reproduce the issue or is it happening
 randomly?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22808 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Always apply Do Not Track, and disable checkbox to prevent changing it.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22808: Always apply Do Not Track, and disable checkbox to prevent changing it.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 #5501 is probably the ticket the cypherpunk alluded to. This is still a
 WONTFIX.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22793 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Printing does not work under specific circumstances with Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22793: Printing does not work under specific circumstances with Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  Td8F  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 Td8F]:
 > I reproduced it in a VM so I'm quite certain OS is fairly clean. Both
 times I used Windows 7 x64.

 Can you check whether that happens with a Firefox 52.2.0 ESR browser as
 well (and whether 52.2.1 ESR solves this problem for you)? You can find
 both on https://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/firefox/releases/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Btw, peers promotes huge tcp window 500K - 1M, my local test didn't show
 such values.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't open AF_INET/AF_INET6 sockets when AF_LOCAL is configured.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22794: Don't open AF_INET/AF_INET6 sockets when AF_LOCAL is configured.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201707   |
Parent ID:  #20775   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing => tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing,
 TorBrowserTeam201707


Comment:

 Hm, I wonder what is going on here. Putting it on our radar.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3837 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Better dialog for 3rd party auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3837: Better dialog for 3rd party auth
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ff52-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: g.koppen@… (removed)
 * cc: gk (added)
 * keywords:  tbb-usability => tbb-usability, ff52-esr-will-have
 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Made more or less obsolete with the switch to first-party isolation for
 HTTP auth.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Regular users also can be affected by this problem?

 Not sure.

 > It's not Linux, which accelerated my relay, but NAT from VirtualBox?

 Yes, NAT-ed VM strips guest's tcp/ip stack, performance will depend host
 entirely for such case.

 > Results are less stable, but upload to 13B2354C still can go up to 450
 KiB/s:

 Mystery of Windows.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22796 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default browser in Ubuntu doesn't work properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22796: Default browser in Ubuntu doesn't work properly
--+--
 Reporter:  macho.p   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > First issue: it looks like you're using the torbrowserlauncher deb? That
 isn't made by us, so you might have better luck filing a ticket about it
 in the debian bts. But alas, I expect you won't have much luck there
 either.
 >
 > Second issue: is making tor browser your default browser even supposed
 to work? That is, are there any howtos out there that explain how to do it
 in a way that's actually safe? I have seen several people wanting to do
 this, and each time they hacked together something that was really unsafe.

 #20811 is relevant.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21862: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Thanks, that's really helpful. For now we are good. We'll take a closer
 look at it during the transition to esr59 and will get back to you in case
 we need more info.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Vort):

 > Try to disable it for network adapter, to test real windows 7 upload
 speed.

 Results are less stable, but upload to 13B2354C still can go up to 450
 KiB/s:
 attachment:tor_upload_without_lso.png

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22792 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to ignore self-signed certificate error for .onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22792: Add an option to ignore self-signed certificate error for .onion
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #13410.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ubuntu 16.04 apparmor policy blocks obfs4proxy without modification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22860: Ubuntu 16.04 apparmor policy blocks obfs4proxy without modification
--+
 Reporter:  ccppuu|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  apparmor, obfs4proxy, tor-pt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  apparmor, obfsproxy, obfs4proxy => apparmor, obfs4proxy, tor-
   pt
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Vort):

 Do the latest results means that
 1. Regular users also can be affected by this problem?
 2. It's not Linux, which accelerated my relay, but NAT from VirtualBox?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22798: Windows relay is several times slower than Linux relay
---+---
 Reporter:  Vort   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay performance windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > upload good when

 "good" as it was 64KB buffer, that is NIC buffer for offloaded data.  It
 seems LSO (TSO) just hides broken windows tcp stack. Try to disable it for
 network adapter, to test real windows 7 upload speed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21760 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Onionperf deployment - CollecTor side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21760: Onionperf deployment - CollecTor side
---+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.3.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => needs_information


Comment:

 Is there anything left to be done?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21760 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Onionperf deployment - CollecTor side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21760: Onionperf deployment - CollecTor side
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.3.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * owner:  metrics-team => iwakeh
 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21759 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add persistence for torperf/onionperf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21759: Add persistence for torperf/onionperf
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.3.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:   => CollecTor 1.3.0


Comment:

 Also add sync-code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21760 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Onionperf deployment - CollecTor side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21760: Onionperf deployment - CollecTor side
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.3.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:   => CollecTor 1.3.0


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add webstats module to collector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: add webstats module to collector
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.3.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:   => CollecTor 1.3.0


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21139 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add javadoc overview page to CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21139: add javadoc overview page to CollecTor
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.3.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:   => CollecTor 1.3.0


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20515 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor's relaydescs module should avoid httpurlconnection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20515: CollecTor's relaydescs module should avoid httpurlconnection
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-help   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8799  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Simply switching to file copy would mean a major change here as the
 current download approach reads the data to memory for verifying and after
 that writes to file(s).
 A toy example of an http-server that accepts connections, but never writes
 the response code yielded the stack-trace provided in #22602.  The easiest
 remedy is setting a read-timeout.
 (A quick inspection of the code that gets used when using Files.copy
 indicates that a timeout seems to be set there, too.)

 Open points:
 * the current read timeout is arbitrarily set to 5000ms. How to find the
 best value?
 * Should a connect timeout be set, too?  There is no bug report that
 indicates necessity for this timeout type.

 Please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-20515=0411ec816ed9298cc657309af96432027348f014
 this change].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8799 [Metrics/CollecTor]: collector's downloads: avoid httpurl-connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8799: collector's downloads: avoid httpurl-connection
---+---
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20518 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 The download in ExitlistDownloader and RelayDescriptorDownloader should be
 based on a common code source, which is not part of this task.  New
 ticket?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20516 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor's exitlists module should avoid httpurlconnection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20516: CollecTor's exitlists module should avoid httpurlconnection
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-help   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8799  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Simply switching to file copy would mean a major change here as the
 current download approach reads the data to memory for verifying and after
 that writes to file(s).
 A toy example of an http-server that accepts connections, but never writes
 the response code yielded the stack-trace provided in #22602.  The easiest
 remedy is setting a read-timeout.
 (A quick inspection of the code that gets used when using Files.copy
 indicates that a timeout seems to be set there, too.)

 Open points:
 * the current read timeout is arbitrarily set to 5000ms. How to find the
 best value?
 * Should a connect timeout be set, too?  There is no bug report that
 indicates necessity for this timeout type.

 Please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-20516=78c7727538709a3cec2d1f2ba950bc23dbc5dc8c
 this change].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise coding standards expectation for tests to be run before review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22762: Revise coding standards expectation for tests to be run before review
---+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo   |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22787 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fontconfig warning: remove 'blank' configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22787: Fontconfig warning: remove 'blank' configuration
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: dcf (added)


Comment:

 I guess we can't remove that part of `fonts.conf`, though, until all
 distros we support have updated to a more recent `fontconfig`?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22615 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor no longer works even after re-installing on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22615: Tor no longer works even after re-installing on Windows 10
--+---
 Reporter:  nicholasac|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #8337.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8337 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Trusteer crashes Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8337: Trusteer crashes Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  mo|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: phoul, torment (added)


Comment:

 Resolved #22615 as duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22869 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22869: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control
interface
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 [[Image(sandboxed-tor-browser-config.png​)]]

 [[Image(sandboxed-tor-browser-tor-config.png​)]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22869 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22869: Documentation: Add some screenshots of sandboxed-tor-browser's control
interface
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I've included some below

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Related: #20314.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17857 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17857: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-20   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Thanks Mike/teor, I understand better the difference.

 `channel_do_open_actions()` still has too much code regarding padding. It
 has 4 if/else branches which 3 of them disable padding and one of them
 reduces it but all of them look at torrc options *specific* to padding.
 IMO, this is a "violation" of separation between subsystems and I'm no big
 fan­.

 I would have like to see this big if/else in some sort of
 "channelpadding_consider_on_open()" or sth which would not clobber
 channel.c with padding stuff and then we can take care of code duplication
 much easily afterwards. And afaict, that padding code in
 `channel_do_open_actions()` is not tested by the unit test.

 I understand the time constraint here, that "it is tested and any other
 changes delay++" so I'm fine for now but my concerns will at least be on
 the record ;).

 Nick, it's your call now :).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs