Re: [tor-bugs] #23389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR will not run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23389: TOR will not run
--+---
 Reporter:  joeh6335  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by joeh6335):

 No error messages appeared.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR will not run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23389: TOR will not run
--+---
 Reporter:  joeh6335  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by joeh6335):

 Every new version. Windows 8.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10942 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Deterministic builds for Instantbird

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10942: Deterministic builds for Instantbird
+
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Windows is reproducible with https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=9accac5b740962c85e044ae620789a156e3c17be ... marking
 this ticket as fixed since all platforms are now reproducible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10942 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Deterministic builds for Instantbird

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10942: Deterministic builds for Instantbird
+--
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:15 sukhbir]:
 > So while there are no files that differ for Windows and OS X on
 unpacking, the EXE and DMG still differ and it seems like the difference
 is at the packaging stage.

 macOS is reproducible as of https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=40a17907e3422785c495e01bfb5c7c0f6b9e7e11

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23365 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make safetyboard.tp.o A record for our hotcrp submission server (was: Make safetyboard.tp.o cname for our hotcrp submission server)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23365: Make safetyboard.tp.o A record for our hotcrp submission server
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23365 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make safetyboard.tp.o cname for our hotcrp submission server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23365: Make safetyboard.tp.o cname for our hotcrp submission server
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17248 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate new WebExtensions API requirements for our extensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17248: Investigate new WebExtensions API requirements for our extensions
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201512  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:15 yawning]:
 > Having to start firefox with the privileges/capabilities that tor needs
 is horrific and is something that we should move away from unless we have
 a lot of faith in Firefox acquiring decent security/sandboxing.

 Well seems like the faith paid off ;) FF acquired Chromium-level
 sandboxing on all three major platforms and should be more and more
 restricted for the upcoming esr FF59:
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Sandbox
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Sandbox/Specifics

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[tor-bugs] #23392 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable preloading of URLs in ESR59 since it's useless in Tor Browser context

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23392: Disable preloading of URLs in ESR59 since it's useless in Tor Browser
context
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff59
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Relevent bugzilla: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1348275

 {{{browser.urlbar.speculativeConnect.enabled = false}}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * priority:  High => Very High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 See branch: `bug23387_032_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19620 [Metrics/Metrics website]: all metrics-web java projects should use java 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19620: all metrics-web java projects should use java 8
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Metrics 2.0.0
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19617   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Hmmm, looks like some of the changes in #19730 actually required Java 8
 which my IDE already uses but which our Ant scripts don't use yet. Can we
 simply upgrade now? [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-19620=9c183f371cf94d6d01ec889a770939f218d30d6e
 Here's a very short, 1-character-only patch]. (Otherwise I'll have to
 partially revert #19730, and that would be sad.) Raising priority, because
 master currently doesn't build. Oops.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10942 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Deterministic builds for Instantbird

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10942: Deterministic builds for Instantbird
+--
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19730 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Metrics web java modules should use Java 7 throughout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19730: Metrics web java modules should use Java 7 throughout
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Awesome, thanks for the quick review! Pushed to master, deploying on
 meronense either later today or over the weekend. (Also agreeing about
 `System.err.print*`, plus we'll want to change all places where we're
 using different logging frameworks than slf4j. But that can happen
 independently of this ticket.) Closing. Thanks again!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23391 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Add changes section to Tor bridge descriptors specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23391: Add changes section to Tor bridge descriptors specification
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Looks good to me. Thanks Karsten!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23383 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23383: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Thank you, Linda! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23391 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Add changes section to Tor bridge descriptors specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23391: Add changes section to Tor bridge descriptors specification
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #23391 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Add changes section to Tor bridge descriptors specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23391: Add changes section to Tor bridge descriptors specification
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 atagar suggest [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 project/2017-September/001426.html on tor-project@] to add a changes
 section to our new [https://metrics.torproject.org/bridge-descriptors.html
 Tor bridge descriptors specification]:

 > One quick thing: when we next change sanitization would you mind adding
 a 'changes' section with the date of the change and what the modification
 was? I keep an eye on the tor-spec git changes to know when the dir-spec
 changes but a webpage like this is harder to track. A list to answer the
 question of "Last time I checked this was August. Has anything changed?"
 would be handy.

 Sounds useful to me. Let's start with such a changes section now, so that
 it doesn't appear out of the blue whenever we next make a change. I dug
 through Git history and found the following changes affecting `@type`
 annotations.

 Dates are Git's "committer dates" rather than "author dates". In the
 future we could switch to release dates as an even better approximation of
 when changes became effective, but past changes were usually deployed
 whenever they arrived in master. In the end the exact timing doesn't
 matter as much, though.

  - May 30, 2012: "@type" annotations were first added to sanitized
 descriptors to indicate descriptor type and version: "@type bridge-server-
 descriptor 1.0", "@type bridge-extra-info 1.0", and "@type bridge-network-
 status 1.0".
  - June 29, 2012: "@type bridge-extra-info 1.1" added sanitized
 "transport" lines.
  - February 1, 2013: "@type bridge-extra-info 1.2" was supposed to
 indicate added "ntor-onion-key" lines, but those changes only affected
 bridge server descriptors, not extra-info descriptors. So, nothing has
 changed as compared to "@type bridge-extra-info 1.1", and there may be
 "@type bridge-server-descriptor 1.0" descriptors with and without those
 lines.
  - June 19, 2015: "@type bridge-server-descriptor 1.1" and "@type bridge-
 extra-info 1.3" added "master-key-ed25519" and "router-digest-sha256"
 lines to descriptors published by bridges using an ed25519 master key.
  - September 18, 2016: "@type bridge-server-descriptor 1.2" and "@type
 bridge-network-status 1.1" introduced sanitized TCP ports.
  - July 10, 2017: "@type bridge-network-status 1.2" introduced the
 "fingerprint" line, containing the fingerprint of the bridge authority
 which produced the document, to the header.

 Please, somebody (probably atagar or iwakeh), review this list. If it
 looks good, I'll put it on the page early next week.

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[tor-bugs] #23390 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB 7.5a4 STATUS_FATAL_APP_EXIT crash in msvcr100.dll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23390: TBB 7.5a4 STATUS_FATAL_APP_EXIT crash in msvcr100.dll
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-crash
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 TBB crash log:
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 52.3.0.6242, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: msvcr100.dll, version: 10.0.30319.1, time stamp:
 0x4ba1dbbe
 Exception code: 0x4015
 Fault offset: 0x0008d635
 }}}

 The only ticket with the same code is #9382.

 It is a bit surprising that you are using an outdated version of
 msvcr100.dll instead of the latest 10.0.40219.325 from
 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2565063/ms11-025-description-of-
 the-security-update-for-visual-c-2010-service

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23389 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR will not run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23389: TOR will not run
--+---
 Reporter:  joeh6335  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Core Tor => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 This seems like a Tor Browser issue.  To make progress, we would need to
 know additional information like program versions, OS type and version,
 and exact error messages.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23149 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor buffer.c: split and rename functions.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23149: Refactor buffer.c: split and rename functions.
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-22  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #22342   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Otherwise, the changes look good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23149 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor buffer.c: split and rename functions.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23149: Refactor buffer.c: split and rename functions.
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-22  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #22342   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * reviewer:  catalyst =>


Comment:

 Proposed fixups in the `nickm/refactor_buffers_api` branch in my github
 repo.

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[tor-bugs] #23389 [Core Tor]: TOR will not run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23389: TOR will not run
--+
 Reporter:  joeh6335  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi,
 I have had Tor running for a few years, but now find that it will not
 start. I have tried to delete all old files and starting over. I get an
 icon on my desktop to click on, but it will not open.
 I also submitted this same ticket weeks ago, and found nothing when
 searching for it today.2017/09/01 15:04:21 - EDT

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19730 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Metrics web java modules should use Java 7 throughout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19730: Metrics web java modules should use Java 7 throughout
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks fine.  Good to move this.

 Next time the code gets touched logging should be added and all the
 System.err.print* and e.printStackTrace should be replaced.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GitLab CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22891: Add GitLab CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, continuous-integration,  |  Actual Points:
  testing, best-practice, unit-testing, new- |
  developers, review-group-22|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, dgoulet |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hiro):

 Here is the update: !https://oniongit.eu/hiro/tor/blob/gitlab-ci/.gitlab-
 ci.yml

 Please let me know if you have any feedback. There is another bit of work
 in terms of keys that need to have write access to the oniongit tor repo.

 Also, in case you want to run this in your own branches and repos, we will
 need to setup runners for it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22902 [Core Tor/Stem]: run_tests.py hangs in process or control.controller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22902: run_tests.py hangs in process or control.controller
---+
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21604 [Core Tor/Stem]: add descriptor-id calc functionality

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21604: add descriptor-id calc functionality
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21177 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21177: Add support for parsing bridge-distribution-request lines in Stem
---+--
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23281 [Core Tor/Stem]: py-stem test failures on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23281: py-stem test failures on FreeBSD
--+---
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing, freebsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * keywords:   => testing, freebsd


Comment:

 Hi yurivict271. Just to be very clear ball's in your court. I don't have a
 FreeBSD system so I'll need to rely on someone who can answer the above
 questions to make progress.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21013 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: We need a platform for users to report censorship events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21013: We need a platform for users to report censorship events
-+--
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  Rapid Response   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * type:  defect => project


Comment:

 I'm going to close this because I don't think anyone is working on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20785 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20785: Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block sa  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #6140 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan uses DPI to block Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6140: Kazakhstan uses DPI to block Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  runa |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  dpi censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket. Newer information about Kazakhstan is in #20348
 and [[doc/OONI/censorshipwiki/CensorshipByCountry/Kazakhstan#a20348]].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21014 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21014: Turkey blocking of direct connections, 2016-12-12
---+--
 Reporter:  mrphs  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block tr Turkey UX  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20907 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20907: Blocking of public relays in Belarus, 2016-12-01
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block by  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20419 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: iran has banned tor successfully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20419: iran has banned tor successfully
-+---
 Reporter:  ufd33|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  censorship block ir  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I'm not sure, but I'm going to call this a duplicate of #20216.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block ir  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  censorship block => censorship block ir
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18781 [Metrics/Analysis]: Russia-based relays seem to be appearing in circuits more frequently (was: Check for Sybil attack from Russia) (was: Check for Sybil attack from Russia)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18781: Russia-based relays seem to be appearing in circuits more frequently 
(was:
Check for Sybil attack from Russia)
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis => Metrics/Analysis


Comment:

 Closing this because there is nothing to act on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18285 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Etisalat (UAE ISP) requiring users to use certain routers (was: The Arab Gulf Governments Surveillance Project) (was: The Arab Gulf Governments Sur

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18285: Etisalat (UAE ISP) requiring users to use certain routers (was: The Arab
Gulf Governments Surveillance Project)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:  Major => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18034 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: the five manipulation eyes (theoretical anonymity enhancement)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18034: the five manipulation eyes (theoretical anonymity enhancement)
-+-
 Reporter:  bo0od|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 As in comment:8:ticket:18121, moving to the "Obfuscation" component, even
 though it's not a perfect match for what else is in Obfuscation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18121 [Obfuscation]: anti-conformational attack (theory)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18121: anti-conformational attack (theory)
-+-
 Reporter:  bo0od|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis => Obfuscation


Comment:

 Moving this to the "Obfuscation" component (not a perfect match) because
 it's about resisting traffic fingerprinting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6045 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Ethiopia blocks Tor based on ServerHello

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6045: Ethiopia blocks Tor based on ServerHello
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  dpi censorship block et  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  dpi => dpi censorship block et
 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #6246 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: UAE uses DPI to block Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6246: UAE uses DPI to block Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  runa |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  dpi censorship block ae  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  dpi => dpi censorship block ae
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket. Newer information about the UAE is in #21345.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6258 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: The Philippines are blocking Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6258: The Philippines are blocking Tor?
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  dpi, censorship, block, ph   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  dpi, censorship, block => dpi, censorship, block, ph
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this inactive ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20781 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Figure out how to sandbox meek in a sensible way.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20781: Figure out how to sandbox meek in a sensible way.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  meek  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 There is no sensible way.  Even in a separate container, a firefox process
 should never get access to the network interface.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15198 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Cyberoam blocking connections to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15198: Cyberoam blocking connections to Tor
--+-
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  cyberoam censorship block tr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  cyberoam => cyberoam censorship block tr
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket. Newer information about Turkey is in #21014.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7141 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: How is Iran blocking Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7141: How is Iran blocking Tor?
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis   |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  dpi, censorship, block, iran, ir  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  dpi, censorship, block, iran => dpi, censorship, block, iran,
   ir
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 Closing this inactive ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7137 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Build a tool that a censored developer can run to discover why their Tor is failing to connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7137: Build a tool that a censored developer can run to discover why their Tor 
is
failing to connect
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  SponsorF20130228 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 [[org/sponsors/SponsorF/Year3#Phase1February282013]]:
 > '''Done:''' ''Final results from this deliverable are a
 [https://research.torproject.org/techreports/censorship-analysis-
 tool-2013-02-06.pdf technical report] which discusses design requirements
 for a censorship analysis tool and a [https://blog.torproject.org/blog
 /towards-tor-censorship-analysis-tool blog post] referencing this
 technical report.  An extended version of the technical report has been
 [https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci13/towards-censorship-analyser-tor
 accepted for publication at FOCI '13].''

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8097 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: I think tor is blocked by my internet provider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8097: I think tor is blocked by my internet provider
-+-
 Reporter:  48ine|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:  censorship block jp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * keywords:   => censorship block jp
 * resolution:   => user disappeared
 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 Closing for lack of activity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22909 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our Rust code is always built in debug mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22909: Our Rust code is always built in debug mode
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot, tor-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
-+-

Comment (by infinity0):

 Whoops, that should have been `[profile.dev]` not `[profile.debug]`, see
 the first link I posted. The rest of the comment is correct.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22909 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our Rust code is always built in debug mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22909: Our Rust code is always built in debug mode
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot, tor-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
-+-

Comment (by infinity0):

 I should have been explicit earlier but this ticket really should be
 closed, it is invalid.

 debug mode is `[profile.debug]`, i.e. what happens when you leave out
 `--release` when invoking `cargo`.

 `debug = true` is ''not'' "debug mode", it is to tell rustc to add DWARF2
 debuginfo to the ELF binaries and is equivalent to `-g` flags to C
 compilers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21307 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create a tpo hostname for the tor messenger build machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21307: Please create a tpo hostname for the tor messenger build machine
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is being done in #23385

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 So, I started reviewing your draft and made a few tweaks here and there.
 But then I moved around things to better reflect the order of sanitizing
 steps and to better reason about why we're doing these steps. In the end I
 decided to start over and write a
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/23243
 /webstats-spec.txt new draft] mostly based on my memory, plus a few other
 sources except for your draft. The idea was to start from scratch. It's
 not supposed to replace your draft entirely, because your draft describes
 some parts better than mine. Maybe we can somehow combine our drafts.
 Though we'll first have to discuss a few open questions (marked with XXX
 in my draft). Maybe something for a pad meeting early next week?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "webstats-spec.txt" added.

 karsten's first draft

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23385 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23385: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:1 sukhbir]:
 > Hello boklm. So this means that we will be using this VM for the TM
 builds instead of paganini?

 Yes, this is what is planned.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by brade):

 For me, seeing a small onion icon does not convey that an image didn't
 load or that something is "broken."  The onion should be something more.
 Perhaps it could have a frame around it (octagon? I'm not sure if that is
 universal and it doesn't quite mean blocked)?  I think it is important
 that the icon convey a "broken" state or "blocked" state.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by linda):

 Thanks for the clarification, cypherpunk. :)

 I can see when Noscript could override the security settings and allow
 scripts to run, but could it also block scripts? I'm imagining that I have
 my security settings on low, but then I click the "Forbid Scripts
 Globally" option.

 I really wished that it couldn't, and Tor has the final say in blocking
 all things, and Noscript allows the exceptions, because that would make it
 easier to understand/it makes sense to just use the onion icon drawn above
 to indicate that something has been blocked on purpose/isn't broken. But I
 have a feeling it might not be the case..

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[tor-bugs] #23388 [- Select a component]: [Tor] GUI loaded only half

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23388: [Tor] GUI loaded only half
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 My GUI is not loaded, except the checkboxes and the "(Version: )" in the
 newest version of Tor (and some before).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 linda]:
 > I also don't know what technically happens if you have "Allow Scripts
 Globally" on NoScript but put your Security Slider setting on High (which
 supposedly blocks javascript).
 >
 > I don't know if it blocks javascript if one of the two settings are set,
 or if the Security Slider sets the NoScript options when you choose high
 but it's overwritten if you toggle the Noscript afterwards... So this
 really depends. Clarification is welcome here.

 With Security Settings set to High and toggling on NoScript's "Allow
 Scripts Globally" or the other option for allowing it on a single site
 will indeed allow JS to run globally/on specific site.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23383 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23383: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: isabela, antonela, stephw (added)


Comment:

 Karsten:

 I think it's a great idea to update the Metrics website again. To answer
 your questions:

 * I am also a fan of not using the purple inverted logo, but just the
 onion logo. We also have a volunteer designer on the team now (antonela,
 cc'ed), who can help us with the design. We'll triage this ticket next
 week and get back to you!
 * I don't know if this question still applies if we use the regular onion
 logo. We have an official repo of images somewhere though, and I think
 isabela/stephw have added it to a repo somewhere. I'll try to find it and
 let you know.
 * Unfortunately, we do not have a web designer on our team yet. But it is
 on our list of people to acquire! We just need some grants to go through,
 and they are taking longer than we thought (you know, the usual).

 Yay, hope to get this going soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by linda):

 Antonela, great work!

 I agree that we should have it dependent on who is doing the blocking.
 Sometimes, it's NoScript, but sometimes, it might be the Security Slider
 settings. I also don't know what technically happens if you have "Allow
 Scripts Globally" on NoScript but put your Security Slider setting on High
 (which supposedly blocks javascript).

 I don't know if it blocks javascript if one of the two settings are set,
 or if the Security Slider sets the NoScript options when you choose high
 but it's overwritten if you toggle the Noscript afterwards... So this
 really depends. Clarification is welcome here.

 I think it ''could'' be the case that Tor's security preferences are
 blocking the media. In this case, I say we use the purple onion. All of
 our onions are purple, so it would be good to keep with the theme!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Is TOR who is blocking this image/content? or is NoScript?

 If is NoScript, I'd like to suggest keeping the same contextual menu we
 have at the top bar and allow the user to show the content if they want to
 [we can add a line about how dangerous it could be].

 If is TOR, I'm 100% in with your approach.
 I'm attaching a mockup and the onion icon to use.

 I made 2 options, green and purple. And also a quick mockup to show how it
 will look.

 **Mockups**
 Before
 https://share.riseup.net/#SUZ7tGEG3c1dpzl6lpgP1w

 After -  Green
 https://share.riseup.net/#tZWiVAdViU486qOyXunowg

 After - Purple
 https://share.riseup.net/#t8ZgbRcHcwGdtm8SE1egoA

 ** Assets [green and purple] **
 https://share.riseup.net/#cum4BGLtJWOm_Iy8VZJUPw

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19817 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Import script to generate update responses and incremental mars in Tor Messenger

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19817: Import script to generate update responses and incremental mars in Tor
Messenger
+---
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:1 boklm]:
 > We still need to add the Makefile rules.

 These exist in tor-browser-build.git and should be copied over,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/Makefile#n86

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14388 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Secure automatic updates for Tor Messenger

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14388: Secure automatic updates for Tor Messenger
+
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19817 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Import script to generate update responses and incremental mars in Tor Messenger

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19817: Import script to generate update responses and incremental mars in Tor
Messenger
+---
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by arlolra):

 * parent:  #14388 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17461 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Client does not find responsible jabber servers (not parsing SRV DNS records)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17461: Client does not find responsible jabber servers (not parsing SRV DNS
records)
+
 Reporter:  flowolf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:3 arlolra]:
 > IB closed that bug (787369) but they did it by bypassing the remote dns
 config, which is dangerous for us.  We should be very careful here when
 moving to ESR 52.  I think there's a switch to turn it off though, which
 is helpful.

 Disabled in, https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=d47648c8a55ad5d2419827aff7461688cc026c41

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22005 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Move to ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22005: Move to ESR 52
+-
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Since merging the esr52 branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17469 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger is not working on Windows XP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17469: Tor Messenger is not working on Windows XP
+
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed by https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=67cf5ed57e2186a5baace53191450d0be2628ae6 and the rest
 of #22005

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20316 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Update OS X toolchain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20316: Update OS X toolchain
+
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 At the time (for ESR 45), we kept our patch reverting, "Adjust atomic ops
 code to be more compatible with thread sanitizer tools."

 In #22005, we're moving to ESR 52 based on tor-browser-build.git, which
 has the necessary changes ported.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service (was: prop224: Time period desynch between client and service)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> David found his client unable to connect to his service. Apparently, they
> compute different hsdir indices because the time period num is not
> synched:
> {{{
> service side: Sep 01 12:36:59.000 [info] hs_get_responsible_hsdirs():
> Finding responsible HSDirs for blinded key
> mCs1ObO+OmLpjYy36SWX3tv5rV9S2P6/BNo8rVjUy0g, time period number 17411 and
> for next period
> }}}
> {{{
> client side: Sep 01 08:23:34.000 [info] hs_get_responsible_hsdirs:
> Finding responsible HSDirs for blinded key
> 3vsekKmh3WYjr85reqpS6Ts2xqJxSSgZHxgX/Jp1FK0, time period number 17410 and
> for current period
> }}}
>
> Theory: We use `time(NULL)` as the time in `node_set_hsdir_index()`
> whereas we use the live consensus `valid-after` in
> `rotate_all_descriptors()`. This can cause desynch within the same tor
> instance. We should probably use the live consensus `valid-after` in all
> cases to have a common point of reference, and avoid problems with clock
> skews.

New description:

 David found his client unable to connect to his service. Apparently, they
 compute different hsdir indices, since it was 12:20UTC (non-overlap
 period) and the live consensus had valid-after at 11:00UTC (overlap
 period). Apparently something got confused.

 Theory: We use `time(NULL)` as the time in `node_set_hsdir_index()`
 whereas we use the live consensus `valid-after` in
 `rotate_all_descriptors()`. This can cause desynch within the same tor
 instance. We should probably use the live consensus `valid-after` in all
 cases to have a common point of reference, and avoid problems with clock
 skews.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23385 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23385: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Hello boklm. So this means that we will be using this VM for the TM builds
 instead of paganini?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22563 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Many memory pages in tor.exe for Windows violate W^X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22563: Many memory pages in tor.exe for Windows violate W^X
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  windows tor-client win32 tor-relay   |  Actual Points:
  security hardening 031-backport,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201707R, tbb-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 windows tor-client win32 tor-relay security hardening 031-backport,
 TorBrowserTeam201707R
 =>
 windows tor-client win32 tor-relay security hardening 031-backport,
 TorBrowserTeam201707R, tbb-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23240 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: do not show progress bar at zero when bootstrap progress is greater than zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23240: do not show progress bar at zero when bootstrap progress is greater than
zero
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R => TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb- |
  backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R
 =>
 tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22542 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.0 Security Settings Window too small on macOS 10.12

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22542: Tor Browser 7.0 Security Settings Window too small on macOS 10.12
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201707R,|
  tbb-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-security-slider,
 TorBrowserTeam201707R
 =>
 tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-security-slider,
 TorBrowserTeam201707R, tbb-backport


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[tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Time period desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: Time period desynch between client and service
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 David found his client unable to connect to his service. Apparently, they
 compute different hsdir indices because the time period num is not
 synched:
 {{{
 service side: Sep 01 12:36:59.000 [info] hs_get_responsible_hsdirs():
 Finding responsible HSDirs for blinded key
 mCs1ObO+OmLpjYy36SWX3tv5rV9S2P6/BNo8rVjUy0g, time period number 17411 and
 for next period
 }}}
 {{{
 client side: Sep 01 08:23:34.000 [info] hs_get_responsible_hsdirs: Finding
 responsible HSDirs for blinded key
 3vsekKmh3WYjr85reqpS6Ts2xqJxSSgZHxgX/Jp1FK0, time period number 17410 and
 for current period
 }}}

 Theory: We use `time(NULL)` as the time in `node_set_hsdir_index()`
 whereas we use the live consensus `valid-after` in
 `rotate_all_descriptors()`. This can cause desynch within the same tor
 instance. We should probably use the live consensus `valid-after` in all
 cases to have a common point of reference, and avoid problems with clock
 skews.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21830 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Copying large text from web console leaks to /tmp

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to /tmp
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  neillm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, TorBrowserTeam201708R => tbb-disk-leak,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-backport


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18101, #21704, #18022, #23025, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18101, #21704, #18022, #23025, #23228 by gk:


Comment:
Moving reviews to September.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch LGTM.


 BTW, is this also a v2 bug? The patch seems to imply so. Or v2 is not
 affected?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23355 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23355: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Patch looks good. One thing makes me anxious: We call
 `DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY` on so many digestmaps without first checking
 that they are not-NULL. I don't think the `foreach` functions check for
 NULL before iterating which might cause segfaults. Shouldn't we check that
 the maps are non-NULL?

 Other than that, LGTM.

 Feel free to fix the above or not and then mark it as `merge_ready`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23384 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23384: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201709


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[tor-bugs] #23386 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Run Tor Browser testsuite on our Windows QA machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23386: Run Tor Browser testsuite on our Windows QA machine
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance   |Version:
  and Testing|   Keywords:
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201709
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 With #23315 we now have a new VM for Windows QA. We need to set up the
 testuite on this machine to run it on new releases and nightly builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23325 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Torproject mirror cloud.ipnett.se has connectivity issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23325: Torproject mirror cloud.ipnett.se has connectivity issues
-+
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by hellais):

 FWIW I have stopped experiencing issues from Vodafone Italia, however as
 @darkk points out, probably there are still users out there having issues.

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[tor-bugs] #23385 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23385: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 With ticket #22764 we now have a VM for doing Tor Messenger builds. We
 should set it up so it is ready to be used.

 This includes:
 * installing needed dependencies and trying to do a build
 * creating an account for all members of the team
 * installing/configuring unattended-upgrades and apt-listchanges, so
 updates are installed

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[tor-bugs] #23384 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23384: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 With ticket #22764 we now have a VM for doing Tor Browser builds. We
 should set it up so it is ready to be used.

 This includes:
 * installing needed dependencies and trying to do a build
 * creating an account for all members of the team
 * installing/configuring unattended-upgrades and apt-listchanges, so
 updates are installed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23325 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Torproject mirror cloud.ipnett.se has connectivity issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23325: Torproject mirror cloud.ipnett.se has connectivity issues
-+
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by darkk):

 > resolved

 Well. Number of failures went down from
 [https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/9252044/?filter=_only=Failed#!map
 64] to
 [https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/9263681/?filter=_only=Failed#!map
 40] (same probes were used in both measurements), but IMHO it's still far
 from "resolved" as connectivity for other addresses is way better.

 Two more measurements towards the host using different set of probes:
 [https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/9262533/ #9262533] and
 [https://atlas.ripe.net/measurements/9263677/ #9263677].

 (irrelevant sidenote, couple of probes: in Spain in Norway show TLS MITM
 from FortiGate)

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[tor-bugs] #23383 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23383: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Let's try to apply the Tor style guide even more to the redesigned
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/ Tor Metrics website]. We already applied
 parts of it by using the colors and fonts suggested there. But we're still
 using our old logo rather than the redesigned onion and sub-brand
 qualifier.

 Two questions to the designers and/or UX people:

  - How would we make the purple logo work with the purple banner? I fear
 that the inverted purple logo looks a lot less official on the main Tor
 Metrics website, but I'm also afraid that giving up on our purple banner
 requires a bigger redesign than we can do without a web designer. What do
 you think?
  - Where would we obtain the original image file of the redesigned logo?
 I'd rather avoid grabbing it from the PDF file if there's a PNG file or
 similar available.
  - Do you have a web designer available in your team to make this
 hopefully minimal change? If not, and if it's more than we can do, we
 could probably ask the web designer who did the redesign last year, but
 that might require a bit of paperwork that I'd like to avoid, if possible.

 Thanks in advance!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23381 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Enable "Sandbox 1" in torrc for sandboxed-tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23381: Enable "Sandbox 1" in torrc for sandboxed-tor-browser
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This is basically totally pointless because the sandboxed installs a
 seccomp filter already.

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[tor-bugs] #23382 [Applications/Tor Browser]: rbm: Error when the tmp_dir directory does not exist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23382: rbm: Error when the tmp_dir directory does not exist
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201709
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In the rbm build, we can define the temporary directory to use with the
 `tmp_dir` option. If we set it to a directory that does not exist yet, it
 fails with an error. We should instead try to create it if it does not
 exist.

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[tor-bugs] #23381 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Enable "Sandbox 1" in torrc for sandboxed-tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23381: Enable "Sandbox 1" in torrc for sandboxed-tor-browser
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Enable "Sandbox 1" in torrc for sandboxed-tor-browser for improved
 security

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23359: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Besides other errors, it has
 {{{
 1504252203300   addons.xpi  WARNAdd-on https-everywhere-
 e...@eff.org is missing bootstrap method uninstall
 1504252203300   addons.xpi  WARNAdd-on https-everywhere-
 e...@eff.org is missing bootstrap method install
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'component' directive.
 chrome.manifest:60
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'contract' directive.
 chrome.manifest:61
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'category' directive.
 chrome.manifest:63
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'overlay' directive.
 chrome.manifest:68
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'overlay' directive.
 chrome.manifest:69
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'style' directive.
 chrome.manifest:71
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'component' directive.
 chrome.manifest:74
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'contract' directive.
 chrome.manifest:75
 Bootstrapped manifest not allowed to use 'category' directive.
 chrome.manifest:76
 }}}
 where 'overlay' directives are
 {{{
 overlay chrome://browser/content/browser.xul chrome://https-
 everywhere/content/toolbar_button.xul application={ec8030f7-c20a-464f-
 9b0e-13a3a9e97384} application={92650c4d-4b8e-4d2a-b7eb-24ecf4f6b63a}
 application={3550f703-e582-4d05-9a08-453d09bdfdc6}
 application={a79fe89b-6662-4ff4-8e88-09950ad4dfde}
 overlay chrome://navigator/content/navigator.xul chrome://https-
 everywhere/content/toolbar_button.xul application={ec8030f7-c20a-464f-
 9b0e-13a3a9e97384} application={92650c4d-4b8e-4d2a-b7eb-24ecf4f6b63a}
 application={3550f703-e582-4d05-9a08-453d09bdfdc6}
 application={a79fe89b-6662-4ff4-8e88-09950ad4dfde}
 }}}
 FF57 is on nightly now, so it seems they'll switch to a WebExtension
 instead of fixing this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21141 [Metrics]: Come up with a more uniform versioning scheme for versions between releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21141: Come up with a more uniform versioning scheme for versions between 
releases
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We have been using the new schema for at least 8 months now, so I hereby
 declare it institutional knowledge. We could of course document it on the
 wiki, but we could document many more things there, and this particular
 part doesn't require us to keep this ticket open. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I'm closing this ticket now. We have three OnionPerf instances deployed
 and integrated into CollecTor and Tor Metrics.

 Regarding irl's op-ab instance, we should discuss any remaining issues
 either at team meetings or on a new ticket, possibly even on GitHub where
 OnionPerf is developed.

 Regarding robgjansen's phantomtrain instance, we discussed putting that
 data on Tor Metrics under Research, but that discussion happens via email.

 Regarding iwakeh's question about a deletion policy, that discussion
 should probably happen on GitHub, too.

 However, nothing important remains for ''deploying'' OnionPerf. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22026 [Metrics/Ideas]: Create new service to retrieve raw documents (was: Add new raw document types)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22026: Create new service to retrieve raw documents
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: cannot get tor to start deleted and dowloaded multiples

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23380: cannot get tor to start  deleted and dowloaded multiples
--+---
 Reporter:  jerry.medsker@…   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser
 * keywords:  RESTART TOR =>


Comment:

 Which operating system are you using?

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[tor-bugs] #23380 [Applications]: cannot get tor to start deleted and dowloaded multiples

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23380: cannot get tor to start  deleted and dowloaded multiples
-+-
 Reporter:  jerry.medsker@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  RESTART TOR
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 tor unexpectedly exited. this might be due to a bug  in tor itself,
 another program or faulty hardware.
 until you restart , the tor browser will not be able to reach any
 websites.. please send a copy or your tor log to the support team

   RESTART TOR
 NEVER WORKS HAVE REMOVED TOR BROWSER MANY TIMES AND INSTALLED AGAIN  ...
 NO JOY

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23359: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [ticket:23359 gk]:
 > > WebExtensions-based HTTPS-Everywhere
 > It is a legacy Embedded WebExtension, "Add-on SDK"-based. WebExtensions-
 based HTTPS-Everywhere will replace it for FF57.
 >
 > Do you think it's a TBB issue?

 I see it happen in Tor Browser but not in Firefox. I might not have tested
 hard enough in the Firefox case, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23379 [Core Tor/Tor]: Atlas marked my relay as a hsdir even though I disabled DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23379: Atlas marked my relay as a hsdir even though I disabled DirPort
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23379 [Core Tor/Tor]: Atlas marked my relay as a hsdir even though I disabled DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23379: Atlas marked my relay as a hsdir even though I disabled DirPort
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:6 arma]:
 > I guess you might want to ask a lawyer for actual legal questions, but
 my non-lawyer answer is: approximately zero legal risk. Nobody has ever
 had a problem with it before, and I can't imagine any realistic scenarios
 where anybody would.
 >
 > Each onion service maps to six HSDir relays each day, and which six it
 is changes each day.
 Great, thank you for the excellent help.

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