Re: [tor-bugs] #18660 [Core Tor/Stem]: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18660: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  utils  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by ewong):

 Link to the branch: https://github.com/ewongbb/stem/tree/t18660

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18660 [Core Tor/Stem]: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18660: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  utils  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by ewong):

 here's my attempt at this:
 https://gist.github.com/ewongbb/0a53344cf53a42c28e6e790a4a321b94

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18660 [Core Tor/Stem]: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18660: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  utils  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:7 ewong]:
 > pardon me, but this isn't just an OSX issue.  I use slackware-current,
 and
 > --encoding=ascii doesn't work.  man version = 1.6g.
 >
 > What version has --encoding=ascii (or -E ascii)?

 http://www.nongnu.org/man-db/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Tor Browser could define a conflicting shortcut, and it might work.

 But if you want to use Tor Browser in an OS that's designed not to leak
 your info, use Tails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18660 [Core Tor/Stem]: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18660: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  utils  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by ewong):

 pardon me, but this isn't just an OSX issue.  I use slackware-current, and
 --encoding=ascii doesn't work.  man version = 1.6g.

 What version has --encoding=ascii (or -E ascii)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23126 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSDirs should publish some count about new-style onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23126: HSDirs should publish some count about new-style onion addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  research, privcount|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra, research => prop224, tor-hs,
 prop224-extra, research, privcount


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 asn]:
 > So a very very basic statistic here that would give us an idea of the
 adoption of HSv3 services could be:
 >
 > a) When a time period completes, every relay '''publishes the number of
 HSv3 blinded keys''' it saw during the previous time period in its extra-
 info desc. Relays also add some laplace noise to obfuscate the original
 number.

 There are several bugs in the HS v2 laplace noise implementation, see
 #23061 and children. In particular, we need to make sure we don't re-
 implement bug #23414 for HS v3.

 > Time periods start at 12:00 UTC and last 24 hours, so relays can publish
 this statistic once per day.
 >
 > b) After we have received all descriptors containing stats from a
 specific time period, we add all the ''unique blinded key counts''
 together, and publish the aggregate count. We add everything together to
 remove the laplace noise, and also to get a final graphable number.
 Unfortunately, that final number is not the number of unique HSv3 services
 since HSes publish their descriptor on multiple HSDirs under the same
 blinded key. However this number is definitely related to the number of
 unique HSes, and by noticing how this number moves over time, we can
 certainly spot adoption rates of HSv3 services.
 >
 > This is a very basic stat that could help us here. Furthermore, we can
 then deploy similar analysis to what we did for the unique v2 .onion
 counts, to weed out the duplicate HSes so that we get a more accurate
 number.

 I think there are some bugs in the v2 analysis, see #23367.

 For v3, here's the analysis and implementation I did for experimental
 privcount:
 
https://github.com/privcount/privcount/blob/master/privcount/tools/compute_fractional_position_weights#L26

 (I left out the HS v3 hash ring, because it needed extra crypto, and
 imports of ed25519 ids in descriptors. I'll implement it in
 https://github.com/privcount/privcount/issues/422 )

 > And I guess we can use privcount etc. to get an even more accurate
 number.

 No, you can't use PrivCount to get unique totals. (Aaron is working on a
 separate project that uniquely aggregates addresses, but the current
 design takes too much CPU and RAM to be run daily on relays.)

 But you can use privcount to get a safe, noisy total from the individual
 relay counts. (Otherwise, to get a total you have to publish the number of
 addresses seen at each HSDir, which is less safe.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23367 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Onion address counts ignore descriptor upload overlap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23367: Onion address counts ignore descriptor upload overlap
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #23126


Comment:

 Let's think about all the v3 stats in the same place: this ticket is for
 metrics, the parent #23126 is for Core Tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028  |
  -backport-maybe, 026-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #23126


Comment:

 We want to fix this before we deploy HS v3 stats.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 catalyst]:
 > Proposed patch in https://oniongit.eu/catalyst/tor/merge_requests/1

 Looks great!

 T1. It might help to be more specific here:
 {{{
- If you must send floating point numbers on the wire, serialize
  them in a platform-independent way. Tor avoids exchanging
  floating-point values. But when it does, it uses ASCII numerals,
  with a decimal point ("."). This is the "C" Locale Format.
 }}}

 For reference, I could only find one floating-point value in all the
 directory documents.
 In extra-info documents, Tor uses the following C code:
 {{{
 printf("epsilon=%.2f", EPSILON_CONSTANT)
 }}}

 Which produces:
 {{{
 epsilon=0.30
 }}}

 T2. I'd also like to add some more notes like this:
 {{{
- Changing the order of operations changes the results of many
  floating-point calculations. Be careful when you simplify
  calculations! If the order is significant, document it using
  a code comment.
- Comparing most floating point values for equality is unreliable.
  Avoid using `==`, instead, use `>=` or `<=`.
- Testing floating-point outputs in unit tests is hard. Tests
  that work on your machine can fail in other environments.
 }}}

 Once you've made these changes, feel free to flip this to "ready to
 merge".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Proposed patch in https://oniongit.eu/catalyst/tor/merge_requests/1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by elias):

 One more thing: I have been using Tor Browser for years, but I didn't
 notice this bug until a few months ago. I don't know exactly when it was
 introduced.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22692 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport Linux content sandboxing from Firefox 54

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22692: Backport Linux content sandboxing from Firefox 54
-+-
 Reporter:  jld  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201709,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by jld):

 You might run into problems related to
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1386279 on Fedora, but the
 patch (https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/c0838ed41842) is simple
 and should backport, although I haven't tried.

 Also, you may want to pick up https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/c963d52551ab, which fixes CVE-2017-7794.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * Attachment "issue.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Command+Shift+L is a system shortcut enabled by default in macOS. To
 disable it go to system preferences->keyboard->shortcuts->services->and
 uncheck search with "any search engine". If possible Tor Browser should
 block this command from searching the selected text.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * status:  needs_review => accepted


Comment:

 There's no patch here so I'll work on one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23428 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update my key on db.torporject.org.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23428: Please update my key on db.torporject.org.
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Is Command+Shift+L doing that in Tor Browser only, or is that also
 happening if you do it in other applications?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23432 [Webpages/Website]: Move CSP style attributes into external stylesheets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23432: Move CSP style attributes into external stylesheets
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  CSP   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  csp => CSP


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[tor-bugs] #23432 [Webpages/Website]: Move CSP style attributes into external stylesheets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23432: Move CSP style attributes into external stylesheets
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  csp
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Suggested by the Mozilla Observatory
 https://observatory.mozilla.org/analyze.html?host=torproject.org

 > Your current CSP policy allows the use of {{{'unsafe-inline'}}} inside
 of {{{style-src}}}. Moving {{{style}}} attributes into external
 stylesheets not only makes you safer, but also makes your code easier to
 maintain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22173: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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[tor-bugs] #23431 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23431: Command+Shift+L unexpectedly Googles selected text in non-Tor browser
--+--
 Reporter:  elias |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I am using Tor Browser 7.0.5 on OS X 10.12.6 and I noticed a bug.

 If I select some text, and then press Command+Shift+L, instead of
 switching to a new Tor circuit, like the keyboard shortcut usually does,
 it opens Safari and does a Google search for what I selected.

 Sometimes, even if I don't have any text selected, Command+Shift+L opens
 Safari with text I have selected a few minutes ago. I don't know what
 exactly is triggering this bug but I'm able to reliably reproduce it by
 selecting text.

 I think this is a serious bug because it can cause the user to
 accidentally reveal sensitive information to the clearnet (with their
 Google session cookies if they are logged into Google).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22173: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 This looks good, but please check my comments in oniongit about the final
 commit. Also this looks like it might have some overlap with #22215,
 especially d7a3e336ee505bcbeb30117d91067810ad096130. Has anyone checked
 for merge conflicts?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23425 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build fails when running without a terminal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23425: Build fails when running without a terminal
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201709R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201709 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201709R


Comment:

 Branch `bug_23425_v2` has a patch to fix that:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_23425_v2

 I did a full rebuild using this patch to check that it didn't break the
 build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22731 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of its datadirectory files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22731: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of 
its
datadirectory files
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Much better!

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Should we also apply this to `options_init_from_string()` that calls
 `options_validate()` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22731 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of its datadirectory files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22731: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of 
its
datadirectory files
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Whoops. Try ticket22731 q?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22377 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rip out AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS event?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22377: Rip out AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS event?
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Code lgtm;

 About the spec patch, shouldn't we leave section `4.1.8.` intact but
 mention at the beginning that it has been removed? I'm saying that because
 we have many supported version that still has it and removing it from our
 spec could lead to some confusion because "oh stem has that but I can't
 find it in the spec".

 We kind of did that with `"dir-usage"` mentioning that we have removed it
 in 029.

 Moving that in need info but if consensus is that it's fine, merge ready!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22731 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of its datadirectory files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22731: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of 
its
datadirectory files
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > See branch `bug22731` in my public repository for a simple
 implementation here.  It turns out that the warn_about_relative_paths()
 function already did most of what we want.

 I see no such branch in `nickm/bug22731` :S ...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22731 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of its datadirectory files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22731: Relative DataDirectory + RunAsDaemon = Tor can't read or write most of 
its
datadirectory files
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23426 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove AllowDotExit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23426: Remove AllowDotExit
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 {{{
 +   * Probably this should be possible, since AllowDotExit no longer
 +   * exists. */
 }}}

 You might mean "this should not be possible" ? Else that unreached assert
 is no good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add 'GETINFO ip-to-country/available'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23237: Add 'GETINFO ip-to-country/available'
+--
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, tor-control, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20119 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should exit if it fails to write its PidFile, under principle of least confusion. Also, maybe Tor should create the directory that the PidFile points to

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20119: Tor should exit if it fails to write its PidFile, under principle of 
least
confusion. Also, maybe Tor should create the directory that the PidFile
points to
-+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, fs, tor-relay, usability,  |  Actual Points:  0
  startup, review-group-23   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Agree with not creating the directory. Creating a hierarchy of dir is
 whole other ball game and could easily be another ticket to do such a
 feature.

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow UI to identify servers by Ed25519 keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15059: Allow UI to identify servers by Ed25519 keys
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, prop220, tor-|  Actual Points:
  ed25519-proto  |
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Back end support in #22173.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22173: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Front end support in #15059.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22644 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assert crash with HSPOST and POSTDESCRIPTOR control port commands

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22644: Assert crash with HSPOST and POSTDESCRIPTOR control port commands
-+-
 Reporter:  donncha  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, crash, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:  .1
  030-backport, 031-backport, review-group-23|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23355 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23355: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23355 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23355: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  merge_ready => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17857 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17857: Create a consensus param to disable (netflow) padding if RSOS is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-20, review-group-23  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Arf... that should be in nickm's court after my last comment. If you like
 it nickm, it's lgtm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22173: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity (backend)
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  needs_review => accepted


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22605, #17857

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22605, #17857 by nickm:


Comment:
Put 0.3.1.x needs_review tickets into review-group-23

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23387, #23355, #23429, #22173, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23387, #23355, #23429, #22173, #22644, #22891, #12541, 
#20119, #21031, #21522, #21816, #22215, #22281, #22377, #22407, #22731, #22805, 
#23304, #23368, #23426, #23237, #20168 by nickm:


Comment:
Put 0.3.2 needs_review and merge_ready tickets into review-group-23.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add new Ubuntu packager to ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23427: Add new Ubuntu packager to ReleasingTor.md
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  doc, packager  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Done!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23430 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to September GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23430: Update to September GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 025-backport|  implemented
  026-backport 027-backport 028-backport |  Actual Points:
  029-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.5 and forward to supported release series!

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[tor-bugs] #23430 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to September GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23430: Update to September GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 025-backport
 Severity:  Normal   |  026-backport 027-backport 028-backport
 |  029-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 ​[https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/tor.git/log/?h=geoip-sep2017
 geoip-sep2017] contains the updated `geoip` and `geoip6` files with IPv4
 and IPv6 ranges and is supposed to be merged into maint-0.2.5 and all
 other relevant branches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23430 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to September GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23430: Update to September GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 025-backport|  Actual Points:
  026-backport 027-backport 028-backport |
  029-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12541: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tcp, kist, scheduling,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay, term-project-ideas, review- |
  group-22   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * reviewer:  dgoulet =>


Comment:

 Ok, I've gone through all the things, did some fixup on pastly branch, he
 reviewed it and everything got addressed (I hope!).

 Time for more reviews.

 Branch: `ticket12541_032_01`
 https://oniongit.eu/dgoulet/tor/merge_requests/7

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Spec branch merged.  Thanks for the extra diagrams, dgoulet!  Now on to
 the code...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23429 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: assert on rend_data when pruning the v2 service list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23429: hs: assert on rend_data when pruning the v2 service list
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `bug23429_032_01`.

 I've gone over the entire code base for asserts on `rend_data` and I think
 they are all safe now.

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[tor-bugs] #23429 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: assert on rend_data when pruning the v2 service list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23429: hs: assert on rend_data when pruning the v2 service list
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Reported by ahf:

 {{{
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 src/or/rendservice.c:561: rend_service_prune_list_impl_: Assertion
 ocirc->rend_data failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev
 acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: Assertion ocirc->rend_data failed in
 rend_service_prune_list_impl_ at src/or/rendservice.c:561. Stack trace:
 (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x7fa7d0ad0f52] (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x94)
 [0x7fa7d0aeb594] (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug:
 ./bin/tor(rend_service_prune_list+0x32f) [0x7fa7d09da46f] (on Tor 0.3.2.0
 -alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(hs_config_service_all+0x87c)
 [0x7fa7d0ab583c] (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(set_options+0x16ca)
 [0x7fa7d0a4b98a] (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug:
 ./bin/tor(options_init_from_string+0x3e0) [0x7fa7d0a4cb40] (on Tor 0.3.2.0
 -alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug:
 ./bin/tor(options_init_from_torrc+0x1e2) [0x7fa7d0a4cde2] (on Tor 0.3.2.0
 -alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(+0x51c79) [0x7fa7d09a9c79]
 (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0xa7b) [0x7fa7cffde24b] (on Tor
 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x24d)
 [0x7fa7d09a841d] (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
 [0x7fa7d09abbb5] (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x7fa7d09a3d59]
 (on Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fa7cf3cff45] (on Tor 0.3.2.0
 -alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 Sep 07 18:02:40.000 [err] Bug: ./bin/tor(+0x4bdab) [0x7fa7d09a3dab] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.0-alpha-dev acfdc4afc126ba23)
 }}}

 The reason is because we iterate over intro circuit in the pruning process
 so we can remove any intro circuit for a service that has been removed.
 However, by doing so we were asserting on `rend_data` but now we have
 `hs_ident` for v3 services.

 Another occurrence of this can be found in `rend_service_del_ephemeral()`
 which also iterates over all circuits...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15762 [Webpages/Website]: Add tor installation instructions using Homebrew for OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15762: Add tor installation instructions using Homebrew for OS X
+--
 Reporter:  sambuddhabasu   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
|  implemented
 Keywords:  defer-new-website, website-content  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15762 [Webpages/Website]: Add tor installation instructions using Homebrew for OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15762: Add tor installation instructions using Homebrew for OS X
+--
 Reporter:  sambuddhabasu   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website, website-content  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by hiro):

 I have added back homebrew since many osx users use it. Planning to also
 add Fink (http://www.finkproject.org/).

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[tor-bugs] #23428 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update my key on db.torporject.org.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23428: Please update my key on db.torporject.org.
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please update my key, it is expired on db.torproject.org:

 pub   rsa2048/0x42E86A2A11F48D36 2011-05-11 [SC] [expires: 2018-05-01]
   Key fingerprint = B744 17ED DF22 AC9F 9E90  F491 42E8 6A2A 11F4
 8D36
   uid   [  full  ] David Goulet
 
   uid   [  full  ] David Goulet
 
   uid   [  full  ] David Goulet
 
   sub   rsa4096/0x2AC6036C93CC198D 2013-09-10 [E] [expires:
 2018-08-07]

 Thanks!
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJZsXeUAAoJEELoaioR9I02QkgH/ROE9J/064JEeQD0toWGSw3W
 hZspvNkAXCdW3tQ/OlAREPGvvZDI1ZPbvXKyI9z5kK35lglsJ6QJ+wQUtHqVvB88
 /cXCPMUGcaRXxN15G1G+dcRG0EeELdGTJOn+xf0aL9fwyiF8rsHsDd0o0X/zP3v+
 0pnZ6XDlGycTxsfcwRGAlyrY3XOapjSPbHndipENugizjQaoDpoZe8+/bJ8V/fnU
 NyZjGsRQ1hs7nuYxLaWMLBI/RZHqWYntAeVPG1v7IaBxg0FFnzt/37OnR6t6MD7e
 QVJxq0oUeRffGuuWCHvWP5xbyvtvkK8mkz/3jMK38QhU7VAd1GwQyajxH973oNs=
 =f8Br
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add new Ubuntu packager to ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23427: Add new Ubuntu packager to ReleasingTor.md
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, packager  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket23427_032_01`

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[tor-bugs] #23427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add new Ubuntu packager to ReleasingTor.md

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23427: Add new Ubuntu packager to ReleasingTor.md
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  doc, packager
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 An Ubuntu packager has been found and is super willing to continue his
 great work already.

 Here is some of the ongoing work to get Xenial (16.04 LTS) to migrate to
 029.

 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/tor/+bug/1710753

 That being said, we should add him to the `ReleasingTor.md` so he gets
 notified when a new tarball is released.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23403 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use tor-browser-build/tmp rather than /tmp as default tmp directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23403: Use tor-browser-build/tmp rather than /tmp as default tmp directory
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201709R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, thanks. Applied to `master` (commit
 b2dd98160a1c07f73f7ab66475cb02be295e4ee5).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Gitlab MR can be fond here: https://oniongit.eu/asn/tor/merge_requests/6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21769 [Webpages/Website]: CSP blocks Tor Debian Instructions' Javascript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21769: CSP blocks Tor Debian Instructions' Javascript
--+-
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Also pushed code branch at `bug23387` which is ready for Nick's eyes.
 Please use the spec branch above as a companion to this patch when
 reviewing. Commit messages + the spec branch should provide enough
 motivation for the code changes.

 Furthermore, the HS reachability test is pretty awesome and gives good
 guarantees of the reachability enhancements we designed.

 If you have any questions don't hesitate to ask them since this is a non-
 trivial change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19307 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "make" targets to generate module callgraph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19307: Add "make" targets to generate module callgraph
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-modularity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17291  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Done with 283be00b0bf515ee80b4b1d809d99a2cd682c46b.  I'm updating the
 scripts that maintain https://people.torproject.org/~nickm/tor-auto/ now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22836 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Parse CollecTor's index.json and provide our own directory listing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22836: Parse CollecTor's index.json and provide our own directory listing
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * cc: iwakeh (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23355 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23355: prop224: Implement a client purge state for NEWNYM
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 These maps are caches initialized by `hs_cache_init()` which is called by
 `hs_init()` in `tor_init()`.

 If they are NULL, tor is in a really really bad shape. I think there are
 some levels of confidence we can accept here that is assuming they won't
 be NULL. Else, our entire testing process is badly flawed if we can't
 notice an unallocated cache and nothing segfaulted? :)

 Because to that extent, we have a LOT of callsite that assume that what is
 initialized in init() functions are safe to use at runtime (just see
 `rendcache.c` and friends).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to time out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3733: Tor should abandon rendezvous circuits that cause a client request to 
time
out
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 I can probably fix this in 032 after the freeze.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23328 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Uninitialized hsdir indices if requesting onion before bootstrap completes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23328: prop224: Uninitialized hsdir indices if requesting onion before 
bootstrap
completes
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 This whole hsdir logic is about to completely change in #23387. I'm
 closing this because we can't reproduce, we haven't seen it in a while and
 the code path there changed a lot in since this was opened.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise hard-coded download schedules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20534: Revise hard-coded download schedules
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, triaged-out-20170124  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise hard-coded download schedules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20534: Revise hard-coded download schedules
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, triaged-out-20170124  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  nickm => (none)
 * status:  accepted => assigned
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Okay; then I'll unassign from myself (I can't write this documentation)
 and defer to 0.3.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16387 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve reachability of hidden services on mobile phones

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16387: Improve reachability of hidden services on mobile phones
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs sponsor8-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21522 [Core Tor/Tor]: ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses should not be deprecated in test networks.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21522: ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses should not be deprecated in test 
networks.
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21031| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23056 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Intro point aren't transfered between services on HUP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23056: prop224: Intro point aren't transfered between services on HUP
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Yes we actually found the issue while testing the HUPing. It does work now
 for sure, I can HUP my long time running service and it is still reachable
 and working correctly with the descriptors.

 Unit tests hopefully will be part of #23310

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Looks okay to me.  Let's merge this if you like it, teor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22880 [Core Tor/Tor]: NETINFO cells are used for clock skew checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22880: NETINFO cells are used for clock skew checks
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec, technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Tried to fix this with d2bdea61f788beb6c31d33e7a4dad8c98c075918.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixup commits in `ticket22430_01` (yes I do have a chutney repository
 now!: https://git.torproject.org/user/dgoulet/chutney.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21522 [Core Tor/Tor]: ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses should not be deprecated in test networks.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21522: ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses should not be deprecated in test 
networks.
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21031| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #21573 => #21031


Comment:

 See ticket for review in parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 How about the approach in `ticket21031` ?  It renames the option to
 TestingClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses; it adds the old option name as an
 alias, and it makes it illegal to change the option except in a testing
 network.

 Or should this look at something other than "testing network", like the
 set of default authorities?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8305 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Use clearer colors in the "Consumed bandwidth by Exit/Guard flag combination" graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8305: Use clearer colors in the "Consumed bandwidth by Exit/Guard flag
combination" graph
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by linda):

 For additional clarity: I am not a color expert (on the level of choosing
 colors for graphing libraries), but FWIW, I think the current colors used
 on the metrics page look fine.

 Blue is generally used more and different shades of blue are easier to
 distinguish than other colors. Since many are red/green colorblind, those
 aren't used so much. Red, orange, yellow, and green, also have
 connotations (red = bad, green = good, for instance), and are only used if
 the whole rainbow is there. Since purple is a mix of red + blue, different
 shades of purple (a warm purple and a cooler purple of similar
 saturation/lightness) are harder to distinguish, etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8305 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Use clearer colors in the "Consumed bandwidth by Exit/Guard flag combination" graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8305: Use clearer colors in the "Consumed bandwidth by Exit/Guard flag
combination" graph
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by linda):

 iwakeh:

 Our style guide currently has color scales defined for graphing
 information.

 I suggest using colors that are picked by your visualization tool for now.
 As long as someone isn't hand-picking the colors and we're okay with it
 not looking tor-tastic, it's okay with me. Graphing libraries generally
 choose colors that make sense and are easily distinguishable, because
 that's something that they need to be good at.

 We'll definitely work on choosing colors, like OONI did, and add more to
 the style guide with time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23383 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23383: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by linda):

 Replying to [comment:4 antonela]:
 > Karsten, I made a mockup to show how the logo should work.
 > https://share.riseup.net/#2GdUbDtOzAsriUiOZiXcSQ
 >
 > Also, the assets are here, both white and color versions (.png, .svg,)
 > https://share.riseup.net/#JkYCWtrCmBy3OJ4rru_qyw
 >
 > let me know if you need anything else :)

 These are great, thanks for your work! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23383 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23383: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by linda):

 Karsten:

 I think that using the white version of the logo is the best step for now.

 I do agree that the all white looks different than the other official
 logos (https://blog.torproject.org/). And at some point, we want all of
 the websites to look the same. And while we want to do that slowly to some
 degree, trying to make other sites look like the blog isn't the best idea,
 since the Tor Blog arguably doesn't follow all the style guidelines, and
 needs some attention. We also didn't decide that that was how we wanted
 all sites to look, it was just an improvement to the old blog styling.

 (additional side rant: I don't like that the purple letters don't have an
 outline, but the onion does. And the onion does, but not its leaves. These
 are things that design people have brought up to us and we want to fix our
 logo so it doesn't have the stylistic inconsistency. And the all-white
 version kind of gets rid of that eyesore, so I'm personally a bit happy
 about this.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23426 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove AllowDotExit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23426: Remove AllowDotExit
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 See branch `remove_allow_dotexit`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23387 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23387: prop224: HSdir index desynch between client and service
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Pushed spec patch at `bug23387`. This is needed to better understand the
 code patch that will soon be posted here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:22 karsten]:
 > ...
 > > > > Similarly, only lines for 400 and 404 response codes are
 discarded.  Any bogus response code will be kept.
 > > >
 > > > Right, but I think 400 and 404 were the most problematic ones when
 we came up with the original plan for sanitizing these logs. Do you have
 any others in mind that we'd have to sanitize? If not, I'd say let's stick
 with 400 and 404 for now.
 > >
 > > No, the other way around.  As said above invalid (=bogus) response
 codes will be kept.  A better way to phrase this: we don't check, if a
 response code is a valid one and only sift out the valid 400 & 404.
 >
 > I'm not sure where this is going. Do you think we should check if status
 code is one that is currently defined by the HTTP protocol and only accept
 the ones that are, except for 400 and 404?

 That's the question.  Intuitively, I would not check for validity.  After
 all the server sets the status code and that should not really be privacy
 jeopardizing, supposing that the faulty codes simply happen by error not
 by hack.

 >
 > > > So, should I move forward with turning draft number five, numbered
 4, into XML?
 > >
 > > Yes :-)
 >
 > Will do as soon as the two open questions are resolved.

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[tor-bugs] #23426 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove AllowDotExit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23426: Remove AllowDotExit
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This option has been deprecated since 0.2.9.x.  We can remove it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:21 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 iwakeh]:
 > > Replying to [comment:17 karsten]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:14 iwakeh]:
 > > > > Another addition:
 > > > >
 > > > > Even though Tor's Apache webservers are configured to only provide
 three ip addresses (e.g. `0.0.0.{0,1,2}`) all lines with different ips are
 accepted and sanitized to ip `0.0.0.0`.
 > > > >
 > > > > Or, should such lines be discarded?
 > > >
 > > > Right now addresses are kept as long as they start with `0.0.0.`,
 which seems plausible to me. The spec draft should also say that.
 > >
 > > Agreed.  My question was a different one: what about log lines that
 contain other ips (e.g. in case Apache suddenly logs more 11.22.33.44).
 Currently these would be replaced by 0.0.0.0 and the sanitized lines kept.
 >
 > Ah, hmm. I think that both the current script and the specification
 draft say that we ''drop'' any lines not starting with `0.0.0.`, but if a
 line matches that, we keep the `0.0.0.x` address unchanged.
 >
 > But I wonder if we should change that to "keep any address starting with
 `0.0.0.` and replace everything else with `0.0.0.0`". That way we could
 easily sanitize logs from web servers using different log formats that are
 compliant with Apache's Common Log Format. What do you think?

 Yes, that's what I would choose.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22996 [Core Tor/Tor]: The router protocol versions section in dir-spec is out of date

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22996: The router protocol versions section in dir-spec is out of date
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec, technical-debt, doc  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Fixed in 0951a931f66b53.

 The entire section was obsolete, and only made sense under the v2
 networkstatus protocol.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22824 [Core Tor/Tor]: Establish guidelines for using assertions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22824: Establish guidelines for using assertions
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-doc, technical-debt, style  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 Done in 1502bf03fdf8255d4673cc529e02ad69cef9995d and
 8421756da3fc3cc116d17fe96b50384c0d79af8b

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:20 iwakeh]:
 > Replying to [comment:18 karsten]:
 > > Replying to [comment:15 iwakeh]:
 > > > Similarly, only lines for 400 and 404 response codes are discarded.
 Any bogus response code will be kept.
 > >
 > > Right, but I think 400 and 404 were the most problematic ones when we
 came up with the original plan for sanitizing these logs. Do you have any
 others in mind that we'd have to sanitize? If not, I'd say let's stick
 with 400 and 404 for now.
 >
 > No, the other way around.  As said above invalid (=bogus) response codes
 will be kept.  A better way to phrase this: we don't check, if a response
 code is a valid one and only sift out the valid 400 & 404.

 I'm not sure where this is going. Do you think we should check if status
 code is one that is currently defined by the HTTP protocol and only accept
 the ones that are, except for 400 and 404?

 > > So, should I move forward with turning draft number five, numbered 4,
 into XML?
 >
 > Yes :-)

 Will do as soon as the two open questions are resolved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:19 iwakeh]:
 > Replying to [comment:17 karsten]:
 > > Replying to [comment:14 iwakeh]:
 > > > Another addition:
 > > >
 > > > Even though Tor's Apache webservers are configured to only provide
 three ip addresses (e.g. `0.0.0.{0,1,2}`) all lines with different ips are
 accepted and sanitized to ip `0.0.0.0`.
 > > >
 > > > Or, should such lines be discarded?
 > >
 > > Right now addresses are kept as long as they start with `0.0.0.`,
 which seems plausible to me. The spec draft should also say that.
 >
 > Agreed.  My question was a different one: what about log lines that
 contain other ips (e.g. in case Apache suddenly logs more 11.22.33.44).
 Currently these would be replaced by 0.0.0.0 and the sanitized lines kept.

 Ah, hmm. I think that both the current script and the specification draft
 say that we ''drop'' any lines not starting with `0.0.0.`, but if a line
 matches that, we keep the `0.0.0.x` address unchanged.

 But I wonder if we should change that to "keep any address starting with
 `0.0.0.` and replace everything else with `0.0.0.0`". That way we could
 easily sanitize logs from web servers using different log formats that are
 compliant with Apache's Common Log Format. What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23372 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: stack-use-after-scope in hs_service/build_update_descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23372: test: stack-use-after-scope in hs_service/build_update_descriptors
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, tor-hs prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Fix will be part of #23387.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:18 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 iwakeh]:
 > > Similarly, only lines for 400 and 404 response codes are discarded.
 Any bogus response code will be kept.
 >
 > Right, but I think 400 and 404 were the most problematic ones when we
 came up with the original plan for sanitizing these logs. Do you have any
 others in mind that we'd have to sanitize? If not, I'd say let's stick
 with 400 and 404 for now.

 No, the other way around.  As said above invalid (=bogus) response codes
 will be kept.  A better way to phrase this: we don't check, if a response
 code is a valid one and only sift out the valid 400 & 404.

 >
 > So, should I move forward with turning draft number five, numbered 4,
 into XML?

 Yes :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:17 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 iwakeh]:
 > > Another addition:
 > >
 > > Even though Tor's Apache webservers are configured to only provide
 three ip addresses (e.g. `0.0.0.{0,1,2}`) all lines with different ips are
 accepted and sanitized to ip `0.0.0.0`.
 > >
 > > Or, should such lines be discarded?
 >
 > Right now addresses are kept as long as they start with `0.0.0.`, which
 seems plausible to me. The spec draft should also say that.

 Agreed.  My question was a different one: what about log lines that
 contain other ips (e.g. in case Apache suddenly logs more 11.22.33.44).
 Currently these would be replaced by 0.0.0.0 and the sanitized lines kept.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22644 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assert crash with HSPOST and POSTDESCRIPTOR control port commands

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22644: Assert crash with HSPOST and POSTDESCRIPTOR control port commands
-+-
 Reporter:  donncha  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control crash 029-backport   |  Actual Points:  .1
  030-backport 031-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * keywords:  tor-control crash => tor-control crash 029-backport
 030-backport 031-backport
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 See branch `bug22644_029`.  I also looked over control.c to make sure
 there weren't any other instances of doing a memchr and then
 asserting/assuming it was non-NULL.

 Since these are post-authentication crashes, I'm not suggesting that we
 backport the fixes any farther.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a standard transition plan for killing off a client version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15940: Make a standard transition plan for killing off a client version
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorS, tor-dos-designs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15941 [Core Tor/Tor]: Form a plan for killing off client versions which assume they'll live forever

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15941: Form a plan for killing off client versions which assume they'll live
forever
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorS, needs-proposal, tor-dos-   |  Actual Points:
  designs|
Parent ID:  #15940   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Completely drop support for Tor 0.2.2.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9476: Completely drop support for Tor 0.2.2.x
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dirauth, needs-   |  Actual Points:
  analysis   | Points:
Parent ID:   |  medium/large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #15940 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add link protocol 5 throughout torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22918: Add link protocol 5 throughout torspec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18856| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in 5772170591a11b.

 I looked over the rest of section 9 and didn't find any mismatches with
 the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16844| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Hrmg.  I'm trying to figure out what's going on looking at those
 functions, but without a lot of luck. Maybe a debug log could help?

 Does this happen on other versions as well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23105 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: outgoing relay cell sent from src/or/relay.c:836 has n_chan==NULL.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23105: Bug: outgoing relay cell sent from src/or/relay.c:836 has n_chan==NULL.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.5-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport harmless? annoyance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 031-backport harmless? annoyance


Comment:

 Hm. I didn't see an obvious cause here, so I've added some stack traces to
 those warnings with 9c404602a0a5dd, which should appear in future releases
 of 0.3.1 and 0.3.2.  If you get any stack traces here, please paste them
 on this ticket.

 For what it's worth, this bug is probably harmless, but it sure is
 annoying, and we should fix it anyway.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22825 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: Add unit tests for circuit_send_next_onion_skin()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22825: test: Add unit tests for circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, test-unit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-circuit, test-unit => tor-circuit, test-unit, tor-hs


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