date:20171002

Re: [tor-bugs] #23746 [Core Tor/Tor]: torguts.git/tree/01d-crypto.md#n13 is incomplete

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23746: torguts.git/tree/01d-crypto.md#n13 is incomplete
--+--
 Reporter:  ewong |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


Comment:

 I'm assigning to nickm since that sentence is

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[tor-bugs] #23746 [Core Tor/Tor]: torguts.git/tree/01d-crypto.md#n13 is incomplete

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23746: torguts.git/tree/01d-crypto.md#n13 is incomplete
--+
 Reporter:  ewong |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/nickm/torguts.git/tree/01d-
 crypto.md#n13, the last statement is

 "The crypto_rand() functions "

 I don't understand this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23742 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Make a snowflake package and distribute it

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23742: Make a snowflake package and distribute it
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: dcf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23577 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23577: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (added)


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[tor-bugs] #23745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tab crashes when using Tor Browser to access Google Drive

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23745: Tab crashes when using Tor Browser to access Google Drive
--+--
 Reporter:  angelotheram2 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  Tor Browser
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Using the Linux 64-bit Tor Browser, or the Tor Browser in Tails 3.0, 3.1
 or 3.2, I log in to Google mail. After logged in I go to drive.google.com.
 The Google Drive page starts to render, then I get the message

 Gah. Your tab just crashed. We can help you!

 Choose Restore This Tab to reload page content.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard sample calls relay descriptors a "consensus"

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23168: Guard sample calls relay descriptors a "consensus"
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by neel):

 I have a patch to address this. It's filename is
 001-desriptive_msg.patch.

 Please tell me that you think about this.

 -Neel

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard sample calls relay descriptors a "consensus"

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23168: Guard sample calls relay descriptors a "consensus"
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-log, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by neel):

 * Attachment "001-desriptive_msg.patch" added.

 Patch to change "Updating sampled guard status based on received
 consensus" message to more descriptive "Received directory document(s) on
 DATE"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Well good news is that for whatever reason on my laptop 'Print to File'
 does not work with latest Tor Browser built from source.  However the
 javascript.use_us_english_locale option seems to have no effect (and
 neither does the browser.tabs.remote.autostart.2 option).  Will dig into
 this tomorrow and try and find some idea of what's going on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport|  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alif):

 Commenting out `#DirPort 9030` solves it. Re-enabling it reproduces that
 assertion failure.

 I now have a working Tor service that is able to go all the way to
 `Bootstrapped 100%: Done`.

 Please, note that I haven't tested commenting out Dirport within my
 original configuration before the introduced obfs4, bridge definitions and
 data files copied from Tor-Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport|  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alif):

 Now, trying to solve my connectivity problem, I installed obfs4proxy from
 the Xenial repository, and coped over the obfs4 bridges from Tor-browser's
 torrc but nothing happened. Still "[notice] While fetching directory info,
 no running dirservers known. Will try again later. (purpose 6)"

 But after I copied the "cached-x" files from Tor browser's Data directory
 to my system and restarting the service, the exception appeared again:

 {{{
  several messages pertaining to connecting to bridges  then
 Oct 03 00:54:12.000 [notice] new bridge descriptor '' (cached):
 $FC259A04A328A07FED1413E9FC6526530D9FD87A~NX01 at XX.XX.XX.XX
 Oct 03 00:54:12.000 [notice] new bridge descriptor 'X' (cached):
 $FE7840FE1E21FE0A0639ED176EDA00A3ECA1E34D~Azadi at XXX.XX.XX.XX
 Oct 03 00:54:12.000 [notice] Delaying directory fetches: Pluggable
 transport proxies still configuring
 Oct 03 00:54:12.000 [notice] Opening Socks listener on /var/run/tor/socks
 Oct 03 00:54:12.000 [notice] Opening Control listener on
 /var/run/tor/control
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 ../src/or/cpuworker.c:499: cpuworker_queue_work: Assertion threadpool
 failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: Assertion threadpool failed in
 cpuworker_queue_work at ../src/or/cpuworker.c:499. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x55fb088902b2] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x94) [0x55fb088a8904] (on Tor 0.3.1.7
 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(cpuworker_queue_work+0x65)
 [0x55fb0884c395] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(consdiffmgr_rescan+0x9a7)
 [0x55fb0883f037] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x4ec7d) [0x55fb08776c7d]
 (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x754) [0x7fa5e1eecf24] (on Tor
 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x24d)
 [0x55fb08777a4d] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1c35)
 [0x55fb0877b215] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x55fb087733c9] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fa5e1099f45] (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 Oct 03 00:54:13.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x4b41b) [0x55fb0877341b]
 (on Tor 0.3.1.7 )
 }}}

 the files I copied are:
 cached-certs
 cached-descriptors
 cached-descriptors.new
 cached-microdesc-consensus
 cached-microdescs
 cached-microdescs.new

 lines changed in torrc:
 {{{
 ClientTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3,obfs4,scramblesuit exec
 /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
 #ClientTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3,ScrambleSuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy
 managed
 }}}
 then some obfs4 definitions copied from tor-browser

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23678: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-doc ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Mostly looks good!

 The test suite needs updating to expect the revised message:
 {{{
   FAIL src/test/test_socks.c:766: expected log to contain "Socks version
 71 not recognized. " "(Tor is not an http proxy.)"  Captured logs:
 1. warn: "Socks version 71 not recognized. (This port is not an HTTP
 proxy; did you want to use HTTPTunnelPort?)\n"
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport|  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alif):

 Well, I'm no longer able to reproduce this! Sorry.
 It persisted for a couple of days after having updated Tor to 0.3.1.7
 using a deb from the projects repository, until I had to reboot for a
 different reason.

 Now I'm back to "[notice] While fetching directory info, no running
 diverseness known. Will try again later. (purpose 6)" which is preventing
 me from making a circuit via obfs3, even though I'm able to do so in the
 Tor-browser via obfs4. But that's a different issue.

 Anyway, my torrc at the time of the errors is the following (I had
 disabled bridges to try to debug and to make the report less complicated).
 I removed commented lines for clarity and redacted secrets:

 

 Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log

 ControlPort 9051
 HashedControlPassword 16:XXX

 PortForwarding 1

 Address redacted.example.com

 Nickname 

 ContactInfo elsewhereXX

 DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
 DirPortFrontPage /usr/share/doc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html

 ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed

 HiddenServiceStatistics 1

 UseBridges 0
 UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 1

 ClientTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3,ScrambleSuit exec /usr/bin/obfsproxy
 managed

 #Some bridge definitions go here; obfs3 and plain
 

 Also here's my /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/tor since I had modified it to
 be able to run obfsproxy in 14.04:
 
 # vim:syntax=apparmor

   #include 
   #include 

   network tcp,
   network udp,

   capability chown,
   capability dac_read_search,
   capability fowner,
   capability fsetid,
   capability setgid,
   capability setuid,

   /usr/bin/tor r,
   /usr/sbin/tor r,

   # Needed by obfs4proxy
   /proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,

   /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid r,
   /sys/devices/system/cpu/ r,
   /sys/devices/system/cpu/** r,

   /etc/tor/* r,
   /usr/share/tor/** r,

   /usr/bin/obfsproxy PUx,
   /usr/bin/obfs4proxy Pix,
 

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[tor-bugs] #23744 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: Notification events have different meaning for each scheduler

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23744: sched: Notification events have different meaning for each scheduler
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-sched
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 As an example, KIST controls how much and when channel data is pushed on
 the network which means this `wants to write` event used by the Vanilla
 scheduler as "queued cell but no space on the outbuf" is not something
 that is coherent with KIST.

 A channel is scheduled in when it has cells in the queue, then they are
 flushed one by one by the KIST scheduler until the kernel says "no more
 space". Then, that channel is put back in the channel pending list and
 will get handled at the next tick of KIST.

 So, we really don't need KIST to be notified of this event from
 `connection_flushed_some()` which is used by Vanilla to try to flush more
 cells in the outbuf because the outbuf has room for it.

 Where it is useful is the second callsite of that even in
 `channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn()` which notifies the scheduler
 that it might be in need of flushing some stuff. In the case of a brand
 new channel just opening, its state is "IDLE" and that even will then put
 it in "waiting for cells" after.

 That being said, what needs to happened:

 1. Make the notification event a per-scheduler thing because KIST and
 Vanilla have different semantic for those events really. We should of
 course avoid as much as we can of code duplication and thus some "generic
 event handler" do make sense if they share the same semantic.

 2. Add a "channel state is open" notification event instead of "wants to
 write" which is really only true in very specific cases in
 `channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn()`. That way, the scheduler can
 take a decision on the status of the channel instead of blind guessing it
 is waiting for cells.

 3. Nullify the "wants to write" event for KIST considering (2) so it stops
 possibly scheduling channels that do not need at all to be scheduled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23740 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23740: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403:
service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor
0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Parckwart):

 asn filed the bug for me. I managed to reproduce the bug, but this time
 while logging in debug mode.

 From the debug log:

 {{{
 Oct 02 23:31:57.000 [debug] extend_info_from_node(): using
 [2a01:4f8:221:1ac1:dead:beef:7005:9001]:9001 for sputnik
 }}}

 So it selected an IPv6 intro node.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23712 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: DESTROY cell on a circuit bypasses the scheduler

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23712: sched: DESTROY cell on a circuit bypasses the scheduler
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `bug23712_032_01`.

 Ok this might look like a very simple fix but it is really not.

 For KIST, this is what we _need_ to do else this process of appending a
 DESTROY cell bypasses the scheduler and can trigger KIST to try to flush
 an empty channel which could be one of the source of #23676. The following
 lists the possible channel state it can be when the destroy cell is
 appended and the scheduler notified:

  i. if in `WAITING_FOR_CELLS`, all good, we will get scheduled
  ii. KIST can't let unscheduled channel in `WAITING_TO_WRITE` so we can't
 be calling "waiting for cells" on a "waiting to write" channel.
  iii. KIST doesn't put channel in `IDLE` state
  iv. `PENDING` state, can't escape the scheduler, like (ii).

 For the Vanilla kernel:

  i. if in `WAITING_FOR_CELLS`, all good, we will get scheduled
  ii. if in `WAITING_TO_WRITE`, it means we have data in the queue but
 can't put them in the outbuf because it is full. The `flushed_some()`
 function will call the "wants to write" event when the outbuf is flushed
 to the network and thus the DESTROY cell will ultimately get drained.
  iii. `PENDING` state, can't escape the scheduler.
  iv. if in the `IDLE` state, it means we have no more cell in the queue
 and the outbuf is full, the channel is put in `WAITING_TO_WRITE` state so
 (ii) applies to this case that is the "wants to write" event will trigger
 a flush of the destroy cell at some point when the outbuf is drained.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23743 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please let ahf push to the webwml repo

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23743: please let ahf push to the webwml repo
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Done. It'll take a moment to update

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[tor-bugs] #23743 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please let ahf push to the webwml repo

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23743: please let ahf push to the webwml repo
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 This way ahf can bump Tor versions in the Makefile when he thinks a new
 release is ready for it.

 Also, maybe he will fix other things when he sees them. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23739 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve documentation on how we use gcov

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23739: improve documentation on how we use gcov
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-doc tor-tests-|  Actual Points:
  coverage   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23741 [Core Tor/Tor]: scripts/test/coverage tries to mv .gcov files to /

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23741: scripts/test/coverage tries to mv .gcov files to /
+
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-tests-coverage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.5.1-alpha


Comment:

 Patch in https://oniongit.eu/catalyst/tor/merge_requests/9

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[tor-bugs] #23742 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Make a snowflake package and distribute it

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23742: Make a snowflake package and distribute it
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 So that one can just write `apt-get install snowflake` and edit the torrc
 to use snowflake with the default tor service.

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[tor-bugs] #23741 [Core Tor/Tor]: scripts/test/coverage tries to mv .gcov files to /

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23741: scripts/test/coverage tries to mv .gcov files to /
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-tests-coverage
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When run with no arguments, the `scripts/test/coverage` script attempts to
 move the .gcov files to the root directory.  This shouldn't happen.
 Hopefully most users won't run this script as a UID that has write access
 to the root directory, but we should fix this anyway.  Either exit with a
 usage error if there is no directory name argument, or change the test to
 `[ -d "$dst" ]`.  (The existing test, `[ -n $dst ]` with no quoting around
 `$dst`, returns true if `$dst` is empty on the macOS and Linux systems
 I've tried it on.  This surprising behavior is apparently required by
 POSIX.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23740 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23740: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403:
service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor
0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> {{{
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
> src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
> !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
> service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
> [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
> [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug:
> ./tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x222e) [0x55d97eb4e69e] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4c5f1) [0x55d97ea2a5f1] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x6bea0) [0x55d97ea49ea0] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fb3bc4123dc] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
> [0x55d97ea2dad4] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
> [0x55d97ea31315] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(main+0x19) [0x55d97ea29229] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fb3bb5fab45] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4b279) [0x55d97ea29279] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
> src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
> !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
> service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
> [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
> [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug:
> ./tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x222e) [0x55d97eb4e69e] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4c5f1) [0x55d97ea2a5f1] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x6bea0) [0x55d97ea49ea0] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fb3bc4123dc] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
> [0x55d97ea2dad4] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
> [0x55d97ea31315] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(main+0x19) [0x55d97ea29229] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fb3bb5fab45] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4b279) [0x55d97ea29279] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
>

> }}}
>
> Perhaps a v6-only relay was chosen as intro point?

New description:

 {{{
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
 !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
 service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
 [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on

Re: [tor-bugs] #23740 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23740: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403:
service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor
0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> {{{
>
> {{{
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
> src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
> !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
> service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
> [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
> [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug:
> ./tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x222e) [0x55d97eb4e69e] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4c5f1) [0x55d97ea2a5f1] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x6bea0) [0x55d97ea49ea0] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fb3bc4123dc] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
> [0x55d97ea2dad4] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
> [0x55d97ea31315] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(main+0x19) [0x55d97ea29229] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fb3bb5fab45] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4b279) [0x55d97ea29279] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
> src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
> !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
> service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
> [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
> [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug:
> ./tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x222e) [0x55d97eb4e69e] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4c5f1) [0x55d97ea2a5f1] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x6bea0) [0x55d97ea49ea0] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fb3bc4123dc] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
> [0x55d97ea2dad4] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
> [0x55d97ea31315] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(main+0x19) [0x55d97ea29229] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
> gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fb3bb5fab45] (on Tor
> 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
> Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4b279) [0x55d97ea29279] (on
> Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
>
> }}}
> {{{
> }}}
> }}}
> {{{
> Perhaps a v6-only relay was chosen as intro point?
> }}}

New description:

 {{{
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
 !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
 service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug:

[tor-bugs] #23740 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23740: prop224: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/hs_service.c:403:
service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed. (on Tor
0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  prop224 tor-ipv6
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{

 {{{
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
 !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
 service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
 [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x222e) [0x55d97eb4e69e] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4c5f1) [0x55d97ea2a5f1] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x6bea0) [0x55d97ea49ea0] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fb3bc4123dc] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
 [0x55d97ea2dad4] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
 [0x55d97ea31315] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(main+0x19) [0x55d97ea29229] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fb3bb5fab45] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:57.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4b279) [0x55d97ea29279] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/hs_service.c:403: service_intro_point_new: Non-fatal assertion
 !(!ls) failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(!ls) failed in
 service_intro_point_new at src/or/hs_service.c:403. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x55d97eb5dd52] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7)
 [0x55d97eb78ba7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x222e) [0x55d97eb4e69e] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4c5f1) [0x55d97ea2a5f1] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x6bea0) [0x55d97ea49ea0] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fb3bc4123dc] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
 [0x55d97ea2dad4] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
 [0x55d97ea31315] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(main+0x19) [0x55d97ea29229] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7fb3bb5fab45] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)
 Oct 02 21:27:58.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor(+0x4b279) [0x55d97ea29279] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5)

 }}}
 {{{
 }}}
 }}}
 {{{
 Perhaps a v6-only relay was chosen as intro point?
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23739 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve documentation on how we use gcov

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23739: improve documentation on how we use gcov
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-doc tor-tests-|  Actual Points:
  coverage   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch in https://oniongit.eu/catalyst/tor/merge_requests/8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23733 [- Select a component]: Tor failed to launch in OSX

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23733: Tor failed to launch in OSX
--+
 Reporter:  jakob4800 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 close Tor browser
 drag TorBrowser to the desktop
 open Activity Monitor and search for "tor"
 if you find tor or tor.real click on it and click the X Ibn the upper left
 and click force quit.
 go back to your desktop and open Tor Browser and it should connect.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon disappears

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23724: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon 
disappears
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Loading entities from NoScript .dtd files is blocked

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23723: Loading entities from NoScript .dtd files is blocked
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23603 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Cleanup race between circuit close and free with the HS circuitmap

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23603: hs: Cleanup race between circuit close and free with the HS circuitmap
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Indeed. The `circuit_retries` is really about "How many time have used
 this IP to build a circuit" regardless of success or fail. Even if the
 circuit was taken down 5 min later, we still count that as a "try".

 Apart from all the numerous issues with this behavior, one of the bug here
 is that we reach 3 try which is not above the limit of 4, so we open a new
 circuit and `circuit_retries == 4` which makes us clean it up the second
 after because we've reached our max...

 We should:

 1. Allow the circuit creation up to 3 tries.
 2. Deny circuit creation at > 3 and clean it up at > 3.

 Kind of tricky here, so I think the easiest way to do that is that if
 circuit_retries is 3 and we want to launch, ++ it and deny the launch.

 OR we only cleanup the intro point if it doesn't have a circuit
 established and the counter has reached the max? (Which is what v2 does,
 cleanups only if it realizes that the retry has reached the max and the
 last circuit is gone thus a retry is soon about to be launched).

 If you have a more elegant solution, I'm all ears?

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[tor-bugs] #23739 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve documentation on how we use gcov

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23739: improve documentation on how we use gcov
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  catalyst
  catalyst   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  new-developers tor-doc tor-tests-
 Severity:  Normal   |  coverage
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Ticket #16792 (0.2.9.1-alpha) introduced some automation for excluding
 lines from filtered gcov output.  We should document the prefixes it uses
 to mark excluded lines.  There should also be information about how to
 read the gcov-diff files, which are processed to remove line numbers,
 among other things.  We should also refer to the gcc documentation for
 gcov at https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Invoking-Gcov.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23261 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23261: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201710  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by brade):

 * status:  merge_ready => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23697 [Webpages/Website]: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23697: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by alison):

 * cc: alison (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23697 [Webpages/Website]: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23697: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by alison):

 I think that a frontdesk@ group consisting of me, Jon, and Phoul is a good
 start. I think that there should be at least one other person in this
 group to start. I hate to assign people more work, but maybe Steph is a
 good person to add, since some of what will come through will be comms
 related and even if it isn't, it's probably a good idea for our comms
 person to learn about Tor by seeing what comes through this list.

 I also would like to move the idea of a paid Tor receptionist to the
 medium-term. I think this could even be a part-time or paid internship
 position to start. We should discuss this more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23711 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: KIST writes to kernel and get a "wants to write" notification right after

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23711: sched: KIST writes to kernel and get a "wants to write" notification 
right
after
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 After some analysis, the Vanilla scheduler needs this call for the case
 where the connection outbuf was full and the circuit queue still has cells
 in it.

 This way, once the outbuf is flushed onto the network, if we ever are
 under the low watermark (16k), the channel is rescheduled so to try to
 flush the cells into the outbuf which has room at that point.

 This is a big house of cards because the channel *has* to be in
 `SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_TO_WRITE` if we ever want to drain the circuit queue
 because the `scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells()` will never do anything
 unless the channel is in state `SCHED_CHAN_WAITING_FOR_CELLS`.

 For KIST, this "wants to write" is useless outside of the scheduler
 because KIST actually schedules things and always put back a channel in
 state "waiting to write" in the channels pending list to be re-assess at
 the next tick and writes to kernel what it just flushed.

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[tor-bugs] #23738 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Setup fpcentral VM

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23738: Setup fpcentral VM
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance   |Version:
  and Testing|   Keywords:
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201710
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #6119
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Once the VM for fpcentral has been created (in #23737), we need to deploy
 fpcentral on this new VM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23697 [Webpages/Website]: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23697: List frontdesk, not execdir, on the contact page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by jselon):

 donations@ receives more support questions than donor related questions.
 It mostly receives a considerable amount of spam.  I receive maybe 3
 legitimate donor questions via donations@ per week. However, it is linked
 to all of our donation sites like paypal, benevity, bitpay etc... so I'm
 not sure if killing it is a good idea.
 giving@ receives very few emails. If it helps, I would be fine with the
 giving@ address being in a more visible location on our site.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23737 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create VM for fpcentral

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23737: Create VM for fpcentral
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6119| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * parent:   => #6119


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[tor-bugs] #23737 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create VM for fpcentral

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23737: Create VM for fpcentral
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need a new VM to run fpcentral, a panopticlic-like website that we want
 to use to check that the Tor Browser fingerprint does not change.

 As this is not a big application, I think we don't need a lot of CPU,
 memory, or disk space.

 We can run this on Debian stable, and we need the `git`, `python3` and
 `python3-virtualenv` packages installed.

 An hostname pointing to this VM would also be useful, such as
 `fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Say how many primary entry guards we're missing descriptors for

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23670: Say how many primary entry guards we're missing descriptors for
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see branch !`bug23670` in my repo for the feature and a basic
 unittest.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23385 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23385: Configure VM for Tor Messenger builds
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The machine has been setup to do Tor Messenger builds, using the ansible
 config added in commit 74e12d3f49bbfe609cab9b76b9d2c58c01867823.

 arlolra, sukhbir: you can send me your ssh key to get access to this
 machine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 The patch looks good to me as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:networking should be whitelisted in NoScript (was: about:networking shouldn't have JS disabled)

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23736: about:networking should be whitelisted in NoScript
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, tbb-easy|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  easy => noscript, tbb-easy


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23718 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Not able to log on to Protonmail with latest NoScript

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23718: Not able to log on to Protonmail with latest NoScript
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW: this is
 https://forums.informaction.com/viewtopic.php?f=7=23343=15

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:networking shouldn't have JS disabled (was: about:networking is broken since JS is disabled)

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23736: about:networking shouldn't have JS disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It isn't broken but JS is disabled indeed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16678 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enhance KeyboardEvent fingerprinting protection for unusual characters

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#16678: Enhance KeyboardEvent fingerprinting protection for unusual characters
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201710R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:18 sysrqb]:
 > After I read Arthur's comment on the github branch[0] I realized there's
 a bug in the patch. I pushed a fixup commit that corrects it[1].
 >
 > So it's in this ticket, the relevant part is:
 > {{{
 > Every call to KEY/SHIFT/ALTGR updates the mapping in all hashmaps,
 therefore
 > calling both ALTGR and SHIFT for the same key results in the ALTGR state
 being
 > overwritten. I'll leave these comments above and instead I'll create a
 fourth
 > macro for ALTGRSHIFT that correctly inserts the key into the hashmaps.
 I'll
 > then replace all occurrences of ALTGR()+SHIFT() with ALTGRSHIFT().
 > }}}
 >
 > Commit 1e094349cd679d8592411d741512d71bc29185fc does this.
 >
 > [0] https://github.com/sysrqb/tor-
 browser/commit/bug16678_2#commitcomment-24566167
 > [1] https://github.com/sysrqb/tor-
 browser/commit/1e094349cd679d8592411d741512d71bc29185fc

 That's a good improvement; thanks.

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[tor-bugs] #23736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:networking is broken since JS is disabled

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23736: about:networking is broken since JS is disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 It should be spared

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23025 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Flags to increase hardening on macOS

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23025: Flags to increase hardening on macOS
--+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21448| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710 => TorBrowserTeam201710R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Hm. I am a bit hesitant using `CPPFLAGS` here as they are (strictly
 speaking) not preprocessor related. Would you mind putting the flags into
 something like `HARDENING_FLAGS` adding it as we add `FLAGS`?

 You are right. Here's a new version.
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser-build/commit/23025+1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23734 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Backport rbm.conf changes from tor-browser-build to tor-messenger-build

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23734: Backport rbm.conf changes from tor-browser-build to tor-messenger-build
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is done with commits 043cc5f96113c6367e29be6064867148c55fea20,
 4e45b18eb98dc3193344e9c156de30c42511f47b and
 bf707b1b225eb9a91b02df84aafb0993fc97e880.

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[tor-bugs] #23735 [Webpages/Website]: Put a banner when detecting Tor exit node but with a non-Tor Browser on the website advising to use TB instead

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23735: Put a banner when detecting Tor exit node but with a non-Tor Browser on 
the
website advising to use TB instead
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 In the same spirit of #23721

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23734 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Backport rbm.conf changes from tor-browser-build to tor-messenger-build

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23734: Backport rbm.conf changes from tor-browser-build to tor-messenger-build
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by boklm):

 Before that, f63b980484f55bdf0bab86720587077b4474b679 also updated the
 tor-browser-build submodule.

 The changes to `rbm.conf` that needs to be backported from `tor-browser-
 build` can be seen with:
 {{{
 git diff 86210c6821e393e98dd58c7d7bb6223755b496d5
 712991345d023d987631a35998df6cf8736b5a2e -- rbm.conf
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20312 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Extend the file size for HTML preview to at least 1 megabyte

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#20312: Extend the file size for HTML preview to at least 1 megabyte
--+
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It seems we need 2 MiBs
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/23733/Screen%20Shot%202017-10-03%20at%203.48.37%20am.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23666 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Deploy newsletter microsite to tpo infrastructure

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23666: Deploy newsletter microsite to tpo infrastructure
-+-
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23096   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 There is now nanodes.torproject.org serving https://newsletter-
 master.torproject.org/.  The very basic stuff is there.  What else is
 needed, package wise and setup wise?t

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23671 [Core Tor/Tor]: Say how many other nodes we're missing descriptors for

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23671: Say how many other nodes we're missing descriptors for
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Say how many primary entry guards we're missing descriptors for

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23670: Say how many primary entry guards we're missing descriptors for
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23678: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-doc ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug23678_032` has a straightforward fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23678: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-doc ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere Import Settings is Missing From Preferences on higher security levels

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23322: HTTPS Everywhere Import Settings is Missing From Preferences on higher
security levels
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW: this is https://forums.informaction.com/viewtopic.php?f=7=21568

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[tor-bugs] #23734 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Backport rbm.conf changes from tor-browser-build to tor-messenger-build

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23734: Backport rbm.conf changes from tor-browser-build to tor-messenger-build
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 In commit 042bcda0ec297e73590c4028fbb3f9c668282279 the `tor-browser-
 build.git` submodule was updated. However some changes from `tor-browser-
 build/rbm.conf` also need to be backported to `rbm.conf`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23733 [- Select a component]: Tor failed to launch in OSX

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23733: Tor failed to launch in OSX
--+
 Reporter:  jakob4800 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by jakob4800):

 * Attachment "Screen Shot 2017-10-03 at 3.48.37 am.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, SponsorZ, tor-pt,|  Actual Points:
  proposal-needed censorship |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)
 * sponsor:   => SponsorM-can


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[tor-bugs] #23733 [- Select a component]: Tor failed to launch in OSX

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23733: Tor failed to launch in OSX
--+
 Reporter:  jakob4800 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 i tried to load tor from the TBB and i got this error
 "Tor exited during startup. This might be due to an error in your torrc
 file, a bug in Tor or another program on your system, or faulty hardware.
 Until you fix the underlying problem and restart Tor, Tor Browser will not
 start."

 so i deleted the app and the TorBrowser-Data file and reinstalled it but
 the error still appeared. it used to work fine but now it doesnt. it
 stopped working after i force ejected the disk image of tor while i had
 the application open

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7144 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement Bridge Guards and other anti-enumeration defenses

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#7144: Implement Bridge Guards and other anti-enumeration defenses
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ, tor-bridge tor-guard   |  Actual Points:
  censorship |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23318 [Core Tor/Tor]: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23318: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  path-selection 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
  030-backport 031-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think it's okay.  The only reason to use llround is that we're
 converting to a uint64, which we need to do for our randomized constant-
 time weighted selection logic.  In frac_nodes_with_descriptors(), we're
 not converting to uint64 at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23732 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Update tor-browser-build.git commit used in tor-messenger

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23732: Update tor-browser-build.git commit used in tor-messenger
+-
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Ah, it seems it is already done in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 messenger-build.git/, but https://github.com/TheTorProject/tor-messenger-
 build/ was not updated.

 However, some changes from `tor-browser-build/rbm.conf` still need to be
 backported to `tor-messenger-build/rbm.conf`.

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[tor-bugs] #23732 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Update tor-browser-build.git commit used in tor-messenger

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23732: Update tor-browser-build.git commit used in tor-messenger
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Tor Messenger is currently building using a tor-browser-build.git
 submodule with a commit from July 2017.

 We should update it to use a more recent commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23384 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23384: Configure VM for Tor Browser builds
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 `unattended-upgrades` is now installed and configured, so I am closing
 this ticket now. But you can still send me your ssh key to get access to
 this machine if you didn't do it yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23357 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build with non-Cross-DSO CFI

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23357: Build with non-Cross-DSO CFI
+--
 Reporter:  shawn.webb  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, defence-in-depth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1.0
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 We'd happily take a patch for a configure option that activates CFI on
 everything that's compiled using Tor's configure.
 (Assuming an appropriate version of llvm.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 030-backport|  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 029-backport 030-backport 031-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Possible fix in branch `bug23693_029` in my public repository, assuming I
 have the diagnosis right.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 alif, if you could answer any of the questions above, that would help us
 diagnose and fix this bug.  I have some guesses below, but they're just
 guesses.

 Some ideas, based on looking at the code:  There are two ways I think this
 could happen: if we reach cpuworker_queue_work() without having called
 cpu_init(), or if we somehow fail to create a threadpool in cpu_init()
 when we do call it. But I don't think it can be the second case, since
 that would have created a nonfatal assertion from threadpool_new().

 We call cpu_init() in two cases: when our settings change, the transition
 affects workers, and we have become a server; or when we start as a server
 in main.c.

 I think that the check in the first cpu_init() case might be wrong: if we
 start as a client, and then transition to a bridge (not a public server),
 I don't think we will trigger options_transition_affects_workers().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23722 [Core Tor/Tor]: Somebody should profile a Tor 0.3.1.7 relay

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23722: Somebody should profile a Tor 0.3.1.7 relay
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * cc: ahf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23722 [Core Tor/Tor]: Somebody should profile a Tor 0.3.1.7 relay

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23722: Somebody should profile a Tor 0.3.1.7 relay
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 After around 1h30 of profiling:

 {{{
   20.87%  tor  [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] update_blocked_averages
 ▒
8.54%  tor  tor[.] curve25519_donna
 ▒
1.50%  tor  [kernel.kallsyms]  [k]
 native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
 ▒
1.27%  tor  libc-2.23.so   [.] malloc
 ▒
1.21%  tor  tor[.] connection_bucket_refill
 ▒
1.09%  tor  [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] __bpf_prog_run
 ▒
0.97%  tor  libc-2.23.so   [.] 0x0007fdeb
 ▒
0.89%  tor  libevent-2.0.so.5.1.9  [.] _init
 ▒
0.86%  tor  libcrypto.so.1.0.0 [.] BN_num_bits_word
 ▒
0.81%  tor  tor[.] circuitmux_find_map_entry
 ▒
0.68%  tor  tor[.] curve25519_square_times
 ▒
0.66%  tor  [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] try_to_wake_up
 ▒
0.65%  tor  libcrypto.so.1.0.0 [.] BN_num_bits
 ▒
0.65%  tor  tor[.] ewma_cmp_cmux
 ▒
0.62%  tor  libc-2.23.so   [.] 0x00081c78
 ▒
0.61%  tor  [nf_conntrack] [k] __nf_conntrack_find_get
 ▒
0.60%  tor  libcrypto.so.1.0.0 [.] 0x000c7567
 ▒
0.55%  tor  tor[.] buf_datalen
 ▒
0.54%  tor  libcrypto.so.1.0.0 [.] 0x000c728e
 ▒
0.52%  tor  [kernel.kallsyms]  [k] __fget
 ▒
0.51%  tor  tor[.]
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel
 ▒
0.51%  tor  tor[.] ge25519_nielsadd2
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22513 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#22513: Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability => tbb-usability-website
 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Changing circuit for page with error switches catch-all circuit instead

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#22538: Changing circuit for page with error switches catch-all circuit instead
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability => tbb-usability-website


Comment:

 No linkability implications.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser doesn't stop "loading" when Tor gave up

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#22432: Tor Browser doesn't stop "loading" when Tor gave up
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Seems the same issue when
 {{{
 [10-02 13:41:07] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 337 FAILED 80
 f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion:443 REASON=END REMOTE_REASON=EXITPOLICY
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change profile location

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23730: Change profile location
--+---
 Reporter:  bitwyse   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Profiles  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bitwyse):

 Thanks for your reply and offer to help!

  - OS = Windows XP Pro SP3
  - Last version with which it worked: 7.0.2 (haven't tried any other in
 between). It worked with all previous versions (for years).
  - Yes, I can move the whole folder (with the default profile) anywhere
 and it works fine.

 (The reason for this configuration is that I keep the system, programmes
 and data all on different partitions).

 Regards

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched, 0.3.2.2  |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:24 nickm]:
 > merged to master!  Is this ready to close?

 dgoulet says yes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change profile location

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23730: Change profile location
--+---
 Reporter:  bitwyse   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Profiles  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Thanks for reporting this problem. It sounds like you are using an unusual
 configuration, but I can try to help. Please answer the following
 questions:
 * What operating system are you using?
 * What version of Tor Browser did this last work in?
 * If you start with a completely new Tor Browser (without trying to reused
 your old profile), are you able to move the profile to a new location and
 use it?

 Also, please avoid creating a new profile using the Profile Manager unless
 you are macOS. It won't work correctly in Tor Browser on Windows or Linux.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it easier for mobile app developers to embed tor

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23684: Make it easier for mobile app developers to embed tor
--+--
 Reporter:  hellais   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-mobile
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23629 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CSP error reports not sent - intended/safe ?

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23629: CSP error reports not sent - intended/safe ?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23720 [Core Tor/Tor]: 'make test' writes into my /tmp

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23720: 'make test' writes into my /tmp
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23720 [Core Tor/Tor]: 'make test' writes into my /tmp

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23720: 'make test' writes into my /tmp
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Prefixing a "tor" temporary directory in `/tmp` is something standard in
 my experience. It could be more of a problem if we were doing something
 like `/tmp/test/` but prefixing with `tor_test_...` seems right to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change profile location

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23730: Change profile location
--+--
 Reporter:  bitwyse   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Profiles  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23731 [Community/Outreach]: some websites block requests by HTTP User-Agent

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23731: some websites block requests by HTTP User-Agent
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  mrphs, alison
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach|Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  User-Agent, blocking  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  tbb-team => mrphs, alison
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Community/Outreach


Comment:

 I don't think we'll ship such a drop-down menu with different user agents
 to pick but am fine with 2. and 3. getting done. Moving this to the
 outreach component.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22451, #23409, #18925, #20254, ...

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #22451, #23409, #18925, #20254, #21256, #22581, #22659, 
#23439 by gk:


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23213 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use rbm for our alpha builds

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23213: Use rbm for our alpha builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201709,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:23213 gk]:

 > 2) We need to update the relevant parts of
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking

 Done. Closing this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23722 [Core Tor/Tor]: Somebody should profile a Tor 0.3.1.7 relay

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23722: Somebody should profile a Tor 0.3.1.7 relay
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I'm currently running a profile on latest master with my fast relay. I'll
 let it sit for a while and report back.

 I did a quick profile on a relay on my desktop that had old data and when
 `liblzma` kicks in, it hugs the CPU big time.

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[tor-bugs] #23731 [Applications/Tor Browser]: some websites block requests by HTTP User-Agent

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23731: some websites block requests by HTTP User-Agent
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  User-Agent,
  |  blocking
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Some websites will use the HTTP User-Agent field to determine whether the
 browser is allowed to visit.  Apparently, this is done in the name of
 "security," with the assumption that "insecure" browsers should not be
 allowed to visit the site.  (Probably, we should not assume that this has
 anything to do with security per se; perhaps it is really about
 correctness.)

 The approach is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve the objectives
 of the site operators.  It is unnecessary because web standards define how
 browsers ought to behave, and any correctness should be determined by
 adherence to the standards, not by whether the name of the browser in
 question happens to be on some list.  It is insufficient because
 circumventing the filter is trivial and can be done simply by changing the
 HTTP User-Agent, which users of Tor Browser can edit by editing
 {{{general.useragent.override}}} on the {{{about:config}}} page.

 The default User-Agent that ships with Tor Browser appears to be:

 {{{
 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
 }}}

 This seems to work well if we want to appear to be using Firefox.
 However, sometimes Firefox is not on the approved list for websites such
 as those described above.  (At least one website approves Safari and
 Chrome while rejecting IE and Firefox.)

 [http://www.browser-info.net/useragents Browser-Info] provides a list of
 popular HTTP User-Agents, and choosing from this list we can configure Tor
 Browser to appear to be Safari by changing
 {{{general.useragent.override}}} to:

 {{{
 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0) AppleWebKit/535.1 (KHTML, like Gecko)
 Chrome/13.0.782.112 Safari/535.1
 }}}

 Web users who do not value privacy may indeed have the option,
 inconvenient as it may be, to switch to a browser that satisfies the
 requirements of the site.  Tor users do not have such an option, because
 there is only one Tor Browser (it happens to be based on Firefox).

 We need to make it easier for everyday Tor users to circumvent filtering
 of this variety.  Some possible suggestions:

 1. Maintain a list of popular User-Agents and provide an option in the
 drop-down onion menu on Tor Browser to choose which one to be for this
 site.
 1. Establish a Wiki page that allows users to report websites that block
 specific browsers by User-Agent, along with examples of User-Agent
 strings, if any, that work.
 1. Where appropriate, liaise with the websites in question, particularly
 if they are popular ones, to make sure that Tor Browser is on the list of
 suitable browsers.

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[tor-bugs] #23730 [- Select a component]: Change profile location

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23730: Change profile location
--+--
 Reporter:  bitwyse   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  Profiles
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hello
 I have always used Tor with the program on one partition and the profile
 on another.
 I simply copied the profile whare I wanted it and changed profiles.ini to
 IsRelative=0
 Path=[absolute path]
 That worked fine and I kept my usual settings after updates.

 I just updated to 7.0.6 and that doesn't work any more.

  - if I do as above it "cannot start" (or if it does it complains that the
 proxy settings are wrong - although I set "no proxy").

  - if I use Profile Manager to create a new profile Tor is in English,
 although my installer version is French - and a lot of things are missing
 from the new profile.
 Can anyone tell me how to get round this?

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6119, #18101, #14205, #16341, ...

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #6119, #18101, #14205, #16341, #18599, #20636, #22343, 
#22451, #23409, #12418, #18925, #20254, #21256, #21404, #21484, #21542, #21657, 
#21674, #21689, #21727, #21847, #21850, #21851, #21863, #21951, #22070, #22125, 
#22525, #22564, #22581, #22586, #22587, #22612, #22659, #22794, #22854, #23024, 
#23025, #23136, #23228, #23229, #23231, #23261, #23262, #23386, #23439, #23442, 
#23456, #23458, #23486, #23561, #23644, #23702 by gk:


Comment:
Items for October 2017

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23725 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Move inactive git repos to attic

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23725: Move inactive git repos to attic
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:5 atagar]:
 > Hi Yawning. Certainly can do though I suspect the 'attic' classification
 wouldn't actually change anything. It's just how things are listed on
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/

 Last I checked, both of my repos fall into "real things that we are
 running, and just happen to not have needed or gotten a commit in the past
 six months".

 Plus, everyone pulls obfs4proxy from where it is now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201710R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23729 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sound is broken on http://websdr.sp3pgx.uz.zgora.pl:8901/

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23729: Sound is broken on http://websdr.sp3pgx.uz.zgora.pl:8901/
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regession  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `dom.webaudio.enabled` was intentionally set to `false` in
 ticket:13017#comment:49

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21704, #13398, #16678, #18022

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #21704, #13398, #16678, #18022 by gk:


Comment:
Moving reviews to October.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23546 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: add a DNS CAA record to

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23546: add a DNS CAA record to
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #23729 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sound is broken on http://websdr.sp3pgx.uz.zgora.pl:8901/

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23729: Sound is broken on http://websdr.sp3pgx.uz.zgora.pl:8901/
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-usability-website,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regession
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We have a report in our blog about broken sound on
 http://websdr.sp3pgx.uz.zgora.pl:8901/ (https://blog.torproject.org/tor-
 browser-706-released?page=1#comment-271626). The website claims that "Your
 browser does not seem to support HTML5 WebAudio", yet it worked in Tor
 Browser 6.x and it works on Firefox 52.4.0esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Loading entities from NoScript .dtd files is blocked

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23723: Loading entities from NoScript .dtd files is blocked
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 cypherpunks]:
 > ??? How did you test that?
 > For correct testing it's necessary to do a restartless update of the
 5.1.2rc1 (with workaround) to something newer.
 > Update: Oh, wait. You're testing another bug...

 Trying to figure out whether entities in .dtd files get properly resolved
 does not necessarily need to get tested via an update I think. I guess you
 mean #23724.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Loading entities from NoScript .dtd files is blocked

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23723: Loading entities from NoScript .dtd files is blocked
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 ??? How did you test that?
 For correct testing it's necessary to do a restartless update of the
 5.1.2rc1 (with workaround) to something newer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23728 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When using duckduckgo's onion/clear net site with TorBrowser's security slider set to high, it forces safe search setting to strict

2017-10-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23728: When using duckduckgo's onion/clear net site with TorBrowser's security
slider set to high, it forces safe search setting to strict
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > This isn't an issue for the Tor Project, right? You may want to tell
 that to DuckDuckGo on their official forum:
 https://reddit.com/r/duckduckgo
 Thanks, I reported the bug to DuckDuckgo.

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