Re: [tor-bugs] #24060 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add x86_64 version of msvcr100.dll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24060: Add x86_64 version of msvcr100.dll
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201711R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20636  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Merged to `master` (commit
 2393932708eb8090ee17374a78ad7d0c6c31c564).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24094 [Core Tor/Torflow]: measured bw percentage is always 100

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24094: measured bw percentage is always 100
--+---
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information


Comment:

 Workaround merged to master as f38c085, setting back to "needs
 information" in case we want to fix the underlying bug in
 torflow/pytorctl.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24087 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add teor as a torflow maintainer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24087: Add teor as a torflow maintainer
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by Sebastian):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Sorry, unrelated error in the config prevented the change from going
 through

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24094 [Core Tor/Torflow]: measured bw percentage is always 100

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24094: measured bw percentage is always 100
--+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 I hate state machines

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24190 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter not working on 7.0.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24190: Twitter not working on 7.0.8
--+---
 Reporter:  rebbecca  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 rebbecca]:
 > please check this problem in twitter after logging in.
 > In High Security Level, JavaScript can't loaded in twitter.com even if
 the site is in NoScript white list.
 > the problem will be solved only if you choose medium security level.

 Chances are that NoScript is actually doing that. Could you try figuring
 that out starting with (older) clean, new Tor Browser versions? You'll
 find them at https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-
 archive/torbrowser/

 You can update NoScript manually on `about:addons` right-click on NoScript
 -> Find Updates

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23577 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add rendezvous point IPv6 address to client introduce cells (was: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23577: Add rendezvous point IPv6 address to client introduce cells
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha =>
 * actualpoints:  1 => 2


Comment:

 My branch bug23577 at https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git has neel's
 changes rebased to the latest master, and fixup / squash commits that:
 * Fix "make check-spaces" errors
 * Check that the IPv4 address is valid before adding any link specifiers
 * Edit some comments to match the new code
 * Summarise the changes file (we usually use one entry per change)

 It passes "make check" and "make test-network-all".

 It is safe to merge to master, because 0.3.2 services ignore IPv6 link
 specifiers in client introduce cells.

 I have opened these follow-up tickets:
 * #24193 for v3 single onion services to use IPv6 addresses (0.3.3), and
 * #24181 for v3 onion services to put unrecognised link specifiers
 (including IPv6) into EXTEND cells (can be longer term)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24181 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put unrecognised link specifiers in onion service EXTEND cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24181: Put unrecognised link specifiers in onion service EXTEND cells
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, tor-spec |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Do we need to do this for CREATE cells as well?
 I don't think so, because we're the ones connecting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24181 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put unrecognised link specifiers in onion service EXTEND cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24181: Put unrecognised link specifiers in onion service EXTEND cells
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, tor-spec |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We should also put IPv6 addresses in EXTEND cell link specifiers, even if
 current relays won't use them.

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[tor-bugs] #24193 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services parse and use IPv6 introduce link specifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24193: Make v3 single onion services parse and use IPv6 introduce link 
specifiers
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23493
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  SponsorV-can   |
-+-
 Once #23577 is merged, we can make single onion services parse IPv6
 addresses in introduce link specifiers. Then they can choose the address
 they want to use to connect to the rend point using their firewall
 settings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24173 [Core Tor/Nyx]: nyx-2.0.4: setup.py doesn't list sqlite3 as a dependency

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24173: nyx-2.0.4: setup.py doesn't list sqlite3 as a dependency
--+--
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Nyx


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23966 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor node_has_curve25519_onion_key() to use node_get_curve25519_onion_key()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23966: Refactor node_has_curve25519_onion_key() to use
node_get_curve25519_onion_key()
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, easy, refactor => easy,
 refactor
 * parent:  #23577 =>


Comment:

 Remove the parent and spurious keywords.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use node_get_curve25519_onion_key() in extend_info_from_node()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23760: Use node_get_curve25519_onion_key() in extend_info_from_node()
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, refactor, easy =>
 refactor, easy
 * parent:  #23577 =>


Comment:

 Removing the parent and spurious keywords.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24087 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add teor as a torflow maintainer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24087: Add teor as a torflow maintainer
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Can you try this again?

 When I try to push master, I see:
 {{{
 $ git push tp-rw master
 W access for torflow DENIED to teor
 fatal: Could not read from remote repository.

 Please make sure you have the correct access rights
 and the repository exists.
 }}}

 My torflow settings are the same as my chutney settings, with the obvious
 substitution:
 {{{
 $ git remote -v | grep tp-rw
 tp-rw   g...@git-rw.torproject.org:torflow.git (fetch)
 tp-rw   g...@git-rw.torproject.org:torflow.git (push)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24094 [Core Tor/Torflow]: measured bw percentage is always 100

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24094: measured bw percentage is always 100
--+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 We've decided this is trivial and syntactically correct, so I'm going to
 merge it as soon as my access comes through.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21697 [Core Tor/Torflow]: torflow bwfiles maybe should be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21697: torflow bwfiles maybe should be updated
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 This is in testing on the live network on a duplicate bandwidth authority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21995 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Set PreferIPv6 on Bandwidth Scanner SOCKSPorts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21995: Set PreferIPv6 on Bandwidth Scanner SOCKSPorts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See my branch feature21995 for this feature.
 We should check with bandwidth server operators before deploying it,
 because it changes how bandwidth server DNS addresses that resolve to IPv6
 addresses are handled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24094 [Core Tor/Torflow]: measured bw percentage is always 100

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24094: measured bw percentage is always 100
--+--
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See my github branch bug24094 for a fix for this.

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[tor-bugs] #24192 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I visit a V3 onion that supplies a invalid certificate, torbrowser will lookup the onion when the get certifice button is clicked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24192: When I visit a V3 onion that supplies a invalid certificate, torbrowser
will lookup the onion when the get certifice button is clicked
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When I visit a V3 onion that supplies a invalid certificate, torbrowser
 will lookup the onion when the get certifice button is clicked. This may
 leak the secret onion address. I attached a photo showing the issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24192 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I visit a V3 onion that supplies a invalid certificate, torbrowser will lookup the onion when the get certifice button is clicked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24192: When I visit a V3 onion that supplies a invalid certificate, torbrowser
will lookup the onion when the get certifice button is clicked
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * Attachment "issue.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21698 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Add a 128M file for really fast relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21698: Add a 128M file for really fast relays
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See my github branch feature21698 for this change.

 We should only merge this change after we've tested it and told all the
 operators, because it needs a new 128M file on bandwidth servers.

 Maybe we should also check if these files exist before the scanner runs?
 See #22031.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24128 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24128: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Sometimes, "auto" means "try both, and choose whatever works". I'm not
 sure how we represent that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24094 [Core Tor/Torflow]: measured bw percentage is always 100

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24094: measured bw percentage is always 100
--+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 The current tor behaviour is being tracked in #24110. But the workaround
 should be ok until we upgrade to a better controller library.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24110 [Core Tor/Tor]: document control protocol router status format surprises when using microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24110: document control protocol router status format surprises when using
microdescriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bwauth-needs, tor-control, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24094   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #24094


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24173 [- Select a component]: nyx-2.0.4: setup.py doesn't list sqlite3 as a dependency (was: nyx-2.0.4: setup.py doesn't list all dependencies)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24173: nyx-2.0.4: setup.py doesn't list sqlite3 as a dependency
--+--
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yurivict271):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  not a bug =>


Comment:

 It fails without py-sqlite3 on the FreeBSD.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24091 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Recommend system-installed tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24091: Recommend system-installed tor
--+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 See also #24094, where Tor versions 0.3.0 and later appear to be
 incompatible with the current TorFlow / pytorctl code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24010 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Make bandwidth authorities use DNS, not IP addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24010: Make bandwidth authorities use DNS, not IP addresses
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21394| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Excellent, let's not change anything then: operators can use DNS or IP,
 and it won't make a difference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23783 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't build Tor 0.3.2.2-alpha with mingw32 on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23783: Can't build Tor 0.3.2.2-alpha with mingw32 on Windows 7
-+-
 Reporter:  Bizarre™ |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-blogpost-bugreport,|  Actual Points:
  windows, mingw |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-blogpost-bugreport => 0.3.2.2-alpha-blogpost-
 bugreport, windows, mingw
 * points:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Sorry about that, adding the dependency was just my suggestion.
 I'm not familiar enough with Windows and our configure script to be sure
 it will fix this, but we should give it a shot.

 If someone puts a patch in a git branch, can you test if it compiles and
 runs?
 It would help us to know whether the patch is enough.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24190 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter not working on 7.0.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24190: Twitter not working on 7.0.8
--+--
 Reporter:  rebbecca  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rebbecca):

 please check this problem in twitter after logging in.
 In High Security Level, JavaScript can't loaded in twitter.com even if the
 site is in NoScript white list.
 the problem will be solved only if you choose medium security level and
 twitter.com is white listed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24190 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter not working on 7.0.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24190: Twitter not working on 7.0.8
--+--
 Reporter:  rebbecca  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:2 rebbecca]:
 > No!
 > I meant even when twitter.com is white listed the problem will be there.
 > this is a "new problem" and has been occurred after the recent update.
 > before that twitter loaded with no problem in High Security Level when
 it was allowed in Noscript; unlike now.
 What URL's are not loading correctly, because the login page works fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24120 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: "Maximum number of external links per post exceeded" is cramping my style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24120: "Maximum number of external links per post exceeded" is cramping my 
style
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Great. I opened #24191 in case we can show more people the love.

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[tor-bugs] #24191 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Remove trac spam prevention from GRP_devel people

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24191: Remove trac spam prevention from GRP_devel people
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Based on #24120, I think we would have many happier people if we figured
 out what is special about GRP_admin from a spam prevention standpoint in
 trac's configuration, and do those things for the people in GRP_devel too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23783 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't build Tor 0.3.2.2-alpha with mingw32 on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23783: Can't build Tor 0.3.2.2-alpha with mingw32 on Windows 7
--+
 Reporter:  Bizarre™  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  0.3.2.2-alpha-blogpost-bugreport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Bizarre™):

 Hi, teor. Thanks for the update. I'll try building Tor again once a new
 version is released in the distro and post here the result.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24190 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter not working on 7.0.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24190: Twitter not working on 7.0.8
--+--
 Reporter:  rebbecca  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rebbecca):

 No!
 I meant even when twitter.com is white listed the problem will be there.
 this is a "new problem" and has been occurred after the recent update.
 before that twitter loaded with no problem in High Security Level when it
 was allowed in Noscript; unlike now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24120 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: "Maximum number of external links per post exceeded" is cramping my style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24120: "Maximum number of external links per post exceeded" is cramping my 
style
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 dcf]:
 > > Even the workaround fails when an edit needs to be split into too many
 pieces.
 >
 > I just made you a GRP_admin experimentally -- maybe it makes things
 better for you, or maybe spam handling is not tied to the permissions.

 Thanks, GRP_admin seems to work in recent edits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23114 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit Build Timeout should apply at circuit completion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23114: Circuit Build Timeout should apply at circuit completion
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:
|  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-prop247-controller  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23100  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, the patch for this is in mikeperry/bugs23100+23114-cleanup-squashed
 (head cf6c5cc04c3f4e8024409f9a02d4285a804b6c4e).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23100 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit Build Timeout needs to count hidden service circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23100: Circuit Build Timeout needs to count hidden service circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery-  |  Actual Points:
  prop247-controller, needs-proposal, mike-can,  |
  prop247, tor-guard |
Parent ID:  #9001| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, patches for this and #23114 are in mikeperry/bugs23100+23114-cleanup-
 squashed (head cf6c5cc04c3f4e8024409f9a02d4285a804b6c4e). I updated the
 comments and wrote tests. This and the child are ready for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23100 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit Build Timeout needs to count hidden service circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23100: Circuit Build Timeout needs to count hidden service circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery-  |  Actual Points:
  prop247-controller, needs-proposal, mike-can,  |
  prop247, tor-guard |
Parent ID:  #9001| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:3 asn]:
 > Thanks for the patch! This seems important! A few comments:
 >
 > - I don't understand how the mods to
 `circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ()` helps us achieve the goal of this
 ticket. It kinda seems like we are restricting that function even more
 (doc change implies that too), when we actually want it to be more
 accepting. I think a nice comment is required for people like me to
 understand how that function works wrt HS circs.

 Ok, I will add to the comment to explain this. Basically we're not making
 it more restrictive. We are changing it from considering only *exactly*
 three hop circuits to considering any circuit that has currently less than
 or equal to 3 hops built (and plans to build at least 3 hops, but maybe
 more).

 > - I also don't understand why the
 `circuit_build_times_decide_to_count_circ()` logic was moved from one
 function to another. I think we need some help here to understand, since
 I'm not familiar with the CBT system at all.

 Actually, what happened here was that a bunch of code that was dangling
 off of circuit_build_no_more_hops() got its own function that does only
 one thing (decides to count the circuit). circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
 now calls that function before we decide if we're done adding hops (so we
 cant calculate timeout info at the point where the circuit reaches 3
 hops).

 > - I think `circuit_get_cpath_len()` should be moded instead of adding
 another func `circuit_get_cpath_opened_len()`. We can add an arg
 `only_count_opened` which does that. I think that'd be cleaner.

 In terms of code readability, code quality, and testability, I really
 disagree here. Combining these two would make for a really ugly
 conditional in the loop which will take much more effort to verify is
 correct than two separate functions. Keeping it simpler by having two
 different functions is preferable IMO. It's not like binary size matters
 for us...

 > - `circuit_build_times_decide_to_count_circ()` is undocumented and I'd
 actually like to know what it does.

 Ok I will add a comment here, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7164 [Core Tor/Tor]: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still referenced 1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7164: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still 
referenced
1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1
-+-
 Reporter:  jaj123   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.19
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, 025-backport, nickm- |  Actual Points:
  should-review, review-group-24 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I wonder if this can happen when a relay wakes up from hibernation after a
 week or two?

 168 hours isn't very old for a microdesc any more: Tor relays used to
 change their onion keys every 7 days, forcing a microdesc hash change
 every week. But now, the expired microdesc can be listed in the new
 consensus after hibernation, because the onion keys only change every 30
 days.

 Maybe this isn't the issue, but it seems like it might be worth looking
 into.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24190 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter not working on 7.0.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24190: Twitter not working on 7.0.8
--+--
 Reporter:  rebbecca  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Here is a exceed from twitter's site.

 '''Twitter.com makes heavy use of JavaScript'''

 '''If you cannot enable it in your browser's preferences, you may have a
 better experience on our mobile site.'''

 When you set the security slider to high javascript is disabled for every
 site, you can enable javascript on specifically Twitter by.

 1. click on no script icon in the upper left or right.

 2.click options and click whitelist.

 3.in the address field add https://twitter.com/ and click OK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22321 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback directory whitelist based on relay changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22321: Update fallback directory whitelist based on relay changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 These relays are moving or going away in March 2019, so we need to remove
 them in the next update:
 {{{
 janschejbalScaleWy2 - 2A4C448784F5A83AFE6C78DA357D5E31F7989DEB
 janschejbalScaleWy3 - 72527E3242CB15AADE28374AE0D35833FC083F60
 janschejbalScaleWy4 - AD253B49E303C6AB1E048B014392AC569E8A7DAE
 janschejbalScaleWy5 - D5F3FB17504744FB7ECEF46F4B1D155258A6D942
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ACKing the branch here. Let's do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23577 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23577: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I have a patch which includes a changes entry and (hopefully) better
 comments. The filename is 006-setup_introduce1_data_node.patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23577 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23577: Make setup_introduce1_data() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * Attachment "006-setup_introduce1_data_node.patch" added.

 Revised Patch (Revision 5)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24163 [Webpages/Website]: Newsletter-master server down

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24163: Newsletter-master server down
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #24190 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter not working on 7.0.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24190: Twitter not working on 7.0.8
--+--
 Reporter:  rebbecca  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Twitter is not working in 7.0.8 tor browser on High Security Level.
 incomplete loading.
 no problem in the Medium Level.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028  |
  -backport-maybe, 026-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 https://i.imgur.com/WTDnnwE.gif

 Replying to [comment:45 catalyst]:
 > Section 5.2 of
 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f2b/7a0d5000a31f7f0713a3d20919f9703c9876.pdf
 describes one way to sample uniformly from all the representable floating
 point numbers in [0, 1).  It's not clear to me whether including the
 numbers with ULPs less than 2^-53^ is required for the success of the
 snapping mitigation described in that paper.

 See "Smoothing" under Section 5.1.

 > It isn't required, and might even be counterproductive.

 Indeed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7164 [Core Tor/Tor]: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still referenced 1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7164: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still 
referenced
1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1
-+-
 Reporter:  jaj123   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.19
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, 025-backport, nickm- |  Actual Points:
  should-review, review-group-24 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 moria1 hits this once a week or so:
 {{{
 Nov 01 15:18:22.682 [warn] microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor
 seemed very old (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is
 still marked as being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it.
 Current networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor
 0.3.3.0-alpha-dev 853bbb9112a16055)
 Nov 01 15:18:22.682 [warn] microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=BB119A5A4D5DA2BBB7B796ECC50E3C0F1D4FD910. md=0x7fdea11000b0,
 rs=0x7fdea6c395c0, ri=(nil). Microdesc digest in RS matches. RS okay in
 networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.3.0-alpha-dev 853bbb9112a16055)
 Nov 01 15:18:22.690 [warn] microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug: Microdescriptor
 seemed very old (last listed 168 hours ago vs 168 hour cutoff), but is
 still marked as being held by 1 node(s). I found 1 node(s) holding it.
 Current networkstatus is 0 hours old. Hashtable badness is 0. (on Tor
 0.3.3.0-alpha-dev 853bbb9112a16055)
 Nov 01 15:18:22.690 [warn] microdesc_cache_clean(): Bug:   [0]:
 ID=B62A3F23955AF323A03F4ADB355C7D00594CFBD1. md=0x7fdea194a650,
 rs=0x7fdec70afbf0, ri=(nil). Microdesc digest in RS matches. RS okay in
 networkstatus. (on Tor 0.3.3.0-alpha-dev 853bbb9112a16055)
 Nov 01 15:18:22.690 [info] microdesc_cache_clean(): Removed 126/55533
 microdescriptors as old.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23318 [Core Tor/Tor]: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23318: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  path-selection, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 path-selection, 029-backport, 030-backport, 031-backport, review-
 group-24
 => path-selection, 029-backport, 030-backport, 031-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23414 [Core Tor/Tor]: rep_hist_format_hs_stats() should add noise, then round

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23414: rep_hist_format_hs_stats() should add noise, then round
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  1.0
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport,  |
  028-backport   |
Parent ID:  #23061   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We also need to implement a scaling/sensitivity mechanism to guarantee
 differential privacy. See
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23523#comment:12 for
 details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23523 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle extreme values better in add_laplace_noise()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23523: Handle extreme values better in add_laplace_noise()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, privcount, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-24   |
Parent ID:  #23061   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Also, a close reading of the proof in section 5.2 of the paper [0] shows
 that it only applies up to 2^46^, not 2^53^.
 So we need to define a constant and use that instead.
 And I think we should error out on platforms that don't have mantissas of
 2^53^.

 (How do we report numbers greater than 2^46^?
 We increase the sensitivity of the signal.
 Practically, this means we multiply the final noise by a scaling factor
 2^N^, clear the N lowest bits of the signal, and add them together.
 We have to clear the signal bits, otherwise signals of 0 are biased,
 because they only occur half as often.
 This is what we tried to do by rounding the hidden service counts to the
 nearest figure, but it's not implemented correctly.)

 [0]:
 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f2b/7a0d5000a31f7f0713a3d20919f9703c9876.pdf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Sebastian):

 great, I haven't looked at any code just asked about the behaviour. I have
 no indication that it happens otherwise

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:7 asn]:
 > Sebastian points out that this `MAX_DL_TO_DELAY` delay functionality
 might also be performed by dirservers which makes the problem worse, since
 it means that dirservers will wait even longer before they get to 100%
 mds.

 That {{{n_downloadable >= MAX_DL_TO_DELAY}}} should only be checked if
 {{{!directory_fetches_dir_info_early()}}}.

 And in theory (there might be bugs), dir mirrors fetch dir info early.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 {{{bug23985_029}}} looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028  |
  -backport-maybe, 026-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:45 catalyst]:
 > Section 5.2 of
 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f2b/7a0d5000a31f7f0713a3d20919f9703c9876.pdf
 describes one way to sample uniformly from all the representable floating
 point numbers in [0, 1).  It's not clear to me whether including the
 numbers with ULPs less than 2^-53^ is required for the success of the
 snapping mitigation described in that paper.

 It isn't required, and might even be counterproductive.
 The floating point numbers in the proof in section 5.2 are of the form
 N*2^-53^, N integer.
 (The proof uses a significand of 52 bits, and refers to 2^-53^
 repeatedly.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18732 [Metrics]: Document release process for Java projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18732: Document release process for Java projects
--+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Huh, fine question about the detail. I could imagine that the main
 audience of this documentation would be fellow team members who happen to
 work on putting out releases now or in the future. How about we switch
 roles for putting out a future release, where you prepare the pre-release
 tarball, I test it, you sign and upload, and I announce it? Maybe we'll
 have to do it after the Rome meeting after more people had the chance to
 sign your PGP key. We would both write documentation for our current roles
 in this process and then try out and improve the documentation of the
 other when taking over their roles.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23761 [Metrics/Website]: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23761: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  core-tor-wants, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 The first graph looks great! And it tells me that the gap between Exit OR
 and exiting isn't that big. That's good news.

 For the second graph, can we try showing confirmed IPv6 Guard OR
 advertised, confirmed Exit OR advertised, and exiting on IPv6 advertised,
 sort of like this existing graph:

 https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth-flags.html

 Can we show the Guard and Exit total (IPv4) advertised as well?
 (There's no equivalent to exiting, because the Exit flag implies an IPv4
 exit policy.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24045 [Metrics/Analysis]: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24045: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  performance, tbb-needs |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * component:  Metrics/Statistics => Metrics/Analysis


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > Hey Karsten, thanks for the graph. It's good to see that most relays
 have a reasonable consensus weight to bandwidth ratio.
 >
 > But for a log plot, that spread seems a lot: in some cases, it looks
 like relays with similar advertised bandwidths get 10x the consensus
 weight. And we still think that bandwidth allocation isn't balanced
 geographically. From what people tell us, US East and EU West coasts get a
 large allocation, and it falls off from there.
 >
 > Can you show the important section of this graph (the high bandwidths
 and the high consensus weights) using a linear plot?

 I'm adding a linear plot below:

 [[Image(overweight-relays-non-log-scale-2017-11-08.png, 700px)]]

 Here's how I made it, using the attached CSV file:

 {{{
 require(ggplot2)
 ggplot(o, aes(x = adv_bw, y = cw)) +
 geom_point(alpha = 0.25) +
 scale_x_continuous("advertised bandwidth") +
 scale_y_continuous("consensus weight")
 ggsave("overweight-relays-non-log-scale-2017-11-08.png",
   width = 8, height = 8, dpi = 150)
 }}}

 > Is there a way of showing the consensus weight to advertised bandwidth
 ratios on a map? Maybe as geolocated points?

 Not easily, and I'm afraid I'm juggling too many other things to dive into
 such a new visualization now. But maybe this is something where others can
 step in. Basically, all relevant data is available via Onionoo, including
 longitude and latitude of relays.

 I'm moving this ticket to Metrics/Analysis where we collect analyses like
 this one without having concrete plans to integrate results into metrics
 code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24189 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: new newsletter@tpo alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24189: new newsletter@tpo alias
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 implemented in tor-puppet commit 6141781

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24045 [Metrics/Statistics]: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24045: Measure and map overloaded or over-weighted relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  performance, tbb-needs |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "overweight-relays-non-log-scale-2017-11-08.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #24189 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: new newsletter@tpo alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24189: new newsletter@tpo alias
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Steph asks me for a new newsletter@ alias, which points to her and tommy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24177 [Applications/Tor Browser]: screenshot command in Web Developer toolbar is broken in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24177: screenshot command in Web Developer toolbar is broken in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 And there's more...
 if I open an empty tab it takes a screen shot!
 A plain white screen shot.
 Going back to the other tabs with content and the error returns.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24177 [Applications/Tor Browser]: screenshot command in Web Developer toolbar is broken in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24177: screenshot command in Web Developer toolbar is broken in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 As I was writing the previous comment I checked it and the issue occured.
 After I was finished I decided to try on Wikipedia ... just to be sure.
 This time I got a different error:
 "TypeError: this.target.tab is null"

 Haven't seen that before.

 As I am writing this I switched back to the Wikipedia tab for one more
 test and I got the usual error this time:
 ""unknownError"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24177 [Applications/Tor Browser]: screenshot command in Web Developer toolbar is broken in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24177: screenshot command in Web Developer toolbar is broken in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Just open Tor Browser and go to any site ,say, Wikipedia.
 In the Developer Toolbar (Shift+F2) at the bottom type in
 screenshot image_name
 hit enter

 Normally a screen shot is taken but now its simply says
 "unknownError"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028  |
  -backport-maybe, 026-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Section 5.2 of
 https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f2b/7a0d5000a31f7f0713a3d20919f9703c9876.pdf
 describes one way to sample uniformly from all the representable floating
 point numbers in [0, 1).  It's not clear to me whether including the
 numbers with ULPs less than 2^-53^ is required for the success of the
 snapping mitigation described in that paper.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23761 [Metrics/Website]: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23761: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  core-tor-wants, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > Hi Karsten, thanks, these look great!

 Great! And thanks for the detailed response below.

 > [...]
 >
 > I would like to see a relay counts by IPv6 announced OR / IPv6 confirmed
 OR / IPv6 exiting / total (IPv4) OR. It would seem to fit with the other
 graphs on the servers page of metrics. I want to have these numbers
 because they are a useful overview, and because they affect things like
 the size of the consensus.

 I guess that would be a graph like this:

 [[Image(relays-ipv6-2017-11-08.png, 700px)]]

 It contains the same data as the long graph above.

 > I would also like to see advertised bandwidth by confirmed guard IPv6 OR
 / confirmed middle IPv6 OR / confirmed exit IPv6 OR / IPv6 exiting / total
 (IPv4) OR. This could go with the other graphs on the traffic page of
 metrics. I want to have these numbers because they show us how easy it is
 for clients to use IPv6 to get in and out of the Tor Network, and they can
 help us decide when we can use more IPv6 between relays. (I don't want to
 graph observed bandwidth until we start logging separate IPv4 and IPv6
 stats on ORPorts and exits, because I think it would be confusing.)

 This one was a bit harder:

 [[Image(advbw-relays-ipv6-2017-11-08.png, 700px)]]

 The five lines in these graph are:

  - Total (IPv4) OR: Total advertised bandwidth of all running relays in
 the network, so far so good.
  - Confirmed guard IPv6 OR: Total advertised bandwidth of all running
 relays with a confirmed reachable IPv6 OR address and with the `Guard`
 flag.
  - Confirmed middle IPv6 OR: Total advertised bandwidth of all running
 relays with a confirmed reachable IPv6 OR address and with neither `Guard`
 nor `Exit` flag.
  - Confirmed exit IPv6 OR: Total advertised bandwidth of all running
 relays with a confirmed reachable IPv6 OR address and with the `Exit`
 flag.
  - IPv6 exiting: Total advertised bandwidth of all running relays with a
 configured IPv6 exit policy that is not `reject *:*`.

 Note that these lines are not independent. If suddenly a bunch of relays
 with confirmed reachable IPv6 OR addresses and with both `Guard` and
 `Exit` flag show up, the guard and exit lines will go up, even though
 clients will prefer them for either position based on the current Wxx
 bandwidth weights. I'm not trying to make this more complex than
 necessary. But maybe there's a way to pick slightly different set of lines
 that don't have this issue? Or maybe it's "just" a question of writing
 good enough documentation.

 > I've cc'd isis, because they will have a better idea of which IPv6
 bridge stats would be useful. (I'd say "like the existing bridge stats",
 or "like the IPv6 relay stats", but I'd only be guessing.)

 I'm curious! I'll hold back making graphs until I know what would be most
 useful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23761 [Metrics/Website]: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23761: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  core-tor-wants, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "advbw-relays-ipv6-2017-11-08.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23761 [Metrics/Website]: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23761: Add IPv6 relay graphs to metrics site
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  core-tor-wants, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "relays-ipv6-2017-11-08.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  usability, ux-team, tbb-7.0-frequent,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201708R, GeorgKoppen201708   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:29 yawning]:
 > Replying to [comment:28 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [comment:27 yawning]:
 > > > How is using a site over Tor through an exit, with a CA signed TLS
 cert any less secure than using an `onion` over HTTP.
 > >
 > > There's the risk of MiTM by the exit, or due to the flawed CA system
 itself - as happened in the past for Tor Project infrastructure with CA
 DigiNotar [1], in comparison with a 0 risk for a MiTM with onion services.
 >
 > HSTS is a thing.

 It's not HSTS that should be spoken about but HPKP. And FYI Google is
 abandroning HPKP: theregister.co.uk/2017/10/30/google_hpkp

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23170: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
  ed25519 needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_revision


Comment:

 Added a draft proposal in an attachment, but I don't think this is such a
 great idea.  It causes a 40% regression in the size of '''compressed'''
 consensus documents.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23170: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
  ed25519 needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * Attachment "xxx-move-ed25519-into-consensus.txt" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24186 [Core Tor/Tor]: vote: Voting schedule is not updated before voting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24186: vote: Voting schedule is not updated before voting
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged to 0.3.2 and forward.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24186 [Core Tor/Tor]: vote: Voting schedule is not updated before voting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24186: vote: Voting schedule is not updated before voting
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 See branch: `bug24186_032_01`

 No changes file, this is a fix on something that hasn't been released.

 Lots of comments to explain that fix in the code, please feel free to
 improve/correct them as it wasn't that trivial to explain ;). And also
 English hard :P.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23523 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle extreme values better in add_laplace_noise()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23523: Handle extreme values better in add_laplace_noise()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, privcount, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-24   |
Parent ID:  #23061   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 catalyst]:
 > I'm still looking over this. One thing that sticks out is that the
 comment in `get_min_safe_noise()` is inaccurate and caused me to
 misinterpret what it's actually doing on platforms with `DBL_MANT_DIG`
 less than 64.  It might be more correct to say "This is always safe,
 because floating point numbers are sign-magnitude and the negation of an
 exact number is also exact."

 All the types here are int64_t.

 But I agree the comment is confusing, particularly after I added a case
 that actually returns +/-INT64_MAX.

 Let's change it to:
 {{{
   tor_assert(get_max_safe_noise() >= 0);
   /* This is safe as long as get_max_safe_noise() is in 0..INT64_MAX,
 because -INT64_MAX..0 are representable as an int64_t. */
   return -get_max_safe_noise();
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24188 [Webpages/Website]: People page: Nicholas Merrill description is incorrect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24188: People page: Nicholas Merrill description is incorrect
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 This is true.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24188 [Webpages/Website]: People page: Nicholas Merrill description is incorrect (was: People page:)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24188: People page: Nicholas Merrill description is incorrect
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24188 [Webpages/Website]: People page:

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24188: People page:
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en#nickcalyx

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[tor-bugs] #24188 [Webpages/Website]: People page:

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24188: People page:
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Nicholas description incorrectly states that he runs a directory
 authority.

 There was a ticket about adding his directory authority but that step has
 never been completed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generated a networkstatus consensus we couldn't parse

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24168: Generated a networkstatus consensus we couldn't parse
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is due to #24186. Closing this in favor of the other ticket.

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[tor-bugs] #24187 [Webpages/Blog]: Reduce bullet spacing on blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24187: Reduce bullet spacing on blog
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Change li margin-bottom from 1.5em to 0.5em

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[tor-bugs] #24186 [Core Tor/Tor]: vote: Voting schedule is not updated before voting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24186: vote: Voting schedule is not updated before voting
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-dirauth
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Commit e67f4441eb2646368e3e7cb1bcee403667b786f0 introduced a safeguard in
 `dirvote_get_next_valid_after_time()` in order to recalculate the voting
 schedule if it is called before it was initialized.

 Turns out that it is actually called very early for a directory authority
 with `sr_init()` thus the voting schedule is first initialized through
 that safeguard.

 That made the following check in `dirvote_act()` not work so the voting
 schedule is never recalculated using the `now` that we are about to use to
 vote with:

 {{{
   if (!voting_schedule.voting_starts) {
 ...
 dirvote_recalculate_timing(options, now);
   }
 }}}

 This lead to warnings such as (snipping some lines):

 {{{
 Nov 08 11:58:19.169 [info] Choosing expected valid-after time as
 2017-11-08 16:58:20: consensus_set=0, interval=5
 [...]
 Nov 08 11:58:20.173 [notice] Time to vote.
 [...]
 Nov 08 11:58:20.175 [notice] Choosing valid-after time in vote as
 2017-11-08 16:58:25: consensus_set=0, last_interval=5
 Nov 08 11:58:20.181 [warn] Rejecting vote from 127.0.0.1 with valid-after
 time of 2017-11-08 16:58:25; we were expecting 2017-11-08 16:58:20
 Nov 08 11:58:20.181 [warn] Couldn't store my own vote! (I told myself,
 'Bad valid-after time'.)
 }}}

 Voting schedule object was set at "11:58:19" which made a valid_after time
 to "11:58:20" but we voted at "11:58:20" without updating that schedule so
 we ended up computing a valid_after = "11:58:25" in the vote but not in
 the voting schedule.

 I *think* the fix here is to always recalculate our voting schedule when
 we are about to vote to use the "now" value maybe?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24185 [Core Tor/Tor]: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog (release-0.3.2 branch)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24185: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog
(release-0.3.2 branch)
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 arg, wrong copy-paste.  Fixed in 388b1d0fab881546f503db91e08d484b78ca71fc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24185 [Core Tor/Tor]: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog (release-0.3.2 branch)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24185: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog
(release-0.3.2 branch)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 fixed (ticket24134_032_01)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24060 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add x86_64 version of msvcr100.dll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24060: Add x86_64 version of msvcr100.dll
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201711R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20636  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201711 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201711R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 The branch `bug_24060` in my git repo has a patch for this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_24060=2393932708eb8090ee17374a78ad7d0c6c31c564

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make supported version timeline easier to find

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24134: Make supported version timeline easier to find
--+
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24185 [Core Tor/Tor]: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog (release-0.3.2 branch)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24185: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog
(release-0.3.2 branch)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #24185 [Core Tor/Tor]: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog (release-0.3.2 branch)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24185: before doing the 0.3.2.4-alpha release (today): typo in changelog
(release-0.3.2 branch)
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:  nickm
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/ChangeLog?h=release-0.3.2



 enarly -> nearly

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client => tor-guard, tor-bridge,
 tor-client, 030-backport, 031-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23985 [Core Tor/Tor]: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23985: If less than 15 missing mds, Tor will delay md download for 10 mins
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 I think for the purposes of possible backporting, we should go with the
 minimal change here for now.  See `bug23985_029`.

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[tor-bugs] #24184 [Webpages/Website]: Edit volunteer page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24184: Edit volunteer page
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en

 Change:
 "...and summarize noteworthy exchanges into articles for Tor Weekly News."

 to:

 "..and summarize noteworthy changes into articles for our blog and
 newsletter."

 Link "newsletter" to newsletter.torproject.org

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24179 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly builds include an old https-everywhere version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24179: Tor Browser nightly builds include an old https-everywhere version
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by legind):

 I suggest using the same tags as in the alpha, since these tags are signed
 by myself and certainly ready for release.  The `master` branch should be
 release-ready at any given point in time, but it seems better to be in
 sync with the actual releases of the extension.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24043 [Core Tor/Tor]: monotonic time test failure on 0.3.0.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24043: monotonic time test failure on 0.3.0.x
---+---
 Reporter:  weasel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.12
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 It's probably an intermittent thing, if it's happening.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028  |
  -backport-maybe, 026-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-22   |
Parent ID:  #23126   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23751 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/common/buffers.c, etc.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23751: [warn] tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/common/buffers.c, etc.
+--
 Reporter:  Felixix |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-channel, tor-sched, tor-buffer  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23993  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Mergd to 0.3.2 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201711R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I applied it to master as commit
 50982eda6d3687aa5bcc2d088546f82c4fa7e53d.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log the actual bandwidth total when logging "Generated weighted bandwidths"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24170: Log the actual bandwidth total when logging "Generated weighted 
bandwidths"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  path-selection, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #23318   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged #23318 in 0.3.2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23318 [Core Tor/Tor]: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23318: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  path-selection, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport, review-group-24|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged that into 0.3.2; seems to work.  Thanks!  Marking for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make supported version timeline easier to find

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24134: Make supported version timeline easier to find
--+
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make supported version timeline easier to find

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24134: Make supported version timeline easier to find
--+
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23318 [Core Tor/Tor]: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23318: compute_weighted_bandwidths: do not add 0.5 to final_weight
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  path-selection, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport, review-group-24|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Rebased onto maint-0.2.9 as `bug23318-redux_029`

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