Re: [tor-bugs] #24742 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add fallback list spec to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24742: Add fallback list spec to torspec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, torspec, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  1.0
Parent ID:  #24725  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  atagar  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:13 pastly]:
 > {{{
 >  "/*" SP+ "nickname=" nickname SP+ "*/" SP* NL
 >
 >[Zero or more times.]
 >
 >The nickname for this FallbackDir, as defined by Onionoo. The
 >transitional 2.0.0 format has zero-length nicknames.
 > }}}
 >
 > Is that accurate? I see nicknames in the output of `fallback-
 format-2-v4`.

 You're right, this is confusing.

 It's in the output of the script in fallback-format-2-v4.
 But it's not in the src/or/fallback_dirs.inc in fallback-format-2-v4.

 I pushed a commit that explains what we do when the nickname or extrainfo
 is missing. I also explained which data is missing from the
 src/or/fallback_dirs.inc in fallback-format-2-v4.

 > {{{
 > A.1. Sample Data
 > }}}
 >
 > Make sure these are up to date.

 Yes, I've updated the links.
 I think one was different in a significant way, and the rest were not.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22759 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Mark the fallbacks that have extra-info descriptors, so stem can use them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22759: Mark the fallbacks that have extra-info descriptors, so stem can use 
them
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, fallback-directory, |  Actual Points:
  dos-resistance, review-group-28|
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24726 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Make sure a comma never appears anywhere in a fallback entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24726: Make sure a comma never appears anywhere in a fallback entry
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Commas are in fact removed Tested by adding `as,df` to all nicknames and
 verifying output nicknames only had `asdf` added. Also visually checked
 code that all `%s` formatters in the fallback entry code had a call to
 `cleanse_c_string`.

 LGTM, but make sure all `fallback-format-2-v4` are merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22759 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Mark the fallbacks that have extra-info descriptors, so stem can use them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22759: Mark the fallbacks that have extra-info descriptors, so stem can use 
them
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, fallback-directory, |  Actual Points:
  dos-resistance, review-group-28|
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:12 pastly]:
 > Not many of the fallbacks in the `fallback-format-2-v4` branch have
 extra info. Does this seem right?
 >
 > {{{
 > $ grep extrainfo fallback.stdout2 | sort | uniq -c
 >   63 /* extrainfo=0 */
 >6 /* extrainfo=1 */
 >
 > }}}

 Yes, this is fine, it's a custom option that only a few relay operators
 set.

 atagar says that 6 is ok, because stem will use them along with the
 authorities:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-December/012741.html

 (If the authority operators decide that extrainfo load is significant, we
 can always ask a few more fallback operators to enable extrainfo.)

 > Of course, the list this branch produces is too small still, but I think
 that's unrelated.
 >
 > {{{
 > Final Count: 69 (Eligible 82, Target 265 (1325 * 0.20), Max 200)
 > Excluded: 13 (Same Operator 8, Failed/Skipped Download 4, Excess 1)
 > Bandwidth Range: 1.7 - 39.1 MByte/s
 > }}}

 That will be fixed in #24785, I think it's happening because our stability
 settings assume a network without an ongoing denial of service.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20946 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Make it easier to find contacts for a fallback list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20946: Make it easier to find contacts for a fallback list
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #24706 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Close at the same time as #24706

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24600 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add fallback nicknames to the file, so stem can use them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24600: Add fallback nicknames to the file, so stem can use them
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, stem, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Nicknames are added. LGTM, but make sure all `fallback-format-2-v4`
 tickets are merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24725 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add a format version number to the fallback file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24725: Add a format version number to the fallback file
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Version number is added. LGTM, but make sure all `fallback-format-2-v4`
 tickets are merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24742 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add fallback list spec to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24742: Add fallback list spec to torspec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, torspec, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  1.0
Parent ID:  #24725  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  atagar  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pastly):

 {{{
  "/*" SP+ "nickname=" nickname SP+ "*/" SP* NL

[Zero or more times.]

The nickname for this FallbackDir, as defined by Onionoo. The
transitional 2.0.0 format has zero-length nicknames.
 }}}

 Is that accurate? I see nicknames in the output of `fallback-format-2-v4`.

 {{{
 A.1. Sample Data
 }}}

 Make sure these are up to date.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24679 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Remove custom weights from each fallback in the fallback list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24679: Remove custom weights from each fallback in the fallback list
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 `fallback-format-2-v4` does in fact remove the weights. LGTM, but make
 sure all the tickets for this branch are merge_ready ( fun)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22759 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Mark the fallbacks that have extra-info descriptors, so stem can use them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22759: Mark the fallbacks that have extra-info descriptors, so stem can use 
them
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, fallback-directory, |  Actual Points:
  dos-resistance, review-group-28|
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Not many of the fallbacks in the `fallback-format-2-v4` branch have extra
 info. Does this seem right?

 {{{
 $ grep extrainfo fallback.stdout2 | sort | uniq -c
   63 /* extrainfo=0 */
6 /* extrainfo=1 */

 }}}

 Of course, the list this branch produces is too small still, but I think
 that's unrelated.

 {{{
 Final Count: 69 (Eligible 82, Target 265 (1325 * 0.20), Max 200)
 Excluded: 13 (Same Operator 8, Failed/Skipped Download 4, Excess 1)
 Bandwidth Range: 1.7 - 39.1 MByte/s
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22759, #24600, #24679, #24725, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22759, #24600, #24679, #24725, #24726 by teor:


Comment:
Please see my revised branch fallback-format-2-v4 at 
https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

pastly found some whitelist and blacklist changes from #22321 that I'd 
accidentally included in some commits, so I took them out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19675 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19675: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201712   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * cc: igt0 (added)
 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 I rebased the Orfox commits on tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2. This includes
 all commits from orfox-tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.0-1, but with some
 modifications.

 1) Rename .mozconfig-orfox as .mozconfig-android
 2) Align .mozconfig-android configuration with .mozconfig configuration
 3) Add comments on non-obvious configuration changes
 4) Bump Java JDK version from openjdk-7 to openjdk-8 (openjdk-7 is EOL)
 5) Bump Android NDK version from r11b to r11c (hash of r11c is published
 on the Android website, r11b's hash is not available)
 6) Verify sha256sum hash of downloaded SDK and NDK files match
 expected/published value

 There are a few outstanding changes that are needed:
 1) Compiling with tests enabled fails
 2) App crashes when running in an Android emulator (it does not crash when
 running on a device)
 3) Change the app name from Orfox to Tor Browser(?)
 4) We need more unit tests
 5) c823adc2da01ee47d50e03f1a5a4f14e661e8a2c adds a third-party extension,
 we need integrate its changes instead
 6) Audit mobile.js and confirm it matches browser.js
 7) Some of the commits add whitespace, we should clean before merging


 branch is tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2_attempt0_1 at
 https://github.com/sysrqb/tor-browser/tree/tor-
 browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2_attempt0_1

 I have some more notes from my review, I will add them here after I think
 about them some more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24681 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the default fallback weight in Tor 10.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24681: Make the default fallback weight in Tor 10.0
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, easy, intro, 032   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  -backport-maybe, 031-backport-maybe, 030   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-28   |
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 (0.1 has worked for us so far, it's the equivalent of "weight=10" in the
 current fallback list, which we want to remove in #24679.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24681 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the default fallback weight in Tor 10.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24681: Make the default fallback weight in Tor 10.0
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, easy, intro, 032   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  -backport-maybe, 031-backport-maybe, 030   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-28   |
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Code LGTM. No comment on whether or not 0.1 is a good value other than I
 trust teor's judgement and math.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23061, #23323, #23415, #24681

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23061, #23323, #23415, #24681 by teor:


Comment:
0.2.8 is EOL, so we won't be backporting to it.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22271, #23061, #23323, #23414, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22271, #23061, #23323, #23414, #23415, #24681 by teor:


Comment:
0.2.8 is EOL, so we won't be backporting to it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24708 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Make the fallback script search harder for python

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24708: Make the fallback script search harder for python
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This also makes virtualenvs work better!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24679 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Remove custom weights from each fallback in the fallback list (was: Remove weights in the fallback list)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24679: Remove custom weights from each fallback in the fallback list
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

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[tor-bugs] #24787 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Revise the fallback stability requirements based on current network load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24787: Revise the fallback stability requirements based on current network load
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #24786
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 In #24785, we decreased the fallback stability requirements due to the
 increased network load from December 2017.

 We should work out whether we can raise them again.

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[tor-bugs] #24786 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Rebuild the fallback list for 0.3.4 or 0.3.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24786: Rebuild the fallback list for 0.3.4 or 0.3.5
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback|Version:
  Scripts|   Keywords:  fallback, 029-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  031-backport-maybe, 032-backport-
 |  maybe, 033-backport, 034-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need to rebuild the list of fallbacks in late 2018 or early 2019.
 We usually do this when 25% or more go down.
 (This is tracked in #tor-bots on IRC.)

 Here are the instructions for running a rebuild:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors

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[tor-bugs] #24785 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Reduce the fallback stability and flag requirements due to extra network load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24785: Reduce the fallback stability and flag requirements due to extra network
load
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22271
   Points:  0.2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 We're only getting 700 candidates, we should adjust the settings so we get
 about 1500, like last time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23881 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23881: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code
---+---
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:
   |  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 It would also be great to hear recommendations (Nick might be the best
 person) on whether refactoring the C side should be in scope for this
 ticket. See this comment regarding log level macros
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23881#comment:14

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24754 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove unnecessary heap allocations in Rust protover implementation.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24754: Remove unnecessary heap allocations in Rust protover implementation.
-+
 Reporter:  frewsxcv |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 This looks good to me as well, using an iterator is a nice improvement.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24421 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Temporarily allow all this page" and uploads get inherited when New Identity is chosen.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24421: "Temporarily allow all this page" and uploads get inherited when New
Identity is chosen.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, TorBrowserTeam201712  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 #24784 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24784 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions on TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24784: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions on TBB
--+---
 Reporter:  mercedes508   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #24421

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24706 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add a script that creates fallback directory whitelist entries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24706: Add a script that creates fallback directory whitelist entries
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-28|  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by pastly):

 Tested both scripts. Look good to me!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20942 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Make consensus expiry tolerance for fallbacks lower when the stale consensus bug is fixed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20942: Make consensus expiry tolerance for fallbacks lower when the stale
consensus bug is fixed
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Code looks fine.

 If we need to test the wisdom of this change but running the script, don't
 merge yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by starlight):

 I think suggestions in comment 6 and 7 are a bit conservative (but ok) and
 still like my approx 40% of available memory per instance.  So on my 4G
 machine thinking ~1G for the kernel, I set MaxMemInQueues=1024MB for one
 relay instance and have some room for a some other daemons.  With this
 setting tor daemon 0.2.9.14 goes to 1.5GB under heavy load (old slow CPU
 and medium-fast FiOS connection, YMMV) and when hit with a known sniper
 attack it went to 2GB and survived with Tor's OOM logic killing a 1GB
 circuit (event log entries above).  Leaves quite a bit of space for socket
 buffer memory and about 500-700MB of other daemons.  Note I prefer
 DisableAllSwap=1 and recommend it strongly, so all Tor daemon memory will
 fall in the Unevictable/Mlocked accounting and _cannot_ be paged to disk
 (a detrimental behavior no doubt).

 Put another way, MMIQ=1G -> daemon 2GB (80%) plus socket-buffer-delta
 guess 500MB or 2.5GB total budget (100%) for the instance.

 I see kernel SLAB around 900MB (buffer frees tuned lazily with ~7000
 active TCP connections at the time of observation, peak around ~9000
 connections).

 On a 4G machine running just Tor and nothing else, I'd take 40% of 3G and
 get MMIQ=1228MB.

 Don't forget sysctl.conf

 vm.min_free_kbytes = 262144

 which causes linux to attempt to keep 1/4 GB of memory free.  Linux will
 take aggressive action to page-out idle memory and free cached files when
 this threshold is hit--it's not an absolute impediment to allocations.
 The idea is a huge sudden burst of network traffic will rapidly chew up
 free memory for socket buffers, and if /proc/meminfo:MemFree hits zero and
 the kernel needs to allocate memory while servicing a network interrupt,
 the systems will OOPS/crash.  So one wants linux to maintain a nice
 cushion against hard memory exhaustion.  /proc/meminfo:Cached not-dirty
 memory the easiest target for obtaining true free memory, but Cached pages
 cannot be converted to MemFree during interrupt service--takes some time,
 i.e. a few hundred microseconds to a couple of milliseconds depending on
 how busy the scheduler is.

 On an 8GB machine I'd still take 1G for the kernel and then 40% of 7G for
 MaxMemInQueues=2800MB.  Two daemons MMIQ=1400MB.  On big memory systems
 (16GB and up) I don't bother setting MMIQ higher than 4096MB or 4G for an
 instance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24521 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate Making Canvas Unfingerprintable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24521: Investigate Making Canvas Unfingerprintable
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
--+
 Reporter:  alif  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop286   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  029-backport, 030-backport, 031-backport, review-group-24 =>
 prop286
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.1.7 => Tor: 0.3.1.9


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:17 rustybird]:
 > > (please reopen if this bug occurs in any version released _after_
 today.)
 >
 > It still occurs if `server_mode()` is false but `dir_server_mode()` is
 true. Doesn't seem to make a difference (with 0.3.1.9) if it is set up
 like that in `torrc` on startup, or the result of being reconfigured.
 >
 > (Use case for this configuration: http://github.com/rustybird/corridor
 calls `SETCONF DirPort="127.0.0.1:9030 NoAdvertise"` to ensure the client
 continues to refresh the consensus even when dormant.)

 Running a directory mirror will cause a lot of unnecessary load and disk
 usage, particularly with newer tor versions. You'll generate a whole bunch
 of compressed diffs that you'll never serve.

 Try using `FetchDirInfoEarly 1` instead. If this doesn't work, just issue
 a RESOLVE request to a common address every hour or two at random, to keep
 tor alive. We have a proposal for a better controller API for this.

 Also, if you want a consensus with IPv6 addresses on a client, use
 `UseMicrodescriptors 0`.

 If you don't care about descriptors, and want to save bandwidth, use
 `FetchServerDescriptors 0`. You might find some bugs using this option,
 it's not well-tested.

 You can set `SOCKSPort 0` if you're not using it. It might add a bit of
 security.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: webgl is blocked without a click-to-play button (was: webgl is getting blocked in low security)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21805: webgl is blocked without a click-to-play button
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Yes, that's because WebGL is a privacy problem and, looking at the data
 from past sec-high and sec-crit bugs, not a security problem.

 Since we last looked at this, there have been some sec-high and sec-crit
 bugs related to WebGL:
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2017-29/#CVE-2017-7845
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2017-21/#CVE-2017-7824
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2017-15/#CVE-2017-7754
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2017-14/#CVE-2017-5031
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2017-10/#CVE-2017-5459
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/security/advisories/mfsa2017-05/#CVE-2017-5411

 > Which is why it is not governed by the security slider and I think
 that's okay.

 You're right -- if it's privacy problem then we may want to block it at
 Low Security regardless of whether it's a security problem.

 > First, WebGL Canvases have click-to-play placeholders (provided by
 NoScript),

 I have tried a number of webgl demos at
 https://experiments.withgoogle.com/chrome and I haven't found any sites
 where a click-to-play icon appears. The only way to enable WebGL appears
 to be to click on the NoScript button and then select one of the menu
 options to temporarily unblock webgl for that site.

 So it would be nice to have a click-to-play button in the middle of a
 canvas, similar to how a click-to-play button is shown in YouTube. Or
 perhaps an easier alternative would be some sort of door hanger that says
 something like "To protect your privacy, Tor Browser has blocked advanced
 graphics on this site. Would you like to temporarily allow them anyway?
 (Yes/No)"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22321 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback directory whitelist based on operator relay changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22321: Update fallback directory whitelist based on operator relay changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 One last reminder to the list, for those who were on holidays in December:

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-January/014017.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24725 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add a format version number to the fallback file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24725: Add a format version number to the fallback file
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fallback => fallback, review-group-28
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Oops, this was meant to be in needs review with the other tickets on this
 branch.
 Sticking it in review-group-28, because they'll be reviewed together.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24678 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback directory whitelist based on latest relay changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24678: Update fallback directory whitelist based on latest relay changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #22321 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * parent:  #22271 => #22321
 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.5


Comment:

 Two of these fallbacks added IPv6 addresses, and one changed IPv4.

 I have assumed these changes are permanent, and updated them in the
 whitelist in my fallback_whiteblack_changes branch at
 https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 This can close when #22321 closes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by teor):

 Still working on the best advice to give.

 Here's a MaxMemInQueues setting that's easier to understand:

 Set MaxMemInQueues to half your available RAM per tor instance.
 (It doesn't track all of Tor's memory usage.)

 If your machine has one relay, if you have this much RAM, try this
 setting:
 4 GB -> MaxMemInQueues 512 MB
 8 GB -> MaxMemInQueues 2 GB
 16 GB -> MaxMemInQueues 4 GB
 32 GB -> MaxMemInQueues 8 GB

 (If you have more than one relay on the machine, divide MaxMemInQueues by
 the
 number of relays. If you still have RAM issues, take down one relay.)

 Here's a list of other options relay operators can use for load tuning,
 probably appropriate for a wiki page:

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-January/014014.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24782: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 This was split off #24737.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7532 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7532: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, term-project-ideas maybe-  |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea needs-discussion  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by enda_sexton):

 Replying to [comment:22 asn]:
 > Replying to [comment:21 enda_sexton]:
 > > Looking into doing a research masters in network security, think I'm
 an idiot if i were to do something like this? Any suggestions?
 >
 > Hello not sure if this fits a research project. Perhaps it does, but
 might be too much engineering and not too much research. Might be worth
 checking out tho.
 >
 > FWIW, last time this topic was brought up people thought that using PCSA
 is the best approach:
 >   https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-March/012001.html
 >   https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-March/012073.html
 >

 Thanks so much for the fast reply asn! Looking at this now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23632 [Community]: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23632: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard
---+
 Reporter:  iry|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24784 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions on TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24784: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions on TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  mercedes508   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23632 [Community]: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23632: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard
---+
 Reporter:  iry|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by iry):

 * severity:  Normal => Minor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23632 [Community]: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23632: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard
---+
 Reporter:  iry|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by iry):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23632 [Community]: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23632: Apply Tor trademark for anon-connection-wizard
---+
 Reporter:  iry|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by iry):

 Hi arma!

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > I ran into iry in an airport today, and he reminded me about this
 ticket.
 >
 > My first thought is that if the goal is feature parity with tor-launcher
 (the Firefox extension in Tor Browser), then it would be good to
 coordinate with mcs and brade to learn about their recent and upcoming UX
 changes for tor-launcher.
 >

 Thank you for your suggestion! I have been trying to follow up the new
 design of the Tor launcher and anon-connection-wizard has had the latest
 design by Tor UX team so far.

 > My second thought is that we've been pushing people to come up with
 their own name for their thing, rather than having them name it tor-
 something, since the more tor-somethings there are in the world, the more
 people will want their thing to be named tor-something, and the cycle will
 continue. So I wonder if there is a cool unique name that you could use
 that makes the thing *yours*. (Imagine a world where several people each
 develop their own Tor launcher helper app, and each of them wants it to be
 named tor-something.) (I recognize that tor-launcher undermines this goal
 by being named tor-something. :(

 Thank you so for your detailed explanation. I agree with you that avoid
 naming everything tor-something is healthier for the Tor ecosystem. Also
 naming it tor-something may let people think it is something TPO is
 responsible for which can be misleading.

 > My third thought is that if we're going to name the thing tor-something,
 we should first figure out how much buy-in we have from the various
 projects that will use it. Those are... tails and whonix?

 Yes. anon-connection-wizard has been integrated into Whonix while it has
 not been integrated into Tails yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24531 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: Add function to change scheduler state and always use it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24531: sched: Add function to change scheduler state and always use it
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-sched, easy, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks okay to me. Merging it to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Loading ifc.ifc_buf using the new tor_free() causes undefined behaviour on x86_64 macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24733: Loading ifc.ifc_buf using the new tor_free() causes undefined behaviour 
on
x86_64 macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  address-sanitizer, unexpected-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  consequences, review-group-28  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Another approach is making a special (static) free function that takes a
 pointer to `struct ifconf` and accesses `ifc->ifc_buf` directly.  We could
 add comments there explaining why it's necessary (which also avoids
 cluttering the main body of `get_interface_addresses_ioctl()`).

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22145, #23966, #24573, #24706, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22145, #23966, #24573, #24706, #24711, #24742, #23881, 
#7590, #20942, #20946, #22527, #22759, #23975, #24135, #24501, #24526, #24531, 
#24581, #24584, #24600, #24641, #24679, #24681, #24695, #24708, #24726, #24733, 
#24754, #24774, #24582 by nickm:


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 030-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  031-backport, review-group-24  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24589 [Webpages/Website]: redirect Amazon Payments thank you page to donate.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24589: redirect Amazon Payments thank you page to donate.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Alex Pandian):

 How to perches free on Amazon Flipkart and more
 Pls tell

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24634 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24634: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global
declaration
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, jenkins  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24634 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24634: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global
declaration
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, jenkins  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24784 [- Select a component]: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions on TBB (was: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24784: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions on TBB
--+
 Reporter:  mercedes508   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24784 [- Select a component]: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24784: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions
--+
 Reporter:  mercedes508   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mercedes508):

 * Attachment "example.mp4" added.

 video file of the issue

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[tor-bugs] #24784 [- Select a component]: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24784: New Identity doesn't revoke temporary javascript permissions
--+
 Reporter:  mercedes508   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In Tor Browser, if you temporarily allow a Website to use JavaScript and
 use the New Identity button and go back to the exact same website
 afterwards no script will forget that it granted temporary access to it
 pre-new identity yet allow scripts to be executed nonetheless

 This issue has been reproduced on both Tails 3.3 and Tor Browser 7.0.11
 running on Debian stable.

 It's been reported on Tails bug tracker first:
 https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/15140

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Loading ifc.ifc_buf using the new tor_free() causes undefined behaviour on x86_64 macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24733: Loading ifc.ifc_buf using the new tor_free() causes undefined behaviour 
on
x86_64 macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  address-sanitizer, unexpected-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  consequences   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I'm okay with reverting the evaluate-once change if we can replace it with
 something that prevents arguments with side-effects.  Otherwise, I'm
 uncertain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor eats all mbufs on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24687: Tor eats all mbufs on FreeBSD
--+
 Reporter:  AMDmi3|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I also wonder if one of the kistlite bugs fixed in 0.3.2.8-rc might have
 been responsible here.  What version of Tor were you running?  If it was
 something between 0.3.2.1-alpha and 0.3.2.7-rc, please upgrade to the
 latest version, and stuff might get a little better.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24634 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24634: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global
declaration
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, jenkins  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug24634` has the logical set of fixes here.  It should merge cleanly
 into maint-0.3.2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24634 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global declaration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24634: test_hs_common.c:974:33: warning: declaration of 'time' shadows a global
declaration
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, jenkins  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24633 [Core Tor/Tor]: to->pending->tqh_last is 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF。

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24633: to->pending->tqh_last is 0x。
-+-
 Reporter:  sx5486510|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  msvc 029-backport 030-backport   |  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 okay; merged my branch to 0.2.9 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7532 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7532: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, term-project-ideas maybe-  |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea needs-discussion  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:21 enda_sexton]:
 > Looking into doing a research masters in network security, think I'm an
 idiot if i were to do something like this? Any suggestions?

 Hello not sure if this fits a research project. Perhaps it does, but might
 be too much engineering and not too much research. Might be worth checking
 out tho.

 FWIW, last time this topic was brought up people thought that using PCSA
 is the best approach:
   https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-March/012001.html
   https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-March/012073.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24522 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/UID and LDAP access for Igor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24522: Please create email alias/UID and LDAP access for Igor
-+
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7532 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7532: Count unique IPs in an anonymous way
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, term-project-ideas maybe-  |  Actual Points:
  bad-idea needs-discussion  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by enda_sexton):

 Looking into doing a research masters in network security, think I'm an
 idiot if i were to do something like this? Any suggestions?

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[tor-bugs] #24783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support browser.storage.sync.*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24783: Support browser.storage.sync.*
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I know Tor browser didn't support Firefox Sync.
 It's okay but would you consider supporting browser.storage.sync.*?

 browser.storage.local.* are working fine.
 browser.storage.sync.* will return nothing.

 This is not my code's problem because sync. is working in Mozilla Firefox.
 How about treating storage.sync request as storage.local internally?
 (I'm not asking for enabling sync - I just want .sync to work as .local)

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