Re: [tor-bugs] #24802 [- Select a component]: torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe PGP signature invalid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24802: torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe PGP signature invalid
--+
 Reporter:  Epic  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 The fingerprint I have for the Tor Browser developers is {{{EF6E 286D DA85
 EA2A 4BA7  DE68 4E2C 6E87 9329 8290}}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by starlight):

 ok, #24806

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[tor-bugs] #24806 [Core Tor/Tor]: LTS branch leaks memory continuously under stress/attack, requires back-port of 0.3.2.8-rc fixes to remain viable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24806: LTS branch leaks memory continuously under stress/attack, requires back-
port of 0.3.2.8-rc fixes to remain viable
--+
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I am a fan of running LTS releases, however 0.2.9.14 leaks memory
 continuously on relays serving as HSDIR for an apparently popular onion
 service and while also under attack.

 Daemon leaked 1GB in eight hours growing from 1.5GB VMRSS to 2.4GB VMRSS
 and was killed due to limited RAM.

 To remain viable 0.2.9 branch requires backports of 0.3.2.8-rc memory
 fixes, otherwise must be deprecated.

 Presently I am switching to 0.3.2.8-rc to see how the relay behaves the
 next time this happens.  Lately high-volume onion services come its way
 shortly after the HSDIR flag is assigned.

 see #24737 for some details

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24786 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 An operator sent me an email asking me to add this relay to the whitelist:

 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/BC6B2E2F62ACC5EDECBABE64DA1E48F84DD98B78

 It's just changed DirPort, so it wouldn't be in the January 2018 list
 anyway.
 (Fallbacks need to have the same address and port for 90 days.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24800 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job posting to website - Chief Financial and Grants Officer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24800: Please add job posting to website - Chief Financial and Grants Officer
--+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Samdney):

 There is a typing mistake

 •   Bachelor’s degree in buslness, finance, accounting, ...

 I have never heart from "buslness" but I know "business". ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:9 starlight]:
 > bad news:
 >
 > Memory leaks in `tor` are more severe than reported at the top of this
 ticket.
 >
 > My relay became a HSDIR earlier today while also undergoing attack and
 the Tor daemon leaked memory all the way from 1.5GB total memory
 utilization to 2.4GB utilization and was killed.
 >
 > 0.2.9.14 is dead (so much for LTS) and I am forced to upgrade to
 0.3.2.8-rc

 Please open a different ticket with this information, or we will lose
 track of it.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #20942, #22321, #22759, #24600, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #20942, #22321, #22759, #24600, #24679, #24706, #24708, 
#24725, #24726, #24785, #24791 by teor:
reviewer to pastly

Comment:
pastly reviewed all of these

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #20942, #22321, #22759, #24600, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #20942, #22321, #22759, #24600, #24679, #24706, #24708, 
#24711, #24725, #24726, #24785, #24791 by teor:


Comment:
This code is now in my branch fallback-code-2018-01 at 
https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22271 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.2 or 0.3.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22271: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.2 or 0.3.3
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 029-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport, 032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Please merge my branch fallback-code-2018-01 into master, and leave this
 ticket open for the remaining children.

 #24742 is in https://github.com/teor2345/torspec.git
 All other branches are in https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 This branch contains:

 Fallback whitelist and blacklist changes:
 * #22321 by pastly and teor, reviewed by teor and pastly, branch
 teor/fallback_whiteblack_changes_squashed

 Fallback script changes:
 * #20942 by minik, reviewed by teor, branch teor/bug20942
 * #24706 by teor and atagar, reviewed by atagar, teor, and pastly, branch
 teor/ticket24706
 * #24708 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/bug24708
 * #24711 by teor, no review (trivial comment change), branch
 teor/ticket24711
 * #24785 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/bug24785
 * #24791 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/bug24791

 Fallback script changes and changes to the format of fallback_dirs.inc
 (but not the fallbacks it contains, so there's no need to backport it):
 * #22759 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/fallback-format-2-v4
 * #24600 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/fallback-format-2-v4
 * #24679 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/fallback-format-2-v4
   * #24679 removes fallback weights, but we keep the same behaviour by
 changing Tor's default weight in #24681
 * #24725 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/fallback-format-2-v4
 * #24726 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/fallback-format-2-v4

 The fallback list format changes were also reviewed by atagar and irl in:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-December/012741.html

 These tickets are *not* in this branch:

 * #24681 by teor, reviewed by pastly, branch teor/ticket24681_028
   * I want nickm's review on this for backporting
 * #24742 by teor, revewed by atagar and pastly, torspec branch teor
 /fallback-format-2-v2
 * #24801 we still need to generate and backport the new list

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24681 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the default fallback weight in Tor 10.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24681: Make the default fallback weight in Tor 10.0
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, easy, intro, 032   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  -backport-maybe, 031-backport-maybe, 030   |
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, review-   |
  group-28   |
Parent ID:  #22271   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  pastly   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => pastly
 * sponsor:  Sponsor8-can =>


Comment:

 I'd like nickm to review this too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24742 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add fallback list spec to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24742: Add fallback list spec to torspec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, torspec, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:  1.0
Parent ID:  #22271  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  atagar  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #24725 => #22271


Comment:

 Re-parenting this, so we don't lose it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24785 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Reduce the fallback stability and flag requirements due to extra network load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24785: Reduce the fallback stability and flag requirements due to extra network
load
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM. Standard "wait actually this isn't merge_ready, wait for other stuff
 to be ready."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22321 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback directory whitelist based on operator relay changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22321: Update fallback directory whitelist based on operator relay changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * type:  task => enhancement
 * actualpoints:   => 2


Comment:

 Please see my branch fallback_whiteblack_changes_squashed on
 https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 Any further changes can go in #24805, which is the ticket for the next
 rebuild.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24786 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 2
 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #24786
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 We need to update the list using:
 * operator emails from 2018
 * the opt-in process in #24804
 * running the script, finding change warnings, contacting operators, and
 updating their details

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[tor-bugs] #24804 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24804: Run an opt-in process for relay operators to become fallbacks
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #24786
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 This involves mailing tor-relays and asking if stable relay operators want
 to become fallbacks.

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[tor-bugs] #24803 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Generate a new fallback list for 0.3.4 or 0.3.5 and backport it to all supported versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24803: Generate a new fallback list for 0.3.4 or 0.3.5 and backport it to all
supported versions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback|Version:
  Scripts|   Keywords:  fallback, 029-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  031-backport-maybe, 032-backport-
 |  maybe, 033-backport, 034-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #24786
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This is the actual list generation ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24802 [- Select a component]: torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe PGP signature invalid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24802: torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe PGP signature invalid
--+
 Reporter:  Epic  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Epic):

 * Attachment "SHA256.png" added.

 SHA256

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[tor-bugs] #24802 [- Select a component]: torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe PGP signature invalid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24802: torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe PGP signature invalid
--+
 Reporter:  Epic  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Signed on 2017-12-08 04:02 with unknown certificate
 0xA4300A6BC93C0877A4451486D1483FA6C3C07136.
 The validity of the signature cannot be verified.

 Imported all developer keys from sig page on torproject.org.  Also
 searched and did not find any 0xA4300A on sig page.
 Key ID's imported
 93298290
 D0220E4B
 683686CC
 23291265
 4B7C3223

 The signature I am using from the tor page
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIcBAABCgAGBQJaKmM4AAoJENFIP6bDwHE2AwgQAKsS5GXsrdAQ9SiHALtNQQbS
 gWEFWGbl8JcBeX5P5nPazkNUh8Ssub8FpNNC0/uBRdt8DG8xTJnzfvjZ9dkpOGbP
 9YU2dbWFZU9l+8Uh0oU1Q+kEk05WwsoF76uWuLuI+U7NQ56X5VHXuUlo39vjAk6b
 6XfBKJIcoAniTrSFKTjfcdzwVFR0IPbYuB8igIy5FjhkfdbiIW4NSpiTSQRM7wqF
 XrF1Xsd4DEOxwzKAoiG3rj5udYGCDTYRs/t9h5JNUnPmUqvFrWwC/yY25XpzSVRx
 rhniDTl2vp5fcX47U4s7sSDf+UcAc0EdbRLMnTxJIR8NhamAFhbsJzMi8wHbSgwE
 yTaGIr+/PZda8ZWwfdfpo954ZB/hWFXKjaS3WvKAMhBsHkoOwuF3PsJdSUGz5BGd
 Ow4II3ws/Yh9C+C8vODqejjGoC7LJREUlEjs/0Sfcehqz+nUO9Cb8T2myckY8zvg
 UxRKergTKCK1NssGDobwoo/u5KSvrSaD5NHTQ4L8yiTi9IoitFIctA63Ak0gZVRv
 bGZLIZ36qfsi7ru58eWeuJnRaaKrHIcgjccyDYOX63Gbf3ZMZ+cI/AGgRLW/KwQJ
 skMCPJxlL+hoHLd17jVYlLBeoGSyW04raICMGpYC7aRbX9VHgQjPc5PhKr4va5qD
 yw5CEDpoW5/IyZ6XN4AT
 =9ynq
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

 SHA256 of torbrowser-install-7.0.11_en-US.exe
 A033EB9B9ED2AD389169B36A90946A8AF8F05BD0C7BBD3E37678041331096624

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24791 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Remove excessive address info from the fallback script log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24791: Remove excessive address info from the fallback script log
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, easy |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Trivial and LGTM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24737: Recommend a MaxMemInQueues value in the Tor man page
+
 Reporter:  starlight   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by starlight):

 bad news:

 Memory leaks in `tor` are more severe than reported at the top of this
 ticket.

 My relay became a HSDIR earlier today while also undergoing attack and the
 Tor daemon leaked memory all the way from 1.5GB total memory utilization
 to 2.4GB utilization and was killed.

 0.2.9.14 is dead (so much for LTS) and I am forced to upgrade to
 0.3.2.8-rc

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[tor-bugs] #24801 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Generate a new fallback list and backport it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24801: Generate a new fallback list and backport it
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback|Version:
  Scripts|   Keywords:  fallback, 029-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  030-backport, 031-backport,
 |  032-backport
Actual Points:  0.5  |  Parent ID:  #22271
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I can generate a new list over the weekend.
 This will be easier once all the other children of #22271 merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Consider changing the fallback process to opt-out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24789: Consider changing the fallback process to opt-out
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24786 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Thanks for this feedback, it looks like we will need to continue to find
 someone to run this process in future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce ipv6 capable exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24798: Enforce ipv6 capable exit
--+
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-client, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.9.11
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
 * keywords:  ipv6 exit policy => tor-client, ipv6
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 It's not clear in this ticket what you want to do.
 But here is how to use the two IPv6 features that you seem to be looking
 for.

 If you want your client to enter the Tor network over IPv6, use:
 `ClientPreferIPv6 1`
 If you want to make IPv6 entries mandatory, use:
 `ClientUseIPv4 0`

 If you want your client to exit the Tor network over IPv6, use:
 `SOCKSPort/TransPort/etc. PORT IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6`
 If you want to make IPv6 mandatory, use:
 `SOCKSPort/TransPort/etc. PORT IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6 NoIPv4Traffic`

 We haven't tested these kinds of configurations, so if you find any bugs,
 please open a new ticket with the specific bug. Recent Tor versions may
 have better support for these features: please try 0.3.1 before submitting
 any bugs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24799 [- Select a component]: how do I download tor for Mac?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24799: how do I download tor for Mac?
--+
 Reporter:  gurudev   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24799 [- Select a component]: how do I download tor for Mac?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24799: how do I download tor for Mac?
--+
 Reporter:  gurudev   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Here is the English version
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/7.0.11/TorBrowser-7.0.11-osx64_en-
 US.dmg

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[tor-bugs] #24800 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job posting to website - Chief Financial and Grants Officer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24800: Please add job posting to website - Chief Financial and Grants Officer
--+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hello. Please add the below job posting to the website under Chief
 Financial and Grants Officer. Thank you!

 {{{

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 January 4, 2018

 New Year's Opportunity: Internet Freedom Nonprofit Seeks Experienced Chief
 Financial and Grants Officer

 Are you looking to use your advanced accounting and leadership skills to
 make the world a better place? Do you care about privacy and personal
 freedoms? If so, we have just the opportunity for you! The Tor Project,
 Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in Seattle that provides
 the technical infrastructure for privacy protection over the Internet,
 helping millions of activists, journalists and others around the world
 communicate securely. With paid staff and contractors of around 35
 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers all over
 the world who contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded in part by
 government grants and contracts, as well as by individual, foundation, and
 corporate donations. Our mission is “To advance human rights and freedoms
 by creating and deploying free and open anonymity and privacy
 technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use, and
 furthering their scientific and popular understanding.”

 We are currently seeking an Experienced Chief Financial and Grants
 Officer. This senior level position, based in our Seattle headquarters,
 will report directly to the Executive Director and will manage the offsite
 Accounting Manager.

 The Chief Financial and Grants Officer will serve as the Tor Project's
 senior grants officer. Grant-related tasks include, but are not limited
 to:

 •   Oversee grants and contracts to ensure compliance with funder
 requirements and progress toward annual goals.
 •   Maintain positive relationships and communications with applicable
 government agencies.
 •   Monitor and track grants through our Granthub software.
 •   Manage invoicing and billing of federal contracts to ensure full
 payment is received.
 •   Communicate the status of grant activities and progress toward
 objectives to stakeholders.
 •   Send monthly reports to front line managers indicating the current
 status of grants worked on by their teams.
 •   Maintain files and documentation for our federal grants and
 contracts to ensure accuracy and compliance.

 In addition, the Chief Financial and Grants Officer will serve as the Tor
 Project's senior finance officer. Finance-related tasks for this position
 include, but are not limited to:

 •   Maintain accounting controls by preparing and recommending
 policies and procedures; review and upgrade as needed to ensure accuracy
 in accounting activities and compliance with any regulatory changes.
 •   Monitor and project cash flow.
 •   Provide oversight to ensure accounts payable and receivables are
 coded and prepared correctly.
 •   Work with outside auditors and CPA firm to furnish requisite data
 to ensure timely completion of annual audits and tax filings.
 •   Work closely with the Executive Director to prepare budgets and
 financial reports.
 •   Track expenditures and income of various programs to ensure
 financial sustainability.
 •   Send monthly reminders to staff members about filling out their
 timesheets and expense reports through Harvest software.

 The person we seek should have the following qualities, skills, and
 abilities:

 •   5+ years of experience with federal grants and contract
 acquisition and management
 •   5+ years of experience overseeing a nonprofit organization's
 accounting function; other relevant experience may substitute for all or
 some of this required experience
 •   5+ years of experience working for or with auditors
 •   Bachelor’s degree in buslness, finance, accounting, or a closely
 related field is ideal but not required; advanced graduate degree in one
 of the above fields is preferred; CPA license a plus
 •   Working knowledge of not-for-profit accounting in accordance with
 U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, Subpart F, of the new
 Uniform Grant Guidance (formerly OMB Circular A-133) and appropriate Code
 of Federal Regulations
 •   Advanced skill and experience using QB, Sage (Peachtree), or some
 other organizational accounting program
 •   Must be comfortable working in a 

[tor-bugs] #24799 [- Select a component]: how do I download tor for Mac?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24799: how do I download tor for Mac?
--+
 Reporter:  gurudev   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 hi folks, your website isn't clear to me... how do I download tor for Mac?
 there was no download link or file... thanks... gurudev

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22548 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when measured performance is not enough

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22548: Firefox downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when measured performance is not
enough
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-22548-Firefox-downgrades-VP9-videos-to-VP8.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22548 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when measured performance is not enough

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22548: Firefox downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when measured performance is not
enough
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is the patch, I hope everything is fine!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24798 [- Select a component]: Enforce ipv6 capable exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24798: Enforce ipv6 capable exit
--+
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6 exit policy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Zakhar):

 Precision:

 using Tor version 0.2.9.11 (on Ubuntu 16.04.3 x64)

 The documentation of the last version of Tor has more configuration items,
 but couldn't find a description corresponding to that.

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[tor-bugs] #24798 [- Select a component]: Enforce ipv6 capable exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24798: Enforce ipv6 capable exit
--+--
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ipv6 exit policy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 '''[Enhancement Request]'''

 ''(unless I missed something in the configurations and options!)''

 While trying to add ipv6 capability to my Tor router, I noticed a
 limitation.

 There does not seem to be a parameter in the configuration to ensure that
 the selected exit node is ipv6 capable... which could be unfortunate if
 the client really needs ipv6!

 Did I miss such a parameter in the configuration?

 So here is some test output. This is done from a machine connected to my
 "Tor router" which is transparently (for the client) routing all TCP
 traffic to Tor, routing DNS through Tor, and discards the rest.

 `$ curl 'http://ipv4.whatismyip.akamai.com'; echo; dig google.com  A
 google.com  +short`
 `185.107.81.234`
 `216.58.198.206`
 `2a00:1450:4007:809::200e`

 `$ curl 'http://ipv4.whatismyip.akamai.com'; echo; dig google.com  A
 google.com  +short`
 `216.218.222.14`
 `172.217.15.110`

 `$ curl 'http://ipv4.whatismyip.akamai.com'; echo; dig google.com  A
 google.com  +short`
 `185.220.101.13`
 `172.217.19.206`
 `2a00:1450:400e:805::200e`

 `$ curl 'http://ipv4.whatismyip.akamai.com'; echo; dig google.com  A
 google.com  +short`
 `142.44.156.128`
 `216.58.212.206`

 `$ curl 'http://ipv4.whatismyip.akamai.com'; echo; dig google.com  A
 google.com  +short`
 `77.247.181.162`
 `172.217.17.142`
 `2a00:1450:400e:807::200e`

 Between each command, I send a NEWNYM through the command port (on the
 router) to get a new identity.
 The curl gives the ipv4 address of the exit node.
 DIG tries to get both ipv4 and ipv6 addresses of a site we konw has both
 (google here).

 As we can see, depending on our exit node we get or we don't get 
 adresses.

 (DNS is done with ipv4)

 When we don't get  resolution, as expected, we don't either have ipv6
 connectivity.

 Although this is undocumented, an educated guess is that an ipv4-only exit
 would never send back  responses to DNS requests since it can't handle
 an incoming request to connect to an ipv6 host. Correct me if I'm wrong on
 that, as I didn't check in the code... just guessing!

 This makes perfect sense and is coherent with what we can observe.

 But then, __from the client point of view__, having''' ipv6 connectivity
 is unreliable'''.

 From trying to understand the "path-spec", I can imagine that if the
 client provides an ipv6 address instead a host name when the circuit is
 established, it could do the trick (not tested it!). But that would not be
 practical at all for end-users (already with ipv4 it's bad, but ipv6 is
 hell!)

 At worst '''it can trigger errors''': since a client might cache DNS
 responses, when you have an ipv6 capable exit node, then a  response
 and use ipv6, and you happen to hit MaxCircuitDirtiness and change exit,
 you could be sending ipv6 requests to an exit that can't handle that,
 resulting in hard to diagnose errors.

 Hence this ticket: it would be nice to be able to have a flag (or any
 reliable method) __allowing to select only ipv6 capable exits__.

 For example, we already have:

 ClientUseIPv6

 (I assume that one of the result of that is to triggers  responses to
 DNS)

 We could have:

 '''ClientNeedIPv6'''

 Or same as you can select exits by country, being able to select exits
 with ipv6

 '''ExitNodes ipv6'''

 (This is not as good because it becomes confusing when you add countries,
 since the implied operator when you supply a list of nodes is OR, and we
 obvisouly want AND for ipv6)

 This should obviously be used with caution, and only when you really need
 it since it might harm anonymity by reducing the number of possible exits
 (same as selecting a country does!).

 Should you thinks there is not yet enough ipv6 capable exits, this
 enhancement could be put in the roadmap at a later date.

 From my tests short tests randomly changing exits, I got between around
 half of capable ipv6 exits... you might have a more reliable stat to
 decide I guess!

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[tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-relay, DDoS-resistance
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tor is willing  all the file descriptors the OS tells it are available for
 the current user.
 So to enforce a connection limit, operators need to drop the user file
 descriptor limit.
 But if the OS is wrong, or there are multiple tor instances under the
 user, tor can easily exceed this limit.
 Or machine hits a kernel, RAM, or CPU limit first, then the user might
 want to artificially limit connections.

 Right now, we have ConnLimit, which looks like it limits connections, but
 it's actually a minimum.
 And we have the out of socket check, but DisableOOSCheck is the default.

 Does enforcing a connection limit require us to set DisableOOSCheck 0?
 Then we should move this ticket to 0.3.4, and open one to improve the out
 of socket check.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24782: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 I'm still seeing some of my Guards use 5-7 GB even with the destroy cell
 fix and MaxMemInQueues 2 GB. They have 11000 - 16 connections open
 each. (This is process RAM, and they don't use KISTLite.) So I think this
 supports decreasing the default for systems with a lot of RAM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24793 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor brower proxy auth basic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24793: tor brower proxy auth basic
--+---
 Reporter:  gilcu3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  proxy auth basic =>


Comment:

 gilcu3, thanks for finding and reporting this bug. Can you please compare
 the torrc that is written when you use Tor Launcher (within Tor Browser)
 to configure proxy settings with the torrc that you used to demonstrate
 that this works with tor alone?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by tom):

 See also #18356

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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[tor-bugs] #24796 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review all requested and required Android permissions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24796: Review all requested and required Android permissions
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The Orfox patches already disable/remove some of the Firefox permissions.
 Review/audit the remaining permissions and purge all remaining permissions
 we do not need.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24526 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it clear that multi-relay operators are expected to set a working ContactInfo and proper MyFamily

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24526: Make it clear that multi-relay operators are expected to set a working
ContactInfo and proper MyFamily
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, man, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24497 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Ian Goldberg also mentioned them in
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-January/012762.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support browser.storage.sync.*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24783: Support browser.storage.sync.*
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Could you explain what you are trying to do? I can't infer it from your
 description, and I think it would be helpful to understand the full use
 case you're trying to accomplish so we can understand what we broke.
 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24795 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24795: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust osx tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Could it be that we haven't noted a "libc" dependency everywhere that we
 were supposed to?  Or that we aren't passing some options that cargo
 expects here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24652 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust builds fail on macOS with linker error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24652: Rust builds fail on macOS with linker error
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24652 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust builds fail on macOS with linker error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24652: Rust builds fail on macOS with linker error
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 My branch `bug24652_032` has a fix here that I think we should merge.  It
 will have minor conflicts on master.

 FWIW though when I run it, stuff builds, but the unit tests fail on OSX
 for me.  I think that's a separate bug from this one, though.  I've opened
 another ticket for that as #24795 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24526 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it clear that multi-relay operators are expected to set a working ContactInfo and proper MyFamily

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24526: Make it clear that multi-relay operators are expected to set a working
ContactInfo and proper MyFamily
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, man, review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24497 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by tom):

 There is a typo in the patch in src/config/torrc.sample.in - a stray 'n'
 at the beginning of a line.

 Aside from that, seems fine, aside from the obvious issue that we are
 using a capital MUST to declare something that is a policy preference with
 no technical enforcement mechanism.

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[tor-bugs] #24795 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24795: test_rust fails on osx with "can't find crate for `libc`"
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust osx tests
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 After I apply mix fix for #24642, I see this message in test-suite.log
 from test_rust.sh:
 {{{

Doc-tests protover
 error[E0463]: can't find crate for `libc`
   --> /Users/nickm/src/tor/src/rust/protover/lib.rs:25:1
|
 25 | extern crate libc;
| ^^ can't find crate

 }}}

 I do not see the same message on my linux rust builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21074 [Core Tor/Tor]: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21074: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  OSX Sierra setrlimit, tbb-needs, |  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 I've tried to take the minimalist approach for a patch here, and made
 setrlimit() failures nonfatal.  See my branch `bug21074_029`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24793 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor brower proxy auth basic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24793: tor brower proxy auth basic
--+--
 Reporter:  gilcu3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy auth basic  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gilcu3):

 I have tried with tor itself and it works, so this must be for sure a
 problem with Tor Browser config

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23883 [Core Tor/Tor]: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23883: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-ci tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by catalyst):

 I'd like us to have some official statement about the torproject/tor
 GitHub repository before putting these instructions anywhere official.

 (I should probably draft one and have isis and other interested people
 review it, assuming we actually got the group account ownership
 transferred as planned.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23883 [Core Tor/Tor]: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23883: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-ci tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 cool!  Do you think you could put this in a patch that we could put
 somewhere in doc/HACKING -- either in HelpfulTools or GettingStarted ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24794 [Core Tor/Tor]: smartlist.rs: do not use i8 interchangeably with libc::c_char

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24794: smartlist.rs: do not use i8 interchangeably with libc::c_char
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24794 [Core Tor/Tor]: smartlist.rs: do not use i8 interchangeably with libc::c_char

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24794: smartlist.rs: do not use i8 interchangeably with libc::c_char
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I have committed 1dab8bae21bc32e5d4e3ff954f4919d6506ad2e1 to fix this.  It
 works fine on x86_64 linux: let's see if the arm builders are happy now.

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[tor-bugs] #24794 [Core Tor/Tor]: smartlist.rs: do not use i8 interchangeably with libc::c_char

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24794: smartlist.rs: do not use i8 interchangeably with libc::c_char
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I tried to look at why our arm rust builds are failing, and found these
 warnings:
 {{{
 20:53:59   --> /srv/jenkins-workspace/workspace/tor-ci-linux-master-rust-
 arm/ARCHITECTURE/armhf/SUITE/sid/tor/src/rust/smartlist/smartlist.rs:37:44
 20:53:59|
 20:53:59 37 | unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts(self.list,
 self.num_used as usize) };
 20:53:59|^
 expected i8, found u8
 20:53:59|
 20:53:59= note: expected type `*const *const i8`
 20:53:59   found type `*const *const u8`
 20:53:59
 20:53:59 error[E0308]: mismatched types
 20:53:59   --> /srv/jenkins-workspace/workspace/tor-ci-linux-master-rust-
 arm/ARCHITECTURE/armhf/SUITE/sid/tor/src/rust/smartlist/smartlist.rs:46:52
 20:53:59|
 20:53:59 46 | let c_string = unsafe { CStr::from_ptr(*elem) };
 20:53:59|^
 expected u8, found i8
 20:53:59|
 20:53:59= note: expected type `*const u8`
 20:53:59   found type `*const i8`
 20:53:59
 }}}

 They happen because we're declaring Stringlist::list as `c_char`, but
 we're declaring elems as `i8`.  That's fine on platforms where C's `char`
 is signed, but on other platforms, `char` is unsigned, and libc::c_char is
 `u8`.

 I believe we can fix this by changing `i8` to `c_char` on this line:
 {{{
 let elems: &[*const i8] =
 unsafe { slice::from_raw_parts(self.list, self.num_used as
 usize) };
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24793 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor brower proxy auth basic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24793: tor brower proxy auth basic
--+--
 Reporter:  gilcu3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy auth basic  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mo):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #24793 [- Select a component]: tor brower proxy auth basic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24793: tor brower proxy auth basic
--+--
 Reporter:  gilcu3|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  proxy auth basic
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When connecting through an http proxy with basic auth, the client (tor)
 should send an HTTP request with header "Proxy-Authorization: Basic
 " (rfc 7235), but instead tor uses something defined
 for basic auth with http servers, like "Authorization: Basic ". For a proxy like squid (at least) this means it cannot
 connect to the relay network as it keeps receiving error 407 (auth
 required)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23883 [Core Tor/Tor]: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23883: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-ci tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Hello71):

 travis:

 1. sign up for GitHub
 2. fork https://github.com/torproject/tor/
 (https://help.github.com/articles/fork-a-repo/)
 3. go to https://travis-ci.org/ and log in.
 4. press the profile button in the top right.
 5. search for "tor". if you don't find it, press "Sync account".
 6. enable "tor".
 7. push to GitHub as usual. builds will show up at travis-ci.org and at
 #tor-ci.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18356 [Core Tor/Tor]: obfs4proxy cannot bind to <1024 port with systemd hardened service unit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18356: obfs4proxy cannot bind to <1024 port with systemd hardened service unit
-+-
 Reporter:  irregulator  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4proxy, systemd, jessie, tor-pt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 I also got bit by this, and found this ticket primarily by luck. It would
 be good to document a recommended workaround somewhere.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19675 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19675: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201712   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by igt0):

 I am not sure if it is related to this merge however we need to sync the:
 https://github.com/sysrqb/tor-browser/blob/tor-
 browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2_attempt0_1/mobile/android/app/mobile.js

 with the

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/modules/libpref/init/all.js?h=tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2

 Replying to [comment:9 sysrqb]:
 > I rebased the Orfox commits on tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2. This
 includes all commits from orfox-tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.0-1, but with some
 modifications.
 >
 > 1) Rename .mozconfig-orfox as .mozconfig-android
 > 2) Align .mozconfig-android configuration with .mozconfig configuration
 > 3) Add comments on non-obvious configuration changes
 > 4) Bump Java JDK version from openjdk-7 to openjdk-8 (openjdk-7 is EOL)
 > 5) Bump Android NDK version from r11b to r11c (hash of r11c is published
 on the Android website, r11b's hash is not available)
 > 6) Verify sha256sum hash of downloaded SDK and NDK files match
 expected/published value
 >
 > There are a few outstanding changes that are needed:
 > 1) Compiling with tests enabled fails
 > 2) App crashes when running in an Android emulator (it does not crash
 when running on a device)
 > 3) Change the app name from Orfox to Tor Browser(?)
 > 4) We need more unit tests
 > 5) c823adc2da01ee47d50e03f1a5a4f14e661e8a2c adds a third-party
 extension, we need integrate its changes instead
 > 6) Audit mobile.js and confirm it matches browser.js
 > 7) Some of the commits add whitespace, we should clean before merging
 >
 >
 > branch is tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2_attempt0_1 at
 https://github.com/sysrqb/tor-browser/tree/tor-
 browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2_attempt0_1
 >
 > I have some more notes from my review, I will add them here after I
 think about them some more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23883 [Core Tor/Tor]: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23883: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-ci tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22701 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing makefile dependencies make parallel builds fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22701: Missing makefile dependencies make parallel builds fail
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 So, apparently this is a known problem with trying to run "clean" and
 "all" in parallel with one another: it's not generally easy to make sure
 that if "clean" is specified, it comes first.

 Searching for "make parallel clean all" gives some ideas, but they tend to
 be stuff like this:

 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/22645139/makefile-parallel-
 cleancompile-issue

 The solutions tend to be kludgy ("define a clean_all target") or to
 require gmake, or both.

 Not sure what to do here, but I don't think we can block 032 on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21074 [Core Tor/Tor]: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21074: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  OSX Sierra setrlimit, tbb-needs, |  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: tor_gmtime_r overflow - gmtime(9223372036854775807) failed with error No error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24555: Bug: tor_gmtime_r overflow - gmtime(9223372036854775807) failed with 
error
No error
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  integer-overflow time-overflow tor-  |  Actual Points:
  relay 2038-problem |
Parent ID:  #18480   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24630: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * keywords:  tor-ci => tor-ci, 032-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Moving this to 0.3.3 - it might make sense to backport this fix for the
 maint-0.3.2 branch?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24763 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor make check FAIL: src/test/test (on OSX)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24763: Tor make check FAIL: src/test/test (on OSX)
-+
 Reporter:  lL__ |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor, make check, failed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24652 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust builds fail on macOS with linker error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24652: Rust builds fail on macOS with linker error
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24782: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 FWIW, I would expect that the kistlite bug #24671 fixed in 0.3.2.8-rc
 might have made Tor use way too much kernel ram; we can take this change,
 but we should keep monitoring Tor's memory usage to see whether our
 estimates are right.  (Also, over time, we should make MaxMemInQueues
 cover more and more of the things that Tor allocates for.  But that
 doesn't affect this ticket.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24303 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor fails to start if %include

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24303: Tor fails to start if %include
---+
 Reporter:  littlefeather  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.4-alpha
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  config |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Moving to 033 due to lack of info.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24629 [Core Tor/Tor]: Activate osx builds on travis, at low priority

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24629: Activate osx builds on travis, at low priority
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  not-just-linux, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by ahf):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24754 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove unnecessary heap allocations in Rust protover implementation.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24754: Remove unnecessary heap allocations in Rust protover implementation.
-+
 Reporter:  frewsxcv |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  review-group-28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks for the review, Chelsea!

 Merging this branch to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23234 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible problem with bootstrapping logic (Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 53%: Loading relay descriptors. (No route to host; NOROUTE; count 7; recommendation war

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23234: Possible problem with bootstrapping logic (Problem bootstrapping. Stuck 
at
53%: Loading relay descriptors. (No route to host; NOROUTE; count 7;
recommendation warn)
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap dirguard bridge needs- |  Actual Points:
  insight 031-backport   |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23620 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor lies about "Optimistically trying directory fetches again"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23620: Tor lies about "Optimistically trying directory fetches again"
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24782: Set a lower default MaxMemInQueues value
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:  (none) => ahf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24113 [Core Tor/Tor]: We stop trying to download an md after 8 failed tries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24113: We stop trying to download an md after 8 failed tries
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Huge work has been done here as part of 032. Let's move it to 033 for the
 rest stuff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23863 [Core Tor/Tor]: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should try an authority or fallback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23863: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should 
try
an authority or fallback
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24610 [Core Tor/Tor]: assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24610: assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs => prop224, tor-hs 032-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tune zstd parameters to decrease memory usage during streaming

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24368: Tune zstd parameters to decrease memory usage during streaming
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, compression, zstd, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  dir, 032-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  regression, compression, zstd, tor-dir => regression,
 compression, zstd, tor-dir, 032-backport


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[tor-bugs] #24792 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Broken links on new collector page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24792: Broken links on new collector page
---+--
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 The links on https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html are broken and
 return 500 errors. (example broken link:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recent/)

 It looks like the data is still available over at
 https://collector.torproject.org/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by alison):

 Replying to [comment:42 cypherpunks]:
 > **Important:** please rename the wiki page from OperatorsTips to
 "TorRelayGuide"
 > before publishing the blog

 done!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19675 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19675: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201712   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by igt0):

 Nice stuff! I am making comments straight in the github.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24791 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Remove excessive address info from the fallback script log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24791: Remove excessive address info from the fallback script log
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, easy |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fallback => fallback, easy
 * cc: atagar, irl (removed)
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * severity:  Normal => Trivial
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug24791 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 It comments out two logging lines in the code.

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[tor-bugs] #24791 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Remove excessive address info from the fallback script log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24791: Remove excessive address info from the fallback script log
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points:  0.1|  Parent ID:  #22271
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 This makes it easier for people to focus on the info that actually
 matters. Also, it makes it fit in a single terminal window.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24785 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Reduce the fallback stability and flag requirements due to extra network load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24785: Reduce the fallback stability and flag requirements due to extra network
load
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 We get 101 fallbacks with the most recent list and current settings.
 Our goal is about 150, or more if we don't want to rebuild the list too
 often.
 (We want to rebuild when 25% are down. Ideally, we don't want to go much
 below 100 fallbacks, either, which implies that we want at least 134 to
 start with.)

 ADDRESS_AND_PORT_STABLE_DAYS is currently 30. But address or port changes
 are the major reason we lose fallbacks. So let's increase it to 90 days.
 (I think it's ok to assume that a relay that's had the same address for 3
 months will keep it for 12-24 months.)

 The cutoffs are currently:
 CUTOFF_RUNNING = .90
 CUTOFF_V2DIR = .90
 CUTOFF_GUARD = .80

 But there's no reason to require the guard flag when we have a minimum
 bandwidth requirement. What we really need is for fallbacks to be Running,
 and V2Dir:
 CUTOFF_RUNNING = .50
 CUTOFF_V2DIR = .50
 CUTOFF_GUARD = .00

 MIN_BANDWIDTH is currently 1.0 MByte/s, or 100x the expected load.
 I think it's fine to drop it to 50x the expected load.
 (Also, the bandwidth system isn't that accurate, anyway, so some relays
 with low measured bandwidth actually have lots of spare capacity to serve
 directory documents.)

 I also removed some old fallback list restrictions that we used to
 manually maintain, but haven't checked since 0.2.8 or 0.2.9. We don't try
 to work out if fallbacks are on the same machine, and we don't
 automatically blacklist fallbacks if their details change. (That's what
 ADDRESS_AND_PORT_STABLE_DAYS is for.)

 This gives us 152 fallbacks, and relay operators are still opting-in.
 So I think we'll go with that, and consider changing to opt-out for the
 next release (#24789).

 Please see my branch ticket24785 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

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[tor-bugs] #24790 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: When 0.2.5 is EOL, remove the fallback script comment that refers to 0.2.8 and earlier

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24790: When 0.2.5 is EOL, remove the fallback script comment that refers to 
0.2.8
and earlier
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback, easy,
   |  doc
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #24786
   Points:  0.1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 We don't accept unsupported Tor versions as fallbacks, so there's no
 reason to talk about other bugs in unsupported versions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Consider changing the fallback process to opt-out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24789: Consider changing the fallback process to opt-out
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24786 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Sebastian):

 I am strongly discouraging this. Distributing the IP address in source
 code can get them flagged by some "security" software as C server
 (happened to my dirauth, caused a bunch of trouble but people knew to talk
 to me). We tell non-exits they basically don't have to worry about running
 a relay and I think that's no longer true with an opt-out process.

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[tor-bugs] #24789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Consider changing the fallback process to opt-out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24789: Consider changing the fallback process to opt-out
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #24786
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 If we did this, we could rebuild the list by running a script, and
 occasionally collect opt-outs and add them to the blacklist.

 I don't think this would worry anyone too much.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24084 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain about data collection to users, and provide opt-out method.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24084: Explain about data collection to users, and provide opt-out method.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 The analysis that developer do on their own devices does not affect user
 privacy.
 Tor typically explains new relay statistics in the release notes (or blog
 posts).
 And research is handled through the research safety board.

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[tor-bugs] #24788 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Please put a timezone on the relay search data time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24788: Please put a timezone on the relay search data time
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Relay search says:
 "Information for relays was published: 2018-01-04 09:00:00."

 Is this UTC?

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