[tor-bugs] #24997 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: please add boklm to torextratpo group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24997: please add boklm to torextratpo group
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please add boklm to the torextratpo group, so he can write files there.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJaaDiIAAoJEMIYUlgZ94RRTYAP/jiDuIMmFodHi+PdR/a1uqem
 NHm7Yo2EANrWyqPErPIwf72nk9PGx+8UzTfFWzZGUx8etc1xL/pvXIdEBiIc/grF
 rJxpnh44qq3HFm9VSe7II/Ho5BETfA72qXwkj6kdq632w+wsaKtv8OnQfy3/TFCw
 FPE4jFk+BBbBoXRZGg3G2w87q2Yq03xMvWg1nuxw2J/wyPICUvR2KagEv5TbqKno
 FLjpTeQipy6iQWyUDaehO8LhMNKTy2p1nkjH5Fh6hvCsK4LJEic4jVX2RjrcuTKL
 aOGiVGT6lyuatSHi2SelrLMgO456O8OM6WTDYlGgRR3ugX7hRgnFs1016ENlWgRj
 ddrq10lRPR0/u0orx153834zwSGYFuiS/2v/Wyf6j2Vn1WOLevwSitkPmRmP6pm3
 qBZN4clQ2B2LSszN7vSXMClqxqPH+usv0aWavPS/QX/PJ6saIlhhIX2UlPj6YGPS
 RdgbN1EAkZHnN7Dprkdp33exxL0nXGU6BehIDVhj7t7DJPpPQh8dfyvwPKtD60VM
 Fxy819Qz85QrsGtAzs987T1QY7UnLb1fW4MMmkTDfFPNpVnXHfRtcUSV9Xd+5yTd
 WMrHCJJfi6G3DcRqVtuFQvXX4sx86ZKfrTl8+V2ptNuv26HQw2d0qwKUyXRaDDVK
 eZt/t33jt9RHyw9xL4B8
 =BbaD
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24996 [Metrics/Statistics]: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24996: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "torperf-failures-public-2017-10-26-2018-01-24-all-50kb.png"
 added.


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[tor-bugs] #24996 [Metrics/Statistics]: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24996: OnionPerf showing >200% timeouts
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 https://metrics.torproject.org/torperf-failures.html

 This doesn't make a lot of sense. Either it's incorrect or it's poorly
 explained.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 I'm on it, will upload the patch shortly. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Run "make check"
 You might need to run configure first, see the instructions in INSTALL

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24995 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Truncated git hash not available in the windows expert bundle build for Tor 0.3.2.9 (was: Truncated git hash not available in the build for Tor 0.3.2.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24995: Truncated git hash not available in the windows expert bundle build for 
Tor
0.3.2.9
--+--
 Reporter:  TheDcoder |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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[tor-bugs] #24995 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Truncated git hash not available in the build for Tor 0.3.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24995: Truncated git hash not available in the build for Tor 0.3.2.9
--+--
 Reporter:  TheDcoder |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hello,

 From latest build of the Expert Bundle (Tor 0.3.2.9) available on the
 website, the `tor.exe` binary doesn't show/have the truncated git hash in
 the version, here is the console output:
 {{{
 E:\Software\ProxAllium\Tor>tor.exe --version
 Tor version 0.3.2.9.
 }}}

 In the previous build/release of the Expert Bundle (Tor 0.3.1.9), there
 used to be a truncated git hash in the version string:
 {{{
 E:\Projects\AutoIt\ProxAllium\Builds\v0.3-beta\ProxAllium\Tor>tor.exe
 --version
 Tor version 0.3.1.9 (git-727d3f1b5e6eeda7).
 }}}

 It might be related to the latest change in Tor Browser's build system
 switch from `gitian/tor-browser-bundle` to `rbm/tor-browser-build`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 Ok, I have made almost all the required changes, one thing that I would
 like to know is how can I run all the tests so I can confirm that I
 accidentally didn't break something?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-control, easy, |  Actual Points:
  spec-conformance   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by aruna1234):

 Then this check would be the right one, I suppose:

 /* Function to check for new descriptors. Returns 0 if changed, else 1 */

 static int check_tiemstamp(const routerstatus_t *a)
 {
 if(a->published_on == a->now)
 return 1;
 else
 return 0;
 }

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24672 [Webpages/Website]: The Security Slider manual should reflect the new changes mad to the security slider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24672: The Security Slider manual should reflect the new changes mad to the
security slider
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gapegas7uftp):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * severity:  Normal => Minor


Comment:

 Since upgrade to TBB 7.5.
 Also present in https://tb-manual.torproject.org/es-ES/security-
 slider.html
 (Español / Spanish) and probably other translazions.

 Still eazy for user to see what to do, so I makred it priority - low,
 severity - minor

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:11 fristonio]:
 > OK, also
 > * In the file `dnsserv.h` I'm not sure if should change this spelling
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.h#n126

 I would say yes.

 > * In file `test_extorport.c` the length of the string should be 32 bytes
 so I cannot correct the spelling of `ther` without changing the string,
 what should I do for this.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/test_extorport.c#n246

 I'd say no, leave this one as it is. (It appears that there are a bunch of
 strings, split between themselves, being all poetic and stuff.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by fristonio):

 * cc: fristonio (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20916 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20916: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop283, ipv6, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 We just made our first consensus with consensus method 28 in the test
 network.
 The microdesc consensus has IPv6 addresses, the (new) microdescs do not,
 and everything kept working.
 So it looks like the new consensus methods are ok.

 I still need to revise the last child ticket, and then we can close this
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 OK, also
 * In the file `dnsserv.h` I'm not sure if should change this spelling
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.h#n126

 * In file `test_extorport.c` the length of the string should be 32 bytes
 so I cannot correct the spelling of `ther` without changing the string,
 what should I do for this.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/test_extorport.c#n246

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 We use a script to combine changes files into the ChangeLog and
 ReleaseNotes.
 You can fix misspellings in them.

 Oh, and remember to base your branch on our master branch.
 Modifying the ChangeLog and ReleaseNotes in older versions gets messy,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 @teor should I also change spellings in `ChangeLogs` and `ReleaseNotes`,
 aren't they autogenerated?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 When we do patches for mass changes like this, we keep the large change
 separate from any ongoing checks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24993 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24993: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  mozilla firefox branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 The Tor Browser developer's views on this particular button of doom is
 somewhat contradictory.

  * It was examined in #13346 (because the now disabled error dialog was
 directing people to click on the "destroy your copy of Tor Browser"
 button) and fixed (Yay).

  * It was also encountered in #14118, because the wonderful safemode
 prompt dialog that the Tor Browser developers didn't disable (Boo),
 includes the button of doom, as an alternative to starting Firefox is safe
 mode.

 The better long term approach would be something like #10760, which will
 make the button actually work.  But in the short/medium term, I'm of the
 opinion that it should probably be patched out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 Yeah, that `make check` part would be great. Will try to create the patch
 as soon as possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24967 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24967: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink
---+--
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by ahf):

 As this patch touches some paths that are only executed on macos I'll give
 it a round of testing later today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 This would be a great place to start!

 Just watch out, some of the suggestions are wrong:
 {{{
 src/or/dns.c:22:38: "rela" is a misspelling of "real"
 src/or/rendcache.c:51:32: "realy" is a misspelling of "really"
 }}}
 These are probably misspellings of "relay".

 Please attach a patch to this ticket, or tell us where your git branch is.

 Once we have fixed all of these, our next step is to work out how to run a
 spelling check regularly as part of "make check".

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[tor-bugs] #24994 [Webpages/Website]: Replace tor-experimental-0.3.0.x with tor-nightly-master on the debian page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24994: Replace tor-experimental-0.3.0.x with tor-nightly-master on the debian 
page
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We tell people to use the Tor 0.3.0 packages for the development branch:
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#development
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#source

 But Tor 0.3.0 will not be supported on 1 February 2018.

 To avoid changing this every 6 months, let's use tor-nightly-master-
 DISTRIBUTION instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23650 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor source code has many typos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23650: Tor source code has many typos
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fristonio):

 Hey,

 I am new to the tor communtiy and would really like contribute, can I take
 up this ticket, would be a good place to start off with. :)

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[tor-bugs] #24993 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24993: about:support option strips TBB down to Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  mozilla firefox
 Severity:  Normal   |  branding
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 -go to about:support
 -click "Refresh Tor Browser"
 -now you're fucked

 This option should restore the Tor Browser Bundle to it's default config,
 meantime as the Tor Browser. Instead it "restores" it to more or less
 FIrefox.

 I used it once where I not only didn't have Tor locally installed, but
 didn't have safe access to updates or downloads, and suddenly found myself
 stranded without web access over tor.

 I understand some users may need to manually re-install the Tor Browser
 Button, etc. But at the very least this path needs to be better marked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 Followup is #24992

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24992 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24992: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left
open
---+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, circuits  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * Attachment "time-wait.txt" added.

 time-wait connection dump; all these relay connections were open.

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[tor-bugs] #24992 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24992: SingleOnion (and Tor2web?) connections may need better expiry, lots left
open
--+---
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  singleonion, circuits
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 This is a followup to #24991, which has two of the config files (tor
 config, and tor log)

 Expanding on the description in #24991, my blog has a low traffic single
 onion - barely gets hit over Tor at all - yet when I investigated it
 recently I found it claiming to have 6 circuits open for an extended
 period (~days) and also ~50 simultaneous TCP connections.

 I confirmed this with netstat, and then by killing the Tor daemon which
 threw all the connections into simultaneous TIME_WAIT.

 I mentioned this to Teor on IRC, who suggested that I log " a ticket about
 expiring single onion and tor2web connections, please" - because this
 seems really strange, and suggests that SingleOnions are not garbage-
 collecting properly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://oniongit.eu/mikeperry/tor/commits/bug24989. Note that I only added
 the client-side hsdir fetch purpose to this check. I figure dealing with
 the service side holistically in #24973 is the right way to deal with the
 service rate limiting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * Attachment "tor.conf" added.

 config

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
-+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  singleonion, guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by alecmuffett):

 * Attachment "tor.log" added.

 log

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[tor-bugs] #24991 [Core Tor/Tor]: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry guards", has no guards, makes no sense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24991: SingleOnion claims "missing descriptors for 1/2 of our primary entry
guards", has no guards, makes no sense
--+-
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  singleonion, guards
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This is the first of a pair of bugs with the same logfiles, so unless
 requested I'll only attach the logs once, here, unless there's a real need
 to duplicate them.

 I have an EOTK SingleOnion, config attached.

 Per the logfile, it is both HiddenServiceSingleHopMode and
 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode.

 It's from "dropsafezeahmyho" which is the onion for my personal blog
 (dropsafe.crypticide.com) which is very low traffic as an Onion, in fact
 it exists mostly as a test onion.

 Issue #1 - after an extended period of uptime, tor claims:

 {{{
 Jan 21 08:45:04.000 [notice] Our directory information is no longer up-to-
 date enough to build circuits: We're missing descriptors for 1/2 of our
 primary entry guards (total microdescriptors: 5975/6006).
 Jan 21 08:45:04.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We're missing descriptors for 1/2 of
 our primary entry guards (total microdescriptors: 5975/6006).
 }}}

 ...which should not be happening, because (as a single onion) there are no
 Guards.

 Issue 2 will be described in the next ticket, and linked back to this one.

 Attachments: logfile and configfile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24988 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (ntor2 module)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24988: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (ntor2 module)
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ntor handshakes tor-circuit  |  Actual Points:
  cryptography   |
Parent ID:  #24985   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 I had a discussion with Ian at RWC2018 about the changes, and we have a
 meeting scheduled for later this week to discuss (and hopefully come to
 some agreement on) them. Notes and takeaways from the meeting will be
 forthcoming.

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[tor-bugs] #24990 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for a post-quantum lattice KEX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24990: Write a proposal for a post-quantum lattice KEX
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core  |Version:
  Tor/Tor |
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  proposal cryptography post-quantum
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24985
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor3  |
--+
 As part of #24985, we'll need a solid, reviewed proposal for which post-
 quantum key exchange we intend concretely to use.

 My current idea for the key exchange is to use q=12289 and n=1024 (the
 lattice parameters from [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1092 NewHope] and
 other designs), along with the constant-time sampling protections I
 devised while working on
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/270-newhope-
 hybrid-handshake.txt prop#270], ripping out the Voronoi-cell based
 reconciliation mechanism and instead using a variant of the XE5
 reconciliation from the NIST [https://mjos.fi/hila5/ HILA5] submission
 (possibly tuning down the failure probability by increasing the noise,
 which raises the security level, since our key exchange is interactive and
 thus we don't care about having the 2^-128^ failure probability which
 allows HILA5 to be used for public key encryption schemes).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24956 [Community/Outreach]: put labs.tp.o on hiatus?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24956: put labs.tp.o on hiatus?
+---
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok. In order to use the auto-renewed Let's Encrypt cert, we need to point
 the labs.torproject.org DNS to be a CNAME for live-
 torlabs.pantheonsite.io.

 (Separately, we should also decide if we want Tor Labs to be a thing -- it
 needs a community manager to interface with volunteer projects to showcase
 them on there. I don't really have the cycles for that).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arma):

 See also the discussion in #24973

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24946 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24946: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose ==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:5 asn]:
 > Mike's fix LGTM too.
 >
 > Mike any chance we should also be checking for `HS_VANGUARD`
 `circ->purpose` in `connection_ap_expire_beginning()` too?

 No, this check is only for circuits that can have attempted streams
 attached. HS_VANGAURD should never have any streams.

 > WRT mike's question on comment:2: I don't think we have inherent rate-
 limiting for hsdir queries on hsv2 or hsv3, but I don't expect Tor clients
 to make many such circuits. Perhaps we should merge the bug fix patch we
 already have, and maybe open a separate ticket about investigating the
 potential issue of `count_pending_general_client_circuits()`?

 Ok. #24989.

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[tor-bugs] #24989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24989: Count hsdir requests against maxcircuitspending
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 In #13837, we split off hsdir purposes from general. In the process, it
 means that we stopped counting hsdir circuits towards the global pending
 rate limit in count_pending_general_client_circuits(). That function was
 already trying to avoid counting hs circuits, but since nothing else
 globally limits the number of pending hs circuits, we probably should keep
 rate limiting hsdirs there, too.

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[tor-bugs] #24988 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (ntor2 module)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24988: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (ntor2 module)
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  ntor handshakes tor-circuit
 Severity:  Normal   |  cryptography
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #24985
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor3   |
-+-
 As part of #24985, we'll need to implement ​prop#269. This should probably
 be in two parts:

 1) Implement a new module which, given function pointers to two
 handshakes (one classic and the other post-quantum secure) which follow
 some prescribed API, compose the handshakes together to produce a final
 shared secret
 2) Implement "hybrid null" (as it's called in the proposal), which
 here I'm calling "ntor2"

 This ticket is about part 2. It ultimately depends upon #24986 and #24987
 as well, although it can be done (and even rolled out into production, if
 we chose to do so) before either are finished.

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[tor-bugs] #24987 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (composition module)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24987: Implement prop#269 "Hybrid Handshakes" (composition module)
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  post-quantum, cryptography, tor-
 Severity:  Normal   |  circuit, handshakes
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #24985
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor3   |
-+-
 As part of #24985, we'll need to implement
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/269-hybrid-
 handshake.txt prop#269]. This should probably be in two parts:

  1) Implement a new module which, given function pointers to two
 handshakes (one classic and the other post-quantum secure) which follow
 some prescribed API, compose the handshakes together to produce a final
 shared secret
  2) Implement "hybrid null" (as it's called in the proposal), which here
 I'm calling "ntor2"

 This ticket is about part 1.  It depends upon #24986 as well.

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[tor-bugs] #24986 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement prop#249 "Large Create Cells"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24986: Implement prop#249 "Large Create Cells"
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-cell tor-circuit trunnel
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24985
   Points:  8 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor3  |
--+--
 As part of #24985, we'll need to implement
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/249-large-
 create-cells.txt prop#249]'s design for large create cells.

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[tor-bugs] #24985 [Core Tor/Tor]: Preserve circuit-layer confidentiality against a quantum-capable adversary

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24985: Preserve circuit-layer confidentiality against a quantum-capable 
adversary
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  post-quantum, cryptography, tor-
 Severity:  Normal   |  circuit
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  9001 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor3   |
-+-
 [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/008 Many] [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/287
 researchers], ourselves included, have been aiming
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/249-large-
 create-cells.txt for]
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/263-ntru-for-pq-
 handshake.txt quite]
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/269-hybrid-
 handshake.txt some]
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/270-newhope-
 hybrid-handshake.txt time] to protect Tor traffic against a hypothetical
 future adversary who has access to a quantum computer capable of breaking
 ECDH key exchanges which have occurred in the past and been recorded.

 This is the parent ticket for organising the work into smaller, byte-sized
 chunks and tracking overall progress.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-control, easy, |  Actual Points:
  spec-conformance   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 But that check isn't the right check: you only want newer descriptors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-control, easy, |  Actual Points:
  spec-conformance   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Yes, this field is the right field.

 Here's how to do this patch:
 1. Create a new function that just checks this field
 2. Find all calls to router_has_changed() in control.c and from controller
 helper functions
 3. Replace them with a call to this new function

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24658: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, refactor, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-29   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * cc: catalyst (added)


Comment:

 clang complained about some missing `static` keywords: https://travis-
 ci.org/tlyu/tor/jobs/332496284
 Patch in the static-version-str branch in my GitHub repository.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24970 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual Jenkins job

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24970: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual Jenkins job
-+
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Good catch and thanks for the specific pointer.

 Fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24983 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24983: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files
---+--
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:2 karsten]:
 > Yes, this is a known (to me), but probably yet undocumented issue.
 Thanks for creating this issue! It bothered me from time to time, but not
 enough to open a ticket. ;)
 >
 > So, making more files available in the `recent/` directory would be one
 option. But all tools downloading from that directory would then have to
 fetch even more data. I'm thinking of newly bootstrapped Onionoo instances
 for development purposes, for one example.

 Valid point.

 >
 > Another option would be to create tarballs for the `archive/` directory
 more often. Maybe every 2 days instead of every 3 days. That would solve
 this issue, too, right? If so, and if there are no concerns, I'll change
 the cronjob to try this out for a week or so.

 That should be fine.
 (We should keep this in mind when we get around to 'java-ize' the
 archiving process.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--

Comment (by isis):

 This is issue is fixed in my `fix/24432` branch. The final remaining thing
 causing the "501 missing resources" error was just a bug in the where the
 resources were registered on the Python server versus where the Apache
 server was redirecting to.

 Running the steps above in comment:4 to run the `./scripts/externalize-pt-
 client` script along with `TEST_PRODUCTION_MOAT=1 ./scripts/test-moat`
 script, produces this request:

 {{{
 curl --proxy socks4a://127.0.0.1:1/ -H 'Content-Type:
 application/vnd.api+json' -H 'Accept: application/vnd.api+json' -H 'X
 -Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4' --data '{"data": [{"supported": ["obfs4"],
 "version": "0.1.0", "type": "client-transports"}]}'
 https://bridges.torproject.org:443/moat/fetch
 }}}

 And the current production server returns the following response:

 {{{
 {"data": [{"challenge":
 "xNAyrt4W7BufeLIWYoRqc4NY1j5Y7XcSPur3nZjjExySWarl0kp3Q-
 
LoFXnCD6net56nvT1FrvyHAGb6ST1-f6KycgMJ4y01nGOKfkCJBqh_PJXajrSh8ruAaXBGwOXOEXnIm3CGLGZXm3pJlaYmynqvo6UVkkRXAi_15AZXQVmll7TMJ_UCpUJmh8QEkVVEjqYRbCJ83V5LRXblQEHR0otDw2FJDjgGHE3
 -0XXl1Gsv5vGq_IJ8LpIrJSQEEGljRWj_dZlHbwdWcQFrFcAD-
 
XMKBh8uHLpPB4ki0eEj9723I1UOFg2TOXxjXiG2kmb6EnsimPDYZMgI2AgSfYTuBUunJOjI4Q8PFEEUHYZ-
 BG2ECCda", "id": 1, "version": "0.1.0", "type": "moat-challenge", "image":
 
"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
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #24432 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24432: The meek<->moat tunneling isn't set up correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  moat bridgedb-dist|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM
--+--
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Tentatively closing as fixed, but please reopen if the issue isn't fixed
 in some way!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24148 [Community/Outreach]: Start a program where developers can call out volunteers for swag and glory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24148: Start a program where developers can call out volunteers for swag and 
glory
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24159 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The Torbutton version check does not deal properly with platform specific checks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24159: The Torbutton version check does not deal properly with platform 
specific
checks
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201801R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201801 => tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201801R
 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Here is a fix:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug24159-01=f8604998e58fdece9c191661121ada6a3b911499

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24975 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: scheduler_notify_networkstatus_changed() calls select_scheduler() without the new consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24975: sched: scheduler_notify_networkstatus_changed() calls select_scheduler()
without the new consensus
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, tor-sched  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by arma):

 Quoting the oniongit comment here for ease of history:
 """
 When this function is called, the consensus ***has not yet changed***. It
 is still old_c. It will be new_c soon. This is your chance to take new
 actions.

 So if you ignore new_c and just call stuff that looks at "the consensus",
 you're going to be looking at the current consensus, i.e. old_c.

 I think this is a bug in 0.3.2 with
 scheduler_notify_networkstatus_changed() too, in that set_scheduler() can
 call select_scheduler() which calls scheduler_can_use_kist() which calls
 kist_scheduler_run_interval(NULL) -- so even though
 kist_scheduler_run_interval knows how to receive an ns as an argument, it
 doesn't get new_c here.
 """

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24981 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Update trac identity to match styleguide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24981: Update trac identity to match styleguide
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  qbi => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned


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[tor-bugs] #24984 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy changes SMTP security setting from STARTTLS to SSL/TLS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24984: Torbirdy changes SMTP security setting from STARTTLS to SSL/TLS
---+-
 Reporter:  markr  |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 If I set up an SMTP server in thunderbird to use STARTTLS, it works fine
 until I install torbirdy (0.2.3) at which point the setting is changed to
 SSL/TLS. If I manually change it back to STARTTLS it works fine, until I
 disable and re-enable torbirdy, which causes the server security setting
 to switch back to SSL/TLS again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24975 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: scheduler_notify_networkstatus_changed() calls select_scheduler() without the new consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24975: sched: scheduler_notify_networkstatus_changed() calls select_scheduler()
without the new consensus
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, tor-sched  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by arma):

 I recommend if you want a function that gets called after the new
 consensus is in place (i.e. you don't care about what the old consensus
 used to say), move your call to the bottom of
 {{{networkstatus_set_current_consensus}}}.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24970 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual Jenkins job

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24970: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual Jenkins job
-+-
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 After looking at things closer, there appears to be an error in the tb-
 manual-install-alpha job:

 {{{
 20:37:40 Copied 1 artifact from "tb-manual" build number 733
 }}}

 This should be copying from tb-manual-alpha, currently build 4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24970 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual Jenkins job

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24970: Create alpha Tor Browser Manual Jenkins job
-+
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I somehow missed this part of your email, my apologies.

 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18918: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, code, refactor|  Actual Points:
  technical-debt tor-relay   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Oh, you left out a few:

 decide_to_advertise_begindir() -> router_should_advertise_begindir()

 consider_testing_reachability():

 Maybe we could split this into a boolean function that doesn't change
 state: router_should_check_reachability().
 And a function that calls that function and changes state:
 router_do_reachability_checks().

 You might also want to check the code and documentation in these
 functions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18918: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, code, refactor|  Actual Points:
  technical-debt tor-relay   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 1
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 ffmancera]:
 > I have been reviewing the code these days. I don't think we should
 rename any function but I want to propose some changes in the code
 structure. I will list all the reviewed functions with my notes about
 them.
 >
 >  * `check_whether_orport_reachable()` and
 `check_whether_dirport_reachable()`: I think they are fine, nice
 documentation and names.
 >
 >  * `router_has_bandwidth_to_dirserver()`: Poor documentation, I already
 improved it a bit. Also I think we don't need to check
 `options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER` because we are
 checking the same on RelayBandwidthRate.

 Let's rename this to router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(). "to
 dirserver" is confusing, it could refer to another dirserver.

 See my note below about removing conditions that depend on external code.

 >  * `router_should_be_directory()`: I don't think we need to check
 `advertising != new_choice` and then `new_choice == 1` because we
 initialize both to `1` and within the function only `new_choice` could
 turn into `0`. I already removed this if statement and it works correctly.

 When we remove statements because they are obviously correct, we usually
 insert a tor_assert_nonfatal_once() or if(BUG()) to make sure the
 condition holds. If the condition depends on code outside the function,
 please check it inside the function.

 For consistency, let's rename this to router_should_be_dirserver().

 > * `dir_server_mode()` and `decide_to_advertise_dirport()`: I think they
 are fine, nice documentation and names.

 Let's rename decide_to_advertise_dirport() to
 router_should_advertise_dirport() for consistency.

 > About combine functions, I think we could get
 `router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserv` into `router_should_be_directory`.

 If both functions are short, this is ok.
 But if the combined function is longer than a standard terminal window (24
 lines), let's not combine them.

 > Let's decide about do or not these changes and I will work on them :-)

 They sound fine to me. Thanks for working on this ticket!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24148 [Community/Outreach]: Start a program where developers can call out volunteers for swag and glory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24148: Start a program where developers can call out volunteers for swag and 
glory
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by kat5):

 * cc: kat@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9186 [Webpages/Website]: Document how to report security vulnerabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9186: Document how to report security vulnerabilities
--+
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  kat5
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by kat5):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 hiro merged this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22402 [Webpages/Website]: Usablity and accessiblity improvement on the Tor assistant page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22402: Usablity and accessiblity improvement on the Tor assistant page
--+---
 Reporter:  iry   |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The link could instead open a minimal static local copy of the online
 documentation which could be bundled with Tor Browser explicitly for help
 configuring Tor Launcher and listing the same contact information for out-
 of-band support.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10888 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10888: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Also see ticket:16886#comment:8 (short summary: icon48.png is used in the
 branded wizards, e.g., the add-on compatibility check dialog).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22402 [Webpages/Website]: Usablity and accessiblity improvement on the Tor assistant page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22402: Usablity and accessiblity improvement on the Tor assistant page
--+---
 Reporter:  iry   |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > we may host a mirror assistant page on website like Github which is "too
 expensive to block" by a censor.
 > open it in a default browser may be dangerous
 Should Tor launcher display all mirrors then or only one?  If one,
 torproject.org cannot be it because it isn't always safe, so then either
 it always has to be a collateral freedom mirror or Tor Launcher has to
 determine which link to display... which is probably impossible to do
 safely in this case when Tor isn't able to connect, so we're back to a
 collateral freedom mirror.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24983 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24983: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files
---+--
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by robgjansen):

 This bugged me now because I actually need the files from the 19th :)

 > Another option would be to create tarballs for the archive/ directory
 more often. Maybe every 2 days instead of every 3 days. That would solve
 this issue, too, right?

 I think that would work, yes. I can't think of any problems with that
 approach other than slightly higher CPU usage for a brief period.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24946 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24946: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose ==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 merged, but not closing. Mike, can you answer asn's questions above and
 could one of you open tickets as appropriate?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24952 [Core Tor/Tor]: channel: channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method() should return the "real_addr" of the connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24952: channel: channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method() should return the 
"real_addr"
of the connection
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-channel   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 But, who calls channel_get_addr_if_possible()?  Will they still work if
 they get real_addr  instead of addr?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24896 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion services should include basic intro/rend stats in their heartbeat logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24896: Onion services should include basic intro/rend stats in their heartbeat
logs
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 lgtm; merging

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24658: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, refactor, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-29   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 merged.  Back into "new" for other refactoring.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24983 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24983: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files
---+--
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten


Comment:

 Yes, this is a known (to me), but probably yet undocumented issue. Thanks
 for creating this issue! It bothered me from time to time, but not enough
 to open a ticket. ;)

 So, making more files available in the `recent/` directory would be one
 option. But all tools downloading from that directory would then have to
 fetch even more data. I'm thinking of newly bootstrapped Onionoo instances
 for development purposes, for one example.

 Another option would be to create tarballs for the `archive/` directory
 more often. Maybe every 2 days instead of every 3 days. That would solve
 this issue, too, right? If so, and if there are no concerns, I'll change
 the cronjob to try this out for a week or so.

 Accepting this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22402 [Webpages/Website]: Usablity and accessiblity improvement on the Tor assistant page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22402: Usablity and accessiblity improvement on the Tor assistant page
--+---
 Reporter:  iry   |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 ticket:22402#comment:8
 > Clicking on the link and open it in a default browser may be dangerous
 for some users It will let an adversary know that the user is trying
 to access torproject.org through their internet traffic, or leave a
 browser history

 This should be written above or below the text-link itself to warn users
 before they copy it. Or hide the link behind an "I'll be careful" or "I
 accept the risk" button like how Firefox does it on its about:config page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24902 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24902: Denial of Service mitigation subsystem
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ddos, tor-relay, review-group-30,|  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 031-backport, 032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 LOTS of fixes went in.

 See _01 branch for all the fixups and new commits.

 The _02 branch is squashed with all the things.

 Now an _03 exists for which we can have a new nice merge requests without
 breaking the _02 one on Oniongit:
 https://oniongit.eu/dgoulet/tor/merge_requests/18

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24658: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, refactor, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-29   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 The history here looks clean to me; I'll merge it as-is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24983 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24983: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files
---+--
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by robgjansen):

 Is it a reasonable change to just expand the number of files available in
 [https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/
 the recent directory of the web server]?

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[tor-bugs] #24983 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24983: Inaccessible semi-recent consensus files
---+--
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 I noticed there is a gap between the consensus files that are available in
 the latest snapshot, e.g.:
 https://collector.torproject.org/archive/relay-
 descriptors/consensuses/consensuses-2018-01.tar.xz

 and those available in the list of recent consensus files:
 https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/consensuses/

 As of right now, many consensus files from January 19th, 2018 are
 inaccessible (they are too old to be in the recent list and too new to
 exist in the latest archived snapshot).

 I realize that those files will get added to the January 2018 archive
 snapshot soon, but it seems to me like a problem in general that at any
 time some consensus files may be inaccessible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24982 [Applications/rbm]: Update url in README file and add script to help updating the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24982: Update url in README file and add script to help updating the website
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201801R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201801R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch `bug_24982` has two commits doing this:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/rbm.git/commit/?h=bug_24982=0eb1f12241ed067ef9c013ef0f72e9cca89ee5e6
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/rbm.git/commit/?h=bug_24982=213fad5a8fe04272359c33778626a2802efc4ebc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22842 [Webpages/Website]: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22842: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs
--+---
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 - Wikipedia
   - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Menu Help:Menu]
   - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:FAQ/Index
 Wikipedia:FAQ/Index]
   - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Directory Help:Directory]
   - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Contents Help:Contents]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22842 [Webpages/Website]: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22842: Create a knowledge base that's more in-depth than FAQs
--+---
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Other example designs and content by and for large open-source
 communities:
 - [https://docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ Read the Docs]
 - [https://wiki.archlinux.org/ ArchWiki] by Arch Linux
 - [https://wiki.debian.org/ Debian Wiki] by Debian Linux

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[tor-bugs] #24982 [Applications/rbm]: Update url in README file and add script to help updating the website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24982: Update url in README file and add script to help updating the website
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 With #24055 we now have the url https://rbm.torproject.org/, so we can
 update the url from the `README.md` file.

 We can also add a script in the docs directory to help us updating the
 website when there are changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Add-on compatibility check dialog" contains Firefox logo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16886: "Add-on compatibility check dialog" contains Firefox logo
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 In Firefox <= 57, there is still a branded dialog that is shown after the
 post-update restart (which is why we still see it in Tor Browser after
 each update). But in Firefox 57 and newer that old XUL-based dialog has
 been replaced with a simpler HTML-based window, as shown here:
 https://bug1353194.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8905214

 Here is the bug where the work was done:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1353194

 We should take another look at this in the ESR 60 timeframe to see if
 there are any branding issues with the new window (text or images).

 In the meantime, we can fix this problem by putting a Tor Browser icon in
 browser/branding/official/content/icon48.png (see ticket:10888#comment:8).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24275 [Webpages/Website]: Testing Lecktor as a possible framework to be used for all portals related to website redesign project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24275: Testing Lecktor as a possible framework to be used for all portals 
related
to website redesign project
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > to be used for all portals
 > - easy for folks to update content

 Specifically concerning the FAQ, Trac wiki, proposed knowledge base, or a
 merger of them, the documentation websites for other software projects
 that I consider the easiest to update are '''wikis'''. Wikis are
 particularly easy for communities of projects with extensive websites and
 sub-projects to contribute quickly and broadly toward updating their
 documentation content even if the administration teams are small in
 comparison or preoccupied.

 A framework like Lecktor will aid in redesigning the theme, style, and
 underlying construction of the website which appears to be the goal of the
 website redesign project, but I don't think it would aid lesser-skilled
 folks who might wish to contribute by keeping the textual documentation
 updated. Git, local servers, and workspace interfaces pile steep learning
 curves onto simply updating a sentence or two.

 > Here is the git repository: ​https://oniongit.eu/infra/portal
 Why not on https://gitweb.torproject.org/? It's also accessible on hidden
 services administrated by TorProject ( https://onion.torproject.org/ )
 which means that Tor users skeptical of exit nodes, third-party hosts, or
 certificate authorities would have a pathway to contribute with less
 reluctance. An alternate but less reassuring (and harder for you) option
 could be maintaining a hidden service on oniongit.eu.

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[tor-bugs] #24981 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Update trac identity to match styleguide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24981: Update trac identity to match styleguide
--+-
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 - change Tor trac logo to:
 https://styleguide.torproject.org/static/images/color.svg

 - change purple links to # 7D4698

 - change green h1 to # 68B030

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10888 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10888: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I closed #24578 as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24578 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tbupdate popup notification formatting error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24578: about:tbupdate popup notification formatting error
--+---
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > I do not think this is a new problem. We do plan to stop using a query
 parameter with about:tbupdate (#21850 is a related ticket). Then the
 doorhanger would just have `about:tbupdate`.

 The above issue is fixed by the patches in #21850.

 > The wrong icon is shown on all of our about: pages, e.g., about:tor so
 that is general branding problem.

 I am resolving this ticket as a duplicate of #10888 because it covers this
 remaining issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10888 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10888: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs, isabela, antonela (added)


Comment:

 For future reference, here are some of the images that still need to be
 replaced in a Firefox 52 ESR-based Tor Browser:
 * browser/branding/official/default22.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/about-logo.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/about-l...@2x.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/about-wordmark.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/about.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/icon48.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/icon64.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/identity-icons-brand.svg
 * browser/branding/official/content/silhouette-40.svg

 We will probably need to update this list for ESR 60, and there are other
 images under browser/branding/official that may or may not be used in Tor
 Browser (I think some of the files are only be used by Firefox's Windows
 installer).

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[tor-bugs] #24980 [Webpages]: Add QubesOS and Whonix's next-gen onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24980: Add QubesOS and Whonix's next-gen onion services
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Add

 {{{
 http://sik5nlgfc5qylnnsr57qrbm64zbdx6t4lreyhpon3ychmxmiem7tioad.onion/
 http://dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion/
 }}}

 to the NextGenOnions trac wiki page.

 Verification: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/23/qubes-whonix-next-
 gen-tor-onion-services/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24965 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Automatically remove metadata from images (EXIF) before upload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24965: Automatically remove metadata from images (EXIF) before upload
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, gsoc-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 By default, seems really great to protect users (would such a benefit
 apply to GlobaLeaks as well?). What if I want to have EXIF data uploaded?
 There should be some pref for that I can flip in such cases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24967 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24967: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink
---+--
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by Hello71):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24967 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24967: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink
---+--
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by Hello71):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  dgoulet => Hello71


Comment:

 
https://cgit.alxu.ca/torsocks.git/commit/?id=db954ddbce29b12baeb1197fbb4ff09471d91133

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24881 [Webpages/Website]: consolidate relay setup instruction pages and link to new guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24881: consolidate relay setup instruction pages and link to new guide
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Silvia [Hiro]:
 > Yes,
 > It is checked for compiling some parts of the docs. That's why the
 > building was failing.

 Oh sorry, I did test my changes by building locally and it did build just
 fine.

 That was probably caused by "Fix merge conflicts in sidenav"
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/webwml.git/commit/?id=c257c6ccac167d74206771f13d63e04335272661

 since it added back the sidenav entry for docs/rpm.

 I removed docs/rpm and the sidenav entry in this branch:
 https://github.com/nusenu/torproject-webwml/tree/remove_rpms_from_sidenav

 would be great if you could merge it since that content is obsolete.

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[tor-bugs] #24979 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks could support ptrace sandboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24979: torsocks could support ptrace sandboxing
---+-
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 pros:

 - 'fixes' SIP, suid, caps
 - fixes static binaries

 cons:

 - kind of a pain to implement
 - DNS would require actual parsing, which is apparently a hard problem
 even for 'minimal' implementations:
 https://security.googleblog.com/2017/10/behind-masq-yet-more-dns-and-
 dhcp.html. I think an initial hybrid implementation could punt on this,
 and it would still fix the ugly hack of hardcoding SIP paths.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24976 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/or/hs_cache.c:628: cache_store_as_client: Non-fatal assertion !(cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter > client_desc->desc->plaintext_data.re

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24976: Bug: src/or/hs_cache.c:628: cache_store_as_client: Non-fatal assertion
!(cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
client_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter) failed
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.4
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with enable-tls1_3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24978: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with
enable-tls1_3
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 031-backport|  Actual Points:
  032-backport openssl   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (If you go to test these out with openssl git master, expect a bunch of
 warnings. I have a PR for that in openssl:
 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5150 .)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24965 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Automatically remove metadata from images (EXIF) before upload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24965: Automatically remove metadata from images (EXIF) before upload
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, gsoc-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:
 > This seems like a good idea and something Firefox and other browsers
 should have as well. I did find this:
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1067211

 Oh, nice. That's surprisingly appropriate. We can also look at MAT as an
 example, as well as the alternatives.

 https://mat.boum.org/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with enable-tls1_3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24978: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with
enable-tls1_3
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 031-backport|  Actual Points:
  032-backport openssl   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See `bug24978_029_enable` and `bug24978_029_disable` for our options.  We
 should merge only one IMO.

 I'd argue against a backport to 0.2.5, since 0.2.5 is EOL in May, and
 since it won't build with OpenSSL 1.1.1 at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24881 [Webpages/Website]: consolidate relay setup instruction pages and link to new guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24881: consolidate relay setup instruction pages and link to new guide
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by hiro):

 This was merged, but rpms.wml cannot be removed at the moment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24965 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Automatically remove metadata from images (EXIF) before upload

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24965: Automatically remove metadata from images (EXIF) before upload
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, gsoc-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 This seems like a good idea and something Firefox and other browsers
 should have as well. I did find this:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1067211

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[tor-bugs] #24978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with enable-tls1_3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24978: Tor doesn't work when built with (unreleased) OpenSSL 1.1.1 built with
enable-tls1_3
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  029-backport 031-backport
 Severity:  Normal   |  032-backport openssl
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 From https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2017/05/04/tlsv1.3/ :

 >If you explicitly configure your ciphersuites then care should be taken
 to ensure that you are not inadvertently excluding all TLSv1.3 compatible
 ciphersuites. If a client has TLSv1.3 enabled but no TLSv1.3 ciphersuites
 configured then it will immediately fail (even if the server does not
 support TLSv1.3) with an error message

 That's the situation we're in now.  When OpenSSL 1.1.1 releases in April,
 current Tor versions just won't work with it at all, since they have
 neither disabled TLS1.3 nor enabled any TLS1.3 ciphers.

 We have two options for fixing this: I'll implement both and we can see
 what we like.

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[tor-bugs] #24977 [- Select a component]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This one is back, since pre-release days of hsv3. Something makes it such
 that the hsdir index is not well set for some relays.

 I got this to happen on my hsv3 service a few weeks ago. I got it a few
 times on the same second for the same node, and then it got fixed... There
 were no other references to that node (or its fpr) before that.

 {{{
 Jan 04 21:30:54.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/hs_common.:1277: node_has_hsdir_index: Non-fatal assertion
 !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
 failed. (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion
 !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
 failed in node_has_hsdir_index at src/or/hs_common.c:1277. Stack trace:
 (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x7f6079a21db2] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor/src/or/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7) [0x7f6079a3cc57] (on Tor 0.3.2.6
 -alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor/src/or/tor(hs_get_responsible_hsdirs+0x4f9) [0x7f6079a046c9] (on Tor
 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor/src/or/tor(hs_service_run_scheduled_events+0x1a5b) [0x7f6079a11c5b]
 (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(+0x4b9f1)
 [0x7f60798ed9f1] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(+0x6b4f0)
 [0x7f607990d4f0] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7f6078f253dc] (on Tor
 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
 [0x7f60798f0eb4] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
 [0x7f60798f46f5] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x7f60798ec629] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1) [0x7f60781182b1] (on Tor 0.3.2.6
 -alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(_start+0x2a)
 [0x7f60798ec67a] (on Tor 0.3.2.6-alpha-dev b6fd78ea301bd089)
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [info] hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(): Node
 $EEC47B34F9403AA7F765D070BB3011E50A373C21~ivanmk2 at 185.22.173.162 was
 found without hsdir index.
 Jan 04 21:30:55.000 [info] run_upload_descriptor_event(): Initiating
 upload for hidden service current descriptor for service onion with 3/3
 introduction points.
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #24976 [- Select a component]: Bug: src/or/hs_cache.c:628: cache_store_as_client: Non-fatal assertion !(cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter > client_desc->desc->plaintext_dat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24976: Bug: src/or/hs_cache.c:628: cache_store_as_client: Non-fatal assertion
!(cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
client_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter) failed
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.4   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Got the following non-fatal assert in my hsv3 IRC client some weeks ago.
 The tor version is pretty old, but I don't think we changed anything in
 the between to fix this issue.

 {{{
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/hs_cache.c:628: cache_store_as_client: Non-fatal assertion
 !(cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
 client_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter) failed. (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion
 !(cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
 client_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter) failed in
 cache_store_as_client at src/or/hs_cache.c:628. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(log_backtrace+0x42)
 [0x7fe385e0b442] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor/src/or/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb7) [0x7fe385e262c7] (on Tor 0.3.2.1
 -alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor/src/or/tor(hs_cache_store_as_client+0x1c2) [0x7fe385de4fc2] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug:
 ./tor/src/or/tor(connection_dir_reached_eof+0x1a67) [0x7fe385dbb757] (on
 Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(+0x1067cf)
 [0x7fe385d927cf] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(+0x4dcf1)
 [0x7fe385cd9cf1] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7fe38530f3dc] (on Tor
 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(do_main_loop+0x244)
 [0x7fe385cdad84] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(tor_main+0x1c25)
 [0x7fe385cde5c5] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x7fe385cd64d9] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1) [0x7fe3845022b1] (on Tor 0.3.2.1
 -alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 Dec 13 16:58:04.000 [warn] Bug: ./tor/src/or/tor(_start+0x2a)
 [0x7fe385cd652a] (on Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev f71ff0cabc36b5ae)
 }}}

 Looking at the code, it seems to me that this BUG() could also be caused
 by some sort of HSDir-desynch, where some HSDirs have a newer desc than
 others? Perhaps we could look into this (altho it might be caused
 naturally with network issues), or just remove the BUG from that if
 statement, since it's handled pretty well?

 Not a serious bug all in all.

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