Re: [tor-bugs] #25293 [- Select a component]: tor router in raspberry pi3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25293: tor router in raspberry pi3
--+
 Reporter:  osos  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.12
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor router|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by osos):

 * Attachment "torrc.tar.gz" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25293 [- Select a component]: tor router in raspberry pi3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25293: tor router in raspberry pi3
--+
 Reporter:  osos  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.12
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor router
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I have configuration on raspberry pi 3 for tor router but i have problem
 in tor configuration
 i have this error

 Feb 18 05:57:19.769 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.12 (git-2b1e823d7bc05a37) running
 on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.0f and Zlib 1.2.8.
 Feb 18 05:57:19.769 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Feb 18 05:57:19.769 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
 Feb 18 05:57:19.780 [warn] The TransListenAddress option is deprecated,
 and will most likely be removed in a future version of Tor. Use TransPort
 instead. (If you think this is a mistake, please let us know!)
 Feb 18 05:57:19.780 [warn] The DNSListenAddress option is deprecated, and
 will most likely be removed in a future version of Tor. Use DNSPort
 instead. (If you think this is a mistake, please let us know!)
 Feb 18 05:57:19.780 [notice] You configured a non-loopback address
 '192.168.42.1:53' for DNSPort. This allows everybody on your local network
 to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you wanted.
 Feb 18 05:57:19.780 [notice] You configured a non-loopback address
 '192.168.42.1:9040' for TransPort. This allows everybody on your local
 network to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you wanted.
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [notice] You configured a non-loopback address
 '192.168.42.1:53' for DNSPort. This allows everybody on your local network
 to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you wanted.
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [notice] You configured a non-loopback address
 '192.168.42.1:9040' for TransPort. This allows everybody on your local
 network to use your machine as a proxy. Make sure this is what you wanted.
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [warn] Could not bind to 127.0.0.1:9050: Address
 already in use. Is Tor already running?
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [notice] Opening DNS listener on 192.168.42.1:53
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [warn] Could not bind to 192.168.42.1:53: Permission
 denied
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 192.168.42.1:9040
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [warn] Could not bind to 192.168.42.1:9040: Address
 already in use. Is Tor already running?
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind
 one of the listener ports.
 Feb 18 05:57:19.783 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above.

 the tor service is blocked in turkey
 Attached torrc file
 please advice

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow MapAddress .exit even if AllowDotExit is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3940: Allow MapAddress .exit even if AllowDotExit is 0
---+
 Reporter:  sjmurdoch  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.2.32
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by fuzzyTew):

 Note that although the comment on the code I removed states it is
 preventing .exit domains that have come from users, actually it is
 preventing automapped mapaddresses.  User-provided .exit domains are
 blocked on line 1247 of src/or/connection_edge.c:
 {{{
   /* Check for whether this is a .exit address.  By default, those are
* disallowed when they're coming straight from the client, but you're
* allowed to have them in MapAddress commands and so forth. */
   if (!strcmpend(socks->address, ".exit")) {
 log_warn(LD_APP, "The  \".exit\" notation is disabled in Tor due to "
  "security risks.");
 control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME
 HOSTNAME=%s",
 escaped(socks->address));
 out->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
 out->should_close = 1;
 return;
   }
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow MapAddress .exit even if AllowDotExit is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3940: Allow MapAddress .exit even if AllowDotExit is 0
---+
 Reporter:  sjmurdoch  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.2.32
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by fuzzyTew):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>
 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 This bug was reintroduced with 9d0fab9872807ef212fadb3feb299cf6309a185f
 'Allow MapAddress and Automap to work together' on 2014-04-08.  Combined
 with f02fd6c3af71141241137403d070d72310cbfd82 'Remove AllowDotExit'
 2017-09-07, it has not been possible to use MapAddress .exit for a number
 of months now.

 The attached patch fixes the issue again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow MapAddress .exit even if AllowDotExit is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3940: Allow MapAddress .exit even if AllowDotExit is 0
---+
 Reporter:  sjmurdoch  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.2.32
 Severity: | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
---+
Changes (by fuzzyTew):

 * Attachment "regression.patch" added.

 remnove check with false assumption

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25055 [Core Tor/Tor]: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25055: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  IPv6 IPv4 tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:9 teor]:
 > 1. If it is a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address, it is not a hostname

 I don't understand why we're making this complicated.

 This string_is_valid_hostname() thing is only used in our socks handshake,
 right?

 If we define hostname to be "anything that is a valid destination", then
 everything becomes simple, right?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16934 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: youtube-dl (recent), torsocks 2.1.0 and TBB5+ failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16934: youtube-dl (recent), torsocks 2.1.0 and TBB5+ failure
---+--
 Reporter:  sponville  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by fuzzyTew):

 I'm having a comparable issue using MapAddress .exit hosts in torrc .  I
 can't curl them with torsocks, because torsocks gives the 'Resolve
 destination buffer too small' error when a domain resolves to an ipv6
 address, and tor defaults to creating ipv6 automap addresses.

 torsocks should either be upgraded to support ipv6 domain resolution, or
 tor should default to NoPreferIPv6Automap for SocksPort entries, so that
 it will interoperate with torsocks when installed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25292 [Internal Services]: Tor 7.5 brakes Session Manager again...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25292: Tor 7.5 brakes Session Manager again...
---+--
 Reporter:  obiwandb   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Tor 7.5 brakes Session Manager again. Not menu item or button.

 See https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21396

 David

 PS: why no high number versions in pull-downs?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I have created an issue for The Onion Box and a pull request to fix the
 links there:

 https://github.com/ralphwetzel/theonionbox/issues/42
 https://github.com/ralphwetzel/theonionbox/pull/43

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25132 [Core Tor]: Add uptime messages to control protocol GETINFO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25132: Add uptime messages to control protocol GETINFO
---+---
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control protocol, GETINFO, uptime  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by atagar):

 Sounds good, glad you figured this out! I don't have an opinion on the tor
 addition either way, I just chimed in since you were using stem. :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.2 rejects connections to raw ipv6 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25036: Tor 0.3.2 rejects connections to raw ipv6 addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, ipv6, 032-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  033-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Review in #25055.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25055 [Core Tor/Tor]: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25055: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  IPv6 IPv4 tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 I just read RFC 1123 Section 2.1.
 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1123#page-13

 I was wrong, it doesn't say that the TLD must be alphabetical:
 {{{
// Last label of a hostname is required to be alphabetic according to
// RFC 1123 Section 2.1.
 }}}

 Instead, it says:
 {{{
 The syntax of a legal Internet host name was specified in RFC-952
   [DNS:4].  One aspect of host name syntax is hereby changed: the
   restriction on the first character is relaxed to allow either a
   letter or a digit.  Host software MUST support this more liberal
   syntax.

 ...

   Whenever a user inputs the identity of an Internet host, it SHOULD
   be possible to enter either (1) a host domain name or (2) an IP
   address in dotted-decimal ("#.#.#.#") form.  The host SHOULD check
   the string syntactically for a dotted-decimal number before
   looking it up in the Domain Name System.
 }}}

 Therefore, rather than trying to detect punycode or alphabetical endings,
 let's use this logic:
 1. If it is a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address, it is not a hostname
 2. Otherwise, if it has alphanumeric, -, or `_`, in the right format, it
 is a hostname.

 Being lax makes Tor more future proof to domain name format changes.
 And it confirms to the RFC.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25289 [Core Tor/Stem]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25289: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283 | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25055 [Core Tor/Tor]: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25055: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  IPv6 IPv4 tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21425 [Core Tor/Tor]: entry_list_is_constrained() should look at the guard_selection_t object

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21425: entry_list_is_constrained() should look at the guard_selection_t object
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guards, 031-deferred-20170425,   |  Actual Points:
  review-group-18|
Parent ID:  #20822   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:23 asn]:
 > Hello people,
 >
 > two comments on the patch so that I understand a bit better what's going
 on because it's been a while and I'm a bit confuse:
 >
 > 1) What are we trying to achieve with this new
 `entry_list_is_constrained()` logic? Can someone explain to me why we
 consider the entry list constrained if it contains more than 50 guards,
 and why this logic makes sense given the way `entry_list_is_constrained()`
 is used in the rest of the code? I think this is a very important question
 and ideally we should have a clear and concise answer :)

 We check guards more aggressively when entry list is constrained,
 There's no point checking guards more aggressively if we have a lot of
 potential guards.
 We chose 50, because we want to make sure Tor Browser's obfs4 guard set is
 considered "constrained".

 Neel, please explain why we chose 50 in the comments in the patch.

 Replying to [ticket:21425 nickm]:
 > We use entry_list_is_constrained() in a few places to find out if our
 list of entry points is highly limited (e.g., to a few bridges or a few
 EntryNodes).  But it doesn't do that very well:  instead, it looks to see
 if EntryNodes is set or UseBridges is set.
 >
 > We have better ways: we should be looking at the size of the guard
 sample, or something.

 > > 2. If #1 is okay, which capacity size should
 {{{sampled_entry_guards}}} be to return 1? Right now, I am guessing 3
 guards. Should it be more? Less?
 >
 > If we want to consider Tor Browser bridge users constrained, the answer
 is around 10 or 20.
 > If not, the answer is around 3.

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > There are 27 obfs4 bridges in Tor Browser at the moment:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/projects/tor-browser/Bundle-Data/PTConfigs/bridge_prefs.js
 > The other bridge types have 1-5 bridges.
 >
 > So let's set the limit to 50 or 100?

 > 2) Why are we using the `capacity` field of a smartlist? We should
 (almost) never dig into the guts of smartlists. If we want to check the
 current number of sampled guards we should use `smartlist_len()`. Is that
 we are trying to do here?

 I asked for this change already, but I forgot to check that it had
 happened:

 Replying to [comment:15 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 neel]:
 > > 1. Is checking the capacity of {{{sampled_entry_guards}}} from the
 {{{guard_selection_t}}} object okay for this patch?
 >
 > Checking the current size of sampled entry guards is ok.
 > (The capacity of a smartlist is the size it can grow to without
 allocating additional memory.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.2 rejects connections to raw ipv6 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25036: Tor 0.3.2 rejects connections to raw ipv6 addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, ipv6, 032-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  033-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25055 [Core Tor/Tor]: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25055: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  IPv6 IPv4 tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25055 [Core Tor/Tor]: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25055: string_is_valid_hostname() returns true for IPv4 addresses
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  IPv6 IPv4 tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by rl1987):

 I believe the above is addressed now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25291 [Core Tor/Tor]: get rid of redundant should_record_bridge_info() call in options_act()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25291: get rid of redundant should_record_bridge_info() call in options_act()
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In options_act() we have
 {{{
 if ((!old_options || !old_options->EntryStatistics) &&
 options->EntryStatistics && !should_record_bridge_info(options)) {
 }}}

 But right above that we have
 {{{
 /* Only collect other relay-only statistics on relays. */
 if (!public_server_mode(options)) {
   options->CellStatistics = 0;
   options->EntryStatistics = 0;
 }}}

 So the only way EntryStatistics could be non-zero at that lower point is
 if public_server_mode() is true.

 So the check to !should_record_bridge_info() will always be true, and is
 redundant to check.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25290 [Core Tor/Tor]: refactor to use should_record_bridge_info() more

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25290: refactor to use should_record_bridge_info() more
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We have this function
 {{{should_record_bridge_info}}}
 which simply checks
 {{{options->BridgeRelay && options->BridgeRecordUsageByCountry}}}.

 But in geoip_note_client_seen(), where we just added the DoS mitigation
 stuff, we don't use the function, instead choosing to check the variables
 directly. We make the same choice in the options_need_geoip_info()
 function.

 We should refactor things so we use the function in all cases.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21425 [Core Tor/Tor]: entry_list_is_constrained() should look at the guard_selection_t object

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21425: entry_list_is_constrained() should look at the guard_selection_t object
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guards, 031-deferred-20170425,   |  Actual Points:
  review-group-18|
Parent ID:  #20822   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hello people,

 two comments on the patch so that I understand a bit better what's going
 on because it's been a while and I'm a bit confuse:

 1) What are we trying to achieve with this new
 `entry_list_is_constrained()` logic? Can someone explain to me why we
 consider the entry list constrained if it contains more than 50 guards,
 and why this logic makes sense given the way `entry_list_is_constrained()`
 is used in the rest of the code? I think this is a very important question
 and ideally we should have a clear and concise answer :)

 2) Why are we using the `capacity` field of a smartlist? We should
 (almost) never dig into the guts of smartlists. If we want to check the
 current number of sampled guards we should use `smartlist_len()`. Is that
 we are trying to do here?

 I'm marking this as `needs_revision` so that we get a good answer to (1)
 and address (2).

 Thanks for the code <3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24815: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, tor-ddos, 031-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  dgoulet => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24815: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, tor-ddos, 031-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
 > The bug is in get_state_valid_until_time():
 > {{{
 >   voting_interval = get_voting_interval();
 >   /* Find the time the current round started. */
 >   beginning_of_current_round = get_start_time_of_current_round();
 >
 >   /* Find how many rounds are left till the end of the protocol run */
 >   current_round = (now / voting_interval) % total_rounds;
 >   rounds_left = total_rounds - current_round;
 >
 >   /* To find the valid-until time now, take the start time of the
 current
 >* round and add to it the time it takes for the leftover rounds to
 >* complete. */
 >   valid_until = beginning_of_current_round + (rounds_left *
 voting_interval);
 > }}}
 >
 > If rounds_left is zero, then valid_until is beginning_of_current_round.

 Hmm that was a pretty good hypothesis. However, can `rounds_left` actually
 be 0? Due to the modulo in the `current_round` calculation, it's
 guaranteed that `current_round` will be between 0 and `total_rounds-1`, so
 `rounds_left` can never be 0.

 Pretty close, but I think the current bug argument won't work exactly as
 is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 Replying to [comment:14 cypherpunks]:
 > Someone should contact atagar to change the link mentioned here
 https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/to_russia_with_love.html

 I have created #25289 for stem and attached a patch to be reviewed there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25289 [Core Tor/Stem]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25289: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283 | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25289 [Core Tor/Stem]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25289: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283 | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "0001-Fixes-Relay-Search-URL-for-new-location-
 Fixes-25289.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25289 [Core Tor/Stem]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25289: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #25283
   Points: |   Reviewer:  atagar
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 atlas.torproject.org is now metrics.torproject.org/rs.html

 There is only one reference found and it's in a comment of an example, but
 it should probably still be fixed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 >
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/MetricsTeam/RelaySearch

 This is now updated.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I have created #25288 for Consensus Health and attached a patch to be
 reviewed there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Someone should contact atagar to change the link mentioned here
 https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/to_russia_with_love.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25288 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25288: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283| Points:
 Reviewer:  tom   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 The above patch updates the name and URLs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25288 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25288: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283| Points:
 Reviewer:  tom   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "0001-Updates-Relay-Search-name-and-URLs-for-new-
 location-.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25288 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25288: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25283
   Points:|   Reviewer:  tom
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This is referenced from the HTML.

 The old URLs look like:

 ​https://atlas.torproject.org/#

 The new URLs look like:

 ​https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/MetricsTeam/RelaySearch

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 Replying to [comment:8 cypherpunks]:
 > It might be more difficult to remove it from this one 
 https://blog.torproject.org/atlas-recent-improvements

 I would be inclined to not update the blog posts and instead just write
 new blog posts about cool new things instead, like after #23509 is
 implemented for example. I'm not sure how many people are reading the
 older blog posts but I imagine it tails off after a while.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > Don't forget to take it down from this list
 https://onion.torproject.org/

 This would happen automatically when the service is retired.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Don't forget to take it down from this list https://onion.torproject.org/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I have created an issue for Tor Map and a pull request to fix the links
 there:

 https://github.com/kargig/tormap/issues/6
 https://github.com/kargig/tormap/pull/7

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It might be more difficult to remove it from this one 
 https://blog.torproject.org/atlas-recent-improvements

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I have created an issue for DuckDuckGo and a pull request to fix the
 module there:

 https://github.com/duckduckgo/zeroclickinfo-spice/issues/3491
 https://github.com/duckduckgo/zeroclickinfo-spice/pull/3492

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25287 [Metrics/Website]: update URL for TorDNSEL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25287: update URL for TorDNSEL
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html#exit-lists

 links to
 https://dist.torproject.org/tordnsel/
 which has a version from 2007

 lets replace the url with (from 2016-05-04):
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tordnsel.git/tree/README

 link Tor check to
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/check.git

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I have created #25286 for torproject.org webwml and attached a patch to be
 reviewed there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25286 [Webpages/Website]: Relay Search has moved to the Metrics portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25286: Relay Search has moved to the Metrics portal
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://people.torproject.org/~irl/volatile/0001-Updates-all-Relay-Search-
 URLs-to-new-location-Fixes-.patch

 (sha256: cd2bb5502195cdaa1f2755eeb4a084bf9950e2b22e143bbcd451a2558be6fe7c)

 It wasn't possible to attach as there were too many URLs in it to pass the
 spam filter. This updates all references to the old atlas.tpo URL to the
 new URL at the Metrics portal.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25286 [Webpages/Website]: Relay Search has moved to the Metrics portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25286: Relay Search has moved to the Metrics portal
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25283
   Points:|   Reviewer:  hiro
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The old URLs look like:

 ​https://atlas.torproject.org/#

 The new URLs look like:

 ​https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25273 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor browser 7.5 fails to download due to silent filename-too-long errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25273: tor browser 7.5 fails to download due to silent filename-too-long errors
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Not the OP, but for completeness' sake here's what happens with 52ESR on
 Windows 7 (This seems to be specific to Unix systems but I don't have one
 handy currently to test it out):

 
[[Image(https://web.archive.org/web/20180217133043if_/https://imgoat.com/uploads/7e1249ffc0/86064.png)]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 tpo is another place that links to atlas.tpo

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25285 [Applications/Tor Check]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25285: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283  | Points:
 Reviewer:  arlolra |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * reviewer:   => arlolra


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by irl):

 I have created #25285 for check.tpo and attached a patch to be reviewed
 there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25285 [Applications/Tor Check]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25285: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 The above patch fixes the name and URL in the HTML template.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25285 [Applications/Tor Check]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25285: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25283  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "0001-Updates-URL-and-name-for-Relay-Search-
 Fixes-25285.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25285 [Applications/Tor Check]: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25285: Atlas is now called Relay Search and it has a new URL
+--
 Reporter:  irl |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #25283
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 This is referenced from the HTML sent to clients when visiting
 check.torproject.org.

 The old URLs look like:

 https://atlas.torproject.org/#

 The new URLs look like:

 https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6236 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove duplicate code between parse_{c, s}method_line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6236: Remove duplicate code between parse_{c,s}method_line
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client easy refactor duplicate-  |  Actual Points:
  code   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:10 fristonio]:
 > For this, I was thinking of wrapping up the common functionalities of
 the two methods into a single function which can then be used by both of
 them to carry on parsing the line. Is this a good way to go or should I
 think of some other way to merge them?

 Yes indeed fristonio. That's the logic.

 Here are the things that I would try to united between those two
 functions:

 a) method_name parsing and validation
 b) addrport parsing and validation
 c) `transport_new` and adding it to `mp->transports`.

 Try to keep it simple :)

 Good luck :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25273 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor browser 7.5 fails to download due to silent filename-too-long errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25273: tor browser 7.5 fails to download due to silent filename-too-long errors
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Can you reproduce this issue in Firefox 52ESR, or is it specific to Tor
 Browser ?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25161 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Fix another memory problem with the webstats bulk import

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25161: Fix another memory problem with the webstats bulk import
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Great! I'll start processing files next Tuesday or Wednesday.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25283 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25283: Decide when we can turn off atlas.torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 check.tpo is another place that links to atlas.tpo

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25161 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Fix another memory problem with the webstats bulk import

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25161: Fix another memory problem with the webstats bulk import
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * owner:  iwakeh => karsten
 * status:  accepted => assigned


Comment:

 Providing plenty of RAM for the import shortens the processing time quite
 a bit due to less GC time.  The 85min using 16G for the entire available
 archives of meronense and weschniakowii together (reported
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25100#comment:18 here])
 reduce to just 65 min with 30G (of which only 22G were actually used at
 peak time, 10G most of the time).  Of course, timing depends highly on
 available cores (here only four were available) and lesser the type of
 cpu.

 If a machine with 64G is available for import it can just be run on the
 entire 'out' folder of webstats.tp.o and should be fine with 48-56G
 (assuming that weschniakowii represents one of the hosts with the heavier
 log load).
 In case the import gets interrupted the logs will clearly indicate which
 hosts were processed successfully.  This should be used to move the
 already completed imports out of the import directory to save processing
 time.  No problem if that is forgotten, CollecTor won't re-add or
 overwrite anything, but the additional scanning might take longer than
 without.

 Collector properties should be set to single run and have limits turned
 off for importing the already existing sanitized logs.

 I used metrics-lib commit 9f2db9a19 and collector commit 06d1a81d4 and
 performed some manual checks that the resulting sanitized logs stay the
 same except for the intended changes (e.g. removal of '?' etc.).  All
 seemed fine.

 Assigning to 'karsten' as the import seems ready to go.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24101 [Metrics/Bot]: Provide percentages not just absolute numbers for country and AS information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24101: Provide percentages not just absolute numbers for country and AS
information
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Bot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:6 irl]:
 > So there's a question for karsten:
 >
 > Was #13673 motivated by no one using the field or was it too much to
 have this in Onionoo? The Onionoo client implementation in metrics-bot
 could synthesise this field if needed, but it would be a hack to do it
 there.

 Its computation was pretty complex. See the summary of #13673 for details.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs