Re: [tor-bugs] #1367 [Applications/Torbutton]: Implementation of URL filters for search queries via any FF search plugin (based on task #1304)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1367: Implementation of URL filters for search queries via any FF search plugin
(based on task #1304)
+--
 Reporter:  MrSpock |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => user disappeared


Comment:

 No further information from the user.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1347 [Applications/Torbutton]: 'Test Settings' button uses saved settings, not displayed settings.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1347: 'Test Settings' button uses saved settings, not displayed settings.
+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.4
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't test settings in a Torbutton menu anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23605 [Core Tor/Tor]: BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=80 is a lie

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23605: BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=80 is a lie
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew tor-guard   |  Actual Points:
  usability ux s8-errors |
Parent ID:  #22266   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23521 [Core Tor/Tor]: detect if clock skew is probably really time zone misconfiguration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23521: detect if clock skew is probably really time zone misconfiguration
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew ux s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew ux => bootstrap clock-skew ux s8-errors


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Re: [tor-bugs] #1334 [Applications/Torbutton]: Split update option into 3 prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1334: Split update option into 3 prefs
+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.4
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Updates are done now over the Tor Browser updater.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1283 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton should disable JS event handlers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1283: Torbutton should disable JS event handlers
+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.4
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1224 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton Disables Clear Fields

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1224: Torbutton Disables Clear Fields
+
 Reporter:  lnxusr  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.3
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => worksforme


Comment:

 That extension seems to be non-functional, so nothing to do here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24485 [- Select a component]: Maybe found a Bad exit?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24485: Maybe found a Bad exit?
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 The "secure connection failed" error is sometimes due to kapersky
 antivirus (#25333), and sometimes due to old SSL implementations on the
 remote website, for example, www.torproject.org (#25354).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23677: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)
---+---
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew ux s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew ux => bootstrap clock-skew ux s8-errors


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Re: [tor-bugs] #1159 [Applications/Torbutton]: Changing Tor proxy settings seems to require FF restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1159: Changing Tor proxy settings seems to require FF restart
+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.2
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> When Tor proxy settings are changed in Firefox 3.5, for some reason they
> don't seem to apply until a
> firefox restart happens. Could be a firefox bug. Or could be ours.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 When Tor proxy settings are changed in Firefox 3.5, for some reason they
 don't seem to apply until a
 firefox restart happens. Could be a firefox bug. Or could be ours.

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 No need for changing proxy settings anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1047 [Applications/Torbutton]: Other Addons are overriding Torbutton-Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1047: Other Addons are overriding Torbutton-Settings
+--
 Reporter:  MrSpock |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> I realized that some other Addons (e. g. User Agent Switcher, RefControl
> etc.) are overwriting Torbutton's settings while surfing.
> Would be great if Torbutton could prevent other Addons from overwriting
> Torbutton's settings (maybe Torbutton must de-activate (all) other Addons
> while surfing anonymous if there's no other way to give Prio 1 to
> Torbuttons settings).
>
> I have just tested 2 more or less "uncritical" Addons. But maybe there a
> other Addons that could cause critical overrides in Torbutton.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 I realized that some other Addons (e. g. User Agent Switcher, RefControl
 etc.) are overwriting Torbutton's settings while surfing.
 Would be great if Torbutton could prevent other Addons from overwriting
 Torbutton's settings (maybe Torbutton must de-activate (all) other Addons
 while surfing anonymous if there's no other way to give Prio 1 to
 Torbuttons settings).

 I have just tested 2 more or less "uncritical" Addons. But maybe there a
 other Addons that could cause critical overrides in Torbutton.

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 We won't defend against other add-ons installed by the user which are
 overriding security/privacy-related settings. Don't install those
 extensions in the first place.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1030 [Applications/Torbutton]: Customizable Tor statusbar text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1030: Customizable Tor statusbar text
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 The statusbar is gone long ago and won't get resurrected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1020 [Applications/Torbutton]: Report changes to browser spoofing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1020: Report changes to browser spoofing
+--
 Reporter:  downie  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => worksforme


Old description:

> Hi,
> I'm very happy with Torbutton.
> However I only just noticed that 'Torbutton now presents itself as
> Windows FF3.0.7'
> My own fault for not reading right to the end of the release notes.
> I spoof the user-agent in other utilities that use Tor (wget etc) so I
> synchronise to Torbutton's setting.
> Could you announce any future changes more prominently please?
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 Hi,
 I'm very happy with Torbutton.
 However I only just noticed that 'Torbutton now presents itself as Windows
 FF3.0.7'
 My own fault for not reading right to the end of the release notes.
 I spoof the user-agent in other utilities that use Tor (wget etc) so I
 synchronise to Torbutton's setting.
 Could you announce any future changes more prominently please?

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 The UA is not spoofed in Torbutton anymore but in Tor Browser now and
 happens with every major Firefox version bump. One sees it in the
 Changelog that accompanies the release and is visible on the blog.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #992 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton reset toolbar's settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#992: Torbutton reset toolbar's settings
+--
 Reporter:  scaler  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #990 [Applications/Torbutton]: Option for Warning dialog(s) to "remember this and don't ask me again until this preference changes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#990: Option for Warning dialog(s) to "remember this and don't ask me again 
until
this preference changes"
+--
 Reporter:  zed |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #989 [Applications/Torbutton]: Proxy-excluded urls should be excluded from Torbutton's manipulations.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#989: Proxy-excluded urls should be excluded from Torbutton's manipulations.
+--
 Reporter:  zed |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> When Torbutton's state is toggled in Firefox, it locks down page
> interaction and
> forces the user to reload the page manually. This includes urls that have
> been excluded from the proxy in Firefox's advanced network configuration
> settings.
>
> It would be helpful if Torbutton respected proxy-excluded urls and left
> their
> state alone.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 When Torbutton's state is toggled in Firefox, it locks down page
 interaction and
 forces the user to reload the page manually. This includes urls that have
 been excluded from the proxy in Firefox's advanced network configuration
 settings.

 It would be helpful if Torbutton respected proxy-excluded urls and left
 their
 state alone.

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Toggle bugs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24485 [- Select a component]: Maybe found a Bad exit?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24485: Maybe found a Bad exit?
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [ticket:24485 cypherpunks]:
 > Liberia 197.231.221.211 with https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/ always
 returns a "Secure Connection Failed"
 >
 > (Sorry for putting it in the bugtracker, I don't know of any email
 service that allows Tor users and I don't think disposable mail service
 would be accepted in the bad-tor relays mail list)
 195.154.105.205 has the same problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25461 [Core Tor/Tor]: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25461: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times
--+
 Reporter:  Dhalgren  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => regression?, performance
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25460 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: trac uses recaptcha v1 - which will be turned off on 2018-03-31

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25460: trac uses recaptcha v1 - which will be turned off on 2018-03-31
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * cc: hiro (added)
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 We need to upgrade the CAPTCHA plugin by the end of March 2018, or it will
 stop working.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25380 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transparent proxy not working with linux kernel 4.15.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25380: Transparent proxy not working with linux kernel 4.15.6
-+-
 Reporter:  vafan|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-must, hang, 032-backport, 031|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, 025   |
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by FlinchX):

 A few additional details here
 https://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/slackware-14/address-already-in-
 use-errors-when-trying-to-restart-tor-4175624554/page2.html#post5829281

 kernel 4.4.118 but tor being replaced with another transparent proxy -
 tinyproxy - which worked fine

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25461 [Core Tor/Tor]: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25461: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times
--+
 Reporter:  Dhalgren  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Dhalgren):

 * Attachment "logfile.00.hist.txt" added.

 function call histogram of 30% nominal cpu interval

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25461 [Core Tor/Tor]: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25461: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times
--+
 Reporter:  Dhalgren  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Dhalgren):

 * Attachment "logfile.03.hist.txt" added.

 function call histogram of 100% cpu interval

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[tor-bugs] #25461 [Core Tor/Tor]: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25461: main event-loop spins consuming 100% of a CPU core at times
--+
 Reporter:  Dhalgren  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Lately have observed my exit hitting 100% cpu on the main even-loop
 thread, sometimes continuously, sometimes cyclically.  Captured full-debug
 of recent cyclical event where CPU started at 30% and rose to 100%, for
 about one cycle.  Chopped the 1G log into eight slices and took a simple
 function call-count histogram.  What's notable is not an increase of calls
 during saturation, but a reduction of several that seem to relate to
 connection close events (conn_close_if_marked, flush_chunk).  Left column
 is for the first slice where CPU was 30%, right column is for fourth slice
 where cpu was 100%.  Functions with less than 1000 calls not included
 below, but complete histograms attached.  Wrote about this on tor-relays:

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-March/014730.html

 This might be an attack of some kind, or perhaps a misbehavior related to
 the KIST scheduler.

 {{{
 append_cell_to_circuit_queue 6787
 append_cell_to_circuit_queue 7280
 channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit 6781
 channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit 7190
 channel_process_cell 11904channel_process_cell
 11813
 channel_write_packed_cell 120301
 channel_write_packed_cell 126330
 channel_write_to_kernel 8588  channel_write_to_kernel
 10048
 circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading 146965
 circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading 152665
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl 14128
 circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl 13468
 circuit_receive_relay_cell 11483
 circuit_receive_relay_cell 11341
 circuit_resume_edge_reading 1203
 circuit_resume_edge_reading 1231
 conn_close_if_marked 39033conn_close_if_marked 779
 conn_read_callback 14743  conn_read_callback 15645
 conn_write_callback 4531  conn_write_callback 4447
 connection_add_impl 1023  connection_add_impl 739
 connection_bucket_refill_helper 14787
 connection_bucket_refill_helper 15842
 connection_buf_read_from_socket 16196
 connection_buf_read_from_socket 17152
 connection_connect 1016   connection_connect 732
 connection_connect_sockaddr 1016
 connection_connect_sockaddr 732
 connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf 237303
 connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf 255347
 connection_edge_process_relay_cell 22219
 connection_edge_process_relay_cell 22332
 connection_exit_begin_conn 3165
 connection_exit_begin_conn 2315
 connection_exit_connect 1050  connection_exit_connect
 772
 connection_handle_write_impl 9240
 connection_handle_write_impl 10539
 connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf 20042
 connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf 20448
 flush_chunk 38192 flush_chunk 12
 flush_chunk_tls 22283 flush_chunk_tls 24061
 free_outbuf_info_by_ent 8588  free_outbuf_info_by_ent
 10047
 outbuf_table_add 8588 outbuf_table_add 10014
 read_to_chunk 6856read_to_chunk 7254
 relay_lookup_conn 8459relay_lookup_conn 8525
 relay_send_command_from_edge_ 119963
 relay_send_command_from_edge_ 128738
 rep_hist_note_exit_bytes 13913rep_hist_note_exit_bytes
 14534
 scheduler_set_channel_state 126896
 scheduler_set_channel_state 133353
 update_socket_info 6719   update_socket_info 7160
 update_socket_written 120297  update_socket_written
 126327
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #25460 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: trac uses recaptcha v1 - which will be turned off on 2018-03-31

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25460: trac uses recaptcha v1 - which will be turned off on 2018-03-31
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/docs/faq#what-happens-to-
 recaptcha-v1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19675 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19675: Merge Orfox patches into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:  #5709| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:19 gk]:
 > I am not overly thrilled to add .xpi files to our tree in commit
 4553e490317622677475d0d63ba169074df2f085, especially as they are outdated
 (there is HTTPS-E 5.2.21 available instead of 5.2.20 if the requirement is
 a non-WebExtension Add-On). But I guess we can iterate from that. :)

 Yes, I can follow up with a new ticket for updating these.

 >
 > Could you provide an updated branch without
 b27b64b540cd81a895a289e09d611a50255de3c1 as it does not seem to do
 anything?

 Sure thing, I pushed branch bug19675_orfox_patches_1 with that commit
 deleted
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug19675_orfox_patches_1

 For reference:
 {{{
 $ git status
 On branch bug19675_orfox_patches_1
 nothing to commit, working tree clean

 $ git diff bug19675_orfox_patches
 diff --git a/mobile/android/base/AndroidManifest.xml.in
 b/mobile/android/base/AndroidManifest.xml.in
 index 1d6730d13ff4..1aa50a08463d 100644
 --- a/mobile/android/base/AndroidManifest.xml.in
 +++ b/mobile/android/base/AndroidManifest.xml.in
 @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
   fileincluded here, so that they can be referenced by both APKs. -->
  #include FennecManifest_permissions.xml.in

 -
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19675#comment:20>
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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 @dcf I'm seeing 80-120sec interruptions at times following your change
 (it's definitely noticeable), looking at the snowflake.log at around the
 intervals in which it happens I found this,

 {{{
 10:54 WebRTC: Collecting a new Snowflake. Currently at [0/1]
 10:54 snowflake-  connecting...
 10:54 WebRTC: PeerConnection created.
 10:54 WebRTC: OnNegotiationNeeded
 10:54 WebRTC: DataChannel created.
 .
 .
 .
 11:10  Handler: snowflake assigned 
 11:10 Buffered xxx bytes --> WebRTC
 11:10 WebRTC: DataChannel.OnOpen
 11:10 Flushed xxx bytes.
 11:10 Traffic Bytes (in|out): xxx | xx -- (1 OnMessages, 1 Sends)
 11:17 Traffic Bytes (in|out): x | x -- (35 OnMessages, 28 Sends)
 11:20 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 11:30 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 11:40 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 11:42 Traffic Bytes (in|out):  |  -- (1 OnMessages, 1 Sends)
 11:50 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 12:00 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 12:10 WebRTC: At capacity [1/1]  Retrying in 10 seconds...
 12:13 WebRTC: No messages received for 30 seconds -- closing stale
 connection.
 12:13 WebRTC: closing DataChannel
 12:13 WebRTC: DataChannel.OnClose [locally]
 12:13 WebRTC: closing PeerConnection
 12:13 WebRTC: Closing
 12:13 copy loop ended
 12:13  Handler: closed ---
 12:13 SOCKS listening...
 12:14 SOCKS accepted:  {0.0.3.0:1  map[]}
 12:18 Traffic Bytes (in|out): 0 | x -- (0 OnMessages, 23 Sends)
 12:20 WebRTC: Collecting a new Snowflake. Currently at [0/1]
 12:20 snowflake-  connecting...
 12:20 WebRTC: PeerConnection created.
 12:20 WebRTC: OnNegotiationNeeded
 12:20 WebRTC: DataChannel created.
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #25459 [Metrics/Analysis]: Compare total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25459: Compare total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We were talking today about how to compare bandwidth authorities, and make
 sure that different implementations are producing similar figures.

 One easy way to compare bandwidth authority implementations is to compare
 their total bandwidth weights.

 For example, this is the total bandwidth weight in the consensus:
 {{{
 $ cat Library/Application\ Support/TorBrowser-Data/Tor/cached-microdesc-
 consensus | grep "^w" | cut -d= -f2 | grep -v Unmeasured | paste -s -d + -
 | bc
 43763163
 }}}

 Do you think we can do a graph of total bandwidth weight for votes?
 Should this go somewhere on metrics?
 Or should it be a once-off thing that Tom (or someone else) does?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #963 [Applications/Torbutton]: Allow caching as an option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#963: Allow caching as an option
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #986 [Applications/Torbutton]: Activating Torbutton in Select Tabs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#986: Activating Torbutton in Select Tabs
+--
 Reporter:  Oxwil   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Torbutton: 1.2.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> Whenever Torbutton is activated, the whole Firefox session is gripped
> under the tight reign of the Tor network. Some users may want use Tor on
> particular sites where their privacy is important, but continue browsing
> the other sites normally. Or simply because it is slower than normal
> connections, they might want to limit it to the particular sites or
> connections where anonymity is prioritized.
>
> I propose an option which allows the user to activate Torbutton only in
> tabs or windows they want access using the Tor network. Simply by
> directing the connection of the Torbutton activated tabs to the Tor
> software, the user can enjoy normal connection beside it.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 Whenever Torbutton is activated, the whole Firefox session is gripped
 under the tight reign of the Tor network. Some users may want use Tor on
 particular sites where their privacy is important, but continue browsing
 the other sites normally. Or simply because it is slower than normal
 connections, they might want to limit it to the particular sites or
 connections where anonymity is prioritized.

 I propose an option which allows the user to activate Torbutton only in
 tabs or windows they want access using the Tor network. Simply by
 directing the connection of the Torbutton activated tabs to the Tor
 software, the user can enjoy normal connection beside it.

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #935 [Applications/Torbutton]: "Restore Defaults" clean up normal (non-tor) browser settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#935: "Restore Defaults" clean up normal (non-tor) browser settings
+-
 Reporter:  Shoorick|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.0
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #844 [Applications/Torbutton]: Removing torbutton does not remove about:config settings (was: Removing torbutton does not remove about:config settings )

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#844: Removing torbutton does not remove about:config settings
+--
 Reporter:  thomas  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.0rc5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> Firefox 3.0.3
> Torbutton 1.2.0
>
> Removing Torbutton using Add-ons dialog does not remove Torbutton
> settings.
>
> [1] http://preview.tinyurl.com/56oesx
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 Firefox 3.0.3
 Torbutton 1.2.0

 Removing Torbutton using Add-ons dialog does not remove Torbutton
 settings.

 [1] http://preview.tinyurl.com/56oesx

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Hard to say whether that's still an issue. But, anyway, we don't support
 removing Torbutton from Tor Browser, so WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #837 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton preferences toggled for unknown reason.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#837: Torbutton preferences toggled for unknown reason.
+--
 Reporter:  d-man97 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.2.0rc5
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> I have been doing much testing with Ubuntu 8.04, FF 3.0.3, and Torbutton
> 1.2.0.
> I went to test the close tor tabs on toggle feature, in order to write
> out a report for seeing two dialog boxes, directly
> after each another, warning me that I am about to close one tab
>
> But, nothing closed. So, I checked my Prefs, and MANY were toggled to
> various positions that I did not put them at.
> I had disabled/enable Torbutton several times and thought maybe they
> reset to default after enabling; however, they were
> not at the default settings. In fact, several "crucial" settings were
> turned off completely.
>
> This happened for an unknown reason, and I cannot figure out how ANYTHING
> would have changed them.
>
> Does Torbutton backup settings? Can I look somewhere for a history/log of
> Torbutton changes?
> Are there any known problems that would cause this?
>
> My settings, which I have had activated forever, are listed on
> http://bugs.noreply.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details=834
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 I have been doing much testing with Ubuntu 8.04, FF 3.0.3, and Torbutton
 1.2.0.
 I went to test the close tor tabs on toggle feature, in order to write out
 a report for seeing two dialog boxes, directly
 after each another, warning me that I am about to close one tab

 But, nothing closed. So, I checked my Prefs, and MANY were toggled to
 various positions that I did not put them at.
 I had disabled/enable Torbutton several times and thought maybe they reset
 to default after enabling; however, they were
 not at the default settings. In fact, several "crucial" settings were
 turned off completely.

 This happened for an unknown reason, and I cannot figure out how ANYTHING
 would have changed them.

 Does Torbutton backup settings? Can I look somewhere for a history/log of
 Torbutton changes?
 Are there any known problems that would cause this?

 My settings, which I have had activated forever, are listed on
 http://bugs.noreply.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details=834

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #645 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton Options Dialog "Blank" Fields when Browsing with Tor and Bittorrent plugin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#645: Torbutton Options Dialog "Blank" Fields when Browsing with Tor and
Bittorrent plugin
+-
 Reporter:  HANtwister  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  0.2.0.22-rc
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> NOTE: This appears to affect 0.2.0.23-rc; please correct the version
> number if/when possible.
>
> In 0.2.0.23-rc, if the user disables browsing with Tor and thereafter
> enables browsing with Tor, the fields in the Options Dialog for Torbutton
> will be blanked.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 NOTE: This appears to affect 0.2.0.23-rc; please correct the version
 number if/when possible.

 In 0.2.0.23-rc, if the user disables browsing with Tor and thereafter
 enables browsing with Tor, the fields in the Options Dialog for Torbutton
 will be blanked.

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #564 [Applications/Torbutton]: Implement correct status reporting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#564: Implement correct status reporting
+-
 Reporter:  squires |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  1.4
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #577 [Applications/Torbutton]: clear homepageurl, to prevent habitual clicking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#577: clear homepageurl, to prevent habitual clicking
+-
 Reporter:  itsme   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> often i find my self clicking by habit on my 'home' button. and from
> there by habit always clicking the same few links.
>
> i think this would be identifyable behaviour.
>
> so to protect the users from their own habits, it would good to clear the
> homepage url when tor is enabled.
>
> this can be done like this:
> m_prefs.setCharPref("browser.startup.homepage", "about:blank");
>

>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 often i find my self clicking by habit on my 'home' button. and from there
 by habit always clicking the same few links.

 i think this would be identifyable behaviour.

 so to protect the users from their own habits, it would good to clear the
 homepage url when tor is enabled.

 this can be done like this:
 m_prefs.setCharPref("browser.startup.homepage", "about:blank");



 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 proper]:
 > Can be closed?
 >
 > Non-Tor is no longer included and homepage is set to check.tpo.

 Yes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #578 [Applications/Torbutton]: add filter list to prevent habitual clicking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#578: add filter list to prevent habitual clicking
+-
 Reporter:  itsme   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> to prevent the tor user from habitually accessing sites he often visits,
> it would be nice to have a list of sites which will be blocked when using
> tor.
>
> i often find my self forgetting i still have tor enabled, when logging in
> to a forum with my own username.
>

> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 to prevent the tor user from habitually accessing sites he often visits,
 it would be nice to have a list of sites which will be blocked when using
 tor.

 i often find my self forgetting i still have tor enabled, when logging in
 to a forum with my own username.


 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Toggle bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #760 [Applications/Torbutton]: please add a README file to torbutton source

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#760: please add a README file to torbutton source
+-
 Reporter:  arno|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  1.1
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:  None => wontfix


Old description:

> Hi,
> torbutton new version adds a lot of security improvements. But, some of
> these improvements involve behaviour which might
> seem strange at first glance (for example, if you load a page without
> tor, switch to tor use, you cannot load a link from that page).
>
> Those strange behaviours are documented online at
> https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/#FAQ
>
> We plan to package torbutton for debian.
> In debian, software documentation is usually placed in a well known
> location (/usr/share/doc directory).
> So, when users encounter those strange behaviours, they will be likely to
> check for documentation in that location, instead of trying to get some
> documentation online.
> Therefore, we'd like to ship a FAQ or README file inside our package.
>
> So, if you ship a FAQ or README file as part of torbutton repository,
> that will make things easy for us.
>
> If that's a problem for you, we'll probably just dump
> https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/ to plain text.
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

New description:

 Hi,
 torbutton new version adds a lot of security improvements. But, some of
 these improvements involve behaviour which might
 seem strange at first glance (for example, if you load a page without tor,
 switch to tor use, you cannot load a link from that page).

 Those strange behaviours are documented online at
 https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/#FAQ

 We plan to package torbutton for debian.
 In debian, software documentation is usually placed in a well known
 location (/usr/share/doc directory).
 So, when users encounter those strange behaviours, they will be likely to
 check for documentation in that location, instead of trying to get some
 documentation online.
 Therefore, we'd like to ship a FAQ or README file inside our package.

 So, if you ship a FAQ or README file as part of torbutton repository, that
 will make things easy for us.

 If that's a problem for you, we'll probably just dump
 https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/ to plain text.

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: All]

--

Comment:

 Torbutton is nothing that is separate anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Automated rounding of content window dimensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14429: Automated rounding of content window dimensions
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:140 cypherpunks]:
 > I don't think automatic rounding is sufficient, it tends to give very
 high scores on panopticlick. I

 Don't use Panopticlick for that as its results are skewed, see #6119 for
 why. So, the high scores don't mean anytihng in the Tor Browser context.

 > think people should be prompted to choose between a few very common
 resolutions (1366x768, 1920x1080, etc) instead

 That is not going to fly as almost no user knows their screen resolution.
 And users might not even know the difference between 1366x768 and
 1920x1080. So, what I would expect is users coming back to us with things
 like "You broke Tor Browser on my computer as I can't see the URL bar
 domain anymore". That does not scale.

 > this will fit the needs of more users (who want to use tor browser on
 larger screens) while reducing identifying information - on a 1080p
 screen, there are 9 * 5 different sizes a tor browser window could be -
 take out the really tiny ones, and you're still left with a good 20 or 30
 possible sizes. Instead, you could just pick between the five or so most
 popular browser window sizes, as per
 https://hardware.metrics.mozilla.com/. you could even do both - on lower
 security levels, use automated rounding, on higher security levels, pick
 between only a few resolutions.

 No. The security slider is no privacy slider. Every user gets the same
 privacy features but users with a different threat model are given the
 option to adapt the security of their browser by choosing an appropriate
 level on the slider. We won't mix both.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hackers blocked Tor Browser Download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25457: Hackers blocked Tor Browser Download
--+---
 Reporter:  Shoshanna |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Nothing we can do in Tor Browser I think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15763 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Need whitelist entry for www.fark.com and total.fark.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15763: Need whitelist entry for www.fark.com and total.fark.com
-+-
 Reporter:  bit0mike |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  HTTPS-E next Chrome
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-|  release
  HTTPS Everywhere   |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hi, thanks a bunch for following up with this!

 Your almost complete switch to HTTPS does not eliminate for a rule in
 HTTPS Everywhere. HTTPS Everywhere still adds an additional protection
 against attacks such as SSLstrip. Also, as opposed to HSTS, it does not
 rely on a trust of first use scheme.

 The only equivalent protection would be to HSTS preload the entire domain
 but that's not an option here since you said that some subdomains
 don't/won't support HTTPS.

 The best move here would be for you to edit the ruleset yourself. Simply
 add a target for each subdomain that supports HTTPS. More information is
 available in our contributing guide: https://github.com/EFForg/https-
 everywhere/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md.

 Otherwise, I can edit this ruleset for you but it would simplify things a
 lot if you could provide me with a complete list of subdomains that
 support HTTPS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hackers blocked Tor Browser Download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25457: Hackers blocked Tor Browser Download
--+---
 Reporter:  Shoshanna |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


Comment:

 If you downloaded Tor Browser from torproject.org , and you have antivirus
 software installed, then the antivirus software is probably making a
 mistake with Tor Browser, and causing the issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25457 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hackers blocked Tor Browser Download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25457: Hackers blocked Tor Browser Download
--+--
 Reporter:  Shoshanna |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > I downloaded Tor

 From torproject.org?

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