Re: [tor-bugs] #25539 [Applications]: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25539: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download
--+--
 Reporter:  neptune2000   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


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[tor-bugs] #25541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor metrics says my relay has been off-line for a day but SSHing to it shows no problems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25541: Tor metrics  says my relay has been off-line for a day but SSHing to it
shows no problems
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Tor metrics  says my relay has been off-line for a day but SSHing to it
 shows no problems
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/5D86AFD7CE409251E67B373B4F0E780A0F41C944
  When I SSH  to the server it says I have no flags  even though NYX shows
 that it’s running

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25539 [Applications]: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25539: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download
--+--
 Reporter:  neptune2000   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Delete the tour browser data folder And
  Try restarting your Mac and re-opening tor browser 7.5.2
  If that does not work try the Alpha
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/8.0a4/TorBrowser-8.0a4-osx64_en-
 US.dmg

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21595 [Internal Services/Wiki]: Wiki start page anonymous wiki account information needs promotion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21595: Wiki start page anonymous wiki account information needs promotion
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Wiki   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  wiki contribute discover anonymous   |  Actual Points:
  account|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jaruga):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 The wiki is not official documentation. It is entirely based on the
 contributions of volunteers and therefore the Tor Project cannot
 authenticate the validity of any of the information provided within it.

 Closing this ticket.

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[tor-bugs] #25540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25540: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As per plan, the bubblewrap based experimental sandbox has essentially
 been abandoned.  Sometime prior to 8.0 sstable being available, automated
 builds (part of the alpha series) should stop, and binaries should be
 removed from the downloads page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25540: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by yawning:

Old description:

> As per plan, the bubblewrap based experimental sandbox has essentially
> been abandoned.  Sometime prior to 8.0 sstable being available, automated
> builds (part of the alpha series) should stop, and binaries should be
> removed from the downloads page.

New description:

 As per plan, the bubblewrap based experimental sandbox has essentially
 been abandoned.  Sometime prior to 8.0 stable being available, automated
 builds (part of the alpha series) should stop, and binaries should be
 removed from the downloads page.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25539 [Applications]: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25539: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download
--+--
 Reporter:  neptune2000   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neptune2000):

 * Attachment "Screen Shot 2018-03-18 at 6.03.03 PM.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25539 [Applications]: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25539: MacOS Tor fails to restart after new download
--+--
 Reporter:  neptune2000   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Blocker   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 lagtest download of 7.5.2 Tor will not restart.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reachability of fallback directory authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25534: Reachability of fallback directory authorities
-+
 Reporter:  anadahz  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability, tcp connect, ooni  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Terminology note: these are "fallback directories", not "fallback
 directory authorities".

 Should this be an Ooni ticket? It doesn't seem to be something we can
 address in Core Tor...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21246 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Remove google recaptha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21246: Remove google recaptha
--+
 Reporter:  scootergrisen |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 see #24676

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24676 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Use selfhost captcha and do not rely on google captcha API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24676: Use selfhost captcha and do not rely on google captcha API
--+
 Reporter:  stupidregistration|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I changed the CAPTCHA to Expressions. This now prints a formula in words
 (seven plus one …) and asks for the solution. I'll have a look how this
 works against spammers and if regular people are still able to register.

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[tor-bugs] #25538 [Core Tor/Tor]: TLS reachability of directory authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25538: TLS reachability of directory authorities
--+-
 Reporter:  anadahz   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  reachability, tls, ooni
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This ticket is about testing the TLS reachability of directory authorities
 (including the fallback).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: irl (removed)
 * cc: metrics-team (added)


Comment:

 karsten, iwakeh - Please see comment:4, I forgot to add metrics-team back
 to CC when taking the ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25518 [Metrics/Relay Search]: RS fails to display bw graphs for relays where onionoo provides 3_days level and not 1_month level data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25518: RS fails to display bw graphs for relays where onionoo provides 3_days
level and not 1_month level data
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => irl


Comment:

 Moving into my queue. I suspect I know what is happening here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25264 [Metrics/Website]: Decide what graph to display when there's no data to graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25264: Decide what graph to display when there's no data to graph
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * Attachment "nodata.png" added.

 Style guide compliant no data available image

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25264 [Metrics/Website]: Decide what graph to display when there's no data to graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25264: Decide what graph to display when there's no data to graph
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 "No Data Available" should be consistent. This should follow the Style
 Guide too.

 Relay Search currently does not follow the Style Guide:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/rs/img/no-data-available.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 Done a little hacking on this, I think my plan looks like:

 * Add a formatAsFeedItem method to `org.torproject.metrics.web.News`
 * Point the resource `/feed.xml` at `NewsServlet`
 * Add a JSP named `feed.jsp`, which is used instead of `news.jsp` to
 render the feed version
 * Implement only ATOM (RFC4287), not RSS, as ATOM has far better support
 for internationalisation that may be used later, where internationalising
 RSS may hold back that work

 This would be the way to do it to match the way the news page is currently
 built. I do wonder though if perhaps we should instead refactor the way
 the news page works:

 * Remove the formatAsTableRow method from
 `org.torproject.metrics.web.News`
 * Make getters for `org.torproject.metrics.news.News` public
 * Re-implement formatAsTableRow using JSTL in `news.jsp`
 * Point the resource `/feed.xml` at `NewsServlet`
 * Add a `feed.jsp` using JSTL

 We definitely do not need to add ROME, or a similar library, at least for
 now. As an example to get an idea, the RSS 0.91 hacky JSP (where I made
 getDescription public so that it could be available):

 {{{
 <%@ page contentType="text/xml" %>
 <%@ taglib prefix="c" uri="http://java.sun.com/jsp/jstl/core; %>
 <%@ taglib prefix="fn" uri="http://java.sun.com/jsp/jstl/functions; %>
 
 
 Tor Metrics - News
 https://metrics.torproject.org/
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 }}}

 karsten, iwakeh - Which approach do you think would be best?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25470 [Applications/Tor Check]: https://check.torproject.org Atlas link gives me a error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25470: https://check.torproject.org Atlas link gives me a error
+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #25285 (which also has a patch on it waiting for
 review).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25491 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Package lektor for Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25491: Package lektor for Debian
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: hiro (removed)
 * cc: irl (added)
 * owner:  irl => hiro


Comment:

 Debian bug is https://bugs.debian.org/892901.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => irl


Comment:

 Moving into my queue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25057 [Community/Tor Support]: Warn Tor users about how to use Bitcoin over Tor, using blog and official twitter.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25057: Warn Tor users about how to use Bitcoin over Tor, using blog and 
official
twitter.
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  Jaruga
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by Jaruga):

 * owner:  phoul => Jaruga
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 That is an interesting idea. While I cannot speak to anything regarding
 the blog or the official Twitter, I will certainly look into creating a
 page on the wiki that touches on these topics. Perhaps it can be used as a
 reference if such a thing did occur.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25458 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI customization half-broken in Tor Browser 8.0a3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25458: UI customization half-broken in Tor Browser 8.0a3
-+-
 Reporter:  viktorj  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:  #25147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Yeah, I can reproduce it now with a fresh clean install of Tor Browser
 8.0a4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in assert_connection_ok when changing Exit options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25245: Crash in assert_connection_ok when changing Exit options
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, regression?, tor-exit, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  relay, ipv6|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by rl1987):

 I figure this happens because we do not properly cleanup/close existing
 edge connections when `ExitRelay` is switched off. A solution would be to
 keep track of child connections that listeners spawn when `accept()`
 succeeds and close all of them when closing the listener.

 Something like:
 * https://github.com/rl1987/tor/compare/bug25245_hax?expand=1

 Does this make sense?

 If this is correct approach I could finalise the patch into mergeable
 shape.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6369 [Metrics/Analysis]: Gather empirical data on AES/RSA operations performed by typical relays or bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6369: Gather empirical data on AES/RSA operations performed by typical relays 
or
bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  nickm-cares   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: ioerror (removed)
 * cc: teor (added)


Comment:

 This may also be a good candidate for implementation using PrivCount.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25537 [Metrics/Ideas]: Integrate Tor BSD Diversity Project's statistics into Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25537: Integrate Tor BSD Diversity Project's statistics into Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 related (there are a lot of ideas for graphs on metrics.tpo based on
 cwfraction, guardprob, exit prob, ..)
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4943
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6856
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23509
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-October/012480.html

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[tor-bugs] #25537 [Metrics/Ideas]: Integrate Tor BSD Diversity Project's statistics into Tor Metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25537: Integrate Tor BSD Diversity Project's statistics into Tor Metrics
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 The Tor BSD Diversity Project (https://torbsd.org/) maintains some scripts
 to produce statistics about diversity in the Tor network. We should look
 to see if there are statistics here that are already handled by Tor
 Metrics or if there are analysis that we could be doing but currently
 we're not.

 I would see this as an "upstreaming" effort, that would increase the
 benefit that can be realised from the analyses by making them more easily
 discoverable and available to other groups (e.g. a potential future "Tor
 IRIX Diversity Project" should not have to duplicate this effort).

 https://github.com/torbsd/tdp-onion-stats contains the scripts that are
 currently used.

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[tor-bugs] #25536 [Internal Services/Schleuder]: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25536: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Schleuder  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 The tor-security@ list is set up using schleuder:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/emailLists#AdministrativeLists

 Generally people send mail to it unencrypted and unsigned, I guess because
 pgp is hard.

 When I reply to the mails, I've been manually pasting the original sender
 onto the To: address, and switching my reply from the default encrypted
 back to unencrypted so the mail can go to the original sender (I don't
 have their key after all). It looks like other people are following a
 similar pattern.

 But intrigeri tells me that there are secret directives you can give to
 schleuder, like x-resend, that might allow me to ask schleuder to handle
 the mail delivery:
 https://schleuder.nadir.org/docs/#using-a-list

 Should we be using that directive and then encrypting the mail to
 schleuder? Does it work? is there something better we should be doing?

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[tor-bugs] #25535 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: retire the valencia2016 list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25535: retire the valencia2016 list
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/valencia2016
 looks like it's still around.

 Now that we've migrated to a more fixed "tor-meeting" list that we reuse
 each time, we should get rid of the old lists for long past dev meetings.
 This one is a great one to get rid of.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17965 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Isolate HPKP and HSTS to url bar domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17965: Isolate HPKP and HSTS to url bar domain
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: Apple claims tracking via HSTS is seen in the wild and they have
 implemented an own defense: https://webkit.org/blog/8146/protecting-
 against-hsts-abuse/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25481: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803, GeorgKoppen201803|
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803. GeorgKoppen201803
 => tbb-rbm, boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803, GeorgKoppen201803


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25529 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor not reading torrc-defaults when started from command line, while it reads it successfully when started from Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25529: Tor not reading torrc-defaults when started from command line, while it
reads it successfully when started from Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  omareg94 |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torrc torrc-defaults defaults meek   |  Actual Points:
  tor-browser-bundle configuration bridge|
  pluggable-transports connection|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:12 omareg94]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > > By the way as far as I know the `meek` that you're seeing there has
 become more and more coupled to the Tor Browser, and for those who want to
 use `meek` the way to go would be to use `meek_lite` ...
 > \\
 > Yes the original meek used in my included log is exactly the same one (I
 thought it was something not widely used so I manipulated it in the
 included log to protect my privacy).

 They use the same front, same url. It's only the ''implementation'' that
 is different.

 > ● I don't get this, why something widely used like this can't be blocked
 by ISP?

 If they want to block it then they have to block all of cloudfront, making
 a lot of collateral damage that isn't a choice for some censors.

 > ● Also is it a security vulnerability to give many users the ''SAME
 MEEK''?

 It isn't by design.

 > ● Also what's the difference between `meek` & `meek_lite` and why to use
 it?

 `meek_lite` is a different implementation of the `meek` client. You should
 use it if you don't want to run the whole Tor Browser just to get the
 standard `meek` implementation going.

 > The only idea I have about meeks is that it's an
 [https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/fronting/meek-architecture.svg
 implementation of Domain Fronting]
 ([https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/fronting/ source]). It will really
 help if you could suggest something to read explaining this in order to
 figure out what's really a meek and why to use meek_lite not meek.

 I thought this had all the necessary info
 ​https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2017-December/043850.html
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25529 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor not reading torrc-defaults when started from command line, while it reads it successfully when started from Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25529: Tor not reading torrc-defaults when started from command line, while it
reads it successfully when started from Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  omareg94 |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torrc torrc-defaults defaults meek   |  Actual Points:
  tor-browser-bundle configuration bridge|
  pluggable-transports connection|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by omareg94):

 Replying to [comment:11 arma]:
 > Correct, I think the mistake here is that the hand-crafted command line
 didn't tell Tor to use that torrc-defaults file, so it doesn't use it.

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > {{{
 > "C:\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Tor\tor.exe" --defaults-torrc "C:\Tor
 Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc-defaults" -f "C:\Tor
 Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc" | more
 > }}}

 I thought Tor by default should have included the torrc-defaults without
 the command line option. So I thought it was a bug not being included.

 I think it's mentioned in the [https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-
 manual.html.en manual] that it loads by default (without adding the
 --defaults-torrc option):
 > --defaults-torrc FILE
 > ... (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults.)
 Please correct me if I'm wrong because I'm not sure what "Default:
 @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults" here really means.

 

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > By the way as far as I know the `meek` that you're seeing there has
 become more and more coupled to the Tor Browser, and for those who want to
 use `meek` the way to go would be to use `meek_lite` ...
 Yes the original meek used in my included log is exactly the same one (I
 thought it was something not widely used so I manipulated it in the
 included log to protect my privacy).
 ● I don't get this, why something widely used like this can't be blocked
 by ISP?
 ● Also is it a security vulnerability to give many users the ''SAME
 MEEK''?
 ● Also what's the difference between ''meek'' & ''meek_lite'' and why to
 use it?
 The only idea I have about meeks is that it's an
 [https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/fronting/meek-architecture.svg
 implementation of Domain Fronting]. It will really help if you could
 suggest something to read explaining this in order to figure out what's
 really a meek and why to use meek_lite not meek.

 > Note that it's a different implementation so the network fingerprint
 will surely not match that of the standard `meek` if I'm not mistaken.
 ● Also, I don't understand the importance of this and what's the problem
 of the standard `meek`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25467 [Applications/Tor Browser]: failing to read userChrome.css

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25467: failing to read userChrome.css
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Your process was correct. It would also be helpful to know what version
 of the TBB you are using, and for you to also test this process on the
 same Ff version I did, i.e. ESR 52.6.0.
 I was using 8.0a3. Will test on it later.

 > Side note: I'm not a he.
 I apologize, I corrected my comment.

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