Re: [tor-bugs] #25692 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25692: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must 033-backport regression |  Actual Points:
  chutney 034-included-20180403 033-maybe-must   |
Parent ID:  #25691   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:  dgoulet => dgoulet, teor
 * parent:   => #25691
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 We are working on this in #25691.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must 033-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-maybe-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:  dgoulet => dgoulet, teor


Comment:

 I added a review on github.

 It looks good, there is a tricky change in compute_frac_paths_available()
 that I would probably defer to 0.3.4.

 I am happy for dgoulet to do the next review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dmr):

 Long comment, so breaking it up into chunks...

  Educating users, color, additional info?

 Replying to [comment:33 isabela]:
 > I like the idea to add the Exit label. I would change the whole thing
 though, and by that I mean I would have label for each node (going back to
 the idea of using every moment to educate our users). I would have
 'Guard', 'Middle', 'Exit'.
 I like the idea of educating the users, but I fear that introducing
 //all// of these terms //AND// that their guard node shouldn't change
 //AND// giving them a button to click //AND// giving them a link to click
 //AND// providing the existing 'Secure Connection' Firefox info* //AND//
 providing the existing Permissions info... would be overload.
 I would encourage that we validate this, however, but I could see it as
 easily overwhelming.

 ^^* which I believe could be, for an HTTPS mixed-content page, saying
 [[span(style=color: #FF, Connection is Not Secure)]] and itself having
 clickable UI elements to learn more.

 I really like the color tie-in of the **[[span(style=color: #7D4698,
 Guard)]]** label at the guard node and in the explanation text - that
 visually connects the two together. I see it as a major strength to the
 design. Similar to overload above, I don't think we can add much more info
 here and tie it all together visually - that use of color would be
 difficult to scale up.

 Since we're talking about mock-ups that have `.onion` sites, I'd like to
 point out that the "Exit" concept doesn't exist there, so if we're trying
 to educate users on the purpose of the various relays, that would be even
 tougher. We'd need to identify the client's 3rd relay as something other
 than an exit ("Rendezvous" might be too confusing) and they'd wonder
 further about the unmarked `Relay` nodes from the Onion Service.

 Lastly, since we have a Guard node `Learn more` link to the manual, maybe
 we can consider education holistically, by presenting layered info for
 them to follow if it interests them. That is: if a user follows this link,
 we could potentially:
 * first present them with the direct info they want to know - why doesn't
 the Guard node change?
 * either below that or with another "Learn more" link (maybe "Learn more
 about other types of Tor relays"), teach them a bit more related info

  Display IP addresses? (imo: yes)

 Replying to [comment:33 isabela]:
 > The IP addresses are something people sometimes want to know so I would
 try to keep them to make it convenient for the user. That said, I wonder
 if it will be indeed too crowed, for some reason I don't think it would.
 But I leave this to Antonela to decide :) if having it there is ok or if
 its better to put it in tooltip or something.

 I agree - it's really nice to get a peek into what Tor is doing under the
 hood.

 It's especially helpful to have the exit IP as confirmation to a
 nontechnical user that "hey, this new circuit button thing actually did
 something", since sometimes it gives you another exit in the same geoip
 country.

 It's similarly especially helpful when multiple relays in the path are
 from the same geoip country.


  Hiding info for user protection? (this is probably orthogonal - move
 to another ticket?)

 Replying to [comment:5 arthuredelstein]:
 > We might also consider hiding the Guard IP address so that users are
 less likely to leak their Guard information.

 I reviewed this ticket and don't see any responses to that. Maybe a
 decision was made in a meeting?

 Anyway: how big of a concern is leaking this info? and what can we
 realistically do about it, without impacting the other goals of this
 display?
 I imagine that //lots// of info in this display + surrounding context is
 potentially risky. We see:
 * the Guard's IP address
 * the Exit's IP address
 * the target website
 * potentially further portions of the website URL or page, if the user
 took a screenshot

 I could see the Guard info as being particularly important to hide, since
 Guards change much less frequently, and some other data like screenshot
 timestamp (if the file was obtained/shared/etc.) could be used to further
 reduce the anonymity set of that person.

 

Re: [tor-bugs] #20843 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: How do we help users to use higher security?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20843: Tor Browser: How do we help users to use higher security?
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25830 [- Select a component]: i dont know how to talk like you guys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25830: i dont know how to talk like you guys
--+-
 Reporter:  Glasscleaner  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 I'm sorry, the ticket tracker isn't for helping people learn how to code.
 You can learn to code in python, Rust, or C in tutorials on the internet.

 If you want to watch us code, try the #tor-dev IRC channel, or the tor-dev
 mailing list:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/contact.html.en#irc
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en#MailingLists

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25694 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 3.1: Improve the user experience of updating Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25694: Activity 3.1: Improve the user experience of updating Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor17
--+---
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18948 [Applications/Tor Browser]: improve update notification UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18948: improve update notification UX
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20083 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to false.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20083: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to 
false.
---+--
 Reporter:  yawning|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17594 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Please reopen existing tabs and windows after upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17594: Please reopen existing tabs and windows after upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  lunar   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-updater, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25697 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create UI for Torbutton (prefs, security slider...)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25697: Create UI for Torbutton (prefs, security slider...)
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25025 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25025: Add icon for next-generation onions in the style guide
-+--
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25638 [Webpages/Website]: Design mocks for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25638: Design mocks for torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor9
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25696 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25696: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25695 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 5.1: Redesign Tor Browser homepage ("about:tor") - create an user onboard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25695: Activity 5.1: Redesign Tor Browser homepage ("about:tor") - create an 
user
onboard
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25830 [- Select a component]: i dont know how to talk like you guys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25830: i dont know how to talk like you guys
--+
 Reporter:  Glasscleaner  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Glasscleaner):

 i dont know code can any one help me?

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[tor-bugs] #25830 [- Select a component]: i dont know how to talk like you guys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25830: i dont know how to talk like you guys
--+
 Reporter:  Glasscleaner  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Here is my current version of a rebase branch:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/25543+6
 (b4907074cbe48d46a621fa8ad2b0e4b29c7041de)

 It contains nearly all desktop patches rebased to mozilla-beta (those
 labeld C and F). It does not yet include a few updater patches (labeled P)
 and mobile patches. See https://torpat.ch for further reference. The
 branch builds and seems to run OK on Linux 64.

 Here's what happened to each patch:

 {{{
 ? = more investigation needed
 B = already included in Firefox 60
 C = cherry-picked
 D = Delete
 F = fixed up
 K = Broken
 N = Not done yet
 O = obsolete
 P = Pearl Crescent (in progress)
 U = Upstreamed

 F 90e16dd25b6e Bug 20283: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc`
 filesystem.
 F 82cd8ae9a5de Bug 21537: Tests for secure .onion cookies
 F c70454fd10ef Bug 21537: Mark .onion cookies as secure
 F 7719a132533d fixup! Bug 16940: After update, load local change notes.
 U 901380f79a74 Bug 23439: Exempt .onion domains from mixed content
 warnings
 U 314e5b4a08d3 Bug 23439: Exempt .onion domains from mixed content
 warnings
 B 0fb51b9375f6 Bug 25147: Sanitize HTML fragments created for chrome-
 privileged documents
 O 74b92f0512e8 Bug 25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista
 64bit
 B 0d3da213dc86 Bug 1370027: Part 1 - Cleanly handle a subprocess child
 being reaped by NSPR. r=aswan
 D 76b6a5dc0859 Revert "Bug 18619: If indexedDB disabled, use in-memory db
 for asyncStorage.js"
 C 93999a363c76 Bug 22794: Don't open AF_INET/AF_INET6 sockets when
 AF_LOCAL is configured
 C 95ad1e098907 Bug 19910: Rip out optimistic data socks handshake variant
 (#3875)
 C ba141b6054ea Bug 22614: Make e10s/non-e10s Tor Browsers
 indistinguishable
 B 01b8fa23b26a Bug 1005640 - Flush StringBundle cache when app-locales
 change. r=valentin
 C f5eebe23eda5 Bug 13575: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user
 tests.
 F 6e2c459fa66a Bug 23916: Add new MAR signing key
 B 5e53cbb2d63c Bug 1403412 - disable VP9 estimizer on Mac; r=jya
 C b91202db5ef3 Bug 22548: Firefox downgrades VP9 videos to VP8.
 U 031dba9cfdf3 Allow std::unordered_*.
 U 848e862614a1 Bug 24197: fix uppercase/lowercase issue in Wow64.h include
 B 52781b3a80f4 Bug 23970: Printing to a file is broken with Linux content
 sandboxing enabled
 B ab8aca382251 Bug 23970: Printing to a file is broken with Linux content
 sandboxing enabled
 B c96c64300d52 Bug 23970: Printing to a file is broken with Linux content
 sandboxing enabled
 B 5d36dc9a3d5b Bug 23970: Printing to a file is broken with Linux content
 sandboxing enabled
 B cfe5bda0cec0 Bug 23970: Printing to a file is broken with Linux content
 sandboxing enabled
 O d6131d2157a1 Bug 23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected
 file in non-English locales
 B a0382e7bc741 Bug 1372072 - Part 2: Add a test case for check whether
 network information API has been spoofed correctly when
 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true. r=arthuredelstein,baku
 B 3841170c74d8 Bug 1372072 - Part 1: Spoofing network information API and
 blocking ontypechange event when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true.
 r=arthuredelstein,baku
 C ab9be0575af0 Bug 24398: Plugin-container process exhausts memory
 C 230cb85895bc Bug 23104: Add a default line height compensation
 C 009bc0a8f600 Bug 24478: Enable debug assertions and tests in our ASan
 builds
 C 2646633951fe Bug 21925: Don't compile with ASan and FORTIFY_SOURCE
 C 6794707e2b3a Bug 24052: Handle redirects by blocking them early
 K 2e0a54b89593 Bug 24052: Streamline handling of file:// resources
 B 2270fb027a31 Bug 1305396 - Replace memmove with std::copy_backward in a
 file that doesn't include cstring explicitly. r=keeler
 D e7fc8cfbe27d Revert "Bug 21308: Set indexedDB->null when
 dom.indexeddb.enabled=false"
 D ca8fa1fb280c Revert "bug 23104 - Add a default line height compensation"
 C 87b15309e159 Bug 13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real
 name, given name) from O/S
 B 8c0c1a4d6469 Bug 366945 - Disable middlemouse.contentLoadURL by default
 on UNIX and Android, r=gijs
 D 478a8ccce85b bug 23104 - Add a default line height compensation
 C a19fd1255901 We don't take the SANDBOX_EXPORTS path and fix compile
 issues along our way
 F[inspect] fc9f5757efd6 Bug 16010: Fixing sandbox compile issues
 B 

Re: [tor-bugs] #17773 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should clients avoid using guards that lost the Guard flag?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17773: Should clients avoid using guards that lost the Guard flag?
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client guards  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium?
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:21 arma]:
 > > What is supposed to happen if the guard is set manually? Will tor
 refuse to build circuits?
 >
 > If you put a relay in your EntryNodes list, Tor should never care
 whether it has the Guard flag. See the code snippet from asn above where
 it checks {{{routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes,node)}}}.

 But see #22204 for a bug in the new design that prevents you from
 requesting any relays for your first hop that don't have the Guard flag
 right now. :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22782 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Additional domain fronts for Snowflake rendezvous (was: Change domain front for snowflake to something that isn't blocked)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22782: Additional domain fronts for Snowflake rendezvous
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25829 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney ignore "Valid-After times do not match"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25829: Make chutney ignore "Valid-After times do not match"
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy fast-fix |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with 3733469 and pushed to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25829 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney ignore "Valid-After times do not match"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25829: Make chutney ignore "Valid-After times do not match"
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy fast-fix |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Old description:

> We need to ignore this Tor warning in chutney:
> {{
> Warning: Unable to add signatures to consensus: Valid-After times do not
> match when adding detached signatures to consensus Number: 2
> }}
>
> It's not a bug, it only happens occasionally, and only in tor 0.3.3 and
> later.

New description:

 We need to ignore this Tor warning in chutney:

 Warning: Unable to add signatures to consensus: Valid-After times do
 not match when adding detached signatures to consensus Number: 2

 It's not a bug, it only happens occasionally, and only in tor 0.3.3 and
 later.

--

Comment (by teor):

 Quote properly

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[tor-bugs] #25829 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Make chutney ignore "Valid-After times do not match"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25829: Make chutney ignore "Valid-After times do not match"
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy fast-fix
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 We need to ignore this Tor warning in chutney:
 {{
 Warning: Unable to add signatures to consensus: Valid-After times do not
 match when adding detached signatures to consensus Number: 2
 }}

 It's not a bug, it only happens occasionally, and only in tor 0.3.3 and
 later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24659 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrap our sha2 interface in Rust which implements the appropriate traits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24659: Wrap our sha2 interface in Rust which implements the appropriate traits
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-crypto, review-group-34,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3-can
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:17 nickm]:
 > Added some initial thoughts on the code. I don't have much in the way of
 thinking about the linking issues though -- let me know if you want me to
 hack on those, or if we should merge without them and have them be a
 separate issue?

 Thanks!

 So our options are:

 1. hack on the linking stuff (and/or solve #25386)
 2. not test any code which needs to call/use hash functions
 3. add a dev-dependency to the Cargo.toml for the sha2 crate for use only
 in tests (e.g. do `#[cfg(test)] pub type Sha256 = sha2::Sha256;` or
 something)
 4. write a crappy, slow sha2 implementation, for use only in tests

 Not sure what's the least painful, but I really dislike !#2.

 I guess we could merge now, if you think that's okay, and say that the XOF
 stuff is a new ticket, and also the linking/testing thing is another
 issue? I'm somewhat inclined to go with !#3, mostly because I don't really
 want to have to do !#4 (and then also implement keccak when the time
 comes).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16665 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit visualizer needs a cue about guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16665: Circuit visualizer needs a cue about guards
-+-
 Reporter:  lunar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201603, ux-team, |
  tbb-7.0-frequent   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25765: TBA - Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about
different padlock states for .onion services
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23247 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25764: TBA - Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 I can reproduce this issue with the following minimal test case:
 {{{
 tor DataDirectory `mktemp -d` DirPort 12345 ORPort 0 SOCKSPort 0
 }}}

 This command works with these tor versions:
 * 0.2.5.16-dev
 * 0.2.9.15-dev

 This command fails for these tor versions:
 * 0.3.1.10-dev
 * 0.3.2.10-dev
 *
 * master

 With minor variations on:
 {{{
 Apr 18 10:08:27.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 40%: Loading authority key certs
 Apr 18 10:08:34.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_: Bug:
 src/or/cpuworker.c:499: cpuworker_queue_work: Assertion threadpool failed;
 aborting. (on Tor 0.3.1.10-dev ce8e7427b9284ef1)
 ...
 }}}

 So I suggest:
 * now: we fix the bugs in this feature in 0.3.1 and later
 * in 0.3.4 or 0.3.5: we decide if we want to support DirPort-only and
 write tests for it, or if we want to deprecate it

 One use case for DirPort-only is a local directory mirror for large
 deployments. It can be configured using the FallbackDir torrc option, to
 take load off relays or authorities. But we could just tell people to use
 `ORPort 12345 PublishDescriptor 0` as a workaround.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22874: Standalone broker (independent of App Engine)
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  cmm32
 Type:  project| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 I just noticed that, due to a mistake of mine, the fallback proxy-go
 instances that were meant to be assigned to the standalone broker were
 instead assigned to the old App Engine broker. So all 6 were on the old
 broker, instead of 3 and 3 like desired.

 I fixed it at 2018-04-18 00:06:42. I suspect it had been misconfigured
 since 2018-04-02 04:57:42, when I reinstated periodic restarts of the
 fallback proxies (comment:1:ticket:25688).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22985 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can we simplify and clarify click-to-play of audio/video?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22985: Can we simplify and clarify click-to-play of audio/video?
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-security, ux- |  Actual Points:
  team   |
Parent ID:  #23150   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: webgl is blocked without a click-to-play button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21805: webgl is blocked without a click-to-play button
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22785 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22785: Show an alternative icon for features that are blocked and not broken.
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20314 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make SVG click-to-play and support fallback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20314: Make SVG click-to-play and support fallback
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Webpages]: .Onion everywhere?: increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: .Onion everywhere?: increasing the use of onion services through 
automatic
redirects and aliasing
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dmr):

 Replying to [comment:36 cypherpunks]:
 > FWIW it's important to keep this timeline in mind especially the coming
 deprecation of the lock icon (2019) for HTTPS https://blog.cloudflare.com
 /https-or-bust-chromes-plan-to-label-sites-as-not-secure/
 >
 > > 1. Google will announce the lock icon’s demise in 2018 and remove it
 in January 2019 with the release of Chrome 72

 Just to place the quote into context:
 This is a //guess/prediction// by CloudFlare. That Chrome will eventually
 deprecate the lock icon seems to be part of their rough plan from 2014,
 but there is no set timeframe indicated in the article. (Still good to
 keep in mind, however.)

 > Chris Palmer's [[https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic
 /blink-dev/DHQLv76QaEM%5B1-25%5D|email to blink-dev]] in 2014 included
 this "strawman proposal" for introducing negative indicators and phasing
 out the marking of secure origins entirely:
 >
 >> Secure > 65%: Non-secure origins marked as Dubious
 >> Secure > 75%: Non-secure origins marked as Non-secure
 >> Secure > 85%: Secure origins unmarked

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25819 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Email committers on jenkins compile+test failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25819: Email committers on jenkins compile+test failures
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Hrmm. Can we install plugins? This could give us the hook we need:
 https://github.com/jenkinsci/postbuildscript-plugin

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at ../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25733: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at
../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.
-+-
 Reporter:  cstest   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 029-backport 031-backport  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 (Other than that, this patch looks okay to me.  Only one request -- could
 you edit the log message so that it's easier for operators to tell what it
 means?  The one that's there right now will only confuse people.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25594 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy registrations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25594: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy 
registrations
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:4 arma]:
 > Ok, from https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/thesis/#fig:snowflake-
 rendezvous it looks like it can be just one round-trip? So something like
 encrypted dns is a great answer?

 That's correct. It needs one round trip. DNS is a good match.

 We should (but don't yet) encrypt client registration messages; see
 #22945. The registration messages don't reveal a ''ton'' of sensitive
 metadata beyond the client's IP address (which we can't hide anyway); but
 there's no reason not to encrypt it. I believe the statement from the
 description ''"the client is making TLS connections with the broker"'' is
 incorrect; in the domain fronting case, the client has a TLS session with
 the CDN, and the CDN has a TLS session with the broker, but the CDN is in
 a MITM position and can read the plaintest of registration messages, in
 the absence of any other protection. It's the same thing with encrypted
 DNS: we may as well encrypt the messages before encoding them as DNS
 requests. But that's a privacy thing, not a blocking resistance thing.

 The situation with Moat is more complicated: Moat relies on end-to-end TLS
 with bridgedb.torproject.org for integrity: it doesn't have separate
 integrity for the message that contains your 3 bridges, for instance. So
 Moat is using a comparatively heavyweight full meek tunnel, constructing a
 general-purpose bidirectional tunnel atop multiple roundtrips. In Moat,
 there is an outer TLS session between the client and the CDN, and a
 separate outer TLS session between the CDN and BridgeDB's Moat endpoint;
 but inside of both is a tunneled end-to-end TLS session between the client
 and BridgeDB.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: arma (added)
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_information


Comment:

 Putting this into needs_information based on Teor's questions above.
 Roger, what do you think here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make periodic events array with flags including when they are enabled/disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25762: Make periodic events array with flags including when they are
enabled/disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, client, |  Actual Points:
  s8-perf|
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 David asked me to look at his revised `ticket25762_034_02`.  Looking
 better! I've left some suggested changes on my branch of the same name.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4902 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Change the default search engine in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4902: Change the default search engine in TBB
---+---
 Reporter:  phobos |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Component:  Firefox Patch  |Version:
  Issues   |
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:  1
  MikePerry201204  |
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by heyjoe):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>
 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 DuckDuckGo is hosted on Amazon which means Amazon receives info about all
 searches.

 Could someone please consider reviewing and reconsidering this?

 startpage.com looks like a better alternative. (or maybe some other
 engine)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25373: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, there's now a branch on top of master.  See `lazy_bucket_refill`,
 with a pull request here at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/53 .
 It also contains a fix for #25828.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25373: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
-+-
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, 033-must, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180326, 033-included-20180326 |
  033-backport, AffectsTails |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 The problem is related to AT_FDCWD being a negative constant and
 libseccomp using uint64_t for parameters.

 See https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/69#issuecomment-273805980

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Test from #18912 failing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25331: Test from #18912 failing
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 This patch looks good to me. I have included it my nascent ESR60 branch.
 We could also consider including it in the ESR52 branches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25594 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy registrations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25594: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy 
registrations
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Ok, from https://www.bamsoftware.com/papers/thesis/#fig:snowflake-
 rendezvous it looks like it can be just one round-trip? So something like
 encrypted dns is a great answer?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25594 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy registrations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25594: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy 
registrations
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Can somebody summarize the requirements for the interaction between the
 Snowflake client and ~~the broker~~whatever components the client has to
 talk to?

 I see mentions of a TLS handshake above, but I'm hoping to get at the
 underlying requirements, for which "do a TLS handshake" is part of one
 possible approach to meeting the requirements, but once we understand the
 requirements more maybe we'll realize there are others.

 In particular, does it have to be an arbitrary number of round-trip
 interactions (e.g. because we're bundling info from a nat piercing
 protocol that needs arbitrary round-trips) or can we constraint it down
 more?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25815 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Speed up hourly updater performance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25815: Speed up hourly updater performance
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * owner:  karsten => metrics-team
 * status:  accepted => assigned


Comment:

 I tried out switching to Jackson, and it turns out that we can save 30% of
 overall time (for writing details documents). That's almost 4 minutes
 every hour. Sounds like a good idea to me.

 I uploaded my branch with temporary commits
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-25815
 here]. I did ''not'' verify that all outputs are correct with regard to
 unicode character escapes and character encodings in general. I only
 looked at performance.

 For the moment, I'm giving this ticket back to metrics-team. I might grab
 it back next week, unless somebody else takes it first.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23947 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Move Snowflake proxy page somewhere devs can write

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23947: Move Snowflake proxy page somewhere devs can write
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  project| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:14 dcf]:
 > I copied the web files to https://snowflake.torproject.org/.
 > {{{
 > cake.coffeescript build
 > rsync -rv build/ staticiforme:/srv/snowflake.torproject.org/htdocs/ &&
 ssh staticiforme 'static-update-component snowflake.torproject.org'
 > }}}

 dcf: careful here! This -rv means that if you ever remove a file from git,
 it will persist on the website until somebody notices it and deletes it.

 Maybe you want something more like "-rvz --delete". (Though that could
 have surprises of its own, if anybody ever puts something in the website
 directory on staticiforme and expects it to not get blown away.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW of 60 is too strict for some drifting dirauth clocks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW of 60 is too strict for some drifting 
dirauth
clocks
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors, 034-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors => clock-skew, s8-errors, 034-roadmap-
 proposed


Comment:

 During this week's meeting, we decided it would be a good idea to relax
 this test to account for the voting schedule.  That way for a client or
 relay to get a "consensus is coming from the future" warning, enough
 dirauths would have to have their clocks skewed by about the same amount.
 A single dirauth with an early clock shouldn't be able to induce this
 warning by releasing a consensus early.  (This is what happened with
 dizum.)

 arma says the `voting-delay` consensus parameter is something we want to
 look at if we want to not hard code this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22346 [Metrics/Statistics]: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017 and 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22346: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017 and 2018
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:16 boklm]:
 > On April 6, 2018, we had again a big increase in the number of pings:
 > https://metrics.torproject.org/webstats-
 tb.html?start=2018-04-01=2018-04-17

 The last release was on March 26, so this does not seem to be related to a
 new release.

 >
 > From March 26 to April 10, we also had an increase in downloads and
 signature downloads:
 > https://metrics.torproject.org/webstats-
 tb.html?start=2018-04-01=2018-04-17

 This one seems related to the new release. However it is surprising to see
 the number increasing in 2 days, staying stable for around 12 days, then
 decreasing back to the previous level in 4 days. It is also the first time
 we see a big increase in signature downloads. It seems signatures were
 downloaded around 1.2M times in 12 days.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22346 [Metrics/Statistics]: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017 and 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22346: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017 and 2018
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 On April 6, 2018, we had again a big increase in the number of pings:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/webstats-
 tb.html?start=2018-04-01=2018-04-17

 From March 26 to April 10, we also had an increase in downloads and
 signature downloads:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/webstats-
 tb.html?start=2018-04-01=2018-04-17

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW of 60 is too strict for some drifting dirauth clocks (was: I keep getting this error on my relay)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW of 60 is too strict for some drifting 
dirauth
clocks
---+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+--

Comment (by catalyst):

 Update ticket summary to better reflect the actual problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25603 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25603: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Oh, and note-to-self. We should disable auto-update for this extension,
 else Orfox will download the new version and it won't rewrite any URLs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25603 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25603: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:7 sysrqb]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > > Does HTTPS-E work for you in a vanilla Firefox for Mobile?
 >
 > Yes, 2018.4.11 works with Fennec 59.0.2. I don't have a vanilla Fennec
 52.7.3 already built, so I'll need to build that and test this.

 It doesn't work with a fresh Fennec 52.7.3. I installed https-everywhere
 2018.4.11 from AMO, and it does not rewrite the URL. I'll focus on testing
 Orfox with https-everywhere 5.2.21. Maybe we can ship it with an updated
 ruleset.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25819 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Email committers on jenkins compile+test failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25819: Email committers on jenkins compile+test failures
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by weasel):

 I wouldn't know where to start.

 This is our current mailing setup:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/jenkins/jobs.git/tree/defaults.yaml#n3

 If you can provide patches or directions we can look into it more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:39 neel]:
 > I have a new patch: `b25511-004.patch`.
 >
 > It also passes CI: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/51.
 Thanks! Looks good; setting to merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19569 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: DataChannel-only libwebrtc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19569: DataChannel-only libwebrtc
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arma):

 So it saves over 6 megabytes on the executable, but when compressed, that
 savings turns into more like 1-2 megabytes?

 Sounds like there's a lot of redundancy in the binary.

 Does cutting out the other parts of libwebrtc give us savings in some
 other step, like disk usage or time in the build process? Or is the only
 question about size of shipped packages / binary?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25515 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25515: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 Thanks for isis for your review and the fixes with the trivial things.
 For the less trivial ones, and after nickm, i have removed the FIXME and
 the unused variables.

 Since your branch is in github, i pushed to github too, you can see the
 diff here:
 
https://github.com/isislovecruft/tor/compare/bug25515...juga0:bug25515_rmunused_vars?diff=split=1=bug25515_rmunused_vars

 Should i attach the patch here or is it easier to just merge or comment my
 branch in github?.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25423 [Core Tor/Stem]: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25423: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 > 1. Failure for GETINFO exit-policy/full to return info.

 Crap. Great catch, dmr! This is a bug within tor. Mind filing a ticket for
 it?

 In the meantime I wonder if we should resurrect our old exit policy
 fetching code as a fallback...

 > 3. Fixed cache-invalidation bugs

 Good catch! Fix pushed.

 > 4. Multiple configuration changes could cause our cache to be invalid

 Another nice catch. Think I agree with meejah here. Constructing another
 ExitPolicy instance is cheap so we can be broader with invalidation.
 Change pushed so we now invalidate it with any config change.

 > 5. Additional event that can invalidate our cache

 Good idea about listening for StatusEvent events. This could also let us
 drop our CACHE_ADDRESS_FOR constant.

 > 8. Probably unnecessary use of with self._msg_lock (removed)

 Oh! Good point. Removed.

 > 9. Potentially deprecate ExitPolicy.get_config_policy() (no change made)

 Good idea. Now that we're no longer attempting to make sense of the torrc
 this function will become less and less reliable over time. Function
 deprecated.

 How does this look?

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=c305b7f

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25515 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25515: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Since this ticket is only about adding unit tests, I'd suggest we hold off
 on changing geoip_load_file()'s behavior.  We can't have it actually clear
 the countries without significant refactoring, since the list of countries
 is shared by both IPv4 and IPv6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25827 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Adapt CollecTor to changes in metrics-lib 2.3.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25827: Adapt CollecTor to changes in metrics-lib 2.3.0
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.6.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/log/?h=task-25827
 this patch], which contains the necessary changes for adapting to metrics-
 lib 2.3.0 (mainly #25523).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our "has our write bucket been empty recently" check is dependent on TokenBucketRefillInterval

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25828: Our "has our write bucket been empty recently" check is dependent on
TokenBucketRefillInterval
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (I've fixed this as part of my #25373 work in a branch called
 lazy_bucket_refill, but it's not ready for review.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25523 [Metrics/Library]: Add support for webstats tarballs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25523: Add support for webstats tarballs
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.3.0
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 True, the implementation needs to be changed too.

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 lib.git/commit/?h=task-25523 another commit], which also includes a
 changelog entry.

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[tor-bugs] #25828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our "has our write bucket been empty recently" check is dependent on TokenBucketRefillInterval

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25828: Our "has our write bucket been empty recently" check is dependent on
TokenBucketRefillInterval
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25373
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Found while working on #25373.

 We have a variable called `write_buckets_empty_last_second`, but it is not
 accurate: it is re-checked and re-set every TokenBucketRefillInterval,
 which is currently 100ms.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25819 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Email committers on jenkins compile+test failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25819: Email committers on jenkins compile+test failures
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Well what if the mailer hook inspected every failure, and then grepped the
 plaintext console output log for "!^+ make -k$" ?

 If the grep comes up empty, then the hook shouldn't mail. But if that grep
 comes up non-empty, then the build script made it past autogen and into
 the build, and then should be very likely a committer-caused failure.

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[tor-bugs] #25827 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Adapt CollecTor to changes in metrics-lib 2.3.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25827: Adapt CollecTor to changes in metrics-lib 2.3.0
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.6.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 This concerns changes necessary for #25523.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25423 [Core Tor/Stem]: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25423: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by meejah):

 Why don't you just invalidate the entire config cache any time you see a
 `CONF_CHANGED` event?

 Obviously, it's *possible* to do better but getting config is fast and it
 won't change very often in general.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25816 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25816: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 1.13.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:7 karsten]:
 > How about 09:50 UTC tomorrow (Wednesday)?

 Fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25792 [Core Tor/Tor]: 32 bit ASAN failures in _dl_get_tls_static_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25792: 32 bit ASAN failures in _dl_get_tls_static_info
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  jenkins   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25603 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25603: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Does HTTPS-E work for you in a vanilla Firefox for Mobile?

 Yes, 2018.4.11 works with Fennec 59.0.2. I don't have a vanilla Fennec
 52.7.3 already built, so I'll need to build that and test this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25816 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25816: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 1.13.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by karsten):

 How about 09:50 UTC tomorrow (Wednesday)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at ../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25733: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at
../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.
-+-
 Reporter:  cstest   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 029-backport 031-backport  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  034-proposed  crash => crash 029-backport 031-backport
 032-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 If you think we should backport this to 0.2.9, could you branch based on
 maint-0.2.9?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25603 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25603: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Does HTTPS-E work for you in a vanilla Firefox for Mobile?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate using coveralls with travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25818: Investigate using coveralls with travis
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  implemented
  029-backport 031-backport 032-backport |  Actual Points:
  033-backport   |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate using coveralls with travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25818: Investigate using coveralls with travis
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport 031-backport 032-backport |
  033-backport   |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 woo; coveralls support is now merged to maint-0.2.9 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25824 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate circuit max_cell_queue_size killer with DoS heartbeats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25824: Integrate circuit max_cell_queue_size killer with DoS heartbeats
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged to 033 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25826 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Trac error (Unable to get database connection within 0 seconds)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25826: Trac error (Unable to get database connection within 0 seconds)
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 I can't reproduce the behaviour. Please provide some more information next
 time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18386 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton doesn't play nice with external Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18386: Torbutton doesn't play nice with external Tor
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 That's fine. The network settings are made available by Tor Launcher and
 they need a Tor being controlled by Tor Launcher.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25603 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25603: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 For reference, I am specifically testing whether loading
 http://deb.torproject.org is rewritten to https://deb.torproject.org. This
 does not happen automatically in Firefox because it is not forced on the
 server-side, but it does happen in Tor Browser. I also tested in Tor
 Browser with https-everywhere disabled, and the request is not redirected.

 Also, I see similar (but not the same) load errors occur on the desktop,
 too.

 {{{
 1523974564000   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNLoading extension '{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}':
 Reading manifest: Error processing permissions.1: Unknown permission
 "privacy"
 1523974564000   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNLoading extension '{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}':
 Reading manifest: Error processing permissions.4: Unknown permission
 "unlimitedStorage"
 Apr 17 14:16:04.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with
 first hop
 1523974564400   addons.webextension.https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 WARNLoading extension 'https-everywhere-...@eff.org': Reading
 manifest: Error processing devtools_page: An unexpected property was found
 in the WebExtension manifest.
 }}}

 Both desktop and Android use the same extensions code for parsing and
 loading, so I'm not sure why there is a difference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23121 [Applications/Torbutton]: Allow adding "New tor circuit" icon to the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23121: Allow adding "New tor circuit" icon to the toolbar
+-
 Reporter:  torbacchi   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  toolbar torbutton   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 There is no icon for "New Tor Circuit for this Site" and we move it out of
 the Torbutton menu into the URL bar (see: #23409). One of the reasons for
 this is to make it more obvious that this command is one that is affecting
 the currently open website in a particular tab and not the global browser
 state. The toolbar however is not meant to be a tab specific thing (even
 though it might show tab related info). Thus, I think we don't want to
 have such an icon on the toolbar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25523 [Metrics/Library]: Add support for webstats tarballs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25523: Add support for webstats tarballs
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.3.0
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_revision => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25824 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate circuit max_cell_queue_size killer with DoS heartbeats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25824: Integrate circuit max_cell_queue_size killer with DoS heartbeats
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I've pushed a fixup commit to be squashed. Because the DoS mitigation line
 is now always in the heartbeat, I had to fix the test that checks for
 those specific lines and format.

 See branch: `ticket25824_033_01` with fixup `e88ffdb211`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19075 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton blocks use of proxy port 9150 when running more than one instance of TorBrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19075: Torbutton blocks use of proxy port 9150 when running more than one 
instance
of TorBrowser
+--
 Reporter:  torbutton_q |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 That'S not a bug. See:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Hacking#RunningMultipleTorBrowsers
 for how to run multiple Tor Browsers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4828 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton 1.4.5.1 + Firefox 9.0.1: Can't drag and drop bookmarks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4828: Torbutton 1.4.5.1 + Firefox 9.0.1: Can't drag and drop bookmarks
+
 Reporter:  runa|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25603 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25603: Update Orfox HTTPS-E Add-on
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * owner:  tbb-team => sysrqb
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Unfortunately this is not working as expected.

 In addition to #25659, during testing I am seeing https-everywhere
 successfully load, but then it doesn't rewrite any URLs. I also tested
 using an older version of Orfox (based on 52.2.0), and it bundles https-
 everywhere 5.2.20 (tagged on 05 Jul, 2017). This combination of https-
 everywhere+Orfox works as expected, and the URLs are rewritten. If I leave
 Orfox open for some time, https-everywhere automatically updates to
 version 2018.4.11 (webextension). After restarting the app, I see the add-
 on loads, but it doesn't perform any URL rewrites. I see some messages in
 the log about an error processing the add-on's manifest, but it seems like
 the extension is loaded successfully.

 {{{
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137200addons.xpi  DEBUG
 getModTime: Recursive scan of https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137200DeferredSave.extensions.json
 DEBUG   Starting timer
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137500DeferredSave.extensions.json
 DEBUG   Starting write
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137700addons.webextension.https-
 everywhere-...@eff.orgWARNLoading extension 'https-everywhere-
 e...@eff.org': Reading manifest: Error processing permissions.3: Unknown
 permission "tabs"
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137700addons.webextension.https-
 everywhere-...@eff.orgWARNLoading extension 'https-everywhere-
 e...@eff.org': Reading manifest: Error processing browser_action: An
 unexpected property was found in the WebExtension manifest.
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137700addons.webextension.https-
 everywhere-...@eff.orgWARNLoading extension 'https-everywhere-
 e...@eff.org': Reading manifest: Error processing devtools_page: An
 unexpected property was found in the WebExtension manifest.
 I/Gecko   (24006): 1523904137700DeferredSave.extensions.json
 DEBUG   Write succeeded
 }}}

 I see these same messages when I bundle https-everywhere 2018.03.13.

 Next, I'll try bundling https-e 5.2.20 with the newest Orfox version,
 because I'm curious if that reliably loads and if it rewrites URLs. If we
 can't get https-everywhere loading or working reliably, I'd rather remove
 it from Orfox in the next release. I don't want to give the false
 impression https-everywhere is loaded and working - when it isn't working
 in reality.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10430 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbrowser update check mishandles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10430: Torbrowser update check mishandles
+
 Reporter:  phip|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That's fixed with our different Tor Browser channels.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16611 [Applications/Torbutton]: cache2 code means minVersion needs bumped

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16611: cache2 code means minVersion needs bumped
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remote_tor_check fails open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9997: remote_tor_check fails open
--+--
 Reporter:  Ry|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-torbutton
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Torbutton => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8538 [Applications/Torbutton]: when torbutton is enabled, one cannot move/change icons/bookmarks/etc with recent FF version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8538: when torbutton is enabled, one cannot move/change  icons/bookmarks/etc
with recent FF version
+
 Reporter:  calestyo|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8512 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton ports and banned_ports inconsistent (tbb 2.3.25-5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8512: Torbutton ports and banned_ports inconsistent (tbb 2.3.25-5)
---+---
 Reporter: |  Owner:  (none)
  paradox_899456   |
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Component: |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
  Applications/Torbutton   |
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 9150 and 9151 got added to `network.security.ports.banned`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25816 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25816: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 1.13.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by iwakeh):

 When shall we deploy?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8499 [Applications/Torbutton]: TorButton breaks toolbar customisation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8499: TorButton breaks toolbar customisation
+--
 Reporter:  spiderplant0|  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25824 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate circuit max_cell_queue_size killer with DoS heartbeats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25824: Integrate circuit max_cell_queue_size killer with DoS heartbeats
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Quick review: this code looks okay but it makes unit tests fail:
 {{{
 status/log_heartbeat__not_in_consensus:
   FAIL src/test/test_status.c:443: unexpected call to logv()
   FAIL src/test/test_status.c:343: assert(CALLED(logv) OP_EQ 5): 6 vs 5
   [log_heartbeat__not_in_consensus FAILED]
 1/1076 TESTS FAILED. (31 skipped)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7537 [Applications/Torbutton]: DNS cache is not cleared while switching to SOCKS proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7537: DNS cache is not cleared while switching to SOCKS proxy
+-
 Reporter:  Aymeric |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Old toggle issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25816 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25816: Release Onionoo 6.0-1.13.0
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo 1.13.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The branches look fine; all java archives are signed properly;
 checks pass; bytecode can be reproduced from given source and libs.

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