Re: [tor-bugs] #25870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix vanguard restrictions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25870: Fix vanguard restrictions
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25883 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion services do not provide stream events to control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25883: Onion services do not provide stream events to control port
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:   => 034-proposed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25883 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion services do not provide stream events to control port (was: Onion services do not provide stream events)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25883: Onion services do not provide stream events to control port
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by mikeperry:

Old description:

> Can we add STREAM and STREAMBW events for service-side onion services?
> Client-side has them already.
>
> I need this for the side channel checks I was working on in the vanguards
> controller.

New description:

 Can we add STREAM and STREAM_BW control port events for service-side onion
 services? Client-side has them already.

 I need this for the side channel checks I was working on in the vanguards
 controller.

--

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[tor-bugs] #25883 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion services do not provide stream events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25883: Onion services do not provide stream events
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25546
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Can we add STREAM and STREAMBW events for service-side onion services?
 Client-side has them already.

 I need this for the side channel checks I was working on in the vanguards
 controller.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17172 [Community/Relays]: A fast guide to run a Win32 tor relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17172: A fast guide to run a Win32 tor relay
--+
 Reporter:  TORques   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Win32 relay tor-docs windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17172 [Community/Relays]: A fast guide to run a Win32 tor relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17172: A fast guide to run a Win32 tor relay
--+--
 Reporter:  TORques   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Win32 relay tor-docs windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > Re-assigning this ticket to the relay component.
 > Does the tor relay guide have a windows section?

 It does not have a windows section and it is unlikely I will add one but
 if someone wants to add and maintain such a section, feel free.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25873 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add teor to the "tortestnet" LDAP group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25873: Add teor to the "tortestnet" LDAP group
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service introduction point retries occur at 1 second intervals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21600: Hidden service introduction point retries occur at 1 second intervals
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #21446   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 To be clear, this ticket is about the onion service retrying circuits to
 its already-announced intro points, so it can resume using these intro
 points, so clients won't be too impacted when e.g. the onion service loses
 its network connection?

 I ask because #25882 seems to be thinking this ticket is about clients who
 access onion services launching too many requests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at ../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25733: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at
../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.
-+-
 Reporter:  cstest   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 029-backport 031-backport  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25515 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25515: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25373: Avoid needless wakeups for token bucket refills.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (I forget where we left this in our IRC conversation -- are we merge_ready
 here, or should I do some more?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prune the list of supported consensus methods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24378: Prune the list of supported consensus methods
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop290, 034-triage-20180328, fast-  |  Actual Points:
  fix|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22455| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Apologies, I reverted the milestone by accent (race condition).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22455| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tor-hs tor-client => tor-hs
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Per #21600, the problem is that we are not failing fast.  We are retrying
 fast, but learning nothing from successive attempts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: youtube is blocking tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25855: youtube is blocking tor
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hey little c'punk, can you try to change the quality of the video? The
 default "auto" sometimes makes weird issues but when I change to something
 else it gets the good good going.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22455 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs tor-client
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22455| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * owner:  teor => (none)
 * priority:  High => Medium
 * parent:   => #22455
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 The owner is the person who will fix the bug. That's not me.

 This could be related to the rapid intro point retries in #21600.
 It should be fixed as part of the retry / discovery review in #22455.

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[tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor version 0.3.2.10 running on Debian stretch;

 The Tor client runs continuously over many days.  Periodically (daily in
 this case), an HTTP client reaches out to the same v2 onion service via
 Tor.  Normally, this works correctly.

 However, sometimes (no more than about 2/5 of the days), the HTTP client
 will fail to connect properly to the onion service, and its TCP connection
 will simply time out.  Restarting Tor almost always solves this problem,
 although automating a reactive Tor restart is undesirable, particularly
 when doing so closes all of the circuits of all other client applications
 using the same Tor.

 Looking closely, we observe that in such cases the Tor client is not able
 to complete a rendezvous with the onion service.  Specifically, the Tor
 client reaches out to the same intro point many times in rapid succession,
 without ever managing to establish a connection.  I surmise that a
 workaround might entail asking Tor to clear its cached onion service
 descriptor for this particular v2 service.  However, the code to handle
 client connections to onion services in {{{hs_client.c}}} intends to
 handle introduction point failures, so we should really determine why the
 many attempts to connect to the same introduction point are not logged as
 a failure that would ultimately lead to fetching the server descriptor
 again.

 My logs show that during a typical onion service request, my Tor attempted
 to connect to the same introduction point, 176.36.20.10, a total of 47
 times in the 112-second interval between 06:52:06 and 06:53:58 UTC.

 {{{
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] relay_send_command_from_edge_(): delivering 33
 cell forward.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] relay_send_command_from_edge_(): Sending a
 RELAY_EARLY cell; 4 remaining.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_package_relay_cell(): encrypting a
 layer of the relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_package_relay_cell(): encrypting a
 layer of the relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_package_relay_cell(): encrypting a
 layer of the relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit
 active.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] scheduler_channel_has_waiting_cells(): Channel
 64 at 0x1c12450 went from waiting_for_cells to pending
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] circuit_get_best(): There is an intro circuit
 being created right now, but it has already taken quite a while. Starting
 one in parallel.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(): Chose
 $04D962C6155BFC3705DC3 8699D4E6B3CE1524AE7~$04D962C6155BFC3705 at
 176.36.20.10 as intro point for '[scrubbed]'.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_find_to_cannibalize(): Hunting for a
 circ to cannibalize: purpose 6, uptime 0, capacity 1, internal 1
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] circuit_launch_by_extend_info(): Cannibalizing
 circ 3202873042 (id: 457) for purpose 6 (Hidden service client: Connecting
 to intro point)
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_change_purpose(): changing purpose of
 origin circ 457 from "General-purpose client" (5) to "Hidden service
 client: Connecting to intro point" (6)
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin():
 starting to send subsequent skin.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] circuit_send_intermediate_onion_skin(): Sending
 extend relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] relay_send_command_from_edge_(): delivering 6
 cell forward.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] relay_send_command_from_edge_(): Sending a
 RELAY_EARLY cell; 4 remaining.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_package_relay_cell(): encrypting a
 layer of the relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_package_relay_cell(): encrypting a
 layer of the relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] circuit_package_relay_cell(): encrypting a
 layer of the relay cell.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [debug] append_cell_to_circuit_queue(): Made a circuit
 active.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] rep_hist_note_used_internal(): New port
 prediction added. Will continue predictive circ building for 2522 more
 seconds.
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(): Intro
 3202873042 (id: 457) and rend circuit 2500882674 (id: 483) circuits are
 not both ready. Stalling conn. (109 sec old)
 Apr 21 06:53:55.000 [info] circuit_predict_and_launch_new(): Have 12 clean
 circs (0 uptime-internal, 12 internal), need another hidden service circ.
 }}}

 Note that the same introduction point is chosen 

[tor-bugs] #25881 [Metrics/Relay Search]: RS: Exit Addresses field description (mouseover) needs to be updated (since it changed in onionoo)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25881: RS: Exit Addresses field description (mouseover) needs to be updated 
(since
it changed in onionoo)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 exit_addresses got changed in #25332
 but RS still shows the old description which includes "Only lists
 addresses that are different from OR address"

 the fix is to simply remove that part.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25600 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Running 2 instances of snowflake-client leads to the former one stopping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25600: Running 2 instances of snowflake-client leads to the former one stopping
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Update: Unfortunately it still happens (used the new domains that dcf made
 in #22782 to get it working),

 {{{
 Apr 21 08:39:23 debian Tor[1274]: Tried for 120 seconds to get a
 connection to [scrubbed]:80. Giving up. (waiting for circuit)
 Apr 21 08:39:23 debian Tor[1274]: Tried for 120 seconds to get a
 connection to [scrubbed]:80. Giving up. (waiting for rendezvous desc)
 Apr 21 08:39:23 debian Tor[1274]: Tried for 120 seconds to get a
 connection to [scrubbed]:80. Giving up. (waiting for circuit)
 Apr 21 08:39:23 debian Tor[1274]: Tried for 120 seconds to get a
 connection to [scrubbed]:443. Giving up. (waiting for circuit)
 Apr 21 08:39:25 debian Tor[1274]: Delaying directory fetches: No running
 bridges
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25873 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add teor to the "tortestnet" LDAP group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25873: Add teor to the "tortestnet" LDAP group
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: teor (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25866 [Core Tor/Stem]: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus descriptors?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25866: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus
descriptors?
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 I think recent versions of stem use fallbacks by default for descriptor
 fetches.

 Anyway, here is the authority behaviour:
 Authorities cache any descriptors posted to them by relays
 Authorities try to fetch all descriptors for every vote and consensus they
 successfully download and validate.
 Authorities cache all descriptors they have ever successfully downloaded.
 Authorities remove a descriptor from their cache when it expires, or for
 miscordescs, when it hasn't been mentioned in a recent consensus.

 So the number of descriptors returned by an authority depends on its
 reachability and uptime.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25880 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: mailing list archive download not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25880: mailing list archive download not working
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I can confirm that this is a torbrowser bug, please flag it as a duplicate
 of that other (unknown to me) bugreport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25879 [HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS Everywhere control panel is broken when JavaScript is turned off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25879: HTTPS Everywhere control panel is broken when JavaScript is turned off
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  javascript|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [ticket:25879 cypherpunks]:
 > I have HTTPS Everywhere in my toolbar. I also have an old addon called
 JS Switch that turns off JavaScript at the about:config level, it's just a
 toggle for that config option.
 Torbutton does the same.

 > Whenever I've used it (or the about:config option directly) to turn off
 JavaScript, HTTPS Everywhere, Privacy Badger, and AdBlock Plus are all
 unable to display their toolbar menus properly or at all. In the case of
 HTTPS Everywhere and Privacy Badger, the menu balloon appears with a few
 words, but most of the words are missing and some of the toggles. The few
 toggles that remain are non functional.
 That's a dangerous game you're doing, Privacy Badger and AdBlock Plus
 would make you easily fingerprintable? Also doesn't Privacy Badger record
 all the websites that you visited so that its algorithm works?

 > Is this some new fallout from the move to WebExtensions?
 Are you sure that you have the latest Tor Browser release? I can't
 reproduce this with Safest security setting in the Torbutton.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25880 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: mailing list archive download not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25880: mailing list archive download not working
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I suspected also something like that (since it appears to be an
 authentication problem).

 I'd rather not use a non-torbrowser, can anyone else try this with a non-
 torbrowser to confirm that this is indeed a torbrowser bug?

 thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25880 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: mailing list archive download not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25880: mailing list archive download not working
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arma):

 This sounds like the Tor Browser bug where it does downloads over the
 catch-all session, not over the session from the tab that started the
 download.

 Next step for you would be to try this from some other browser, and if it
 works there, then this is a duplicate of those recent tor browser tickets
 (filed by e.g. sysrqb).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25866 [Core Tor/Stem]: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus descriptors?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25866: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus
descriptors?
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 and thanks for the fast documentation fix

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25866 [Core Tor/Stem]: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus descriptors?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25866: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus
descriptors?
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 in this example the script directly connects to dir auths I guess.

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[tor-bugs] #25880 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: mailing list archive download not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25880: mailing list archive download not working
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Steps to reproduce (using torbrowser, but probably also any other
 browser):
 - login to any private ML on lists.tpo
 - click on the Archives URL e.g. https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-
 bin/mailman/private/bad-relays/
 - in the last column ("Downloadable version") choose any entry -> right
 click -> "Save as..."

 - try to open the file (it is an html file instead of a .gz)
 and it does not contain any emails (just the html authentication form)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13893 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13893: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x
-+-
 Reporter:  Diapolo  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,   |
  GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201610,   |
  ff52-esr   |
Parent ID:  #12820   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:94 gk]:
 > We'll update the compiler to GCC 6.4.0 in the next alpha (8.0a6) which
 should fix this issue.
 Wrong. See comment:87.
 > Please, open a new one if there are still outstanding problems.
 It would make sense if you were talking about new problems.
 But here we deal with the old problem which now also causes a startup
 crash of sandboxed firefox.exe.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19963 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login to trac through the onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19963: Cannot login to trac through the onion service
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed with #21537

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