date:20180425

Re: [tor-bugs] #25870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix vanguard restrictions

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25870: Fix vanguard restrictions
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 This post provides some more justification:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013098.html

 This ticket is the first steps towards the proposal at the bottom of that
 post, which I think covers all of the properties we want.

 I would like to figure out how to get a strong version of property #6 in
 the short term too, though. Right now, with S - G - L2 - L3 - M - RP, the
 RP gets to learn the guard if we're using one primary guard (because we
 haven't set the consensus param, or because we have set it but one of the
 guards is temporarily down). We could add a hack to let that M also be
 G...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25892 [Core Tor/Tor]: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25892: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config, 035-proposed, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
+--
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  tor-config => tor-config, 035-proposed, easy
 * cc: isis (added)
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => SponsorZ


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > @isis
 >
 > Reporter here.
 >
 > > If you meant your Tor client
 >
 > I mean Tor client. I want my Tor to block all exit connections except
 port 443 and 9877.
 >
 > network[PC -- TorServer] === ISP === Tor Nodes === Internet
 >
 > PC: http x.y.z -> tor: reject and close request
 > PC https x.y.z -> tor: proceed
 >
 > @cypherpunk
 >
 > > Actually I would also like this feature
 >
 > Nice!

 Okay, fair enough! I'm reopening and postponing since our new triage rules
 default to everything being triaged out and select proposed things being
 triaged in.

 FWIW, this ticket should be easily accessible for new contributors, and
 I'm also nominating it for 0.3.5 in case someone wants to do this in the
 next couple months. (Sorry, I probably will unfortunately not have enough
 time.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25807 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can not request bridges from torproject.org (App Engine is broken for moat)

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25807: Can not request bridges from torproject.org (App Engine is broken for 
moat)
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Looking closer dcf seems to have #25804 for snowflake despite the
 generic title. Let's have that one for moat then.
 >
 > The problem in #25804 is affecting Moat as well because we are doing
 something like
 > {{{
 > ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client" "-url" "https://tor-
 bridges-hyphae-channel.appspot.com" "-front" "www.google.com" "--helper"
 "127.0.0.1:44219
 > }}}
 >
 > I leave this ticket in the Tor Browser component right now even though
 we can't do anything about it until the issue at the BrideDB side gets
 solved (or the App Engine starts to work for us again).

 Oh, wait… what is the issue on the BridgeDB server-side? (Did you maybe
 mean fixing/updating the middleware server for the meek-reflector?)

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[tor-bugs] #25921 [Applications/Tor Browser]: There's a clickable button under the "About Tor Browser"

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25921: There's a clickable button under the "About Tor Browser"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
--+--
 Can you remove it?

 = -> (?) -> there's an empty, small height button under "About Tor
 Browser" option

 This thing exist since 2017

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17343 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17343: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224-maybe torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25918  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 HiddenService* --> OnionService*

 Currently:
 HiddenServiceVersion 3
 HiddenService...

 New:
 OnionService...

 (automatically set version to 3)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25892 [Core Tor/Tor]: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25892: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 @isis

 Reporter here.

 > If you meant your Tor client

 I mean Tor client. I want my Tor to block all exit connections except port
 443 and 9877.

 network[PC -- TorServer] === ISP === Tor Nodes === Internet

 PC: http x.y.z -> tor: reject and close request
 PC https x.y.z -> tor: proceed

 @cypherpunk

 > Actually I would also like this feature

 Nice!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Standardize the 'onion service' name

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25918: Standardize the 'onion service' name
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)
 * keywords:   => tor-hs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17343 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17343: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224-maybe torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25918  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * keywords:  tor-hs prop224? torrc => tor-hs prop224-maybe torrc
 * cc: dmr (added)


Comment:

 //Minor//: `prop224-maybe` seems like a better convention for the keyword

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23107 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Optimize hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ() digest calculation

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23107: prop224: Optimize hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ() digest calculation
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, prop224-extra, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  optimization, 032-unreached|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25386 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix rust tests

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25386: fix rust tests
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180401  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by Hello71):

 It has occurred to me that shared libraries also split the global variable
 namespace along with the function namespace. This may be a problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Standardize the 'onion service' name

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25918: Standardize the 'onion service' name
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I think the content of this ticket would be a great starter email for a
 thread on tor-dev.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25920 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH for v3 services

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25920: HSFETCH for v3 services
--+---
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25417| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by atagar):

 Oh damn me. Thanks teor. I tried searching through my email since I
 thought there was one but couldn't find it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Standardize the 'onion service' name

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25918: Standardize the 'onion service' name
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi teor, thanks for the link! I pointed folks toward this ticket in my
 reply on tor-dev@.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23359: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25920 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH for v3 services

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25920: HSFETCH for v3 services
--+---
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25417| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19270 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update warning on about:tor is not eye-catchy enough

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19270: update warning on about:tor is not eye-catchy enough
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25920 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH for v3 services

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25920: HSFETCH for v3 services
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25417| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #25417


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #25417,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17769 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think of ways to make Tor Browser multi-user aware

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17769: Think of ways to make Tor Browser multi-user aware
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Standardize the 'onion service' name

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25918: Standardize the 'onion service' name
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Please see #17343, which is about providing torrc option aliases.

 Would you like to send the content of this ticket in an email to tor-dev?
 Tickets aren't great places to dicsuss strategy and scheduling.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't block audio/video on https sites under Medium Security

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#22981: Don't block audio/video on https sites under Medium Security
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  ux-team|
Parent ID:  #23150   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17343 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#17343: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*
---+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224? torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25918 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #25918


Comment:

 #25918 is an umbrella ticket for the entire rename

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Basic Usability Issues

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#21183: Basic Usability Issues
--+
 Reporter:  ninavizz  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, torbrowser   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20843| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24129 [Webpages/Website]: support.torproject.org work

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24129: support.torproject.org work
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24133 [Webpages/Website]: community.torproject.org work

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24133: community.torproject.org work
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24132 [Webpages/Website]: dev.torproject.org work

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24132: dev.torproject.org work
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #14429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Automated rounding of content window dimensions

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#14429: Automated rounding of content window dimensions
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19408 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Tor cannot work in China

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19408: Tor cannot work in China
-+-
 Reporter:  sam1275  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  block|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Kukaene):

 Tor cannot work in China due to the above mentioned reasons. I think a
 Lyman cannot understand which you told here. You need to more specific and
 to the point content here to understand for a common person. However, I
 try to get some reviews of [https://www.aussiewritingreviews.com/
 aussiewritingreviews] but hope you will understand my point.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25140: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory
-+
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:  Jigsaw52
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by tseretni-rmd):

 * cc: tseretni-rmd (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3723 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report version of bwscanners in votes

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#3723: Report version of bwscanners in votes
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13630| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 This is about the format of the *vote* line, not the format of the
 v3bwfile header, which is multiple lines.

 Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
 > Hi juga, this is the ticket for putting the bandwidth authority version
 in votes.
 >
 > We are working on the file format in #25869 and
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/4
 >
 > I think we should:
 > 1. add a "timestamp=" to the timestamp
 > 2. turn the entire bwfile header into a single line
 > 3. put it all in the vote as a line with a new keyword, "bandwidth-file"
 >
 > For bandwidth file format 1.0.0, the line would be:
 > bandwidth-file timestamp=1234567890
 >
 > For bandwidth file format 1.1.0, the line would be:
 > bandwidth-file timestamp=1234567890 version=1.1.0 software=sbws
 software_version=0.1.0
 >
 > If we implement the feature in this way, then Tor will automatically add
 new fields to the bandwidth-file line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 [[Image(circuitWithBridge.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * Attachment "circuitWithBridge.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * Attachment "circuitWithBridge.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:57 gk]:
 > Two comments so far:
 >
 > The "Learn more" link goes to the Tor Browser manual in *general* but
 seems to indicate that the user gets to know more about why the guard node
 is not changing in *particular*. I wonder whether we should link to a
 dedicate guard related section in the manual instead (which has to get
 written yet).

 Yes, we definitely should.

 > Looking at https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards it
 seems to me we are talking only about public relays and not private ones
 (i.e. bridges) when considering guards to the Tor network. However, the UI
 shows "Guard" and "Your Guard node may not change. Learn more", too, in
 cases where users have configured bridges. I think this is misleading and
 we should avoid that.

 Good point. Here's a new version that hides the "Guard" stuff when a
 bridge is being used:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commits/24309+7

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25919 [Core Tor/Stem]: Tor not generating ADDRMAP Events for Externally Resolved HTTP(S) Requests

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25919: Tor not generating ADDRMAP Events for Externally Resolved HTTP(S) 
Requests
-+---
 Reporter:  jparkerdiamond   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  addrmap, stem, tor, tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by jparkerdiamond):

 * Attachment "ipecho_body.txt" added.

 HTML Body showing IP Address of Tor Exit

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[tor-bugs] #25920 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH for v3 services

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25920: HSFETCH for v3 services
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tracking ticket for [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree
 /control-spec.txt#n1480 downloading HS descriptors] for v3 services.

 {{{
 21:16 <+asn> parazyd: so i guess the answer is "it's not currently
 impossible to fetch it using the control port" :/
 21:17 <+asn> parazyd: we could in theory implement HSFETCH for v3
 21:17 <+asn> parazyd: but it's not really in the roadmap or prioritized
 21:17 <+atagar> asn: Maybe we should have a ticket to track v3 HSFETCH? I
 did a quick search but couldn't find what to point them toward since
 #20699 is closed.
 21:18 <+asn> atagar: agreed
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25919 [Core Tor/Stem]: Tor not generating ADDRMAP Events for Externally Resolved HTTP(S) Requests

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25919: Tor not generating ADDRMAP Events for Externally Resolved HTTP(S) 
Requests
-+---
 Reporter:  jparkerdiamond   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  addrmap, stem, tor, tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by jparkerdiamond):

 * Attachment "tor_curl_output.txt" added.

 Output of cURL working through Tor

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[tor-bugs] #25919 [Core Tor/Stem]: Tor not generating ADDRMAP Events for Externally Resolved HTTP(S) Requests

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25919: Tor not generating ADDRMAP Events for Externally Resolved HTTP(S) 
Requests
+-
 Reporter:  jparkerdiamond  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  addrmap, stem, tor, tor-dns
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 Tor Version 0.3.2.10
 Stem Version 1.6.0

 Previous use of Stem with Tor used to to generate ADDRMAP events that
 would provide which hostnames were resolved to which IP addresses. Not
 sure what component changed along the way, but it does not appear to
 generate ADDRMAP events anymore. The change was noticed a month or two
 ago, but I didn't run this check at every upgrade, so I don't know exactly
 what changed/when.

 I use the following to create a Tor process and to add event listeners for
 ADDRMAP and STREAM events with Stem. Relevant Code:

 {{{
 config = {"ControlPort": "9050",
   "DataDirectory": "/some_directory",
   "MaxCircuitDirtiness": "3600",
   "SocksPort": "7000",
   "StrictNodes": "1"}

 def start(self):
 self.process = stem.process.launch_tor_with_config(self.config,
 timeout=180, take_ownership=True)
 self.controller =
 stem.control.Controller.from_port(port=int(self.config['ControlPort']))
 self.controller.authenticate()
 self.controller.set_caching(False)
 #self.controller.add_event_listener(self.exitCheck,
 stem.control.EventType.STREAM)
 self.controller.add_event_listener(self.addrMap,
 stem.control.EventType.ADDRMAP)
 return (self.process, self.controller)

 def addrMap(self,resolution):
 print("Added resolution of {0} to
 {1}".format(resolution.hostname,resolution.destination))
 self.resources.add(resolution.hostname+','+resolution.destination)
 }}}

 The commented line registers another listener that listens for STREAM
 events -- those work and are printed out. cURL and a Selenium driven
 browser are successfully passed through Tor (ipecho shows the expected
 exit IP address), but they do not generate a ADDRMAP event. Additionally,
 subsequent requests (via HTML events or JS, etc) from a page make it
 through Tor, but they receive a general server failure, which might be a
 separate issue.

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[tor-bugs] #25918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Standardize the 'onion service' name

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25918: Standardize the 'onion service' name
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-April/013097.html A
 recent post on tor-dev@] just got me thinking about the roadblocks we have
 for v2 deprecation. There's a couple I don't believe we're following in
 trac so lets fix that.

 For me the biggest is its name. Renaming takes work, and we attempted to
 rename hidden services in v3 without investing the time to make it happen.
 We should either fix that or revert to to the old name. To move forward we
 need to...

 1. Have OnionService aliases for controller commands, events, descriptor
 fields, and anything else referencing 'HS' or 'HiddenService'.

  Speaking of which, how do we plan to replace abbreviations? Having an
 'OSFETCH' or 'OS_CREATED' event doesn't exactly have the same ring as
 their HS counterparts. ;P

 2. Adjust all our docs to be consistent about the name.

 Renaming takes work. Lesson I learned from Nyx is that it works best if
 you draw a line in the sand and stand by it. With Nyx, version 2.0 is
 called Nyx (you won't find any docs saying otherwise) and version 1.x is
 the legacy 'arm' project.

 If I was in your shoes I'd opt for the same. Either prioritize the aliases
 and be firm that v3 are 'Onion Services' or abort the rename. Otherwise
 this will live in a confusing dual-named limbo land indefinitely. ;P

 Cheers! -Damian

 PS. Stem and Nyx have stuck with the old name ("hidden services") and will
 continue to do so until tor's standardized this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (That is, Tor doesn't use or need libevent's openssl support.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 fwiw, you can build libevent with --disable-openssl

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:14 isis]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > > Hm. Can you get it to dump version and h_version there, to see what
 they are claiming to be?
 >
 > {{{
 > crypto/openssl_version: [forking] openssl version = 1.0.2l
 > openssl h_version = 1.0.2n
 >   FAIL ../src/test/test_crypto.c:156: assert(!strcmpstart(version,
 h_version))
 >   [openssl_version FAILED]
 > }}}
 > (From
 [https://ci.appveyor.com/project/isislovecruft/tor/build/1.0.13#L2304 this
 build].)
 >
 > I believe the mismatch is due to using pacman to install openssl when
 [https://www.appveyor.com/docs/build-environment/#tools it's already
 installed]; I'll try not reinstalling it.
 >

 Update: It's because pacman is installing libevent, and its version of
 libevent wants openssl, and somehow it doesn't recognise that openssl is
 already installed.  Also, there's no way to tell pacman which version of
 openssl to install, because Arch is a steaming pile of crap made by
 masochists who like everything to be maximally broken all the time. I'm
 going to try building libevent from git instead, and get rid of this
 pacman garbage entirely.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16665 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit visualizer needs a cue about guards

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#16665: Circuit visualizer needs a cue about guards
-+-
 Reporter:  lunar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201603, ux-team, |
  tbb-7.0-frequent   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Basically fixed in the work by Arthur in #24309.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804, ff60-esr-  |  Actual Points:
  will-have  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:25 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:24 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [comment:21 gk]:
 > > > Interestingly, I recall that I still needed that when I worked on
 the Stylo bug, which means with a pretty recent m-c tree.
 > > (As you're not polite and don't think it's good form to reply to
 useful comments, this comment was reduced.)
 > > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1257501
 >
 > The bug you want is https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1443823
 (see my comment 8).
 Who wants?
 > The patch in the bug you are linking to is just concerned with the 32bit
 cross-compilation, which is not the problem we are facing in this ticket:
 only when cross-compiling for 64bit Windows are we hitting the STL wrapper
 related compiler error.
 Forbid the usage of `-fno-keep-inline-dllexport` optimization option
 entirely and recheck.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > Hm. Can you get it to dump version and h_version there, to see what they
 are claiming to be?

 {{{
 crypto/openssl_version: [forking] openssl version = 1.0.2l
 openssl h_version = 1.0.2n
   FAIL ../src/test/test_crypto.c:156: assert(!strcmpstart(version,
 h_version))
   [openssl_version FAILED]
 }}}

 (From
 [https://ci.appveyor.com/project/isislovecruft/tor/build/1.0.13#L2304 this
 build].)

 I believe the mismatch is due to using pacman to install openssl when
 [https://www.appveyor.com/docs/build-environment/#tools it's already
 installed]; I'll try not reinstalling it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25917 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Audit Suggested Site

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25917: TBA - Audit Suggested Site
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5709 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 We need better thumbnails for check.tp.o and tp.o, too. I think we can
 steal the onion favicons (or whatever we use on the new website). In
 reality, we need higher resolution images than favicons, but we can tackle
 one problem at a time, if that's easier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25892 [Core Tor/Tor]: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25892: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 Actually I would also like this feature even though I didn't know about
 RejectPlaintextPorts before seeing this ticket.

 This feature would make the torrc also a lot cleaner.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25892 [Core Tor/Tor]: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25892: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-config|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:   => tor-config
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Hi! If by "my Tor" you meant a relay that you're running, this is can be
 accomplished with the ExitPolicy configuration option:

 {{{
 ExitPolicy accept *:443, accept *:9877, reject *:*
 }}}

 If you meant your Tor client, however, this is accomplished by running:

 {{{#!python
 python -c"import sys;sys.stdout.write('RejectPlaintextPorts
 '+','.join([str(x) for x in range(65535) if not x in (443,9877)]))" >>
 /etc/tor/torrc
 }}}

 I'm going to close this because I don't see it being a generally useful
 feature for most users, but feel free to reopen if you disagree.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25900 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run clean_consdiffmgr() callback on all directories

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25900: Run clean_consdiffmgr() callback on all directories
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25500| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 See branch: `ticket25900_034_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23591 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Tor and Tor Browser with -mmitigate-rop

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23591: Build Tor and Tor Browser with -mmitigate-rop
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => tbb-security
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Needs investigation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25899 [Core Tor/Tor]: Only run retry_dns() and check_dns_honesty() on exits

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25899: Only run retry_dns() and check_dns_honesty() on exits
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 nickm mentionned that things will changed through another branch or new
 commit(s).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19665 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should *Port_set count sockets?

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19665: Should *Port_set count sockets?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control technical-debt config|  Actual Points:
  torrc startup  |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 See branch `ticket19665_034_01`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25917 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Audit Suggested Site

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25917: TBA - Audit Suggested Site
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5709 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm => tbb-mobile


Comment:

 Not related to rbm.

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[tor-bugs] #25917 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Audit Suggested Site

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25917: TBA - Audit Suggested Site
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-
  |  rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #5709
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On Desktop, we don't have any suggested sites. Orfox currently shows:
 - Check
 - tp.o
 - guardianproject.info
 - Facebook Onion

 I'm hesitant about us being in the position of promoting some sites (and
 specifically onion sites) over others. However, if we keep Facebook here,
 then maybe we should add/replace others. NYT? ProPublica? It's easy for us
 to start down this path, but I'm not sure we'll like where this will take
 us. That being said, this is the easiest way we can promote using onion
 sites over internet TLDs, especially on mobile.

 Firefox on Android current shows:
 - Facebook
 - Youtube
 - Amazon
 - Wikimedia
 - Twitter

 Note, this is different from about:tor. These sites are shown when the
 user clicks on the URL bar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25876: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  attila|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 I started working on this in branch `bug_25876_v2`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25876_v2=6013d37fda456b987fe1f5e3262340f2a28d30b0

 {{{
 $ make openbsd-port-alpha
 git submodule update --init
 ./rbm/rbm build openbsd-port --target alpha
 Building project tor-browser - src-tarballs-8.0a6-build1-build1-9e0027
 Using directory /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/projects/tor-browser/Bundle-
 Data
 Building project torbutton - torbutton-1.9.9.1-c33dea.xpi
 Tag 1.9.9.1 is signed with key 35CD74C24A9B15A19E1A81A194373AA94B7C3223
 Created /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/tmp/rbm-
 MswRJ/torbutton-1.9.9.1.tar.gz
 Build log: /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/logs/torbutton.log
 Finished build of project torbutton - torbutton-1.9.9.1-c33dea.xpi
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-
 port/torbutton/torbutton-1.9.9.1-c33dea.xpi
 Building project tor-launcher - tor-launcher-0.2.15.1-01c01f.xpi
 Tag 0.2.15.1 is signed with key 35CD74C24A9B15A19E1A81A194373AA94B7C3223
 Created /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/tmp/rbm-KUjp3/tor-
 launcher-0.2.15.1.tar.gz
 Build log: /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/logs/tor-launcher.log
 Finished build of project tor-launcher - tor-launcher-0.2.15.1-01c01f.xpi
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-port/tor-launcher
 /tor-launcher-0.2.15.1-01c01f.xpi
 Building project firefox - tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1-build2.tar.gz
 Tag tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1-build2 is signed with key
 35CD74C24A9B15A19E1A81A194373AA94B7C3223
 Created /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/tmp/rbm-HPgTn/firefox-
 90e16dd25b6e.tar.gz
 Build log: /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/logs/firefox.log
 Finished build of project firefox - tor-
 browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1-build2.tar.gz
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-port/firefox/tor-
 browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1-build2.tar.gz
 converted
 'https://secure.informaction.com/download/releases/noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi'
 (ANSI_X3.4-1968) ->
 'https://secure.informaction.com/download/releases/noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi'
 (UTF-8)
 --2018-04-25 16:27:04--
 https://secure.informaction.com/download/releases/noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi
 Resolving secure.informaction.com (secure.informaction.com)...
 69.195.158.197, 69.195.158.196, 69.195.158.195, ...
 Connecting to secure.informaction.com
 (secure.informaction.com)|69.195.158.197|:443... connected.
 HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
 Length: 789174 (771K) [application/x-xpinstall]
 Saving to: '/home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-port/tor-
 browser/noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi'

 /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-
 
100%[===>]
 770.68K  1.26MB/s   in 0.6s

 2018-04-25 16:27:05 (1.26 MB/s) - '/home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out
 /openbsd-port/tor-browser/noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi' saved [789174/789174]

 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-port/tor-
 browser/noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi
 Building project https-everywhere - https-everywhere-2018.4.11-6efcd6.xpi
 Tag 2018.4.11 is signed with key 1073E74EB38BD6D19476CBF8EA9DBF9FB761A677
 Created /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/tmp/rbm-G1sBy/https-
 everywhere-2018.4.11.tar.gz
 Build log: /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/logs/https-everywhere.log
 Finished build of project https-everywhere - https-
 everywhere-2018.4.11-6efcd6.xpi
 Using file /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-port/https-everywhere
 /https-everywhere-2018.4.11-6efcd6.xpi
 Build log: /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/logs/tor-browser.log
 Finished build of project tor-browser - src-
 tarballs-8.0a6-build1-build1-9e0027
 Using directory /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/out/openbsd-port/tor-browser
 /src-tarballs-8.0a6-build1-build1-9e0027
 Build log: /home/boklm/tor-browser-build/logs/openbsd-port.log
 $ ls -l alpha/openbsd-port/8.0a6-build1/src-tarballs/
 total 296952
 -rw-r--r-- 1 boklm boklm   1646514 Apr 25 18:27 https-
 everywhere-2018.4.11-6efcd6.xpi
 -rw-r--r-- 1 boklm boklm789174 Apr 25 18:27 noscript-5.1.8.5.xpi
 -rw-r--r-- 1 boklm boklm 299179260 Apr 25 18:27 tor-
 browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1-build2.tar.gz
 -rw-r--r-- 1 boklm boklm953652 Apr 25 18:27 tor-browser-bundle-
 data-8.0a6-build1.tar.gz
 -rw-r--r-- 1 boklm boklm843424 Apr 25 18:27
 torbutton-1.9.9.1-c33dea.xpi

Re: [tor-bugs] #25909 [Applications/Tor Browser]: disable updater telemetry

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25909: disable updater telemetry
+--
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr,TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr,TorBrowserTeam201804 =>
   ff60-esr,TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #25916 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable MOZ_DISABLE_CONTENT_SANDBOX

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25916: Disable MOZ_DISABLE_CONTENT_SANDBOX
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 MOZ_DISABLE_CONTENT_SANDBOX can be used at runtime to disable the content
 sandbox.  If an attacker can influence this, we're probably already sunk,
 but just like we disable the "Dump all your TLS Session Keys here please"
 environment variable, we should disable this one too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25610 [Core Tor/Tor]: module: Modularized directory authority subsystem

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25610: module: Modularized directory authority subsystem
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  modularization, 034-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  subtask, tor-dirauth, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25494   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => ahf


Comment:

 Alpha version: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/58

 The gist is:

 * `--disable-module-dirauth` configure option is the option. The module is
 enabled by default.
 * Currently, when disabling the module, the tests do not build due to a
 linking error which is what the WIP commit is for but not succeeding for
 now.
 * All the commits are moving code around and very few do move code into
 *new* functions.
 * `dirserv.c` and `directory.c` have a lot of dirauth specific code but we
 should clean it up and extract the code to the module as a second step to
 this.

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[tor-bugs] #25915 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Audit menu UI

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25915: TBA - Audit menu UI
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #5709
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 If we changed a default setting/preference value, does the menu option
 correctly show the value?

 For example, we enable `Clear private data on exit`, but it is not checked
 in the Settings menu.

 Any other options/prefs? The UI should reflect the actual current state.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#16472: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201804,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804   |
Parent ID:  #12968   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:54 gk]:
 > Beacuse he is not using ucrtbase yet but plain msvcrt (you are using the
 former with `--with-default-msvcrt=ucrtbase`). See:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1390583#c51 for an unresolved
 issue.
 Did you add `--with-default-msvcrt=ucrtbase` to both headers and crt?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix vanguard restrictions

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25870: Fix vanguard restrictions
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:6 asn]:
 > OK, the explanation above makes sense but it's also quite complicated.
 I'm gonna try to write some unittests and see if I can get a bit more
 confidence.
 >
 > Another design-level question: Why are we doing this change just for
 vanguard circuits and not for all circuits? Is it because we only aim to
 protect against guard-discovery attacks like #14917 only in vanguard
 circuits? Or because vanguard-circuits are naturally not 3-hops and so
 it's eaier to block A - B -A type circs? Or something else?

 I decided to do the first commit because it is a simple way to prevent the
 adversary from being able to influence your guard choice without
 completely changing how we build paths. I only did it for vanguards
 because we did not agree on a solution for how we want to handle
 restrictions in the general case. And also yes, with vanguards it does not
 create any degenerate conditions that induce warnings, but it would with
 normal circuits.

 I decided to do the second commit because the HSLayerN options will
 generate warnings on relays as-is. I originally removed all restrictions
 for vanguard circuits because of issues discovered during testing of
 #13837 and #24487. With two entry guards and this patch (which we can also
 do easily with vanguards), #24487 no longer leaks information to later
 layers, and the HSLayerN options will no longer cause warnings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix vanguard restrictions

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25870: Fix vanguard restrictions
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 OK, the explanation above makes sense but it's also quite complicated. I'm
 gonna try to write some unittests and see if I can get a bit more
 confidence.

 Another design-level question: Why are we doing this change just for
 vanguard circuits and not for all circuits? Is it because we only aim to
 protect against guard-discovery attacks like #14917 only in vanguard
 circuits? Or because vanguard-circuits are naturally not 3-hops and so
 it's eaier to block A - B -A type circs? Or something else?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---

Comment (by antonela):

 Thank people for jumping on this ticket! For sure, privacy and security
 concepts have diffuse borders for user's interpretation.

 Last week we talked about which icon/image/metaphor represents "security"
 better, and the lock seems to be the most robust option.

 I tried to avoid empty states, or the idea of something is wrong when the
 setting is at the default level.

 I worked on two ideas:

 -
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/25658%20-%203.png
 This option shows some progress which I know is not exactly what the
 configuration represents but in some way it shows the status of the
 security level.

 -
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/25658%20-%204.png
 Talking with Hiro about this came up the idea about more circles, more
 security. And it also works as a representation of a layer of protection.
 So, adding layers/circles, we add security. Does it look like an abstract
 onion? :)

 Open to discuss all these ideas during our meeting today!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25810 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fixes for Orfox

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25810: Backport fixes for Orfox
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 The backported bugs 1356893 and 1416940 are attached. The freetype ones we
 decided to skip for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 4.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 3.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25810 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fixes for Orfox

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25810: Backport fixes for Orfox
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * Attachment "0002-Bug-1416940-r-snorp.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25810 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fixes for Orfox

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25810: Backport fixes for Orfox
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-1356893-Reject-opening-intents-with-file-data-
 sc.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25577 [Core Tor/Tor]: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25577: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-must, regression fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25466 [Applications/Tor Browser]: On OSX Installation not completing, stuck on loading screen "Mounting..."

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25466: On OSX Installation not completing, stuck on loading screen 
"Mounting..."
--+--
 Reporter:  uhat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 Is this issue resolved? If not, please reopen this ticket and provide the
 information I requested in comment:2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24434 [Metrics/Library]: Provide fallback list parser

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24434: Provide fallback list parser
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24429   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 As #24854 is now also implemented, we probably want to have a parser for
 those lists (directory authorities) too.

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=1295044dc8c999fb8c4a3de0011ab900053e7b1b
 is the relevant commit.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/plain/src/or/auth_dirs.inc is the
 relevant file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 029-backport, review-group-22,   |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25263   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:
 tor-relay, security-low, privcount, 031-backport, 029-backport, 026
 -backport-maybe, review-group-22, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328
 =>
 tor-relay, security-low, privcount, 031-backport, 029-backport,
 review-group-22, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328


Comment:

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C99#IEEE_754_floating_point_support

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25914 [Core Tor/Tor]: dirserv: Remove dead code

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25914: dirserv: Remove dead code
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, deadcode, easy, 034 |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-subtask   |
Parent ID:  #25610   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `ticket25914_034_01`

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[tor-bugs] #25914 [Core Tor/Tor]: dirserv: Remove dead code

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25914: dirserv: Remove dead code
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-dirauth, deadcode, easy, 034
 Severity:  Normal   |  -roadmap-subtask
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25610
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 While working on #25610, I've noticed dead code that uses
 `dirserv_get_consensus()`.

 In `networkstatus.c`, function `networkstatus_set_current_consensus()`:

 We parse the flavor and if it is unknown, we bail early with:

 {{{
   if (flav < 0) {
 /*  we don't handle unrecognized flavors yet. */
 log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unrecognized consensus flavor %s", flavor);
 return -2;
   }
 }}}

 But later in the function we have this if/else on the flavor name with a
 `else {}` statement that uses `dirserv_get_consensus()`. But we can't get
 into that else case since the first conditions are the only two flavors we
 can handle.

 In between the first checks above and this if/else ^, the flavor can
 change as in we take the one from the given consensus but again, there is
 a check on if we can handle that flavor:

 {{{
   if (flav != usable_consensus_flavor() &&
   !we_want_to_fetch_flavor(options, flav)) {
 }}}

 Bottom line, I think the `else {}` code is dead code. This simplifies the
 callgraph into the dirauth subsystem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25577 [Core Tor/Tor]: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25577: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-must, regression fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > I think this is a one-liner: please review `bug25577_034`?

 Yes exactly that is the fix! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25577 [Core Tor/Tor]: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25577: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-must, regression fast-fix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  regression, 034-triage-20180328, 034-must, regression =>
 regression, 034-triage-20180328, 034-must, regression fast-fix
 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 I think this is a one-liner: please review `bug25577_034`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25577 [Core Tor/Tor]: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25577: cmux: CircuitPriorityHalflife value is never taken from the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-must, regression   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  dgoulet => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25913 [Core Tor/Tor]: If our win32 monotonic timers are not monotonic, make them so.

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25913: If our win32 monotonic timers are not monotonic, make them so.
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I have a branch, `ratchet_gettickcount`, against maint-0.2.9.

 Not putting this in needs_review, since again we don't actually know we
 have a Windows bug to work around here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25910 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: please update my OpenPGP key in db.torproject.org

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25910: please update my OpenPGP key in db.torproject.org
-+
 Reporter:  alison   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #25913 [Core Tor/Tor]: If our win32 monotonic timers are not monotonic, make them so.

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25913: If our win32 monotonic timers are not monotonic, make them so.
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There's a rumor that sometimes GetTickCount64 or GetTickCount can move
 backwards.  This is possibly due to a misunderstanding of bug #23558
 (fixed with `77cc97cf0a20ed0a062a1cb87bef6c40941e4cff`).  But in case it
 isn't, we should fix it.

 (QueryPerformanceCounter *can* move backwards, and we have code to handle
 that.)

 Putting this ticket in tor:unspecified since I don't actually think we
 have a bug here.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16659

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #16659 by irl:


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6473, #16520

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

Batch modification to #6473, #16520 by irl:


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI in a WebPage

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25790: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI 
in
a WebPage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25703| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Nice! It seems we are good for the first alpha then as this one will
 likely be based on Firefox 61? If so, let's close this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI in a WebPage

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25790: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI 
in
a WebPage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25703| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 It was merged in Firefox master:

 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/9a092f00fdd6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25843 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make NumEntryGuards consistent with #271 consensus params

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25843: Make NumEntryGuards consistent with #271 consensus params
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25843 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make NumEntryGuards consistent with #271 consensus params

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25843: Make NumEntryGuards consistent with #271 consensus params
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > This seems good for testing, but I don't think this is actually the
 right behavior if we want to make these values adjustable IRL.  Instead, I
 think we should make separate, independent configuration options.  That
 way, if we (or anybody else!) want to experiment with different values, we
 can actually experiment with the full range of possibilities.

 Good point. Please check branch `bug25843_v2` which introduces the
 `NumPrimaryGuards` torrc option.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7177 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Understand how accurate the bandwidth authority estimates are

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#7177: Understand how accurate the bandwidth authority estimates are
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13630| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24250 [Core Tor/Tor]: In a private network some relays advertise zero bandwidth-observed

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24250: In a private network some relays advertise zero bandwidth-observed
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 031-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, 033-backport,|
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19009 [Core Tor/Tor]: bandwidth testing circuits should be allowed to use our guards

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#19009: bandwidth testing circuits should be allowed to use our guards
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bandwidth torflow measurement|  Actual Points:
  metrics|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7281 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Bandwidth auths should publish average and weighted onionskin failure rates

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#7281: Bandwidth auths should publish average and weighted onionskin failure 
rates
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #5456 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16559 [Core Tor/Torflow]: bwauth code needs to be smarter about failed circuits

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#16559: bwauth code needs to be smarter about failed circuits
--+
 Reporter:  TvdW  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13630| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24104 [Core Tor/Tor]: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24104: Delay descriptor bandwidth reporting on large relays
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats, chutney-  |  Actual Points:
  wants, bwauth-wants, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25912 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1435130: Incorrect expression (COPY_PASTE_ERROR)

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25912: CID 1435130:  Incorrect expression  (COPY_PASTE_ERROR)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25912 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1435130: Incorrect expression (COPY_PASTE_ERROR)

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25912: CID 1435130:  Incorrect expression  (COPY_PASTE_ERROR)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Fixed with `bb35405d2ad01dbc8cf59ed275c41bd7d6098ae8` in 0.3.1 and
 forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays should regularly do a larger bandwidth self-test

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#22453: Relays should regularly do a larger bandwidth self-test
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #24499   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23693 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#23693: 0.3.1.7: Assertion threadpool failed in cpuworker_queue_work
-+-
 Reporter:  alif |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 The original version of this patch had a bug: #23693.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25912 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1435130: Incorrect expression (COPY_PASTE_ERROR)

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25912: CID 1435130:  Incorrect expression  (COPY_PASTE_ERROR)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop286, 034-triage-20180328,|  Actual Points:
  034-must crash 033-backport 032-backport   |
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Yup, that seems right to me.  Fixing...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25876: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  attila|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Some other idea, maybe for a different ticket: after looking a little at
 https://github.com/openbsd/ports/tree/master/www/tor-browser, I have been
 thinking that in addition to having a command to generate source tarballs,
 if that's helpful it might be possible to add the openbsd `www/tor-
 browser` directory somewhere into `tor-browser-build`. Then we could have
 some `make openbsd-port-release` command that would generate an updated
 `www/tor-browser` directory with:
 - `Makefile` files for tor-browser, browser, https-everywhere, noscript,
 tor-launcher, torbutton with updated version numbers
 - `distinfo` files for browser, https-everywhere, noscript, tor-launcher,
 torbutton with updated SHA256SUM and SIZE
 - `tor-browser/browser/files/extension-overrides.js` file with updated
 list of bridges and other prefs

 Then the openbsd port release process could be something like:
 - checkout the new tor browser version tag in `tor-browser-build`
 - run `make openbsd-port-release`
 - upload source tarballs somewhere
 - copy updated `www/tor-browser` to openbsd ports tree
 - go to the openbsd ports tree, start the build and commit the changes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Two comments so far:

 The "Learn more" link goes to the Tor Browser manual in *general* but
 seems to indicate that the user gets to know more about why the guard node
 is not changing in *particular*. I wonder whether we should link to a
 dedicate guard related section in the manual instead (which has to get
 written yet).

 Looking at https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards it
 seems to me we are talking only about public relays and not private ones
 (i.e. bridges) when considering guards to the Tor network. However, the UI
 shows "Guard" and "Your Guard node may not change. Learn more", too, in
 cases where users have configured bridges. I think this is misleading and
 we should avoid that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25876: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  attila|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > You mean a source tarball just for the browser part or for the whole
 bundle, including things like pluggable transports, the browser profile,
 tor, etc.?

 Okay, answering my own question: looking at the related tickets (#25877
 and #25878) it seems only the browser part, torbutton, and tor-launcher
 are requested.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Button

2018-04-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki

#25877: Source release tarballs for Tor Button
--+--
 Reporter:  attila|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-torbutton
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Torbutton => Applications/Tor Browser


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