Re: [tor-bugs] #27623 [Applications/Tor Browser]: wrong default pref values in Tor Browser 8.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27623: wrong default pref values in Tor Browser 8.0
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-8.0-issues,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201809R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by fuckingtrac):

 Enabled Remote Debugging / Backdoor don't bother you?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27175 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript plugin does not save per-site permissions/settings when tor browser closes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27175: NoScript plugin does not save per-site permissions/settings when tor
browser closes
-+-
 Reporter:  tor-user-1234|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, tbb-regression,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  noscript, tbb-regression, tbb-8.0-issues => noscript, tbb-
 regression, tbb-8.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201809R


Comment:

 Below is a patch for review. It introduces a pref,
 "extensions.torbutton.noscript_persist" that is disabled by default. When
 enabled, it allows per-site settings to be persisted in NoScript. Note
 that, even with the pref enabled, if the user changes the security slider
 setting, all custom per-site settings are lost.

 However, enabling this pref is dangerous in my opinion and should only be
 used with caution.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/27175

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27427 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [PATCH] Fix NoScript IPC for about:blank by whitelisting messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27427: [PATCH] Fix NoScript IPC for about:blank by whitelisting messages
-+-
 Reporter:  rustybird|  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201809R,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I tested both of rustybird's patches from comment:16. They worked well and
 look good to me. So I think we're good to go for the alpha. For
 convenience here's a branch with both patches:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commits/27427_alpha

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27759 [Core Tor/Tor]: 3 Bugs in Tor relay logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27759: 3 Bugs in Tor relay logs
--+--
 Reporter:  fcornu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by fcornu):

 Apologies for the poor stack trace formatting

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[tor-bugs] #27759 [Core Tor/Tor]: 3 Bugs in Tor relay logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27759: 3 Bugs in Tor relay logs
--+--
 Reporter:  fcornu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Greetings, all :)

 Got these in my relay's log this morning

 `Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug:
 Emptied a dirserv buffer, but it's still spooling! (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18
 06:00:58.000 [warn] connection_mark_for_close_internal_(): Bug: Duplicate
 call to connection_mark_for_close at ../src/or/directory.c:5201 (first at
 ../src/or/main.c:1210) (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn]
 tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/connection.c:841:
 connection_mark_for_close_internal_: This line should not have been
 reached. (Future instances of this warning will be silenced.) (on Tor
 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at
 connection_mark_for_close_internal_ at ../src/or/connection.c:841. Stack
 trace: (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44) [0x5605ad9f8354] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18
 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9)
 [0x5605ada132f9] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_dir_finished_flushing+0xab) [0x5605ad9acd3b] (on
 Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_handle_read+0xb7a) [0x5605ad98586a] (on Tor
 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x53afe)
 [0x5605ad8c3afe] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6a0)
 [0x7f5fe7ebb5a0] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x265) [0x5605ad8c5e95] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18
 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1175)
 [0x5605ad8c8685] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x5605ad8c04ba] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18
 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x5605ad8c0229] (on
 Tor 0.3.4.8 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1) [0x7f5fe67172e1] (on Tor 0.3.4.8
 )Sep 18 06:00:58.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)
 [0x5605ad8c027a] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 )`

 As they appeared quite on the same time, I thought I'd report them in a
 single ticket, they may be related.

 Relay is 'wardsback'

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27758 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the requi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27758: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are
required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the
required permissions.
--+-
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 a crawl bot caused a lot of load today so this feature was disabled,
 hopefully just temporarily, sorry :/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27728 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: Build an HSv3 descriptor with authorized client is apparently broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27728: test: Build an HSv3 descriptor with authorized client is apparently 
broken
--+
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Hello71):

 specifically, steps to reproduce:

 1. install gcc, maybe you need 8.2.1+20180831-1 (I use Arch, fyi),
 probably 8.2.0 or even earlier will break too

 2. configure tor git master with `CFLAGS='-O3 -flto' LDFLAGS=-flto`
 (probably -O2 works too, but I only tried -O3)

 3. `make src/test/test`

 alternatively:

 1. insert:
 {{{
 #ifndef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
 #error bad include
 #endif
 }}}
 in src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h.

 2. make `src/test/test`.

 because only the test executable is being built, all object files must
 define crypto_strongest_rand as the same type. this requires that
 src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h must always be included with
 TOR_UNIT_TESTS (or without, but we are forcing only tests to be built
 here)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27757 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha: minor changelog fixes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27757: 0.3.5.1-alpha: minor changelog fixes
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-changelog  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged those; thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27757 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha: minor changelog fixes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27757: 0.3.5.1-alpha: minor changelog fixes
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-changelog  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my branch ticket27757 at https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.10-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  implemented
  bootstrap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.4.10-alpha


Comment:

 This is actually a fix on commit fcf906ec733 in 0.2.4.10-alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26369: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26369: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20874 [Core Tor/Tor]: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20874: ReachableAddresses adds an extra reject *:* on every SAVECONF
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client, torrc, saveconf, |  Actual Points:
  configuration, annoyance, 035-triaged- |
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 This is a bugfix on commit 249b72f53e in 0.1.1.5-alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27758 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the requi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27758: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are
required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the
required permissions.
--+-
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)


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[tor-bugs] #27758 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the required

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27758: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are
required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the
required permissions.
+--
 Reporter:  neel|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 When I go to the Tor bug tracker from the website, I get an error like:

 >Error: Forbidden
 >
 >REPORT_VIEW privileges are required to perform this operation on
 report:12. You don't have the required permissions.

 In the past (2016-2017), I was able to view this Bug tracker without
 signing in. Later, it required that I sign in (early 2018), and now I
 can't even view the bugs even with an account.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15518 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor considers routers in the same IPv6 /16 to be "in the same subnet"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15518: Tor considers routers in the same IPv6 /16 to be "in the same subnet"
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, path, path-bias, tor-client|  Actual Points:
  easy   |
Parent ID:  #24393   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.3.1-alpha


Comment:

 This bug was introduced in f9ea242aca in 0.2.3.1-alpha.

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[tor-bugs] #27757 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha: minor changelog fixes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27757: 0.3.5.1-alpha: minor changelog fixes
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-changelog
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23512 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23512: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, congestion-attack,   |  Actual Points:
  research, watermark, tor-stats, guard- |
  discovery-stats, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Ok I changed the patch's use of approx_time() to time() for consistency
 with rephist.c (which fixes the flapping test for me), and I now check the
 exact byte count in the tests. Otherwise the following branches are
 identical to v3. Setting back to merge_ready.

 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/348
 0.3.2: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/349
 0.3.3: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/350
 0.3.4: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/351 (same as 0.3.3, but PR
 against 0.3.4 for CI tests)
 master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/352

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27756 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27756: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-changes, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27756 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27756: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-changes, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 sure, seems reasonable. merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27756 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27756: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-changes, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See my bug27756 branch on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

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[tor-bugs] #27756 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27756: 0.3.5.1-alpha ChangeLog: delete all the consensuses to un-break nss
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-changes, fast-fix
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 The required protocol version check occurs before the consensus flavour
 check. So on directory mirrors, alpha users need to delete both consensus
 flavours.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27130 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust dependency updating instructions don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27130: rust dependency updating instructions don't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 catalyst]:
 > I think we only need to backport if we expect to need to update the rust
 dependencies in the older releases.

 While the older releases are still supported, we might update their
 dependencies:
 * to resolve rust bugs, or
 * to pick up security fixes, or
 * if the exact versions of crates in the old cargo config stop being
 available.

 It's also worth being consistent between releases.

 Since this patch is pretty simple, I think we should backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27755 [Webpages/Website]: Please remove/deactivate Grant Writer job posting (website)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27755: Please remove/deactivate Grant Writer job posting (website)
--+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/52

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27730 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27730: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 cyberpunks]:
 > This check was completely redundant anyway, actually. There would be a
 potential memory leak here, where buf is non-null but the length is
 impossibly long, except it can't happen because even ignoring running out
 of ram, `read_file_to_str()` calls a function that
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/lib/fs/files.c?id=f606b3cfd157dc52872e8b40a9a042861d9246e1#n186
 makes the same check against SSIZE_MAX already.]

 We don't mind a few redundant checks: they are a defence in depth. It's
 easy to forget to do a size check.

 Also, this cast might have unexpected results if off_t and ssize_t are
 different types:
 {{{
 (ssize_t)st.st_size
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #27755 [Webpages/Website]: Please remove/deactivate Grant Writer job posting (website)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27755: Please remove/deactivate Grant Writer job posting (website)
+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Webpages/Website
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Hello. Please remove/deactivate the Grant Writer job posting from the
 website. The position has been filled and we’ll be making an announcement
 soon. Thank you!
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAlugPMsACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc702Q/+Lo4OOdtOtpbBQLc6DLPG0AVM2a/uO+BOsV1DtSZac8KkUVs6+uiOjlKt
 icJXpcNykozcx9P7z7Yyo9hBG29UVNTZWMgbzEneXomFBm4wTSXYHAtSbL9zuwVl
 mrznzULYNhRjyYHKQE2LmAd5vtGskfhK0qaIAsBKsrirvb7602ovQN8vhS5B0kC1
 80RB9MNQk3ClLqZUE+KuxFSRq0CUiqZ1KvEydQfVRFSBFh5xFG9bOycPD0phph4X
 R/kkpdUFlQwR3wpkomkcL/guBkGqrorCHZpG3C0ZgkbC65N1TFTWNX3YkFSV2LhR
 vLfN3sCwfipZ9JO6E7pckvLOYcYkr0jWVltdyIRIIyIlbzKnsn26JTI5skWvojQr
 3/cQWQ/aEseHW6ANZt0MfM2Nm8hBZCsEkkmxcdUNOuquuz9xmIFcrSZN7dZ+MluR
 CoJKQDEgvPmckV1Nl6JjGOW/hBjZEi/37I9a4Qa8lkYjw4c5xI31WYxzJrZeFdw2
 i8GTLfREQJr9QlpHRXi4aVhKf7LE2yKg6JTeo1C/xEKRNEqN7jnVUzc3fR6Ou5VR
 TQbE/dJKVLvtdxD9Bh5uca1K1Cy1JcKxk68DdPja0L7yW/Q5BHBmdMRAwzEXoRTm
 xZEdONe84Q/mMBymZSggL+rF3ct09Fbut+0KrNNDS28b4X09hOI=
 =N1Zm
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27396 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Don't track progress.dtd in the import translations script anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27396: Don't track progress.dtd in the import translations script anymore
---+-
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready


Comment:

 The tor-launcher patch looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:8 cyberpunks]:
 > If #27273 were fixed and there were rust + asan CI runs, would asan have
 probably caught this?

 Probably not:
 * ASAN monitors RAM accesses, and the first few arguments are almost
 always passed in registers
 * ASAN can only find out of bounds accesses past a certain number of
 bytes. 1 byte or 1 word might not be far enough.

 Here are some things that probably would have caught the bug:
 * using automated Rust to C function prototype generation (I'm sure we
 have a ticket for this, but I can't find it right now)
 * C to Rust unit tests (maybe depends on #25386?), if the values in the
 uninitialised register weren't always zero, or if the architecture poisons
 uninitialised registers
 * fuzzing C against Rust (#27229), if the values in the uninitialised
 register weren't always zero, or if the architecture poisons uninitialised
 registers

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27723 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Obfs4 stopped working 16 Sept 18

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27723: Obfs4 stopped working 16 Sept 18
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block ae obfs4 meek   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => censorship block ae obfs4 meek
 * component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy => Obfuscation/Censorship analysis
 * type:  enhancement => task
 * owner:  asn => dcf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19812 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onion everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19812: onion everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  ilf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  onion, https-everywhere   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21952| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks3):

 traumschule
 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/healthy-onion/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26624 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript blocks on Standard-Safer security setting in 8.0a9 contrary to behavior in 8.0a8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26624: NoScript blocks  on Standard-Safer security setting in 8.0a9
contrary to behavior in 8.0a8
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-8.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201809,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27264 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bookmark items are not visible on the bookmarks toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27264: Bookmark items are not visible on the bookmarks toolbar
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201809,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > `bug_27264` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_27264&id=1d974fa2b70dfe07bea896c99c88d7f62f3268a5)
 in my public `tor-browser` repo has a fix for review.

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27130 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust dependency updating instructions don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27130: rust dependency updating instructions don't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 I think we only need to backport if we expect to need to update the rust
 dependencies in the older releases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23371 [Webpages/Support]: adding a short paragraph on how to protect themself anonymous on internet and outside of it to " Tips On Staying Anonymous » "

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23371: adding a short paragraph on how to protect themself anonymous on 
internet
and outside of it to " Tips On Staying Anonymous » "
---+--
 Reporter:  throwable_account  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Support   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  FAQ|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  (none) => hiro
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Webpages/Support


Comment:

 ok, let's see what we have.

 http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/docs/faq.html.en#AnonymityAndSecurity "
 > What protections does Tor provide?
 > So I'm totally anonymous if I use Tor?
 > No.
 http://ea5faa5po25cf7fb.onion/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OperationalSecurity
 > Warning: This page contains outdated information and has not been
 maintained in the recent past.
 > How to Run a Secure Tor Server
 Written for operators some of these apply for users as well.
 http://4bflp2c4tnynnbes.onion/#tbb-3
 >  When I use Tor Browser, will anyone be able to tell which websites I
 visit?
 I guess the last one should be expanded a bit.

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[tor-bugs] #27754 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add a feature to block typing in non-English characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27754: Add a feature to block typing in non-English characters
-+--
 Reporter:  echaskaris   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Title says it all. I don't want to start typing in Greek because I forgot
 to change the language and press enter to go to an invalid web page. Yet,
 I don't want to remove Greek from the language selection. I wish Tor
 Browser wouldn't accept these characters, as well as warned me when typing
 them. Note that you can also let me select which language's characters to
 block, so as not to block all non-English characters. Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27543: QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor 
Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201809,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 pospeselr]:
 > > Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > > > Seems we need to flip
 `privacy.resistFingerprinting.autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts` to
 `false` here as well, until the Mozilla bug gets fixed. I did that in
 `bug_27543` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_27543&id=ce60de442f949393b7f24acd153f82a57d78fe0e)
 in my public `tor-browser` repository. Please review.
 > >
 > > Unless I'm misundersanding things, it looks like you'll have to
 backport some code in CanvasUtils.cpp for that option to do anything (
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/source/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp#146 ).
 >
 > No, https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376865 has all we need
 already, I think (and made it into ESR 60).

 Ah my mistake, the pref getter is wrapped in the 'DOM_PREF' macro in
 /dom/base/DOMPrefsInternal.h which is used.  This patch looks good to me!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, commit 7540556c69566bc5454be354d877d08b98ac5d99 on `master` has
 the fixup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27543: QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor 
Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201809,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:9 pospeselr]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > > Seems we need to flip
 `privacy.resistFingerprinting.autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts` to
 `false` here as well, until the Mozilla bug gets fixed. I did that in
 `bug_27543` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_27543&id=ce60de442f949393b7f24acd153f82a57d78fe0e)
 in my public `tor-browser` repository. Please review.
 >
 > Unless I'm misundersanding things, it looks like you'll have to backport
 some code in CanvasUtils.cpp for that option to do anything (
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/source/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp#146 ).

 No, https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376865 has all we need
 already, I think (and made it into ESR 60).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27543: QR code on http://web.whatsapp.com is only shortly visible in Tor 
Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201809,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Hm, I wonder whether we want to switch the default button being selected
 to "Don't Allow". Having the scary warning on the dialog ("This may be
 used to uniquely identify your computer.") does not really seem to fit to
 having the allow options pre-selected, just one click away.

 Unless I'm misundersanding things, tt looks like you'll have to backport
 some code in CanvasUtils.cpp for that option to do anything (
 https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/source/dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp#146 ).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Oh, that explains why I used
 {{{
 +const kAboutTorHideTorNewsBanner = this.kAboutTorHideTorNewsBanner;
 }}}
 before.

 I had forgotten. Anyway, this fixup looks good to me, and the banner
 worked properly for me with this patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27731 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor restart loop: "The missing protocols are: LinkAuth=1"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27731: tor restart loop: "The missing protocols are: LinkAuth=1"
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27288| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 fixed in current nightly and master HEAD

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27623 [Applications/Tor Browser]: wrong default pref values in Tor Browser 8.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27623: wrong default pref values in Tor Browser 8.0
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-8.0-issues,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201809R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can => ff60-esr,
 tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201809R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch to use for 8.5a2:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug27623-01&id=e8d4909fcd059614106222a858d8839b58fee00f

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New circuit display shows bridge address (e.g. 0.0.3.0 for snowflake PT, 0.0.2.0 for meek) when it doesn't in previous version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26555: New circuit display shows bridge address (e.g. 0.0.3.0 for snowflake PT,
0.0.2.0 for meek) when it doesn't in previous version
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, cherry-picked to `master` (commit
 51c3b458ef0d9bf4a0df42410a4d02e6c49c97d4).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27730 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27730: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 This check was completely redundant anyway, actually. There would be a
 potential memory leak here, where buf is non-null but the length is
 impossibly long, except it can't happen because even ignoring running out
 of ram, `read_file_to_str()` calls a function that
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/lib/fs/files.c?id=f606b3cfd157dc52872e8b40a9a042861d9246e1#n186
 makes the same check against SSIZE_MAX already.]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Ha, so it seems we got the scope of "this" wrong. I have a follup-up fix
 for that issue in my `bug_27097-fixup`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_27097-fixup&id=7540556c69566bc5454be354d877d08b98ac5d99).
 Arthur, please review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27753 [Community/Relays]: Improve visibility of IPv6 related settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27753: Improve visibility of IPv6 related settings
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nusenu):

 Replying to [ticket:27753 traumschule]:
 > IPv6 related questions come up regularly, which is a good thing, because
 its adoption among relays can be improved.
 >
 > There was some [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-September/016251.html good stuff on the list]

 this content is already in the [[TorRelayGuide#IPv6]]

 > that could be added at our IPv6 FAQ entry

 that would be a separate ticket/component

 > or the [[TorRelayGuide#IPv6]]. (comparing both most of it is already
 there, maybe we instead should try to increase the visibility a bit more?)

 since I pointed the person directly to that content in
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-September/016223.html
 I don't think that in this particular case visibility is the problem

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[tor-bugs] #27753 [Community/Relays]: Improve visibility of IPv6 related settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27753: Improve visibility of IPv6 related settings
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Component:  Community/Relays
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 IPv6 related questions come up regularly, which is a good thing, because
 its adoption among relays can be improved.

 There was some [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-September/016251.html good stuff on the list] (and probably
 also somewhere else) that could be added at our IPv6 FAQ entry or the
 [[TorRelayGuide#IPv6]]. (comparing both most of it is already there, maybe
 we instead should try to increase the visibility a bit more?)
 https://torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#IPv6
 https://torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#IPv6Relay

 related: #17811 (clients), see keywords

 (assigning this to the relay guide to get another opinion and happily get
 it back for the website)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27130 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust dependency updating instructions don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27130: rust dependency updating instructions don't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Created a pull request at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/347

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test dropped cell counting from command_process_relay_cell()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27679: Test dropped cell counting from command_process_relay_cell()
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor page does not load on first start on Windows and browser is stuck in endless reload cycle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26381: about:tor page does not load on first start on Windows and browser is 
stuck
in endless reload cycle
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by brade):

 brade and I do not see any problem with this approach or your patch, but
 it would be reassuring to receive some feedback from the Mozilla
 engineers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23512 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23512: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, congestion-attack,   |  Actual Points:
  research, watermark, tor-stats, guard- |
  discovery-stats, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 The unit test sometimes fails (approx 1 time out of 10) due (I think) to
 our use of approx_time() in the patch, but time() in rephist.c I will redo
 the branches for this fix, merge forward as before, and then make a master
 merge commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good now, thanks! Merged to `master` (commit
 b55672f07a24e5611510840012a32108553cf413).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27410 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed in retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc at ../src/or/hs_client.c:268

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27410: Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed 
in
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc at ../src/or/hs_client.c:268
---+
 Reporter:  cstest |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-v3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I have a long theory about what can cause this problem:

 It all starts with `hs_client_desc_has_arrived()` which is called when a
 descriptor is cached (client side). That function goes over all pending
 SOCKS request that are waiting for that descriptor. It changes the state
 of the connection to "wait for circuits".

 However, there is one code path that can make it exit early which is when
 no intro points in the descriptor are usable. In that case, we'll
 unattached a SOCKS connection and exit the function. But, here comes the
 problem, there could be more SOCKS connection for that same .onion, they
 won't be unattached and ultimately wait until they timeout.

 This creates the problem that when our directory information changes, the
 HS client will go retry all SOCKS connection and see if we should refetch
 the descriptor:

 {{{
 /* Order a refetch in case it works this time. */
 status = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk);
 if (BUG(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC)) {
   /* This case is unique because it can NOT happen in theory. Once we
 get
* a new descriptor, the HS client subsystem is notified immediately
 and
* the connections waiting for it are handled which means the state
 will
* change from renddesc wait state. Log this and continue to next
* connection. */
   continue;
 }
 }}}

 The comment explaining the BUG() is actually wrong for one edge case. In
 reality, we change the state of *one* single SOCKS connection, not all of
 them. So yes, we can end up looking at a SOCKS connection for which we
 have a descriptor where the IPs in the descriptor (that were originally
 flagged has unusable) might now be usable now (intro point failure cache
 cleanup for instance) and so the SOCKS connection state is still in
 `RENDDESC_WAIT`, we now have a usable descriptor
 (`HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC`) and boom.

 I think the solution needs those two elements:

 1. In `hs_client_desc_has_arrived()`, do not exit if the descriptor is not
 usable but rather continue to loop on all SOCKS connections so we can
 detach them all.

 2. Once a descriptor arrives and stored in our cache, if it is unusable,
 get rid of it.

 For (1), it is super important that we end up with no SOCKS connection in
 `RENDDESC_WAIT` state if we know that the descriptor is unusable and there
 are no inflight directory requests for it.

 About (2), there is this issue where we'll create a way to continuously
 re-request the descriptor on the HSDirs at each SOCKS request adding
 considerable loads on the network. In theory, we shouldn't because we have
 the `last_hid_serv_requests_` cache for this meaning we can't query the
 same HSDir for the same .onion more than once in a 15 minutes time frame.
 HOWEVER, in `hs_client_desc_has_arrived()`, if the descriptor is unusable,
 we purge that cache for the .onion so we can attempt again to fetch the
 descriptor that might have changed on the HSDir
 (`note_connection_attempt_succeeded()`).

 I still think (2) worth doing but then we might want to remove that purge
 if the IPs aren't usable and bring down that retry time period to
 something more acceptable like 60 secs instead of 15 minutes which is
 crazy high for the user experience.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12774 [Obfuscation/meek]: "Firefox is already running" when you select meek after bootstrapping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12774: "Firefox is already running" when you select meek after bootstrapping
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by toralf):

 FWIW - applied cleaanly against 0.3.84 - and works at a stable hardened
 Gentoo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27410 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed in retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc at ../src/or/hs_client.c:268

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27410: Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed 
in
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc at ../src/or/hs_client.c:268
---+
 Reporter:  cstest |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-v3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs, hs-v3
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27621 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Idea: port tb-manual to lektor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27621: Idea: port tb-manual to lektor
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #3600 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent redirects from transmitting+storing cookies+identifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3600: Prevent redirects from transmitting+storing cookies+identifiers
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-testcase, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25493 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve patterns for cleaning up static variables on exit/restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25493: Improve patterns for cleaning up static variables on exit/restart
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-included-20180405, 035-roadmap-   |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:  #25510   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


Comment:

 Related to our mobile API work. We are pass the 035 freeze, sending to
 036.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3600 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent redirects from transmitting+storing cookies+identifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3600: Prevent redirects from transmitting+storing cookies+identifiers
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-testcase, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27752 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Network settings dialog does not switch to meek smoothly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27752: Network settings dialog does not switch to meek smoothly
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-8.0-issue, tbb-8.0-regressions =>
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 That's actually an old bug and nothing new: #12774.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27315: Sandbox regression in 0.3.4.7-rc
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression?, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by toralf):

 You mean commit 7eb6458b61499d9042214a34c2b790ed8a1b229f of
 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor.git ?
 No, I didn'tz applied that.
 I assumed that that patch was already pulled in 0.3.4.8 - but seems to be
 not - so sry for the noise, then I'll patch it myself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27429 [UX]: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27429: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube
-+--
 Reporter:  h1n1 |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 is this for our screencasts?

 tested with TB 8.5a1:
 - browsing videos works well!
 - watching videos doesn't work with feature filter ("Safest") and js
 enabled
 - works in "Safe" made although it spins a lot and the console is filled
 with {{{Image corrupt or truncated.}}}, also once
 {{{
 [Exception... "Component returned failure code: 0xc1f30001
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED) [nsIMessageSender.sendAsyncMessage]"  nsresult:
 "0xc1f30001 (NS_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED)"  location: "JS frame ::
 resource://gre/modules/ExtensionUtils.jsm :: sendAsyncMessage :: line 533"
 data: no]  (unknown)
 sendAsyncMessage resource://gre/modules/ExtensionUtils.jsm:533:51
 _handleMessage/deferred.promise<
 resource://gre/modules/MessageChannel.jsm:984:9
 }}}
 - youtube-dl manages to download videos, good!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12774 [Obfuscation/meek]: "Firefox is already running" when you select meek after bootstrapping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12774: "Firefox is already running" when you select meek after bootstrapping
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 #27752 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25502 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report intermediate PT bootstrapping status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25502: Report intermediate PT bootstrapping status
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711, s8-bootstrap =>
 s8-bootstrap
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27542 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Saving websites locally loses pictures and layout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27542: Saving websites locally loses pictures and layout
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I see the same behavior in Firefox 62. For downloading
 https://torproject.org, it fails to download `typography.min.css`.

 So I think this may be a Firefox bug, but I'm not sure it's an old bug
 because I think it used to work in previous versions of Firefox and Tor
 Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New circuit display shows bridge address (e.g. 0.0.3.0 for snowflake PT, 0.0.2.0 for meek) when it doesn't in previous version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26555: New circuit display shows bridge address (e.g. 0.0.3.0 for snowflake PT,
0.0.2.0 for meek) when it doesn't in previous version
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display, tbb-8.0-issues,
 tbb-8.0.1-can =>
 tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can,
 TorBrowserTeam201809R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch for review:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/26555

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27552 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Latest tor browser launcher broken on linux (CentOS 6.8)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27552: Latest tor browser launcher broken on linux (CentOS 6.8)
-+-
 Reporter:  LinuxProbes  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tries):

 I just downloaded the build from above comment (bug_27552/tor-browser-
 linux64-8.5a1_en-US.tar.xz) as a clean install (CentOS 6, 64bit).
 The tor-browser does start and works as expected.

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[tor-bugs] #27752 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Network settings dialog does not switch to meek smoothly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27752: Network settings dialog does not switch to meek smoothly
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issue,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-8.0-regressions
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When I open a freshly downloaded Tor Browser 8.0, and select
 {{{
 Tor Network Settings > Tor is Censored in my country > Select a built-in
 bridge > meek-azure
 }}}
 on Linux, it pops up 3(!) alert windows that say "Close Tor Browser. Tor
 Browser is already running but not responding. To open a new window, you
 must first close the existing Tor Browser process, or restart your system.
 If I close those three alerts but I don't close the main browser window,
 then Tor Browser continues to work, but is not using meek. (If I then
 restart Tor Browser, it does use meek as desired.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27333 [Core Tor/Tor]: outdated docs for onion_extend_cpath()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27333: outdated docs for onion_extend_cpath()
--+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks|  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.1.2.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27194 [Core Tor/Tor]: handling extra commas in protover

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27194: handling extra commas in protover
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, security-low, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  032-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 []Replying to [comment:8 ahf]:
 > Just chatted with Nick on IRC about this. Can't this patch be simplified
 into:

 It actually can't. That's exactly what the first draft of this patch was,
 but that would ignore a trailing comma. That's why the comment was there.
 {{{
 // Skip the comma separator between ranges. Don't ignore a trailing
 comma.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23512 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23512: Bandwidth stats info leak upon close of circuits with queued cells
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, congestion-attack,   |  Actual Points:
  research, watermark, tor-stats, guard- |
  discovery-stats, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm!

 I would *really* want us to not forget to document `#define
 TLS_PER_CELL_OVERHEAD 29`. I know we are waiting on pastly to do the
 impossible job of recalling how 29 came about during the KIST development
 process.

 In any case, now KIST and this will *at least* use the same value.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 If #27273 were fixed and there were rust + asan CI runs, would asan have
 probably caught this?

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[tor-bugs] #27751 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: add CI with --enable-nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27751: Travis: add CI with --enable-nss
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fast-fix, tor-ci
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Now that tor supports nss, we should add CI with nss enabled.

 We should do a quick nss build on Linux gcc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/346 ?

 You probably shouldn't remove the trailing comma after the last argument
 (`threshold: c_int,`), pretty sure rustfmt would add it back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 How do you like my branch `bug27741_033`, with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/346 ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27356 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Reduce database size and variance of query response times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27356: Reduce database size and variance of query response times
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 irl asked me today how this change improved query times. Here are some
 quick statistics based on log statements over roughly one 1.5 weeks saying
 how much time passed between opening a connection and returning it:

 ||='''Statistic''' =||= '''Before change'''=||= '''After change'''=||
 ||Min. || 37|| 2068||
 ||1st Qu. || 170|| 2173||
 ||Median || 191|| 2197||
 ||Mean || 18912|| 2275||
 ||3rd Qu. || 260|| 2235||
 ||Max. || 3008467|| 17136||

 Despite the increase in minimum, first quartile, median, and even third
 quartile, I'd say that the decrease in mean and in particular maximum
 values make this change a huge improvement. While it's cool that some or
 even most responses in the old approach were really fast, it was the very
 high response times that made the service hard to predict. With the new
 approach, users can expect a request to return within a few seconds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising, TorBrowserTeam201809, tbb-8.0.1-can
 => ux-team, tbb-fundraising, TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-8.0.1-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27097: Add "Tor News" newsletter signup link in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-fundraising,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201809, tbb-8.0.1-can|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:26 gk]:

 Thanks for the review!

 > Looks good! One small thing:
 > {{{
 > +const kAboutTorHideTorNewsBanner = this.kAboutTorHideTorNewsBanner;
 > }}}
 > just remove that line and use `this.kAboutTorHideTorNewsBanner` in the
 two instances needed directly. Having a `kAboutTorHideTorNewsBanner` in
 the function scope and declared above is confusing and seems not worth it.

 Good catch. Here's a revised version where I fix that and rebased to the
 latest master.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/27097+6

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[tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  regression, assert
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From tor-talk:

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2018-September/08.html

 {{{
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/main.c:1044:
 conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
 failed. (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion
 !(connection_is_writing(conn)) failed in conn_close_if_marked at
 src/or/main.c:1044. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x47)
 [0x55727ae152e7] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xbd)
 [0x55727ae307ad] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x51b18)
 [0x55727acdbb18] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /lib64/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x235b1)
 [0x7fb01de555b1] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug:
 /lib64/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x537) [0x7fb01de55d47] (on Tor
 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x209)
 [0x55727acde149] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x1015)
 [0x55727ace0835] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3e)
 [0x55727acd868e] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x1d)
 [0x55727acd841d] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb)
 [0x7fb01c3d611b] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 Sep 15 16:06:26.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a)
 [0x55727acd847a] (on Tor 0.3.4.8 da95b91355248ad8)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26913 [Core Tor/Tor]: DataDirectoryGroupReadable enabled does not have effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26913: DataDirectoryGroupReadable enabled does not have effect
-+-
 Reporter:  maha |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-roadmap-proposed,|  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 How about branch `bug26913_033` in my public repository?  PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/345

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26913 [Core Tor/Tor]: DataDirectoryGroupReadable enabled does not have effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26913: DataDirectoryGroupReadable enabled does not have effect
-+-
 Reporter:  maha |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-roadmap-proposed,|  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26148 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update binutils to a version more recent than 2.26.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26148: Update binutils to a version more recent than 2.26.1
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201805,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201809|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I will try a build using `-Wl,-t` to see if this can help understand the
 issue (as suggested in
 https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=23466#c1).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27073 [Core Tor/Tor]: conditionvar_timeout intermittently fails on maint-0.3.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27073: conditionvar_timeout intermittently fails on maint-0.3.3
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, 029-backport 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27709 [Core Tor/Tor]: The compiler doesn't warn about tor_assert(a = b)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27709: The compiler doesn't warn about tor_assert(a = b)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport 032-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26631 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor to build with NSS instead of OpenSSL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26631: Allow Tor to build with NSS instead of OpenSSL
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  implemented
  in-20180711|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21814   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Remaining children are closed; closing this too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27288 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor with NSS must not claim to support LinkAuth=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27288: Tor with NSS must not claim to support LinkAuth=1
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711, rust  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #26631 =>


Comment:

 unparenting.

 Per discussion, I do not currently plan to revert this, but instead to
 include "how to try out NSS" instructions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27675 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rebind.py depends on python >=2.7 or >=3.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27675: test_rebind.py depends on python >=2.7 or >=3.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27197 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover accepts excess commas in version strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27197: rust protover accepts excess commas in version strings
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, security-low, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:  #27194   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27730 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27730: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I think the easiest solution here is just to impose a shorter limit on the
 maximum size of a private-key file. I've chosen 16 MB arbitrarily, and
 committed f606b3cfd157dc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27201 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust/protover doesn't forbid version zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27201: rust/protover doesn't forbid version zero
+--
 Reporter:  cyberpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust,033-backport,034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27198  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27130 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust dependency updating instructions don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27130: rust dependency updating instructions don't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27139 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS i386 fails time unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27139: macOS i386 fails time unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, macos, i386, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, arm32, 32-bit|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27333 [Core Tor/Tor]: outdated docs for onion_extend_cpath()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27333: outdated docs for onion_extend_cpath()
--+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks|  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.1.2.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27073 [Core Tor/Tor]: conditionvar_timeout intermittently fails on maint-0.3.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27073: conditionvar_timeout intermittently fails on maint-0.3.3
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, 029-backport 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27550 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Don't warn so loudly when tor is unable to decode a descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27550: hs-v3: Don't warn so loudly when tor is unable to decode a descriptor
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27544| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27686 [Core Tor/Tor]: OOM code should count space used in a circuit's half-closed list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27686: OOM code should count space used in a circuit's half-closed list
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-backport?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27730 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27730: CID 1439330: "st.st_size > 9223372036854775807L" is always false
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


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