Re: [tor-bugs] #28081 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28081: rust protover discards all votes if one is not UTF-8
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Do you want to wait until #27741 is merged?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27912 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27912: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => teor


Comment:

 I have an experimental version in my chutney-travis branch at
 https://github.com/teor2345/chutney.git

 It's still going through CI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27912 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27912: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27751 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: add CI with --enable-nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27751: Travis: add CI with --enable-nss
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 The pull request for this branch is:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/433

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27968 [Core Tor/Tor]: SIGNAL HALT race condition in test-rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27968: SIGNAL HALT race condition in test-rebind.py
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 The pull request is:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/432

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The 0.3.3 pull request is:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/346

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 cyberpunks]:
 > > rustfmt actually says the `bug27741_033` branch should put the
 function arguments all in one line, since they fit within 100 characters
 now.
 >
 > We only applied rustfmt in 0.3.5, so I made a separate branch for 0.3.5
 and later.
 > See `bug27741_035` on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git
 >
 > GitHub is having issues, so I can't open a pull request:
 > https://status.github.com/messages

 The 0.3.5 pull request is:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/431

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28096 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows 8.1 and 10 relays claim to be Windows 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28096: Windows 8.1 and 10 relays claim to be Windows 8
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.34
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows, fast-fix, 029-backport, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28096 [Core Tor/Tor]: Windows 8.1 and 10 relays claim to be Windows 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28096: Windows 8.1 and 10 relays claim to be Windows 8
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.34
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows, fast-fix, 029-backport, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * actualpoints:  0.1 => 0.2
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.2.34
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * points:   => 0.2


Comment:

 The internal version numbers for Windows versions 8.1 and 10 were sourced
 from:
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Microsoft_Windows_versions

 My bug28096-029 merges cleanly from maint-0.2.9 to maint-0.3.4.
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/429

 My bug28096-035 merges cleanly from maint-0.3.5 to master.
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/430

 (See https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git for the branches.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28134 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: upgrade jQuery File Upload to 9.22.1 (CVE-2018-9206)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28134: upgrade jQuery File Upload to 9.22.1 (CVE-2018-9206)
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 https://github.com/blueimp/jQuery-File-
 Upload/commit/aeb47e51c67df8a504b7726595576c1c66b5dc2f

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27309 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deterministic builds / ar warns about u modifier

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27309: Deterministic builds / ar warns about u modifier
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 I'm now seeing this complaint when building on Debian stable.

 I see it on every single AR line during make, which is many of them now
 that we've started breaking things up into ar files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28097 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get the actual Windows version from Kernel32.dll

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28097: Get the actual Windows version from Kernel32.dll
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 If we implement this feature, we should fall back to the original code
 when:
 * the function isn't available, or
 * the sandbox stops us using the function

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27490 [Core Tor/Tor]: When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is set to auto, and a relay is being chosen for a directory or orport connection, prefer IPv4 or IPv6 at random

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27490: When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is set to auto, and a relay is being chosen 
for
a directory or orport connection, prefer IPv4 or IPv6 at random
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17835| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => ipv6
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:17 teor]:
 > We should also test it with chutney with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort 1 and 0.
 I'll do that this afternoon.

 Sorry, I ran out of time on Friday.

 This branch passes all chutney networks with:
 * (ClientAutoIPv6ORPort default)
 * ClientAutoIPv6ORPort 1
 There are no unexpected warnings in these chutney networks.

 I'm still testing:
 * ClientAutoIPv6ORPort 0 (which is the default, so it should be the same
 as the first run)

 Let's merge this experimental option, and see how it goes.

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[tor-bugs] #28135 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bad CERTS cells in mixed chutney network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28135: Bad CERTS cells in mixed chutney network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  regression, tor-dirauth, macOS,
 Severity:  Normal   |  035-must, 035-roadmap-proposed
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #27146
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Yet another mixed network error - these race conditions really are
 exercising a whole lot of unusual code paths:
 {{{
 FAIL: mixed+hs-v2
 Detail: chutney/tools/warnings.sh /Users/base/chutney/net/nodes.1537279328
 Warning: Received a bad CERTS cell from 127.0.0.1:5002: Problem setting or
 checking peer id Number: 1
 Warning: Received a bad CERTS cell from 127.0.0.1:5003: Problem setting or
 checking peer id Number: 1
 Warning: Tried connecting to router at 127.0.0.1:5002, but RSA identity
 key was not as expected: wanted F0F7644942E7570548AA9BB1763F643123CE40C5 +
 no ed25519 key but got 72658EEB1AB9F6326635849C1D33052FC0C0F551 +
 95IoksCTUXVIyqHU+lPMR3ppCzj+AdT5Bpg6BTSKDzI. Number: 1
 Warning: Tried connecting to router at 127.0.0.1:5003, but RSA identity
 key was not as expected: wanted 185EF19538055B8B6F591224A66F0516C204BE98 +
 no ed25519 key but got 945CD7D474D11CA2A6DBEF63715477BA17657E68 +
 RT2D7+9+F4bADlz7427uBoUrV3iKtSz31l7/xT/xTls. Number: 1
 Warning: http status 400 ("Nonauthoritative directory does not accept
 posted server descriptors") response from dirserver '127.0.0.1:7002'.
 Please correct. Number: 3
 Warning: http status 400 ("Nonauthoritative directory does not accept
 posted server descriptors") response from dirserver '127.0.0.1:7003'.
 Please correct. Number: 3
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #28134 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: upgrade jQuery File Upload to 9.22.1 (CVE-2018-9206)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28134: upgrade jQuery File Upload to 9.22.1 (CVE-2018-9206)
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2018/q4/54
 http://www.vapidlabs.com/advisory.php?v=204

 https://www.zdnet.com/article/zero-day-in-popular-jquery-plugin-actively-
 exploited-for-at-least-three-years
 > The vulnerability received the CVE-2018-9206 identifier earlier this
 month, a good starting point to get more people paying attention.
 > All jQuery File Upload versions before 9.22.1 are vulnerable. Since the
 vulnerability affected the code for handling file uploads for PHP apps,
 other server-side implementations should be considered safe.

 (is this better placed in services or sysadmin maybe?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27741 [Core Tor/Tor]: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27741: too many arguments in rust protover_compute_vote()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-must, protover, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #27739   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 cyberpunks]:
 > rustfmt actually says the `bug27741_033` branch should put the function
 arguments all in one line, since they fit within 100 characters now.

 We only applied rustfmt in 0.3.5, so I made a separate branch for 0.3.5
 and later.
 See `bug27741_035` on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 GitHub is having issues, so I can't open a pull request:
 https://status.github.com/messages

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27968 [Core Tor/Tor]: SIGNAL HALT race condition in test-rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27968: SIGNAL HALT race condition in test-rebind.py
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 catalyst]:
 > Looks good! I commented on one minor issue in the pull request.

 Thanks for the review!

 I made the errno into its symbolic constant.

 But we might see failures on some platforms, if the constant is not
 available:

 Of the following list, symbols that are not used on the current
 platform are not defined by the module. The specific list of defined
 symbols is available as errno.errorcode.keys(). Symbols available can
 include:

 https://docs.python.org/2/library/errno.html

 Also, GitHub was having storage issues when I pushed my branch:

 https://status.github.com/messages

 So I couldn't re-open a new pull request from my main account. I'll try
 again in a few hours, or tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27197 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust protover accepts excess commas in version strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27197: rust protover accepts excess commas in version strings
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, security-low, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:  #27194   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The 0.3.3 pull request for this branch is:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/428

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27201 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust/protover doesn't forbid version zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27201: rust/protover doesn't forbid version zero
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
  rust,033-backport,034-backport,035-backport|
Parent ID:  #27198   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rust,033-backport,034-backport =>
 rust,033-backport,034-backport,035-backport
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


Comment:

 This branch seems to have a lot of unrelated changes in it.

 Can you please cherry-pick the "zero" changes on top of master?
 If you can't, just let us know, and we will do it eventually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27662 [Core Tor/Tor]: refactor networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27662: refactor networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string()
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, refactor, long-  |  Actual Points:
  functions, cthulhucode |
Parent ID:  #22408   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 teor]:
 > This branch can be reviewed, but I wonder if it conflicts with other
 code changes that have already been merged. I guess we'll find out.

 This branch conflicts with some changes in master.
 (We split some files as part of a refactor. Sorry about that.)

 Can you please rebase it on master?
 If you can't, just let us know, and we will do the rebase eventually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27912 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository (was: Add Chutney to travis-ci if possible)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27912: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Make title clearer

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28068 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor not reopening on USB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28068: Tor not reopening on USB
+--
 Reporter:  mackey  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-8.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mackey):

 I should clarify that I was creating a virtual drive within that USB but
 never had this issue on previous Tor versions. Also, I was using the 64bit
 version, however, this all applies to the 32bit version as well.

 I directly installed Tor onto the virtual drive and copied it directly
 from the local c: drive as well. Same issue. Randomly, it may open and
 connect to Tor a couple times but eventually the same issue occurred and
 would stay permanent unless I install the entire Tor folder again from
 scratch. Tested it by leaving Tor at default settings and also changing
 settings, same issue.

 Tried it on the local drive and directly onto the USB (non-virtual). The
 issue does not appear. So it seems that using Tor on virtual drive is the
 problem.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17457, #17461, #17465, #17485, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17457, #17461, #17465, #17485, #17516, #17528, #17961, 
#18389, #18449, #18464, #19817, #20205, #20293, #20294, #21005, #21526, #21781, 
#21921, #22441, #22676, #23665, #23675, #23717, #23800, #23889, #25028, #25433 
by traumschule:


Action: resolve

Comment:
<+sukhe> hello. yes, I think it's fine to close the tickets. thanks for doing 
what we should done earlier :)

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #15161, #18391, #17833, #18973, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #15161, #18391, #17833, #18973, #21238, #16478, #17453, 
#17474, #17510, #17727, #18129, #18524, #18539, #19709, #20263, #20368, #22005, 
#22939, #1676, #2918, #2919, #2920, #5498, #10210, #10937, #10938, #10939, 
#10940, #10941, #10942, #10943, #10944, #10945, #10946, #10947, #10949, #10950, 
#10953, #11174, #11385, #11386, #11532, #11533, #12097, #12252, #12791, #12792, 
#12880, #13312, #13321, #13322, #13323, #13617, #13618, #13743, #13757, #13795, 
#13852, #13855, #13861, #13979, #13994, #14104, #14105, #14108, #14159, #14160, 
#14161, #14382, #14385, #14388, #14850, #15149, #15150, #15152, #15162, #15179, 
#15256, #16203, #16270, #16318, #16475, #16489, #16490, #16491, #16492, #16493, 
#16494, #16500, #16508, #16526, #16536, #16544, #16606, #17363, #17405, #17409, 
#17411, #17421, #17429 by traumschule:


Action: resolve

Comment:
> <+sukhe> hello. yes, I think it's fine to close the tickets. thanks for doing 
> what we should done earlier :)

sad but true:
https://blog.torproject.org/sunsetting-tor-messenger

luckily there are alternatives:
https://blog.torproject.org/tor-heart-onion-messaging

.. and maybe someday
- https://cwtch.im (#27364)
- https://github.com/warner/magic-wormhole/issues/8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28132 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add 'linus' to 'adm'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28132: Add 'linus' to 'adm'
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Awesome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28132 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add 'linus' to 'adm'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28132: Add 'linus' to 'adm'
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ln5):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > Yep, sounds great to me too. Linus, hopefully you had a chat with weasel
 so he knows the plan here?

 Yup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28059 [Applications/Tor Browser]: How to enable add-ons in Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28059: How to enable add-ons in Tor Browser for Android
--+---
 Reporter:  Legion|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Legion):

 xpinstall.enabled is the preference... I'll tattoo it on my forehead for
 future reference .

 Perhaps to save others from this runaround Tor should make this preference
 known either in the app or in the Google Play description.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28132 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add 'linus' to 'adm'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28132: Add 'linus' to 'adm'
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Yep, sounds great to me too. Linus, hopefully you had a chat with weasel
 so he knows the plan here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28132 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add 'linus' to 'adm'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28132: Add 'linus' to 'adm'
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by qbi):

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 I'd be happy to have linus on the adm group.

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEYNhbjZoc0tE1Xr6fZbPwlOo+TWEFAlvM9EwACgkQZbPwlOo+
 TWENkw/+MPSYe2nfRM/vjKmA0vLjokxnzRGBSrG2iM7yArwX/vyW4+/t+pXAmjil
 yySPyS9WhN4xJte5BVRguidj4ilK9IKf+SBv2iP6BSSHB2LaEKULiX6ysXv1jxkc
 rpKStK6QL1jD7OyvxFdQHzVRxA5dUBXZLOuyaeZWFH1nUvzq80xlNpK9a7815/aB
 Kc6bDg/Ujt8u6XpJMjCWVuMLovguT9y8W4wEUpFB+6Ited3yCgjsHgcne7NlSR/b
 uFwLsUfpUtE/UL6/8tYvSTyKSEmM9xdvdxr7zQwIQNtqlX7XaAL1H/NcrnlZIxLS
 bBmbqg8jHnDMf6AbjUSDKBrDiwcTzv3YsLmulN86zBpCqeXZpQmVBjHyjUGKjnRw
 AVfPLEriv8uNmPwMs/eTLdWmJU81XIQjdQc3gLkt1TeiOFYMJKpNT1poeHNUnNyD
 XKnIi0nMSpMYA+0Z5JOW6A0yofTpHJpOfgeuntZYJenIBeL5G54+36Gb/CsZhpx9
 dpKnV8sfJzOyhiAGLQ+l1/lebbvtkJotHi+iwh3t68/DohQcn9XDAC2b2srOV5OY
 Dn2lUFwbYFuywemaKtxMPfN1SoYWsW37RbY263eduPqQOaCYOoBKTCLqcx50xEA0
 OaFu+CF3gdDgcQ3QGDp1FJC82m0S4yEwb1KAWGx75P5aFMOy0B4=
 =G+BY
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5553 [Core Tor/Tor]: prevent protocol leaks; Tor client connection API or protocol review howto

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5553: prevent protocol leaks; Tor client connection API or protocol review 
howto
+--
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client documentation developer  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * cc: traumschule (added)


Comment:

 Just added a comment in comment:49:issue:1676 and wonder how to revive
 this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1676 [Archived/Tor Messenger]: Audit jabber/XMPP support for pidgin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1676: Audit jabber/XMPP support for pidgin
---+-
 Reporter:  katmagic   |  Owner:  ioerror
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Tor Messenger |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  pidgin, DNS, needs-triage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * severity:   => Blocker
 * parent:  #2918 =>


Comment:

 Just to clarify: the ticket has been closed as invalid because the
 intention to use pidgin for TorMessenger did go (#2918),
 [https://blog.torproject.org/sunsetting-tor-messenger just as the latter
 itself]. For alternatives see https://blog.torproject.org/tor-heart-onion-
 messaging


 Unfortunately the ticket description still makes a valid point. You can
 verify this with {{{torsocks -d}}}. The DNS requests are blocked and
 pidgin is waiting for reply hanging forever with
 > Waiting for connection.

 The torsocks log shows:
 > DEBUG torsocks[30140]: IPv4/v6 non TCP socket denied. Tor network can't
 handle it. (in tsocks_socket() at socket.c:69)
 > DEBUG torsocks[30140]: [conect] Connection is not IPv4/v6. Ignoring. (in
 tsocks_validate_socket() at connect.c:63)

 [[doc/TorifyHOWTO/InstantMessaging#Libpurple-basedclients]] rightfully
 states:
 > Warning: Libpurple has been proven critically flawed in recent years.
 While problems do continually come up related to that and most times they
 are subsequently patched, the long-term vulnerability of the platform is
 inevitable and therefore it is recommended against using any of the
 software listed below.

 (leaving it closed though because there is still no reason to audit)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27841: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs dos|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by neel):

 PR is here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/426

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27896 [Core Tor/Tor]: base32 padding inconsistency between client and server in HS v3 client auth preview

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27896: base32 padding inconsistency between client and server in HS v3 client 
auth
preview
-+
 Reporter:  jchevali |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by jchevali):

 I should add with regards to comment nº 4 above, that this server is only
 apparently producing invalid descriptors (or so the client says) for the
 HS that has server-side authorization defined on it.  For others without
 access defined the descriptors are fine and the service(s) can be used
 successfully.

 This assuming they're invalid and it's not just a question of not being
 able to decrypt.  In which case the client message should be changed.
 What I'd mostly do to change it is to remove the long verbatim descriptor
 from the error message.  Even with truncation, this makes the message
 extremely long.  I don't think there's a need to, or it should be
 truncated to only a few hundred characters.  (If it's truncated in the
 first place surely there's no question of copying it from the message and
 into a manually operated decryption tool, so not even for developers could
 the extra length be of help.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28126 [Metrics/Website]: tor 0.3.5 missing in "relays by version" graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28126: tor 0.3.5 missing in "relays by version" graph
-+--
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the hint! Fixed. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25578 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Package and distribute Tor Browser using Flatpak

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25578: Package and distribute Tor Browser using Flatpak
--+--
 Reporter:  mjog  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mjog):

 > flatkill

 Tin-foil-hat drivel by the same kinds of people that dislike systemd
 because they can't imagine that a better way of doing something that isn't
 the way they've always done it.

 Rejoiner: http://ramcq.net/2018/10/15/flatpak-sandbox-security/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by udo):

 What remains of the configuration torrc:

 {{{
 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local
 connections.

 Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
 RunAsDaemon 1
 DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
 ControlPort 9051
 HashedControlPassword zz:xxx

 Address x
 Nickname x
 ContactInfo Random Person 

 ORPort 9001
 DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections

 GeoIPExcludeUnknown 1
 ExcludeNodes
 
default,Unnamed,{ae},{af},{ag},{ao},{az},{ba},{bb},{bd},{bh},{bi},{bn},{bt},{bw},{by},{cd},{cf},{cg},{ci},{ck},{cm},{cn},{cu},{cy},{dj},{dm},{dz},{eg},{er},{et},{fj},{ga},{gd},{gh},{gm},{gn},{gq},{gy},{hr},{ht},{id},{in},{iq},{ir},{jm},{jo},{ke},{kg},{kh},{ki},{km},{kn},{kp},{kw},{kz},{la},{lb},{lc},{lk},{lr},{ly},{ma},{me},{mk},{ml},{mm},{mr},{mu},{mv},{mw},{my},{na},{ng},{om},{pg},{ph},{pk},{ps},{qa},{rs},{ru},{rw},{sa},{sb},{sd},{sg},{si},{sl},{sn},{so},{st},{sy},{sz},{td},{tg},{th},{tj},{tm},{tn},{to},{tr},{tt},{tv},{tz},{ug},{uz},{vc},{ve},{vn},{ws},{ye},{zm},{zw},{??}
 ExcludeExitNodes
 
default,Unnamed,{ae},{af},{ag},{ao},{az},{ba},{bb},{bd},{bh},{bi},{bn},{bt},{bw},{by},{cd},{cf},{cg},{ci},{ck},{cm},{cn},{cu},{cy},{dj},{dm},{dz},{eg},{er},{et},{fj},{ga},{gd},{gh},{gm},{gn},{gq},{gy},{hr},{ht},{id},{in},{iq},{ir},{jm},{jo},{ke},{kg},{kh},{ki},{km},{kn},{kp},{kw},{kz},{la},{lb},{lc},{lk},{lr},{ly},{ma},{me},{mk},{ml},{mm},{mr},{mu},{mv},{mw},{my},{na},{ng},{om},{pg},{ph},{pk},{ps},{qa},{rs},{ru},{rw},{sa},{sb},{sd},{sg},{si},{sl},{sn},{so},{st},{sy},{sz},{td},{tg},{th},{tj},{tm},{tn},{to},{tr},{tt},{tv},{tz},{ug},{uz},{vc},{ve},{vn},{ws},{ye},{zm},{zw},{??}

 LongLivedPorts
 
21,22,80,110,143,443,706,993,1863,5050,5190,5222,5223,6523,6667,6697,8080,8300,8443,9001,9030

 ExitPolicy accept *:22 # SSH
 ExitPolicy accept *:53# DNS

 ExitPolicy reject *:* # middleman only -- no exits allowed

 ExitRelay 1
 MaxMemInQueues 1024 MB

 BandwidthRate 1024 KB
 BandwidthBurst 1536 KB
 MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 999 KB

 AccountingStart day 12:21
 AccountingMax 99 GB

 DisableAllSwap 1

 User _tor

 ServerDNSResolvConfFile /etc/tor/resolv.conf

 ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/local/bin/obfs4proxy managed
 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 x:y
 ExtORPort auto

 Strictnodes 1

 PidFile /run/tor/tor.pid
 }}}
 Any weird things remaining?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by udo):

 FWIW: I restarted tor with `ExitPolicy reject` removed from torrc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by udo):

 After ~18 hours per the logs I posted.
 What are 'weird' torrc options?
 It is a mostly non-exit node with obfs4 proxy.
 Only two open ports.
 List of `ExitPolicy reject` from tornull.org.
 `ExcludeNodes` and `ExcludeExitNodes` from same source.
 But are these efecting the issue we see here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28107 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0 turns off VP9 videos when detects low fps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28107: Tor Browser 8.0 turns off VP9 videos when detects low fps
--+---
 Reporter:  vp9   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by vp9):

 Oh, crap, it's not easy to reproduce starting from a clean 8.0.2. And
 there is nothing obvious in the source code... But the same is for
 #22548... All we have is:
 {{{
   return !mp4supported || !hwsupported || VP9Benchmark::IsVP9DecodeFast();
 }}}
 Then, how come it returns `false` for machines without mp4? Does it check
 for `mp4enabled` instead of `mp4supported`?
 How come it returns `false` for machines without hardware decoding and
 even with hardware acceleration disabled?
 It could be easier to enable vp9 unconditionally, because
 > VP9 software decoding is faster than H.264 software decoding.
  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1213177#c10
 but as you prefer to deal with all that 'hardware acceleration' mess,
 things become much more complicated, and you have to inspect `hwsupported`
 works correctly in every weird hardware configuration.
 As for `IsVP9DecodeFast()`, it seems it always returns `false` on a first
 run, see https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 aurora/rev/921e6142e8b9#l1.67, but there also could be more weird e10s-
 related bugs like https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1446931.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:19 udo]:
 > So what does this tell us?
 > Were we dealing with two issues? With one fixed now?

 That does sound like a plausible summary of where we are.

 Udo: how quickly does your relay experience this bug, after startup?

 And, do you have any weird torrc options set?

 Can you remove as many torrc options as possible, while still experiencing
 the bug? If so, can you tell us what minimal set of torrc options still
 trigger it?

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