[tor-bugs] #29029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make "tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit" into a protocol warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29029: Make "tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit" into a protocol
warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: unspecified
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-hs, fast-fix, 041-proposed-
 Severity:  Normal   |  fast-fix, 040-backport, 035-backport,
 |  034-backport, 033-backport, 029-backport
Actual Points:  0.1  |  Parent ID:  #15618
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 There's nothing that relay operators can do to fix it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29022 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is fingerprintable with WebGL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29022: Tor Browser is fingerprintable with WebGL
--+--
 Reporter:  randomname|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Panopticlick is not a good platform for doing this kind of tests as it is
 strongly biased both with respect to older browsers it has seen and to
 non-Tor Browser browsers. What we aim is to reduce the user difference
 *just within* the Tor Browser group, which Panopticlick can't measure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27881 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript initial configuration bug?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27881: NoScript initial configuration bug?
--+---
 Reporter:  simplestuf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 simple]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > > What exactly is the bug report about here? (I am confused and it seems
 to me there is more than one issue complained about in the description.)
 >
 > When tor browser is opened, no sites are listed as 'Untrusted' and
 'Default' sites (which is every site) have everything allowed. Hence
 Noscript is completely useless unless one bothers to look into the
 settings and fix things up before starting to browse.

 That's not a bug but expected. We use NoScript to get the properties of
 our "safer" and "safest" security mode we want. On the level "standard"
 you should get the most usable browsing experience, which means the least
 amount of website breakage due to disabled features we can provide.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't set `privacy.resistFingerprinting.autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts` to `false` anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29028: Don't set
`privacy.resistFingerprinting.autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts` to
`false` anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, GeorgKoppen201901 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201901R, GeorgKoppen201901
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_29028` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_29028&id=99781eb755a832e48e832ac8e354e818d614d765)
 has the fix for review.

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[tor-bugs] #29028 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't set `privacy.resistFingerprinting.autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts` to `false` anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29028: Don't set
`privacy.resistFingerprinting.autoDeclineNoUserInputCanvasPrompts` to
`false` anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201901
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1446472 got solved and the
 fix will be in the next ESR. We should remove our workaround done in
 #27543.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27881 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript initial configuration bug?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27881: NoScript initial configuration bug?
--+---
 Reporter:  simplestuf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by simple):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > What exactly is the bug report about here? (I am confused and it seems
 to me there is more than one issue complained about in the description.)

 When tor browser is opened, no sites are listed as 'Untrusted' and
 'Default' sites (which is every site) have everything allowed. Hence
 Noscript is completely useless unless one bothers to look into the
 settings and fix things up before starting to browse.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29015 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document tor_ersatz_socketpair() and the functions it calls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29015: Document tor_ersatz_socketpair() and the functions it calls
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, easy, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28995 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29015 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document tor_ersatz_socketpair() and the functions it calls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29015: Document tor_ersatz_socketpair() and the functions it calls
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, easy, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28995 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29015 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document tor_ersatz_socketpair() and the functions it calls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29015: Document tor_ersatz_socketpair() and the functions it calls
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, easy, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28995 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:  teor =>


Comment:

 Hey dgoulet, I can't review my own stuff.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24953 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: In check_existing mode, log "fallback list", not "whitelist"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24953: In check_existing mode, log "fallback list", not "whitelist"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, fallback,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => teor
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha


Comment:

 We're almost there, I left a few comments on the pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,|  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711, 040-roadmap-proposed |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:50 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:49 teor]:
 > > > You think this is valid test and this can be merged?.
 > >
 > > As long as we can get stem 1.7, it seems like a good test.
 >
 > Hmm, i didn't mean to include the python code as a test in tor code,
 since the test in C already checks the header
 (https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/468/files#diff-
 a63a60330b655aa123b096768848f5bfR2552), but to manually extra check that i
 can actually get the bandwidth file in a test network.
 > I currently don't know how it'd be possible to run a test network when
 running tor tests and include this code as an stem test.

 We don't need a test network, we just need a single tor instance.
 We have some tor integration tests already:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/test_rebind.sh

 But we would need to configure the tor instance as a directory authority.
 So we would need to run tor-gencert to generate the authority keys. And
 require stem.

 Maybe the best place for this test is in stem?
 We could open a ticket for a stem integration test that tests bandwidth
 files.
 Do you think this test is worth adding? Will it catch future bugs?

 > So the question is then, is it fine the PR as it is?.

 I think the PR is ok without the test.
 But ahf still needs to review your changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23605 [Core Tor/Tor]: expired consensus causes guard selection to stall at BOOTSTRAP PROGRESS=80

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23605: expired consensus causes guard selection to stall at BOOTSTRAP 
PROGRESS=80
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  usability, ux, s8-errors, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing because the remaining bits are fixed by #27167.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24661, #28351, #28591

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24661, #28351, #28591 by catalyst:
parent to #28018

Comment:
Reparent so we can close #23605.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28454 [Core Tor/Tor]: Actually use zstd on Appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28454: Actually use zstd on Appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci appveyor windows  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  034-backport 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #28399 =>
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28768 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback script to match Tor bootstrap changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28768: Update fallback script to match Tor bootstrap changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #24838 =>
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Accept a future consensus for bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28591: Accept a future consensus for bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:  0.5
  usability, ux, s8-errors, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #23605   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28308 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log the Tor version before running the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28308: Log the Tor version before running the unit tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28096| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28319 [Core Tor/Tor]: accept a reasonably live consensus for path selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28319: accept a reasonably live consensus for path selection
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  usability, ux, s8-errors, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #24661   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  0.1 =>
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28319 [Core Tor/Tor]: accept a reasonably live consensus for path selection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28319: accept a reasonably live consensus for path selection
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  usability, ux, s8-errors, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #24661   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount blinding and encryption: add rustfmt CI check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26973: Privcount blinding and encryption: add rustfmt CI check
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 035-roadmap-master, 035   |  implemented
  -triaged-in-20180711, rust |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #25669   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28255 [Core Tor/Tor]: verify guard selection consensus expiry constraints

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28255: verify guard selection consensus expiry constraints
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  usability, ux, s8-errors, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #24661   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25669: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 035-roadmap-master, 035   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  -triaged-in-20180711, rust,|
  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed-on-   |
  roadmap|
Parent ID:  #29009   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.2
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23576, #23588, #26992

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23576, #23588, #26992 by teor:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

Comment:
These IPv6 tickets won't make it into 0.4.0, let's think about doing them in 
0.4.1.
(They're not on the roadmap, so we'll need to decide if diagnosing the 
underlying issues is worth the time.)

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23565, #25061, #27104, #27308

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23565, #25061, #27104, #27308 by catalyst:
sponsor to Sponsor19-can

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28281, #28925

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28281, #28925 by catalyst:
sponsor to Sponsor19

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27912 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27912: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28928 [Core Tor/Tor]: update control-spec.txt for new bootstrap phases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28928: update control-spec.txt for new bootstrap phases
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor19-also, s8-bootstrap, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  spec   |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor8 => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28930 [Core Tor/Tor]: consider reordering PT/proxy phases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28930: consider reordering PT/proxy phases
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor19-also, s8-bootstrap, pt,|  Actual Points:
  proxy  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor8 => Sponsor19


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25669, #26970, #27162, #27906, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25669, #26970, #27162, #27906, #27908, #29004, #29005, 
#29006, #29007, #29008, #29009, #29010, #29011, #29019, #29027 by teor:
milestone to Tor: 0.4.1.x-final

Comment:
Let's review these tickets at the next meeting using our 041-proposed process.

They're on the roadmap, so the review should focus on ticket size and team 
capacity (and sponsor expectations).

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26288, #26839, #26840, #26841, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #26288, #26839, #26840, #26841, #26842, #26846, #26871, 
#29023, #29024 by teor:


Comment:
Let's review these tickets at the next meeting using our 041-proposed process.
They're on the roadmap, so the review should focus on ticket size and team 
capacity (and sponsor expectations).

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25669, #26970, #27162, #27906, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25669, #26970, #27162, #27906, #27908, #29004, #29005, 
#29006, #29007, #29008, #29009, #29010, #29011, #29019, #29027 by teor:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

Comment:
These tasks are on the 0.4.1 roadmap for PrivCount and Sponsor V.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23061, #26941, #26944, #26945, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23061, #26941, #26944, #26945, #26957, #26958 by teor:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

Comment:
These tasks aren't essential for a PrivCount proof of concept: moving them to 
Tor: unspecified.

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[tor-bugs] #29027 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: put the PrivCount statistics in a stats/ file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29027: PrivCount proof of concept: put the PrivCount statistics in a stats/ 
file
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29004
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorV  |
--+
 Maybe we should put all the stats in files while we're at it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28843 [Core Tor/Tor]: DROPOWNERSHIP command

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28843: DROPOWNERSHIP command
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I assume the test failure is either some travis issue or other transient
 failure? Seems unrelated.

 This looks good otherwise.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28895 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Your guard" log messages are causing confusion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28895: "Your guard" log messages are causing confusion
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-log, easy,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28856 [Core Tor/Tor]: Discard strcmp_len()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28856: Discard strcmp_len()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android startup performance  |  Actual Points:  .3
  controller |
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good. Little sad about the test coverage reduction, but not that
 sad. V simple fucntion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28058 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run shellcheck as part of "make check"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28058: Run shellcheck as part of "make check"
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Actually, you know what.. Can we fix the formatting in that makefile rule,
 and maybe comment that the command -v thing is checking for shellcheck
 before running it? The fact that Nick missed that is probably a sign this
 code is too dense right now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28757 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deprecated ControlPort commands from GETINFO info/names listing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28757: Remove deprecated ControlPort commands from GETINFO info/names listing
-+-
 Reporter:  wagon|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-spec, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Both the spec changes and the code changes look good to me.  Maybe the
 spec change should say which version we removed them in, and maybe also
 which version they stopped giving useful information.  Then again maybe
 this has been deprecated long enough that it's not important to mention
 that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28058 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run shellcheck as part of "make check"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28058: Run shellcheck as part of "make check"
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Seems simple enough to me. Looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29025 [Core Tor]: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29025: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support
+--
 Reporter:  Mangix  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  openssl,engine  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #29026

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29025 [Core Tor]: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29025: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support
+--
 Reporter:  Mangix  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl,engine  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by Mangix):

 * Attachment "010-openssl-engines.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29026 [Core Tor/Tor]: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29026: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support
--+--
 Reporter:  Mangix|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => ahf
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Marking as needs review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29026 [Core Tor]: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29026: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support
--+---
 Reporter:  Mangix|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by Mangix):

 * Attachment "010-openssl-engines.patch" added.


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[tor-bugs] #29026 [Core Tor]: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29026: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support
---+--
 Reporter:  Mangix |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.10  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Tor currently disables its engine support for Android only. This breaks
 compilation on other platforms that lack engine support.

 This patch changes the check to check for OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE, which should
 work everywhere.

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[tor-bugs] #29025 [Core Tor]: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29025: OpenSSL will not compile without engine support
--+--
 Reporter:  Mangix|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  openssl,engine|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 In OpenWrt, ENGINE support is disabled (supposed to be actually) and this
 makes compilation fail as currently in Tor, it is unconditionally disabled
 for ANDROID.

 This changes tor to check for OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE which also works with
 Android.

 The missing headers are for fixing offsetof and SHA512 being undefined.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21314 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21314: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it
requests
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt snowflake   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tor-pt snowflake
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29024 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29024: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => tor-pt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25601 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Multiplex - one snowflake proxy should be able to support multiple clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25601: Multiplex - one snowflake proxy should be able to support multiple 
clients
---+---
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake tor-pt   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => snowflake tor-pt
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28020 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run another memory profile in late 0.4.0 to figure out how much memory we saved.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28020: Run another memory profile in late 0.4.0 to figure out how much memory 
we
saved.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  Actual Points:  0.5
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26630   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Needs revision wrt to the one-side close issue and my comments in the PR.

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[tor-bugs] #29024 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29024: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19 |
--+
 We need to make PTs in general, and Snowflake in particular, more reliable
 and well-tested.  On way to do that is with realistic integration tests,
 using Chutney.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28866 [Core Tor/sbws]: ResultDump.queue.put() can hang if the queue is full

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28866: ResultDump.queue.put() can hang if the queue is full
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 juga]:
 > > So sbws should call put() without blocking, or with a (very small)
 timeout:
 > > https://docs.python.org/3/library/queue.html#queue.Queue.put
 >
 > With put timeout it will always return Full unless the slot is
 immediatly available
 (https://docs.python.org/3/library/queue.html#queue.Queue.put)

 i miss-interpreted this, it doesn't return Full.

 Implemented the timeout in check whether the queue is full:
 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/325

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25890 [Core Tor/Nyx]: add instructions for running nyx safely to the FAQ

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25890: add instructions for running nyx safely to the FAQ
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 Hi all, think I'm gonna resolve this. If someone has a patch they'd care
 to propose I'd be happy to discuss it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28869 [Core Tor/sbws]: KeyboardInterrupt will cause a callback error and does not close the thread pool cleanly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28869: KeyboardInterrupt will cause a callback error and does not close the 
thread
pool cleanly
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 when #28897 is merged, callback error will stop receiving TypeError
 when #28870 is merged, callback error will stop receiving AssertionError

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28869 [Core Tor/sbws]: KeyboardInterrupt will cause a callback error and does not close the thread pool cleanly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28869: KeyboardInterrupt will cause a callback error and does not close the 
thread
pool cleanly
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/324

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25453 [Core Tor/Nyx]: When I start nyx in small terminal then I expand the terminal window and the "cpu %" disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25453: When I start nyx in small terminal then I expand the terminal window and
the "cpu %" disappears
---+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 Think I'm gonna resolve this. Feel free to reopen if anyone has tips that
 repros this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by testcy):

 I was talking about ticket #23390. Anyway, I tried the debug build as you
 suggested from comment:5:ticket:28874, but it crashes before even
 starting.

 First a window opens with the message:

 DLL blacklist was unable to intercept AppInit DLLs.
 Assertion failure: false (MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE: Opcode sequence includes
 commands after JMP), at /var/tmp/build/firefox-8cac0295141b/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/nsWindowsDLLInterceptor.h:856

 Then the following message appears:

 Tor Browser has stopped working

 Problem signature:
   Problem Event Name:   APPCRASH
   Application Name: firefox.exe
   Application Version:  60.4.0.6609
   Application Timestamp:
   Fault Module Name:mozglue.dll
   Fault Module Version: 60.4.0.6609
   Fault Module Timestamp:   
   Exception Code:   c005
   Exception Offset: 0003b96f
   OS Version:   6.1.7601.2.1.0.256.1
   Locale ID:1032
   Additional Information 1: 70e3
   Additional Information 2: 70e39dc7b636ff3f20e4a7953f9ac3f1
   Additional Information 3: c2a5
   Additional Information 4: c2a50e6264b9325008e2c2287ce9888f

 Read our privacy statement online:
   http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=104288&clcid=0x0409

 If the online privacy statement is not available, please read our privacy
 statement offline:
   C:\Windows\system32\en-US\erofflps.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28296 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Nyx shows wrong IP address for ControlPort connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28296: Nyx shows wrong IP address for ControlPort connection
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Hi wagon. I see what you mean, you're right that it's more accurate to
 display your controller connection as...

 {{{
 127.0.0.1:43230-->  127.0.0.1:9051
 }}}

 ... rather than...

 {{{
 127.0.0.1:43230-->  97.113.4.188:9051
 }}}

 That said, I still prefer the later because inbound/outbound connections
 display 97.113.4.188 for 'me'. Either approach will cause confusion
 (showing 127.0.0.1 because it does not match other connection types, or
 97.113.4.188 because the connection isn't truly with our externally facing
 endpoint.

 Think I'm gonna opt to keep this as it is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28334 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Nyx configurashion editor does not work with options' values properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28334: Nyx configurashion editor does not work with options' values properly
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Nice catch! Thanks wagon, fixed.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/commit/?id=15d0c64

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28861 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks: Unsupported syscall number 217

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28861: torsocks: Unsupported syscall number 217
+--
 Reporter:  ilf |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torsocks, syscall, 217  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by onirony):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 No problem, I squashed them into a single commit:
 
https://github.com/seisvelas/torsocks/commit/085f5675a6ea23e5733a4eba26e5129d13d7546e

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26146 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Setting `general.useragent.override` does not spoof the platform part anymore in ESR 60 which is confusing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26146: Setting `general.useragent.override` does not spoof the platform part
anymore in ESR 60 which is confusing
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-os, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201809R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks3):

 Replying to [comment:72 tom]:
 > I don't know if we'll uplift it to esr60, but we can put it in Nightly
 easy enough.
 Still waiting...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28874 [Applications/Tor Browser]: https://browserleaks.com/webgl crashes tab on 64bit Tor Browser for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28874: https://browserleaks.com/webgl crashes tab on 64bit Tor Browser for 
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, TorBrowserTeam201812  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 Thanks cypherpunk; that's probably it. I'm sending in some trials on
 TaskCluster to see if that solves my 8-month old error. I pinged Jacek
 about whether MinGW should update or we should override.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26288, #26839, #26840, #26841, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #26288, #26839, #26840, #26841, #26842, #26846, #26871, 
#29023 by dgoulet:
milestone to Tor: 0.4.1.x-final

Comment:
prop289 won't make it in 040. Feature freeze is in 7 days.

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[tor-bugs] #29023 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29023: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  prop289, tor-relay
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #26871
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorV  |
--+
 In order to add randomness to each relay cell, we require a very fast
 PRNG. This ticket is for the implementation of such a feature so we can
 use it for prop289.

 The ticket that adds randomness is #26871.

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[tor-bugs] #29022 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is fingerprintable with WebGL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29022: Tor Browser is fingerprintable with WebGL
+--
 Reporter:  randomname  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 https://panopticlick.eff.org

 Hash of WebGL fingerprint on this test always returns the same unique
 value to me on the same system. I have restarted the browser, installed a
 fresh Tor Browser, results are the same.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, 034-backport, 035-must,  |  Actual Points:
  035-rc-blocker?|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by udo):

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29004 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29004: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #27908| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:  nickm => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28757 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deprecated ControlPort commands from GETINFO info/names listing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28757: Remove deprecated ControlPort commands from GETINFO info/names listing
-+-
 Reporter:  wagon|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-spec, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:  teor => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29004 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29004: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #27908| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28870, #28989

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28870, #28989 by dgoulet:
reviewer to asn

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28897, #28920

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28897, #28920 by dgoulet:
reviewer to teor

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28757, #28774, #29015

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28757, #28774, #29015 by dgoulet:
reviewer to teor

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28780, #28895

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28780, #28895 by dgoulet:
reviewer to mikeperry

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28717, #29017, #29018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28717, #29017, #29018 by dgoulet:
reviewer to nickm

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #20006, #28741, #28932

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #20006, #28741, #28932 by dgoulet:
reviewer to dgoulet

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28590, #28981, #28994

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28590, #28981, #28994 by dgoulet:
reviewer to ahf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28861 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks: Unsupported syscall number 217

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28861: torsocks: Unsupported syscall number 217
+
 Reporter:  ilf |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  torsocks, syscall, 217  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 onirony]:
 > Thanks for the feedback, dgoulet. Updated the branch:
 https://github.com/seisvelas/torsocks/tree/getdent_fix
 >

 Looks great. Can I ask you one last thing. To squash together all commits
 into one? I see 7 commits with roughly the same title so it doesn't tell
 us much about what it is or does.

 If you have question about it, let me know on IRC/email or I can do it
 myself if you prefer. Whatever suits you!

 Thanks to everyone for the testing as well!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Surprise race: Intro point closes circuit after NACK, at the same time as client tries to extend circuit to new intro point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27841: Surprise race: Intro point closes circuit after NACK, at the same time 
as
client tries to extend circuit to new intro point
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs dos|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 No backport then we are good here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by jb.1234abcd):

 Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks3]:
 > > GDB only!
 >
 > What do you mean? I was assuming jb.1234abcd was just starting Tor
 Browser "as usual" outside of a debugger or am I wrong?
 If I may (as I understand it):
 I asked how this can be debugged to help TB developers, and cypherpunks3
 answered that in GDB only as he suggests there  is a "deadlock after
 calling tor_cleanup".

 Btw, is this problem with a process left behind experienced by me only, or
 by others too ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29020 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Warn when bug 10416 is detected

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29020: Warn when bug 10416 is detected
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28874 [Applications/Tor Browser]: https://browserleaks.com/webgl crashes tab on 64bit Tor Browser for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28874: https://browserleaks.com/webgl crashes tab on 64bit Tor Browser for 
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, TorBrowserTeam201812  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by omg):

 
https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mingw-w64/ci/master/tree/mingw-w64-headers/direct-x/include/d3dcompiler.h#l38

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks3]:
 > GDB only!

 What do you mean? I was assuming jb.1234abcd was just starting Tor Browser
 "as usual" outside of a debugger or am I wrong?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+---
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:   => tbb-usability-website
 * severity:  Critical => Normal
 * priority:  High => Medium


Comment:

 Which Firefox version did you try? I just tested with the Firefox ESR
 version that my Debian box ships and there I see the same issue. So, it is
 not a Tor Browser-only problem. Could you try with a vanilla Firefox ESR
 (see: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/all/ for some
 bundles) and report back if that one is working for you (in case you did
 not test it yet)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28971 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (Sub)key rotation sometimes break downstream projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28971: (Sub)key rotation sometimes break downstream projects
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 I am closing this bug as I am not sure what exactly we are supposed to be
 doing given comment:3. And, yes, if Trisquel is still shipping torbrowser-
 launcher for March 2016 there is not much we can do about potential
 breakage.

 Feel free to reopen, or better, to file separate issues for concrete
 things the browser team should be doing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28971 [Applications/Tor Browser]: (Sub)key rotation sometimes break downstream projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28971: (Sub)key rotation sometimes break downstream projects
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 We have a policy even though it is not written down yet.

 Assuming we are not aware of any key compromise the master key's expiry
 date will get updated once it is about to run out and new subkeys get
 rotated once their expiry date is about to run out. "Is about to run out"
 is a bit vague but the idea is to make sure the current stable release is
 always signed with an up-to-date and unexpired key.

 To address ahf's second question: Yes, the new subkeys are always
 announced both on the first stable and alpha blogpost for releases which
 are signed with the new keys. In particular, for downstream projects like
 torbrowser-launcher the *alpha* blog posts are relevant here as they
 introduce new keys *months* before they reach the stable series. We test
 the new subkey during a bunch of alpha releases before it is used for
 stable, too.

 For the third question: I don't know about a location for the (new) keys.
 I make sure that `gpg --recv-keys` is working before using the new key and
 am under the assumption that getting the key via any other web request
 would be failing, too, if the gpg command is failing. That said, I am fine
 if someone wants to put the Tor Browser signing keys fetched via `gpg
 --recv-keys` at some other place for easy download.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24953 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: In check_existing mode, log "fallback list", not "whitelist"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24953: In check_existing mode, log "fallback list", not "whitelist"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, fallback,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * cc: rl1987 (added)


Comment:

 Tried addressing these in 08921df6a2daa18729d9f3012d724d7ecb65883d.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20091 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add a required version setting to chutney (or to chutney networks)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20091: Add a required version setting to chutney (or to chutney networks)
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy? |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by egypcio):

 * cc: egypcio (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20344 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Do chutney releases with semantic versioning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20344: Do chutney releases with semantic versioning
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20091| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by egypcio):

 * cc: egypcio (added)


Comment:

 hi teor,
 thank you for pointing me the ticket. very appreciated (:

 my idea, as soon as we have any semantic release is to start a port for
 FreeBSD;
 I am adding myself in CC here to get notified about any update.

 again, thank you very much! KR,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,|  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711, 040-roadmap-proposed |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:49 teor]:
 > > You think this is valid test and this can be merged?.
 >
 > As long as we can get stem 1.7, it seems like a good test.

 Hmm, i didn't mean to include the python code as a test in tor code, since
 the test in C already checks the header
 (https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/468/files#diff-
 a63a60330b655aa123b096768848f5bfR2552), but to manually extra check that i
 can actually get the bandwidth file in a test network.
 I currently don't know how it'd be possible to run a test network when
 running tor tests and include this code as an stem test.

 So the question is then, is it fine the PR as it is?.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:21 testcy]:
 > Could the above bug be related?

 Which bug are you talking about? Could you use the debug build I made and
 pointed to from comment:5:ticket:28874? Does it show anything useful in
 the console (crash output/assertions) before actually crashing?

 I might be easiest to flip `browser.tabs.remote.autostart` to `false` and
 restart (Note: the build is crashing on first start but should work
 afterwards. This is tracked in #28875).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28874 [Applications/Tor Browser]: https://browserleaks.com/webgl crashes tab on 64bit Tor Browser for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28874: https://browserleaks.com/webgl crashes tab on 64bit Tor Browser for 
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, TorBrowserTeam201812  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 gl: any update on this issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28964 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Please show tor version in About dialog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28964: Please show tor version in About dialog
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > This seems like a good suggestion; maybe we should also show the tor
 version on the about:tor page.

 Fine with me in general. I wonder, though, whether we would clutter the
 `about:tor` page too much with `-alpha` or some potential git hash in case
 nightlies are involved...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28873 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cascading of permissions does not seem to work properly in Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28873: Cascading of permissions does not seem to work properly in Tor Browser 8
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  ma1
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  noscript, tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  torbutton, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, |
  TorBrowserTeam201812R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:12 ma1]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 gk]:
 > >  "only execute JavaScript loaded over HTTPS provided the URL bar
 domain got loaded over HTTPS as well".
 > >
 > > E.g. it should not be possible that an exit node owner rewrites URLs
 in a document loaded over HTTP, pointing to malicious JavaScript loaded
 over HTTPS from a domain they control and getting that JavaScript executed
 in Tor Browser if the user is on "safer".
 >
 > OK, so as long as this is kept guaranteed (e.g. by checking whether the
 subdocument has been granted its TRUSTED status by a domain-specific rule
 or just by the generic "https:", as Tor does, and in the latter case
 enforcing this "HTTPS only" policy) we're fine, right?

 I think so, yes.

 > > I am fine adding additional code on our side for interacting with
 NoScript to get that property if that helps you and other users of
 NoScript who where complaining.
 >
 > I'd actually like to at least have a sure-fire mean to tell whether
 we're running in the Tor Browser or not, in order to enforce special cases
 which are important for Tor users without affecting the general
 population.

 I created #29021 for that.

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[tor-bugs] #29021 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide a means to inform NoScript about being run in a Tor Browser context

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29021: Provide a means to inform NoScript about being run in a Tor Browser 
context
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  noscript
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor Browser has some special requirements which NoScript helps to fulfill.
 However, this kind of NoScript usage might come with a worse experience
 for non-Tor Browser NoScript users. Thus, it would be helpful for NoScript
 to know whether it is running in a Tor Browser context to be able to apply
 our needs only then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28957 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Privacy setting not remembered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28957: Privacy setting not remembered
--+--
 Reporter:  siketa|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Duplicate of #19369.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: On the privacy pane "Never Remember History" can't get selected

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19369: On the privacy pane "Never Remember History" can't get selected
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: siketa (added)


Comment:

 #28957 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: annoying: new circuit button dissapears. Highly unstable!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28949: annoying: new circuit button dissapears. Highly unstable!
--+---
 Reporter:  gdfhgh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Does the issue happen outside of a Tails context, too? If so, on which
 operating system did you encounter that problem?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10416 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10416: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters
-+-
 Reporter:  iktsuarpok   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode, win32  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25729   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:37 cypherpunks2]:
 > Simple detector for tor-launcher
 > {{{
 > diff --git a/src/components/tl-process.js b/src/components/tl-process.js
 > index 3aa45e4..e12e523 100644
 > --- a/src/components/tl-process.js
 > +++ b/src/components/tl-process.js
 > @@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ TorProcessService.prototype =
 >mLastTorWarningPhase: null,
 >mLastTorWarningReason: null,
 >mDefaultPreferencesAreLoaded: false,
 > +  mWindowsCodePageWrong: false,
 >
 >// Private Methods
 /
 >_startTor: function(aForceDisableNetwork)
 > @@ -510,6 +511,12 @@ TorProcessService.prototype =
 >  if (env.exists("PATH"))
 >path += ";" + env.get("PATH");
 >  env.set("PATH", path);
 > +var check = env.get("PATH");
 > +if (path != check) {
 > +   this.mWindowsCodePageWrong = true;
 > +   var s =
 TorLauncherUtil.getLocalizedString("wrong_windows_codepage")
 > +   this._notifyUserOfError(s, null,
 this.kTorProcessDidNotStartTopic);
 > +}
 >}
 >
 >this.mTorProcessStatus = this.kStatusStarting;
 > }}}

 Thanks! I opened #29020 for a potential warning mechanism in Tor Launcher.

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[tor-bugs] #29020 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Warn when bug 10416 is detected

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29020: Warn when bug 10416 is detected
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Tor has still issues on Windows if a path contains non-ASCII characters
 (i.e. #10416) but it seems we could warn about that better from Tor
 Launchers site. For a potentially useful code snippet see:
 comment:37:ticket:10416.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28491 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: tb-manual: translate topics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28491: tb-manual: translate topics
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 it works now, thanks hiro!

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