Re: [tor-bugs] #27175 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript plugin does not save per-site permissions/settings when tor browser closes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27175: NoScript plugin does not save per-site permissions/settings when tor
browser closes
-+-
 Reporter:  tor-user-1234|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  noscript, tbb-regression,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-|
  backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 noscript, tbb-regression, tbb-8.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-
 backport
 =>
 noscript, tbb-regression, tbb-8.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201809R, tbb-
 backported


Comment:

 That's commit d0adb5ad47e97e2143bac6595084a33e6355acb8 on `maint-2.0` now
 and will make it into 8.0.5.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26540: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading
-+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201811R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201811R, tbb-backport => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201811R, tbb-backported


Comment:

 Commit 65efe12e32275e12ede3746c253d03e6a7ca34ae on `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.0-1` fixes this for the 8.0 series.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28695 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set BRNameMatchingPolicy to "Enforce"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28695: Set BRNameMatchingPolicy to "Enforce"
-+-
 Reporter:  omg  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-backported  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-backport => tbb-
 security, TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-backported


Comment:

 Commit acd09ddc7ea5fe3c3cc195a7a1b6e3722f8758e6 on `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.0-1` has the backport for the 8.0 series.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28740 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make navigator.platform return "Win32", even on Win64 OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28740: Make navigator.platform return "Win32", even on Win64 OS
-+-
 Reporter:  omg  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201812,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-backported  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  GeorgKoppen201812, TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-backport =>
 GeorgKoppen201812, TorBrowserTeam201812R, tbb-backported


Comment:

 commit a102f8b853fb04db32bcd0f924fd6391cd3d40da on `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.0-1` has the backport for the 8.0 series.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by watt):

 Replying to [comment:6 dcf]:
 > what the difference between the success and failure TLSv1.3 handshakes
 is.
 draft vs final TLSv1.3?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:7 watt]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 dcf]:
 > > TLSv1.3 (which `Firefox_60` always does).
 > `Firefox_60` doesn't support TLSv1.3.

 My bad, I actually meant `HelloFirefox_63`. You can see where the
 fingerprint specifies TLSv1.3 [https://github.com/refraction-
 networking/utls/blob/fd72b83e043e8ed28e5ce8cdca84a1080927c208/u_parrots.go#L195
 here]. `HelloFirefox_Auto` currently means `HelloFirefox_63`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by watt):

 Replying to [comment:6 dcf]:
 > TLSv1.3 (which `Firefox_60` always does).
 `Firefox_60` doesn't support TLSv1.3.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Yeah I did some tests today with `HelloRandomizedNoALPN`, 400 trials
 against each of 3 servers.
 =**ajax.aspnetcdn.com** =||
 ||  284||no error ||
 ||   80||remote error: tls: handshake failure ||
 ||   36||tls: server selected unsupported group ||
 =**golang.org** =||
 ||  335||no error ||
 ||   65||remote error: tls: handshake failure ||
 =**www.cloudflare.com** =||
 ||  400||no error ||

 `HelloRandomizedNoALPN` [https://github.com/refraction-
 
networking/utls/blob/a89e7e6da482a5a0db02578fc606ace9ccfbea62/u_parrots.go#L557-L564
 unconditionally includes] sec256r1 and sec384r1, but it doesn't seem to
 cause a problem unless it also happens to choose TLSv1.3 (which
 `Firefox_60` always does). 100% of the failures used a fingerprint with
 TLSv1.3, while only 28% of the successes did. I haven't dug deeper to see
 what the difference between the success and failure TLSv1.3 handshakes is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:1 dcf]:
 > (b) causes the server to select a feature that the client advertised in
 its fake fingerprint but doesn't actually support. When this happens, you
 get an error in the meek-client log like
 > {{{
 > error in handling request: tls: server selected unsupported group
 > }}}

 Probably old news, but since this happens with the `Firefox_Auto` preset
 on the Azure bridge, I looked into it a bit, and it is primarily caused by
 `utls`'s support for curves other than X25519 being non-existent in
 certain cases.

 This is code inherited from `crypto/tls`, and the issue arises from the
 assumption that the server will always negotiate X25519
 (ajax.aspnetcdn.com will pick `secp256r1`) if it is present in the
 ClientHello's Supported Curves extension.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29127 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias and LDAP for new dev

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29127: Please create email alias and LDAP for new dev
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Looks like the key is on the keyservers now.

 But it has zero sigs.

 Cecylia, I wonder if you could get somebody local that we know to sign it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28615 [Metrics/Library]: Additional @type annotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28615: Additional @type annotation
-+--
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by atagar):

 > The missing "w" line was an example.

 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2376 'w'
 lines are not mandatory], so omitting them does not malform router status
 entries (unlike the digest, which arguably does).

 Lacking those lines sounds like a weird control protocol quirk which
 should be noted in its spec, but is unimportant to the annotation.

 > We could look at this function at our hackfest next week. It will need a
 refactor before we make any changes. I'll put it on our list.

 Thanks!

 > 5/6 bandwidth authorities are still using version 1.0 of the bandwidth
 file format, because they run torflow.

 Gotcha. I'll leave it up to Karsten how we want to present it on the
 metrics site. Adding the '@type bandwidth-file' annotation is the
 important bit to me. I'll leave it up to others if we want CollecTor to
 describe the differences between versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29144 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29144: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets
--+
 Reporter:  kjak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.1


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29144 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29144: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets
--+
 Reporter:  kjak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 041-proposed
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Let's review this in 0.4.1, without discussing it at the team meeting.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29145: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c
--+
 Reporter:  kjak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 041-proposed
 * points:   => 0.1
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Let's review this in 0.4.1, without discussing it at the team meeting.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28615 [Metrics/Library]: Additional @type annotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28615: Additional @type annotation
-+--
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:14 atagar]:
 > > except with truncated descriptor digests if tor is using
 microdescriptors and without w lines.

 And maybe missing some other lines, and maybe with some other format
 quirks.
 The missing "w" line was an example.

 > Is this somthing we want to codify in our spec? Ticket #24110 is still
 open, and in re-reading that it sounds to me like...
 >
 >   * Router status entries vended though the control port have 'r' lines
 with a microdescriptor rather than a server descriptor digest.
 >
 >   * It sounds like we're unaware of anything that referrences these
 erronious digests, so fixing is probably fine.
 >
 > Am I wrong? Is referrencing the microdescriptor digest either desirable
 or necessary?
 >
 > Sorry if I'm missing something!

 We don't know if any code depends on the digest here, but if it does, it's
 terribly fragile, because it will break when UseMicrodescriptors changes.

 We could look at this function at our hackfest next week. It will need a
 refactor before we make any changes. I'll put it on our list.

 > > atagar, would you mind starting a patch?
 >
 > {{{
 > @type detached-signature 1.0
 >
 >   Detached signature as per section 3.10 of the dir-spec,
 >   and downloadable for DistSeconds every consensus freshness
 >   period (usually five minutes each hour) via the
 >   '/tor/status-vote/next/consensus-signatures' resource.
 >
 > @type network-status-entry-3 1.0
 >
 >   Individual router status entry from an unflavored v3
 >   network status document. These are available from
 >   Tor's control port 'GETINFO ns/*' commands and NS
 >   events.
 >
 > @type bandwidth-file 1.2
 >
 >   Bandwidth authority metrics as defined in the
 >   bandwidth-file-spec [1]. These are available from
 >   a DirPort's '/tor/status-vote/next/bandwidth' url
 >   and CollecTor. [3]
 >
 >
 > [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/bandwidth-file-
 spec.txt
 > [2] Both are pending
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21377
 > }}}

 5/6 bandwidth authorities are still using version 1.0 of the bandwidth
 file format, because they run torflow.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29056 [Core Tor/Stem]: Implement bandwidth file parser and formater

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29056: Implement bandwidth file parser and formater
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 atagar]:
 > Hi juga, just pushed stem support for parsing and creating bandwidth
 files. Would you like anything tweaked?
 >
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=9cac908

 There wasn't any pull request, so I left comments on the commit:
 
https://github.com/torproject/stem/commit/9cac9085504230e036ff65754d88a349ad88d549

 I also updated the spec to clarify some things, it will get merged in
 #29079:
 https://github.com/teor2345/torspec/blob/ticket29079/bandwidth-file-
 spec.txt

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec with the correct Tor version when bandwidth-file-digest is merged

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29147: Update dir-spec with the correct Tor version when bandwidth-file-digest 
is
merged
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-spec tor-crypto tor-dirauth
 Severity:  Normal   |  tor-bwauth 041-proposed
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26698
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 It currently says 0.4.0.1-alpha, but this feature didn't make it:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2162

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29079 [Core Tor/Tor]: Minor bandwidth file spec updates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29079: Minor bandwidth file spec updates
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec, doc,|  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #29056   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  juga |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec, doc, postfreeze-ok => tor-bwauth,
 torspec, doc, 041-proposed
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
 * points:   => 0.2
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 The typo was in the previous version.

 I added a commit to fix the order.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29146 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Add instructions to the Pluggable Transports page on tb-manual (was: Add instructions on how to use pluggable transports to the Pluggable Transpor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29146: Add instructions to the Pluggable Transports page on tb-manual
--+--
 Reporter:  wayward   |  Owner:  wayward
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29146 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Add instructions on how to use pluggable transports to the Pluggable Transports page on tb-manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29146: Add instructions on how to use pluggable transports to the Pluggable
Transports page on tb-manual
--+--
 Reporter:  wayward   |  Owner:  wayward
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by wayward):

 * keywords:  tb-manual =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29146 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Add instructions on how to use pluggable transports to the Pluggable Transports page on tb-manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29146: Add instructions on how to use pluggable transports to the Pluggable
Transports page on tb-manual
--+---
 Reporter:  wayward   |  Owner:  wayward
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tb-manual
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 The pluggable transports page on tb-manual (https://tb-
 manual.torproject.org/transports/) currently includes no instructions on
 how to use pluggable transports. We should add instructions to make it
 easier for users to learn how to use them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29145: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c
--+--
 Reporter:  kjak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by kjak):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/664

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29145: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c
+--
 Reporter:  kjak|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 In test-memwipe.c, `malloc_options` needs to be declared extern:

 {{{
 src/test/test-memwipe.c:50:13: warning: no previous extern declaration for
 non-static variable 'malloc_options' [-Wmissing-variable-declarations]
 const char *malloc_options="sufjj";
 }}}

 (`malloc_options` is only used on OpenBSD)

 PR to follow.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24131 [Webpages/Website]: torproject.org work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24131: torproject.org work
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks for reviewing it geko! We iterated over that version and the one
 which is going to reach live, after your review, is here:
 https://marvelapp.com/f66ig5j/screen/52591498

 Basically, we removed the input select because is hard to make it work
 without js, and we want to provide a good experience for users with that
 opt-out. With this version, users are able to select the version per
 operative system, and we will offer the localized version if they arrive
 from tpo.org/download_X.

 Also, we will allow users to download another language and other versions,
 as you see clicking the prototype.

 I included a section for TBA, which still needs some work on the download
 buttons.

 We need some copy review, but the UX is almost shaped. What do you think?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29144 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29144: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets
--+--
 Reporter:  kjak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by kjak):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/663

 This PR includes the fix and a changes file.  `make check-changes` does
 not complain.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28615 [Metrics/Library]: Additional @type annotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28615: Additional @type annotation
-+--
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by atagar):

 > except with truncated descriptor digests if tor is using
 microdescriptors and without w lines.

 Is this somthing we want to codify in our spec? Ticket #24110 is still
 open, and in re-reading that it sounds to me like...

   * Router status entries vended though the control port have 'r' lines
 with a microdescriptor rather than a server descriptor digest.

   * It sounds like we're unaware of anything that referrences these
 erronious digests, so fixing is probably fine.

 Am I wrong? Is referrencing the microdescriptor digest either desirable or
 necessary?

 Sorry if I'm missing something!

 > atagar, would you mind starting a patch?

 {{{
 @type detached-signature 1.0

   Detached signature as per section 3.10 of the dir-spec,
   and downloadable for DistSeconds every consensus freshness
   period (usually five minutes each hour) via the
   '/tor/status-vote/next/consensus-signatures' resource.

 @type network-status-entry-3 1.0

   Individual router status entry from an unflavored v3
   network status document. These are available from
   Tor's control port 'GETINFO ns/*' commands and NS
   events.

 @type bandwidth-file 1.2

   Bandwidth authority metrics as defined in the
   bandwidth-file-spec [1]. These are available from
   a DirPort's '/tor/status-vote/next/bandwidth' url
   and CollecTor. [3]


 [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/bandwidth-file-spec.txt
 [2] Both are pending https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21377
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29144 [Core Tor/Tor]: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29144: Log the correct "auto" port number for listening sockets
+--
 Reporter:  kjak|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 When `auto` is used for the port number for a listening socket, the
 message that gets logged after opening the socket incorrectly says port 0
 instead of the actual port being used.

 A contrived config like this

 {{{
 ControlPort auto
 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:auto
 ORPort 127.0.0.1:auto
 ORPort [::1]:auto
 }}}

 gives log messages like this


   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:0
   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Socks listener listening on port 22840.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:0'''
   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:0
   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Control listener listening on port 14414.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opened Control listener on
 127.0.0.1:0'''
   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opening OR listener on 127.0.0.1:0
   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] OR listener listening on port 19719.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opened OR listener on 127.0.0.1:0'''
   Jan 21 12:38:05.741 [notice] Opening OR listener on [::1]:0
   Jan 21 12:38:05.742 [notice] OR listener listening on port 4298.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:05.742 [notice] Opened OR listener on [::1]:0'''

 An upcoming PR will fix this so that the log messages will have the actual
 port numbers like this

   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:0
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Socks listener listening on port 5236.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opened Socks listener on
 127.0.0.1:5236'''
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:0
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Control listener listening on port 14584.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opened Control listener on
 127.0.0.1:14584'''
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opening OR listener on 127.0.0.1:0
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] OR listener listening on port 15220.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opened OR listener on 127.0.0.1:15220'''
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opening OR listener on [::1]:0
   Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] OR listener listening on port 36901.
   '''Jan 21 12:38:57.709 [notice] Opened OR listener on [::1]:36901'''

 This was introduced by commit 27c868eff19dbcc208f6db66ec3e2de2104fa754 and
 occurs in 0.3.5.1-alpha.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27531: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:
 tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-
 rbm
 =>
 tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-
 rbm
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_27531_v2`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_27531_v2=f79412dffd134cb89d463229a5875e53e4274991

 I uploaded a build with this patch at:
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/builds/testbuild-bug_27531/tor-
 browser-linux64-8.5a6_en-US.tar.xz.asc
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/builds/testbuild-bug_27531/tor-
 browser-linux64-8.5a6_en-US.tar.xz

 Can someone check that this build is fixing the crash?

 I could not check if fte is still working as I don't know a working fte
 bridge, but when using this build to connect with fte and the default
 bridges, I get the same error as in previous builds.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28961 [Core Tor/Stem]: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors via orport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28961: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors 
via
orport
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by starlight):

 * Attachment "stem_timeout_stacktrace.txt" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28961 [Core Tor/Stem]: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors via orport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28961: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors 
via
orport
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by starlight):

 the timeout happened randomly while testing, a bit more trouble to
 reproduce but this will do so after some time

 {{{
  A=-1; while (( ++A < 1000 )); do B=$(printf "%03d" $A);
 TORSOCKS_ISOLATE_PID=1 torsocks python3 download_descriptor.py -t
 extrainfo -f A0DB820FEC87C0405F7BF05DEE5E4ADED2BB9904 --orport
 199.249.230.82:443 >xxzz$B 2>&1; done
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20006 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH fails for hidden services which use client authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20006: HSFETCH fails for hidden services which use client authentication
-+-
 Reporter:  segfault |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-spec, tor-control|  Actual Points:
  missing-feature authentication hs-auth |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 lgtm;

 As for testing, yeah we would need to create a new one from scratch that
 tests with client auth basically.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20006 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH fails for hidden services which use client authentication

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20006: HSFETCH fails for hidden services which use client authentication
-+-
 Reporter:  segfault |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-spec, tor-control|  Actual Points:
  missing-feature authentication hs-auth |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28741 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws should send scanner metadata as part of every HTTP request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28741: sbws should send scanner metadata as part of every HTTP request
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28932 [Core Tor/sbws]: Detect when sbws stalls and log backtrace

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28932: Detect when sbws stalls and log backtrace
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I think we should make `36` value into some sort of constant because it
 isn't clear what is that value but also it is repeated twice.

 I had to read the loop above to get that it is every 5 seconds and thus 36
 is for 3 minutes. Either adding a clearer comment linking the two or
 making it a constant and comment there.

 The other thing is that, don't you want to exit after the bug is detected
 or it will recover from the mistake?

 Feel free to merge after that :).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28913 [Core Tor/Tor]: Base32_decode should return the length of its result.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28913: Base32_decode should return the length of its result.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  util tor-client base32  cleanup  |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt 041-proposed|
Parent ID:  #19531   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ack.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29070 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: torify issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29070: shellcheck: torify issue
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29108 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor crypto_digest.c to have fewer ifdefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29108: Refactor crypto_digest.c to have fewer ifdefs
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed refactor technical- |  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29042 [Core Tor/Tor]: Error loading private key after 0.3.5.7 upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29042: Error loading private key after 0.3.5.7 upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  anong   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, 035-proposed regression  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28979 [Core Tor/Tor]: Current alpha manual typo authorized_clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28979: Current alpha manual typo authorized_clients
-+-
 Reporter:  Felixix  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, doc, postfreeze-ok,  |  Actual Points:  0
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => asn


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28668 [Core Tor/Tor]: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28668: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, postfreeze-ok  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  juga   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => juga


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  onionbalance, 041-proposed |
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29122, #28976

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #29122, #28976 by dgoulet:
reviewer to nickm

--
Tickets URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Standardize 'Bandwidth File' name

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29137: Standardize 'Bandwidth File' name
+--
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed, fast-fix, bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => teor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28933 [Core Tor/sbws]: Run one sbws main loop using the test network as part of integration tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28933: Run one sbws main loop using the test network as part of integration 
tests
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29040 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor crashes if ClientOnionAuthDir contains more than one private key for a hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29040: Tor crashes if ClientOnionAuthDir contains more than one private key 
for a
hidden service
-+-
 Reporter:  demfloro |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-proposed, tor-hs, crash, |  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This lgtm;

 That `safe_str_client()` fix is a good catch also.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29079 [Core Tor/Tor]: Minor bandwidth file spec updates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29079: Minor bandwidth file spec updates
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, torspec, doc,|  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:  #29056   | Points:
 Reviewer:  juga |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good, i think there's a typo and i added a comment about the order
 of the headers.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29143: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS 
support
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 (the nightly build from today did not fail because it was started before
 the obfs4 commit was pushed)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201901,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ld):

 {{{
   if (Args.hasArg(OPT_no_insert_timestamp))
 Add("-timestamp:0");
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-addon, tbb-usability tbb-|  Actual Points:
  security, tbb-performance  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by h1n1):

 exist a point that, if all TB users block ADs, tor traffic can be seen as
 more undesirable for webmaster, because of economic reasons, TB users will
 be weird and hostile for some sites

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean-up branding directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29142: Clean-up branding directories
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-branding|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks2]:
 > Replying to [ticket:29142 gk]:
 > > The first branding patch is the one for #2716.
 > Wrong ticket.

 Indeed, thanks. I meant #2176.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean-up branding directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29142: Clean-up branding directories
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-branding|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 Replying to [ticket:29142 gk]:
 > The first branding patch is the one for #2716.
 Wrong ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29143: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS 
support
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201901
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 Starting build: Mon Jan 21 13:50:13 2019
 
/var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4.git/transports/meeklite/transport.go:30:2:
 cannot find package "github.com/refraction-networking/utls" in any of:
 /var/tmp/dist/go/src/github.com/refraction-networking/utls (from
 $GOROOT)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/github.com/refraction-networking/utls
 (from $GOPATH)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/golang.org/x/net/idna/idna.go:23:2: cannot find
 package "golang.org/x/text/secure/bidirule" in any of:
 /var/tmp/dist/go/src/golang.org/x/text/secure/bidirule (from
 $GOROOT)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/golang.org/x/text/secure/bidirule (from
 $GOPATH)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/golang.org/x/net/idna/idna.go:24:2: cannot find
 package "golang.org/x/text/unicode/bidi" in any of:
 /var/tmp/dist/go/src/golang.org/x/text/unicode/bidi (from $GOROOT)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/golang.org/x/text/unicode/bidi (from
 $GOPATH)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/golang.org/x/net/idna/idna.go:25:2: cannot find
 package "golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm" in any of:
 /var/tmp/dist/go/src/golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm (from $GOROOT)
 /var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm (from
 $GOPATH)
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Thanks for the patch! I wonder what happens if the video is larger than
 the available memory cache (or the latter is already filled up with other
 cached stuff). Does the browser crash then? Or become unusable otherwise?
 I tested using the video in the main ticket post, which is ~30mb (the
 MemoryCache was hardcoded to 8192000 bytes in the patch).

 As far as I can tell, it ''seems'' to properly reuse old memory once it
 hits the cache limit, I could play through the whole video without
 anything unusual happening, if I seeked back to the beginning after
 playing through it, it would make a new HTTP request to fetch that data,
 so it seemed to have properly fallen out of the cache.

 One thing that should be looked into is if the MemoryBlockCache can safely
 be used concurrently by multiple streams (as a "single global cache" like
 the FileBlockCache is), if you look at the code here:
 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 
esr60/file/256453759958ed9c2eb17a0764d2fcfd7f8e3323/dom/media/MediaCache.cpp#l737

 You'll see that normally, a new MemoryBlockCache object is created for
 each resource below {{{media.memory_cache_max_size}}}, they don't seem to
 be reused across multiple resources like the FileBlockCache is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide Tor Browser for Android for arm64-v8a devices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28119: Provide Tor Browser for Android for arm64-v8a devices
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 Replying to [comment:1 peredor]:
 > i need to install Tor Browser for Ubuntu on an arm64 architekure.
 You can join #12631 and add rbm descriptors for aarch64.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27471 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS intermittently fails: Non-fatal assertion failed in send_introduce1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27471: HS intermittently fails: Non-fatal assertion failed in send_introduce1
+--
 Reporter:  tgragnato   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 035-backport, 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Let's not backport this given that it's a pretty big patch that doesn't
 fix a security issue or a fatal assertion. If someone disagrees, please
 reopen ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps):

 Replying to [comment:8 cypherpunks2]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps]:
 > > {{{RefPtr bc = new MemoryBlockCache(8192000);}}}
 > {{{RefPtr bc = new MemoryBlockCache(0);}}}
 > https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 
esr60/file/256453759958ed9c2eb17a0764d2fcfd7f8e3323/dom/media/MemoryBlockCache.cpp#l182
 I don't think the code you linked does what you think it does. If you look
 right before that, you'll see an early return on {{{aContentLength ==
 0}}}. {{{initialLength}}} is based on the size of the internal buffer, so
 that code in the if statement will simply be executed on the first write
 to the cache rather than on initialization, it doesn't change the
 situation very much.

 Another option I thought of while reading the MediaCache source is that
 was can probably get by with just slightly modifying the current code that
 creates MemoryBlockCache objects.
 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 
esr60/file/256453759958ed9c2eb17a0764d2fcfd7f8e3323/dom/media/MediaCache.cpp#l737

 If you would humor some code, this would be replacing the if statement
 from that linked line:
 {{{
 // The size we will initialize the cache to
 int64_t cacheBytes = 0;

 if (aContentLength <= 0) {
   // Unknown content length, give it a max sized buffer just to be sure.
   cacheBytes = int64_t(MediaPrefs::MediaMemoryCacheMaxSize()) * 1024
 } else {
   // If the content length is known, we'll try to initialize a cache that
 will hold it, but only up to the max cache size
   cacheBytes = std::min(aContentLength,
 int64_t(MediaPrefs::MediaMemoryCacheMaxSize()) * 1024)
 }

 RefPtr bc = new MemoryBlockCache(cacheBytes);
 nsresult rv = bc->Init();
 if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
   RefPtr mc = new MediaCache(bc);
   LOG("GetMediaCache(%" PRIi64 ") -> Memory MediaCache %p",
 aContentLength,
 mc.get());
   return mc;
 }

 // Init() failed...
 // In the MediaCache source, there is a fallback to a file-backed cache
 beyond this point.
 // We don't want that, so something else will have to be done here.
 // In the origial code, the function will return a nullptr (gMediaCache)
 if both caches fail to initialize, but I'm not sure what the consequences
 of that are.
 }}}

 This code would create a new MemoryBlockCache for every request, doing
 away with the content size limit, and instead replacing it with a maximum
 cache size (based on the {{{media.memory_cache_max_size}}} preference).
 This should work since my previous test showed that an undersized cache
 will properly reuse memory as needed.
 I think it should also play nicely with whatever built in mechanism is in
 place to manage the total in-memory cache size, since it's pretty much
 using the original code with just minor modification.

 Let me know what you think.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201901,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 https://reviews.llvm.org/rL332613 seems like the relevant revision for the
 timestamp issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW there are media.memory_cache* preferences as well, which might be
 useful here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28976 [Core Tor/Tor]: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make check-changes'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28976: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make 
check-changes'
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/662

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 Replying to [comment:4 QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps]:
 > {{{RefPtr bc = new MemoryBlockCache(8192000);}}}
 {{{RefPtr bc = new MemoryBlockCache(0);}}}
 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 
esr60/file/256453759958ed9c2eb17a0764d2fcfd7f8e3323/dom/media/MemoryBlockCache.cpp#l182

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29117 [Community/Tor Support]: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the brower thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29117: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the 
brower
thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.
---+--
 Reporter:  micc2x |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 #29116 is a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29116 [Core Tor]: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the brower thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29116: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the 
brower
thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.
-+--
 Reporter:  micc2x   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #29117.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor browser will not start and there is no log?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29138: tor browser will not start and there is no log?
--+---
 Reporter:  edickey   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * owner:  ilv => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/GetTor => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 What platform/operating system are you using? Do you have any
 antivirus/firewall software installed that could block Tor Browser from
 running? If so, which and please uninstall it for testing purposes
 (disabling it is often not enough).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29117 [Community/Tor Support]: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the brower thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29117: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the 
brower
thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.
---+--
 Reporter:  micc2x |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  project| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 This is our bug tracker to coordinate development efforts. For support
 please use one (or several) of our channels outlined at:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/contact.html.en#support. Thanks and
 hopefully you can figure out your issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-website => tbb-disk-leak, tbb-
 usability-website, TorBrowserTeam201901


Comment:

 Thanks for the patch! I wonder what happens if the video is larger than
 the available memory cache (or the latter is already filled up with other
 cached stuff). Does the browser crash then? Or become unusable otherwise?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28810 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have tor operate on different ports by default for alpha, release and nightly Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28810: Have tor operate on different ports by default for alpha, release and
nightly Tor Browser builds
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #25702 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28546 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebrand Tor Browser's Window's Installer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28546: Rebrand Tor Browser's Window's Installer
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  project   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #25702 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28622: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901, TBA-a3   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201901 => ux-team, tbb-
 mobile, TorBrowserTeam201901, TBA-a3
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * parent:  #25702 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for ARM architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12631: Tor Browser for ARM architecture
--+
 Reporter:  mttp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by peredor):

 * cc: peredor (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create build-specific installer for macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28809: Create build-specific installer for macOS
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #25702 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29139 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: False Advertising of the Tor Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29139: False Advertising of the Tor Project
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks3  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  tbb-team => qbi
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Internal Services/Service - trac


Comment:

 Not a Tor Browser bug. Moving over to the Trac folks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28976 [Core Tor/Tor]: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make check-changes'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28976: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make 
check-changes'
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => rl1987


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29123 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox opening without Tor connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29123: Firefox opening without Tor connection
--+---
 Reporter:  alpra |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Do you have steps to reproduce your problem? Did you move Tor Browser
 around somehow as cypherpunks3 suggests?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean-up branding directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29142: Clean-up branding directories
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 During work on #25702 we realized that the branding directories contain
 old cruft which is not needed anymore (like the .bmp file changes). We
 should go over our branding patch(es) and make sure we have everything we
 need (and only that).

 The first branding patch is the one for #2716. It could be worth merging
 the one from #25702 with it and doing the clean-up while that happens
 (i.e. during the esr68 rebase). Putting it tentatively on that radar.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean-up branding directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29142: Clean-up branding directories
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-branding|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr => ff68-esr, tbb-branding


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29122: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 The issue here is that sometimes the test will schedule padding using
 timers that will trigger immediately during the test run and hence screw
 up our cell counting tests.

 Here is a good run with stacktraces when `n_client_cells` gets
 incremented:
 {{{
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop: [forking] Jan 21 12:28:44.174
 [warn] Bug: . Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(log_backtrace_impl+0x46)
 [0x5601302e6486] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0xddd6c) [0x56012fea2d6c] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(relay_send_command_from_edge___real+0x139)
 [0x5601301af079] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(circpad_send_command_to_hop__real+0x66) [0x560130187216]
 (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(circpad_negotiate_padding+0x15d)
 [0x560130189afd] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0x3c4ced) [0x560130189ced] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0xde288) [0x56012fea3288] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(test_circuitpadding_wronghop+0xff)
 [0x56012fea466f] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0x373f74) [0x560130138f74] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(testcase_run_one+0x2f1)
 [0x5601301392d1] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(tinytest_main+0x10c)
 [0x5601301398fc] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(main+0x2aa) [0x56012fe4510a] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb) [0x7f8727f1309b] (on Tor 0.4.0.1
 -alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(_start+0x2a) [0x56012fe4521a] (on
 Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: . Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev
 d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(log_backtrace_impl+0x46)
 [0x5601302e6486] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0xddd6c) [0x56012fea2d6c] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(relay_send_command_from_edge___real+0x139)
 [0x5601301af079] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(circpad_send_command_to_hop__real+0x66) [0x560130187216]
 (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(circpad_negotiate_padding+0x15d)
 [0x560130189afd] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(test_circuitpadding_wronghop+0xcb3)
 [0x56012fea5223] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0x373f74) [0x560130138f74] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(testcase_run_one+0x2f1)
 [0x5601301392d1] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(tinytest_main+0x10c)
 [0x5601301398fc] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(main+0x2aa) [0x56012fe4510a] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xeb) [0x7f8727f1309b] (on Tor 0.4.0.1
 -alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 GOOD  [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(_start+0x2a) [0x56012fe4521a] (on
 Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 OK
 1 tests ok.  (0 skipped)
 }}}

 and here is a bad run (see the last increment):
 {{{
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop: [forking] Jan 21 12:28:44.234
 [warn] Bug: . Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 BAD [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(log_backtrace_impl+0x46)
 [0x555e4b1bb486] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 BAD [warn] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0xddd6c) [0x555e4ad77d6c] (on Tor
 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 BAD [warn] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(relay_send_command_from_edge___real+0x139)
 [0x555e4b084079] (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha-dev d1af4d65df8b5ef8)
 BAD [warn] Bug:
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #25702 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 1.1 Update Tor Browser icon to follow design guidelines.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25702: Activity 1.1 Update Tor Browser icon to follow design guidelines.
+---
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201901R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201901R => ux-team,
 TorBrowserTeam201901R
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! I think we are done here. The most important bits remaining are
 #28546 (which is in `needs_review` and #28622 which I moved onto our
 TBA-a3 radar.

 The Torbutton patch got applied to `master` (commit
 0c52aa0a90de3c98938d583c2faae0a9f8a11c58). The `tor-browser-build` one is
 on the respective `master` branch, too (commit
 1f83faba6016d988303a125abcee67aff63a7142). The `tor-browser` repo on `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.5-1` has the browser changes (commit
 7f7a40f907f74a531642a5cb4982f2d762316d38).

 I filed #29142 for a branding clean-up we should do.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29122: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29122: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 The fix is to disable the scheduling of padding timers for this test since
 it relies on preicse cell counting. See branch `bug29122` in my repo:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/661

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22654 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox icon is shown for Tor Browser on Windows 10 start menu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22654: Firefox icon is shown for Tor Browser on Windows 10 start menu
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25702| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This got fixed by commit 7f7a40f907f74a531642a5cb4982f2d762316d38.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide Tor Browser for Android for arm64-v8a devices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28119: Provide Tor Browser for Android for arm64-v8a devices
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by peredor):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks2]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 peredor]:
 > > i need to install Tor Browser for Ubuntu on an arm64 architekure.
 > You can join #12631 and add rbm descriptors for aarch64.

 Thanks a lot, i found this ticket already in the past but thougt this
 wouldn't work for me.
 buying a modern SBC is how entering a Linux Lesson, you have to learn much
 :) Try my best

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: For about:tor, use a Tor Browser icon in identity box

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28111: For about:tor, use a Tor Browser icon in identity box
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-branding,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:  #25702   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That's fixed with commit 7f7a40f907f74a531642a5cb4982f2d762316d38 on `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.5-1`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 
https://gitlab.com/yawning/obfs4/commit/4d453dab2120082b00bf6e63ab4aaeeda6b8d8a3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26698: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto tor-dirauth tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #27047   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I found out why your hashes weren't matching: see the pull request.

 Please be careful with sizeof() and strlen()!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28961 [Core Tor/Stem]: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors via orport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28961: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors 
via
orport
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by starlight):

 didn't change anything; just git fetch, git pull, python3 setup.py install

 then test using the first command example above

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide Tor Browser for Android for arm64-v8a devices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28119: Provide Tor Browser for Android for arm64-v8a devices
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by peredor):

 hi,
 i need to install Tor Browser for Ubuntu on an arm64 architekure.

 I couldnt find any linux release for arm64, so i tried to build tor
 browser on my device (rockpro64, Ubuntu Bionic 18.04.1 arm64).
 I used the git clone https://git.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git but i read in the README make will only produce a version for
 armv71 and I386/amd64.
 i went further anyway executed make [file], i think the output is the
 following file:
 /tor-browser-build/out/debootstrap-image/container-image_ubuntu-
 base-18.04.1-base-amd64.tar.gz

 but what now?
 Is it Possible?
 Exist already a build?
 is it neccesary to install tor browser, tor itself and mozilla is
 availible in my package repository?

 Thanks and greetings
 Mark

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document the max number of v3 client auths I can make

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29134: Document the max number of v3 client auths I can make
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 pastly]:
 > The limit seems to be around 350-360

 Client auth uses 80 bytes per client. Then there's some padding to obscure
 the number of clients.

 Client auth effectively uses the leftover space in the descriptor under 50
 kB.

 So the limit may be lower if your onion service:
 * is a single onion service (21 bytes)
 * has 4-10 introduction points (default 3)
 * has legacy introduction points (chosen at random, fewer legacy into
 points as more relays upgrade from 0.2.9 and earlier)
 * has IPv6 introduction points (one #26992 is implemented, if an IPv6
 relay is chosen at random, then its address will be added to the link
 specifiers. There will be more IPv6 intro points as more relays configure
 IPv6.)

 We should calculate the worst-case scenario for the hard limit, and
 implement a check for it. We should add some paddiding, because adding
 extra link specifiers on relays will increase the size of descriptors
 (once #26971 is implemented).

 Then we can document the hard limit, and a suggested soft maximum that's
 compatible with future versions of Tor. We should add a test for the hard
 limit. Otherwise, we could make changes that increase the size of a
 descriptor, but fail to change the limit in the documentation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29117 [Community/Tor Support]: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the brower thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29117: I need help.. all I know is I accidentally changed the socks on the 
brower
thinking it was another browser & since then I've been screwed.
---+--
 Reporter:  micc2x |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => phoul
 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Community/Tor Support


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches against 60.5.0esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29104: Rebase Tor Browser patches against 60.5.0esr
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, GeorgKoppen201901 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201901R, GeorgKoppen201901
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > I did not realize that the reformatting was applied to the ESR code, but
 it make sense from Mozilla's perspective to do so. What is the status of
 automated tools to help with the rebase (after the reformatting)? I know
 Mozilla created some tools for hg and git, but I did not follow the
 conversation closely on their dev-platform list.

 That's been a good point which I had forgotten about.

 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mozilla.dev.platform/kQ0q29dlmJQ

 is relevant here and contains two tools for Git. I used
 https://github.com/emilio/clang-format-merge which I had to patch: `./mach
 clang-format` did not work for me (not sure if that's expected for esr60),
 instead I made sure that the wrapper hit `cat "$1" | clang-format
 "-assume-filename=$REPO_PATH" > "$1.tmp"` (needs to have `clang-format`
 installed).

 After that the rewriting mostly worked. There are five patches (IIRC)
 which I needed to adapt manually. `bug_29104_rebase_6050esr_v2`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_29104_rebase_6050esr_v2) in my `tor-browser` repo
 is the result. Let me know if that makes sense (it's not the final rebase
 for the release but I plan to use it for comparison to make sure the final
 rebase is correct, both for the alpha and the stable branch).

 I additionally filed #29141 to track a clean-up of our search engine list
 patch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up our search list.json file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29141: Clean up our search list.json file
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff68-esr


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29141 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up our search list.json file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29141: Clean up our search list.json file
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We are patching the `list.json` file to make sure our Tor Browser
 distributes the search engines we want per locale. However, it seems not
 all of that patching is necessary as the more recently added locales lack
 a corresponding patch in `list.json` but the right search engines are
 available, though. We should investigate that and clean that json file up.

 Adding tentatively to our ESR 68 radar.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor privdrop on (Open)BSD fails to reclaim capabilities of "User".

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29140: Tor privdrop on (Open)BSD fails to reclaim capabilities of "User".
-+-
 Reporter:  RatherAnonymousOne   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core
 |  Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9 |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  openbsd, bsd, privilege drop, user,  |  Actual Points:
  torrc, root, disableallswap, capabilities  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 As summary states. Should Tor need invocation as superuser it will fail
 claim the capabilities of the target "User" in torrc. One statement that
 is therefore affected is e.g. "DisableAllSwap 1" which would either
 require Tor running as root or raising of superuser capabilities (this was
 never tested however). Both alternatives are unattractive.

 Regarding option with "DisableAllSwap" I will give pretty obvious pointers
 from your own GitHub repositories:

 L1510 @ src/app/config/config.c
 L220  @ src/lib/process/setuid.c
 L316  @ src/lib/process/setuid.c

 And here is kdump format of a ktrace of faulty execution:
 {{{
 28446 tor  CALL  setegid(1000<"user">)
 28446 tor  RET   setegid 0
 28446 tor  CALL  setgid(1000<"user">)
 28446 tor  RET   setgid 0
 28446 tor  CALL  setuid(1000<"user">)
 28446 tor  RET   setuid 0
 28446 tor  CALL  seteuid(1000<"user">)
 28446 tor  RET   seteuid 0
 28446 tor  CALL  setgid(0<"wheel">)
 28446 tor  RET   setgid -1 errno 1 Operation not permitted
 28446 tor  CALL  setegid(0<"wheel">)
 28446 tor  RET   setegid -1 errno 1 Operation not permitted
 28446 tor  CALL  setuid(0<"root">)
 28446 tor  RET   setuid -1 errno 1 Operation not permitted
 28446 tor  CALL  seteuid(0<"root">)
 28446 tor  RET   seteuid -1 errno 1 Operation not permitted
 }}}

 P.S. This applies to 0.3.4.9 but also to 0.3.5.7.

 P.P.S. I am sorry I did not take the time to patch this myself yes. For
 anyone interested in this these are great resources:

 man 2 setuid
 man 2 seteuid
 man 2 setgid
 man 2 setegid
 man 2 getrlimit
 man 2 setrlimit

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps):

 * Attachment "memorymediacache.patch" added.

 FileBlockCache -> MemoryBlockCache

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9316 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should export statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9316: BridgeDB should export statistics
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics,bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)


Comment:

 sysrqb and I discussed this topic in Mexico City. IIRC, we said that
 sysrqb would send me 24 hours of logs, which can easily be non-recent and
 heavily obfuscated and use encrypted email, and I use those logs to
 suggest a possible statistics format on tor-dev@. sysrqb, want to send me
 those logs, and I move things forward as time permits?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19332 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Publish BridgeDB stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19332: Publish BridgeDB stats
--+---
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)


Comment:

 This looks like a duplicate of #9316. Should we close it?

 Or is this ticket supposed to cover the ''publish'' part of the statistics
 ''exported'' in #9316? If so, we should move it to Metrics/CollecTor and
 set it to needs_information until there's something to publish.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29139 [Applications/Tor Browser]: False Advertising of the Tor Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29139: False Advertising of the Tor Project
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks3  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Unofficial Documentation

 Most of the content here is written by volunteers from around the world.
 If you find a topic you want to fix, expand, or create, please either
 create an account or use the multi-user account cypherpunks with the
 password writecode Note that edits will be credited to the cypherpunks
 account and not you personally.


 That account can't edit or create ticket/wiki. What's the point?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29097 [Applications/Tor Browser]: https-everywhere make.sh explicitly depends on missing python 3.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29097: https-everywhere make.sh explicitly depends on missing python 3.6
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Cherry-picked to `master` (commit
 a1ac92687ed03f64c12992d7b83b40892beacb37) and `maint-8.0` (commit
 57a48c1c712a17bb2d58e3688d183bddd5e82423). Pinning the build script to a
 specific Python version seems a bit brittle to me but at least the HTTPS-
 Everywhere devs know about it now. :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28961 [Core Tor/Stem]: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors via orport

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28961: exception in descriptor/remote.py downloading large server descriptors 
via
orport
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by starlight):

 fetch from the DIR port and compare

 {{{
 curl -sv
 
http://199.249.230.82:80/tor/extra/fp/A0DB820FEC87C0405F7BF05DEE5E4ADED2BB9904.z
 | openssl zlib -d
 curl -sv
 
http://199.249.230.82:80/tor/server/fp/A0DB820FEC87C0405F7BF05DEE5E4ADED2BB9904.z
 | openssl zlib -d
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29056 [Core Tor/Stem]: Implement bandwidth file parser and formater

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29056: Implement bandwidth file parser and formater
---+--
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi juga, just pushed stem support for parsing and creating bandwidth
 files. Would you like anything tweaked?

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=9cac908

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29136 [Core Tor/Tor]: PT_LOG and PT_STATUS event fields unspecifed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29136: PT_LOG and PT_STATUS event fields unspecifed
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > On a side note I'd appreciate it if the control-spec lists all the event
 fields rather than instructing the reader to see the pt-spec. It's fine to
 cite the pt-spec for information, but when it comes the basic event format
 the control-spec should include everything the reader needs.
 >
 > I watch the control-spec and dir-spec to keep informed about control and
 directory specification changes. Reshuffling event formatting under other
 specs makes my life harder, and arguably makes our control-spec
 incomplete.

 If we duplicate information in control-spec and pt-spec, then they will
 get out of sync. Here's two options to avoid that:
 1. put the relevant information in control-spec, and point pt-spec to
 control-spec
 2. put the basic syntax in control-spec, and then say that additional
 fields may be added, and point to pt-spec for details

 Whatever we decide, we should make sure that we are consistent with our
 other specs.
 For example, the control-spec directory GETINFOs have basic info like URLs
 and descriptions, but the exact format is in dir-spec (like option 2).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs