Re: [tor-bugs] #29360 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor-Browser Linux: no audio playback (pulseaudio)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29360: Tor-Browser Linux: no audio playback (pulseaudio)
--+---
 Reporter:  tries |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Thanks for the detailed bug report. I wonder why you are the only one
 reporting this. Which Linux flavor is that? And which Tor Browser version?
 Where did you get your Tor Browser from?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29077 [Obfuscation/meek]: uTLS for meek-client camouflage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29077: uTLS for meek-client camouflage
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 * https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/log/?h=utls_3=21abea57d28abe614887135ab380bfb4355de9fc

 Here's another merge candidate, rebased and cleaned up. It's the same
 utls_2 from comment:12, except for squashed commits, more tests, and fixes
 for two small bugs I found through testing: when the `utls.Config` doesn't
 have a `ServerName` set, take the SNI from the dial address; and if
 someone happens to make an http request using `UTLSRoundTripper`, honor
 the proxy setting on the `UTLSRoundTripper`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: getting video error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29362: getting video error message
--+---
 Reporter:  releasetheclowns  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Do you have an example website where this is happening?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use fast_rng in place of weak_rng.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29363: Use fast_rng in place of weak_rng.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  tor-relay 041-proposed security
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29023
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 See parent ticket.

 Once the fast_rng code is merged, it might be wise to use it in place of
 our existing weak_rng code.  I don't *think* that any of the weak_rng code
 is security sensitive, but it's better to be safe than sorry.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29023 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29023: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, tor-relay, 041-proposed-|  Actual Points:  3
  on-roadmap |
Parent ID:  #26871   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * points:   => 3
 * actualpoints:   => 3


Comment:

 See my branch `fast_rng` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/685

 The code uses a AES256-CTR, with a much more efficient construction than
 CTR-DBRG.  The construction is the same one used in libottery, libottery-
 lite, and the BSDs' replacements for arc4random() -- except that it uses
 AES instead of ChaCha.  I'm using AES here because performance matters
 most here on relays, and relays all ought to have cpu support for AES.

 Performance here is much better than the alternatives, even with openssl
 1.1.1a:
 {{{
 = rand =
 crypto_rand(4): 999.539250 nsec.
 crypto_fast_rng_getbytes(4): 9.474050 nsec.
 crypto_strongest_rand(4): 2306.595720 nsec.
 weak_rand(4): 2.113900 nsec.
 crypto_rand(16): 948.858240 nsec.
 crypto_fast_rng_getbytes(16): 13.679440 nsec.
 crypto_strongest_rand(16): 2319.716010 nsec.
 crypto_rand(128): 1110.183610 nsec.
 crypto_fast_rng_getbytes(128): 56.717480 nsec.
 }}}

 I am *not* using this branch by default anywhere yet, but I think we
 should probably remove our weak_rng uses and use this instead.

 No changes file here, since the code isn't actually used yet.

 Please remember that one can bikeshed a rng forever.  Let's not do that in
 this case?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29273 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Document BridgeDB infrastructure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29273: Document BridgeDB infrastructure
--+---
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  sysrqb => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #12381, #5304, #6264, #7532, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #12381, #5304, #6264, #7532, #9902, #10134, #10371, 
#10782, #11050, #11093, #11134, #11190, #11197, #11203, #11354, #12836, #12879, 
#13040, #19496, #20251, #20943, #29286, #29297, #5130, #9825, #14211 by cohosh:


Action: new

Comment:
tickets are unassigned, reverting to 'new'

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29279 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Reach out to NGOs about obfs4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29279: Reach out to NGOs about obfs4
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  NGO, community |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh


Comment:

 Noting some previous possible mentions of blocking:

 China: #19408 (2016)
 Kazakhstan: #20348 (2016-?)
 Poland: #27435 (2018)
 UAE: #27723, #25966 (2017/2018)

 Some things that might be the cause of blocking:
 #7349, #28655, #26083, #26122

 Tickets related to reachability tests:
 #17159, #29275, #29277

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29286 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Maintain obfs4 proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29286: Maintain obfs4 proxy
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, maintainance|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by ahf):

 While it may seem plausible that this is an off season April 1st joke
 since we are off exactly by two months from the 1st of April when this
 ticket was created, but no, that is not the case :-)

 This ticket was created as part of a larger roadmap session we did in
 Brussels for Tor's new anti-censorship team that we have recently been
 hiring for. The ticket is by no means a "let's take over maintainership
 from Yawning" ticket or anything like that. It should be seen more as a
 tracker bug for us to remember to look into obfs4 and if there is anything
 we can help with around obfs4. For example: we have recently added the LOG
 and STATUS handlers in little-t-tor and adding support for that in obfs4
 might be something we should do.

 Our main focus is going to be on getting the Snowflake PT into a state
 where we can ship it with Tor browser, but we are also interested in
 helping out with anything around obfs4 wherever we can :-)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Obfuscation/Censorship analysis]: Allot Communications blocking of vanilla Tor, obfs4, and meek in Kazakhstan, starting 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Allot Communications blocking of vanilla Tor, obfs4, and meek in
Kazakhstan, starting 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23089, #28035, #17159, #24271, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23089, #28035, #17159, #24271, #3591, #5148, #5483, 
#7153, #7320, #7903, #8676, #9125, #9192, #9228, #10314, #10671, #10873, 
#11501, #12930, #15213, #15826, #16451, #17057, #17315, #19408, #22088, #22860, 
#26923, #28293, #29274, #29275, #29283, #29285, #29288, #29296, #12190, #12612, 
#16895, #29111, #29272, #29278, #29287 by cohosh:


Action: new

Comment:
tickets were assigned to asn, setting them as unassigned (new) again.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19408 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Tor cannot work in China

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19408: Tor cannot work in China
-+-
 Reporter:  sam1275  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  block|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29297 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Add any necessary metrics to verify if obfs4 is working or not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29297: Add any necessary metrics to verify if obfs4 is working or not
---+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #29279 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29353 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: new mailing list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29353: new mailing list
---+
 Reporter:  gaba   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 6


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29207 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, design  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 5


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bind outbound ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29339: Bind outbound ports
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 We could extend the OutboundBindAddress options to include a port range.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: getting video error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29362: getting video error message
--+---
 Reporter:  releasetheclowns  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by releasetheclowns):

 Im using Mac OS. If i use Firefox or google it works fine?
 Only when i use Tor browser which is using Firefox as its default?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: We are using linux i686 langpacks in the linux x86_64 builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29183: We are using linux i686 langpacks in the linux x86_64 builds
+--
 Reporter:  langpack|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201902R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Merged to `master` (commit
 86ebdafc28a55042fea553ad7f23f796ea963b75).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: getting video error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29362: getting video error message
--+---
 Reporter:  releasetheclowns  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability-website
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  Webpages => Applications/Tor Browser
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 Where do you get that and which operating system are you on?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29362 [Webpages]: getting video error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29362: getting video error message
--+--
 Reporter:  releasetheclowns  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Component:  Webpages
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I see the following message "Sorry your browser does not support current
 video technology" please use Google Chrome

 Im using version 8.0.5

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29361 [Webpages/Blog]: CP sharing site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29361: CP sharing site
--+---
 Reporter:  cryeprecision |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Webpages/Blog
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  CP|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
 Hello.Im hating CP content.And here is one.This is sharing project below
 russian social net.I dont know where i need to write to help block this
 site,im from russia and bad on English.Please helm me block this site.
 http://vkphotojgahnpuixpfyuigkxwf5xnurp3drt7tehsqnwbbfw7jeykuid.onion

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bind outbound ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29339: Bind outbound ports
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29360 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor-Browser Linux: no audio playback (pulseaudio)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29360: Tor-Browser Linux: no audio playback (pulseaudio)
+--
 Reporter:  tries   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Symptoms:
 Audio (via pulseaudio) not working.
 Starting tor-browser in verbose mode gives the following output when Tor-
 Browser tries to start playing audio:

 {{{
 [Child 25922, MediaPlayback #1] WARNING: 7f711d9bf880 OpenCubeb() failed
 to init cubeb: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 7393f1ffd512/dom/media/AudioStream.cpp, line 375
 [Child 25922, MediaPlayback #1] WARNING: Decoder=7f711d9b4600
 [OnMediaSinkAudioError]: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 7393f1ffd512/dom/media/MediaDecoderStateMachine.cpp, line 3385
 [Child 25922, MediaPlayback #1] WARNING: Decoder=7f711d9b4600 Decode
 error: NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_MEDIASINK_ERR (0x806e000b) -
 OnMediaSinkAudioError: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 7393f1ffd512/dom/media/MediaDecoderStateMachine.cpp, line 3118
 }}}


 What I have figured out so far:
 * Tor-Browser maintains its own HOME directory, which is set in
 .../Browser/start-tor-browser and points to .../Browser/
 * When accessing (or trying to) pulseaudio, Tor-Browser uses the
 pulseaudio  files (.pulse/ and .pulse-cookie) as well as the .esd_auth
 from this fake HOME.

 In my case, Tor-Browser was not able talk with the already running
 pulseaudio daemon - very likely due to a mismatch in the auth cookie (did
 not verify this). After manually removing these files and directory and
 copying them from the real users HOME, audio playback did work again.

 My temporary fix is to remove and copy above mentioned files before
 starting tor-browser:
 {{{
 # fix up pulseaudio stuff...
 rm ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/.esd_auth
 rm ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/.pulse-cookie
 rm ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/.pulse/*
 rmdir ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/.pulse

 cp -p $HOME/.esd_auth ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/.esd_auth
 cp -p $HOME/.pulse-cookie ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/.pulse-cookie
 cp -pr $HOME/.pulse ${INSTALLDIR}/Browser/
 }}}

 If there is no specific reason (privacy, information leak, ...) not to do
 so, tor-browser startup should make sure that those files in the fake HOME
 contain correct data to allow communication with pulseaudio.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * cc: sukhbir (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Firefox 60 ESR (the current basis of Tor Browser 8) officially doesn't
> support "legacy" browser extensions using XPCOM/XUL, only the newer
> WebExtension API.
> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/60.0esr/releasenotes/#changed
> Tor Browser still includes some legacy extensions; apparently what makes
> them keep working is a [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
> browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/000-tor-
> browser.js?id=4d0f9fa5fdd5831fbc2e28cb6c7b1056bd4deeab#n265
> extensions.legacy.exceptions] pref (#26127; thanks sukhe for knowing
> that). I don't see where !meek-http-hel...@bamsoftware.com is being
> allowed (edit: probably a [comment:4|source patch], thanks mcs), but
> somehow it is still working too.
>
> Assess whether it's possible to rewrite the helper as a WebExtension, and
> do it if so. Ideally it will be possible to keep 100% compatibility with
> the current helper interface; but changing meek-client and meek-client-
> torbrowser is also an option.

New description:

 Firefox 60 ESR (the current basis of Tor Browser 8) officially doesn't
 support "legacy" browser extensions using XPCOM/XUL, only the newer
 WebExtension API.
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/60.0esr/releasenotes/#changed
 Tor Browser still includes some legacy extensions; apparently what makes
 them keep working is a [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/000-tor-
 browser.js?id=4d0f9fa5fdd5831fbc2e28cb6c7b1056bd4deeab#n265
 extensions.legacy.exceptions] pref (#26127; thanks sukhe for knowing
 that). I don't see where !meek-http-hel...@bamsoftware.com is being
 allowed (edit: probably a [comment:4 source patch], thanks mcs), but
 somehow it is still working too.

 Assess whether it's possible to rewrite the helper as a WebExtension, and
 do it if so. Ideally it will be possible to keep 100% compatibility with
 the current helper interface; but changing meek-client and meek-client-
 torbrowser is also an option.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29229 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29229: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?
--+---
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => bridgedb
 * owner:  sysrqb => dgoulet
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #9316, #12802, #26154, #28496, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #9316, #12802, #26154, #28496, #28655 by dgoulet:


Action: reassign

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28121 [Obfuscation]: bridges.torproject.org/keypub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28121: bridges.torproject.org/keypub
+
 Reporter:  torproject  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV-must
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29295 [Core Tor/sbws]: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29295: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * keywords:   => easy


Comment:

 The fix itself is only 1 line, the other commits refactor the code and add
 a test.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29294 [Core Tor/sbws]: Create an script to automate releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29294: Create an script to automate releases
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * keywords:   => easy
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/332
 Putting into needs_review, though this doesn't affect the functionality of
 the scanner. I'll merge it in any case if it's not reviewed in 1 week.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29352 [Core Tor/Stem]: AttributeError when running bandwidth_file.py test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29352: AttributeError when running bandwidth_file.py test
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Hi juga, that's not how you run Stem's tests. Please check...

 https://stem.torproject.org/faq.html#how-do-i-run-the-tests

 Use the '--test' argument if you would like to run only a single test.

 {{{
 % ./run_tests.py --unit --test descriptor.bandwidth_file
 ==
  INITIALISING
 ==

   stem version...1.7.1-dev (commit f1c6e30d)
   python version...  2.7.12
   operating system...Linux (Ubuntu 16.04)
   cryptography version...2.0.3
   pynacl version...  missing
   mock version...2.0.0
   pyflakes version...1.5.0
   pycodestyle version... 2.4.0
   checking for orphaned .pyc files...done (0.0s)
   checking for unused tests...   done (0.0s)
   importing test modules...  done (0.0s)

 ==
   UNIT TESTS
 ==

   descriptor.bandwidth_file... success (0.01s)

 TESTING PASSED (0 seconds)
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29351 [Core Tor/Stem]: BandwidthFile TypeError when initializing or accessing attributes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29351: BandwidthFile TypeError when initializing or accessing attributes
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi juga, there's several ways of creating a descriptor depending on what
 you are making it from...

 = String Descriptor Content =

 {{{
 >>> from stem.descriptor.bandwidth_file import BandwidthFile
 >>> content = """1523911758
 ... node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 bw=760 nick=Test"""
 >>> bwfile = BandwidthFile.from_str(content)
 >>> bwfile.measurements
 {u'68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80': {u'nick': u'Test',
 u'node_id': u'$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80', u'bw': u'760'}}
 }}}

 = File Descriptor Content =

 {{{
 >>> import stem.descriptor
 >>> bwfile = next(stem.descriptor.parse_file('bandwidth_file_v1.2',
 'bandwidth-file 1.2'))
 >>> print("This file has data for %i relays" % len(bwfile.measurements))
 This file has data for 81 relays
 }}}

 = Individual Attributes =

 {{{
 >>> from stem.descriptor.bandwidth_file import BandwidthFile
 >>> bwfile = BandwidthFile.create({
 ...   'version': '5.4.3',
 ...   'software': 'my_application',
 ...   'content': [
 ... 'bw=1 bw_mean=191643 bw_median=218251
 node_id=$92808CA58D8F32CA34A34C547610869BF4E2A6EC',
 ... 'bw=1 bw_mean=93766 bw_median=93606
 node_id=$A6443E49306288C7DAE9B8466568F08DA5BD58D4',
 ...   ],
 ... })
 >>> print(bwfile)
 1549479544
 version=5.4.3
 software=my_application
 =
 bw=1 bw_mean=191643 bw_median=218251
 node_id=$92808CA58D8F32CA34A34C547610869BF4E2A6EC
 bw=1 bw_mean=93766 bw_median=93606
 node_id=$A6443E49306288C7DAE9B8466568F08DA5BD58D4
 }}}

 

 Did you have any other questions?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Firefox 60 ESR (the current basis of Tor Browser 8) officially doesn't
> support "legacy" browser extensions using XPCOM/XUL, only the newer
> WebExtension API.
> https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/60.0esr/releasenotes/#changed
> Tor Browser still includes some legacy extensions; apparently what makes
> them keep working is a [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
> browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/000-tor-
> browser.js?id=4d0f9fa5fdd5831fbc2e28cb6c7b1056bd4deeab#n265
> extensions.legacy.exceptions] pref (#26127; thanks sukhe for knowing
> that). I don't see where !meek-http-hel...@bamsoftware.com is being
> allowed, but somehow it is still working too.
>
> Assess whether it's possible to rewrite the helper as a WebExtension, and
> do it if so. Ideally it will be possible to keep 100% compatibility with
> the current helper interface; but changing meek-client and meek-client-
> torbrowser is also an option.

New description:

 Firefox 60 ESR (the current basis of Tor Browser 8) officially doesn't
 support "legacy" browser extensions using XPCOM/XUL, only the newer
 WebExtension API.
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/60.0esr/releasenotes/#changed
 Tor Browser still includes some legacy extensions; apparently what makes
 them keep working is a [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/000-tor-
 browser.js?id=4d0f9fa5fdd5831fbc2e28cb6c7b1056bd4deeab#n265
 extensions.legacy.exceptions] pref (#26127; thanks sukhe for knowing
 that). I don't see where !meek-http-hel...@bamsoftware.com is being
 allowed (edit: probably a [comment:4|source patch], thanks mcs), but
 somehow it is still working too.

 Assess whether it's possible to rewrite the helper as a WebExtension, and
 do it if so. Ideally it will be possible to keep 100% compatibility with
 the current helper interface; but changing meek-client and meek-client-
 torbrowser is also an option.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29333 [Core Tor/Stem]: Use the bandwidth-file-spec.txt keywords as BandwidthFile attributes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29333: Use the bandwidth-file-spec.txt keywords as BandwidthFile attributes
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 > So, i'd propose that we delay these changes until we solve #28547, and
 mark this as needs_information. Sounds good?

 Hi juga. I'd be happy to rename these attributes, keep them as-is, or
 wait. Your call.

 Every other Stem Descriptor subclasses uses nicer attribute names than the
 spec. Bandwidth files are not unique in this regard. My goal with Stem is
 to provide the most developer friendly library I can, not to mirror spec
 terminology. If you feel the names proposed above improve code readability
 we can go with that but personally I think it's a step backward.

 To be clear we can only await the tickets you cite until Stem's next
 release. That won't be for a long while (rough guess: six months?), but
 once Stem makes a release these attribute names can no longer change. (*)

 How would you care to proceed?

 > Feel free to open tickets for the specification regarding software
 versions and not specification versions.

 I'll leave this at your discretion. Our spec determines the API I provide
 in Stem and those struck me as rough edges as I implemented it, but I
 don't have a personal interest in if the spec changes or not. Just
 feedback - that's all.

 Cheers! -Damian

 (*) Not entirely true, but something to be avoided. We can still rename
 attributes but it's done so via aliases, with the deprecated name
 remaining around until Stem 2.x which will be released in 2020 when Python
 2.7 is deprecated.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25642 [Webpages/Website]: translation of torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25642: translation of torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by emmapeel):

 They have been hooked, although not many translations yet

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29295 [Core Tor/sbws]: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29295: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/331

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:4 mcs]:
 > I might be pleasantly surprised, but I suspect it will be challenging to
 reimplement it as a Webextension while remaining compatible with the
 existing external interface. For example, I don't think there is an easy
 way to write to stdout.

 I haven't tried it all yet, but I've sketched it out mentally and I
 haven't found any showstoppers yet. (I found and appreciated you catalog
 of API differences at #17248.) [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/API/Window/dump window.dump] still works for writing to
 stdout, as long as the pref browser.dom.window.dump.enabled is set. I'm
 not hung up on 100% compatibility, but fundamentally we need some way for
 meek-client to send specifications of HTTP requests into the browser and
 receive responses (currently we have the browser open a local TCP socket),
 so I think you're right, we will need the native messaging API. Instead of
 having the browser open its own socket, it will spawn a subprocess to open
 the socket and then pass information to/from the subprocess. This is the
 process tree I envision:
 {{{
 tor
 └─meek-client-torbrowser
   ├─firefox --headless
   │ └─socket_shim (opens a socket on 127.0.0.1:)
   └─meek-client --helper 127.0.0.1:
 }}}

 meek-client and what I've here called socket_shim communicate over a local
 TCP socket. The socket_shim can communicate its unpredictable port number
  upward through the same native messaging API connection that it uses
 to exchange HTTP requests/responses.

 > I was hoping the new direction for the Tor Browser meek client would be
 to stop using a real browser (but that assumes the TLS fingerprint
 spoofing works well enough).

 That is the plan—there's a near-merge-ready branch at
 comment:15:ticket:29077 that, if you have time, I'd appreciate you having
 a look at. Using obfs4proxy meek_lite is also an option, since obfs4proxy
 also integrated uTLS.

 The headless Firefox WebExtension still has value for ESNI. Firefox has an
 ESNI implementation and Go doesn't. That's what led me to make this
 ticket—I wanted to try meek-client with ESNI in place of domain fronting,
 and found that a Firefox that is new enough to support ESNI is also too
 new to support the current browser extension 

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29294 [Core Tor/sbws]: Create an script to automate releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29294: Create an script to automate releases
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * points:  0.2 => 1


Comment:

 Minimum points is 1. Assign to myself.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15279: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript
--+--
 Reporter:  johnakabean   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This is a good idea.  uMatrix has had four years to evolve since this
 ticket was originally created.  Now there are versions of uMatrix for
 various platforms, and they work well.

 1. There is essentially nothing that NoScript does that uMatrix cannot do
 also.

 2. The design of NoScript is based on an assumption, specifically that a
 user essentially '''never''' wants to run scripts from some sites and
 '''always''' wants to run scripts from others.  This might be appropriate
 if the threat model is malware.  It is emphatically inappropriate if the
 threat model is cross-site tracking.  For example, I might want to allow
 scripts from google.com for certain first-party sites that use Recaptcha,
 but not in the general case.  uMatrix addresses this elegantly.

 3. NoScript and uMatrix interact together poorly.  Specifically, allowing
 a site with NoScript and blocking it with uMatrix results in the site
 being always allowed, despite the fact that it would be both '''safer'''
 to apply the most restrictive policy and '''more logical''' to interpret
 fine-grained uMatrix rules sequentially last.

 So let's do this, folks.  There is no reason to make it hard for people
 who want to use uMatrix for more fine-grained control.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29295 [Core Tor/sbws]: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29295: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => assigned
 * points:  0.1 => 1


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29295 [Core Tor/sbws]: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit (was: Remove three consecutive attempts to measure a relay)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29295: Remove three consecutive attempts to build a circuit
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Description changed by juga:

Old description:

> Currently, a relay is measured to a maximum of 3 consecutives times when
> the previous measurements fail, but in most of the cases, when measuring
> a relay fails the first time, it will also fail the consecutives times.
> The relay will be measured anyway in the next iteration.
>
> Based on what we talked in
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsNetworkTeam/Notes/SBWSRoadmap#Questions

New description:

 Currently, ~~a relay is measured to~~ when measuring a relay, circuits are
 attempted to be built a maximum of 3 consecutives times when the previous
 ~~measurements fail~~ attempt fails, but in most of the cases, when
 ~~measuring a relay~~ building a circuit fails the first time, it will
 also fail the consecutives times.
 The relay will be measured anyway in the next iteration.

 Based on what we talked in
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsNetworkTeam/Notes/SBWSRoadmap#Questions

 Edit: the three attempts happen when trying to build the circuit when
 measuring a relay, but it's not three attempts to measure the relay.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29359 [Webpages/Website]: Update about Tor on job page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29359: Update about Tor on job page
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by steph:

Old description:

> https://www.torproject.org/about/jobs.html.en
>
> Update "About the company" from this:
>
> The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
> Seattle that provides the technical infrastructure for privacy protection
> over the Internet, helping millions of activists, journalists, and others
> around the world communicate securely. With paid staff and contractors of
> around 35 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers
> all over the world who contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded
> in part by government grants and contracts, as well as by individual,
> foundation, and corporate donations. Our mission is to advance human
> rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open anonymity and
> privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use,
> and furthering their scientific and popular understanding.
>

> To this:
>
> The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
> Seattle with paid staff and contractors of around 45 engineers and
> operational support people, plus many volunteers all over the world. Tor
> develops free and open source software for privacy and freedom online,
> protecting people from tracking, surveillance, and censorship. The Tor
> Project’s mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and
> deploying free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies,
> support their unrestricted availability and use, and further their
> scientific and popular understanding.
>
> The Tor Project, Inc., is an equal opportunity, affirmative action
> employer.

New description:

 https://www.torproject.org/about/jobs.html.en

 Update "About the company" from this:

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
 Seattle that provides the technical infrastructure for privacy protection
 over the Internet, helping millions of activists, journalists, and others
 around the world communicate securely. With paid staff and contractors of
 around 35 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers
 all over the world who contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded
 in part by government grants and contracts, as well as by individual,
 foundation, and corporate donations. Our mission is to advance human
 rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open anonymity and
 privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use,
 and furthering their scientific and popular understanding.


 To this:

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
 Seattle with paid staff and contractors of around 45 engineers and
 operational support people, plus many volunteers all over the world. Tor
 develops free and open source software for privacy and freedom online,
 protecting people from tracking, surveillance, and censorship. The Tor
 Project is funded in part by government grants and contracts, as well as
 by individual, foundation, and corporate donations. The Tor Project’s
 mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying
 free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies, support their
 unrestricted availability and use, and further their scientific and
 popular understanding.

 The Tor Project, Inc., is an equal opportunity, affirmative action
 employer.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29359 [Webpages/Website]: Update about Tor on job page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29359: Update about Tor on job page
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://www.torproject.org/about/jobs.html.en

 Update "About the company" from this:

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
 Seattle that provides the technical infrastructure for privacy protection
 over the Internet, helping millions of activists, journalists, and others
 around the world communicate securely. With paid staff and contractors of
 around 35 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers
 all over the world who contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded
 in part by government grants and contracts, as well as by individual,
 foundation, and corporate donations. Our mission is to advance human
 rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open anonymity and
 privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use,
 and furthering their scientific and popular understanding.


 To this:

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
 Seattle with paid staff and contractors of around 45 engineers and
 operational support people, plus many volunteers all over the world. Tor
 develops free and open source software for privacy and freedom online,
 protecting people from tracking, surveillance, and censorship. The Tor
 Project’s mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and
 deploying free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies, support
 their unrestricted availability and use, and further their scientific and
 popular understanding.

 The Tor Project, Inc., is an equal opportunity, affirmative action
 employer.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28866 [Core Tor/sbws]: ResultDump.queue.put() can hang if the queue is full

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28866: ResultDump.queue.put() can hang if the queue is full
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * points:   => 1


Comment:

 I think i solved the bug.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28900 [Webpages/Website]: Upload press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28900: Upload press clips to website
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: We are using linux i686 langpacks in the linux x86_64 builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29183: We are using linux i686 langpacks in the linux x86_64 builds
+--
 Reporter:  langpack|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201902R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201902R, tbb-rbm
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_29183`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29183=86ebdafc28a55042fea553ad7f23f796ea963b75

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18948 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Check for Tor Browser Update" label should by dynamic (was: improve update notification UX)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18948: "Check for Tor Browser Update" label should by dynamic
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-update  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 The update notification on about:tor has been removed, but it would still
 be good to change the menu item label to track the update status. One
 approach would be to use the same strings as are shown in the app menu,
 i.e.:
 * Check for Tor Browser Update
 * Download Tor Browser update (show this when we know an update is
 available)
 * Downloading Tor Browser update
 * Restart to update Tor Browser

 However, we should delay working on this until after #10760 is further
 along.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29358 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop overloading the CPU when the test network is run in the integration tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29358: Stop overloading the CPU when the test network is run in the integration
tests
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 It might be caused by the test network relays' configuration.
 In the case it's not possible to do not possible to overload the CPU, it's
 still possible to simplify the relays' configuration.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20083 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to false.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20083: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to 
false.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing, tbb-usability, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  update |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by brade):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Resolving as wontfix because this is not currently needed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19270 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update warning on about:tor is not eye-catchy enough

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19270: update warning on about:tor is not eye-catchy enough
+--
 Reporter:  mrphs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team, tbb-update  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by brade):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Resolving as wontfix. In #26960, the update warning was removed from
 about:tor. In #25694, we made some improvements to Firefox's update UX.
 Tor Browser also displays a doorhanger on the app menu much sooner than
 Firefox does when an update is available.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Randomize small allocations in mozjemalloc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28710: Randomize small allocations in mozjemalloc
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28707| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 tom]:
 > > Windows is broken, this was my most recent attempt to fix it:
 
https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=try=2db9b7395f35ea22144cfea29cc836d7674a03fc=216260440
 > > (Compiles, but something causes some tests to fail that normally
 work.)
 >
 > But that's no problem for us right now as we don't use mozjemalloc
 anyway on Windows at the moment (alas). So, we should be good with
 backporting what you already have or should we wait with it?

 This is true... However in March I expect we will have an updated version
 of this patch that does work on Windows. Additionally once we switch to
 mingwclang we'll be using jemalloc.

 So I think it's best to wait just to avoid extra work for a narrow window
 of deployment...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25694 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 3.1: Improve the user experience of updating Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25694: Activity 3.1: Improve the user experience of updating Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor17
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Antonela, regarding the "Tor Browser is Updated" part of your comment:13:
 do you still like the idea of integrating about:tbupdate into the
 about:tor page? If you think so, please open a new ticket for that task so
 we can work on it in a future iteration.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29045 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: ask tor to leave dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29045: ask tor to leave dormant mode
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29357 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * parent:   => #29357


Comment:

 I filed #29357 to ask the Network Team for an `ActiveOnStartup` config
 option. If that is added to tor, we can simple add a line like this to our
 torrc-defaults file:
  ActiveOnStartup 1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
--+---
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-needs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 When Tor Browser starts tor, it does not make sense to start in dormant
 mode (the browser is an interactive application which people will
 typically immediately begin using to surf the web). It would be very
 helpful if tor had an `ActiveOnStartup` Boolean config option which would
 ensure that tor starts in active mode.

 Related: #29045

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27466 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate single-locale language repacks for Tor Browser on desktop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27466: Investigate single-locale language repacks for Tor Browser on desktop
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201902,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:  #28196   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by CyrilBrulebois):

 * cc: ckb@… (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26553 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sign our own extensions in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26553: Sign our own extensions in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902, TorBrowserTeam201902|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by CyrilBrulebois):

 * cc: ckb@… (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29356 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create user/brade/tor-browser-spec repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29356: Create user/brade/tor-browser-spec repo
-+
 Reporter:  brade|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Please create a new git repo for me:

 user/brade/tor-browser-spec

 The description should be:

 Kathy's tor-browser-spec Repository

 Thank you!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I think it is the following patch that allows `meek-http-
 hel...@bamsoftware.com` to work in Tor Browser 8.x:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-60.5.0esr-8.5-1=10e590c79b01b2a30db1f01a2112c8808696a6cf

 I might be pleasantly surprised, but I suspect it will be challenging to
 reimplement it as a Webextension while remaining compatible with the
 existing external interface. For example, I don't think there is an easy
 way to write to stdout. The Native Messaging API is another "tool" which
 you might need:
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-
 ons/WebExtensions/Native_messaging

 I was hoping the new direction for the Tor Browser meek client would be to
 stop using a real browser (but that assumes the TLS fingerprint spoofing
 works well enough).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28866 [Core Tor/sbws]: ResultDump.queue.put() can hang if the queue is full

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28866: ResultDump.queue.put() can hang if the queue is full
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 Changing to assigned because i discovered a bug in the PR, i'll change
 again to needs_review when i fix it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29299 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29299: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file 
header
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Branch https://github.com/juga0/sbws/tree/ticket29299 add scanner and
 destination country in the configuration and scanner country in the
 bandwidth file. It's still missing adding the destination(s) country in
 the bandwidth file.

 nickm thought is the more information, the better.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29355 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner nickname and UUID in the bandwidth file headers?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29355: Include scanner nickname and UUID in the bandwidth file headers?
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 In #28741 the scanner sends HTTP metadata in every request to make it
 easier to debug issues, but this information is not include in the
 bandwidth file header.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29299 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29299: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file 
header
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:1 juga]:
 > The scanner country can be added to the headers.
 > Currently, we are not reporting which destinations are used, not in the
 headers nor in the bandwidth lines, so we should:
 > - report which destinations are used. In the headers or for each
 bandwidth line?
 > - if we report the destinations in the headers, we can also report their
 countries.
 >   if we report the destination in each bandwidth line, the country of
 each destination can still be reported in the headers.
 >
 > Also, when the destination is in a CDN, we could know from which country
 is replying by solving the IP address from the exit, but that would add
 more complexity.
 > I'm adding instead "00" as country code for a CDN, meaning that we don't
 know from where it's reached.

 I'd solve this as:
 - if there's only 1 destination, include the destination (and its country)
 in the headers
 - if all the destinations are in a CDN, include the destinations (and
 their countries) in the headers
 - if there're several destinations and some of them are not in a CDN,
 still doubt whether to include the destination in each bandwidth line, or
 to make it simpler, add it only to the headers.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29299 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29299: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file 
header
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final => sbws: 1.1.x-final


Comment:

 Moving to 1.1 milestone, since it'd change the bandwidth file.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28848 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Document Snowflake broker implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28848: Document Snowflake broker implementation
---+--
 Reporter:  ahf|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake tor-pt   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  8
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:  (none) => ahf
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26536, #27539, #28708

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #26536, #27539, #28708 by gk:


Comment:
Adding to our radar.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29354: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-spec, postfreeze-ok
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29299
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29299 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29299: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file 
header
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => assigned
 * points:  0.1 => 1


Comment:

 Changing points to 1 since that's the minimum.
 Assigning to myself.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29299 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29299: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file 
header
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 The scanner country can be added to the headers.
 Currently, we are not reporting which destinations are used, not in the
 headers nor in the bandwidth lines, so we should:
 - report which destinations are used. In the headers or for each bandwidth
 line?
 - if we report the destinations in the headers, we can also report their
 countries.
   if we report the destination in each bandwidth line, the country of each
 destination can still be reported in the headers.

 Also, when the destination is in a CDN, we could know from which country
 is replying by solving the IP address from the exit, but that would add
 more complexity.
 I'm adding instead "00" as country code for a CDN, meaning that we don't
 know from where it's reached.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29353 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: new mailing list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29353: new mailing list
---+-
 Reporter:  gaba   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by gaba):

 >What is the list name?

 tor-scaling

 >What is the email address of the list maintainer?

 g...@torproject.org

 >What is a one sentence description of the list? (see
 ​lists.torproject.org for examples)

 Internal discussion list for performance metrics, roadmap on scaling and
 funding proposals.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29353 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: new mailing list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29353: new mailing list
---+-
 Reporter:  gaba   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by qbi):

 Could you please add all the information which are listed here:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/emailLists#HowdoIaskforanewmailinglist

 Thanks

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29353 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: new mailing list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29353: new mailing list
---+-
 Reporter:  gaba   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Hi dear sysadmin people!

 We need a new invitation-only close-archive mailing list called 'tor-
 scaling'. Can you create it and add me as a moderator for it?

 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29352 [Core Tor/Stem]: AttributeError when running bandwidth_file.py test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29352: AttributeError when running bandwidth_file.py test
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Running `pytest test/unit/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py` both in Python 2.7
 and 3.5

 {{{
 test/unit/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py .FF..
 [100%]

 
 FAILURES
 
 __
 TestBandwidthFile.test_header_for_v1
 __

 self = 

 def test_header_for_v1(self):
   """
 Document version 1.0 predates headers, and as such should be
 prohibited.
 """

 > self.assertRaisesWith(ValueError, 'Headers require BandwidthFile
 version 1.1 or later', BandwidthFile.create, {'new_header': 'neat stuff'})
 E AttributeError: 'TestBandwidthFile' object has no attribute
 'assertRaisesWith'

 test/unit/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py:181: AttributeError
 
 TestBandwidthFile.test_invalid_timestamp
 

 self = 

 def test_invalid_timestamp(self):
   """
 Invalid timestamp values.
 """

   test_values = (
 b'',
 b'boo',
 b'123.4',
 b'-123',
   )

   for value in test_values:
 expected_exc = "First line should be a unix timestamp, but was
 '%s'" % value
 >   self.assertRaisesWith(ValueError, expected_exc,
 BandwidthFile.create, {'timestamp': value})
 E   AttributeError: 'TestBandwidthFile' object has no attribute
 'assertRaisesWith'

 test/unit/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py:209: AttributeError
 === 2 failed, 7 passed
 in 0.11 seconds ===
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29351 [Core Tor/Stem]: BandwidthFile TypeError when initializing or accessing attributes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29351: BandwidthFile TypeError when initializing or accessing attributes
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-bwauth
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 I obtain the same error both in Python 2.7 and 3.5.
 Maybe i'm doing something wrong

 {{{
 >>> from stem.descriptor import bandwidth_file
 >>> content = """1523911758
 ... node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 bw=760 nick=Test"""
 >>> bwfile = bandwidth_file.BandwidthFile(content, validate=True)
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "", line 1, in 
 bwfile = bandwidth_file.BandwidthFile(content, validate=True)
   File "/home/dev/stem/stem/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py", line 262, in
 __init__
 _parse_timestamp(self, None)
   File "/home/dev/stem/stem/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py", line 132, in
 _parse_timestamp
 first_line = io.BytesIO(descriptor.get_bytes()).readline().strip()
 TypeError: a bytes-like object is required, not 'str'
 >>> bwfile = bandwidth_file.BandwidthFile(content)
 >>> bwfile.header
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "", line 1, in 
 bwfile.header
   File "/home/user/_my/code/bwauth-
 related/stem/stem/descriptor/__init__.py", line 1041, in __getattr__
 parsing_function(self, self._entries)
   File "/home/dev/stem/stem/descriptor/bandwidth_file.py", line 105, in
 _parse_header
 content = io.BytesIO(descriptor.get_bytes())
 TypeError: a bytes-like object is required, not 'str'
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26902 [Core Tor/Stem]: Download and parse bwauth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26902: Download and parse bwauth files
+---
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:7 atagar]:
 > Hi juga. Stem support and test coverage for bandwidth file DirPort
 downloads will need to await its implementation within tor (ticket
 #21377). Is there anything in my court here at present?

 Nope, you're right, we need to wait for #21377.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29333 [Core Tor/Stem]: Use the bandwidth-file-spec.txt keywords as BandwidthFile attributes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29333: Use the bandwidth-file-spec.txt keywords as BandwidthFile attributes
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 [...]
 > That said, I'd be happy to defer to whatever you'd like when it comes to
 BandwidthFiles. To be clear you want the following changes...
 >
 > {{{
 > * Rename desc.created_at to desc.file_created
 > * Rename desc.generated_at to desc.generator_started
 > * Rename desc.consensus_size to desc.number_consensus_relays
 > * Rename desc.eligible_count to desc.number_eligible_relays
 > * Rename desc.eligible_percent to desc.percent_eligible_relays
 > * Rename desc.min_count to desc.minimum_number_eligible_relays
 > * Rename desc.min_percent to desc.minimum_percent_eligible_relays
 > * Rename desc.measurements to desc.bandwidth_lines
 > }}}
 >
 > Is this correct?

 Yes, it's.
 However, you're right that the names you chose might be clearer.
 We have a ticket to try to decide better names for keyword #28099, and
 before April we might add other keywords as part of #28547 (see
 https://pad.riseup.net/p/sbws-exclude-reasons-keep for the keywords
 proposed so far).
 So, i'd propose that we delay these changes until we solve #28547, and
 mark this as needs_information. Sounds good?

 > On a side note I like the spec, but felt while implementing it there's a
 few rough edges...
 >
 [...]

 If we change the keywords or add new, we should change also the
 specification.
 Feel free to open tickets for the specification regarding software
 versions and not specification versions.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser's updater work over Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17216: Make Tor Browser's updater work over Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-security,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-update   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Hi!

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > I'd like to test this out, first in the alpha series, sooner than later.
 The idea would be to fetch the metadata file (update.xml) over .onion
 which is a pretty small file (around 1000 bytes) but *not* the full
 update. I am in particular concerned about TLS being the means of
 authenticating the contents of that xml file and think we can do better
 with an .onion responsible for that.
 >
 > weasel, ln5: do you feel the current .onion setup for aus1 is robust
 enough for that test? Should we wait until we have v3 services available?
 Or...?

 We discussed this in Brussels a bit.  It is our current consensus that the
 onion service providing aus1.tpo is not suitable for this purpose.

 The onion service is backed by onionbalance, which appears to be
 unmaintained upstream and which does not support v3 onion services.
 Furthermore, in order for us to be comfortable relying and depending on an
 onion service for such an important purpose, we would want that
 onionbalance itself could be run in a distributed/redundant way such that
 we would not have any SPoFs.

 Once these issues are addressed, we can reconsider the issue.  For now,
 however, we recommend you not rely on the onion for updates.

 Cheers,

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22137: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18283 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Definitely prefer patching, but would like it done at Mozilla's end, even
 if tied to RFP

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22137: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18283 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 Thorin]:
 > Georg, I have been using the solution outlined in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1397996#c2 for over year,
 flawlessly. These are the original authors. I don't know about this new
 one (which looks like a modified version or copy), but the one I've used
 has a menu item to turn it on/off - so you'd probably need to remove that
 (I guess).
 >
 > FYI: There will also be a test for this at
 https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html#useragent
 - under `[scrollbar width] os` when added (soon), which incorporates
 detection of zoom (which is required to correctly calculate the scrollbar
 width if zoom is not 100%)

 Nice!

 I think what we need to figure out in this ticket first is the approach we
 want to take to solve this issue. I am not a huge fan of shipping some
 `userChrome.css` etc. if we have the option to easily patch the browser
 ourselves (which we have) as patching seems less complex and error-prone
 to me and we want to upstream the fix to Firefox anyway. (That way
 everyone can benefit.) The easiest and sufficient solution might still be
 to just give a fixed value, say 17px, back for all platforms.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22137: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18283 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Georg, I have been using the solution outlined in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1397996#c2 for over year,
 flawlessly. These are the original authors. I don't know about this new
 one (which looks like a modified version or copy), but the one I've used
 has a menu item to turn it on/off - so you'd probably need to remove that
 (I guess).

 FYI: There will also be a test for this at
 https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html#useragent
 - under `[scrollbar width] os` when added (soon), which incorporates
 detection of zoom (which is required to correctly calculate the scrollbar
 width if zoom is not 100%)

 -- from the bugzilla comment to save time
 [STEP1] https://github.com/nuchi/firefox-quantum-userchromejs
   - save (or append to existing) userChrome.xml and userChrome.js to
 profile/chrome
 [STEP2]
 
https://github.com/Endor8/userChrome.js/blob/master/floatingscrollbar/FloatingScrollbar.uc.js
   - save (or append to existing) FloatingScrollbar.uc.js as userChrome.js
 to profile/chrome
 [Step3] clear CACHE and restart

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29318 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drop mingw-w64/gcc toolchain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29318: Drop mingw-w64/gcc toolchain
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12968| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Note that we want to look into CFG once we are done here (Trac does not
 let me specify two parent IDs, so let's note that here).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Randomize small allocations in mozjemalloc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28710: Randomize small allocations in mozjemalloc
--+---
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28707| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 tom]:
 > Windows is broken, this was my most recent attempt to fix it:
 
https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=try=2db9b7395f35ea22144cfea29cc836d7674a03fc=216260440
 > (Compiles, but something causes some tests to fail that normally work.)

 But that's no problem for us right now as we don't use mozjemalloc anyway
 on Windows at the moment (alas). So, we should be good with backporting
 what you already have or should we wait with it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29049 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport JS Poison Patch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29049: Backport JS Poison Patch
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201902,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201902 => tbb-security,
 TorBrowserTeam201902, GeorgKoppen201902


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29013, #29118

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #29013, #29118 by gk:
priority to High

--
Tickets URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #12968, #22176, #24855, #26323, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #12968, #22176, #24855, #26323, #26858, #27105, #27609, 
#27616, #28329, #28802, #29185, #10760, #13747, #18867, #21404, #22070, #22854, 
#23386, #23657, #24331, #24332, #25021, #25623, #25658, #25764, #26407, #26529, 
#26553, #26599, #26601, #26602, #26605, #26606, #26607, #26608, #26610, #26782, 
#26844, #27210, #27399, #27466, #27503, #28044, #28238, #28622, #28685, #28800, 
#28803, #29003, #29238, #24622, #26242, #26318, #27120, #27137, #28145, #28175, 
#28369, #28520, #28523, #28628, #28665, #28798, #29013, #29049, #29080, #29118, 
#29312, #29313 by gk:


Comment:
Moving tickets to February.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26574 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26574: Save TBA updates in the internal android storage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201901  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26242| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29059 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: fuzz_static_testcases.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29059: shellcheck: fuzz_static_testcases.sh issues
+--
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/684

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29071 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: nagios-check-tor-authority-cert issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29071: shellcheck: nagios-check-tor-authority-cert issues
+--
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/683

 Do we still use this script anywhere?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29348 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add userChrome to Tor Browser to spoof scrollbars to reduce fingerprinting surface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29348: Add userChrome to Tor Browser to spoof scrollbars to reduce 
fingerprinting
surface
---+---
 Reporter:  concerneduser  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  scrollbar fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting-resolution
 * status:  new => closed
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 Thorin]:
 > Also note that chrome affects the inner window. Showing the toolbar in
 windows makes Tor Browser (with density = compact) out by 2 pixels (loads
 as 1000x998). Using the findbar alters the inner window, as does toggling
 the menu on and off, or using the sidebar.

 Yes, that's #16456. Closing this ticket as a duplicate of #22137.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22137: Provide the same scrollbar size across different platforms
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18283 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: concerneduser (added)


Comment:

 Marking #29348 as a duplicate of this bug. #29348 proposes to use
 https://gist.github.com/mrkwatz/277fb19d210a7539304ca2388f24d8e3 and notes
 {{{
 it makes the clientWidth become 1000 as intended (you obviously could also
 make the scrollbars the same width/height as on Windows, but I think this
 is a better approach). If something like this is included into standard
 Tor browser it would minimize segregation and thus allow users to use Tor
 on Linux/Mac while still appearing as Windows users.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29071 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: nagios-check-tor-authority-cert issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29071: shellcheck: nagios-check-tor-authority-cert issues
+--
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => rl1987
 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29338 [Core Tor/Tor]: restore HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient in v3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29338: restore HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient in v3
+--
 Reporter:  Alan|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hs-auth, client-auth, hsv3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * cc: rl1987 (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29066 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test_workqueue_cancel.sh issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29066: shellcheck: test_workqueue_cancel.sh issue
+---
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Actually #29067 is more general than this ticket and covers this warning
 as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs