Re: [tor-bugs] #29444 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to login from onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29444: Unable to login from onion
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * priority:  High => Medium


Comment:

 Any way to reproduce that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15279: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript
--+--
 Reporter:  johnakabean   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: ui_priv (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29452 [Applications]: Tor Browser 8.0.5 - Disqus do not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29452: Tor Browser 8.0.5 - Disqus do not work
-+---
 Reporter:  klondike |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  Tor-Browser, Disqus  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #27249.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15279: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript
--+--
 Reporter:  johnakabean   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Closed #29443 as a duplicate. See: #17569 which proposes to just include
 uBlock Origin to Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include uMatrix and uBlock Origin in Tor Browser for Android Alpha/Bundle (like Tails using uBO)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29443: Include uMatrix and uBlock Origin in Tor Browser for Android 
Alpha/Bundle
(like Tails using uBO)
+--
 Reporter:  ui_priv |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
|  duplicate
 Keywords:  adblock, uMatrix, uBlock, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * owner:  legind => tbb-team
 * component:  HTTPS Everywhere => Applications/Tor Browser
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #15279.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29450 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Option to view BridgeDB in English

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29450: Option to view BridgeDB in English
--+
 Reporter:  gecko |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => sysrqb
 * component:  - Select a component => Obfuscation/BridgeDB


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor 8.0a won't let me log in to Disqus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27249: Tor 8.0a won't let me log in to Disqus
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-8.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: klondike (added)


Comment:

 Closed #29452 as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 legind, alexishan: Is that just a glitch in the UI or expected behavior
 or...?

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[tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 A user on the blog
 (https://blog.torproject.org/comment/279696#comment-279696) noticed that
 updates we ship do not seem to update the rulesets. While the HTTPS-
 Everywhere version is updated, the rulesets version shown by clicking on
 the HTTPS-Everywhere icon is still the old one.

 While this issue goes away with the regular rulesets update in the
 background, it seems weird that the rulesets do not seem to get updated in
 the first place.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29453 [Applications/Tor Browser]: buster-amd64 is missing from debootstrap-image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29453: buster-amd64 is missing from debootstrap-image
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201902R, tbb-rbm,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201902, tbb-rbm => TorBrowserTeam201902R, tbb-
 rbm, GeorgKoppen201902
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See: `bug_29453` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29453&id=af5f73dc3dc34144736d5f4dfb3134db4f8f652c)
 in my repo for a possible fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by monmire):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 The problem recurred after upgrading from TB 8.0.4 to TB 8.0.5.[[br]]

 With neither bookmarks nor bookmarks-folders appearing in the enabled
 Bookmarks Toolbar, the screen size is `wide:1000 x high:1000`.[[br]]

 However, dragging "Bookmarks Toolbars Items" from the Customize panel into
 the Bookmarks Toolbar or dragging "Bookmarks Toolbars Items" from the
 Overflow Menu panel into the Bookmarks Toolbar changes screen size to
 `wide:1000 x high:0998`. [[br]]


 Steps to reproduce issue: [[br]]


 Create backup of Bookmarks. [[br]]

 Download and verify Tor Browser 8.0.5. [[br]]

 Uninstall TorBrowser-Data (v8.04) folder. [[br]]

 Quit Tor Browser [[br]]

 Install TB 8.0.5. [[br]]

 Restore all bookmarks. [[br]]

  [[br]]
 Desired result: with bookmarks and bookmarks-folders visible in the
 Bookmarks Toolbar, screen size should be `wide:1000 x high:1000` and
 should not be `wide:1000 x high:0998`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29449 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please refresh the GPG key for irl in LDAP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29449: Please refresh the GPG key for irl in LDAP
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ln5):

 Great, thanks!

 The keyring repo is made readable to all members through git.tpo.
 Not sure who's using it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29449 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please refresh the GPG key for irl in LDAP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29449: Please refresh the GPG key for irl in LDAP
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25849: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201811, GeorgKoppen201902 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201811 => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,
 boklm201811, GeorgKoppen201902


Comment:

 Thanks, that's a good idea. `bug_25849_v3`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25849_v3&id=3de8afa44fa4a7078f917263147f6e19107e3141)
 has the adapted fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29194 [Applications/rbm]: Set DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive when installing packages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29194: Set DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive when installing packages
---+---
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by boklm):

 In branch `bug_29194` I made a patch setting
 `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive`. However, I didn't fully test it yet, and
 because it is changing build instructions for all containers, it will
 require everything to be rebuilt.

 With #29235 we stopped using buster in `projects/https-everywhere`,
 however we still use in in `projects/tor-browser` for `android-armv7`.
 Before merging the fix that will require rebuilding everything, I think we
 could start by fixing it only for `projects/tor-browser` on `android-
 armv7`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=bug_29194_android&id=c87154eadb5920aa54e52763fd092dea56e97485

 And later merge the full fix, after more testing.

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[tor-bugs] #29453 [Applications/Tor Browser]: buster-amd64 is missing from debootstrap-image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29453: buster-amd64 is missing from debootstrap-image
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201902,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 With the changes from #29235 we removed buster from `projects/debootstrap-
 image/config`.

 However buster is still used in `projects/tor-browser/config` for the
 `android-armv7` build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25849: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > > Is that correct that you apply `unwind_128.patch` to Firefox Nightly
 also?
 >
 > Good catch. No, it is not correct. I hoped I can somehow avoid version
 comparisons. Maybe boklm has a good idea whether we can achieve that.

 I think you can add something like this to `projects/tor/config`:
 {{{
 diff --git a/projects/tor/config b/projects/tor/config
 index 80282ea..f4b8e8f 100644
 --- a/projects/tor/config
 +++ b/projects/tor/config
 @@ -68,4 +68,5 @@ input_files:
  input_file_var:
rust_version: 1.28.0
prev_version: 1.27.2
 +  unwind_128: '[% c("var/windows-i686") %]'
  enable: '[% (c("var/linux") || c("var/osx")) && c("var/nightly") %]'
 }}}

 And then use `input_file_var/unwind_128` in the conditions to apply
 `unwind_128.patch`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25849: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R, boklm201811, GeorgKoppen201902
 => tbb-rbm, boklm201811
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > Is that correct that you apply `unwind_128.patch` to Firefox Nightly
 also?

 Good catch. No, it is not correct. I hoped I can somehow avoid version
 comparisons. Maybe boklm has a good idea whether we can achieve that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25849: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201811, GeorgKoppen201902 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Is that correct that you apply `unwind_128.patch` to Firefox Nightly also?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25849: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for Windows with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902R,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201811, GeorgKoppen201902 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201804, boklm201811 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201902R, boklm201811, GeorgKoppen201902
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Finally: `bug_25849_v2` (commit 21677b3571d9a7975b50074673169c6a6dc83b05).
 Please review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29452 [Applications]: Tor Browser 8.0.5 - Disqus do not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29452: Tor Browser 8.0.5 - Disqus do not work
-+
 Reporter:  klondike |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor-Browser, Disqus  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by klondike):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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[tor-bugs] #29452 [Applications]: Tor Browser 8.0.5 - Disqus do not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29452: Tor Browser 8.0.5 - Disqus do not work
-+--
 Reporter:  klondike |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Tor-Browser, Disqus  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Can login into disqus hp with TB. But Disqus do not work with TB when it´s
 integrated in a webpage as commenting system. HTTPS Everywhere is
 disabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27824 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser or NoScript 10 prevents cookies even if cookie exceptions are present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27824: TorBrowser or NoScript 10 prevents cookies even if cookie exceptions are
present
+--
 Reporter:  joebt   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor Browser, NoScript, cookies  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Why are you playing with your ~~food~~ cookies? Leave them alone.

 > third party cookies shouldn't be enabled by default

 **They're not.** - a default new Tor Browser & profile (8.0.5) has a
 slider setting of "standard" and cookies are enabled for **1st party
 only**. `network.cookie.cookieBehavior` is set at `1`, you can see this in
 about:preferences#privacy where "Accept third party cookies and data" =
 "Never".

 The only reason you have 3rd party cookies at "Always" is because you were
 playing with the settings. The logic behind the "Accept cookies and site
 data (recommended)" UI, when changing from unchecked to checked, is to
 reset the child option for 3rd party cookies to "Always". That's your
 issue, and it's due to code from Mozilla.

 Maybe that's something that TB could address with a patch. Force 3rd party
 cookie option to always be "Never" and to disable it (the same as the
 "Keep until" option)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27824 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser or NoScript 10 prevents cookies even if cookie exceptions are present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27824: TorBrowser or NoScript 10 prevents cookies even if cookie exceptions are
present
+--
 Reporter:  joebt   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor Browser, NoScript, cookies  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 In TBB 8.5 & earlier (linux), IF torbutton security slider is default
 **"Standard** setting," and in preferences - **"Accept cookies & site
 data"** is checked, **then** "Accept third party cookies & site data" is
 checked & set @ Always - by default.

 With torbutton @ Standard security, when 3rd party cookies are **allowed
 Always**, it **toggles** the "privacy.firstparty.isolate" pref to FALSE;
 and toggles it to True when 3rd party cookies are set to "Never."  Then
 lots of **3rd party cookies are set** instantly.  I assume 3rd parties'
 Site Data is also loaded, but I've not checked it yet.

 I suggest that it not toggle the firstparty.isolate pref.

 In TBB, same settings as above, but 3rd Party Cookies are = "From Visited
 Sites," it still toggles firstparty.isolate = False (shouldn't), but seems
 to allow only 1st party cookies.  (I haven't checked that on 100's of
 sites.)

 When firstparty.isolate is False & torbutton security setting = Safer, it
 seems to **block** 3rd party cookies when Accept 3rd Party cookies =
 Always.  Safer setting - good.  But, parts of some sites haven't worked in
 the past at torbutton Safer setting.

 Checked this behavior several times in TBB & regular Fx 60.5esr (Linux)
 Both new installs, new profile for regular Fx ESR, no addons installed in
 the regular Fx ESR; only default addons in TBB.

 Same behavior in both of the ESR flavors, whether TBB is restarted / get
 new identity or not.  Yes, it'd delete 3rd party cookies, but they'll come
 right back unless Accept 3rd party cookies  = "Never."

 In Firefox 65 (Linux) they've changed the cookie options UI, even from a
 couple versions ago.  In it, disabling ALL cookie blocking (incl. 3rd
 party) does not toggle "privacy.firstparty.isolate" to False.

--
Ticket URL: 
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