[tor-bugs] #29499 [- Select a component]: permission error: nyx requires executable permission bit for `/var/lib/tor`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29499: permission error: nyx requires executable permission bit for 
`/var/lib/tor`
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9  |   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords:  nyx   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Offending logs from strace:
 {{{
 stat("/var/lib/tor/control_auth_cookie", 0x7ffca7ba61f0) = -1 EACCES
 (Permission denied)
 stat("/var/lib/tor/control_auth_cookie", 0x7ffca7ba61f0) = -1 EACCES
 (Permission denied)
 write(1, "We were unable to read tor's aut"..., 176We were unable to read
 tor's authentication cookie...

   Path: /var/lib/tor/control_auth_cookie
   Issue: Authentication failed: '/var/lib/tor/control_auth_cookie' doesn't
 exist) = 176
 }}}

 Permissions on /var/lib/tor:
 {{{ drwx--  3 tor tor 4.0K Feb 14 17:04 tor }}}

 Permissions for cookie file:
 {{{ -rw-r- 1 tor tor 32 Feb 13 06:36 control_auth_cookie }}}

 A quick fix on the user part is to add the executable bit for group, but
 in general the cookie file should be accessible without the executable bit
 set so as long as the cookie file is configured to be readable by group
 (i.e. 'CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1' written in /etc/tor/torrc).

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[tor-bugs] #29498 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Outbound proxy not working in Tor Browser Android.

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#29498: Outbound proxy not working in Tor Browser Android.
--+--
 Reporter:  zero_trust|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Android Browser   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 As of version 60.5.0, Outbound Proxy options in Tor Browser Android are
 not working. It never worked from the beginning of TBB Android. In Orbot,
 it works fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Here is a first version, using the scheme I described in comment:5. It
 doesn't support domain fronting or a proxy yet, but it is enough to
 bootstrap 100% with `meek-client --helper`.
  * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/log/?h=webextension=0245c8e73900eb8f90775d9206610547b9f1f216
 webextension branch]
  * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/meek.git/diff/?h=webextension=0245c8e73900eb8f90775d9206610547b9f1f216=bbe789add5ece1d493f065ff0d0b125b0c2a6c78
 diff]

 Next I'm going to add domain fronting and proxy support, but feedback is
 welcome in the meantime.

 === Setup instructions ===

 I used Firefox 65.

 1. Compile the native application.
{{{
 cd webextension/native && go build
}}}
 2. Edit meek.http.helper.json and set the `"path"` field to the path to
 the native application.
{{{
 "path": "/path/to/webextension/native/native",
}}}
 3. Copy the edited meek.http.helper.json file to the
 [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-
 ons/WebExtensions/Native_manifests#Manifest_location OS-appropriate
 location]. The meek.http.helper.json file is called the "host manifest" or
 "app manifest" and it tells the browser where to find the native part of
 the WebExtension.
* macOS
  {{{
 mkdir -p ~/"Library/Application Support/Mozilla/NativeMessagingHosts/"
 cp meek.http.helper.json ~/"Library/Application
 Support/Mozilla/NativeMessagingHosts/"
  }}}
* other Unix
  {{{
 mkdir -p ~/.mozilla/native-messaging-hosts/
 cp meek.http.helper.json ~/.mozilla/native-messaging-hosts/
  }}}
* no Windows yet, see below
 4. Run Firefox in a terminal so you can see its stdout. In Firefox, go to
 about:config and set
{{{
 browser.dom.window.dump.enabled=true
}}}
This enables the extension to write to stdout.
 5. In Firefox, go to about:debugging and click
 [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Tools/about:debugging
 #Loading_a_temporary_add-on "Load Temporary Add-on..."]. Find
 webextension/manifest.json and click Open. In the terminal, you should see
 a line like this, with a random port number in place of '''':
{{{
 meek-http-helper: listen 127.0.0.1:
}}}

 Test it out with this torrc (you need to replace ''''):
 {{{
 UseBridges 1
 ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./meek-client --helper 127.0.0.1:
 --log meek-client.log
 Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:1 url=https://meek.bamsoftware.com/
 }}}

 In the browser, open the browser console with Ctrl+Shift+J and you will
 see the requests being made.

 === Notes ===

 The WebExtension is made of two parts: the extension and the native
 application. The extension itself is JavaScript, runs in the browser, and
 is responsible for making HTTP requests as instructed. The native
 application runs as a subprocess of the browser; its job is to open a
 localhost socket and act as an intermediary between the extension and
 meek-client, because the extension cannot open a socket by itself.

 The in-browser part of the WebExtension is actually really really simple
 now. Most of the XPCOM extension was concerned with IPC, but now native
 messaging takes care of that. It will get a little more complicated once I
 add the ability to override the Host header and use a proxy.

 The main complication in the native part of the WebExtension is that we
 have to share the [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-
 ons/WebExtensions/Native_messaging#App_side stdio channel] to the browser
 among many request–response pairs. Formerly, the XPCOM extension opened a
 server socket and did one request–response exchange for each new TCP
 connection. The TCP connection provided a natural binding between a
 request and its corresponding response. But now, every request and
 response must use the permanent stdio–stdout channel. To make this work, I
 had the native part of the extension tag every request with a random ID
 before sending it to the browser. When the browser sends back a response,
 it also tags the response with the same ID. That way, the native part can
 match them up and continue to provide the same old old-connection-per-
 roundtrip interface to meek-client.

 Another slight complication is that meek-client needs to know the
 listening port of the native part, which is two levels down in the process
 hierarchy. To make this work, I added a `"report-address"` command that
 the 

[tor-bugs] #29497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage and stays there til killed in task list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29497: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage 
and
stays there til killed in task list
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 re: Tor Browser 8.0.6 (and also 8.0.3)

 Have noticed since 8.0.3 to 8.0.6 that, every time tor crashes,
 firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50-60% cpu usage and stays there
 until i restart the whole browser or kill the process in the task list,
 thus losing all tabs.

 Can we get a fix for this? It's annoying to have to save all tabs,
 restart, and then reload them again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29174: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
---+
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard, hidden service  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by TBD.Chen):

 I think using 2 guards is quiet better than the spot-check in this certain
 schema.

 Because the spot-check should balance traffic cost and the response time
 after the guard starting to drop cells. And if the spot-check failed, we
 cannot locate the bad points instantly. The bad point may be Intro-Points,
 other middle nodes, or even HSDirs.

 But if we use the 2 guards when we creating HS-IP circuit, we can avoid
 this with several additionally cost. If the attacker blocks half of the
 HS-IntroPoint circuits, the client may fail to send her INTRODUCE1 cell
 with half probability at the first, and then she will retry automatically
 until success.
 The client feels no abnormality.

 -
 At last, can I get a TROVE-id or CVE-id for this bug track? Which can
 eclipse hidden services stealthily (:
 -
 -
 Replying to [comment:5 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 mikeperry]:
 > > it would not be to hard to augment it to send periodic end-to-end
 probes for introduce1 circuits
 >
 > In the original tor-design paper, we spoke of onion services doing spot-
 checks of their introduction points, to make sure that they are actually
 introducing. That approach would test a larger fraction of the system than
 just doing a liveness check within the circuit. Both are kind of messy
 though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 @ monmire. The inner window is only resized when opening a **new** window
 (which includes when you start Tor Browser). **It is not dynamically
 resized as you add/remove/change chrome elements**

 TB 8.06 (windows7)
 - density normal, toolbar on with icons: opens at `1000x996`, change
 density to compact and the inner windows is now `1000x1010`
 - new identity at density compact: opens at `1000x998`

 I do not have MacOS. It *may* be that compact on MacOS achieves 1000x1000
 on a new window, but then what happens if the toolbar has no icons (it
 will change size, and your *fix* will break). And what about all the
 people who don't use compact theme. This is not a solution, sorry.

 The problem is the icon padding and/or margins which change the height of
 the toolbar, and this happens after the resizing is calculated on the
 creation of a new window.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29495 [Webpages/Website]: Running site fails with python 2.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29495: Running site fails with python 2.x
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Uggg. I got more errors running the site with python2 so finally gave up
 and reinstalled lektor with python3. Unfortunately the 'b' I added in the
 open call broke the site for python3...

 {{{
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/atagar/.local/lib/lektor/lib/python3.5/site-
 packages/lektor/devserver.py", line 47, in build
 builder.build_all()
   File "/home/atagar/.local/lib/lektor/lib/python3.5/site-
 packages/lektor/builder.py", line 1141, in build_all
 prog, build_state = self.build(source, path_cache=path_cache)
   File "/home/atagar/.local/lib/lektor/lib/python3.5/site-
 packages/lektor/builder.py", line 1110, in build
 source=source, prog=prog)
   File "/home/atagar/.local/lib/lektor/lib/python3.5/site-
 packages/lektor/pluginsystem.py", line 161, in emit
 rv[plugin.id] = handler(**kwargs)
   File "/home/atagar/Desktop/tor/tpo/packages/i18n/lektor_i18n.py", line
 350, in on_before_build
 f.write(content)
 TypeError: a bytes-like object is required, not 'str'
 }}}

 I would suggest that rather than this patch we simply abort if the user is
 running python2. The site fails a few different, confusing ways so better
 to say upfront 'please run python3' rather than suggest that we support
 both python versions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29495 [Webpages/Website]: Running site fails with python 2.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29495: Running site fails with python 2.x
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by atagar:

Old description:

> When running our new website with 'lektor server' python 2.x stacktraces,
> and fails to load 'about' pages. Hopefully I'll be able to provide a
> branch to pull from for future branches (#29493), but until then
> providing attaching a patch file you should be able to apply with 'git am
> 0001-Stacktrace-when-launching-lektor-server.patch'.

New description:

 When running our new website with 'lektor server' python 2.x stacktraces,
 and fails to load 'about' pages. Hopefully I'll be able to provide a
 branch to pull from for future patches (#29493), but until then providing
 attaching a patch file you should be able to apply with 'git am 0001
 -Stacktrace-when-launching-lektor-server.patch'.

--

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[tor-bugs] #29496 [Core Tor/Tor]: DOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29496: DOS
+--
 Reporter:  bass|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Hi<
 New to the Wiki, I'm having a awful time with DOS,any help would be
 greatly appreciated.Thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29495 [Webpages/Website]: Running site fails with python 2.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29495: Running site fails with python 2.x
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * Attachment "0001-Stacktrace-when-launching-lektor-server.patch" added.


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[tor-bugs] #29495 [Webpages/Website]: Running site fails with python 2.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29495: Running site fails with python 2.x
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When running our new website with 'lektor server' python 2.x stacktraces,
 and fails to load 'about' pages. Hopefully I'll be able to provide a
 branch to pull from for future branches (#29493), but until then providing
 attaching a patch file you should be able to apply with 'git am 0001
 -Stacktrace-when-launching-lektor-server.patch'.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by monmire):

 Replying to [comment:17 Thorin]:
 > I didn't realize this had been closed.
 >
 > The problem is not MacOS specific. It has been happening in Windows7 as
 well in **all** 8.* versions. The problem is not the toolbar per se, it is
 the **height/padding/spacing/margin** of any icons.
 >
 > It's been happening since FF57 and Quantum's redesign - see
 https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-user.js/issues/297 [[br]]

 I resolved the issue on my system (MacOS) [[br]]
 See comment:20

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by monmire):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 On Tor Browser 8.0.6, I discovered a "Customize" configuration that seems
 to have resolved the issue on my system (MacOS): [[br]]


 Go to main menu (hamburger menu) and select "Customize" to open Customize
 panel. [[br]]


 Near the bottom of the Customize panel, open the "Density" panel in which
 the custom option "Normal" is the default setting. Select the custom
 option: Compact. [[br]]

 After selecting the Compact option, screen size changed from `wide:1000 x
 high:0998` to screen size `wide:1000 x high:1000` with Bookmarks Toolbar
 enabled and with bookmarks-folders with text and individual bookmarks with
 text appearing in the enabled Bookmarks Toolbar. [[br]]
  [[br]]
 Recommendation: the Tor Browser User Manual and/or the Tor FAQ General
 questions could include information stating the user can/might achieve
 screen size `wide:1000 x high:1000` with the Bookmarks Toolbar enabled and
 with bookmarks-folders with text and individual bookmarks with text
 appearing in the enabled Bookmarks Toolbar if the users selects
 "Customize/Density/Compact".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29360 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor-Browser Linux: no audio playback (pulseaudio)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29360: Tor-Browser Linux: no audio playback (pulseaudio)
--+---
 Reporter:  tries |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by tries):

 The presense/requirement of the .pulse directory seems to depend on the
 pulseaudio version.
   * CentOS 6 with pulseaudio 0.9.21 does have these directories
   * CentOS 7 with pulseaudio 10.0 does NOT have them (there, things are
 located in $HOME/.config/pulse/

 However, audio with tor-browser on CentOS 7 works fine, even without any
 links/copies of pulseadio related files. I tested 6.0, 7.5, 7.0, 7.5 and
 current 8.0 versions of tor-browser - my audio issue with CentOS 6 exists
 with all these versions (clean install of tor-browser).

 I have to admit, currently I have no idea why my audio did work at all
 before...
 But my best guess to get around this would be to place a symlink to the
 .pulse directory in the real home directory - if this directory should
 exists in the users $HOME (similar to what has been done in #9353).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27610 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript is broken at .onion pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27610: NoScript is broken at .onion pages
--+--
 Reporter:  torbr0|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  browser noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29204 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29204: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, 041-proposed, network-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok I think the first thing to do is to make this be a simple fix that
 prevents us from triggering OOM conditions. The simplest way to do this is
 to inspect the circuitmux queue and if it is too full, just not send the
 padding cell, emit a log, and tell the padding system we did send a
 padding cell. I filed #29494 for optimizing this solution, which we may or
 may not need to do depending on the padding machines we make.

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[tor-bugs] #29494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize interaction between circuitmux and circuitpadding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29494: Optimize interaction between circuitmux and circuitpadding
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  wtf-pad
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor2  |
--+---
 In #29204, we realized that we needed to inspect the circuit queue to
 prevent the circuit padding system from queuing too much padding. For that
 ticket, we're going to do the simple fix -- we don't schedule padding if
 the circuit's cell queue already has a window full of cells on it. In that
 case, we just lie to circpad and tell the machine we sent padding even
 though we did not.

 However, we should determine if we want to have a more complicated
 interaction, such as delaying our padding until the queue drains. We
 should also examine creating alternate machine events for when cells are
 dequeued from circuitmux vs when they are sent locally. This has pluses
 and minuses for machine interaction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27531: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm,|
  tbb-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * keywords:
 tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-
 rbm
 =>
 tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-
 rbm, tbb-backport
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:23 wert2]:
 > Sorry didn't see this earlier.  This still crashes for me using 8.0.6 on
 an up-to-date Fedora 29 workstation w/ Gnome 3.30.2.

 Yes, the fix currently is only in the alpha (starting with 8.5a7), but not
 in the stable series yet.

 I'm adding the `tbb-backport` keyword so we can look at backporting it in
 the next stable release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26698: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto tor-dirauth tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #27047   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (I don't know whether the child tickets here should be closed or
 unparented -- please do whatever is appropriate to them, and then close
 this ticket?  Thanks!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27610 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript is broken at .onion pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27610: NoScript is broken at .onion pages
--+--
 Reporter:  torbr0|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  browser noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * cc: antonela, micahflee (added)
 * status:  needs_information => accepted
 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr


Comment:

 It looks like we aren't including HTTP .onion sites in the set of sites we
 allow JS on for the 'Safer' security sliding.

 See this issue in onionshare:
 https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare/pull/901

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26698: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto tor-dirauth tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #27047   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay -- the commits look like what I read before, and chutney passes on
 the results.  Merged to master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29023 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29023: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, tor-relay, 041-proposed-|  Actual Points:  3
  on-roadmap |
Parent ID:  #26871   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Your comments all look reasonable! I've made the changes you requested in
 a set of fixup commits, pushed to the same branch and PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29023 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29023: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, tor-relay, 041-proposed-|  Actual Points:  3
  on-roadmap |
Parent ID:  #26871   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #29493 [Internal Services/Service - git]: User repo for new website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29493: User repo for new website
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hi, I'll be making patches for our new website and I'd appreciate a user
 repository to stage pull requests...

 Requested repo: user/atagar/web/tpo.git
 For pull requests of: https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/tpo.git/

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29229 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29229: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb, network-team-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 If Serge goes down, I think doctor sends email to...some people?

 As part of the tor-consensus-health automation.

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[tor-bugs] #29492 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: yet no rule for www.audiop2p.com

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29492: yet no rule for www.audiop2p.com
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS
 |  Everywhere
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 www.audiop2p.com supports HTTPS, but features no automatic redirect.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29229 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29229: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb, network-team-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  bridgedb => bridgedb, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29479 [Webpages]: https://donate.torproject.org/ is leaking huge amount of memory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29479: https://donate.torproject.org/ is leaking huge amount of memory
--+
 Reporter:  Porkepix  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 hiro: I saw on irc that you had some guess about what this might be, and
 took some step to get closer to fixing it?

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[tor-bugs] #29491 [Core Tor/Tor]: Chutney fails when Tor is built with --enable-nss

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29491: Chutney fails when Tor is built with --enable-nss
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  CI
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29280
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can  |
---+
 We should get chutney passing when Tor is built with --enable-nss.
 Currently, it fails for two reasons:
   * tor-gencert is not built with NSS.
   * If you use a copy of a working tor-gencert, some of the chutney tests
 fail.

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[tor-bugs] #29490 [Core Tor/Tor]: Chutney fails (sometimes?) when tor is built with --enable-coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29490: Chutney fails (sometimes?) when tor is built with --enable-coverage
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  CI,
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29280
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can  |
---+
 Right now we can't enable chutney on Travis when Tor is built with
 --enable-coverage. This appears to be relating to timing issues with
 consensus generation. I can reproduce this behavior on my desktop.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29280 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use Chutney for CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29280: Use Chutney for CI
--+
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29267| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  Obfuscation => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29061 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test_bt.sh issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29061: shellcheck: test_bt.sh issue
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Thanks! This looks good to me to be squashed and merged in 0.4.1, assuming
 the CI passes.w

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28623 [Core Tor/Tor]: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28623: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)
--+
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, doc |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28623 [Core Tor/Tor]: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28623: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)
--+
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Okay -- merged to master!

 (I'm taking this postfreeze since it's a documentation-only fix)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28405 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unable to parse networkstatus consensus (related to CR in time field)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28405: Unable to parse networkstatus consensus (related to CR in time field)
--+--
 Reporter:  nth   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This was a duplicate of #28614, which is now fixed in master,

 Thanks for the bug report!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27531: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by wert2):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29160 [Core Tor/Tor]: do not LOG_ERR from test_address_get_if_addrs6 when there is no ipv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29160: do not LOG_ERR from test_address_get_if_addrs6 when there is no ipv6
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28668   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged part of parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28668 [Core Tor/Tor]: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28668: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt, postfreeze-ok  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  juga,asn   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29161 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expect some gmtime/localtime() failures on windows, don't log bugs from tests.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29161: Expect some gmtime/localtime() failures on windows, don't log bugs from
tests.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28668   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged as part of parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28659 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor CI: error removing temporary directories - permission denied

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28659: Appveyor CI: error removing temporary directories - permission denied
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  appveyor ci 034-backport |  Actual Points:
  035-backport 040-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #28668 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29161 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expect some gmtime/localtime() failures on windows, don't log bugs from tests.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29161: Expect some gmtime/localtime() failures on windows, don't log bugs from
tests.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, postfreeze-ok,   |  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28668   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The patch in
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/650/commits/6144cf99adae5ffebbc549a4e0f3c6e05e51ad16
 looks good to me.

 Looks like asn marked the parent merge_ready too, so marking this one
 merge_ready as well even though it will get in with the parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29487 [Core Tor/Tor]: SOCKS5 handshake fail when client sending user/pass auth method

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29487: SOCKS5 handshake fail when client sending user/pass auth method
---+--
 Reporter:  access_denied  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by nickm):

 (also merged to maint-0.3.5)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27531: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by wert2):

 Sorry didn't see this earlier.  This still crashes for me using 8.0.6 on
 an up-to-date Fedora 29 workstation w/ Gnome 3.30.2.

 It will crash if I do Ctrl+P or File...Print. I can safely go to
 File...Print Preview, and the preview is generated fine, but if I click
 Page Setup or Print, it crashes.


 {{{
 $ .local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/firefox
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm, line 9: uncaught
 exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: jar:file:///home//.local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/omni.ja!/components/MainProcessSingleton.js,
 line 72: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: chrome://global/content/process-content.js, line 10:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: , line 0: uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: jar:file:///home//.local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/omni.ja!/components/addonManager.js, line 40:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/AddonManager.jsm, line 73:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/AddonManager.jsm, line 110:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/AddonManager.jsm, line 3724:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/AddonManager.jsm, line 876:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 JavaScript error: resource://gre/modules/AddonManager.jsm, line 876:
 uncaught exception: out of memory
 Feb 13 13:42:47.870 [notice] Tor 0.3.5.7 (git-9beb085c10562a25) running on
 Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2q, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma
 N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 Feb 13 13:42:47.870 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Feb 13 13:42:47.870 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/home//.local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults".
 Feb 13 13:42:47.870 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/home//.local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc".
 Feb 13 13:42:47.872 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 Feb 13 13:42:47.872 [notice] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 Feb 13 13:42:47.872 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151
 Feb 13 13:42:47.873 [notice] Opened Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151
 Feb 13 13:42:47.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file
 /home//.local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip.
 Feb 13 13:42:47.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /home//.local/share/torbrowser/tbb/x86_64/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip6.
 Feb 13 13:42:48.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Feb 13 13:42:48.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
 Feb 13 13:42:48.000 [notice] New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Feb 13 13:42:48.000 [notice] New control connection opened from 127.0.0.1.
 1550065368603   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 1550065368604   addons.webextension.https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 Feb 13 13:42:49.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server
 Feb 13 13:42:49.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 Feb 13 13:42:50.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 Feb 13 13:42:51.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 Feb 13 13:42:55.000 

Re: [tor-bugs] #28623 [Core Tor/Tor]: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28623: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Good idea to get this fixed. Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28868 [Core Tor/sbws]: best_priority() can starve the worker threads of good relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28868: best_priority() can starve the worker threads of good relays
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The code in PR328 looks reasonable to me. I added a minor comment to a
 boolean expression, but nothing blocking.

 I still feel that I don't know the codebase well enough to say if changes
 are net positive/negative for the overall codebase, but I trust juga to
 get those details right.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't parse networkstatus consensus time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28614: Can't parse networkstatus consensus time
-+-
 Reporter:  Vort |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-rc-must, regression, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, tbb-needs   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28405 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unable to parse networkstatus consensus (related to CR in time field)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28405: Unable to parse networkstatus consensus (related to CR in time field)
--+--
 Reporter:  nth   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #28614 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29067 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test_workqueue_*.sh issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29067: shellcheck: test_workqueue_*.sh issue
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27539 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create plan for releasing on F-Droid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27539: Create plan for releasing on F-Droid
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201902,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-8.5|
Parent ID:  #26318   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 Another nice feature of getting Tor Browser integrated into the F-Droid
 ecosystem is the "Update Channels" library for making an app be able to
 find/download/install it own updates.  One way it can operate is that TBA
 would check the Tor Project repo for updates.  This requires only a HTTP
 HEAD request, then comparing the ETag, so like < 1kb.  One mode of
 operation is starting to check for updates if it hasn't been updated in
 the past month.

 https://gitlab.com/fdroid/update-channels

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29488 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider renaming all bash scripts to have .bash extension (was: Consider renaming all bash scripts to .bash)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29488: Consider renaming all bash scripts to have .bash extension
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29487 [Core Tor/Tor]: SOCKS5 handshake fail when client sending user/pass auth method

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29487: SOCKS5 handshake fail when client sending user/pass auth method
---+--
 Reporter:  access_denied  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 #29175 - fixed and merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29061 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test_bt.sh issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29061: shellcheck: test_bt.sh issue
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixing this differently in:

 * https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/700

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29489 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Set up automated local testing environment for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29489: Set up automated local testing environment for Snowflake
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 I'm starting with this example of networked docker containers used for
 testing decoy routing systems as inspiration: https://gitlab.com/slitheen
 /test-env

 We probably don't need the virtual ethernet to network docker containers
 together at the "link layer" since snowflake uses application-layer
 communication.

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[tor-bugs] #29489 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Set up automated local testing environment for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29489: Set up automated local testing environment for Snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19  |
---+--
 The goal is to set up a locally networked testing environment for
 Snowflake that can be easily and automatically set up and run. This will
 include the easy installation and configuration of dependencies.

 Hopefully this environment will be able to reproduce bugs that have
 occurred in the deployed system (such as #25688) that have so far not been
 reproducible locally. That will be one of the benchmarks for this ticket
 to see whether or not the local environment is close enough to a deployed
 one.

 The current idea is to use networked docker containers.

 Perhaps farther in the future, it might be interesting to see if we can do
 some kind of continuous integration with gitlab:
 https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/ci/#gitlab-cicd-for-docker.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29471 [Webpages/Website]: text cleanup on new contact page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29471: text cleanup on new contact page
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by steph):

 - edit: "Discuss Tor-related coding and protocols. Ideas are welcome."

 - "Get Involved" - link to
 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer

 - link "Get Support" & "Support Portal" to https://support.torproject.org

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26698: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto tor-dirauth tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #27047   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 I squashed it in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/699.

 I also had to rebase it, because i created the branch when appveyor was
 failing with openssl (see comment
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/497#discussion_r248581721).
 I tried to rebase it to the commit in which i think the openssl was fixed,
 but then travis was failing cause not being able to write cargo.lock, so i
 just rebased to current master where CI doesn't fail.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29485 [Core Tor/Tor]: guidelines for POSIX sh vs bash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29485: guidelines for POSIX sh vs bash
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-tests, portability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * cc: rl1987 (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29273 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Document BridgeDB infrastructure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29273: Document BridgeDB infrastructure
+---
 Reporter:  ahf |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29062 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test_keygen.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29062: shellcheck: test_keygen.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM! Thanks rl1987!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29060 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29060: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29060 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29060: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by rl1987):

 Replying to [comment:6 ahf]:
 > I think these patches looks good with 2 things that we need to figure
 out. I just asked these questions on IRC as well.
 >
 > 1. bash isn't always located in `/bin/bash` so it might be smarter if we
 use `/usr/bin/env bash` for the shebang line. On FreeBSD things installed
 from ports go to `/usr/local/` as prefix.

 Did so in 4f9061868b04724bf3eaecddf9b536c189bd34da.

 > 2. Should we use `.bash` instead of `.sh` for bash scripts? I think yes,
 but I'm not sure what everyone else thinks here.
 >
 > The second question is a bit more open. Let's fix the first one now and
 then we can figure out if we should do question 2 as well later :-)

 Opened #29488 for this.

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[tor-bugs] #29488 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider renaming all bash scripts to .bash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29488: Consider renaming all bash scripts to .bash
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29298: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad 041-proposed network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Also related to #29122 which revealed the underlying issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27908 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27908: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #22898   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115 =>
 privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115, network-
 team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * points:  5 => 3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29260 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Should Snowflake proxies have a way to identify themselves to the broker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29260: Should Snowflake proxies have a way to identify themselves to the broker
+--
 Reporter:  ahf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake   |Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * points:   => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29122: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 OK, while this is not the same bug as the original bug of this ticket,
 let's use the same ticket for it (the original bug was in
 `circuitpadding_wronghop`, the teor one is in `circuitsetup_machine`).

 So, I discussed this with mikeperry in brussels and we figured out what's
 the issue. The issue is that `circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine` uses a
 2-bin histogram, and the fact that it only has 2-bins causes undefined
 behavior since the spec has conflicting rules about how 2-bin histograms
 work. In particular, the current spec causes UB for 1-bin 2-bin and 3-bin
 histograms, because of the way the bin edges are calculated automatically.

 The long-term fix here is to do #29298 which allows the histogram designer
 to specify the bin edges themselves, but we will do this in 041 since it's
 a non-trivial fix. The short-term fix here is probably to disable this
 unittest until the 041 fix comes in. Mike, do you agree?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29207 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, design, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  snowflake, design => snowflake, design, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29023 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29023: prop289: Implement a fast PRNG
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, tor-relay, 041-proposed-|  Actual Points:  3
  on-roadmap |
Parent ID:  #26871   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Done an initial review here. Most of the code looks great.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29298: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad 041-proposed network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad 041-proposed => wtf-pad 041-proposed network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711, prop289
 -assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap
 =>
 prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711, prop289
 -assigned-sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-team-
 roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * points:   => 21


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module communications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28226: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module
communications
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe => tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe,
 network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * points:   => 8
 * sponsor:  Sponsor31-can => Sponsor31-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29298: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28631| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+--
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:   => #28631


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake
+---
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19001 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor Browser with Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19001: Tor Browser with Snowflake
+---
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake   |Version:
 Severity:  Critical| Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29176 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job description to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29176: Please add job description to website
--+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29242 [Webpages/Website]: Please post job description to website (OONI Backend Developer)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29242: Please post job description to website (OONI Backend Developer)
--+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29468 [Webpages/Website]: Broken link: "Verify Tor Browser signature here"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29468: Broken link: "Verify Tor Browser signature here"
--+--
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks, we filled #29422 to work on it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29133 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29133: Refactor dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt tor-crypto tor-   |  Actual Points:
  dirauth tor-bwauth 041-proposed|
Parent ID:  #26698   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 i'm copying them here the notes about refactoring, since the PR comments
 are long.

 Commented in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/497#discussion_r249245814:

 {{{
 This function keeps on getting bigger. If we just add code, it will get
 harder and harder to change.

 Let's think about splitting up what this function has to do into separate
 functions:

 read a line from the file
 add the line to the hash
 process the line
 check the timestamp
 add it to the headers
 stop accepting timestamps
 check for a k=v header, the terminator, or a relay line
 add headers to the headers
 at the terminator or first relay line, stop accepting k=v
 headers
 add relay lines to the relays
 }}}

 Commented in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/497#discussion_r249244433:

 Remove line
 {{{
  /* Initialise line, so that we can't possibly run off the end. */
 }}}

 Commented in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/497#discussion_r249244629:

 {{{
 3. The comment about fgets is outdated: let's update it to say getdelim.

 4. the timestamp check is outdated, if it succeeds, getdelim always NUL-
 terminates its output

 We can delete the strlen() check, and move the newline check.
 }}}

 Commented in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/497#discussion_r249244743

 {{{
 If we delete case 3 above, we need to move the newline check here:

 -   line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
 +   if (line[strlen(line)-1] == '\n')
 + line[strlen(line)-1] = '\0';
 }}}

 Commented in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/497#discussion_r249244842:

 {{{
 This EOF check is redundant, getline tells you when the input is done by
 returning <= 0.

   while (!feof(fp)) {
 }}}

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