Re: [tor-bugs] #29540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Impossible to change the color of visited links in Tor Browser

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29540: Impossible to change the color of visited links in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  sajolida  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  UX|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 I thought Tor set layout.css.visited_links_enabled to false to avoid pixel
 stealing attacks; but it seems like I'm wrong, so I don't know offhand why
 this happens...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29538 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage fails on master

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29538: Coverage fails on master
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, external-failure,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 #29435 might also be related - we were looking for coverage files in the
 wrong locations.

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[tor-bugs] #29549 [Core Tor/Tor]: How can we close obsolete GitHub pull requests?

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29549: How can we close obsolete GitHub pull requests?
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-github
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Most of our GitHub pull requests are automatically closed when the commits
 in the pull request are merged.

 But if we don't merge the exact commits from a pull request, it sticks
 around.

 Here are some things we could do:
 * Ignore old pull requests
 * Close all pull requests older than N months
 * Work out some clever way to identify obsolete pull requests, and
 automatically close them

 We talked about this issue in Brussels:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsNetworkTeam/Notes/StableMaintainer#CurrentProcess

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I just opened #29547 and #29548 with related pre-push hook tasks. If
 they're handled by this ticket, please feel free to close them. Otherwise,
 let's handle them in separate pull requests?

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[tor-bugs] #29548 [Core Tor/Tor]: Block back-merges of later release branches to earlier releases

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29548: Block back-merges of later release branches to earlier releases
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In our release meeting in Brussels, we talked about blocking back-merges,
 where a merge is based on a later release branch, but it gets merged to an
 earlier branch:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsNetworkTeam/Notes/StableMaintainer#ActionItems

 Our merge workflow is typically:
 * base the bugfix branch on the maint branch for the earliest possible
 backport release
 * merge the bugfix branch to master (or alpha and master)
 * test for a while
 * merge the bugfix branch to an earlier release, then merge forward to
 master
 * merge maint-* into release-* for each release series

 So I'm not sure exactly how we can limit ourselves to just these merges.
 Here are some ideas:
 * Count the commits, and put a limit on the number of commits
 * Keep an ordered list of releases, and check that:
   * maint: merged branches are based on this maint release, or an earlier
 maint release
   * release: merged branches are based on the same maint release
 * Is there some neat trick that I'm missing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29145: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c
-+-
 Reporter:  kjak |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed 029-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport 035-backport |
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 (This branch was accidentally pushed to
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/
 See #29531 for the delete request, and #29532 for the permanent fix.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> See #29135 for motivation

New description:

 See #29531 for motivation

 Edit: correct ticket

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[tor-bugs] #29547 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable merging to unsupported branches on origin

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29547: Disable merging to unsupported branches on origin
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In our release meeting in Brussels, we talked about disabling merges to
 unsupported branches:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsNetworkTeam/Notes/StableMaintainer#ActionItems

 In particular, we should only allow merges to current release and maint
 branches, and master.

 Here is a list of current releases (prefixed with release- and maint-):
 * 0.2.9 (LTS)
 * 0.3.3 (expires 28 February 2019)
 * 0.3.4
 * 0.3.5 (LTS)
 * 0.4.0
 * 0.4.1 (in git, 0.4.1 is the master branch at the moment)

 We should also allow:
 * master

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases#Current

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29546 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add draft maintainer table to network team wiki

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29546: Add draft maintainer table to network team wiki
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  policy, doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 == Maintainers ==

 See our maintainer policy at ...

 Any maintainer can merge to any release.
 "primary" maintainers are the people who usually do the merges.

 || Releases || Timing   || nickm   || dgoulet || asn ||
 teor|| arma ||
 || current  || at least once per week   || primary || || ||
 ||  ||
 || old  || about once every 2 weeks || || || ||
 primary ||  ||

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[tor-bugs] #29546 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add draft maintainer table to network team wiki

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29546: Add draft maintainer table to network team wiki
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  policy, doc
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.3   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should add a list of maintainers to the network team wiki.

 We can work on drafts in this ticket.

 Based on the table at:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsNetworkTeam/Notes/StableMaintainer#Proposals

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 FYI, I ran these two tests in a loop for ~20 hours in wine64 on my laptop
 (using https://github.com/ahf/tor-win32/ to build) and was unable to
 reproduce. :/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29204 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29204: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, 041-proposed, network-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/719 - the simplest possible fix, to
 avoid OOM only.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, security-low,  |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The coveralls bot is back:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/709#issuecomment-465408842

 These unit tests increase the overall coverage by 0.2%.

 I looked at the uncovered lines: many of them are error cases or mocking.
 Some of them are from other pull requests.

 I decided not to unit test the new
 `router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo()` function: it requires too much
 state. (See #29521.)

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[tor-bugs] #29545 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for anarcat

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29545: Please create email alias/forwarding and LDAP for anarcat
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512



 Please create email alias and LDAP for our new sysadmin, as follows:

 Name: anarcat
 Desired uid: anarcat
 Forwarding address: anar...@orangeseeds.org
 PGP key: 8DC9 01CE 6414 6C04 8AD5  0FBB 7921 5252 7B75 921E

 Thank you!


 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAlxt+8IACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc5sxA//cyUXHkqgWOtztbKzzZT27Vv+QRUC+40FodhriTk/wl7ys0Vbt+Imd4/p
 Cm6OvpyGwI0rRuhoYLZG73WyWodbdeNlbRiB7LdKiWnjQcYX8gMCF2pltMlaZJTx
 cg+85RiFLp+ycGsm5MZS7QvcQPGtcF82tDe+NvLzUKMHwOKoBxdd/hJ/Fw+8OOar
 ezDNnyrl5i5NSUszkRNCR80BdH8hjWi/KmwWlqpVdVNw+OX1wulf8I24IqZzXdD9
 oihvaGY+qGEf6GHkZUHwtBtUNg+0jqHsj7HpQL53dthAr/ojXiMIHeXh2EA/rVi9
 6qF4qE2LnhCa4ufNQJbpe6G+n8RHlzseM9nqGPnz8EoQ2dCoz+K4mGg99bYMlMsW
 DbDNBovFd2awJ6QfufCo6Hxlz9Y32lK+mhQQQXsSG86HKkleYUGC8S7sZVThFRXT
 CDSFfEzmKAb/SC5RPSeLqFD3EArHbut3onCq1824wC1H8Pp7uikRX9BbUu1nksnx
 puLvIzLFvOWsOagmQ3vPxAeKpJtlf/7BtWeoZ67R3sRG9E/oO/9TNzBs2qOtmoWC
 ierHr72DBE7WQhk0a/VSHN+B51WNuZoQ965BcIIFmYNmN2YNZcZyscPYGeup94QF
 Q5O+ARbJU8ZWGGnuYHuisV1zaYoRY0VbNHEh8QRw+nhbs4KF9r4=
 =skRK
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, security-low,  |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fast-fix, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220 => fast-fix,
 security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 This task is on the 0.4.1 roadmap as part of Sponsor V.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29538 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage fails on master

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29538: Coverage fails on master
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, external-failure,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Some older pull requests were missing coveralls bot comments yesterday and
 the day before.
 Now they have comments:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/709#issuecomment-465408842

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29538 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage fails on master

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29538: Coverage fails on master
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, external-failure,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, regression?, external-failure?, 040-must =>
 tor-ci, tor-test, external-failure, 040-must
 * type:  defect => task
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29538 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage fails on master

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29538: Coverage fails on master
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, regression?,   |  Actual Points:
  external-failure?, 040-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > I opened two pull requests with dummy commits:
 > * master 1 week ago: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/715
 > * master now: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/716
 >
 > If both fail to get coverage, it's an external issue.

 Both tests did not have coverage comments from the coveralls bot on
 GitHub.

 Both tests ended successfully, with a message like this:
 {{{
 {u'url': u'https://coveralls.io/jobs/45358787', u'message': u'Job
 #3862.6'}
 Done. Your build exited with 0.
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/495786483#L7333
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/495787030#L7333

 Both tests have coverage reports with data on coveralls.io :
 https://coveralls.io/jobs/45358787
 https://coveralls.io/jobs/45359147
 (Yesterday's jobs had empty coverage reports.)

 It looks like the "job not found" errors were a coveralls.io issue:
 http://status.coveralls.io/incidents/wzpyvx3lrpzt

 coveralls.io currently has a job processing backlog:
 http://status.coveralls.io/incidents/g5h0ffcdrpn7

 Next steps:

 Monitor pull requests over the next few days, and make sure they get
 coveralls bot comments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29544 [Applications/Tor Browser]: couldn't load " xpcom".

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29544: couldn't load " xpcom".
--+--
 Reporter:  proserv   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #29544 [- Select a component]: couldn't load " xpcom".

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29544: couldn't load " xpcom".
-+--
 Reporter:  proserv  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 How do I overcome this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25140: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I agree but the tor_glob function was changed by a later commit.

 After developing get_glob_opened_files in commit
 111ec3ebd5c6cf4b46344f98a1b78b12dcabdf6a
 
(https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/489/commits/111ec3ebd5c6cf4b46344f98a1b78b12dcabdf6a),
 the Windows version of tor_glob ended up sharing much of the code with
 get_glob_opened_files (due to both needing to expand path components with
 globs manually). Because of that, all the common code has been split into
 smaller functions in commit c5883f356f92aca478450f0e09d6caac53ce2085
 
(https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/489/commits/c5883f356f92aca478450f0e09d6caac53ce2085).

 I think it might be easier to review this pull request code by looking at
 the diff for the whole pull request (the files changed tab in github).
 I've avoided squashing the first 4 commits because they were already
 reviewed in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/25140#comment:19 but I now
 wish I hadn't as the pull request would be easier to read if they had been
 squashed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 One other wishlist item I'd like from TOPL is support for using a
 ControlSocket and SocksSocket (Unix domain sockets) instead of TCP ports.
 In pariticular, this would be lovely on Android where there is a system
 library implementation. TOPL could ship its own impl for other *nix, too.

 One further (and crazier idea), is providing a Binder interface (somehow
 streaming over binder). But that'll require a little more thought.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Shane, nice patches. I reviewed them and have some comments. I guess some
 follow-up PRs on the repo can resolve most of them.

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR96
 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR117
 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR135
 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR158
 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR169

 These are all public methods, should we catch the case where config is
 null?

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-81e0435044baa197ee1db0ad93a5a940R185
 Same as above but for onionProxyContext

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-a5155bb08733d67f397556a9ada17249R110

 This methods assigns the resolved torrc to the instance variable, is this
 what we want? The comment doesn't say it overwrites the current value

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-187809677e9cf785e207eb5077425815R15
 Nit: Is this import necessary?

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/pull/45/commits/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-5c2594ca8e8f166cdf275dbd29be29e5R20
 Is this import needed?

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/2ba4a486c6849affbacb012d8d181e1d7b47527d
 #diff-81e0435044baa197ee1db0ad93a5a940R331
 Nit: Indentation

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/0ebdd33a287a5d7b10f40a0bea7bcec7d76d257f
 #diff-17352e51d9de729ccd4d10b27b8e2141R144
 Nit: Two spaces

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/44911f6b1f7791947652139ff8432090f3efe914
 #diff-9045687b92ef42f4b5a7c35b7479228aR1
 It would've been nice if each of these prototypes had a descriptive
 comment
 Is there a reason getListOfSupportedBridges() returns a String (instead of
 a List or Vector)?
 Socks5 should be the default SocksPort, should DefaultSettings reflect
 this?
 Should the *Port() accessors return an int instead of a string?
 Starting with "DisableNetwork 1" is usually safer

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/83436482fba7701c7ebd82ba34dbda15b216fad8
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR161
 H. We shouldn't use Google DNS as the default. (as some background,
 see https://medium.com/@nusenu/who-controls-tors-dns-traffic-
 a74a7632e8ca). Related to the comment below, I wonder if we actually need
 this at all.

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/83436482fba7701c7ebd82ba34dbda15b216fad8
 #diff-6701d53cd7d0cd826c18c5e8c5c7dbfeR201
 Nit: White space

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/83436482fba7701c7ebd82ba34dbda15b216fad8
 #diff-9aaca4263fb73e2f8615d49825b318f2R73
 Nit: This comment isn't necessarily correct because it's based on `input`,
 right?

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/83436482fba7701c7ebd82ba34dbda15b216fad8
 #diff-9aaca4263fb73e2f8615d49825b318f2R138
 `getListOfSupportedBridges()` may return null, yes?

 
https://github.com/thaliproject/Tor_Onion_Proxy_Library/commit/83436482fba7701c7ebd82ba34dbda15b216fad8
 #diff-9aaca4263fb73e2f8615d49825b318f2R201
 Maybe TorSettings.disableNetwork() should be renamed as
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #27609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27609: TBA: Evaluate Tor Onion Proxy Library
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 In general, I'd like to see the Android (and Java) ecosystem agree on a
 single Tor controller. I don't know if Briar want more functionality in
 the future than what TorPlugin currently provides. If we're going to put
 time/effort into TOPL, then we should be reasonably sure it won't be
 wasted.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25140: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 So hmmm... this commit is the one that worries me the most:

 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/489/commits/d8ef6c80c9774b2c4c9c3ee27aa5214083bc9e30

 Not only that `tor_glob()` function is kind of insane but also it seems
 most of it was copied from `tor_listdir`. I would really like us to avoid
 code duplication from that madness.

 That function should be simplified to have a `tor_listdir()` per platform
 instead of a mayhem of `#ifdef`. And then extract the common part that we
 can use within `tor_glob()` in smaller functions that lib/path/ can all
 use.

 Sorry to put that back in `needs_revision` but we just can't pile up
 technical debt like that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26698: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-crypto tor-dirauth tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #27047   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 All the child are closed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29476 [Webpages/Website]: Add RecommendedTBBVersions to the new website

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29476: Add RecommendedTBBVersions to the new website
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:1 hiro]:
 > Can you please check
 > https://lektor-
 staging.torproject.org/tpo/staging/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions
 ?
 > Is this going to work?
 > Cheers,
 > -hiro

 Yes, this looks good. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage and stays there til killed in task list

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29497: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage 
and
stays there til killed in task list
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > > we are wondering if we should try harder
 >
 >
 
https://github.com/lieser/dkim_verifier/commit/03a089621002e79eb54231a91f449ba61f69f642

 Thanks. We did try fixing the args earlier but it seems that is not
 enough: no messages were received by the circuit display code. We ran out
 of time for debugging so I thought it might be more productive to ping
 Igor and Arthur in case they have already been down this path.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29241 [Core Tor/Tor]: NSS SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial failing

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29241: NSS SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial failing
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-backport?,   |  Actual Points:
  040-must, spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:   => 2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27530: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, postfreeze-ok, 040-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28611| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:   => .2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  .5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:   => .5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Looking better; left another question.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29543 [Core Tor/Tor]: failed to bind to one of the listener ports??

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29543: failed to bind to one of the listener ports??
--+--
 Reporter:  drak  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Here's the problem:
 {{{
  2/20/19, 17:15:51.189 [WARN] Could not bind to 103.9.164.146:80: Cannot
 assign requested address [WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL ]
 }}}

 It looks like this isn't an address that your computer thinks it has, but
 it has been set as your SocksPort.  Generally, you should just have your
 socksport be something like "127.0.0.1:9050".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29542 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using weak_rng.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29542: Stop using weak_rng.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See my branch `no_weak_rng` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/718.  It is based on the branch
 from #29536.

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[tor-bugs] #29543 [- Select a component]: failed to bind to one of the listener ports??

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29543: failed to bind to one of the listener ports??
+--
 Reporter:  drak|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.186 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.188 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.188 [NOTICE] Switching to guard context "bridges" (was
 using "default")
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.189 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.189 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 103.9.164.146:80
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.189 [WARN] Could not bind to 103.9.164.146:80: Cannot
 assign requested address [WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL ]
 2/20/19, 17:15:51.189 [WARN] Controller gave us config lines that didn't
 validate: Failed to bind one of the listener ports.
 2/20/19, 17:15:57.741 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:15:57.742 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.806 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.807 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.807 [NOTICE] Switching to guard context "default" (was
 using "bridges")
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.807 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.808 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.808 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.809 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.809 [WARN] You specified a public address
 '103.9.164.146:80' for SocksPort. Other people on the Internet might find
 your computer and use it as an open proxy. Please don't allow this unless
 you have a good reason.
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.810 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 103.9.164.146:80
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.811 [WARN] Could not bind to 103.9.164.146:80: Cannot
 assign requested address [WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL ]
 2/20/19, 17:16:02.812 [WARN] Controller gave us config lines that didn't
 validate: Failed to bind one of the listener ports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29436 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add scripts to test unit test coverage determinism

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29436: Add scripts to test unit test coverage determinism
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in master. Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #29542 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using weak_rng.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29542: Stop using weak_rng.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:  .1|  Parent ID:
   Points:  .1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We have crypto_fast_rng now, we should be able to use it everywhere that
 we were relying on our goofy old prng.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage and stays there til killed in task list

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29497: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage 
and
stays there til killed in task list
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > we are wondering if we should try harder

 
https://github.com/lieser/dkim_verifier/commit/03a089621002e79eb54231a91f449ba61f69f642

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29068 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: zero_length_keys.sh issues

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29068: shellcheck: zero_length_keys.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in master. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29069 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: autogen.sh issues

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29069: shellcheck: autogen.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged into master. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29061 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test_bt.sh issue

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29061: shellcheck: test_bt.sh issue
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in master! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,|  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711, 040-roadmap-proposed |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 See comments on the PR. Don't hesitate to rebase on master here to use the
 new function as I pointed out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25110 [Core Tor/Tor]: Warn operators who set MyFamily that they must also set ContactInfo

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25110: Warn operators who set MyFamily that they must also set ContactInfo
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, intro, 025-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  029-backport-maybe, 033-backport-maybe,|
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  031-unreached-backport-maybe, 032-unreached-   |
  backport-maybe |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in master. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Call a correct connection_buf_add* function based on compress_state of dir_connection_t

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28816: Call a correct connection_buf_add* function based on compress_state of
dir_connection_t
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-dir, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21377   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28925 [Core Tor/Tor]: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28925: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-needs, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-pt, tbb-needs, 040-can =>
 s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-pt, tbb-needs, 040-must
 * priority:  Low => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29529 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/map_anon_nofork test fails on macOS

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29529: util/map_anon_nofork test fails on macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, regression,|  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 #29534 has been merged to disable this test. I've added #29541 in 0.4.1.x
 to make it pass and re-enable it.

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[tor-bugs] #29541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-enable util/mmap_anon_no_fork

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29541: Re-enable util/mmap_anon_no_fork
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  prop289, prop289-assigned-
 Severity:  Normal   |  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-
 |  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26288
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The test above was disabled with #29534 in 0.4.0.  We should re-enable it
 and make it pass everywhere.  I think I know what the problem is: I think
 it's a matter of some flags existing in the headers but not in the kernel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28925 [Core Tor/Tor]: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28925: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-needs, 040-can |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-pt, 040-can => s8-bootstrap,
 usability, ux, tor-pt, tbb-needs, 040-can


Comment:

 I added tbb-needs to this ticket (which I included on #29341 when I filed
 it).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-can |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  dgoulet => teor
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * cc: dgoulet (removed)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27530: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, postfreeze-ok, 040-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28611| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  assigned => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-can |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2019-001

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29168: Fix TROVE-2019-001
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, trove, regression, |  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29168, #28966, #29034

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #29168, #28966, #29034 by dgoulet:


Action: reassign

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29241 [Core Tor/Tor]: NSS SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial failing

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29241: NSS SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial failing
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-backport?,   |  Actual Points:
  040-must, spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2019-001

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29168: Fix TROVE-2019-001
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, trove, regression, |  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2019-001

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29168: Fix TROVE-2019-001
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, trove, regression, |  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2019-001

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29168: Fix TROVE-2019-001
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, trove, regression, |  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (the patch is on the network team security encrypted ML)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2019-001

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29168: Fix TROVE-2019-001
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, trove, regression, |  Actual Points:
  040-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-can |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-can |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs, 040-proposed, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28656, #28970, #28966

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #28656, #28970, #28966 by nickm:
priority to High

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28928, #28984, #29241, #29354

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #28928, #28984, #29241, #29354 by nickm:
priority to High

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16824, #25372, #28018, #28140, ...

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #16824, #25372, #28018, #28140, #28223, #28356, #11966, 
#17520, #17949, #18098, #20006, #24000, #24300, #24546, #24732, #25713, #25899, 
#26316, #26369, #26478, #26578, #26769, #27104, #27201, #27284, #27308, #27662, 
#27739, #27896, #27914, #27921, #28027, #28057, #28090, #28190, #28220, #28281, 
#28344, #28525, #28597, #28611, #28664, #28714, #28860, #28930, #28962, #29018, 
#29128, #29201, #29245, #29110 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

Comment:
Deferring 51 tickets from 0.4.0.x-final.  Tagging them with 
040-deferred-20190220 for visibility. These are the tickets that did not get 
040-must, 040-can, or tor-ci.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28377, #28378, #28437, #28438, ...

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #28377, #28378, #28437, #28438, #28439 by nickm:


Comment:
Adding tor-ci tag to some tickets that are ci-related

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26368, #26376, #27161, #27530, ...

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #26368, #26376, #27161, #27530, #28453, #28522, #28925, 
#29017, #29391 by dgoulet:
priority to Low

Comment:
Bug triage of 0.4.0 tickets. These are now in the "CAN" section. Lower priority 
than "040-must".

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28656, #28928, #28966, #28970, ...

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #28656, #28928, #28966, #28970, #28984, #29034, #29136, 
#29168, #29241, #29354, #29357, #29500, #29527, #29529, #29538 by nickm:


Comment:
Marking tickets as 040-must based on triage with dgoulet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage and stays there til killed in task list

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29497: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage 
and
stays there til killed in task list
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * cc: igt0, arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > `extensions.torbutton.display_circuit`
 > Bug stopped when it is set to false.

 Ah ha! Thanks for tracking that down.

 What happens when tor exits is that the code inside src/modules/tor-
 control-port.js enters a tight loop in which the `awaitNextChunk()`
 function within `io.pumpInputStream()` is called repeatedly. One possible
 fix would be to check for a zero return from
 `scriptableInputStream.available()` and shut down the circuit display
 monitor when that occurs (but I am not 100% sure that is a safe fix).
 Comments in Mozilla's code imply that the available() call should throw
 after the stream has closed, but apparently that is not true in all
 situations.

 Igor and/or Arthur, do you remember why the following change was made?
  Bug 26100: Use inputStream.asyncWait instead of nsIInputStreamPump
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/commit/?id=2764f9a0019b1eb8704e6748bfa46b9f58aaf74a

 Kathy and I were unable to get circuit display working after we switched
 back to nsIInputStreamPump, and we are wondering if we should try harder.
 We also are hoping that the reason for the above change may shed some
 light on this bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some address/get_if_addrs* tests fail when the network is unreachable

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29530: Some address/get_if_addrs* tests fail when the network is unreachable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-test, regression, tor-ci, fast-  |  Actual Points:
  fix|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It is merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29534 [Core Tor/Tor]: Regression: map_anon_nofork test is breaking jenkins on some platforms

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29534: Regression: map_anon_nofork test is breaking jenkins on some platforms
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It is merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29357 [Core Tor/Tor]: add an ActiveOnStartup config option

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29357: add an ActiveOnStartup config option
+
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs 040-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28363: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  040-proposed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28698 [Core Tor/Tor]: When circuit times are fixed, they can't be "relaxed"

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28698: When circuit times are fixed, they can't be "relaxed"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, log, intro, fast-fix,  |  Actual Points:
  035-backport?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, log, intro, fast-fix, 040-proposed, 035-backport? =>
 easy, log, intro, fast-fix, 035-backport?


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29476 [Webpages/Website]: Add RecommendedTBBVersions to the new website

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29476: Add RecommendedTBBVersions to the new website
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Can you please check
 https://lektor-
 staging.torproject.org/tpo/staging/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions
 ?
 Is this going to work?
 Cheers,
 -hiro

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename fascist_firewall_* functions to reachable_address_*

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18106: Rename fascist_firewall_* functions to reachable_address_*
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Trivial | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, minor, rename, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Branches like this should be based on master.

 As you do this, remember that this ticket is only about renaming stuff in
 the code -- user-facing options are separate.

 Best wishes!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hi! I left a couple of questions on the PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29101 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Configure the push hook from git.tpo to github for fallback-scripts

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29101: Configure the push hook from git.tpo to github for fallback-scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fallback, 035-can, postfreeze-ok  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27914| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This should push to GitHub on the next commit pushed to git.tpo. If it
 does not, please reopen with the output of the git push command.

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[tor-bugs] #29540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Impossible to change the color of visited links in Tor Browser

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29540: Impossible to change the color of visited links in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  sajolida  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  UX
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Changing the color of visited links (for example, from blue to purple) is
 a core feature of web navigation since it's origin. It helps users
 navigate websites by making it easier to understand where they have been
 already and where they can go.

 In 2011, it was qualified as top 3 mistake in web design by UX guru Jakob
 Nielsen:

 https://www.nngroup.com/articles/change-the-color-of-visited-links/

 https://www.nngroup.com/articles/top-10-mistakes-web-design/

 In Tor Browser 8.0.6, visited links don't change color. I tried this on
 several websites:

 - A Google search result page
 - https://debian.org/
 - https://tails.boum.org/

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[tor-bugs] #29539 [Core Tor/Stem]: version key should be in the second possition in the Bandwidth File

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29539: version key should be in the second possition in the Bandwidth File
---+
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-bwauth
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 According to the spec: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree
 /bandwidth-file-spec.txt?id=698d6301a409c8ebb2db389d06d2ee8f40d0fa3a#n152

 But i can create a Bandwidth File with version in other position:
 {{{
 >>> content = """1523911758
 ... earliest_bandwidth=2019-02-14T16:06:24
 ... version=1.2
 ... =
 ... bw=760 node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 nick=Test"""
 ... bwfile = BandwidthFile.from_str(content)
 ...
 ...
 >>> str(bwfile)
 '1523911758\nearliest_bandwidth=2019-02-14T16:06:24\nversion=1.2\n=\nbw=760
 node_id=$68A483E05A2ABDCA6DA5A3EF8DB5177638A27F80 nick=Test'
 >>>
 }}}

 When generating the string, the version should be in the second position.
 When parsing the string, i'm not sure if we should assume that is version
 1.0 and ignore all the other headers or because stem is able to parse it,
 ignore the error and accept it's version 1.2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29497 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage and stays there til killed in task list

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29497: After tor crash, firefox.exe (tor browser) shoots up to 50+% cpu usage 
and
stays there til killed in task list
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `extensions.torbutton.display_circuit`
 Bug stopped when it is set to false.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29351 [Core Tor/Stem]: BandwidthFile TypeError when initializing or accessing attributes

2019-02-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29351: BandwidthFile TypeError when initializing or accessing attributes
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 juga]:

 > Hmm, weird, doing the same, i get from `bwfile.measurements` an empty
 dictionary (all the attributes are empty or None except `_raw_contents`).
 > What i'm doing wrong this time?

 i don't know what i did, but checking second time works.
 So this can be closed, thanks for the explanations.

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