Re: [tor-bugs] #29585 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failures in dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29585: Intermittent test failures in dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 juga]:
 > > This means you've merged 065e7da8e6 on top of 69238ca2da?
 >
 > I did that and run the tests, no error.

 I only saw the error once. I don't know how often it happens.

 Replying to [comment:3 juga]:
 > Replying to [ticket:29585 teor]:
 > > {{{
 > > commit 5614960e94 (HEAD, tor-github/pr/723/merge)
 > > Merge: 69238ca2da 065e7da8e6
 > > }}}
 >
 > This means you've merged 065e7da8e6 on top of 69238ca2da?

 This is the merge HEAD of a GitHub pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/723

 GitHub automatically merged torproject:master and nmathewson:bug29541.

 > > Here is the test error:
 > > {{{
 > > dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths: [forking]
 > >   FAIL ../src/test/test_dir.c:1802: assert(0 OP_EQ
 dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths(fname, NULL, bw_file_headers, NULL)): 0
 vs -1
 > >   [dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths FAILED]
 > > }}}
 > >
 > > It looks like this test was last modified in #26698 in master.
 > >
 > > Is it an obvious fix?
 >
 > Not obvious to me, since they don't touch same files.

 Unstable tests can fail, even if there are no changes to any code run by
 that test.

 Is there an obvious error in dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths that caused
 the failure?
 Can we fix that error?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28897 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop running twice destination usability tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28897: Stop running twice destination usability tests
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Thanks, the fixups and squashed PR seem fine to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 The tickets are #29605 and #29606.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28044 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Integrate Tor Launcher into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28044: Integrate Tor Launcher into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, ux-team,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> We need to move away from our XPCOM extensions, Tor Launcher being one of
> them. As for Tor Browser it might be hard/impossible. if we tried to
> reimplement everything Tor Launcher does with the WebExtensions API.
> Instead we plan to integrate it tighter into the browser itself making
> use of it's capabilities.
>
> This ticket is the parent ticket for this plan.
>
> We need probably a proposal making sure we have the plan right before
> going to implement it.

New description:

 We need to move away from our XPCOM extensions, Tor Launcher being one of
 them. As for Tor Browser it might be hard/impossible, if we tried to
 reimplement everything Tor Launcher does with the WebExtensions API.
 Instead we plan to integrate it tighter into the browser itself making use
 of its capabilities.

 This ticket is the parent ticket for this plan.

 We need probably a proposal making sure we have the plan right before
 going to implement it.

--

Comment (by gk):

 Nice! Have you by chance tried testing the mechanism you are using for
 integrating Tor Launcher into the browser in, say, some recent-ish
 mozilla-central build? It might be worth it in order to figure out whether
 we could do more work already now in case there are unanticipated problems
 with our migration plan for esr68.

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[tor-bugs] #29606 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove tor 0.3.3 from the git-* scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29606: Remove tor 0.3.3 from the git-* scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On the 28th of February, Tor 0.3.3 will no longer be supported:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases

 We need to remove it from the git scripts.

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[tor-bugs] #29605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add branch expiry dates to the git-* scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29605: Add branch expiry dates to the git-* scripts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Let's add a (UTC) expiry date to each branch in the git-* merge scripts,
 based on the supported release schedule:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases

 Then we only have to add new branches as they are created. We can clear
 out old branches every so often.

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[tor-bugs] #29604 [Core Tor/Tor]: Always pull-all before merge-forward

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29604: Always pull-all before merge-forward
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should make git-merge-forward.sh always do a git-pull-all.sh.

 And we should make git-pull-all.sh fail if the pull is not a fast-forward
 merge.

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[tor-bugs] #29603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a script that sets up worktrees for the git-* merge scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29603: Make a script that sets up worktrees for the git-* merge scripts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We could make a script that sets up the worktrees for git-pull-all, git-
 merge-forward and git-push-all.

 For bonus points:
 * Once we have a standard directory structure, we can put a sensible
 default config in those scripts.
 * The script should clone tor, set up the remotes, and do a test git-pull-
 all.
 * Refactor some common configs and functions out of the scripts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29593 [Core Tor/Tor]: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29593: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test|  Actual Points:
  040-must 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Tor built and passed its test suite on a retry --
  https://buildd.debian.org/status/logs.php?pkg=tor&ver=0.3.5.8-1&arch=mips

 Not sure what to take from this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29601 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop the oldest Windows 32-bit build on Appveyor to speed up builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29601: Drop the oldest Windows 32-bit build on Appveyor to speed up builds
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my 0.3.5 pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/733

 I also set fast_finish, so that failing jobs fail the entire build
 immediately.

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[tor-bugs] #29602 [Core Tor/Tor]: Speed up builds using Appveyor's build cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29602: Speed up builds using Appveyor's build cache
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, tor-windows,
 Severity:  Normal   |  appveyor
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We can use up to 1 GB (compressed) build cache in Appveyor across all our
 jobs:
 https://www.appveyor.com/docs/build-cache/

 Is there something we could cache to speed up builds?
 It would have to be less than 200 MB compressed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20842 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20842: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:18 winterflaw]:
 > Okay, so, I have some odd results to report.
 >
 > First, I checked security settings.  They're set to standard.
 >
 > Next, I followed the link you provided to CSS tricks.
 >
 > I'm doing what it says *except* the font-face rule in my code was not
 first, before any style rules.  I moved it, uploaded the CSS file,
 reloaded the site (shift+click on the reload icon) in Tor Browser.  No
 change.
 >
 > I then wanted to check the site in Firefox from a HTTP server.  After
 all, HTTP is fairly different to local and I had only checked Firefox from
 local disk.
 >
 > I copied the site to a normal, non-onion site I have (temporarily
 replaced the site there - only two files) and viewed the site in Firefox
 ESR (Debian 9).
 >
 > The Linear B font loaded correctly.
 >
 > I then put the original site back in place, and did a recursive chmod,
 changing all ownerships on all files for all web-sites (including the
 onion site) to "www-data" (files I upload through the Debian UI SFTP end
 up being my username - which should work fine, global "r" permission).
 >
 > (Bear in mind that *prior* to this, the font loaded correctly in Firefox
 ESR over HTTP, which was using a cp -R copy of the onion site.)
 >
 > I then went back to Tor Browser (which was still running - I'd not quit
 it) and reloaded the site - and hey presto, the font is showing.
 >
 > So, I no longer have a problem, but I don't know why.

 Glad to hear it's working! That is indeed mysterious. But it sounds like
 maybe the file was not accessible for some reason? If you could reproduce
 the original problem, it might be interesting to see if you could directly
 download the font files with Tor Browser, or if you are getting some kind
 of HTTP error.

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[tor-bugs] #29601 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop the oldest Windows 32-bit build on Appveyor to speed up builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29601: Drop the oldest Windows 32-bit build on Appveyor to speed up builds
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, windows
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Our Appveyor builds are really slow. We can still get decent coverage if
 we drop the 32-bit Windows Server 2012 R2 build.

 The remaining builds will be:
 * 64-bit Windows Server 2016
 * 32-bit Windows Server 2016
 * 64-bit Windows Server 2012 R2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29599 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to missing sr_state_free[_all]() in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29599: Test failure due to missing sr_state_free[_all]() in shared-random unit
tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-leak,   |  Actual Points:
  external-change, 029-backport, 033-backport,   |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is one of the failed CIs with memory leak logs:
 https://travis-ci.org/tlyu/tor/jobs/499009440#L4956

 Here are the pull requests for review:

 0.2.9 pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/730

 0.3.3 pull request (function name change):
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/731

 I also did a merge to master to test that there aren't any memory leaks in
 other tests:

 master pull request: (CI only - no changes from 0.3.3)
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/732

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Make sure GeKo and the tbb-team see this proposal. Proposal 227 was
 created to eliminate single points of failure/coercion points in the Tor
 Browser build+update system.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29600 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser not opening

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29600: Tor Browser not opening
--+
 Reporter:  survivor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by survivor):

 2/27/19, 18:24:48.940 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.940 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.940 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.940 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.950 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.950 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.984 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 2/27/19, 18:24:48.985 [NOTICE] Our circuit 0 (id: 2) died due to an
 invalid selected path, purpose General-purpose client. This may be a torrc
 configuration issue, or a bug.
 2/27/19, 18:24:49.988 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 2/27/19, 18:24:50.990 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 2/27/19, 18:24:51.985 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 2/27/19, 18:24:52.984 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.
 2/27/19, 18:24:53.988 [WARN] Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path.
 Discarding this circuit.

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[tor-bugs] #29600 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser not opening

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29600: Tor Browser not opening
--+--
 Reporter:  survivor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Hi,

  My tor used to work fine but after reinstalling the windows 10 it stopped
 loading.

  Tor is not banned in my country as far as I know.

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[tor-bugs] #29599 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to missing sr_state_free[_all]() in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29599: Test failure due to missing sr_state_free[_all]() in shared-random unit
tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
  High   |
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-leak,
 Severity:  Major|  external-change, 029-backport, 033-backport,
 |  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 It looks like Travis recently upgraded to a clang with a (better)
 LeakSanitizer.

 The following tests have memory leaks:
 * shared-random/vote
 * shared-random/sr_compute_srv
 * shared-random/state_transition

 They are missing a call to sr_state_free() in 0.2.9 and later.
 But it's spelt sr_state_free_all() in 0.3.3 and later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29298: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad 041-proposed network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks great now!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:9 asn]:
 > Mike, wrt the `test_circuitpadding_tokens()` test, could it be another
 case where the test actually schedules legit padding because of a state
 transition or something and it might trigger or might not depending on how
 the timing of the test goes?  Like the one from #29122?

 Yes, that does seem likely for the tokens test. In fact, I think this
 should fix it, if we could reproduce:
 https://github.com/mikeperry-
 tor/tor/commit/b61cd3709be53dd0aee55111dc0c29b882c31cc6

 However, I have no idea why the rtt test is failing. It almost seems like
 a compiler bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29598 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please give Teor permissions to push to torspec.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29598: Please give Teor permissions to push to torspec.git
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 26 Feb 2019

 (As above, but signed)

 Hello!

 Please give Teor permission to push to the torspec git repository.

 In theory I have permissions to do this myself, but I think I should
 probably make a ticket and let real admins do this stuff.  Please
 let me know if that's wrong.

 cheers,
 - -Nick
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJcddITAAoJEGr+5tSekrYBWtMP/ibglSx/bMgMUD3yovtgoFle
 GhVUlIRKt+jJs6dwFw67fSytHQi6y0pQdZtGhDZyOGn6kvjLBDlKknE/MSTS2t1+
 LA8fXQCJP++o+ZuckEe7XXKrXRXaFA9iFW8i+9OVvPxbWi51fcF5EtDYMZIiVE19
 47qAF6QO57X9gef0u57CKrMgAVmQxKKMyMOgUpLZ8vKgfOzcF95wyyVW30mJ7Jp7
 hl7irYTHwtbYc19xsE0yQ1xQ2aZpNUxZBdUcN4kcBDcfd8lc6KjRCb5r+guqsGeN
 sfVchRnGTTYKul4H4Nay7yI0EY6tgJcMXPfjM+PhQWbcwWy7CD8FJleJ8ZQiZw5H
 RAjidv2yXswd23kSwXWD6cpTtZRiYNyWtnX+77azWSuqH6J7NEx5eRRCqANBCSEG
 Z9QyHSZhXTaLkfX/2CwUuUHrAu/1Yrh/yjGE5v2v52B0u5NLam1X2y1RdjaIdelM
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 9en8pM40kr9G8TDzxOysv2rnK6ThDSyF/6S9RBSc0q/C2Awm3xs8l2aVGH6mNX+a
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 8QMJ+YscMps/3s8AUPHf
 =NdLn
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23681 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Clients mark intro circs as timed-out within seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23681: prop224: Clients mark intro circs as timed-out within seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 031-unreached-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 This seems like a small, low-risk change to backport.
 It's been tested in 0.3.2 and later.

 dgoulet, let me know if you think we should backport it to 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29145: Fix a compiler warning on OpenBSD in test-memwipe.c
-+-
 Reporter:  kjak |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-proposed 029-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport 035-backport |
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This ticket has been in 0.4.0 and master for a week.
 It's small, low-risk, and it only affects OpenBSD.

 Backported to 0.2.9 and later.

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[tor-bugs] #29598 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please give Teor permissions to push to torspec.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29598: Please give Teor permissions to push to torspec.git
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hello!

 Please give Teor permission to push to the torspec git repository.

 In theory I have permissions to do this myself, but I think I should
 probably make a ticket and let real admins do this stuff.  Please
 let me know if that's wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722, and 1415723)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26780: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722,
and 1415723)
--+---
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information


Comment:

 We merged a fix to this ticket - we need to check if the coverity warnings
 went away.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:12 dgoulet]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > > Replying to [comment:10 asn]:
 > > > I guess we need to add 040 before merging right? David is this
 something you can do?
 > >
 > > We need to add 040 because it's now a separate branch.
 >
 > So this is the part that gets annoying, we need to update that script at
 every new and EOL version... If one day we can figure out a way to
 automate this part by somehow flagging a git branch (no idea how...) that
 it is EOL, then we could do that automatically and less error prone from
 any of us messing up because we forgot to update the scripts.

 We could add a (UTC) expiry date for each branch.

 I'll open tickets for expiry dates and removing 0.3.3 when I do my ticket-
 opening sprint later today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 > Yes, but lying in the sense that the date is wrong as in the bug report.
 The user opened an old Tor Browser, updated and was confused that the *old
 date* was still shown in the display suggesting that the rules from that
 date were used while the update brought a new HTTPS-Everywhere version
 with the new rules. I think the expected behavior would be: show the date
 of applied rulesets either those that got downloaded (as is the case now)
 OR those that we got by a new HTTPS Everywhere version (which is not
 happening right now). The request on start-up might not get through for
 whatever reason...

 To avoid the problem of old rulesets still applying even when a new
 extension version is released, the simplest thing to do is probably to
 just clear the out-of-band rulesets from storage upon first load of any
 new version.  This will ensure that the extension-bundled rulesets are
 used upon each extension upgrade.  How does this sound?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29483 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Use systemd init script for BridgeDB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29483: Use systemd init script for BridgeDB
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  sysrqb|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket29483_01`.

 Will require a bit more testing in production but we should be close to
 what we need at first. Ultimately, I would like us to drop `run-bridgedb`
 and `reload-bridgedb` in favor of this init script. But we aren't there
 yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by karsten):

 We can make a pad. I'll start one tomorrow and make edits there. My
 original idea was to put it on the Tor Metrics website once we're done. Or
 should it rather go elsewhere?

 Will work on the earlier comments tomorrow!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor unexpectedly exited. this may be do to a Tor Bug, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29555: Tor unexpectedly exited. this may be do to a Tor Bug, etc
--+---
 Reporter:  FMCfmc|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  exited|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 FMCfmc, please provide the following information:
 * Which version of Windows you are using, e.g., Windows 7 64-bit.
 * What version of Tor Browser you are trying to use and where you obtained
 it from.
 * Has Tor Browser ever worked in the past?
 * Are any tor.exe processes or firefox.exe processes running in the
 background on your system? If they are, please use Windows Task Manager to
 kill them and then try to start Tor Browser.
 * If you download a new copy of Tor Browser from
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/8.0.6/ and install it in a new
 folder, does it work?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29597 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Cleanup bridgedb-admin git repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29597: Cleanup bridgedb-admin git repository
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket29597_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29080 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge OrbotService and TOPL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29080: Merge OrbotService and TOPL
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902R  |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:14 sysrqb]:
 > Shane, can you expand on why this is better? https://github.com/sisbell
 /tor-android-service/issues/12

 In tor-browser-build, we will replace these jars/libs with the ones that
 are generated as part of the build. The developer who wants to use tor-
 android-service in their own project will have these libraries already
 provided in the libs folder. This keeps a consistent approach. I'm still
 exploring whether these dependent libraries should be treated as provided,
 meaning they won't be packaged in the resulting aar.

 Ideally, in the future, I'd like to get the TOPL artifacts officially
 deployed to a maven repo and pull these down as dependencies during a
 regular developer build. The tor-browser-build would pull down the
 dependencies as part of the build process as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29299 [Core Tor/sbws]: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29299: Include scanner country and Web server country in the bandwidth file 
header
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:12 juga]:
 > Squashed and rebased in https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/338
 Thanks! It mostly looks good. I don't have the ability to easily test
 this, so my review is based on reading the changes. I made some minor
 comments on the pull request.

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[tor-bugs] #29597 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Cleanup bridgedb-admin git repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29597: Cleanup bridgedb-admin git repository
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:  sysrqb
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 It is full of either out of date scripts or thing that aren't used.

 The branch will probably have many commits touching many things ;). Spring
 cleanup!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29596 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Cleanup bridgedb crontab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29596: Cleanup bridgedb crontab
--+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Within #29481.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29481 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Cleanup bridgedb.conf and bridgedb.crontab (was: Cleanup bridgedb.conf)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29481: Cleanup bridgedb.conf and bridgedb.crontab
-+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb, configuration  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--

Comment (by dgoulet):

 (Added the crontab file also just to be more efficient in review here.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29595 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please add dgoulet as a member of the bridgedb-admin git group (was: Please give dgoulet in the bridgedb-admin git group)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29595: Please add dgoulet as a member of the bridgedb-admin git group
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

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[tor-bugs] #29596 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Cleanup bridgedb crontab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29596: Cleanup bridgedb crontab
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:  sysrqb
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Overall cleanup to what the server is actually running.

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[tor-bugs] #29595 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please give dgoulet in the bridgedb-admin git group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29595: Please give dgoulet in the bridgedb-admin git group
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Hi!

 Please give dgoulet write access on the bridgedb-admin.git repo.

 Thanks!
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEmQpn3DVLpEMbqGYohK8DqE7aGAAFAlx1jPIACgkQhK8DqE7a
 GADiFRAAh6NXLC39KzBo0qG8W3co631IsgETamfkWY/sCdzjadtGkOjIzY/7mJLY
 vbvKye4ULBBeq1hriVywDxuHBaJVE+qQiytCYcQUnyItEeQrM68vNoD6/uDuHkp7
 I0BwQrdTrolsqCjI7H1oyEBbEBVWphHIZsi0e8XYSaA/AW3Bsu9NzpEfBzZVVpuC
 zLcvMwLG67MKf/kNC74JEpm3Gwkjj9aRccGchV9JAWYLJu2Ljqm8Y/8cg1HNpJx8
 YNyTCNwSYscaAaggM7UBciEB0sTIKaPhRyr6sgr6T3TBJP2u6oNZQIb82fykHjjR
 /JcSWlX8/hiTPmPCvVLgReQMmEgwrNDDujW+20it7Tj50OWAjuMuCH+I3lZ9ri4s
 1zg+hvJo7e4CRJkwh39ej6ckq9Xp91w6l5mvO1Slzdv+FQJq4CnjFJg2SUgmBeu1
 LM0DWN50JKVAOifLMEhptt7Lit3MFbw+fuE98D2Q0LALRre6Wz2HxmRV9pyAX5Ts
 9dC0KKVF43eaMa9DbNFdXBpmiYpmjdDXX9vTiAtiblsCXqDiwSLGqbFMjR6EsJet
 LCZh373umCr7xSfUBs06ScyVNZ/zc6XNCRYRJARFFDNixqQJBT0+TrKETy94VhQR
 nwhf+2Xl1qwKwnTdVhngME0oXhD7s8y5oNe6h01ZAUfedBQoa2E=
 =a8uV
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:6 legind]:
 > > Okay, so the item is meant to display the last date when those
 rulesets got *fetched*? Or is it meant to show the version of the
 currently *active* rulesets? My intuition (and that of the user who
 reported that bug) is the latter, because that's what I as a user care
 about. It seems to me then that the item should not "lie" to the user
 regardless whether the check on start-up is succeeding or not (it might in
 fact even fail outside of Tor Browser/unrelated to it for various
 reasons).
 >
 > Yes, it's the latter.  I don't quite understand your point about the
 extension lieing to the user.  If the rulesets have been downloaded and
 applied, it displays it.  If not, it will not display the ruleset line.

 Yes, but lying in the sense that the date is wrong as in the bug report.
 The user opened an old Tor Browser, updated and was confused that the *old
 date* was still shown in the display suggesting that the rules from that
 date were used while the update brought a new HTTPS-Everywhere version
 with the new rules. I think the expected behavior would be: show the date
 of applied rulesets either those that got downloaded (as is the case now)
 OR those that we got by a new HTTPS Everywhere version (which is not
 happening right now). The request on start-up might not get through for
 whatever reason...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29481 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Cleanup bridgedb.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29481: Cleanup bridgedb.conf
-+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb, configuration  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket29481_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29593 [Core Tor/Tor]: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29593: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test|  Actual Points:
  040-must 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 This failure has nothing to do with channelpadding. It's an assert due to
 crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string() returning an error code while
 parsing one of PREGEN_KEYS_2048[] from ./src/test/testing_rsakeys.c

 Possibly a MIPS-specific openssl-related issue? Should not be intermittent
 unless our key parsing is non-deterministic...

 If we ran the tests with log level info, then
 crypto_pk_read_from_string_generic() will output a logline telling us if
 the error is in PEM decoding or ASN.1 parsing. Not sure if that will be
 any more helpful, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by irl):

 git for a single text file probably isn't making things easier. We could
 make a pad though.

 It would be a good idea to work out what we will do with this document
 once we're done with it. Does it just go on the website?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29080 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge OrbotService and TOPL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29080: Merge OrbotService and TOPL
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902R  |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Shane, can you expand on why this is better? https://github.com/sisbell
 /tor-android-service/issues/12

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29482 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create bridgedb.git and bridgedb-admin.git repository for dgoulet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29482: Create bridgedb.git and bridgedb-admin.git repository for dgoulet
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:8 irl]:
 > Would you like to have another pass or should I make these changes and
 then attach a new revision?

 Hmm, wouldn't be easier for you both (or others) to use a git repository
 to edit this file?.
 Ignore the comment if it's just easier with an attachment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29594 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Remove OpenSSL.rand.bytes from code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29594: Remove OpenSSL.rand.bytes from code
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket29594_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29482 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create bridgedb.git and bridgedb-admin.git repository for dgoulet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29482: Create bridgedb.git and bridgedb-admin.git repository for dgoulet
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Bump. I have `bridgedb.git` but not the -admin.git ...

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[tor-bugs] #29594 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Remove OpenSSL.rand.bytes from code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29594: Remove OpenSSL.rand.bytes from code
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  bridgedb
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:  sysrqb
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 It is now deprecated in favor of `os.urandom()`:

 {{{
 OpenSSL.rand is deprecated - you should use os.urandom instead
 }}}

 This is needed if we want to upgrade the requirements.txt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29593 [Core Tor/Tor]: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29593: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test|  Actual Points:
  040-must 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test => channel-padding padding
 unit-test 040-must 035-backport


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[tor-bugs] #29593 [Core Tor/Tor]: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29593: channelpadding_timers test failed on tor-0.3.5.8
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core   |Version:
  Tor/Tor  |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  channel-padding padding unit-test
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 weasel reported the following test failure today:
 {{{
 channelpadding/channelpadding_timers: [forking] Feb 22 09:58:55.345 [err]
 tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug: ../src/test/testing_rsakeys.c:540:
 init_pregenerated_keys: Assertion r == 0 failed; aborting. (on Tor 0.3.5.8
 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.347 [err] Bug: Assertion r == 0 failed in
 init_pregenerated_keys at ../src/test/testing_rsakeys.c:540. Stack trace:
 (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.348 [err] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(log_backtrace_impl+0x84) [0x569abc28] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.348 [err] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(tor_assertion_failed_+0xc4) [0x569a67b8] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.348 [err] Bug:
 ./src/test/test(init_pregenerated_keys+0x198) [0x5678f770] (on Tor 0.3.5.8
 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.349 [err] Bug: ./src/test/test(testcase_run_one+0x284)
 [0x5678fb14] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.349 [err] Bug: ./src/test/test(tinytest_main+0x188)
 [0x56790490] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.349 [err] Bug: ./src/test/test(main+0x43c)
 [0x563dca5c] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.349 [err] Bug: /lib/mips-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x108) [0x76d422b8] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 Feb 22 09:58:55.350 [err] Bug: ./src/test/test(+0x5fbd4) [0x563dcbd4]
 (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 [Lost connection!]
   [channelpadding_timers FAILED]
 channeltls/create: [forking] OK
 }}}

 from
 
https://buildd.debian.org/status/fetch.php?pkg=tor&arch=mips&ver=0.3.5.8-1&stamp=1550830462&raw=0

 Apparently, if this is not dealt with, it'll mean 0.3.5.8 will not ship
 with the next Debian

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master!

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[tor-bugs] #29592 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve resistance to fingerprinting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29592: Improve resistance to fingerprinting
---+--
 Reporter:  feature-requester  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Per https://panopticlick.eff.org the system fonts and screen size/color
 depth are by far the biggest pieces of identifying information.

 If you could get the most common list of system fonts from the EFF and use
 that or a small rotating set of common ones, that would be one less thing
 that could be monitored.

 As a broader (optional) feature, perhaps a setting that let your browser
 window automatically resize by chunking to even numbers and 'standard'
 sizes instead of allowing things like 1037x824x24.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29347 [Obfuscation/meek]: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29347: Rewrite meek-http-helper as a WebExtension
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  webextension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:16 gk]:
 > Yes, those are good points. However, I'd like to understand what you
 think we should do for Tor Browser here. In particular, I was wondering
 whether to spend time on reviewing and testing your changes in a Tor
 Browser context *now*, with the aim to have all of that merged to the
 alpha series (so it will eventually be in stable at some point), given the
 current plan outlined in #29430.

 No, there's no time-sensitive need to do any reviewing now.

 Replaying to [comment:17 yawning]:
 > For my reference when should I have a new tag of utls and obfs4proxy by?

 Let's please keep other topics on their own tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 > Okay, so the item is meant to display the last date when those rulesets
 got *fetched*? Or is it meant to show the version of the currently
 *active* rulesets? My intuition (and that of the user who reported that
 bug) is the latter, because that's what I as a user care about. It seems
 to me then that the item should not "lie" to the user regardless whether
 the check on start-up is succeeding or not (it might in fact even fail
 outside of Tor Browser/unrelated to it for various reasons).

 Yes, it's the latter.  I don't quite understand your point about the
 extension lieing to the user.  If the rulesets have been downloaded and
 applied, it displays it.  If not, it will not display the ruleset line.



 > Extension update checks are not on the same schedule as ruleset update
 checks, so what happens if you update your extension (because there is a
 new version available) but you already had *newer* rulesets installed? Do
 those newer rulesets get overwritten by the ones shipped with the
 extension?

 Out-of-band downloaded rulesets, if present, will always take precedence
 over extension-bundled rulesets.  We also always make a ruleset release on
 the same day as an extension release, to minimize the cases where a user
 has an old out-of-band ruleset and a newer extension.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:10 boklm]:
 > This is fixed by adding an `export CGO_ENABLED=1`. It seems that cgo is
 enabled by default, except when cross-compiling, which is the case when we
 build for linux-i686 on linux-x86_64, so the build of `go-webrtc` was
 missing the cgo parts.
 >
 > I am not sure if we should add this `export CGO_ENABLED=1` to
 `var/setup` in `projects/go/config`, so that it applies to all go
 projects, or add it only in `projects/go-webrtc/config` and
 `projects/snowflake/config`.

 I think either way should work. It is probably sufficient to set
 `CGO_ENABLED=1` only in the projects that use Cgo, but I don't know any
 disadvantages to keeping to always set.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28481 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's startup time is getting slower on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28481: Tor's startup time is getting slower on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  akwizgran|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android startup performance  |  Actual Points:
  controller |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by akwizgran):

 0.4.0 is looking much better on Linux x64_64:

 ||= Tor version =||= Min =||= Max =||
 ||0.2.9.16||0.32||0.51||
 ||0.3.4.9||0.90||1.02||
 ||0.3.5.8||0.57||0.60||
 ||0.4.0.2-alpha||0.28||0.30||

 As before, the differences between versions disappear into the noise when
 cached-* files are deleted before each run:

 ||= Tor version =||= Min =||= Max =||
 ||0.2.9.16||0.051||0.13||
 ||0.3.4.9||0.11||0.31||
 ||0.3.5.8||0.014||0.041||
 ||0.4.0.2-alpha||0.013||0.067||

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: dcf (removed)


Comment:

 The build of snowflake was failing with the error:
 {{{
 ./rendezvous.go:77:43: undefined: webrtc.SessionDescription
 ./rendezvous.go:78:3: undefined: webrtc.SessionDescription
 ./rendezvous.go:119:16: undefined: webrtc.Configuration
 }}}

 This is fixed by adding an `export CGO_ENABLED=1`. It seems that cgo is
 enabled by default, except when cross-compiling, which is the case when we
 build for linux-i686 on linux-x86_64, so the build of `go-webrtc` was
 missing the cgo parts.

 I am not sure if we should add this `export CGO_ENABLED=1` to `var/setup`
 in `projects/go/config`, so that it applies to all go projects, or add it
 only in `projects/go-webrtc/config` and `projects/snowflake/config`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: dcf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29445 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is denying ESR policies.json. This should work because TB is ESR fork.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29445: Tor Browser is denying ESR policies.json. This should work because TB is
ESR fork.
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > mcs/brade: What had been the reason for not using `esr` as the update
 channel for the stable series, given that Tor Browser is based on that
 series?

 Kathy and I don't remember all of the details, but probably we knew we
 needed two update channels for our public releases and chose `release` and
 `alpha`. At this point (assuming we want to support the enterprise policy
 features), it might be easiest to patch the code mentioned in comment:1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29562 [Core Tor/Tor]: APPCRASH of tor.exe on Windows when PT bootstrap is cancelled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29562: APPCRASH of tor.exe on Windows when PT bootstrap is cancelled
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression 040-must crash  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID: | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * points:   => 0.3
 * actualpoints:   => 0.3


Comment:

 Looks like CI was happy with this.

 PR against maint-0.4.0 can be found at:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/728

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, security-low,  |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet- |
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I'm acking 709, but only once 683 is merged as a part of #29017.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29563 [Applications/Tor Browser]: css line-height revisted [at least zoom and linux]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29563: css line-height revisted [at least zoom and linux]
--+--
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:4 Thorin]:
 > Does anyone have any access to macOS and macOS X?

 On a macOS 10.13.16 system that has a "Retina" (@2x) display, the
 https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html#useragent
 page reports 19.2px for all zoom levels.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, security-low,  |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet- |
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:14 nickm]:
 > LGTM. This can go in after #29017 has been merged.

 Is this ACK for the PR 639 or 709. They are MASSIVELY different and the
 709 one is huge. I just want to make sure what was reviewed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor unexpectedly exited. this may be do to a Tor Bug, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29555: Tor unexpectedly exited. this may be do to a Tor Bug, etc
--+---
 Reporter:  FMCfmc|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  exited|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by FMCfmc):

 USING fIREFOX, Windows, Still cannot get Tor to open

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use openssl's SHA3 implementations when they are faster.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28837: Use openssl's SHA3 implementations when they are faster.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  android startup performance  |  Actual Points:
  controller 041-proposed dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:  #28481   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged into 041!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29017 [Core Tor/Tor]: PaddingStatistics should be disabled when ExtraInfoStatistics is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29017: PaddingStatistics should be disabled when ExtraInfoStatistics is 0
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  1.3
  034-backport, 033-backport, postfreeze-ok, |
  040-can, dgoulet-merge |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 040 and master. Moving this to 035 Milestone for backport
 decision.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29435 [Core Tor/Tor]: coverage script broken by library refactoring

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29435: coverage script broken by library refactoring
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  trivial testing coverage dgoulet-|  Actual Points:  0
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a post-merge hook that logs a message when the git hooks are updated in master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29588: Make a post-merge hook that logs a message when the git hooks are 
updated
in master
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts, 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * cc: rl1987 (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24366 [Core Tor/Tor]: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision resistance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24366: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision
resistance
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, possible-consensus- |  Actual Points:
  failure, needs-proposal, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28044 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Integrate Tor Launcher into tor-browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28044: Integrate Tor Launcher into tor-browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, ux-team,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  AffectsTails, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201902 => AffectsTails,
 ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201902R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 This work is now ready for review. There are 3 Tor Launcher commits which
 are available on the `bug28044-01` branch within the brade repo:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/log/?h=bug28044-01

 There is one tor-browser commit:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug28044-01&id=79f8ea9c98c69eb594e7d2aace9199b3bceb22cb

 And one tor-browser-build commit:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug28044-01&id=90a8ef3543cddebc2bfa946351c9eacc58641dd9

 We also need to update the proposal to account for feedback we received
 from Tails as well as a couple of other things we learned; we will do that
 soon. For localization, including all of the completed translations seems
 to work fine. Also, we ended up keeping the `pkg-prepare` target in the
 Tor Launcher Makefile because it may be useful for TorBirdy or other
 projects (that Makefile is no longer used by the tor-browser-build
 process).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I added that comment and pushed it to the PR (the one in Comment 15).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29583 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive onionbalance for v3s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29583: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive
onionbalance for v3s)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport 035-backport needs-proposal   |
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > If we do decide to fix this (and I think we should), I think we'll need
 a multistep process.  Something like this:

 This means basically that we end up being right now doing OnionBalance v3
 easily but then by 2022 when we start removing the cert from the
 descriptor, we won't be able anymore...

 In other words, fixing this probably means not doing the OnionBalance
 naively. h

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29345 [Community/Tor Support]: Can't install TOR as a service on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29345: Can't install TOR as a service on Windows 10
-+-
 Reporter:  JohnnyFrog   |  Owner:
 |  JohnnyFrog
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  service unformattable error torrc|  Actual Points:
  windows 10 win |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by JohnnyFrog):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29345 [Community/Tor Support]: Can't install TOR as a service on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29345: Can't install TOR as a service on Windows 10
-+-
 Reporter:  JohnnyFrog   |  Owner:
 |  JohnnyFrog
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  service unformattable error torrc|  Actual Points:
  windows 10 win |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by JohnnyFrog):

 I managed to solve this "bug".
 Actually it's not really a bug, but it is just a question of permissions.

 To solve this problem you have to assign to the Tor folder the Full
 Control to Users group in Windows 10.

 In fact, if you extract tor files in a Tor folder located in C:\ you
 probably won't have this problem of permissions (it depends on how are the
 permissions set on your computer), but if you extract these files in a tor
 folder located in C:\Windows you'll probably get this problem and you will
 need to apply the permissions to Users group.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/729

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 still lgtm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This looks plausible to me.  I'd like to see one more commit here, though,
 documenting the new behavior of `for_listening` in the documentation
 comments.  I'd like it to explain when you should use IP_LISTEN_EXTERNAL
 and when (if ever?) you should use IP_LISTEN_INTERNAL.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 With changes file and 040 and rebased on latest master:
 `ticket29391_041_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Currently there is a compilation failure on AppVeyor:

 {{{
  from ../src/core/or/or.h:32,
  from ../src/core/or/sendme.c:12:
 ../src/core/or/sendme.c: In function
 'sendme_connection_edge_consider_sending':
 ../src/core/or/sendme.c:326:27: error: format '%lu' expects argument of
 type 'long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'size_t {aka unsigned
 int}' [-Werror=format=]
  log_debug(log_domain, "Outbuf %lu, queuing stream SENDME.",
^
 ../src/lib/log/log.h:243:48: note: in definition of macro 'log_debug'
log_fn_(LOG_DEBUG, domain, __FUNCTION__, args, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
 ^~~~
 }}}

 Looks like the test failures on Travis isn't related to this code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29583 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive onionbalance for v3s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29583: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive
onionbalance for v3s)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance  |  Actual Points:
  040-backport 035-backport needs-proposal   |
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance => tor-hs scaling onionbalance
 040-backport 035-backport needs-proposal
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29583 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive onionbalance for v3s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29583: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive
onionbalance for v3s)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 If we do decide to fix this (and I think we should), I think we'll need a
 multistep process.  Something like this:

 1. Begin including the correct versions of these certificates.  Continue
 including the current (incorrect) versions so as not to break existing
 clients, but mark them with an extension to indicate that you should only
 accept them when the correct certificates are present too.
 2. Check the new (correct certificates) when they are present.
 3. Stop including the old (incorrect) certificates.

 For step 1 and step 2, we'll probably want to use a consensus-triggered
 feature to avoid fingerprinting.  We can't do step 3 until 2022, when
 support for 0.3.5.x ends, unless we decide to backport this or something,
 which would be ... questionable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:13 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 dgoulet]:
 > >
 > > ...
 > >
 > > So a piece missing is the integration with protover. I'm not entirely
 sure how to proceed code wise because what I've tried with `SendMe=1` and
 it was not working. Basically, what I need is a confirmation that what is
 proposed makes sense and is doable that way. If so, I'll push the commit
 that implements this and will ask nickm to hunt down why it is failing.
 >
 > SENDMEs are part of circuits and streams, so we could increment the
 Relay protocol version:

 H the only reason I created a `SendMe` here is because it would have
 made `Relay` a bit messier... but I guess overall that is what we've
 designed Protover to support anyway:

 We already have a SENDME version (0) that all tor supports. And now we
 want to support v1. In order for protover to "stop" the use of v0, we then
 need to introduce two new versions to `Relay` which right now would be 3
 and 4.

 Then to remove the usage of v0, we would advertise `Relay=1-2,4` which
 should effectively exit() every client that does NOT support v1 that is
 `Relay=4`.

 Doable!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29562 [Core Tor/Tor]: APPCRASH of tor.exe on Windows when PT bootstrap is cancelled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29562: APPCRASH of tor.exe on Windows when PT bootstrap is cancelled
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression 040-must crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ahf):

 Let's see if CI likes: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/728

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29391: Put git branch-maintenance scripts into scripts directory
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-can asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 asn]:
 > > I guess we need to add 040 before merging right? David is this
 something you can do?
 >
 > We need to add 040 because it's now a separate branch.

 So this is the part that gets annoying, we need to update that script at
 every new and EOL version... If one day we can figure out a way to
 automate this part by somehow flagging a git branch (no idea how...) that
 it is EOL, then we could do that automatically and less error prone from
 any of us messing up because we forgot to update the scripts.

 I'll do the changes in a jiffy for 040.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29585 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failures in dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29585: Intermittent test failures in dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:3 juga]:
 > This means you've merged 065e7da8e6 on top of 69238ca2da?

 I did that and run the tests, no error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29585 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failures in dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29585: Intermittent test failures in dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [ticket:29585 teor]:
 > {{{
 > commit 5614960e94 (HEAD, tor-github/pr/723/merge)
 > Merge: 69238ca2da 065e7da8e6
 > }}}

 This means you've merged 065e7da8e6 on top of 69238ca2da?

 > Here is the test error:
 > {{{
 > dir/dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths: [forking]
 >   FAIL ../src/test/test_dir.c:1802: assert(0 OP_EQ
 dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths(fname, NULL, bw_file_headers, NULL)): 0
 vs -1
 >   [dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths FAILED]
 > }}}
 >
 > It looks like this test was last modified in #26698 in master.
 >
 > Is it an obvious fix?

 Not obvious to me, since they don't touch same files.

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[tor-bugs] #29591 [Core Tor/sbws]: Add KeyValues to monitor relays that are not measured

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29591: Add KeyValues to monitor relays that are not measured
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/sbws   |   Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-
 Severity:  Normal   |  moved-20181128
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28547
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Since adding new KeyValues in every #28547 child will create many
 conflicts, add all of them at once.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, security-low,  |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet- |
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * keywords:  fast-fix, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount =>
 fast-fix, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet-
 merge


Comment:

 LGTM. This can go in after #29017 has been merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Mike, wrt the `test_circuitpadding_tokens()` test, could it be another
 case where the test actually schedules legit padding because of a state
 transition or something and it might trigger or might not depending on how
 the timing of the test goes?  Like the one from #29122?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 I ran the tests on 32-bit x86 Windows 10 for ~4.5h yesterday and didn't
 manage to hit this test failure. I let the same machine run over night
 with a 64-bit x86 build and also didn't see the test failure there.

 MinGW version:

 x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc: 6.3.0 20170516
 i686-w64-mingw32-gcc: 6.3.0 20170516

 PowerShell code to run the tests in a loop:

 {{{
 while ($true) { .\test.exe circuitpadding/... ; if ($LastExitCode -ne 0) {
 break; } }
 }}}

 Maybe we should move this to needs_information?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29425 [Metrics/Statistics]: Write integration tests for data-processing modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29425: Write integration tests for data-processing modules
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 {{{
 [java] Exception in thread "main" org.postgresql.util.PSQLException: The
 server requested password-based authentication, but no password was
 provided.
 }}}

 I'm going to need more detailed instructions on how the postgres server
 should be set up. Some of the modules run OK, others have null pointer
 exceptions or psqlexceptions as above.

 I'm running as root in a throwaway VM with a "root" postgres role created
 with login and superuser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29425 [Metrics/Statistics]: Write integration tests for data-processing modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29425: Write integration tests for data-processing modules
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 {{{
 -Dfile.encoding=UTF8
 }}}

 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/464874/unmappable-character-for-
 encoding-warning-in-java

 We really need to add this to our ant scripts. Running the test in a
 throwaway env and I had forgotten that I've set this now in my .profile to
 get around a load of errors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Misleading error messages about bind_ipv4_only and bind_ipv6_only?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13221: Misleading error messages about bind_ipv4_only and bind_ipv6_only?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed, tor-client, easy,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  logging, message, usability, 029-backport- |
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 merged to 0.4.0 and forward; marking for possible backport

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Hi, George!

 I think that the function/file length thing I mentioned was just ad hoc
 one-liners, like `find src/ -name '*.[ch]' | xargs wc -l |sort -n` and
 like whatever I used for cyclomatic complexity in #6313.

 I think you should feel free to go with whatever fruit seems lowest-
 hanging here.  `complexity` seems like a good start for measurement, but I
 don't see immediately how to use it for enforcing rules.  What do you
 think there?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * Attachment "tor_complexity.log" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--

Comment (by asn):

 OK I'm getting started with this ticket:

 Nick what do you mean that some of these measures already have code for
 them? We have code  in Tor to count function and file length? I could not
 find that in `scripts/` but we do have the `#include` checking script.

 On this note, and since we are chasing for low-hanging fruit here, I
 played a bit with static analysis tools today. The thing that worked out
 best because it's open source and does some of the things that we want it
 do is GNU complexity (...): https://www.gnu.org/software/complexity/

 Based on the best practices list of #29219, complexity can calculate: file
 length, function length, nesting level count, and function-per-file count.
 As far as I know we don't have any of these right now so being able to do
 these would be an improvement. Also it's a GNU tool so it's FOSS and
 something we can use as an optional parts of our scripts toolkit.

 As an example here is complexity's output for `hs_intropoint.c`:
 {{{
 $ complexity --histogram --score --thresh=1 ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c
 NOTE: proc kist_scheduler_run in file ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c line
 544
 nesting depth reached level 5
 Complexity Scores
 Score | ln-ct | nc-lns| file-name(line): proc-name
 1   2   2   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(140):
 free_all_socket_info
 1   4   2   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(420): MOCK_IMPL
 1   4   2   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(473):
 kist_scheduler_on_new_options
 1   3   3   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(109):
 each_channel_write_to_kernel
 1   4   4   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(147):
 socket_table_search
 1   4   4   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(773):
 scheduler_kist_set_lite_mode
 1   4   4   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(783):
 scheduler_kist_set_full_mode
 1   5   5   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(118):
 free_outbuf_info_by_ent
 1   5   5   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(129):
 free_socket_info_by_ent
 1   5   5   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(430): MOCK_IMPL
 1   5   5   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(441): have_work
 1   8   5   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(95):
 channel_outbuf_length
 1   7   7   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(333):
 outbuf_table_remove
 1   7   7   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(346):
 set_scheduler_run_interval
 1   8   8   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(157):
 free_socket_info_by_chan
 1  10   8   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(396):
 update_socket_written
 1  12   8   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(794):
 scheduler_can_use_kist
 1  10   9   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(483):
 kist_scheduler_init
 1  14   9   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(359):
 socket_can_write
 1  10  10   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(301):
 init_socket_info
 1  10  10   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(318):
 outbuf_table_add
 1  11  11   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(379):
 update_socket_info
 1  16  11   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(751):
 kist_scheduler_run_interval
 2  31  20   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(507):
 kist_scheduler_schedule
 5 120  54   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(172): MOCK_IMPL
17 168  89   ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c(544):
 kist_scheduler_run

 Complexity Histogram
 Score-Range  Lin-Ct
 0-9 218
 
10-19 89 

 Scored procedure ct:   26
 Non-comment line ct:  307
 Average line score: 6
 25%-ile score:  1 (75% in higher score procs)
 50%-ile score:  2 (half in higher score procs)
 75%-ile score: 17 (25% in higher score procs)
 Highest score: 17 (kist_scheduler_run() in
 ./src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c)
 }}}

 In the CLI I set the  score threshold to 1 so that it ignores truly
 trivial functions, but that can be set to 0 if wanted.

 You can see the following:
 - It tells us that there is a function with a bad nesting dept

Re: [tor-bugs] #29315 [Metrics/Website]: Write down guidelines for adding new stats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29315: Write down guidelines for adding new stats
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This is a good start and gets all the right questions asked but I think we
 can be a bit clearer about what we think the answers to those questions
 should look like. For example, we don't want to add YAML/TOML/HCL parser
 libraries if we can avoid it.


 


 > What belongs into the data format for the data to be archived?

 * The name of software that produced the result.
 * The version of the software that produced the result.
 * If performing active measurement, the network location of the vantage
 point (e.g. IP address, ASN, and/or country).
 * If performing passive measurement, an identifier for the object of the
 observations (may be implicit if the same as the source identifier).


 

 I think we should be clearer about what exactly it is that we can do. We
 can archive data without doing anything else with it and our bar for that
 should be a lot lower than committing to analyzing and visualizing the
 data on an ongoing basis.

 > What data belongs on Tor Metrics?

 This I think should be changed to two sections "What data belongs in
 CollecTor?" and "What visualizations belong on the Tor Metrics Portal?".

 While we've decided not to do the OONI visualization for now, it would
 belong there even though that data is external.

 

 Would you like to have another pass or should I make these changes and
 then attach a new revision?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29576 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser won't start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29576: Tor Browser won't start
--+---
 Reporter:  thelamper |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by thelamper):

 Windows Defender is turned on on my computer. And I also have McAfee too.
 But I have had both of these anti-virus/firewall software installed on my
 computer for ages, and they never caused any negative interaction with the
 Tor Browser.

 I will try downloading a fresh copy and installing it in a different
 location, as you suggest. thanks.

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