Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Just from a quick glance at the screenshots. Are those from a fresh Tor
 Browser? I am asking because one of the ideas related to this ticket was
 to reorganize the toolbar while we are at it, see:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser-spec.git/tree/proposals/101
 -security-controls-redesign.txt section 2.1. At the end we would omit the
 HTTPS-E and NoScript icon and the Torbutton one would be at the right side
 next to the URL bar. Back then when I worked on this ticket I looked at
 that a bit and it was not obvious at least how to prevent WebExtensions
 from showing their icons by default on the toolbar. But maybe I just did
 not look deep enough...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812, TorBrowserTeam201902R => ux-team,
 GeorgKoppen201812, TorBrowserTeam201903R
 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27478: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme
-+-
 Reporter:  nsuchy   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201903|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201809R
 => ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201903
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201903


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 boklm]:
 > There are two patches for review in branch `bug_26323_v7`:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26323_v7&id=676f75ecb97484368b340ee5d355aa422c2b0a7c

 `tor` compilation for nightly builds breaks in this case with
 {{{
 configure: error: TOR_RUST_TARGET must be specified when cross-compiling
 with Rust enabled.
 }}}

 > I think a possible improvement we can do after this, is to share the gcc
 and rust builds between linux32 and linux64.

 Hm, what is missing here? In particular, I wonder what the issue with GCC
 is as the build script at least should be the same (modulo the different
 hash in the bundle name that stems from somewhere else).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201903R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Opened https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532486 and provided
 edited patch without the tor-browser specific pref.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available : Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28656: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available 
:
Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-rc-blocker?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:9 teor]:
 > (Note that !(f_exit > 0.0) is the same as (f_exit == 0.0), because
 f_exit can never be negative.)

 Ah, but some compilers warn on float ==.
 I pushed a fixup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available : Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28656: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available 
:
Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-rc-blocker?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:
 regression, 035-rc-blocker?, 034-backport, 035-backport, postfreeze-
 ok, 040-must
 => regression, 035-rc-blocker?, 035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must
 * points:   => 0.1
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha => Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 There is another set of logs in #29858.

 This bug was introduced in #27237 in 0.3.5.1-alpha, due to an unexpected
 interaction with #27236 in 0.3.4.7-rc. See the comments in the pull
 request for details.

 We can fix it by removing the BUG() warning:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/758

 (Note that !(f_exit > 0.0) is the same as (f_exit == 0.0), because f_exit
 can never be negative.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 035-backport, 034-backport,  |
  029-backport, security-low |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm, teor  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:11 nickm]:
 > In other words, these addresses are not useful enough to call them
 public, but not safe enough to call them private.
 Could you forget the times when private was related to safe?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29659 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: WARNING torsocks[6254]: [syscall] Unsupported syscall number 39. Denying the call (in tsocks_syscall() at syscall.c:605)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29659: WARNING torsocks[6254]: [syscall] Unsupported syscall number 39. Denying
the call (in tsocks_syscall() at syscall.c:605)
---+-
 Reporter:  tu8367 |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8 =>
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Torsocks


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed in compute_frac_paths_available at ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29658: Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed in 
compute_frac_paths_available
at ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457
--+--
 Reporter:  torcrash  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28656| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * parent:   => #28656


Comment:

 Thanks for reporting this bug!

 We already have a ticket at #28656, so I'm going to close this one as a
 duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by jlongworth):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Who cares? You? Pathetic.

 Close.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by jlongworth):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 No.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 035-backport, 034-backport,  |
  029-backport, security-low |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm, teor  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * cc: teor (removed)
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
 * keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220 =>
 ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, 040-backport, 035-backport, 034-backport,
 029-backport, security-low
 * reviewer:  nickm => nickm, teor
 * type:  enhancement => defect


Comment:

 It seems ok to me.

 It's a bit weird that we don't list 0.0.0.0 in the list of internal
 addresses. But no sensible OS will try to connect to it anyway, so that
 doesn't really matter. (And if we want to fix 0.0.0.0, we should do it in
 another ticket.)

 This patch mitigates some security issues created by RFC 6598 by:
 * blocking control ports on RFC 6598 addresses
 * warning when client ports and ExtORPorts are on RFC 6598 addresses
 (Despite our earlier comments, we don't currently block or warn on RFC
 6598 addresses.)

 So I'm marking it for possible backport.

 Here's what we should do before we merge:
 * update the changes file to describe these major, user-visible security
 changes
 * squash and cherry-pick to maint-0.2.9

 neel, are you ok making these changes?
 Just let us know if you can't, and someone will do it eventually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 We can always extract removed code from the git history.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24144 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms')

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24144: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit
forms')
--+-
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 (It also means that no-one else will review the ticket.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I added a better explanation to #29640 in response to your comments, and
 nickm's comments:
 {{{
  * Zero time differences can happen on some machines, even after a large
  * amount of time has elapsed. Our ratchet corrects non-monotonic times
 and
  * returns a zero time difference:
  *  - on Windows (due to an OS bug that yields non-monotonic times from
 the
  *monotonic time API),
  *  - on platforms where we emulate monotonic time using wall-clock time
  *(after wall clock time is set to an earlier time).
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29640 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve the monotonic time documentation in compat_time.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29640: Improve the monotonic time documentation in compat_time.c
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-time, 040-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > > * on Windows, where the time is not always monotonic, due to an OS bug
 > > * on platforms without specialised monotonic functions, during a wall
 clock time change
 >
 > FWIW, I think our code does some ratcheting to ensure that even if we're
 basing our code on non-monotonic timers, our outputs never move backwards.

 Yes, the code does some ratcheting to make sure that outputs never move
 backwards. But that's not the same as always moving forwards, because the
 result can be zero.

 I separated the ratchet and non-ratchet cases in a fixup, and explained
 them better.

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[tor-bugs] #29659 [Core Tor]: WARNING torsocks[6254]: [syscall] Unsupported syscall number 39. Denying the call (in tsocks_syscall() at syscall.c:605)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29659: WARNING torsocks[6254]: [syscall] Unsupported syscall number 39. Denying
the call (in tsocks_syscall() at syscall.c:605)
--+--
 Reporter:  tu8367|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Following the suggestion to make a ticket at
 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/46634215/torsocks-and-unsupported-
 syscalls, which is about a non related issue:

 The below warning is with torsocks 2.3.0:

 WARNING torsocks[6254]: [syscall] Unsupported syscall number 39. Denying
 the call (in tsocks_syscall() at syscall.c:605)

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[tor-bugs] #29658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed in compute_frac_paths_available at ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29658: Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed in 
compute_frac_paths_available
at ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457
--+--
 Reporter:  torcrash  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Tor was suddenly disconnected from Internet, so it wasn't able to connect
 to network for a few hours. Later I had stopped Tor daemon. Then, when I
 had recovered Internet connection and started Tor again, I got this:

 {{{
 11:50:46.000 [notice] Tor 0.3.5.8 opening new log file.
 11:50:46.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
 11:50:46.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
 11:50:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 11:50:54.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "restricted"
 11:50:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server
 11:50:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with directory
 server
 11:50:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 45%: Asking for relay descriptors
 11:50:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 70%: Loading relay descriptors
 11:50:55.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 76%: Loading relay descriptors
 11:50:56.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
 11:50:56.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
 11:50:57.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
 11:50:57.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
 11:51:07.000 [notice] The current consensus has no exit nodes. Tor can
 only build internal paths, such as paths to onion services.
 11:51:07.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457: compute_frac_paths_available:
 Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed in
 compute_frac_paths_available at ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457.
 Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x47)
 [0xd5ee5ab7] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xbe)
 [0xd5ee122e] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x120182) [0xd5e0b182] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(router_have_minimum_dir_info+0x14b) [0xd5e0d74b] (on Tor
 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(directory_info_has_arrived+0x39)
 [0xd5d570c9] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_dir_reached_eof+0xd8e) [0xd5dcf31e] (on Tor
 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(connection_handle_read+0x840)
 [0xd5d50e50] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x6bc41) [0xd5d56c41] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x7fc) [0x7f2d516873dc] (on Tor
 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xb1)
 [0xd5d58021] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x11f5)
 [0xd5d46055] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0xd5d4322a]
 (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0xd5d42d89] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5) [0x7f2d5000bb45] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 11:51:07.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x57dd9) [0xd5d42dd9] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457: compute_frac_paths_available:
 Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed. (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed in
 compute_frac_paths_available at ../src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2457.
 Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x47)
 [0xd5ee5ab7] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xbe)
 [0xd5ee122e] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x120182) [0xd5e0b182] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(count_loading_descriptors_progress+0x6c) [0xd5e0dc7c] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0xb1c2b) [0xd5d9cc2b] (on
 Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(circuit_receive_relay_cell+0x369) [0xd5d9d6e9] (on Tor
 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(command_process_cell+0x278)
 [0xd5d7e6b8] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [warn] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(channel_tls_handle_cell+0x273)
 [0xd5d633f3] (on Tor 0.3.5.8 )
 12:52:06.000 [wa

Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 mikeperry]:
 > ...
 > Might as well set needs_review. I suppose there could be an argument for
 handling the case where monotime_absolute_usec() might return 0 in the
 wild, but I don't think that is actually possible there (this code only
 runs on relays upon receiving valid onionskins for circuit extension..
 lots of time should have passed since monotime_init() at that point).

 It doesn't matter how much time has passed, the monotime_*diff_*()
 functions can still return zero. So all code that uses the
 monotime_*diff_*() functions needs to handle zero correctly.

 See #29640, in particular:
 {{{
 Zero deltas happen more often:
  *  - on Windows (due to an OS bug),
  *  - when using monotime_coarse, or on systems with low-resolution
 timers,
  *  - on platforms where we emulate monotonic time using wall-clock time,
 and
  *  - when using time units that are larger than nanoseconds (due to
  *truncation on division).
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27478: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme
-+-
 Reporter:  nsuchy   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201809R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  reopened => assigned
 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27478: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme
-+-
 Reporter:  nsuchy   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201809R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 The color isn't quite right here with custom themes. As part of my work
 for #25658 figured out how firefox propagates the theme color to icons. In
 the source svg we need to set the fill to 'context-fill' and opacity to
 'context-fill-opacity' and then the icon will get whatever colors are
 appropriate for the current theme.

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[tor-bugs] #29657 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change the 'Learn More' links in the securitylevel component to point to new documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29657: Change the 'Learn More' links in the securitylevel component to point to
new documentation
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25658
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 The Learn More links currently point to the Security Slider documentation,
 which is no longer useful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812, TorBrowserTeam201902 => ux-team,
 GeorgKoppen201812, TorBrowserTeam201902R


Comment:

 tor-browser patch for review! Implements the new Security Level toolbar
 button, hangar, and about:preferences options.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_25658_v3&id=a44cbb0565a532847d33552ac71bfa73a0902180

 screenshots:

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/screenshot01.png
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/screenshot02.png
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/screenshot03.png
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/25658/screenshot04.png

 Patch for torbutton hopefully later this week!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "screenshot04.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "screenshot02.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "screenshot03.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "screenshot01.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29631 [Core Tor/Tor]: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29631: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29635 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor man page screws up quotes when telling you to use quotes for command line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29635: tor man page screws up quotes when telling you to use quotes for command
line
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok, I changed the monotime mocking to start at 1000 usec rather than 1000
 nsec, on the wild guess that this is a precision issue on some platforms
 due to our mocking. That fix, plus the tokens test fix are at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/757

 Might as well set needs_review. I suppose there could be an argument for
 handling the case where monotime_absolute_usec() might return 0 in the
 wild, but I don't think that is actually possible there (this code only
 runs on relays upon receiving valid onionskins for circuit extension..
 lots of time should have passed since monotime_init() at that point).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29279 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Reach out to NGOs about obfs4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29279: Reach out to NGOs about obfs4
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  NGO, community |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 The current plan is to do the following:

 1) Set up several diverse, new, private obfs4 bridges for these tests

 2) Write a client-side script that will test for obfs4 reachability,
 making sure to measure bandwidth for throttling (#29297)

 3) Get set up on a VPS to perform these tests ourselves initially

 4) Contact users to run the scripts and send us collected data

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29297 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Write reachability tests to verify if obfs4 is working or not (was: Add any necessary metrics to verify if obfs4 is working or not)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29297: Write reachability tests to verify if obfs4 is working or not
---+---
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29279 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * type:  defect => task


Old description:

> Ensure that we have all necessary metrics to verify if obfs4 is working
> for users.
>
> TODO: Determine what these metrics should be, where they should be added,
> methods for aggregating them and analyzing them.

New description:

 The main goal of this is to determine whether obfs4 bridges are being
 blocked due to bridge IP enumeration, or if there is something blockable
 about the obfs4 protocol.

 These tests will use new, private (unpublished) obfs4 IP addresses that
 have not been used for censorship circumvention prior to these tests.

 The outcome should be a script that users we reach out to in censored can
 run from which we can collect metrics about their ability to connect and
 bandwidth measurements. Before we send out the script we should figure
 out:

 - Whether we have all necessary metrics on the bridge side to verify if
 obfs4 is working and whether it is being throttled

 - How we are going to collect the client-side measurement data

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 mikeperry]:
 > > However, I have no idea why the rtt test is failing. It almost seems
 like a compiler bug.
 >
 > It's an OS bug:
 >
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/lib/time/compat_time.c#n543
 > https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0418/#windows-
 queryperformancecounter
 >
 > Which tor works around by pretending that no time has elapsed:
 >
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/lib/time/compat_time.c#n175
 >
 > More generally, there is no guarantee that the monotonic clock will have
 increased by at least 1000 nanoseconds between monotime_init() and
 circpad_estimate_circ_rtt_on_received()'s call to
 monotime_absolute_usec(). A non-increasing value is more likely when the
 monotonic clock's resolution is in milliseconds: two calls can easily
 return the same value.
 >
 > But the circuitpadding code assumes that monotime_absolute_usec() is
 always greater than zero.

 But wait, how is this OS bug still happening even though I mocked monotime
 and monotime_coarse in test_circuitpad_rtt()? I set the mocked absolute
 time to be 1000 nsec, so
 monotime_absolute_usec() should be returning 1 in
 circpad_estimate_circ_rtt_on_received().

 Is the problem maybe that sometimes the nsec_per_tick_numer value is very
 high on some appveyor instances? Would using a larger initial mocked time
 than 1000 nsec solve the issue for this test?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:36 gk]:
 > FWIW: I built an .apk with the patches I used for testing on top of the
 #28802 patch to check for bridge support. I did not get it working so far
 (while bridges seem to work without the changes in this bug). I'll dig
 deeper while reviewing.

 Okay, `obfs4` has been failing as the bridge seems unreachable. Some
 `obfs3` bridges worked, though. Fun bugs I found while testing are (for
 each one start with a clean new installation:

 A)

 1) Select a built-in bridge
 2) Close Tor Browser
 3) Start again
 4) Click onto the gear icon
 5) Bridge usage is selected and it's said you are using a default bridge
 6) Tap on the "Change"-link -> bridge panel opens but now nothing is
 selected

 B)

 1) Select a built-in bridge by opening the gear icon and tapping on the
 switch
 UI and choosing e.g. obfs4
 2) Click again on the gear icon
 3) Tapping on the switch UI does *only* change the UI it seems but does
 not close
 the current UI nor opens the bridge selection one (while this happened in
 step 1) )
 4) However, tapping the region "around" the switch UI does disable bridge
 selection

 (Thus, the switch UI is behaving inconsistenly)

 C)

 1) Enable bridges
 2) Go back quickly so that available default bridge options are not shown
 yet
 3) repeat step 1) + 2)
 4) App crashes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I looked over the patch and it looks reasonable with respect to escaping
 and everything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29572: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 So, doing the `git checkout -q --detach` manually in the `tor` repo helps.
 Now, the question is how I could have landed in that buggy state...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds (was: Fetching latest commits fails with older git versions when building testbuilds)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29572: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, this happens with 2.11.0 as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24144 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms')

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24144: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit
forms')
--+-
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  needs_review => new
 * reviewer:  arma =>


Comment:

 (making me a reviewer on a ticket does not mean that i am any more likely
 to review the ticket. in fact, it can mean the opposite.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24144 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms')

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24144: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit
forms')
--+
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  arma  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 No, I don't think that by itself will work -- we don't want to make the
 cookies insecure (i.e. make the browser willing to send them to http
 sites), so just changing how the server handles it when it receives a
 cookie won't be enough.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29420 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Delete inactive users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29420: Delete inactive users
--+--
 Reporter:  ln5   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 seems like a fair way of cleaning things up

 (just testing if my recovered trac account actually works ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I still like the updater hardening idea but I can see how the parts that
 got implemented create overhead, especially if they have been unused for
 such a long time. Additionally, we won't have time to work on this this
 year anymore, I think, and given our likely (funding) prios for the next
 two years I doubt implementing the missing things will be done by then.
 Especially, as we still need to iron out the application part of prop 227
 (so, it's not just a matter of coding something).

 So, all in all and even though it pains me to say this: I think it's not
 unreasonable to remove those unused parts for now. If we want to get to
 that kind of hardening at some point we should take a fresh look at
 proposals that came up meanwhile (cosigning/CHAINIAC etc.) and make sure
 we get all the relevant bits implemented while working under Sponsor $foo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 teor, you okay with it now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29654 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Initial MVP for new exit scanner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29654: Initial MVP for new exit scanner
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29650   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 6


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit Display" / "See My Path"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27484: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit
Display" / "See My Path"
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201903 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: antonela (added)


Comment:

 The downside of the A option is that the most beneficial action in the 4th
 and following steps is not `[next]`, is probably experience the circuit
 display UI, review their security setting, learn more about browsing with
 Tor and visiting a .onion.

 If we are prioritizing the completion of onboarding flow, that is, users
 should arrive at the end of the onboarding, then the two buttons idea
 seems appropriate.

 Here, `[next]` acts as a Primary, and goes to the right side for RTL
 languages. And `[See My Path]` `[Review Settings]` `[See FAQs]` and
 `[Visit an .onion]` goes as a Default style.

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[tor-bugs] #29656 [Core Tor/Tor]: describe global initialization in our tinytest-based unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29656: describe global initialization in our tinytest-based unit tests
---+--
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  developer-doc
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 I was trying to figure out how global state initialization happens in our
 unit tests.  I eventually found that src/test/test_common.c is the
 location of the `main()` function for the tinytest-based test programs.
 We should document this better, probably in doc/HACKING/WritingTests.md.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Configure Firefox Project to Use New TOPL Dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29575: Configure Firefox Project to Use New TOPL Dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201902   |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 I just have one remaining issue involving use of transitive resources. I
 believe I have a solution. I'll test this out today and then update this
 ticket with the results.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27137 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: tbb-testsuite: fix the navigation-timing, performance-observer, resource-timing, user-timing tests (was: tbb-testsuite: fix the navi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27137: tbb-testsuite: fix the navigation-timing, performance-observer, 
resource-
timing, user-timing tests
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-testsuite, boklm201903,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:  #27105   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-testsuite, boklm201811, TorBrowserTeam201902 => tbb-
 testsuite, boklm201903, TorBrowserTeam201903


Comment:

 Adding the performance-observer, resource-timing, user-timing tests to
 this ticket, as they fail for a similar reason.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29420 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Delete inactive users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29420: Delete inactive users
--+--
 Reporter:  ln5   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 If we just delete all the users who haven't logged in in a year, we're
 going to have weird surprises, like somebody creating a new account under
 an old name and suddenly having control over "their" old tickets.

 So as a slight modification of the original idea: how about if the db
 query also checks if they have made a ticket and/or a comment, and skips
 over them if so? I bet that would still take care of most of the unused
 accounts.

 For extra credit, it might then be instructive to look at the accounts
 with only one ticket-or-comment to their credit -- I wonder how many of
 these are spammers that got through.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201902 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201903R


Comment:

 There are two patches for review in branch `bug_26323_v7`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26323_v7&id=676f75ecb97484368b340ee5d355aa422c2b0a7c

 I think a possible improvement we can do after this, is to share the gcc
 and rust builds between linux32 and linux64.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29655 [Metrics]: Tor Metrics / Users / Bridge users by country and transport / Source: China, fails to render graph lines clearly (was: Tor Metrics / Users / Bridge users by country an

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29655: Tor Metrics / Users / Bridge users by country and transport / Source:
China, fails to render graph lines clearly
-+--
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor-Metrics-graph issue  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-enable util/mmap_anon_no_fork

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29541: Re-enable util/mmap_anon_no_fork
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  prop289, prop289-assigned-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-merge  |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged. There was no changes file but that's because the bug was not
 released yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17357 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() ignores hs_service_requires_uptime_circ()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17357: rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() ignores
hs_service_requires_uptime_circ()
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, asn-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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[tor-bugs] #29655 [Metrics]: Tor Metrics / Users / Bridge users by country and transport / Source: China fails to render graph lines clearly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29655: Tor Metrics / Users / Bridge users by country and transport / Source: 
China
fails to render graph lines clearly
-+--
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Metrics
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Tor-Metrics-graph issue  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 — After selecting Source: China, Germany, and some other country names,
 the , meek, and obfs4 graph lines appear washed out, faint, and
 indistinct. This defect has persisted for approximately the past 2 weeks
 or longer.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2018-12-04&end=2019-03-04&country=cn

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29611 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Work around lack of app.update.enabled pref in Firefox 63+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29611: Work around lack of app.update.enabled pref in Firefox 63+
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek moat tbb-update, ff68-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 After we fix #29445, another approach would be to use an enterprise policy
 to disable updates. I haven't tried it, but I assume it works. See:
 https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/questions/1232918#answer-1176526

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17357 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() ignores hs_service_requires_uptime_circ()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17357: rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() ignores
hs_service_requires_uptime_circ()
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, asn-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs, asn-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm! Thanks neel yet again! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some address/get_if_addrs* tests fail when the network is unreachable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29530: Some address/get_if_addrs* tests fail when the network is unreachable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, regression, tor-ci, fast-  |  Actual Points:
  fix 035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Still good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29354: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-spec, postfreeze-|  Actual Points:
  ok, 040-must, spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 LGTM. Just a small nitpick on the PR and this can move to merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Pull request opened: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/60

 Discussion: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2019-February/013703.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25642 [Webpages/Website]: translation of torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25642: translation of torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24131| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: pili (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29531 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Remove accidentally pushed branch `bug29145_029` from tor.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29531: Remove accidentally pushed branch `bug29145_029` from tor.git
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done. Grepping our config for "tor" is not easy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29619 [Webpages/Blog]: Add comment policy to the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29619: Add comment policy to the blog
---+
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:14 asn]:

 > b) Need to add type-checking to the downcasting macros in prob_distr.c .
 Some of it was done in d82a8a7f9d268728b2447b2dbbaa346140784f9b but I'm
 not sure if this is good enough. Might need to think of the right API here
 to come up with the best plan. **Nick let me know if you have any ideas
 here, but please don't spend too much time, becaues I can probably figure
 it out too.**

 I think that it's best to use inline functions for this kind of thing, so
 that you can assert.  Something like this:
 {{{
 static inline dist_to_geometric(struct dist *obj)
 {
   tor_assert(obj->ops == &geometric_ops);
   return SUBTYPE_P(obj, struct geometric, base));
 }
 }}}
 You could use a macro to define a bunch of these, since they're all
 basically the same.

 > c) `<+nickm> Also there are all these generic dist_ops functions that
 you could use ... but the API seems to encourage you not to use them.
 having wrapper functions instead that call dist->dist_ops.func(dist, ...)
 would be neat`
 >
 >I'm not sure what this comment calls for. **Can you please tell me some
 more about it?** Riastradh seems to expand on this on comment:5 but I
 cannot quite get it.

 It looks like these functions already exist.  They are dist_name,
 dist_sample, dist_cdf, and so on.  They do need documentation, though.

 Once those functions are documented, we should just use them everywhere
 outside of prob_distr.c.  (I think we already do in most places?)  I think
 we should make the definition of `struct dist_ops hidden`, so that other
 modules don't use it.  We'd have to make the various `_dist_ops` extern
 constants only expose their pointers, but that's actually the only thing
 that the rest of the code uses.

 > d) `<+nickm> oh, one list thing: I think src/lib/math is not allowed to
 include lib/crypt_ops, since that would introduce a circularity. Better
 make sure that it doesn't`
 >
 >Is this circular dependency still a problem? i see that `src/lib/math/`
 includes `lib/crypt_ops` but I don't see the other way around.** Is this
 for future proofing this, or is there currently a problem?** Also, would
 we be OK with the suggestion that Riastradh gives in comment:5 where we
 split prob_distr.c into the computational part, and the sampling part
 which calls `crypto_rand()`?

 I was wrong; lib_math is allowed to include lib/crypt_ops; see
 lib/math/.may_include.  Current versions of check-includes will detect
 circularities, so you don't need to worry about this in the future.

 Based on that, I think that splitting the code into sampling and
 computation would be elegant, but I wouldn't call it a super high
 priority.

 For the randomness part, btw, it would be good to look into
 crypto_fast_rng() here.  It's up to 100 times faster for short outputs,
 and this code is likely to get called a lot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29631 [Core Tor/Tor]: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29631: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:  nickm => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29643 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29643: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport, fast-fix, tor- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  windows, memory-management, technical-debt |
Parent ID:  #29642   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:  ahf => cohosh


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29609 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create new repository for privacy docs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29609: Create new repository for privacy docs
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 {{{
 repo privacy-docs
 RW   = @webwml
 config hooks.email-enabled   = true
 config hooks.mailinglist = tor-
 comm...@lists.torproject.org
 config hooks.githuburl   = torproject/privacy-docs
 privacy-docs "The Tor Project" = "Privacy Web Docs"
 }}}

 Is this done?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29595 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please add dgoulet as a member of the bridgedb-admin git group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29595: Please add dgoulet as a member of the bridgedb-admin git group
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 @service-bridgedb= isis sysrqb dgoulet

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29640 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve the monotonic time documentation in compat_time.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29640: Improve the monotonic time documentation in compat_time.c
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-time, 040-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29643 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29643: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport, fast-fix, tor- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  windows, memory-management, technical-debt |
Parent ID:  #29642   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a post-merge hook that logs a message when the git hooks are updated in master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29588: Make a post-merge hook that logs a message when the git hooks are 
updated
in master
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts, 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29635 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor man page screws up quotes when telling you to use quotes for command line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29635: tor man page screws up quotes when telling you to use quotes for command
line
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-doc
 * reviewer:   => ahf
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29631 [Core Tor/Tor]: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29631: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29537 [Core Tor/Tor]: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29537: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  portability technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29601 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop redundant jobs on Appveyor to speed up builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29601: Drop redundant jobs on Appveyor to speed up builds
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29612 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update the documentation for ExitRelay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29612: Update the documentation for ExitRelay
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, doc, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29354: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-spec, postfreeze-|  Actual Points:
  ok, 040-must, spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17357 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() ignores hs_service_requires_uptime_circ()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17357: rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous() ignores
hs_service_requires_uptime_circ()
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29595 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please add dgoulet as a member of the bridgedb-admin git group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29595: Please add dgoulet as a member of the bridgedb-admin git group
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 This request needs to come from sysrqb. Please ask them to add a signed
 comment with the request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29639 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add anarcat to @torproject-admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29639: Add anarcat to @torproject-admin
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 OK I'm trying to map out what needs to happen for this ticket, because
 there is lots of info in here:

 a) Need to see how circuitmapping should interact with the dormant
 subsystem. I think I can figure this out, maybe after speaking with Mike
 about the ideal behavior here.

 b) Need to add type-checking to the downcasting macros in prob_distr.c .
 Some of it was done in d82a8a7f9d268728b2447b2dbbaa346140784f9b but I'm
 not sure if this is good enough. Might need to think of the right API here
 to come up with the best plan. **Nick let me know if you have any ideas
 here, but please don't spend too much time, becaues I can probably figure
 it out too.**

 I was thinking of perhaps ditching the generic `dist` abstraction and only
 using the underlying functions (in a switch statement when needed (e.g. in
 the unittests)) so that we don't have type safety issues. Or otherwise
 adding some sort of magic field and introducing initialization functions
 for all the distributions, and then checking the magic field in the
 downcasting macro.

 c) `<+nickm> Also there are all these generic dist_ops functions that you
 could use ... but the API seems to encourage you not to use them. having
 wrapper functions instead that call dist->dist_ops.func(dist, ...) would
 be neat`

   I'm not sure what this comment calls for. **Can you please tell me some
 more about it?** Riastradh seems to expand on this on comment:5 but I
 cannot quite get it.

 d) `<+nickm> oh, one list thing: I think src/lib/math is not allowed to
 include lib/crypt_ops, since that would introduce a circularity. Better
 make sure that it doesn't`

   Is this circular dependency still a problem? i see that `src/lib/math/`
 includes `lib/crypt_ops` but I don't see the other way around.** Is this
 for future proofing this, or is there currently a problem?** Also, would
 we be OK with the suggestion that Riastradh gives in comment:5 where we
 split prob_distr.c into the computational part, and the sampling part
 which calls `crypto_rand()`?

 e) I should do the renaming that mike suggests in comment:10.

 f) not sure if I will have time to do the API change that comment:13
 recommends. Will see abou this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>


Comment:

 > Cloudflare is not a MITM.

 You didn't read OP's description, did you?

 If you are a tor project member, curse you. I love Tor and this is what
 you answer to anti-privacy company!?

 Keep this ticket open, thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>


Comment:

 I'm here, now what!!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29570: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, reachability,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Replying to [comment:10 AVee]:

 > Can you explain to me how this makes 3 and 4 worse, compared to the same
 relay running a normal dual stack? Unless i'm missing something here about
 the internals of Tor (which could well be the case) any progress on 2 will
 have a negative impact on 3 and 4.

 Not teor, but I believe this would:

  * Add overhead to IPv6 connections as they would be routed to IPv4. On
 top of this, you won't really have true IPv6 sockets as much as IPv4
 sockets routed to an IPv6 address.
  * Possibly make the consensus harder to calculate with a non-standard
 configuration.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29634 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Riot.im local storage lost when closing tab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29634: Riot.im local storage lost when closing tab
-+-
 Reporter:  0tzVNmkQxgql |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  riot, matrix, local storage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by 0tzVNmkQxgql):

 This is what I did:

 Options -> Privacy and Security -> History: Uncheck "Always use private
 browsing mode" (so this is the problem?), restart
 Options -> Privacy and Security -> History: Check "Clear history when Tor
 Browser closes", then uncheck "Cookies" and "Active Logins" under Settings
 ("Offline Website Data" and "Site Preferences" are already unchecked)
 Options -> Cookies and Site Data: Check "Keep until I close Tor Browser",
 click on "Exceptions" and add "riot.im" with status "Allow".

 This retains cookies and IndexedDB even over restarts. I also set "Store
 Data in Persistent Storage" to "Allow" in the Permissions tab that you can
 reach when clicking the green lock.

 This actually worked for a while last year and stopped working in January.
 I tried to downgrade TB and Riot to find the last versions on which it
 worked, but I was unsuccessful.

 I am currently running a Whonix VM just for Riot, which is rather
 inconvenient and has its problems. I could set up the Electron desktop
 client to use Tor as a Proxy and to not self-update, but I don't trust
 Electron apps not to make connections anyway and firewalling it off is
 cumbersome, because the executable path changes with every update.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29570: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, reachability,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Replying to [comment:9 teor]:
 > Allowing an IPv4 and an IPv6 advertised address to redirect to the same
 underlying port:
 > * makes 1 and 2 better for a few relays
 > * makes 3, 4, and 5 slightly worse, all over the network
 >
 > Rejecting this rare case:
 > * makes 1 and 2 worse for a few relays
 > * makes 3, 4, and 5 slightly better, all over the network
 > * makes 6 a tiny bit worse, because it requires a little bit of extra
 code and documentation

 I would also reject this case (redirecting IPv6 to IPv4).

 It adds unnecessary complexity to the Tor code and network setup to be
 worth it. (At least in my opinion) the costs would be more than the
 benefits.

 Why not just listen on IPv6 as well instead of giving "IPv6" which is
 really a tunneled IPv4 socket?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22346 [Metrics/Statistics]: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017, 2018, and 2019 (was: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017 and 2018)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22346: Investigate drop in Tor Browser update pings in early 2017, 2018, and 
2019
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 We had another annual drop recently. Looking at the graphs it seems
 release related (but not major release related).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29624 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: New version of exit list format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29624: New version of exit list format
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29650   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * keywords:  metrics-exit-list-project metrics-roadmap-2019-q2 => metrics-
 roadmap-2019-q2
 * reviewer:   => irl


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[tor-bugs] #29654 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Initial MVP for new exit scanner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29654: Initial MVP for new exit scanner
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  metrics-
  |  roadmap-2019-q2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29650
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This will depend on the design document created in #29651.

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[tor-bugs] #29653 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Evaluate the reusability of existing TorDNSEL application

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29653: Evaluate the reusability of existing TorDNSEL application
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  metrics-
  |  roadmap-2019-q2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29650
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It is possible that we may be able to reuse parts of the existing TorDNSEL
 application. If so, we would only need to update it to consume the new
 exit list format.

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[tor-bugs] #29652 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Evaluate the reusability of existing check.tpo application

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29652: Evaluate the reusability of existing check.tpo application
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  metrics-
  |  roadmap-2019-q2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29650
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This application, I'm told, was rewritten in Go and is maintainable and
 fast. It is possible we can just update this to use the new exit list
 format.

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[tor-bugs] #29651 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Design the new exit scanner architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29651: Design the new exit scanner architecture
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  metrics-
  |  roadmap-2019-q2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29650
   Points:  2 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Produce a design document that would fulfill the goals of the exit scanner
 project.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29624 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: New version of exit list format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29624: New version of exit list format
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-exit-list-project metrics-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #29650   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * component:  Metrics/Website => Metrics/Exit Scanner
 * parent:   => #29650


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29650 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29650: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * component:  Metrics => Metrics/Exit Scanner


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[tor-bugs] #29650 [Metrics]: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29650: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The current exit scanner is purpose written software using Haskell. It is
 non-trivial to update this program to run on a modern Debian system and
 would be easier in the longer term to simply replace.

 This task requires the new exit list specification to be completed in
 #29624.

 Expected new features:

 * Written in Python
 * Support for IPv6
 * Support for new exit list format

 Features we would like:

 * Cryptographically signed measurement results
 * Archival signatures

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29558 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please chown /srv/research.torproject.org/htdocs on staticiforme to torresearch group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29558: Please chown /srv/research.torproject.org/htdocs on staticiforme to
torresearch group
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  research |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26838   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I've done

 {{{
 sudo chown root /srv/research.torproject.org/htdocs
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29640 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve the monotonic time documentation in compat_time.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29640: Improve the monotonic time documentation in compat_time.c
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-time, 040-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 > * on Windows, where the time is not always monotonic, due to an OS bug
 > * on platforms without specialised monotonic functions, during a wall
 clock time change

 FWIW, I think our code does some ratcheting to ensure that even if we're
 basing our code on non-monotonic timers, our outputs never move backwards.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crash in assert_connection_ok when changing Exit options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25245: Crash in assert_connection_ok when changing Exit options
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, regression?, tor-exit, tor-   |  worksforme
  relay, ipv6, 033-triage-20180320,  |  Actual Points:
  033-included-20180320, 035-must, 035-triaged-  |
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Closing as worksforme, but please reopen if it happens again.

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