Re: [tor-bugs] #29647 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser freezing due to NoScript XSS protection

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29647: Browser freezing due to NoScript XSS protection
--+--
 Reporter:  atac  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  xss noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: ma1 (added)


Comment:

 Yeah, that's something like #22362 again. :(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29634 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Riot.im local storage lost when closing tab

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29634: Riot.im local storage lost when closing tab
-+-
 Reporter:  0tzVNmkQxgql |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  riot, matrix, local storage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 0tzVNmkQxgql]:
 > This is what I did:
 >
 > Options -> Privacy and Security -> History: Uncheck "Always use private
 browsing mode" (so this is the problem?), restart
 > Options -> Privacy and Security -> History: Check "Clear history when
 Tor Browser closes", then uncheck "Cookies" and "Active Logins" under
 Settings ("Offline Website Data" and "Site Preferences" are already
 unchecked)
 > Options -> Cookies and Site Data: Check "Keep until I close Tor
 Browser", click on "Exceptions" and add "riot.im" with status "Allow".
 >
 > This retains cookies and IndexedDB even over restarts. I also set "Store
 Data in Persistent Storage" to "Allow" in the Permissions tab that you can
 reach when clicking the green lock.
 >
 > This actually worked for a while last year and stopped working in
 January. I tried to downgrade TB and Riot to find the last versions on
 which it worked, but I was unsuccessful.

 Hm. So, I'd have suggested something along the lines above, which you
 already tried. Did you start with a clean new Tor Browser for trying to
 pinpoint your issue? Looking over the Tor Browser release in January I
 don't see anything obvious that could have caused this problem...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser > 8.0.2, XMPP - can not connect to socks5 anymore

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29660: TorBrowser > 8.0.2, XMPP - can not connect to socks5 anymore
--+--
 Reporter:  o9491020  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201903
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I bumped the `tor` version both on `maint-8.0` (commit
 fbd366f2f0a0b1b58642cf5f860d98ba768ebe78) and `master` (commit
 864a167a1cdef48560b52c5f3ba559f343eddae0) for our stable and alpha series.
 We'll start building with that next week.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29445 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is denying ESR policies.json. This should work because TB is ESR fork.

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29445: Tor Browser is denying ESR policies.json. This should work because TB is
ESR fork.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me, merged to `tor-browser-60.5.1esr-8.5-1` (commit
 7ce43156780e3b91f35481cce1eb4afed56a4b0f).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28774 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop the integration tests http server when the tests end

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28774: Stop the integration tests http server when the tests end
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > This pull request conflicts with master, and the CI has errored.

 Rebased to master in https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/343.
 The CI error was due Travis failing again to obtain gpg key. The commit
 that fixed that wasn't in that branch yet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29354: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-spec, postfreeze-|  Actual Points:
  ok, 040-must, spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've made the changes you suggest. Leave to you to decide whether is
 merge_ready.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29430: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "tor-launcher-Make-uTLS-aware.helloretry.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29430: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "torbrowser-utls-helloretry.pcap.gz" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:4 mcs]:
 > Kathy and I think this is worth fixing. Here is a revised patch:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug29627-02=99035eb7b6069c60fe4f97291abbea5af4fee886

 I incidentally tested this revised patch (with an additional patch to send
 the `utls=` SOCKS) arg while testing for comment:12:ticket:29430. Moat
 worked fine, and had the same TLS fingerprints as meek.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29430: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek utls |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > Heads up, upstream utls fixed a distinguishability bug recently. A
 second ClientHello (which the client sends after the server sends a
 HelloRetryRequest) was not being camouflaged correctly. I confirmed that
 the bug existed with HelloChrome_70 against ajax.aspnetcdn.com, but I
 haven't personally tested yet that the fix actually fixes it. When I do,
 I'll update the branch.
 > https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls/pull/21

 Here's an updated branch with the aforementioned uTLS fix. It also
 requires a patch, attachment:tor-launcher-Make-uTLS-
 aware.helloretry.patch, that makes tor-launcher pass the `utls=` SOCKS arg
 (applies on top of comment:4:ticket:29627).

  * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-build.git/log/?h
 =meek-client-utls_2=b8a752802f177abf38f61c0b55c5325556986a3e new
 commits]
  * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-build.git/diff/?h
 =meek-client-
 
utls_2=b8a752802f177abf38f61c0b55c5325556986a3e=616fbe2c19a9fce7a9d0adbc466b259c18c45fb8
 diff] since comment:1

 Here is a packet capture: attachment:torbrowser-utls-helloretry.pcap.gz.
 And below are the fingerprints. The first one looks like Chrome, as
 expected. The second one (sent in response to HelloRetryRequest) seems to
 be very uncommon, but possibly I am misinterpreting the results. I've
 asked Sergey to look at it.
  * [https://tlsfingerprint.io/id/bc4c7e42f4961cd7 bc4c7e42f4961cd7]
 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190306042947/https://tlsfingerprint.io/id/bc4c7e42f4961cd7
 (archive)] rank 11
  * [https://tlsfingerprint.io/id/6f8a8a4b42dd552d 6f8a8a4b42dd552d]
 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190306043034/https://tlsfingerprint.io/id/6f8a8a4b42dd552d
 (archive)] rank 13911
  * [https://tlsfingerprint.io/compare/bc4c7e42f4961cd7/6f8a8a4b42dd552d
 comparison]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29613 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make relays into exits when ExitRelay is auto and IPv6Exit is 1

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29613: Make relays into exits when ExitRelay is auto and IPv6Exit is 1
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 041-proposed, tor-relay, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  exit   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29613 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make relays into exits when ExitRelay is auto and IPv6Exit is 1

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29613: Make relays into exits when ExitRelay is auto and IPv6Exit is 1
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 041-proposed, tor-relay, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  exit   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
-+-
 Reporter:  neel |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 040-deferred-20190220, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 035-backport, 034-backport,  |
  029-backport, security-low |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm, teor  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I have updated the changes file and have squashed the commits. I am not
 planning to cherry-pick the commits to `maint-0.2.9`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29641 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29641: Tor Browser fails to bootstrap on IPv6-only access networks
--+--
 Reporter:  jeremyvisser  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > > Tor does have a set of hard-coded IPv6 directory servers, but they're
 not on by default.
 > >
 > > There are a few ways for us to fix this issue permanently:
 > >
 > > * Tor Browser can learn to auto-detect IPv6-only networks, and set the
 appropriate options. Or it can add a Tor Launcher option that says "I am
 on an IPv6-only network". OnionBrowser uses this strategy.
 >
 > I'd like to avoid that workaround if possible and get this fixed in tor
 land. teor: what would be a good tor ticket for the `tbb-needs` keyword?

 #17835, with a note saying that you need Tor to work on IPv4, IPv6, and
 dual-stack networks without extra configuration.
 (We won't do all the child tickets - they are ideas that we can try if we
 need to.)
 You could say that you're trialling ClientAutoIPv6ORPort.

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > > * tor can learn to connect over IPv4 and IPv6, and use whichever one
 works. We have an experimental "ClientAutoIPv6ORPort" option in our alpha
 versions. But we're not sure if it will trigger other bugs. (For example,
 the guard code stops using guards when there are too many failures.) It
 needs more testing.
 >
 > I am fine setting that in the alpha series if you think that would be
 helpful to shake out bugs on tor's side. What's the tor ticket
 implementing that option?

 #27490 in 0.4.0.1-alpha and later.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28940 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Add support for LOG to goptlib

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28940: Add support for LOG to goptlib
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  goptlib  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 attachment:Bug-28940-add-support-for-LOG.2.patch has some minor changes.
 The first is that I changed "log level" to "log severity" to match the
 terminology of the spec.

 The second change is to better conform with the letter of the spec
 regarding the value of `SEVERITY=`. But the way the spec is worded may be
 an oversight, so I want to check. Formerly I defined the log severity
 constants as plain strings. This was safe because the function escaped the
 severity string, so no matter what garbage the caller provided, it would
 not violate the global "any US-ASCII character but NUL or NL".

 But while the spec specifies quoting for `MESSAGE=`, it
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/pt-
 spec.txt?id=d890052d5525a09829c798ab0ad6dcdcede1a8ef#n599 does not
 actually say] that `SEVERITY=` may be quoted. That is, while this
 certainly conforms:
 {{{
 LOG SEVERITY=debug MESSAGE="hello world"
 }}}
 this may not conform:
 {{{
 LOG SEVERITY="debug" MESSAGE="hello world"
 }}}
 But if we don't quote the severity string, then we need to prevent callers
 from providing garbage values for it. I took some inspiration from
 [https://github.com/ahf/goptlib/commit/6815c6e0bcb5547e9d4328b8d7a3a10746094b1b
 #diff-308aaa719425f4333033c97cfb3b9868R10 ahf's patch]. I made the log
 severity constants be instances of an unexported struct type; i.e., it's
 not possible to create additional instances of the style from outside the
 package. In short it looks like this:
 {{{
 // Unexported type to prevent external callers from inventing new
 severities.
 type logSeverity struct {
 string
 }

 // Severity levels for the Log function.
 var (
 LogSeverityError   = logSeverity{"error"}
 LogSeverityWarning = logSeverity{"warning"}
 LogSeverityNotice  = logSeverity{"notice"}
 LogSeverityInfo= logSeverity{"info"}
 LogSeverityDebug   = logSeverity{"debug"}
 )
 }}}
 And the body of `Log` changed from
 {{{
 line("LOG", "SEVERITY="+encodeCString(severity),
 "MESSAGE="+encodeCString(message))
 }}}
 to
 {{{
 line("LOG", "SEVERITY="+severity.string,
 "MESSAGE="+encodeCString(message))
 }}}
 So the question is, is this strict enumeration necessary, or is the spec
 meant to allow quoting of `SEVERITY=`? It's allowed by tor; but should we
 specify it? As it stands, an implementation would be totally justified in
 parsing a LOG line with a regex, something like: `^LOG
 SEVERITY=(error|warning|notice|info|debug)
 MESSAGE=(\w+|"(\\[0-9]{1,3}|\\n|\\t|\\r|\\"||[^\\])*")$`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 Here's a more detailed explainer on ruleset updates:
 https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/blob/master/docs/en_US/ruleset-
 update-channels.md

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 jlongworth's brain is invalid

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28940 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Add support for LOG to goptlib

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28940: Add support for LOG to goptlib
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  goptlib  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "Bug-28940-add-support-for-LOG.2.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 jlongworth's brain is invalid

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 **gk**:

 No the screenshots are not from a fresh Tor Browser, rather it's a pre-
 built tor-browser with the new firefox bits deployed over it. If I'm
 understanding things correctly, I can update the 000-torbrowser.js file to
 remove the extension icons from the toolbar. I'll do a full tor-browser-
 build once my changes for torbutton are complete and fix any other issues
 that pop up.

 **antonela**:

 I can make all these change (:

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by legind):

 > Sounds good to me. What happens to the shown date after "Rulesets
 version for EFF (full)" in that case? I guess, ideally, it would reflect
 the extension release date as that's the date of the active rulesets
 (until a new out-of-band ruleset update happens).

 In that case only the "Version: " line would appear.  The ruleset line
 would not appear, since no ruleset bundle would have been downloaded
 separately.

 I understand this is kind of confusing, since it makes it appear as though
 users aren't being protected by the extension when they actually are.  We
 may want to change the logic to display this line in any case, even if no
 ruleset bundle has been downloaded yet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15826 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Check and return error values in goptlib

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#15826: Check and return error values in goptlib
-+
 Reporter:  gsathya  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  goptlib  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I added the checks to `s.SetDeadline` and `f.Close`, and added tests for a
 failing `s.SetDeadline`, in this series of commits:
  * https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/goptlib.git/diff/?id=3be4b5e2d3ba2add44e0d0307ad3f2487f8ad208=737bb08d9520b27030c32884b0303c389b407671
 I decided that it's not worth breaking out a test for a failing `f.Close`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28864 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws AsyncResults have no timeout

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28864: sbws AsyncResults have no timeout
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28774 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop the integration tests http server when the tests end

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28774: Stop the integration tests http server when the tests end
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This pull request conflicts with master, and the CI has errored.
 I don't know how to fix these issues.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25075 [Core Tor/Stem]: Constants are included in sphinx output

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25075: Constants are included in sphinx output
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  website easy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Perfect! Thanks hannelores, merged.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=de5875a

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Stem]: test-stem times out intermittently

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by atagar):

 Another report of this: #29644

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29644 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem's integration test hangs

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29644: Stem's integration test hangs
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Hi teor, deduplicating this with #29437. Unfortunately the intermittent
 nature of this is gonna make it a real pita to troubleshoot. It would be
 helpful if we add '--log TRACE' to the test arguments so we have more
 information when this arises, but on the downside that will mean
 unpleasantly verbose output when troubleshooting other issues...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Stem]: test-stem times out intermittently

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Stem


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake
+---
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh


Comment:

 At moment, we're focusing on the proxy--broker protocol, but it is
 somewhat related. I'll assign it to myself since we'll cover it together
 with #29207

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29665 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP circuits

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29665: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP 
circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Thanks to a single onion service operator on IRC in the #tor channel
 (`slingamn`), armadev and I were able to identify this issue.

 Any clients connecting to a single onion service and then being idle for
 60 seconds would get disconnected as in the rendezvous circuit closed.

 It turns out that the rendezvous point closes the service circuit through
 this function `circuit_expire_old_circuits_serversid()` if is idle for
 more than 60 seconds (only for single onion service). The faulty condition
 is:

 {{{
 if (or_circ->p_chan && channel_is_client(or_circ->p_chan) &&
 !circ->n_chan &&
 !or_circ->n_streams && !or_circ->resolving_streams &&
 channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan) <= cutoff) {
 }}}

 The RP is the end of the service circuit (`or_circ`), all data is spliced
 to the client circuit which makes it that `n_streams` and `n_chan` are
 NULL and thus validating the condition.

 Also possible to hit this if `channel_is_client()` is a false positive for
 the exit point.

 The fix here is to check if the circuit being looked at is a rendezvous
 point and ignore it if so. The `or_circ->rend_splice` should be non-NULL
 if so.

 This needs to be backported and affects v2 and v3 hidden service.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Support i386 target

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27210: TBA - Support i386 target
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201902, TorBrowserTeam201903R   |
Parent ID:  #5709| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 >
 > I think both are good points. I think I've addressed them in
 `bug_27210_v3` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_27210_v3=f4b5f7b3b38679456d97b71904b0c59d4e4600d9)
 (together with a stupid typo).

 This looks good to me. I merged this to master with commit
 `ba9064e4b5a369b9c70201e335ef706db25f2815`.

 In the merge I fixed a conflict in `projects/orbot/build`: the patch was
 changing some lines which have been removed by #29633.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 wow, this is a big one. I've reviewed the first N commits here. I'll do
 the next N commits soon.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol for Snowflake
+---
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---

Comment (by gaba):

 cohosh, are you working on this ticket?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29601 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop redundant jobs on Appveyor to speed up builds

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29601: Drop redundant jobs on Appveyor to speed up builds
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Thanks!  Patch looks good by visual inspection.  I agree with the strategy
 in the patch.  I confirmed that the patch does what it claims to do by
 looking at the appveyor build logs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28585 [Core Tor/sbws]: Release 1.0.3

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28585: Release 1.0.3
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws:
  |  1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Released: https://github.com/torproject/sbws/releases/tag/v1.0.3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29445 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is denying ESR policies.json. This should work because TB is ESR fork.

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29445: Tor Browser is denying ESR policies.json. This should work because TB is
ESR fork.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201903R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug29445-01=7ce43156780e3b91f35481cce1eb4afed56a4b0f

 As an "escape hatch", support for enterprise policies can still be
 disabled by setting `browser.policies.testing.disallowEnterprise = false`
 (but I would guess that Mozilla only intends that pref to be used for
 automated tests).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  git-scripts dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master! Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29559 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-client-torbrowser should exit on stdin close, even while waiting on browser output

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29559: meek-client-torbrowser should exit on stdin close, even while waiting on
browser output
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=01ea27b4c59cd8ae17e608006cd7a9a16ba282c4
 01ea27b4c59cd8ae17e608006cd7a9a16ba282c4].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > We have `meekTransport`, `meekClientPath`, and `meekClientArgs` as
 parameters in `network-settings.js`. I wonder what happened to the `meek`
 part in `meekTransport` in `tl-bridgedb.jsm` as we only have
 `aTransport`/`mTransport` there. Maybe we don't need `meekTransport` but
 just `transport` in `network-seetings.js`?
 >
 > It's not that a big deal, I got just confused while reading over the
 code.

 Kathy and I think this is worth fixing. Here is a revised patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug29627-02=99035eb7b6069c60fe4f97291abbea5af4fee886

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Do you think this is a good place to ask for feedback / report a bug too?
 If yes, should we link users to our contact page?

 https://lektor-staging.torproject.org/tpo/staging/contact/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:10 mcs]:
 > I am not sure what kind of styling you have in mind, but the page is
 XHTML.

 Nothing too much complicated. Something close to:

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/29440/about%3Achangelog.jpg, 700px)]]

 Any monospace system font is elegant for the changelog copy. Then, you
 already have our brand font loaded. What do you think?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "about:changelog.jpg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25776 [Metrics/Ideas]: Extend OnionPerf to measure pluggable transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25776: Extend OnionPerf to measure pluggable transports
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  acute
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  onionperf  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  metrics-team => acute


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29373 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Check that OnionPerf paths really do reflect user paths

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29373: Check that OnionPerf paths really do reflect user paths
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  acute
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  acute-2019-q1-planned  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  metrics-team => acute


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29375 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Improve code documentation coverage for OnionPerf

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29375: Improve code documentation coverage for OnionPerf
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  acute
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  acute-2019-q1-planned  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  metrics-team => acute
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29376 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Document deployment process for OnionPerf

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29376: Document deployment process for OnionPerf
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  acute
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  acute-2019-q1-planned  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  metrics-team => acute
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29377 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Improve unit test coverage

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29377: Improve unit test coverage
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  acute
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  acute-2019-q1-planned  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  metrics-team => acute
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29372 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Add support for measuring v3 onion services

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29372: Add support for measuring v3 onion services
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  acute
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  acute-2019-q1-planned  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  metrics-team => acute
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:8 antonela]:
 > 2. Yes! `about:changelog` is the place where we are going to list change
 log lists. We discussed with Geko the possibility of including it in some
 place of the website. I owe that ticket. But, it is not related with this
 ticket scope. Maybe, that copy needs to be updated as well, since we are
 not going to link to the website, yet. Any suggestion?

 The old about:tbupdate page links to the blog posting for the release. I
 think we can keep that for now. Since the URL is retrieved from a server
 during the update process, it will be easy to change it later if the
 website gains a nice changelog page.

 > 3. I think that we should include it always. Could we keep it?

 Yes, will do.

 > Now my turn :)
 >
 > Do you need a mockup for `about:changelog`? Is that html/markdown? Do
 you want to put the data there and could I work on the style? Let me know
 what is better for you.

 I am not sure what kind of styling you have in mind, but the page is
 XHTML. Look here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/browser/base/content/abouttbupdate?h=tor-
 browser-60.5.1esr-8.5-1  One of the current limitations is that the change
 log itself is extracted from a plain text file: the contents of the
 `id="changelog"`  within the `aboutTBUpdate.xhtml` file are replaced
 with the first portion of the following file:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-build.git/tree/projects
 /tor-browser/Bundle-Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt

 That means it will be difficult to apply different styles to different
 parts of the list of changes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser > 8.0.2, XMPP - can not connect to socks5 anymore

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29660: TorBrowser > 8.0.2, XMPP - can not connect to socks5 anymore
--+--
 Reporter:  o9491020  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Core Tor => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 Moving the ticket to Tor Browser component, since the remaining bug is
 "you're still shipping an old Tor stable".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29660 [Core Tor]: TorBrowser > 8.0.2, XMPP - can not connect to socks5 anymore

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29660: TorBrowser > 8.0.2, XMPP - can not connect to socks5 anymore
---+
 Reporter:  o9491020   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 This is a result of bug #29175, which is in Tor 0.3.5.7, and fixed in Tor
 0.3.5.8, but Tor Browser 8.0.x (through x=6) still has the old Tor:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/plain/projects/tor-browser/Bundle-
 Data/Docs/ChangeLog.txt?h=maint-8.0

 The eventual fix will be to wait for Tor Browser to move to 0.3.5.8.

 The workaround in the meantime is to put something (like "x") in your
 socks username or socks password setting in your xmpp app.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29298: Explicitly specify histogram bin endpoints/widths
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad 041-proposed network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've added a couple of comments on the PR.  Most will probably not be
 things that need to change.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29631 [Core Tor/Tor]: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29631: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix, nickm- |  Actual Points:
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged that one to 0.4.0 and forward.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29196 [Core Tor/Tor]: circ: Remove p_mux and n_mux from circuit_t and or_circuit_t

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29196: circ: Remove p_mux and n_mux from circuit_t and or_circuit_t
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cmux, tor-circuit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 catalyst]:
 > This ticket says it targets 0.4.1 but the branch seems based on 0.4.0
 (and has no pull request?). I'm not sure, which target branch is intended?

 It is intended for master. No backport. At the time the branch was done,
 master was still 040.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29631 [Core Tor/Tor]: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29631: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix, nickm- |  Actual Points:
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix => rust, protover, fast-fix, nickm-
 merge


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > Is this a backport candidate? PRT_PADDING was first defined in 0.4.0.

 Oh! Damn I thought it was 0.4.1... So yes, seems we support Rust for last
 two stables. I've pushed a changes file to a 040 branch for backport:
 `ticket29631_040_01`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29623 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Deploy Marionette in Linux nightly builds

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29623: Deploy Marionette in Linux nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Marionette tor-pt,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-  |
  rbm|
Parent ID:  #26920   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 I moved some resources around after our conversation on irc about shelving
 this for now.

 I'll keep the bridge up and running in case anyone wants to look at it,
 but it has a new IP and less resources allocated to it. The new line in
 bridge_prefs.js should be:

 {{{
 pref("extensions.torlauncher.default_bridge.marionette.1", "marionette
 68.183.200.16:8081 C6345F09C3ECCE5DAE37E8D1EC8495A4577CA356");
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29664 [Webpages/Website]: Create release notes page at torproject.org

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29664: Create release notes page at torproject.org
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: traumschule (removed)


Old description:

> On #29440 we discussed the possibility to have release notes per release
> outside the blog. That is useful for different reasons; one of them is
> having a centralized place to look for these notes.
>
> I'd suggest including this at
>
> `torproject.org/torbrowser/%version%/releasenotes`
> `torproject.org/torbrowserandroid/%version%/releasenotes`
>
> We may want to automate it in many ways, the first iteration could be
> static as well.

New description:

 On #29440 we discussed the possibility to have release notes per each
 browser release outside the blog. That is useful for different reasons;
 one of them is having a centralized place to look for these notes.

 I'd suggest including this at

 `torproject.org/torbrowser/%version%/releasenotes`
 `torproject.org/torbrowserandroid/%version%/releasenotes`

 We may want to automate it in many ways, the first iteration could be
 static as well.

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Yup, sounds like a good idea to me. Do you mind opening a ticket (bonus
 points for suggestions where on the website this should be shown. :) )?

 Done #29664, thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29664 [Webpages/Website]: Create release notes page at torproject.org

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29664: Create release notes page at torproject.org
--+-
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 On #29440 we discussed the possibility to have release notes per release
 outside the blog. That is useful for different reasons; one of them is
 having a centralized place to look for these notes.

 I'd suggest including this at

 `torproject.org/torbrowser/%version%/releasenotes`
 `torproject.org/torbrowserandroid/%version%/releasenotes`

 We may want to automate it in many ways, the first iteration could be
 static as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:

 Happy to have you both working on it :)

 1. Exactly, you right. One time and one time only. Next time they open the
 browser, or next time they open `about:tor` we should have the regular
 `about:tor`.

 2. Yes! `about:changelog` is the place where we are going to list change
 log lists. We discussed with Geko the possibility of including it in some
 place of the website. I owe that ticket. But, it is not related with this
 ticket scope.

 3. I think that we should include it always. Could we keep it?

 Now my turn :)

 Do you need a mockup for `about:changelog`? Is that html/markdown? Do you
 want to put the data there and could I work on the style? Let me know what
 is better for you.

 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25614 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not client transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25614: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not
client transports
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-backport 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 great; merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25614 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not client transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25614: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not
client transports
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > Is this a backport candidate?  Possibly to 0.3.5?

 IMO no backport is needed, because current transports all have workarounds
 for this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29635 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor man page screws up quotes when telling you to use quotes for command line

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29635: tor man page screws up quotes when telling you to use quotes for command
line
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29631 [Core Tor/Tor]: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29631: protover: Rust missing Padding value in translate_to_rust()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, protover, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Is this a backport candidate? PRT_PADDING was first defined in 0.4.0.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29060 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29060: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25614 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not client transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25614: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not
client transports
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 Is this a backport candidate?  Possibly to 0.3.5?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 Looks like this was triggered again in
 https://ci.appveyor.com/project/ahf/tor/build/1.0.78/job/t57vj493837qgvd4#L5547

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Kathy and I are starting to look at implementation for this ticket and we
 have a few UX questions:
 1. Should the post-update about:tor page that includes the `Tor Browser
 has been updated` text be displayed one time and one time only? We assume
 the answer is yes, but that does mean there will be no way for the user to
 return to that variation of about:tor once they close it or navigate away.
 2. Should we include the `For the most up-to-date information about this
 release, visit our website.` text and link on the new about:changelog
 page? Kathy and I think we should so that users can access that link in
 the future by opening about:changelog (after they close or navigate away
 from the post-update about:tor page).
 3. Should the top-right corner of about:tor always include the `View
 Changelog` link, or should that only be visible in the post-update
 about:tor page? Always including it seems preferable because that will
 provide a way for users to see the changelog later from within the
 browser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've made a few comments in the PR.  This is generally looking very solid.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29662 [Core Tor]: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29662: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/760

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25614 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not client transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25614: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not
client transports
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Patch looks good and CI is happy. Let's get it in.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I have simplified the if loop and pushed it.

 I do not plan to write a test for `add_ed25519_to_dir()`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--

Comment (by asn):

 OK fixed the CI issues and also added a squash commit that slightly
 improves the error message in case of problems. We can always do better
 but this might be OK for a minimum-viable-product here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Deploy Marionette as a Pluggable Transport

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26920: Deploy Marionette as a Pluggable Transport
--+---
 Reporter:  Marionette|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Marionette tor-pt |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Just commenting to say that I've reallocated some resouces and have
 updated information for this bridge:

 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/C6345F09C3ECCE5DAE37E8D1EC8495A4577CA356

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed to origin.

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29532: Update pre-push hook so that only maint-* and release-* can get pushed 
to
origin.
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  git-scripts => git-scripts dgoulet-merge
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This seems okay now.  Let's squash and merge.  (I say that we don't need
 another round of CI after the squash, since this doesn't touch any code
 that CI tests.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a post-merge hook that logs a message when the git hooks are updated in master

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29588: Make a post-merge hook that logs a message when the git hooks are 
updated
in master
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts, 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hi! This is a good start. I've asked a few questions on the PR.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29060 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29060: shellcheck: test-network.sh issues
+
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I cannot see a reason for why we saved `$@` - maybe it was to give it a
 more explicit name?

 I think the code looks good now from what I can tell. Moving to
 `merge_ready` and then let's get an additional set of eyes on it from the
 merger :-)

 Thanks for doing this work!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25614 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not client transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25614: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not
client transports
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ahf):

 Looks like CI was unhappy. Added
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/759/commits/c9a9de120f4287ccb5cd3998916cbe7b81dba89a
 - let's see what it says now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25614 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not client transports

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25614: tor sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` only for server transports, not
client transports
---+---
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ahf):

 In the future, please submit Github pull requests if possible for tor.git
 since this makes it much easier for us to review after our Travis CI and
 Appveyor CI have run on the pull request :-)

 I've opened a pull request with your patch now.

 Let us see if CI likes this: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/759

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29663 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Deploy /etc/puppet as a role account

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29663: Deploy /etc/puppet as a role account
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Internal Services/Services
 |  Admin Team
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 On our puppet master (alberti.tpo), the post-receive git hook deploys the
 tor-puppet repo in /etc/puppet as the user pushing. As long as umask is
 correct and the stars are aligned, things are good. Sometimes files end up
 with 0644 when we need them to be 0664 in order for other accounts (in
 group 'adm') to be able to change existing files.

 Start using a role account instead of individual admin accounts for
 deploying to /etc/puppet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Code looks reasonable in principle. Added some tech-debt related concerns
 to the PR. Let me know if you want to fix these, thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29662 [Core Tor]: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29662: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => rl1987
 * status:  assigned => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29662 [Core Tor]: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29662: Introduce assert functions that allow us to printf error message
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25876: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser
---+---
 Reporter:  attila |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 attila: Are you good if we only keep the latest two releases? And putting
 them on dist.torproject.org would work as well for you?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29661 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove needs_information flag from ticket #25876.

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29661: Remove needs_information flag from ticket #25876.
--+--
 Reporter:  nrG9pBu   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The reason for still waiting was that I wanted to get feedback from attila
 as he opened the bug and I was not sure whether your requirements matches
 his.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25876: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser
---+---
 Reporter:  attila |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903
 * status:  needs_information => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 boklm]:
 > If we decide to publish source tarballs, then branch `bug_25876_v4` can
 be used for that:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25876_v4=e7f96823c16fb9f15302a1d6464af10e573e6198

 I rebased this patch on master, in branch `bug_25876_v5`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25876_v5=ee759bad2b293fa1700ee463575f2618ed07111b

 With this patch, we can run `src-tarballs-{release,alpha}`, which create
 source tarballs in directory `{alpha,release}/src-
 tarballs/$TORBROWSER_VERSION`.

 However, it might be easier if we just put those files into the normal
 bundle directory, so that we can sign and publish them like the other
 bundles. I will make a revision of the patch doing that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:77 pospeselr]:
 > Patch for torbutton hopefully later this week!

 It looks awesome! Thanks for this work pospeselr!

 A few minor UI details in `about:preferences#`

 - Let's move the `Learn More` link after description. It will looks like

 {{{
 Disable certain web features that can be used to attack your
 security and anonymity. Learn More
 }}}

 - Standard, Safer and Safest titles, could we have it in **bold**?
 - Could we have 2x bottom padding (probably, 6px) between each option?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)
 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update => ux-team, tbb-update,
   TorBrowserTeam201903


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28628 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce New Security Settings to users

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28628: Introduce New Security Settings to users
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)
 * keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201902 => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201903


Comment:

 mcs/brade: Could you think about that ticket while reviewing #25658?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28628 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce New Security Settings to users

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28628: Introduce New Security Settings to users
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201902  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 I think we should go with the Option 2.

 **Prototype**
 ​https://sketch.cloud/s/q8JlM/nRVdjEz/play

 **Behaviour**
 During the onboarding, users click on `[See Your Security Level]` and the
 doorhanger gets open.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #29661 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove needs_information flag from ticket #25876.

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29661: Remove needs_information flag from ticket #25876.
-+--
 Reporter:  nrG9pBu  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 The ticket #25876 has been in needs_information state for over half a
 year.

 I think all info has been provided. I'm afraid devs don't look at that
 ticket anymore, because of needs_information flag. But I can't remove the
 flag, only a dev can do it. It has been written on that ticket that the
 flag shall disappear, but probably no dev saw it, as they probably don't
 look at needs_information tickets - catch 44.

 So please remove needs_information flag or write explicitly what sort of
 further information is needed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
 > When are you going to build gmp, mpc, mpfr as Mozilla does?

 There are no plans for that yet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:14 boklm]:
 > > > There are two patches for review in branch `bug_26323_v7`:
 > > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26323_v7=676f75ecb97484368b340ee5d355aa422c2b0a7c
 > >
 > > `tor` compilation for nightly builds breaks in this case with
 > > {{{
 > > configure: error: TOR_RUST_TARGET must be specified when cross-
 compiling with Rust enabled.
 > > }}}
 >
 > Oh, I forgot to test the nightly target.
 >
 > >
 > > > I think a possible improvement we can do after this, is to share the
 gcc and rust builds between linux32 and linux64.
 > >
 > > Hm, what is missing here? In particular, I wonder what the issue with
 GCC is as the build script at least should be the same (modulo the
 different hash in the bundle name that stems from somewhere else).
 >
 > Yes, GCC is built exactly in the same way in both cases, the only
 difference is the list of packages installed in the containers, and the
 `dpkg --add-architecture i386` we only run in the i686 case (which are
 causing the hash in the filename to differ).

 That means we need to have two containers for that. Then I think we just
 can fold the i686 stuff that does make a difference into the x86_64 parts,
 so that we can avoid having two containers and two GCCs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27486 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: "Visit an Onion" creates an "about:blank" loading page

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27486: Onboarding: "Visit an Onion" creates an "about:blank" loading page
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201903R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Cherry-picked onto `tor-browser-60.5.1esr-8.5-1` (commit
 3a69f6697799d7c6d0ed408df8aa28239b430556).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 boklm]:
 > > There are two patches for review in branch `bug_26323_v7`:
 > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26323_v7=676f75ecb97484368b340ee5d355aa422c2b0a7c
 >
 > `tor` compilation for nightly builds breaks in this case with
 > {{{
 > configure: error: TOR_RUST_TARGET must be specified when cross-compiling
 with Rust enabled.
 > }}}

 Oh, I forgot to test the nightly target.

 >
 > > I think a possible improvement we can do after this, is to share the
 gcc and rust builds between linux32 and linux64.
 >
 > Hm, what is missing here? In particular, I wonder what the issue with
 GCC is as the build script at least should be the same (modulo the
 different hash in the bundle name that stems from somewhere else).

 Yes, GCC is built exactly in the same way in both cases, the only
 difference is the list of packages installed in the containers, and the
 `dpkg --add-architecture i386` we only run in the i686 case (which are
 causing the hash in the filename to differ).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:16 gk]:
 > Another thing I am wondering: I just merged the patches for #29194 and
 saw those for this bug contain some `apt-get install` incantations. Do
 they need adjustment (too) in light of the #29194 fixes?

 That's a good point, we should set `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive` here
 too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26468 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 When are you going to build gmp, mpc, mpfr as Mozilla does?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28864 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws AsyncResults have no timeout

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28864: sbws AsyncResults have no timeout
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28663 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Solving also #28865:
 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/342
 Moving to 1.1 milestone since #28932 check progress and logs error.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29627 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite

2019-03-05 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#29627: Moat: add support for obfsproxy's meek_lite
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29430 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 We have `meekTransport`, `meekClientPath`, and `meekClientArgs` as
 parameters in `network-settings.js`. I wonder what happened to the `meek`
 part in `meekTransport` in `tl-bridgedb.jsm` as we only have
 `aTransport`/`mTransport` there. Maybe we don't need `meekTransport` but
 just `transport` in `network-seetings.js`?

 It's not that a big deal, I got just confused while reading over the code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

  1   2   >