Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
--+--
 Reporter:  pidgin|  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pidgin):

 Replying to [comment:26 asn]:
 > Replying to [comment:25 pidgin]:
 > > Any updates?
 >
 > You could send logs to my email address/PGP:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en#asn
 > Teor is also there:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en#teor
 >
 > Keep in mind it's the weekend and we are generally all pretty busy! :/

 Understandable, thank you for the information.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29733 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29733: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by eloquence):

 Did a bit more 127.0.0.1 testing in this version of Tor as well (using
 Micah's upload server script: https://github.com/micahflee/noscript-
 upload-bug) and can further confirm that 1) As expected, I can't reproduce
 the issue with the "Scan uploads for potential cross-site attacks"
 checkbox unchecked; 2) As expected, I can reproduce it quickly with that
 checkbox checked.

 As long as the preferences are indeed set correctly in the shipped
 version, I think we're good to go as far as this bug is concerned. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
--+--
 Reporter:  pidgin|  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:25 pidgin]:
 > Any updates?

 You could send logs to my email address/PGP:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en#asn
 Teor is also there:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html.en#teor

 Keep in mind it's the weekend and we are generally all pretty busy! :/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
--+--
 Reporter:  pidgin|  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pidgin):

 Any updates?

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[tor-bugs] #29796 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: synchronize puppet and LDAP hosts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29796: synchronize puppet and LDAP hosts
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We have hosts that are in Puppet and not in LDAP and vice versa. Every
 host in LDAP should be in Puppet and vice versa.

 This is the current diff:

 {{{
 $ diff puppet ldap
 29a30,31
 > geyeri.torproject.org
 > gillii.torproject.org
 36d37
 < hyalinum.torproject.org
 74a76,78
 > weissii.torproject.org
 > winklerianum.torproject.org
 > woronowii.torproject.org
 }}}

 That is, right now, we have the following hosts in LDAP but not in Puppet:

  * geyeri.torproject.org
  * gillii.torproject.org
  * weissii.torproject.org
  * winklerianum.torproject.org
  * woronowii.torproject.org

 The following is in Puppet, but not LDAP:

  * hyalinum.torproject.org

 The two lists (`puppet` and `ldap`) were obtain using the following
 commands:

 {{{
 ssh -t pauli.torproject.org 'sudo -u postgres psql puppetdb -P pager=off
 -A -t -c "SELECT c.certname FROM certnames c WHERE c.deactivated IS NULL"'
 | tee puppet
 tail -n +2 puppet | sort | sponge puppet
 ssh alberti.torproject.org 'ldapsearch -h db.torproject.org -x -ZZ -b
 dc=torproject,dc=org -LLL "hostname=*.torproject.org" hostname | awk "\$1
 == \"hostname:\" {print \$2}" | sort' > ldap
 }}}

 ... as detailed in the [https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/puppet/ new
 Puppet docs].

 I'm not exactly sure how to resolve this. When weasel saw a previous
 version of this list, he said:

 {{{
 12:30:00  from a quick glance, all but the arm hosts can go.
 12:30:06  best to double-check with ldap.
 12:30:19  if they are not in ldap, and they haven't done a puppet
 run in a while, they should be removed from puppet also.
 12:30:45  gillii and geyeri are the old CRM hosts.  I think linus
 wants to kill them soon but maybe keep them around (and offline) for now.
 }}}

 According to nagios, hyalinum has not checked into Puppet since
 2018-02-12T08:53:13.339Z, over a month ago. So presumably that should be
 removed from puppet, and we should double-check the retirement procedure
 to see if it was completed correctly.

 The hosts in LDAP and not in Puppet should probably be added to puppet,
 carefully (--noop is your friend) to see if it breaks anything.

 In the future, we might want to add a Nagios check on the Puppet server to
 make sure this is synchronized.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28925 [Core Tor/Tor]: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28925: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-needs, 040-must, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > I added tbb-needs to this ticket (which I included on #29341 when I
 filed it).
 Sorry for dropping the tag. Do you need this to be in 0.4.0? It might be
 easier to put in 0.4.1 because we can use the pubsub framework. It might
 be possible to put it in 0.4.0 but it might take longer, and might be too
 big a change at this stage of the release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, i pushed another branch, `28329_20` with some deleted newlines
 around licenses. I cleaned up `part 1` files, but the xml files in `part
 4` weren't consistent. This is now corrected, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available : Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28656: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available 
:
Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-rc-blocker?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > Okay, I've squashed the branch as bug28656_035_squashed, and made a new
 PR as https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/798 .  Merging to 0.4.0 and
 forward.  Marking for possible backport.
 Backport pull request looks good. I have no strong opinions either way
 about backporting it to 0.3.5. Has anyone reported it triggering on 0.3.5?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 The bootstrap-onion is still too wide, i'll need some more time for
 finding how to solve this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, I pushed a new branch. `28329_19`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:72 gk]:
 > Oh, I forgot one thing from the list
 >
 > `// Runnable for changing the alpha of the Onion image every two
 seconds.`
 >
 > yet `private long mOnionAlphaChangerSleepInterval = 1000;` so did you
 mean "every second"?

 Corrected. Now it is slightly different, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:71 gk]:
 > Here is what is still left over after looking at `28329_17`
 >
 > `res/drawable/tor_spinning_onion.xml` - license?
 >
 > For readability (and consistency across files) newlines between XML
 header, license, and the meat of the files would be good.
 >
 > "ViewPager containing for our bootstrapping pages" s/containing for/for
 containting/ ?
 >
 > "stop bootstrapping animation" s/stop/stop the/
 >
 > nit: "being used. There" <- one whitespace too much :) (in
 TorPreferences.java)
 >
 > "clicks on the Change link" <- missing "." at the end
 >
 > "if meek-azure if chosen" -> s/if chosen/is chosen/
 >
 > {{{
 > +// This implements TorNetworkBridgePopulateList so it can receive
 the list
 > +// of bridges asynchronously from Gecko.
 > }}}
 > can go
 > {{{
 > // Request the list of built-in bridges after the View is created
 > }}}
 > can go, too
 >
 > 'substitute it with "meek_lite"'.  s/meek_lite/meek/
 >

 All addressed.

 > The switch for enabling/disabling bridges itself is jumping a bit during
 the transition, probably depending on the text. I think the correct
 behavior would be that the switch stayed where it is and just the text
 "moves".

 This is a little difficult, unfortunately. I won't solve this today.

 >
 > comment:61 is still an issue.

 Same here, this may be a bug in Orbot. It needs more investigation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebExtensions icons are not shown on first start but on restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23359: WebExtensions icons are not shown on first start but on restart
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:
|  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  AffectsTails => AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201903
 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed by #25658, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update TBA built-in bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29794: Update TBA built-in bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201903
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Any reason why we just do not use the same bridges as on
 desktop? Anyway, that's now commit
 a6fedc0228d1c66f067f5dc8454cdc110ed2777d on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Maybe if we can get metric diffs from practracker, we can see if an
 increase in badness exceeds some threshold before failing the build? and
 use the GitHub APIs to post a comment otherwise? (like Coveralls does)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 Potential solutions to the issue where practracker can break master, when
 we merge-forward bad commits from earlier releases (and the PR was on
 those earlier releases which don't contain practracker):

 a) Add inline comments to denote practracker exceptions. Negative: Ugly.
 b) Add practracker to all the active releases. Negative: This will still
 not solve the problem, since we would need to open PRs for all releases
 everytime we merge-forward to somewhere.
 c) Add practracker as a post-commit git hook. Negative: Might be annoying.
 Not all volunteers will know about that thing.
 d) Disable practracker in CI. Negative: We lose all the positive aspects
 of practracker that will probably be ignored.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Here's a new candidate: https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/compare/geoip

 In addition to the changes above, here are the other changes I made:

 Replying to [comment:8 ahf]:
 > - I don't know if this is a common thing in Go code to do, but in many
 functional languages where you have type aliases people tend to do type
 aliases for `string` types to make them "more specific". In this case the
 country-string type could be called `Country` so the metrics table would
 be a mapping of a Country to a monotonically increasing counter.
 I did that for CountryStats (which is the map from country codes to
 counts) is doing this for the country strings too noisy?
 > - What should we do with these values when they are here? Should we have
 an API end-point that can dump them? Should we save them to a log file
 with some heartbeat interval? Chelsea Komlo showed me a neat library for
 collecting internal metrics in Go applications, but it might be too early
 to introduce additional dependencies just for this. It was this library:
 https://github.com/armon/go-metrics
 I think it's still very early... my suggestion is to do something simple,
 close this ticket, and then think about what we want a bit more before
 adding new dependencies. Right now it just logs the country counts to a
 log file every hour

 >Oh, and more thing I forgot. Should we have a SIGHUP handler that reloads
 the tables?
 Added.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28802: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, GeorgKoppen201903,  |
  tbb-8.5, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 I opened an issue to add back in support for PT in tor-android-service.
 Its a fairly simple fix.

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-android-service/issues/16

 I'd like to add the copying of libraries as part of android-tor-service
 gradle build (since this should be included in the base library anyway).
 Then we can remove the the copying of libraries from the patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29795 [Community/Translations]: Add new Torbutton file securityLevel.properties to the translations repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29795: Add new Torbutton file securityLevel.properties to the translations repo
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> #25658 brings a bunch of new strings to translate along which are
> organized in a new file, securityLevel.properties. We need to get that
> added to the translations repo to get the strings in all the needed
> locales.
>
> Currently the code in Torbutton's `import-translations.sh` expects the
> branch to be `torbutton-securityLevelproperties` but that's easily
> adjustable if needed.

New description:

 #25658 brings a bunch of new strings to translate along which are
 organized in a new file, `securityLevel.properties`. We need to get that
 added to the translations repo to get the strings in all the needed
 locales.

 Currently the code in Torbutton's `import-translations.sh` expects the
 branch to be `torbutton-securityLevelproperties` but that's easily
 adjustable if needed.

--

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[tor-bugs] #29795 [Community/Translations]: Add new Torbutton file securityLevel.properties to the translations repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29795: Add new Torbutton file securityLevel.properties to the translations repo
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #25658
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 #25658 brings a bunch of new strings to translate along which are
 organized in a new file, securityLevel.properties. We need to get that
 added to the translations repo to get the strings in all the needed
 locales.

 Currently the code in Torbutton's `import-translations.sh` expects the
 branch to be `torbutton-securityLevelproperties` but that's easily
 adjustable if needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update TBA built-in bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29794: Update TBA built-in bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, i pushed `29794_0` to my repo. It still needs testing.

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[tor-bugs] #29794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update TBA built-in bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29794: Update TBA built-in bridges
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 After #28802, we should update the built-in bridges provided by tor
 browser on android.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29717 [Core Tor/sbws]: Refactor Relay and RelayList to be able to initialize them without Tor's controller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29717: Refactor Relay and RelayList to be able to initialize them without Tor's
controller
-+---
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tech-debt, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28684   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by irl):

 Ah, maybe not. I thought this was a stem thing.

 bushel is the experimental CollecTor replacement
 https://github.com/irl/bushel

 This might still be interesting to look at later and see if some decisions
 you make here are also applicable to bushel, even if only indirectly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28802 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28802: Integrate PTs and bridge support into Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, GeorgKoppen201903,  |
  tbb-8.5, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 `bug_28802_v3` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_28802_v3=68730ec4ae152475f638cd52f79b6621412b3f85)
 has the updated version of the patch. I adjusted the commit message and a
 comment in the Orbot project slightly to take into account that we
 actually get bridge support for free by exposing the necessary UI e.g.
 with the patch in #28329.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 > One way, if we're comfortable relying on Debian dependencies, is to ask
 the operator to install ​tor-geoipdb or ​geoip-database package.

 > We should make the path to the two GeoIP databases configurable (either
 via a command line parameter and/or a small config file?)

 I think this is the best of both worlds:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/fbb87b508641bbbcfd3163d1f2a43b9aff4e0085

 The broker now allows the operator to pass in a path to geop files (for
 IPv4 and IPv6) as command-line arguments. The default is the install
 location of the debian tor-geoip package. If an invalid filename is
 provided (or none are provided and the package is not installed), the
 table will fail to load but not cause any crashes. There's a test for that
 here:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/09dd27f9408b1ff3ff916e374bcd5f659ad5b26b

 > In the tests, I would also test an address that maps to "" and perhaps
 special cases like 127.0.0.1, 0.0.0.0, 255.255.255.255.

 Thanks! Got some bugs :) Here's the tests and fixes:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/be4d245375722d958dd85f1a53849cdc37b3382b

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[tor-bugs] #29793 [Core Tor/Tor]: show-distdir-core and friends should fail more quietly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29793: show-distdir-core and friends should fail more quietly
---+--
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ci, travis
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 `make show-distdir-core` and `make show-distdir-testlog` should probably
 fail more quietly so they don't produce spurious errors from `make`. These
 spurious errors can make troubleshooting actual build problems more
 difficult.

 (Yes, Travis ignores them, but `make` doesn't.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, I forgot one thing from the list

 `// Runnable for changing the alpha of the Onion image every two seconds.`

 yet `private long mOnionAlphaChangerSleepInterval = 1000;` so did you mean
 "every second"?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Here is what is still left over after looking at `28329_17`

 `res/drawable/tor_spinning_onion.xml` - license?

 For readability (and consistency across files) newlines between XML
 header, license, and the meat of the files would be good.

 "ViewPager containing for our bootstrapping pages" s/containing for/for
 containting/ ?

 "stop bootstrapping animation" s/stop/stop the/

 nit: "being used. There" <- one whitespace too much :) (in
 TorPreferences.java)

 "clicks on the Change link" <- missing "." at the end

 "if meek-azure if chosen" -> s/if chosen/is chosen/

 {{{
 +// This implements TorNetworkBridgePopulateList so it can receive the
 list
 +// of bridges asynchronously from Gecko.
 }}}
 can go
 {{{
 // Request the list of built-in bridges after the View is created
 }}}
 can go, too

 'substitute it with "meek_lite"'.  s/meek_lite/meek/

 The switch for enabling/disabling bridges itself is jumping a bit during
 the transition, probably depending on the text. I think the correct
 behavior would be that the switch stayed where it is and just the text
 "moves".

 comment:61 is still an issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've merged the PR, but we should still think about good solutions here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Fix for the issues can be found here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/799

 We should also figure out what to do about the greater problem mentioned
 in the top post, otherwise this is gonna come up again and again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker tech-debt tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  practracker tech-debt => practracker tech-debt tor-ci


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[tor-bugs] #29792 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker problems and CI broken on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29792: practracker problems and CI broken on master
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  practracker tech-debt
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 CI is broken on master because of the following practracker issues:
 {{{
 python3 ./scripts/maint/practracker/practracker.py .
 problem function-size
 /src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:compute_frac_paths_available() 193
 problem file-size /src/core/or/circuituse.c 3150
 }}}

 These were caused by #28656 and #29665.
 They were not detected during the PR-check phase, because the PR was for
 035 and 040 which dont include the practracker check. How should we avoid
 this issue in the future?

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[tor-bugs] #29791 [- Select a component]: Importing bookmarks from chrome to tor failed every time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29791: Importing bookmarks from chrome to tor failed every time
-+--
 Reporter:  AlAllen  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 I want to start using Tor as my main browser but trying more than 10 times
 to import bookmarks from chrome in all ways possible Tor becomes
 irresponsive and blocked.

 What to do?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29789 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker.py codec exception in some locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29789: practracker.py codec exception in some locales
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, tools   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:   => easy, tools
 * points:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29789 [Core Tor/Tor]: practracker.py codec exception in some locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29789: practracker.py codec exception in some locales
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+--

Comment (by catalyst):

 There's a change in b4b8fa4899fcde9983f66a6310878ea47186e5eb to
 checkIncludes.py that looks like it might help. Maybe we should copy it
 (or refactor it into some shared maintenance script utility code)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:103 gk]:
 > I am wondering what happens if users had customized their toolbar, say
 by adding a home button or custom extension buttons. While those vanish,
 too?

 I think the answer is "yes." Another way to solve the upgrade issue would
 be to "surgically" relocate the Torbutton toolbar item and then insert the
 new Security Settings one in the correct place. Maybe that can be
 implemented in a followup ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5,
 tbb-parity => tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903,
 tbb-8.5


Comment:

 Testing
 tor-browser-8.5a8-android-armv7-multi-qa_28329.apk

 `Bootstrapping screen`
 - The icon is stretched, seems like the container is set up as an square,
 but is not. If you need a 1:1 icon there use >
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/28329/icon1x1.svg
 - Use the icon white version >
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/28329/icon.svg
 - The animation should go from 100% opacity to 0% and from 0% to 100%, not
 a 0% 100% loop.


 `Select a Bridge`
 - Selecte a bridge and Provide a bridge I know should have the same
 padding/margin around.

 `Provide a Bridge`
 - The keyboard has a . We should have the Enter/Confirm icon there back.
 - When going back to the previous screen, the keyboard keeps open.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5, tbb-parity  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "icon.svg" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5, tbb-parity  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "icon1x1.svg" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Hi!  I left two comments.  One should be easy to fix, but the one about
 dormant mode should be less so.

 If the dormant-mode change is hard, then I'd suggest that you rebase the
 branch to include a fix for the RNG issue, and remove the dormant-mode
 change.  We can merge the branch after that, and you can do the dormant-
 mode thing in a separate branch.  Sound ok?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available : Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28656: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available 
:
Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-rc-blocker?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Okay, I've squashed the branch as bug28656_035_squashed, and made a new PR
 as https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/798 .  Merging to 0.4.0 and
 forward.  Marking for possible backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term 
fix
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-authority-   |  Actual Points:  1.1
  test, consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,  |
  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034   |
  -backport-maybe, 035-backport, 040-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 okay, merged again and trying again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term 
fix
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-authority-   |  Actual Points:  1.1
  test, consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,  |
  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034   |
  -backport-maybe, 035-backport, 040-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29665 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29665: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP 
circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Merged PR 791 to 0.4.0 and forward. Marking for possible backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add build option to store profile in HOME directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29790: Add build option to store profile in HOME directory
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => tbb-security


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:29790 boklm]:
 > On Windows and Linux, we currently include the profile inside the Tor
 Browser bundle directory. However, this does not work if we want to
 install Tor Browser in a read-only directory (for instance somewhere in
 /usr).
 Hallelujah!

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[tor-bugs] #29790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add build option to store profile in HOME directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29790: Add build option to store profile in HOME directory
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On Windows and Linux, we currently include the profile inside the Tor
 Browser bundle directory. However, this does not work if we want to
 install Tor Browser in a read-only directory (for instance somewhere in
 /usr).

 We added the --enable-tor-browser-data-outside-app-dir option (which we
 currently use on macOS), to be able to store the profile in a TorBrowser-
 Data directory outside the bundle directory, to avoid codesigning issues
 on macOS. However, I think it is not currently possible to select where
 the TorBrowser-Data directory is located.

 On the tor-packagers mailing list, Thomas Klausner suggested a patch to be
 able to store the profile in the HOME directory:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 packagers/2019-March/60.html

 However, I am not sure if the patch is enough, or if more things are
 needed to handle updates correctly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29743 [Core Tor/Tor]: Long-running tor instances fail to keep up-to-date directory information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29743: Long-running tor instances fail to keep up-to-date directory information
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 I'll also look at op-ab logs which should be running a more recent tor
 version, and we're going to update the tor versions on the three OnionPerf
 instances mentioned above. This is going to take a few days if the op-ab
 logs contain something useful or a few weeks if we first need to update
 tor versions and make new measurements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29744 [Core Tor/Tor]: Streams sometimes stall for up to 1 hour without making any progress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29744: Streams sometimes stall for up to 1 hour without making any progress
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 I'll also look at op-ab logs which should be running a more recent tor
 version, and we're going to update the tor versions on the three OnionPerf
 instances mentioned above. This is going to take a few days if the op-ab
 logs contain something useful or a few weeks if we first need to update
 tor versions and make new measurements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Reading
 {{{
Toolbars are reset
 to
 the Tor Browser default when the new 'inserted_security_level' pref is
 false. Coupled with the changes in tor-browser, users which upgrade
 will
 have their toolbars reset to the new design.
 }}}
 I am wondering what happens if users had customized their toolbar, say by
 adding a home button or custom extension buttons. While those vanish, too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29787 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29787: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf
output
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Interesting! These sound like they could be very useful to better
 understand how the application observes failures and timeouts. But as you
 say, we'll probably have to further correlate these error codes with
 torctl logs to get a better insight into failures observed by the tor
 process.

 Ideally, we'd have combined error cases/codes for failures/timeouts
 observed by the application ''and'' the tor process, rather than including
 OnionPerf's error code and then something from torctl events in .tpf
 output. Or we'll have to specify somewhere which combinations are possible
 and what exactly they mean. This is probably not trivial to do, but if we
 don't do it, others will try it and do it slightly wrong, so it's better
 if we do it.

 Can I help with the digging? Maybe we can share the digging work without
 duplicating the effort?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24653 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24653: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  security-slider, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW, no that #25658 landed we should cover those changes in this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW, we can use #24653 to tackle the mobile side of this ticket.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27083, #28329, #27592, #28704, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #27083, #28329, #27592, #28704, #29003, #24653, #24957, 
#26242, #26318, #28763, #28764, #28765, #28766, #29498 by gk:


Comment:
tbb-parity items.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Gradle with --offline when building the browser part

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28753: Use Gradle with --offline when building the browser part
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it (was: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201903,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-parity  |
Parent ID:  #24855   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903 =>
 AffectsTails, TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-parity


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24855, #28802, #25764, #26529, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24855, #28802, #25764, #26529, #28622, #28800, #28803, 
#28145 by gk:


Comment:
Introducing tbb-parity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: user not taught *how* to open the security-slider dialog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27485: Onboarding: user not taught *how* to open the security-slider dialog
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201903|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-team, tbb-8.5 =>
 tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-team, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201903


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:preferences hash urls do not work properly in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29554: about:preferences hash urls do not work properly in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201903
 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This got with commit a7ba005d5398a29d95320a5e8c02bf050e58f08b on `tor-
 browser-60.5.1esr-8.5-1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 I applied the Torbutton patch to `master` (commit
 5a3d6d26e1f8046b20e51d93ca9457a729063bfc) and added both the tor-browser
 patch and the fixup to `tor-browser-60.5.0esr-8.5-1` (commits
 a7ba005d5398a29d95320a5e8c02bf050e58f08b and
 d76b18ccef4ba4cb5be25f8c81b5817610f4d292). I did not have a chance to look
 over the tor-browser patch yet but from the comments in this ticket it
 *seems* it fixes #29554 as well. I'll close that ticket, but please reopen
 if I was wrong. What about #23359? Are done here as well in the sense that
 the buttons are not shown anymore?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce new features to users in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29768: Introduce new features to users in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-8.5
 * cc: tbb-8.5 (removed)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29657 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change the 'Learn More' links in the securitylevel component to point to new documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29657: Change the 'Learn More' links in the securitylevel component to point to
new documentation
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-8.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: user not taught *how* to open the security-slider dialog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27485: Onboarding: user not taught *how* to open the security-slider dialog
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We are done here with #28628 solved.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28628 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce New Security Settings to users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28628: Introduce New Security Settings to users
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201903R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I cherry-picked the Torbutton patch (commit
 52c12d905ff4f6d35d5788b5cc379e474be429e9 on `torbutton`'s `master`) and
 the tor-browser patch (commit ea65909a1c1060e544ea56a110f948994e2a3df9 on
 `tor-browser`'s `tor-browser-60.5.1esr-8.5-1`).

 We'll deal with the more general question of introducing new features in
 #29768.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce new features to users in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29768: Introduce new features to users in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: tbb-8.5 (added)
 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 Bumping prio and getting on our 8.5 radar as we want to have this fixed
 for the stable when the new security settings feature ships.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser ignores proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29765: TorBrowser ignores proxy settings
--+
 Reporter:  DNied |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Great that it works for you now! Closing as WORKSFORME.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27478: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme
-+-
 Reporter:  nsuchy   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, thanks! Merged to `master` (commit
 2930d898032e04443527af8c6528481f202a2c4e).

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