Re: [tor-bugs] #7600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Edit curr torrc: comments # in the configuration file will lead to " Error at line 1: "" "

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7600: Edit curr torrc: comments # in the configuration file will lead to " 
Error
at line 1: ""  "
--+---
 Reporter:  steve45king   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.2.39
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  torrc comments error  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by Mahewtt):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 We all interested in error configurations for the new ticket. They all
 wants our instructions to [https://edubirdie.com/check-my-grammar/ view it
 now]  for better projects. Then everyone will use the interesting reports
 and assignments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restore IPv6 intro points in the HS client tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29237: Restore IPv6 intro points in the HS client tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, prop224, tor-hs, single-   |  Actual Points:
  onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-proposed, v3-onion-service-feature-|
  parity-can |
Parent ID:  #23588   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed, v3-onion-
 service-feature-parity
 =>
 fast-fix, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed, v3-onion-
 service-feature-parity-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27251 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add single-onion-v23-ipv6-md to make test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27251: Add single-onion-v23-ipv6-md to make test-network-all
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, prop224, tor-hs, single-   |  Actual Points:
  onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328, v3-onion-service-|
  feature-parity-can |
Parent ID:  #23588   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, v3-onion-service-feature-parity
 =>
 fast-fix, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, v3-onion-service-feature-parity-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-proposed, v3-onion-service-feature-|
  parity-can |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed, v3-onion-
 service-feature-parity
 =>
 prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed, v3-onion-
 service-feature-parity-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  v3-onion-service-feature-parity- |  Actual Points:  0.7
  can, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,  |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328
 =>
 v3-onion-service-feature-parity-can, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,
 ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23588, #27251, #29237

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23588, #27251, #29237 by teor:


Comment:
The IPv6 tickets are not a must-have for feature parity, because v2 used a 
workaround for IPv6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23507 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add single onion unreachable address algorithm to prop224 and implement it (was: Add single onion unreachable address algorithm to prop224)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23507: Add single onion unreachable address algorithm to prop224 and implement 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  v3-onion-service-feature-parity, |  Actual Points:
  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,   |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 doc, tor-spec, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,
 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328
 =>
 v3-onion-service-feature-parity, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,
 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23818: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  v3-onion-service-feature-parity, |  Actual Points:
  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,   |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328
 =>
 v3-onion-service-feature-parity, prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6,
 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23588, #27251, #29237

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23588, #27251, #29237 by teor:


Comment:
Pili asked me to tag these tickets

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 040-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Oops, there is an extra argument in dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths() in
 0.3.5.
 Pushed a commit to 0.3.5 and re-did the master merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29019 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make relays report bandwidth usage more often in test networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29019: Make relays report bandwidth usage more often in test networks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  backlog, privcount,  |  Actual Points:
  040-unreached-20190109,|
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29005   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115, network-
 team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 backlog, privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115,
 network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29004 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29004: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  backlog, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  040-unreached-20190109,|
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #27908   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115, network-
 team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 backlog, privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115,
 network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29005 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29005: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  backlog, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  040-unreached-20190109,|
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #27908   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115, network-
 team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 backlog, privcount, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-accepted-20190115,
 network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29004 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29004: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #27908   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I have part of a patch for this ticket, but it needs to be revised after
 #29018 and #29019, and with #29005.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28925 [Core Tor/Tor]: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28925: distinguish PT vs proxy for real in bootstrap tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, usability, ux, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-needs, 040-must, network-team- |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 WIP branch at https://github.com/tlyu/tor/tree/bug28925 , needs a bit of
 cleanup and some documentation.

 Not the greatest strategy (adds more state into `or_connection_t`), but
 not too horrible either.

 Manually tested with built-in PT bridges on TB 8.5a8; haven't yet tested
 non-PT proxies.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29005 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29005: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #27908   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 I have part of a patch for this ticket, but it needs to be revised after
 #29018 and #29019.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29019 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make relays report bandwidth usage more often in test networks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29019: Make relays report bandwidth usage more often in test networks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29005   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 I have a patch, but it needs to be split up and re-tested after #29018
 merges.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge, security-low, |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet- |
  merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet-
 merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-merge
 =>
 asn-merge, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet-
 merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2


Comment:

 Fix keywords.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29018 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29018: Make all statistics depend on ExtraInfoStatistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, security-low,  |  Actual Points:  2
  040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet- |
  merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-|
  merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 fast-fix, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet-
 merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2
 =>
 fast-fix, security-low, 040-deferred-20190220, privcount, dgoulet-
 merge, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, asn-merge


Comment:

 Oh right, asn has to merge this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29763 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Fix 0.2.9 failures in chutney CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29763: Fix 0.2.9 failures in chutney CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  chutney-ci, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29729   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This issue seems to be fixed by the bootstrap changes, let's open specific
 bugs for failures.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29761 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Track chutney CI failures, and tweak the allow failures settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29761: Track chutney CI failures, and tweak the allow failures settings
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  chutney-ci, network-team-|  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29729   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This issue seems to be fixed by the bootstrap changes, let's open specific
 bugs for failures.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backport test-network.sh fixes to 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29703: Backport test-network.sh fixes to 0.2.9
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs 029-backport network-team-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29280   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I wasn't able to do this pull request, I will try to get it done by the
 end of the week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I wasn't able to do this review in the last two weeks: I have been very
 busy with roadmap coding, the review backlog, the backport backlog, and
 0.4.0 bugs.

 I expect to have time to do #29237 and #27251 by the end of March. This
 review might take another week after that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28565 [Core Tor/sbws]: Report excluded results in a relay's bandwidth line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28565: Report excluded results in a relay's bandwidth line
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I think you missed some of the changes you were going to do.
 There are also some comments that are hard to understand, or duplicates.

 Once you are happy with the name change and comments, please put this
 ticket into merge_ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 040-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 There is a changes file.
 The spec is in #29813.
 The CI passed on both pull requests, but 809 still shows travis as
 pending.
 That seems to be a GitHub bug.

 The branches have fixups, so I need to do a squash.

 The branches have the same effect, but the code changes are in different
 files. I was concerned about merge conflicts between 0.3.4 and 0.3.5. I
 did a merge from the 0.3.4 branch to 0.3.5, and copied over the code
 changes to the new directory structure.

 Here are the pull requests:
 * 0.3.4 squashed: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/820
 * 0.3.5 merged: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/821
 * master merged: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/822 (for testing)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29813 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unmeasured and vote Line KeyValues in the bandwidth-file-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29813: Add unmeasured and vote Line KeyValues in the bandwidth-file-spec
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, bandwidth-file-spec, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  bwauth |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm, teor  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 There is one typo in the spec, I added a comment on the pull request.

 I think we can merge this change when #29806 merges.

 Why do you want to wait until the next sbws release?
 If we keep this pull request open, and you make another pull request on
 torspec master, they might have conflicts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec observed bandwidth to 5 days

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28984: Update dir-spec observed bandwidth to 5 days
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, doc, tor-spec, fast-fix,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-must, spec  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master as commit 2390032.

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[tor-bugs] #29842 [Applications]: How to use command F in Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29842: How to use command F in Tor?
--+--
 Reporter:  Silver70  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Component:  Applications
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I would like to know how to set up command F in tor like chrome which
 works fine for me.

 Which file should I edit on my mac? What should I put into this file to
 achieve this?

 Thanks,
 Silver70

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29842 [Applications]: How to use command F in Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29842: How to use command F in Tor?
--+--
 Reporter:  Silver70  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Silver70):

 This is not spam. It is real.

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[tor-bugs] #29841 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: ipsec VPN generates gigantic logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29841: ipsec VPN generates gigantic logs
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Serious yak shaving night...

 To try to silence this seemingly innocuous warning:

 {{{
 /etc/cron.daily/logrotate:
 error: Compressing program wrote following message to stderr when
 compressing log /var/log/syslog.1:
 gzip: stdin: file size changed while zipping
 }}}

 ... I have looked at the logrotate configuration deployed through Puppet,
 and it seems slightly out of date compared to the one available in
 stretch. This is the configuration left over from the stretch upgrade on
 eugeni, for example:

 {{{
 /var/log/syslog
 {
 rotate 7
 daily
 missingok
 notifempty
 delaycompress
 compress
 postrotate
 invoke-rc.d syslog-ng reload > /dev/null
 endscript
 }

 /var/log/mail.info
 /var/log/mail.warn
 /var/log/mail.err
 /var/log/mail.log
 /var/log/daemon.log
 /var/log/kern.log
 /var/log/auth.log
 /var/log/user.log
 /var/log/lpr.log
 /var/log/cron.log
 /var/log/debug
 /var/log/messages
 /var/log/error
 {
 rotate 4
 weekly
 missingok
 notifempty
 compress
 delaycompress
 sharedscripts
 postrotate
 invoke-rc.d syslog-ng reload > /dev/null
 endscript
 }
 }}}

 Out of those, we're not doing the `syslog-ng reload`, the `delaycompress`,
 `notifempty` and each logfile is in a separate block which makes it harder
 to read. So I looked at doing the postrotate action, but then I realized
 it was happening on the syslog logfile which *is* correctly reloaded. so
 then i figured the `delaycompress` might be the bit missing.

 but before enabling that blindly, I figured I would check if this would
 blow up the disk space on a server. how to do that you ask? well with our
 shiny new Cumin tool of course:

 {{{
 anarcat@curie:~(master)$ cumin -p 0 '*' 'for log in /var/log/*.log ; do if
 [ `du -b "$log" | cut -f1` -gt 10 ] ; then echo "logfile $log
 larger than 1GB"; exit 1 ; fi; done'
 74 hosts will be targeted:
 
alberti.torproject.org,arlgirdense.torproject.org,bracteata.torproject.org,brulloi.torproject.org
 ,build-
 
arm-[01-03].torproject.org,build-x86-[05-09].torproject.org,bungei.torproject.org,carinatum.torproject.org
 ,cdn-backend-
 
sunet-01.torproject.org,chamaemoly.torproject.org,chiwui.torproject.org,colchicifolium.torproject.org,corsicum.torproject.org,crispum.torproject.org
 ,crm-ext-01.torproject.org,crm-
 
int-01.torproject.org,cupani.torproject.org,dictyotum.torproject.org,eugeni.torproject.org,fallax.torproject.org,forrestii.torproject.org,gayi.torproject.org,getulum.torproject.org,gitlab-01.torproject.org,henryi.torproject.org
 ,hetzner-hel1-[01-03].torproject.org,hetzner-
 
nbg1-01.torproject.org,hyalinum.torproject.org,iranicum.torproject.org,kvm[4-5].torproject.org,listera.torproject.org,macrum.torproject.org,majus.torproject.org,materculae.torproject.org,meronense.torproject.org,moly.torproject.org,neriniflorum.torproject.org,nevii.torproject.org,nova.torproject.org,nutans.torproject.org,omeiense.torproject.org
 ,oo-
 
hetzner-03.torproject.org,opacum.torproject.org,orestis.torproject.org,oschaninii.torproject.org,palmeri.torproject.org,pauli.torproject.org,peninsulare.torproject.org,perdulce.torproject.org,polyanthum.torproject.org,rouyi.torproject.org,rude.torproject.org,savii.torproject.org,saxatile.torproject.org
 ,scw-arm-ams-01.torproject.org,scw-arm-
 
par-01.torproject.org,staticiforme.torproject.org,subnotabile.torproject.org,textile.torproject.org,togashii.torproject.org,troodi.torproject.org,unifolium.torproject.org,vineale.torproject.org
 ,web-cymru-01.torproject.org,web-hetzner-01.torproject.org
 Confirm to continue [y/n]? y
 |██▌
 |  12% (9/74) [00:47<08:25,  7.78s/hosts]
 = NODE GROUP =
 |██▌
 |  12% (9/74) [00:52<08:25,  7.78s/hosts]
 (3) build-arm-[01-03].torproject.org
 |██▌
 |  12% (9/74) [00:52<08:25,  7.78s/hosts]
 - OUTPUT of 'for log in /var/...xit 1 ; fi; done' -
 |██▌
 |  12% (9/74) [00:52<08:25,  7.78s/hosts]
 Connection timed out during banner exchange
 |██▌
 |  12% (9/74) [00:52<08:25,  7.78s/hosts]
 = NODE GROUP =
 |██▌
 |  12% (9/74) [00:52<08:25,  7.78s/hosts]
 (5) hetzner-
 
hel1-01.torproject

Re: [tor-bugs] #29693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Decrease probability of stochastic failures in test-slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29693: Decrease probability of stochastic failures in test-slow
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor2-must
+--

Comment (by teor):

 This bug caused #28636 to fail:
 {{{
 slow/prob_distr/stochastic_weibull: [forking] fail Weibull sampler
   FAIL src/test/test_prob_distr.c:1419: assert(ok)
 NOTE: This is a stochastic test, and we expect it to fail from
 time to time, with some low probability. If you see it fail more
 than one trial in 100, though, please tell us.
 Seed: D954C0E889C484D1BF3BB1D895E726F1
   [stochastic_weibull FAILED]
 1/20 TESTS FAILED. (0 skipped)
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/509213576#L5738

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The squashed pull request failed due to #29693.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision
 * version:   => Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Here are things that need revision:
 * Please fill in the actual points on this ticket.
 * This is a bug on code that was released in 0.4.0.1-alpha, so it needs a
 changes file.
   * Was any of this code released earlier than 0.4.0.1-alpha?
 * I did a review, I found at least one potential bug, and one typo:
   * https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/819
 * I don't know enough to know if this code needs spec changes:
   * The only functional change I can see is padding is disabled in dormant
 mode.

 Here are the things I did:
 * The CI passed on the original pull request.
 * The pull request is based on master, so I'm setting the milestone to
 0.4.1 with no backport.
 * This branch has fixups, squashed to bug28636_squashed and made a pull
 request:
   * https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/819
 * I reviewed the squashed version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29500: Broken circuitpadding unittests on appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, 040-must|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 This bug caused #29824 to fail:
 {{{
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_tokens: [forking]
   FAIL ../src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:1150: assert(mi->histogram[4]
 OP_EQ 2): 0 vs 2
   [circuitpadding_tokens FAILED]
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_negotiation: [forking] OK
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop: [forking] OK
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_conditions: [forking] OK
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_rtt: [forking]
   FAIL ../src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:322:
 assert(relay_side->padding_info[0]->last_received_time_usec OP_NE 0): 0 vs
 0
   [circuitpadding_rtt FAILED]
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_sample_distribution: [forking] OK
 }}}
 
https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/builds/23230458/job/e8is73u02ymt6xfl?fullLog=true

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29824 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1444119 resource leak in BUG case in consdiff.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29824: CID 1444119 resource leak in BUG case in consdiff.c
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Appveyor failed due to #29500, I'll trigger a rebuild.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29645 [Core Tor/Tor]: test.exe hangs on Appveyor CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29645: test.exe hangs on Appveyor CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-windows, tor-test, hang  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 #29528 master failed on appveyor due to #29645:
 
https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/builds/23216905/job/1q8wji257qffgfs4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29528 [Core Tor/Tor]: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer errors should fail the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29528: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer errors should fail the unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 041-proposed,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Link for #29693 failure:
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/508841104

 master failed on appveyor due to #29645:
 
https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/builds/23216905/job/1q8wji257qffgfs4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29528 [Core Tor/Tor]: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer errors should fail the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29528: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer errors should fail the unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 041-proposed,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 master failed due to #29693.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29693 [Core Tor/Tor]: Decrease probability of stochastic failures in test-slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29693: Decrease probability of stochastic failures in test-slow
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, 040-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor2-must
+--

Comment (by teor):

 This bug caused #29528 to fail on master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29395 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Document the steps of adding someone to the TSA team

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29395: Document the steps of adding someone to the TSA team
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  ln5
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29396   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 note that there's a relation with the [[org/onboarding]] document here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29537 [Core Tor/Tor]: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29537: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  portability technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, teor  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29537 [Core Tor/Tor]: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29537: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  portability technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, teor  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 (More precisely, the code seems to assume that int and intptr are the same
 size, but I don't think that's guaranteed.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29537 [Core Tor/Tor]: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29537: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  portability technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, teor  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks!

 The code looks good,
 We're missing some function-level documentation.
 And I have a question about the size of an int being smaller than or equal
 to void *.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP
Version Failure Count)
---+
 Reporter:  neel   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27491 | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > Third, I'm assuming that we only do this algorithm when we detect that
 we are dual-stack.  If we only have an ipv6 address or an ipv4 address,
 then we should just assume that's the only one we can use, right?

 And what do we do if we can't detect any of our addresses?
 (Some OSes allow administrators to block the APIs that Tor uses to detect
 local addresses. I know of at least one Tor user who does this.)

 Using local addresses is covered by ticket #27492 - Try IPv4 or IPv6 more
 often based on public or private IP addresses. I think it makes sense to
 include all the children of #17835 in this proposal. (It's the only
 missing child that adds a new feature. All the rest are refactoring or
 bugs.)

 > Fourth, the halving algorithm seems kind of complicated to me.  In some
 other places, we halve things like this based on the passage of time,
 rather than on their totals. Would that make sense here?
 >
 > Fifth, I don't understand section 7.  Why would a client need to make 4
 connections at once to a guard?

 You're right. This section is not very clear.

 Tor limits the number of simultaneous connection attempts *when
 bootstrapping* using the option
 ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries. The default is 3, which is too
 low for networks that drop all IPv4 or all IPv6 packets.

 Tor doesn't limit the number of simultaneous connection attempts once it
 has bootstrapped. Unless the DDoS code added a limit on the client side?

 > Sixth, what should the default be for ClientAutoIPv6ORPort?

 0 until it has been tested and we are sure we want the feature on by
 default.
 Similarly, each flag should be off by default, until we have tested it.
 Then we can decide if it should be on by default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
--+--
 Reporter:  pidgin|  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:30 pidgin]:
 > Replying to [comment:28 teor]:
 > > Hi pidgin,
 > >
 > > We need to know more about your setup to help you:
 > >
 > > Replying to [comment:22 teor]:
 > > > The v3 service doesn't have the guard issue, it's getting much
 further along. Have you tried running it on a separate machine? (Or by
 itself without v2 running on the same machine?)
 >
 > there is enough cpu and bandwidth

 Tor also uses many other resources that can become exhausted, like
 sockets, memory, and various kernel data structures.

 Can you please test the v3 service on a machine by itself?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Intelligently insert the Security Level button to the user's taskbar rather than resetting to default on upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29825: Intelligently insert the Security Level button to the user's taskbar 
rather
than resetting to default on upgrade
+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Juga, after you merge this code, please check that the number of relays in
 the bandwidth file is about the same as the number of relays in the
 consensus.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Intelligently insert the Security Level button to the user's taskbar rather than resetting to default on upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29825: Intelligently insert the Security Level button to the user's taskbar 
rather
than resetting to default on upgrade
+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Intelligently insert the Security Level button to the user's taskbar rather than resetting to default on upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29825: Intelligently insert the Security Level button to the user's taskbar 
rather
than resetting to default on upgrade
+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_review => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21304 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Sanitize snowflake.log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21304: Sanitize snowflake.log
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 I've implemented a log scrubber that sends all log output through a series
 of regular expressions to replace IPv4 and IPv6 addresses with safe
 strings ({{{X.X.X.X}}} and {{{X:X:X:X:X:X:X:X}}}, respectively). Here is
 the commit:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/e5dda8a3d526b692712baa4e8602b4248ea38376

 The http server panic mentioned above is solved in this way, since the
 server is set up to log messages to the default logger (set up in
 server.go to output to the provided log file). If the code is ever changed
 to give the http.Server structs created in server.go their own logger,
 we'll need to make sure we add a scrubber to the logger.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:107 gk]:

 > What I mean is not a redesign of how per-site security settings should
 work but we thought about making site-specific settings _as they are
 available today_ accessible. Ideas we had were outlined in section 2.2 of
 the proposal.

 Got it! I approached a UI for what is described at 2.2.

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/25658/25658%20-%202.2.png, 700px)]]

 Questions:

 - ` By default only the option to temporarily allow JavaScript would be
 visible.` When? On the Default level? Or in all security levels?

 - What happens when user enable/disable JS or Active Content? Should they
 reload to apply effects?

 - We cannot prompt users to enable JS for each website who wants to use
 JS. How are we going to balance it? One option could be to not prompt
 users but enable it automatically and giving users visual feedback at the
 URL bar with the colored icon. If this is the road we are going to take,
 then we should expose this in global settings as an opt-in.

 - Can we save trusted sites in any safe way? Those trusted sites could
 have JS enabled, even if the global security level is `Safest`.

 - The gear icon at the Control Center goes to `about:preferences#privacy
 Permissions`. Should we incorporate JS and Active Content as an option
 there too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 2.2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit Display" / "See My Path"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27484: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit
Display" / "See My Path"
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Yeah, is great. I think is working. Thanks for sharing!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit Display" / "See My Path"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27484: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit
Display" / "See My Path"
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:21 antonela]:
 > Let's implement the two buttons navigation idea. That will fix the
 uncertainty about the navigation.

 Thanks! We made some progress on this today and produced the following:

 [[Image(27484-wip1.png, 700px)]]

 Antonela, is the position of the "See My Path" button acceptable? We
 placed it below the text for two reasons:
 1. The action is associated with the text above.
 2. The implementation is a lot easier. Why? Because Mozilla used a 2x2
 grid for the layout of each onboarding panel, which means there really is
 not enough room in row 2, column 2 for both buttons.

 Let us know what you think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit Display" / "See My Path"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27484: Onboarding: unintuitive not-navigation buttons, starting with "Circuit
Display" / "See My Path"
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-onboarding, ux-  |  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "27484-wip1.png" added.

 revised onboarding (work in progress)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29824 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1444119 resource leak in BUG case in consdiff.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29824: CID 1444119 resource leak in BUG case in consdiff.c
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  coverity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/818

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29537 [Core Tor/Tor]: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29537: verify intptr_t round-trip through void *
+--
 Reporter:  catalyst|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  portability technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst, teor  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29674 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: silence or uninstall logwatch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29674: silence or uninstall logwatch
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 added the resource to puppet, this will be completed by the time all
 puppet runs finish within a few hours. we'll see tomorrow if it worked!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29788 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create email alias to core contributor Vinícius Zavam (egypcio)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29788: Create email alias to core contributor Vinícius Zavam (egypcio)
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ggus):

 >shouldn't egypcio need a full LDAP account if they're a core contributor?

 No, Egypcio only needs email alias.

 >where do they fit in this decision tree?

 Here:

 {{{
 Are they a Core Contributor?

 An existing Core Contributor should request an email alias.
 }}}

 And egypcio OpenPGP key:

 pub   rsa4096/0x415C653413B43475 2014-06-06 [SC] [expires: 2021-06-04]
   Key fingerprint = 13AC CF3E D4E3 B36F 626F  D3AE 415C 6534 13B4 3475

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29674 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: silence or uninstall logwatch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29674: silence or uninstall logwatch
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 weasel approved this if i remember correctly, i'll clean that up. from
 what I can tell, it's not in puppet so, ironically, i'll need to *add*
 logwatch to puppet to remove it. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29400 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Set up a Gitlab instance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29400: Set up a Gitlab instance
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i don't know what it's worth, but there's a trac to gitlab migration tool
 that seems it could be useful for us, if we want to move content between
 the two tools:

 https://github.com/tracboat/tracboat

 i, for one, would absolutely love to move our issue tracking (and wiki!)
 there...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for ARM architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12631: Tor Browser for ARM architecture
--+
 Reporter:  mttp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by c6h12o6):

 Would future native builds then have to utilize the cross-toolchain
 (instead of the native toolchain currently used) to achieve
 reproducibility across different host/target combinations?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29817 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: dead disk on moly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29817: dead disk on moly
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i asked jon to order the disk from newegg and ship it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29788 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create email alias to core contributor Vinícius Zavam (egypcio)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29788: Create email alias to core contributor Vinícius Zavam (egypcio)
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 shouldn't egypcio need a full LDAP account if they're a core contributor?
 where do they fit in this decision tree?

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/accounts/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 whoops.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec observed bandwidth to 5 days

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28984: Update dir-spec observed bandwidth to 5 days
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, tor-spec, fast-fix,   |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 040-must, spec  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 lgtm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm now

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[tor-bugs] #29840 [Core Tor/Tor]: WTF-PAD: Log padding counters into the heartbeat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29840: WTF-PAD: Log padding counters into the heartbeat
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,
 Severity:  Normal   |  padding, 041-proposed
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28632
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We should tie the padding counters in circuitpadding to the heartbeat so
 that we can see (at least on the relays) how much padding we are
 sending/receiving.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29820 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Change PGP key for ahf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29820: Change PGP key for ahf
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  ln5
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 ONe more change -- that test is backwards now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP
Version Failure Count)
---+
 Reporter:  neel   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27491 | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 040-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29801 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29801: Add teor's suggestions for Prop#299 (referring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP
Version Failure Count)
---+--
 Reporter:  neel   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop299  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27491 | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Hi!  Here are my initial questions on the proposal.

 First off, I'd like to understand how this interacts with the guard-
 selection algorithms in guard-spec.txt.  At what stage(s) during guard
 selection _exactly_ do we take these probabilities into account?

 Second, I'd like to understand better why we are picking the constants we
 have here.  Why are werounding everything to multiples of 1/4, and
 rounding up to 1/4.  I understand that we don't want to reduce the
 probability to 0, but why 1/4 and not some other value?  Similarly, why
 are we counting "no route" as twice as bad as a regular failure, instead
 of 1.5x or 3x or something?

 Third, I'm assuming that we only do this algorithm when we detect that we
 are dual-stack.  If we only have an ipv6 address or an ipv4 address, then
 we should just assume that's the only one we can use, right?

 Fourth, the halving algorithm seems kind of complicated to me.  In some
 other places, we halve things like this based on the passage of time,
 rather than on their totals. Would that make sense here?

 Fifth, I don't understand section 7.  Why would a client need to make 4
 connections at once to a guard?

 Sixth, what should the default be for ClientAutoIPv6ORPort?

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[tor-bugs] #29839 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include Tor Browser data from F-Droid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29839: Include Tor Browser data from F-Droid
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Note: This is currently blocking on #27539. When that is complete, re-
 assign this to Metrics->Website. In addition, we should understand if this
 is possible before reassigning this ticket.
 

 Similar to #29837, we should include statistics on Tor Browser on Android
 from F-Droid. How/if we can obtain this data remains an open question.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29159 [Community/Translations]: Outreach material localization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29159: Outreach material localization
+--
 Reporter:  antonela|  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  stephw, ggus|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 well, i guess some more languages are going to eventually get translated,
 but i will close the ticket for the time being, as the system is working
 now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21304 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Sanitize snowflake.log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21304: Sanitize snowflake.log
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  starter|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28983 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how long it takes sbws to measure the network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28983: Work out how long it takes sbws to measure the network
+---
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM! Thanks for the fixes!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28563 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28563: Work out how sbws can report excluded relays in the bandwidth file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.0
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128, sbws-11x-final-|
  removed-20190312, sbws-110-proposed, changes-  |
  version-minor  |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 lgtm now

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29838 [Core Tor/sbws]: Update trac wiki pages where sbws should be listed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29838: Update trac wiki pages where sbws should be listed
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Probably #29836 is due to this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29836 [Webpages/Website]: Replace torflow by sbws in volunteer page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29836: Replace torflow by sbws in volunteer page
--+--
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by juga):

 i also created #29838 so that i/someone remember to update trac wiki pages

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks for the help. Pushed fixup for that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 040-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm.

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[tor-bugs] #29838 [Core Tor/sbws]: Update trac wiki pages where sbws should be listed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29838: Update trac wiki pages where sbws should be listed
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-bwauth
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 All the pages where it's listed:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=torflow&noquickjump=1&wiki=on

 For instance, include sbws in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects
 Remove torflow when bandwidth authorities are happy with sbws.

 Adding this in sbws as there's no component for trac pages.

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[tor-bugs] #29837 [Metrics/Website]: Include Tor Browser data from Google Play

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29837: Include Tor Browser data from Google Play
-+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Statistics of app distribution are available for export from Google Play
 using Google's special tool. We should use this and provide public data
 from this.

 https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-
 developer/answer/6135870#export

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29036: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-accepted-20190115, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-ci, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/806 - CI looks happy. Let's get it
 reviewed.

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[tor-bugs] #29836 [Webpages/Website]: Replace torflow by sbws in volunteer page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29836: Replace torflow by sbws in volunteer page
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-bwauth
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I realized that https://www.torproject.org/about/gsoc.html.en is pointing
 to
 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Projects and
 torflow is listed there.
 We decided to don't do any improvements on torflow but on sbws.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28636: Address WTF-PAD comments by Nick (2018-11-27 over IRC)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28632   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The RNG patch is okay, but the patch to look at dormant mode isn't wrote.
 `net_is_disabled()` and `net_is_completely_disbled()` check for
 DisableNetwork and hibernation status.  `is_participating_on_network()` is
 what we need here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29835 [Metrics/Website]: Include Android as a Tor Browser platform

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29835: Include Android as a Tor Browser platform
-+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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[tor-bugs] #29835 [Metrics/Website]: Include Android as a Tor Browser platform

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29835: Include Android as a Tor Browser platform
-+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 There should be some web server log entries now for the tor-browser*.apk
 files (over the past ~6 months). It'd be nice seeing these included in the
 graphs. Tor Browser on Android does not automatically execute update pings
 or download mar files, so initial downloads and updates likely look
 identical.

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[tor-bugs] #29834 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Google Play screenshots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29834: Update Google Play screenshots
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should show the new bootstrap/configuration UI. Maybe we should wait
 until the animation is working, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29724 [Core Tor/sbws]: Create a blog post about work done and future work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29724: Create a blog post about work done and future work
--+---
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:  sbws: 1.0.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version, docs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 I should work on this this week so that it can be reviewed with 1 week in
 advance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28983 [Core Tor/sbws]: Work out how long it takes sbws to measure the network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28983: Work out how long it takes sbws to measure the network
+---
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  no-changes-version  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 weirdness explained

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29813 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unmeasured and vote Line KeyValues in the bandwidth-file-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29813: Add unmeasured and vote Line KeyValues in the bandwidth-file-spec
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, bandwidth-file-spec, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  bwauth |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm, teor  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 i'll leave it in revision until i do next relase

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29036 [Core Tor/Tor]: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29036: Coverage merge failures cause test_process_slow stderr check to fail
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-accepted-20190115, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-ci, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 Let's see what CI says to: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/806

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29813 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unmeasured and vote Line KeyValues in the bandwidth-file-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29813: Add unmeasured and vote Line KeyValues in the bandwidth-file-spec
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, bandwidth-file-spec, tor-  |  Actual Points:
  bwauth |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm, teor  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 I pushed all teor's suggestions

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
--+--
 Reporter:  pidgin|  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pidgin):

 Replying to [comment:28 teor]:
 > Hi pidgin,
 >
 > We need to know more about your setup to help you:
 >
 > Replying to [comment:22 teor]:
 > > The v3 service doesn't have the guard issue, it's getting much further
 along. Have you tried running it on a separate machine? (Or by itself
 without v2 running on the same machine?)

 there is enough cpu and bandwidth

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29589 [Core Tor/sbws]: Recover a destination when it stops failing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29589: Recover a destination when it stops failing
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  changes-version-patch  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * actualpoints:   => 1


Comment:

 Thanks, changed that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29806: Ignore bandwidth file lines with "vote=0"
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, 040-backport,|  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:  #28563   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Added tests, modified one to remove things that were not needed and pushed
 in 035 the change teor suggested in 034

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29833 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:logo still contains Firefox logos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29833: about:logo still contains Firefox logos
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-branding, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Santa?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10888 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10888: Mozilla trademarks still remain in some about: urls
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 mcs]:
 > For future reference, here are some of the images that still need to be
 replaced in a Firefox 52 ESR-based Tor Browser:
 > * browser/branding/official/default22.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/about-logo.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/about-l...@2x.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/about-wordmark.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/about.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/icon48.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/icon64.png
 > * browser/branding/official/content/identity-icons-brand.svg
 > * browser/branding/official/content/silhouette-40.svg

 Looking at those from a post-#25702 angle we only have left:

 * browser/branding/official/content/about-logo.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/about-l...@2x.png
 * browser/branding/official/content/about-wordmark.svg
 * browser/branding/official/content/about.png

 The former three are dealt with in Torbutton currently where our
 `aboutDialog.css` is overriding the built-in one. Just the `about.png` on
 `about:logo` remains from that list then. The former two are pointing
 directly the proper icon in `tor-browser` and the `about-wordmark.svg`
 file is replaced by a respective .png in `torbutton`.

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