[tor-bugs] #30124 [- Select a component]: Tor Starting Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30124: Tor Starting Problem
---+--
 Reporter:  sagararla  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 My Tor-Browser is not working. It just opens a blank page. I have posted
 the problem previously under ticket no. 30116

 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30116]

 I am thank full for the help to that guy, but he left in the middle

 Every details is given in that ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30122 [Core Tor/Stem]: Make stem's unit tests propagate the backtrace signals to child processes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30122: Make stem's unit tests propagate the backtrace signals to child 
processes
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.4
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.4


Comment:

 See my pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/stem/pull/12

 This change should give us enough information to diagnose the hangs that
 we're seeing in tor's CI.

 Now I see tracebacks like this:
 {{{
 $ make src/app/tor && timelimit -p -t 30 -s USR1 -T 10 -S ABRT python
 "$HOME"/stem/run_tests.py --tor src/app/tor --integ --log notice --target
 RUN_ALL
 ...
 timelimit: sending kill signal 6
 Signal 6 received by thread 140735628112768 in process 23883:

 Traceback for thread 123145553137664 in process 23883:

   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/threading.py",
 line 885, in _bootstrap
 self._bootstrap_inner()
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/threading.py",
 line 917, in _bootstrap_inner
 self.run()
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/threading.py",
 line 865, in run
 self._target(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 169, in _wrapper
 runner(*args) if args else runner()
   File "/Users/base/stem/test/integ/descriptor/server_descriptor.py", line
 34, in test_cached_descriptor
 for desc in stem.descriptor.parse_file(descriptor_file, 'server-
 descriptor 1.0', validate = True):
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/descriptor/__init__.py", line 354, in
 parse_file
 for desc in parse(descriptor_file):
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/descriptor/__init__.py", line 401, in
 _parse_metrics_file
 for desc in
 stem.descriptor.server_descriptor._parse_file(descriptor_file, is_bridge =
 False, validate = validate, **kwargs):
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/descriptor/server_descriptor.py", line 221,
 in _parse_file
 yield RelayDescriptor(descriptor_text, validate, annotations,
 **kwargs)
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/descriptor/server_descriptor.py", line 868,
 in __init__
 if stem.prereq._is_crypto_ed25519_supported() and self.certificate:
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/prereq.py", line 252, in
 _is_crypto_ed25519_supported
 if not is_crypto_available():
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/prereq.py", line 127, in is_crypto_available
 from cryptography.utils import int_from_bytes, int_to_bytes
   File "", line 983, in _find_and_load
   File "", line 953, in
 _find_and_load_unlocked
   File "", line 219, in
 _call_with_frames_removed
   File "", line 983, in _find_and_load
   File "", line 963, in
 _find_and_load_unlocked
   File "", line 906, in _find_spec
   File "", line 1280, in find_spec
   File "", line 1252, in _get_spec
   File "", line 1364, in find_spec
   File "", line 81, in _path_stat


 Traceback for thread 140735628112768 in process 23883:

   File "/Users/base/stem/run_tests.py", line 468, in 
 main()
   File "/Users/base/stem/run_tests.py", line 309, in main
 run_result = _run_test(args, test_class, output_filters)
   File "/Users/base/stem/run_tests.py", line 449, in _run_test
 run_result = stem.util.test_tools.TimedTestRunner(test_results,
 verbosity = 2).run(suite)
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 308, in run
 return super(TimedTestRunner, self).run(test)
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/unittest/runner.py",
 line 176, in run
 test(result)
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/unittest/suite.py",
 line 84, in __call__
 return self.run(*args, **kwds)
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/unittest/suite.py",
 line 122, in run
 test(result)
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/unittest/case.py",
 line 663, in __call__
 return self.run(*args, **kwds)
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 258, in run
 result = super(type(self), self).run(result)
   File
 
"/usr/local/Cellar/python/3.7.3/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.7/lib/python3.7/unittest/case.py",
 line 615, in run
 testMethod()
   File "/Users/base/stem/stem/util/test_tools.py", line 152, in 
 

[tor-bugs] #30123 [Core Tor/Tor]: MAPADDRESS result can mix status codes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30123: MAPADDRESS result can mix status codes
--+---
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-control, tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 When using MAPADDRESS at the control port, mixing valid and invalid
 address mappings can result in a mixture of status codes, contrary to
 Section 2.3, which says:
 {{{
   Multiple lines in a single reply from Tor to the controller are
 guaranteed to
   share the same status code.
 }}}
 Example:
 {{{
 mapaddress xxx=@@@ 0.0.0.0=bogus1.google.com
 512-syntax error: invalid address '@@@'
 250 127.199.80.246=bogus1.google.com
 }}}
 It's not clear what the right thing to do here is. Checking the syntax
 first might help, but maybe it's possible to run into resource exhaustion
 for some requested mappings and not others?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30117 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support stem's backtrace signals in Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30117: Support stem's backtrace signals in Travis
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes => tor-ci-fail-sometimes, 035-backport,
 040-backport
 * actualpoints:  0.3 => 0.4


Comment:

 I change timelimit's signals so they trigger a stem backtrace, and
 unwrapped "make test-stem" so that timelimit can signal python directly.

 See my pull request on 0.3.5:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/932

 Assigning review to nickm, because he's on CI this week.

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > Timelimit doesn't signal the whole process group, so we don't actually
 see the backtrace in the individual tests. We'll need to use `kill -pid`
 instead, with some kind of sleep command.

 We might need to make stem's tests propagate the signal to their child
 processes. See #30112 for that change in stem.

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[tor-bugs] #30122 [Core Tor/Stem]: Make stem's unit tests propagate the backtrace signals to child processes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30122: Make stem's unit tests propagate the backtrace signals to child 
processes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29437
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Sometimes, our test backtraces just show us that stem's test is waiting
 for a response from a child process.

 But we can fix that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30113 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser English and Tor Browser X(lang other) is fingerprintable!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30113: Tor Browser English and Tor Browser X(lang other) is fingerprintable!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [ticket:30113 cypherpunks]:
 > Tor Browser Windows (YOur Lang)

 Can you go to about:support and paste your `Important Modified
 Preferences`

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > ... Search for tickets with `tbb-fingerprinting-os` ...

 It's the language not the OS that is apparently leaking

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30113 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser English and Tor Browser X(lang other) is fingerprintable!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30113: Tor Browser English and Tor Browser X(lang other) is fingerprintable!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 Just to add to my attempt to replicate the issue: while English is my
 system language / format / locale , it is not `English (United States)`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29238: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Yes, install a previous version of the app and run it, then install this
 patched version. It should not crash after installation and opening the
 app again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29843 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fix for bug 1527534 for Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29843: Backport fix for bug 1527534 for Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, GeorgKoppen201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I can't easily test this on an older Android version due to #29906, but it
 works without any apparent issues on newer versions - therefore lgtm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => mikeperry
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30117 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support stem's backtrace signals in Travis (was: Temporarily use a stem branch with backtrace support)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30117: Support stem's backtrace signals in Travis
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 #30012 has been merged into stem, so we don't need to use a special stem
 branch any more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
+
 Reporter:  pidgin  |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
+

Comment (by pidgin):

 Problem is still not solved, still the same error.
 I have provided everything i could to you guys i have no clue what to do
 else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include onboarding/start-up translations in localized builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30016: Include onboarding/start-up translations in localized builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201904R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904, tbb-8.5-must, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:  #26782   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I merged it to master with commit
 `516887a876b9ed5ebb020e8e3723fc09ac2fe3ec`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30113 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser English and Tor Browser X(lang other) is fingerprintable!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30113: Tor Browser English and Tor Browser X(lang other) is fingerprintable!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Completely different result also with Tor Browser Android English

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 better approach
 A better proposal would be to trust the cert but replace the padlock with
 something that indicates that the endpoint is as untrustworthy as
 cloudflare. I suggest a clown head icon mounted over top of a padlock. A
 clown head with a metallic "∩" bend would be an intuitive way to express
 that you've secured a tunnel to a dodgy endpoint that's not controlled by
 the entity that the URL would seem to indicate. Or if a clown head too
 explicitly expresses that the user is clownfucked then replace the padlock
 with cloud logo with a little metallic "∩" above it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Cloudflare's Official "Privacy Pass" addon to evaluate inclusion in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24321: Review Cloudflare's Official "Privacy Pass" addon to evaluate inclusion 
in
Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  cloudflare,mitm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 jlongworth its still Very High

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, I think I figured out some of your problems. That check for
 CIRCPAD_TOKEN_REMOVAL_NONE in circpad_machine_setup_tokens() is needed for
 the padding to work correctly. The root issue was misusing machineinfo in
 one of the places to inspect mi->histogram_len instead of
 state->histogram_len (hidden behind the CIRCPAD_INFINITY_BIN() macro).

 I fixed these and a simple test works: it pads after not closing the intro
 circ. And I don't get pathbias errors (though I don't know why).

 I do have a very strange unit test failure in your tests.. I think it's
 due to you switching to shutting down the machine.. But oddly if I check
 for null on the failing line that checks
 client_side->padding_info[0]->current_state, the check passes. Heisenbug..
 Yay.

 Anyway I didn't have to make any changes to the PR for this branch for
 this, just additional fixes effectively to your #28632 code. So I'm
 setting this back to needs_review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
---+---
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh (added)
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28622: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  parity, tbb-8.5-must-alpha,|
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, GeorgKoppen201904   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:31 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:30 sysrqb]:
 [snip]
 > > f1a5708aa82fc832ec4e1d3529f18ae8ceaa217f (tor-browser bug_28622_v3):
 > >
 > > {{{
 > > -ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 > >  MOZ_APP_DISPLAYNAME="Tor Browser for Android (Alpha)"
 > > +ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 > > }}}
 > >
 > > I'm guessing this isn't an important change.
 >
 > No, it's just aligning that file with the layout of the other
 `configure.sh` files (those for stable and nightly).

 Okay.

 >
 [snip]
 > >
 > > This doesn't seems like the result we want, right? Similarly, I'm
 guessing `mobile/android/branding/alpha/locales/en-US/brand.properties`
 was copied from `mobile/android/branding/nightly`, should that use the
 same content as the old torbrowser file?
 >
 > Huh, you are right. I am not sure how this happened, sorry for that. I
 pushed a fixup commit (2ee3e339625a403e6f92618a272264d7353aefdf) on the
 same branch that should correct this for all supported series,

 Thanks, looks good.

 > that is stable (aka official), alpha, and nightly. I am following here
 the desktop lead and don't differentiate the brand names based on series
 but using the same for all three.

 Ah, okay, that was one of my questions. My other question is: Do we want
 to follow Mozilla's lead with the naming in terms of dropping the "for
 Android" tag? Looking a little closer at this, it seems Mozilla used
 "Firefox for Android" only internally, and they branded Fennec as Mozilla
 Firefox (and Firefox for the short name) externally. I don't have much of
 a preference here.

 {{{
 --- a/mobile/android/branding/official/locales/en-US/brand.properties
 +++ b/mobile/android/branding/official/locales/en-US/brand.properties
 @@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
  # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.

 -brandShortName=Firefox
 -brandFullName=Mozilla Firefox
 +brandShortName=Tor Browser
 +brandFullName=Tor Browser for Android
 }}}

 and

 {{{
 --- a/mobile/android/branding/official/configure.sh
 +++ b/mobile/android/branding/official/configure.sh
 @@ -2,10 +2,7 @@
  # License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
  # file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.

 -MOZ_APP_DISPLAYNAME=Firefox
 -ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.mozilla.firefox
 +MOZ_APP_DISPLAYNAME="Tor Browser for Android"
 +ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser
 }}}

 I haven't built all of the series with tor-browser-build, but the changes
 look good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28655 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: If a bridge supports obfs4, don't give out its other flavors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28655: If a bridge supports obfs4, don't give out its other flavors
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  dgoulet => phw


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29859: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, GeorgKoppen201904,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, on older Android versions (Jellybean and earlier) Fennec uses a
 custom async wrapper around Android built-in MediaCodec system for
 handling media files/streams. On newer versions, Android provides an async
 MediaCodec library, and Fennec uses that directly. Therefore, it seems
 like this should work on all supported versions, but the error log above
 indicates this isn't the reality:
 {{{
 E/MediaCodec( 2336): Codec reported an error. (omx error 0x80001001,
 internalError -2147483648)
 W/System.err( 2336): java.lang.IllegalStateException
 W/System.err( 2336): java.lang.IllegalStateException
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 android.media.MediaCodec.dequeueInputBuffer(Native Method)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.media.JellyBeanAsyncCodec$BufferPoller.pollInputBuffer(JellyBeanAsyncCodec.java:216)
 }}}

 I'll dig into this a little more (and GeKo suggested testing a vanilla
 Fennec build, so I'll try that, too).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29859: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, GeorgKoppen201904,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 On API level 28, the video plays successfully:

 {{{
 04-10 20:31:23.570  2886  2910 W VideoCapabilities: Unrecognized profile 4
 for video/hevc
 04-10 20:31:23.593  2886  2910 I VideoCapabilities: Unsupported profile 4
 for video/mp4v-es
 ...
 04-10 20:31:33.895  1848  1865 I ActivityManager: Start proc
 3115:org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha:media/u0a376 for service
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.media.MediaManager
 ...
 04-10 20:31:34.457  3115  3130 W VideoCapabilities: Unrecognized profile 4
 for video/hevc
 04-10 20:31:34.496  3115  3130 I VideoCapabilities: Unsupported profile 4
 for video/mp4v-es
 04-10 20:31:34.529  3115  3134 I OMXClient: IOmx service obtained
 04-10 20:31:34.531  1718  2111 I OMXMaster:
 makeComponentInstance(OMX.google.aac.decoder) in omx@1.0-service process
 04-10 20:31:34.552  3115  3134 I MediaCodec: MediaCodec will operate in
 async mode
 ...
 04-10 20:31:34.902  1718  1718 W OMXNodeInstance:
 [0xedaa6c60:google.h264.decoder] component does not support metadata mode;
 using fallback
 ...
 04-10 20:31:35.671  3115  3140 D SoftwareRenderer: setting dataspace on
 output surface to #103
 04-10 20:31:36.096  1996  2241 I OpenGLRenderer: Davey! duration=737ms;
 Flags=0, IntendedVsync=247180479682, Vsync=247180479682,
 OldestInputEvent=9223372036854775807, NewestInputEvent=0,
 HandleInputStart=2471890
 00051, AnimationStart=247189012334, PerformTraversalsStart=247189012745,
 DrawStart=247189869221, SyncQueued=247189906569, SyncStart=247245032677,
 IssueDrawCommandsStart=247245109814, SwapBuffers=247949524636, Fr
 ameCompleted=247973058364, DequeueBufferDuration=8072000,
 QueueBufferDuration=8073000,
 04-10 20:31:36.280  2886  2886 D GeckoToolbar: onTabChanged:
 MEDIA_PLAYING_CHANGE
 04-10 20:31:36.280  2886  2886 D GeckoBrowserApp: BrowserApp.onTabChanged:
 2: MEDIA_PLAYING_CHANGE
 04-10 20:31:36.280  2886  2886 D MediaControlService: onStateChanged,
 state = PLAYING
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21305 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Client gets into an unrecoverable connect / close loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21305: Client gets into an unrecoverable connect / close loop
---+---
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21315 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: publish some realtime stats from the broker?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21315: publish some realtime stats from the broker?
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29461 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29034 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29034: circuit: Cleanup an HS circuit when it is being re-purposed
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs-reachability, 029-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, postfreeze-ok|
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok I did the simplest narrow fix, based on what dgoulet said in the
 description:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/931

 Someone who is deeply familiar with both v2 and v3 state should review
 this. It's simple, and I think it's ok, but I don't know both v2 and v3
 code bases well enough to really be sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: mrphs (added)
 * keywords:  default bridge => default bridge tbb-bridges


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges => default bridge
 * cc: mrphs (removed)
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28622: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  parity, tbb-8.5-must-alpha,|
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, GeorgKoppen201904   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:30 sysrqb]:
 > 300c55e5e0cf8e24f49959eababd2c7d9fc056ad (tor-browser-build
 bug_28622_v2) - Seems ok
 >
 > f1a5708aa82fc832ec4e1d3529f18ae8ceaa217f (tor-browser bug_28622_v3):
 >
 > {{{
 > -ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 >  MOZ_APP_DISPLAYNAME="Tor Browser for Android (Alpha)"
 > +ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 > }}}
 >
 > I'm guessing this isn't an important change.

 No, it's just aligning that file with the layout of the other
 `configure.sh` files (those for stable and nightly).

 > I'll assume all of the binary changes are okay.
 >
 > {{{
 > --- a/mobile/android/branding/torbrowser/locales/en-US/brand.dtd
 > +++ b/mobile/android/branding/alpha/locales/en-US/brand.dtd
 > @@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 > - License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with
 this
 > - file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. -->
 >
 > -
 > -
 > -
 > +
 > +
 > +
 > }}}
 >
 > This doesn't seems like the result we want, right? Similarly, I'm
 guessing `mobile/android/branding/alpha/locales/en-US/brand.properties`
 was copied from `mobile/android/branding/nightly`, should that use the
 same content as the old torbrowser file?

 Huh, you are right. I am not sure how this happened, sorry for that. I
 pushed a fixup commit (2ee3e339625a403e6f92618a272264d7353aefdf) on the
 same branch that should correct this for all supported series, that is
 stable (aka official), alpha, and nightly. I am following here the desktop
 lead and don't differentiate the brand names based on series but using the
 same for all three.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29773 [Metrics/Website]: Plot nearly worst-case circuit round-trip latencies to [public|onion] server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29773: Plot nearly worst-case circuit round-trip latencies to [public|onion]
server
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  scalability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => scalability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29772 [Metrics/Website]: Plot nearly worst-case bandwidth when downloading from [public|onion] server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29772: Plot nearly worst-case bandwidth when downloading from [public|onion]
server
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  scalability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => scalability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29859: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, GeorgKoppen201904,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I get a few errors in the logcat while testing on an emulator running API
 level 19, but the end result is the video element displaying a message
 saying "The media could not be played" - so this is better than crashing.
 This is testing the twitter video in the description.

 {{{
 W/dalvikvm( 1989): dvmFindClassByName rejecting
 'org/mozilla/gecko/media/CodecProxy$NativeCallbacks'
 W/dalvikvm( 1989): dvmFindClassByName rejecting
 'org/mozilla/gecko/media/CodecProxy'
 I/ActivityManager( 1592): Start proc org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha:media
 for service
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.media.MediaManager:
 pid=2336 uid=10065 gids={50065, 3003, 1028, 1015}
 ...
 E/OMXNodeInstance( 2336): OMX_GetExtensionIndex
 OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers failed
 W/OMXNodeInstance( 2336): OMX_GetExtensionIndex
 OMX.google.android.index.prepareForAdaptivePlayback failed
 E/OMXNodeInstance( 2336): OMX_GetExtensionIndex
 OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers failed
 E/ACodec  ( 2336): [OMX.google.h264.decoder] storeMetaDataInBuffers failed
 w/ err -2147483648
 I/SoftAAC2( 2336): Reconfiguring decoder: 0->48000 Hz, 0->2 channels
 E/SoftAVC ( 2336): Decoder failed: -2
 E/ACodec  ( 2336): [OMX.google.h264.decoder] ERROR(0x80001001)
 E/MediaCodec( 2336): Codec reported an error. (omx error 0x80001001,
 internalError -2147483648)
 W/System.err( 2336): java.lang.IllegalStateException
 W/System.err( 2336): java.lang.IllegalStateException
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 android.media.MediaCodec.dequeueInputBuffer(Native Method)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.media.JellyBeanAsyncCodec$BufferPoller.pollInputBuffer(JellyBeanAsyncCodec.java:216)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.media.JellyBeanAsyncCodec$BufferPoller.handleMessageLocked(JellyBeanAsyncCodec.java:199)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.media.JellyBeanAsyncCodec$CancelableHandler.handleMessage(JellyBeanAsyncCodec.java:58)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:102)
 W/System.err( 2336):at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:136)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 android.os.HandlerThread.run(HandlerThread.java:61)
 E/GeckoAsyncCodecAPIv16( 2336): codec error:-1
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 android.media.MediaCodec.queueInputBuffer(Native Method)
 W/System.err( 2336):at java.lang.Exception: codec error:-1
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.Codec$Callbacks.onError(Codec.java:48)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.media.JellyBeanAsyncCodec.queueInputBuffer(JellyBeanAsyncCodec.java:371)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.media.JellyBeanAsyncCodec$CallbackSender.handleMessageLocked(JellyBeanAsyncCodec.java:144)
 W/System.err( 2336):
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.Codec$InputProcessor.feedSampleToBuffer(Codec.java:167)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.Codec$InputProcessor.queueSample(Codec.java:107)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.Codec$InputProcessor.onSample(Codec.java:95)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.Codec$InputProcessor.access$1700(Codec.java:66)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.Codec.queueInput(Codec.java:553)
 W/System.err( 2336):at
 org.mozilla.gecko.media.ICodec$Stub.onTransact(ICodec.java:150)
 W/System.err( 2336):at  at
 android.os.Binder.execTransact(Binder.java:404)
 W/System.err( 2336):at dalvik.system.NativeStart.run(Native Method)
 I/Gecko   ( 1989): [1989, MediaPlayback #2] WARNING: Decoder=91bb2940
 Decode error: NS_ERROR_DOM_MEDIA_FATAL_ERR (0x806e0005) - void
 mozilla::JavaCallbacksSupport::OnError(bool): file /home/android/tor-
 browser/d
 om/media/MediaDecoderStateMachine.cpp, line 3118
 }}}

 With the Azure reference, when I go to the Azure HTML5 player (DASH) and
 press play the script basically hangs. I don't know what it's doing, but
 the browser shows the unresponsive-script dialog but the video player
 never plays the video, and I 

Re: [tor-bugs] #29744 [Core Tor/Tor]: Streams sometimes stall for up to 1 hour without making any progress

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29744: Streams sometimes stall for up to 1 hour without making any progress
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight usability scalability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)
 * keywords:  needs-insight usability => needs-insight usability scalability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29743 [Core Tor/Tor]: Long-running tor instances fail to keep up-to-date directory information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29743: Long-running tor instances fail to keep up-to-date directory information
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight usability scalability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  needs-insight usability => needs-insight usability scalability
 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, last branch with a small addition (unregister the global
 ViewTreeLayoutListener) - this prevents spamming the log with debug
 messages regarding layout updates after bootstrapping completes. I pushed
 `28329_31`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21305 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Client gets into an unrecoverable connect / close loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21305: Client gets into an unrecoverable connect / close loop
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > So when you were in this connect/close loop, were you unable to send and
 receive traffic?

 This was @arma's client and I believe they refreshed their browser window
 a few times to no avail.

 But note that this was during a period of time when the standalone go-
 proxies that we're running (and currently handle the majority of capacity)
 were in a pretty unreliable state and we did not confirm that the new
 proxy we tried to hand them was the one they actually connected to in that
 log.

 Maybe they just got lucky when restarting the client?

 > Or is this just usual behaviour like in #25429?

 For the most part, yes.  The suspicious thing is that they suddenly
 received a proxy that was able to send messages upon restarting.

 Short of manual inspection, you could try establishing a connection and
 then disconnecting your network, waiting a bit, and reconnecting a few
 times to see if it's reproducible.  Otherwise, feel free to close it as
 "worksforme".  If it's really a client issue, it'll rear its head again
 and we'll have fresher data to work with.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22022 [Core Tor/Stem]: Move to cryptography for ed25519 validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22022: Move to cryptography for ed25519 validation
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  descriptor unactionable  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by illia-v):

 Thanks, Damian!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29859: Playing videos on Twitter is not working and freezing the mobile browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, GeorgKoppen201904,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:12 gk]:
 > Okay, so, if we really can't handle HLS, be it on desktop or mobile we
 get the options to download the m3u8 file and/or open it with an external
 app. One can test that behavior with
 >
 > https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/live-247-reference-streams-
 available/
 >
 > On mobile with 8.5a10 the symptoms of this bug are visible but with my
 patch one gets the desktop behavior of the external helper app dialog
 showing up.


 This sounds like it ties onto #26529.

 [snip]

 > The second line is interesting because it shows that the HLS support is
 provided by Twitter via some JS file which explains why the content (both
 on desktop and mobile) is playing at all. How frequent that fallback
 mechanism is on the web I don't know but either way, I think we can live
 with the patch for now.

 I've heard this is popular with some of the popular video-streaming sites,
 but I don't know how popular it is in general. I suspect not-very-popular.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option to build without using containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29981: Add option to build without using containers
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 Wow, great progress!  That sort order issue is frustrating.  My experience
 is that doing post-processing of APKs with `zip` or other tools usually
 leads to random repro issues like that.  The Android tools have been
 getting better, but they still have repro quirks.  It seems that the `zip`
 commands are used for adding and removing static assets.  I can help move
 that to the pre-packaging phase of the Android build, if gradle is in use.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30028 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: additional prometheus/grafana exporters/dashboards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30028: additional prometheus/grafana exporters/dashboards
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 note that i pushed the grafana dashboards to a public repo here:

 https://gitlab.com/anarcat/grafana-dashboards

 i haven't used git.tpo because I want the community to possibly send us
 patches and pull requests, and it seems Trac is a bit heavy for that (and
 gitlab is not quite ready yet).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30104: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam20190410R|
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team => tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5,
 ux-team, TorBrowserTeam20190410R


Comment:

 Thanks Antonela! Here's a patch (a fixup for #30104):
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug29768-01=2ce9594b59620b0adf9404fdc34096ddc5fcfdaf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29223 [Core Tor/Tor]: List canonical abbreviations to use in Tor functions and identifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29223: List canonical abbreviations to use in Tor functions and identifiers
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30012 [Core Tor/Stem]: When stem receives a signal, log useful information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30012: When stem receives a signal, log useful information
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 This is a great patch, thanks teor!
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=854338c Moved this a
 tad] but otherwise looks perfect. Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:14 anarcat]:
 > a comment in #30121 made me think that the CI / build process could be
 the thing that checks for integrity in the bridge list. if CI is able to
 access the network, it could just try to ping those bridges as part of the
 build and warn/fail if they are not reachable.
 >
 > that would be simpler and better integrated than running a different
 monitoring server.

 Alternatively, we had Rabbi Rob and gman999 offer to run monitoring for us
 -- using Nagios and sysmon, respectively. We may want to take them up on
 their offer, and while we're at it, also have our bridge authority
 monitored, as discussed in #29229. BridgeDB also needs monitoring.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30121 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30121: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mrphs):

 * cc: mrphs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30028 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: additional prometheus/grafana exporters/dashboards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30028: additional prometheus/grafana exporters/dashboards
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 i have finished working on the dashboard, which required extensive enough
 fixing that i ended up publishing a fork at
 https://grafana.com/dashboards/10024

 i have also rebuilt the bind exporter and uploaded it to
 db.torproject.org. i did that because I mistakenly thought I needed a full
 source upload with `.changes` and `.dsc` and `.orig.tgz` files to get the
 package to propagate. as it turns out it wasn't showing up on nova because
 it is a 32 bit system and i had uploaded the amd64 binary.

 so this is now fixed and the exporter should be deployed on all
 nameservers soon.

 given the time I have had to spend to deploy this exporter and fix the
 dashboards, I'm not sure it's worth deploying the other ones. so until we
 have concrete problems we're trying to solve, I'll consider this
 praticular ticket done. we have a reference of good exporters and
 dashboards for the remaining services anyways.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28622 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28622: Update Tor Browser Icon for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  parity, tbb-8.5-must-alpha,|
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, GeorgKoppen201904   |
Parent ID:  #27399   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 300c55e5e0cf8e24f49959eababd2c7d9fc056ad (tor-browser-build bug_28622_v2)
 - Seems ok

 f1a5708aa82fc832ec4e1d3529f18ae8ceaa217f (tor-browser bug_28622_v3):

 {{{
 -ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
  MOZ_APP_DISPLAYNAME="Tor Browser for Android (Alpha)"
 +ANDROID_PACKAGE_NAME=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha
 }}}

 I'm guessing this isn't an important change.

 I'll assume all of the binary changes are okay.

 {{{
 --- a/mobile/android/branding/torbrowser/locales/en-US/brand.dtd
 +++ b/mobile/android/branding/alpha/locales/en-US/brand.dtd
 @@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 - License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 - file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. -->

 -
 -
 -
 +
 +
 +
 }}}

 This doesn't seems like the result we want, right? Similarly, I'm guessing
 `mobile/android/branding/alpha/locales/en-US/brand.properties` was copied
 from `mobile/android/branding/nightly`, should that use the same content
 as the old torbrowser file?

 {{{

 --- a/mobile/android/branding/torbrowser/locales/en-US/brand.properties
 +++ /dev/null
 @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 -# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 -# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 -# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
 -
 -#filter
 -brandShortName=Tor Browser
 -brandFullName=Tor Browser for Android
 }}}


 {{{
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/mobile/android/branding/alpha/locales/en-US/brand.properties
 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
 +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
 +
 +brandShortName=Nightly
 +brandFullName=Mozilla Nightly
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30121 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30121: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22022 [Core Tor/Stem]: Move to cryptography for ed25519 validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22022: Move to cryptography for ed25519 validation
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  descriptor unactionable  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Yikes! This was a perfect patch. Thank you Illia, this was much
 appreciated. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30119 [Core Tor/Tor]: cert-spec uses binary encodings but does not specify byte order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30119: cert-spec uses binary encodings but does not specify byte order
---+---
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dir-spec, easy, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 It's fine to copy the notice, or to add it by reference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9843 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Document how to verify Tor Browser archives after download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9843: Document how to verify Tor Browser archives after download
--+
 Reporter:  Sherief   |  Owner:
  |  traumschule
 Type:  task  | Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorO, sebastian-0115-triaged  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3893 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mrphs):

 * cc: mrphs (removed)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 a comment in #30121 made me think that the CI / build process could be the
 thing that checks for integrity in the bridge list. if CI is able to
 access the network, it could just try to ping those bridges as part of the
 build and warn/fail if they are not reachable.

 that would be simpler and better integrated than running a different
 monitoring server.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30121 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30121: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: irl (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:8 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 phw]:
 > > I'm considering creating a git repository, maintained by the anti-
 censorship team, that contains an up-to-date CSV file (which would be
 simple for anarcat to fetch and parse) for our default bridges with the
 following information:
 > >
 > > * Fingerprint
 > > * IP address and port(s)
 > > * Email address (or other contact info) of owner
 > > * What protocols the bridge speaks (e.g., vanilla Tor, obfs3, ...)
 > > * Date of when the bridge was set up
 > > * ...anything else?
 > >
 > > What do you think? Should we rather keep OONI's list up-to-date?
 Mostly, I want a single source of truth that includes contact information
 of the operator.
 >
 > If there is a git repository containing this CSV file, then maybe we
 could use it in tor-browser-build to generate the .js file containing the
 prefs for Tor Browser.

 I just filed #30121 to discuss this.

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[tor-bugs] #30121 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30121: Create authoritative, parseable list of Tor Browser's default bridges
--+-
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-bridges
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The ''authoritative'' list of default bridges that Tor Browser ships with
 is part of the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/projects/tor-browser/Bundle-Data/PTConfigs/bridge_prefs.js
 tor-browser-build.git] repository. Other repositories however use this
 list; most importantly [https://github.com/OpenObservatory/ooni-
 resources/blob/master/bridge_reachability/tor-bridges-ip-port.csv OONI],
 as part of the "TCP Connect" scan, and possibly others. Having the
 authoritative list in tor-browser-build.git is error-prone because
 whenever it changes, we need to manually sync OONI's list. (We now have
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/DefaultBridges
 a wiki page] that maps our default bridges to their respective owners but
 the page can be edited by anyone and can therefore not be authoritative.)

 To solve this problem, we could create a separate, authoritative list of
 these default bridges. We also need this list to be easy to parse, e.g.,
 in the form of a simple CSV file. irl mentioned on IRC that our CI
 infrastructure can then notify us if repositories that include default
 bridges are out-of-date. In fact, we could even automate the inclusion of
 default bridges in other repositories:
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30006#comment:8 boklm
 mentioned] that tor-browser-build.git could automatically generate the
 JavaScript file that includes default bridges, and OONI may be able to do
 the same.

 To get things started, here's what I propose:
 * Create a new git repository, say tor-browser-default-bridges.git, that
 contains our list of default bridges as CSV files.
 * This repository is public and can therefore be referenced and included
 by other projects.
 * This repository is maintained by the anti-censorship team, which takes
 responsibility that its content is up-to-date.

 Does this sound reasonable? Is there a simpler solution?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28780 [Core Tor/Tor]: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is active

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28780: circpadding: Add machine flag for not closing circuit if machine is 
active
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding, 041-proposed, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #28634   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23790 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_service_prune_list_impl_() doesn't copy over desc_is_dirty when copying intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23790: rend_service_prune_list_impl_() doesn't copy over desc_is_dirty when
copying intro points
-+-
 Reporter:  jl   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  029-backport, 031-unreached-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I don't think so -- I do that kind of thing (adding "backport from x.y.z")
 when I make a changelog.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  default bridge => default bridge tbb-bridges


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > I guess .csv would work for you? See over at #29275 the OONI folks have
 such a thing it seems (even though it might be outdated):
 ​https://github.com/citizenlab/test-
 lists/blob/master/lists/services/tor/bridges.csv.

 That list is not maintained. An up-to-date one (used for the tcp_connect
 test, and containing more than just default bridges) is at
 https://github.com/OpenObservatory/ooni-
 resources/blob/master/bridge_reachability/tor-bridges-ip-port.csv. However
 that, too, is probably going to change in the future as OONI deploys its
 orchestrator.

 Replying to [comment:7 phw]:
 > I'm considering creating a git repository, maintained by the anti-
 censorship team, that contains an up-to-date CSV file (which would be
 simple for anarcat to fetch and parse) for our default bridges with the
 following information:
 >
 > * Fingerprint
 > * IP address and port(s)
 > * Email address (or other contact info) of owner
 > * What protocols the bridge speaks (e.g., vanilla Tor, obfs3, ...)
 > * Date of when the bridge was set up
 > * ...anything else?

 You may want a list separate from the OONI one, because the OONI one
 doesn't have all the information you want.

 There's some past data (2015–2018) https://repo.eecs.berkeley.edu/git-
 anon/users/fifield/proxy-probe.git, see the files proxy-probe.csv and
 significant_dates.txt.

 I try to make sure that every ticket about default bridges is tagged with
 the
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=accepted=assigned=closed=merge_ready=needs_information=needs_review=needs_revision=new=reopened
 =~tbb-bridges=priority tbb-bridges] tag. You can look over those
 tickets to get information about timing and who the operator is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29275 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Get default bridges checked for reachability by OONI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29275: Get default bridges checked for reachability by OONI
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => tbb-bridges


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option to build without using containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29981: Add option to build without using containers
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Using the patch from branch `bug_29981_v3` I have been able to do a build
 without containers:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29981_v3=ab3c5d96be66d09d4dc98be385e495244bef48af

 The apk I got does not match the one built using container, but the only
 difference is:
 {{{
 --- tor-browser-8.5a10-android-armv7-multi-qa.apk
 +++ ../../testbuild/tor-browser-8.5a10-android-armv7-multi-qa.apk
 ├── zipinfo {}
 │ @@ -1502,13 +1502,13 @@
 │  -rwxr-xr-x  2.0 unx 5596 b- defX 10-Jan-01 00:00 lib/armeabi-v7a
 /libplugin-container.so
 │  -rw-r--r--  2.0 unx  382 b- defX 10-Jan-01 00:00 application.ini
 │  -rw-r--r--  2.0 unx   32 b- defX 10-Jan-01 00:00 package-name.txt
 │  -rw-r--r--  2.0 unx  795 b- defX 10-Jan-01 00:00 ua-update.json
 │  -rw-r--r--  2.0 unx   48 b- defX 10-Jan-01 00:00 platform.ini
 │  -rw-r--r--  2.0 unx   97 b- defX 10-Jan-01 00:00 removed-files
 │  -rw-r--r--  2.0 unx 10641927 b- stor 10-Jan-01 00:00 assets/omni.ja
 │ --rw-r--r--  3.0 unx   502590 b- defN 00-Jan-01 00:00
 assets/distribution/extensions/{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}.xpi
 │  -rw-r--r--  3.0 unx  1765652 b- defN 00-Jan-01 00:00
 assets/distribution/extensions/https-everywhere-...@eff.org.xpi
 │ +-rw-r--r--  3.0 unx   502590 b- defN 00-Jan-01 00:00
 assets/distribution/extensions/{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}.xpi
 │  -rw 2.0 fat   144465 b- defN 10-Jan-01 00:00 META-
 INF/ANDROIDQ.SF
 │  -rw 2.0 fat 1194 b- defN 10-Jan-01 00:00 META-
 INF/ANDROIDQ.RSA
 │  -rw 2.0 fat   144360 b- defN 10-Jan-01 00:00 META-
 INF/MANIFEST.MF
 │  1512 files, 58292874 bytes uncompressed, 44899152 bytes compressed:
 23.0%
 }}}

 I think the cause of this is this line in `projects/tor-
 browser/build.android`:
 {{{
 zip -r -X $apk $ext_dir
 }}}

 Which is not adding the extensions to the .apk in a sorted order.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mrphs):

 * cc: mrphs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30120 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30120: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `bug30120` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/930

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29045 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: ask tor to leave dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29045: ask tor to leave dormant mode
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I forgot to mention that to test this you can add a line like the
 following to your torrc:
  DormantClientTimeout 600
 This will cause tor to enter dormant mode after 10 minutes with no client-
 initiated network activity (this is the minimum allowed setting). If you
 are watching, you will see a message like the following when the
 transition to dormant mode occurs:
  Apr xx xx:00:00.000 [notice] No user activity in a long time: becoming
 dormant.
 Then you can exit and restart Tor Browser and make sure tor leaves dormant
 mode (it will be obvious if it does not, because bootstrapping progress
 will stay at 0%).

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[tor-bugs] #30120 [Core Tor/Tor]: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30120: pre-commit.git-hook doesn't check for changes files correctly.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Have a look.  What's wrong here:
 {{{
 -if [ ! -z "ls ./changes/*" ]; then
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29045 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: ask tor to leave dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29045: ask tor to leave dormant mode
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904 => TorBrowserTeam201904R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug29045-01=3685e0fd7900082bfd8fd8b5b771d01a9174c4ee

 We need to be careful not to ship this patch if we are not using tor
 0.4.x.

 Also, should I open another ticket to solve this for TBA? Does it use a
 torrc-defaults file or do we need to use a different technique on Android
 to address this issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30040 [Core Tor/Tor]: Double-free bug on huge bandwidth file in some platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30040: Double-free bug on huge bandwidth file in some platforms
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  teor-merge, consider-backport-   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  after-0405-alpha, security-low? bw-auth|
  double-free hackerone bug-bounty 040-backport  |
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 teor-merge, consider-backport-after-0405-alpha, security-low? bw-auth
 double-free hackerone bug-bounty 040-backport 040-must 035-backport
 =>
 teor-merge, consider-backport-after-0405-alpha, security-low? bw-auth
 double-free hackerone bug-bounty 040-backport 035-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.0 and forward; let's backport if it works in 0.4.0.4.rc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30040 [Core Tor/Tor]: Double-free bug on huge bandwidth file in some platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30040: Double-free bug on huge bandwidth file in some platforms
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  teor-merge, consider-backport-   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  after-0405-alpha, security-low? bw-auth|
  double-free hackerone bug-bounty 040-backport  |
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28329: Design TBA+Orbot configuration UI/UX
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:94 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:91 sysrqb]:
 > > Replying to [comment:88 gk]:
 >
 > [snip]
 >
 > > >
 > > > {{{
 > > > final int expectedHeight = (int)
 (currentWidth*imgHeight/imgWidth);
 > > > final int expectedWidth = (int)
 (currentHeight*imgWidth/imgHeight);
 > > > }}}
 > > > You already calculated the ratios and saved them in variables, no
 need to
 > > > calculate them again here (and elsewhere!).
 > > >
 > >
 > > I deleted the ratio variables because I found the syntax confusing due
 to additional type casting and needing more nested parentheses. This was
 included in the accidental-fixup commit, but I can revert this change if
 you think the ratio variables are more readable.
 >
 > Works for me. In that case please remove
 > {{{
 > final double imgDimensionRatioHeightWidth = imgHeight/imgWidth;
 > final double imgDimensionRatioWidthHeight = imgWidth/imgHeight;
 > }}}

 Those should be deleted in the `fixup!` commit.

 {{{
 -final int expectedHeight = (int) (((double)
 currentWidth)*imgDimensionRatioHeightWidth);
 -final int expectedWidth = (int) (((double)
 currentHeight)*imgDimensionRatioWidthHeight);
 +final int expectedHeight = (int)
 (currentWidth*imgHeight/imgWidth);
 +final int expectedWidth = (int)
 (currentHeight*imgWidth/imgHeight);
 }}}

 In any case, I pushed a new branch with these corrections, and I modified
 the dense comment above the width/height conditional so it is clearer (I
 hope). Branch `28329_30`.

 For the onion size, I adding a little more logic for choosing the size. If
 the image's width is greater than 600dp then set the max width at 600dp
 and scale the height accordingly. However, if the the current width is
 already near 600dp (+/- 100dp), then set the width at 400dp and scale the
 height accordingly. I'm hoping this allows for a better experience on
 lower-density/lower-resolution screens.

 As for the space between the `about:tor` text and the url bar, I don't
 know what it causing that. I haven't successfully reproduced it. We added
 some code for preventing this by reloading the page when the chrome (url
 bar) is rendered after bootstrapping completes. I noticed we reload the
 page and allow  Gecko to use the cache. I wonder if this is the bug, where
 it is using the cached version instead of re-rendering it, but I don't
 know why I can't reproduce it. In this new branch I forced bypass-cache
 with reload, so I'm curious if this solves the problem.

 In addition, I now have a spinning onion animation file we may be able to
 use. I don't know if we'll be can get it into this release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21305 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Client gets into an unrecoverable connect / close loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21305: Client gets into an unrecoverable connect / close loop
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Hey, I'm working on reproducing this bug and after investigating these log
 messages from above:
 {{{
 2017/01/24 13:35:16 Traffic Bytes (in|out): 749 | 218 -- (1 OnMessages, 1
 Sends)
 2017/01/24 13:35:23 Traffic Bytes (in|out): 4803 | 3907 -- (8 OnMessages,
 7 Sends)
 }}}
 It looks like your client is actually sending and receiving bytes
 correctly.

 So when you were in this connect/close loop, were you unable to send and
 receive traffic? Or is this just usual behaviour like in #25429?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 Replacing tor.exe of 7.5a5 with tor.exe of 7.5a4 - gives just a blank page

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:24 sagararla]:
 > Version 7.5a5 - just a Blank Page
 >
 > Version 7.5a4 - Error page "Gah! "
 >
 > Version 7.5.a3 - No windows version to download
 >
 > Version 7.5a2 - Welcome to Tor- browser page, but gives an error "Gah!
 ..." page when browsing

 Thanks, can you copy over the `tor.exe` (not the `firefox.exe`!) from a
 7.5a4 over the 7.5a5 `tor.exe`, so that 7.5a5 is using the older Tor
 version? As I said above they should be in your Tor Browser directory in
 `Browser\TorBrowser\Tor`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use apksigner instead of jarsigner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30089: Use apksigner instead of jarsigner
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29981  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks looks good now. This made into into `master` with commit
 c14145264cd1f8eaff3a465d0014d5bf1d061e8a.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30104: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Awesome, here >
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/30104/security-
 level-%401x.png

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30104: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "security-lev...@1x.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 All those when anti-virus disabled

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30104: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:3 antonela]:
 > Good catch. I attached a solution for all the locales. We can replace
 the English one too. What do you think?

 Thanks for the quick response! I think this is a good solution. It would
 be best if you gave us a @1X image (300 x 300 pixels) since currently we
 cannot use @2x or @3x images (due to #27357).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27357 [Applications/Tor Browser]: allow @2x and @3x images to be used on about:tor (was: allow @2x and @2x images to be used on about:tor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27357: allow @2x and @3x images to be used on about:tor
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 This impacts the onboarding overlay as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27680 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27680: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  hs-auth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 Version 7.5a5 - just a Blank Page

 Version 7.5a4 - Error page "Gah! "

 Version 7.5.a3 - No windows version to download

 Version 7.5a2 - Welcome to Tor- browser page, but gives an error "Gah!
 ..." page when browsing

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30006 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30006: Monitor "aliveness" of default bridges in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  default bridge   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: unexpected exit on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30035: unexpected exit on startup
--+
 Reporter:  TDionysus |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 TDionysus, have you seen this problem again since you made your original
 report? Our Tor Browser development team would like to learn how to
 reproduce this problem since it seems like other macOS users are
 encountering it as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:22 sagararla]:
 > Well verion 7.0.11 is last one that gave an error message "Gah!".
 Version 7.5 is not giving any error message, just a blank page

 Okay, great. Now, let's look at the versions with an "a" in them. Where do
 change things if you test 7.5a1, 7.5a2... 7.5a10 (if they change at all
 within that range)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 Well verion 7.0.11 is last one that gave an error message "Gah!".
 Version 7.5 is not giving any error message, just a blank page

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30039 [Applications/rbm]: Add options to be able to prepend or append targets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30039: Add options to be able to prepend or append targets
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good and merged to `master` (commit
 ed424fd45a740f1b62857456fbcf616976012986).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29768 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce new features to users in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29768: Introduce new features to users in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha|
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:51 gk]:
 > One thing I noticed, which I missed in my earlier reviews: the Tor logo
 left to the onboarding bubble is now closely aligned to the left side.
 This got prevented previously by having `offset-inline-start: 12px` for
 the `onboarding-overlay-button`. Could we fix that in a follow-up fixup? I
 am attaching screen shots shortly.

 Good catch. Here is a fixup:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug29768-01=f29aef752c7bb1a6215bc537fff1d742ea0961fe

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29209 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce visibility of more data type internals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29209: Reduce visibility of more data type internals
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt refactoring  |  Actual Points:  3.5
Parent ID:  | Points:  15
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 3.5


Comment:

 OK, I finally have something to show here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/929

 So basically this branch does the following:
 - Moves `crypt_path_t` related functions to its own file
 `src/core/or/crypt_path.c`. Previously they were all over the place, even
 tho they were cpath-specific.
 - Starts splitting `crypt_path_t` into a public struct and a private
 struct (using an opaque pointer).
 - Moves `crypt_path_t.crypto` to the private part of the struct by
 defining appropriate functions for doing circuit crypto.

 This took much longer than anticipated because I first experimented with
 encapsulating others parts of `crypt_path_t` before deciding to go with
 `crypto`. In particular, I first started hiding `deliver_window` and
 `package_window` but I quickly realized that this would cause lots of
 conflicts with #26288. I think after #26288 gets merged, these two fields
 might be the next candidates for hiding.

 Now in terms of general notes, this project took me more than 3 days of
 careful refactoring work, and I've only hided like 10% of the cpath
 structure. Hiding the whole structure is far far away since there are
 quite complicated structures involved like `extend_info_t`.

 In terms of future goals here, I think hiding `extend_info_t` into its own
 interface would be quite convenient since that structure is used and poked
 in weird ways all over the codebase. Furthermore, that would mean we can
 eventually encapsulate `crypt_path_t` even better. Other plausible medium-
 term targets would be structures like `tor_cert_t` which are mostly
 hidden, but not completely.

 I also added some TODO notes in the top of `crypt_path.c` with more cpath-
 specific things we can move without too much trouble.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 sagararla]:
 > I'm just following the order of the versions given i the page

 That page is not ordered so that newer versions are automatically below
 older versions. The version number is the important part here. So we have
 7.0, 7.0.1... 7.0.11, 7.5, 7.5.1... So, with that in mind how does the
 situation look regarding my comment:17?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 Well I got error 'Gah! .' in 7.0 version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 I'm just following the order of the versions given i the page

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 If we omit 'a', 7.5.1 is where I didn't get an error message. And 7.0 the
 previous version to 7.5.1 (as in the order if we omit 'a') is where I will
 probably will get the error messgae (I didnt try for version 7.0)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Thanks. Let's omit the versions with an "a" in it for now (those are alpha
 versions). So, 7.0.11 is still showing the crash message, and 7.5 as well
 but 7.5.1 stopped doing that and you get just the blank white page
 instead? Do I see that right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 Tor-start page - means after clicking on connect we will get a tor-home
 page (starting page) where everything looks fine and problem arise when I
 typed something to search

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29787 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29787: Enumerate possible failure cases and include failure information in .tpf
output
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by acute):

 Hi, this has been pushed to https://github.com/ana-cc/OPvalidator.
 Ok, so my development maching runs testing, the issue is your version of
 pandas is older.
 I've pushed a version that keeps compatibility with version 0.19 (the one
 in stretch).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 Tor Version 7.5.1 is where the I didn't an error message saying "Gah! Your
 Tab just crashed" (just showing a blank page).
 Version 7.0a4 is the last version where I got both the Tor-start page
 (we)and when I tried browsing something it displayed the message "Gah!
 Your Tab just crashed"

 Some version previous to 7.0a4 didnt even show Tor-Home-page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30104: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Good catch. I attached a solution for all the locales. We can replace the
 English one too. What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30104: browser onboarding: 8.5 security level image includes English text
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-onboarding, tbb-8.5, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "security-level.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:13 sagararla]:
 > I mean Tor-6.5a6 is the last properly working version. In version 7.0.2,
 I got the Tor-Page. But when I tried to surf the net, it gave a message
 saying 'Gah! your page got crashed'.

 Well, that may be different issues. What is with 7.0 and 7.0.1? And at
 which release did the 'Gah! your page got crashed' stop? Was the first
 release where this was not happening anymore the first one with the
 current "just-opening-a-blank-page"-behavior?

 > I tried to copy the firefox.exe (tor.exe) file from version-6.5a6 and
 replaced 7.0.1 firefox.exe file and tried to run it. It gave a error
 message "Platform version'52.2.0' is not compatible with minVersio >=
 45.6.0
 > maxVersion <= 45.6.0"

 Yeah, that's probably expected.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Start Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30116: Tor Start Problem
--+---
 Reporter:  sagararla |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29123| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sagararla):

 I mean Tor-6.5a6 is the last properly working version. In version 7.0.2, I
 got the Tor-Page. But when I tried to surf the net, it gave a message
 saying 'Gah! your page got crashed'.

 I tried to copy the firefox.exe (tor.exe) file from version-6.5a6 and
 replaced 7.0.1 firefox.exe file and tried to run it. It gave a error
 message "Platform version'52.2.0' is not compatible with minVersio >=
 45.6.0
 maxVersion <= 45.6.0"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: var/build_id should be stable accross build machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30118: var/build_id should be stable accross build machines
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Probably the same issue with Linux. From the same commit on two different
 machines:

 tor-browser-8.5a10-linux-x86_64-ab56a1
 tor-browser-8.5a10-linux-x86_64-69993c

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29374 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Analysis files sometimes present negative numbers in the payload_progress field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29374: Analysis files sometimes present negative numbers in the 
payload_progress
field
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  acute-2019-q1-planned  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by acute):

 Replying to [comment:3 karsten]:
 > Some thoughts on this, since I have been looking at tgen logs for a
 while now:
 >
 >  - The tgen log line you mention does not contain anything to identify
 the transfer. Would it be easier to use the next tgen log line which at
 least contains the source port? `2019-02-11 00:13:00 1549843980.555482
 [info] [shd-tgen-transport.c:203] [_tgentransport_changeState] transport
 TCP,16,localhost:127.0.0.1:43810,localhost:127.0.0.1:41204,op-
 ab.onionperf.torproject.net:137.50.19.2:80,state=CONNECT,error=NONE moving
 from state CONNECT to state INIT`; and would it still be accurate enough?

 Have had another look at it, the OP parser only looks at lines containing
 [transfer-status], [transfer-complete] and [transfer-error]. It currently
 identifies transfers by the time and transfer number only, without
 including any ports.
 The problem is that the transfer number only starts appearing in lines
 onwards after 'moving from state COMMAND to state RESPONSE', and the
 parser gets all the other information for a transfer from the tgen process
 summary report...

 Not sure where to go from here...we could change the way we identify
 reports (I agree with you that we should use both ports + time) to get
 timestamp information from the previous lines, and we add rules for
 parsing these? This would mean a major change to the OP parser.



 >  - What's the reason for overwriting this timestamp with the calculated
 value for ''complete'' transfers? This log line has usec granularity, too
 (1554084910'''.250433'''). I think it would be easier to compare partial
 progress of complete and incomplete transfers if we'd use the same
 timestamps for calculating them.
 My fear was that if the values reported by the tgen process are the
 absoulute source of truth, by changing them we'd report inaccurate
 information. I agree that calculating everything the same way is more
 consistent - we should go with this after we figure out what to do for the
 previous step.
 >  - Do we know of any tools ''relying'' on `payload_progress` numbers
 being negative for incomplete downloads? I admit that this would be a
 weird use of the data. Still, maybe worth checking if we're using them
 anywhere ourselves and probably worth writing something in the next
 release notes.

 Excellent point, will have a look at the visualization module.

 >  - You'll find more tgen logs for testing at https://op-
 ab.onionperf.torproject.net/ .
 Thanks for this!

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