Re: [tor-bugs] #30299 [Core Tor/Tor]: Switch network interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30299: Switch network interface
-+-
 Reporter:  enriquejr99  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network, interface, vpn, torrc,  |  Actual Points:
  dnsport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  Applications => Core Tor/Tor
 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


Comment:

 I am not convinced this is an applications bug. Maybe that's a Core Tor
 issue, though?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30334 [Applications/Tor Browser]: build_go_lib for executables?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30334: build_go_lib for executables?
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm


Comment:

 Not sure actually. boklm might know, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29982 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29982: Clicking on cog/gear icon crashes Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5
 -must-alpha => tbb-mobile, ux-team, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201904,
 tbb-8.5-must
 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>
 * parent:  #28329 =>


Comment:

 Still an issue, although slightly different now:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/281010#comment-281010

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30213 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove sudo: false from Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30213: Remove sudo: false from Travis
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/991
 * 0.3.4: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/992
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/990
 * 0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/989

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29307: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:18 cypherpunks]:
 > for some reason current tor mingw builds are not built with
 > {{{
 > Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 > }}}
 > please remind to configure
 > {{{
 > --enable-lzma   --enable-zstd
 > }}}
 > them with both libs.
 >
 > {{{
 > [notice] Tor 0.3.5.7 (git-9beb085c10562a25) running on Windows 8 [or
 later] with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2q, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma
 N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 > }}}
 >
 > they was even available for mingw package very long time...

 #22341 is the ticket you wanted to put this comment on. Yes, we want to
 have this too, so patches are welcome.

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[tor-bugs] #30335 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS-Everywhere handshake check flaw

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30335: HTTPS-Everywhere handshake check flaw
-+-
 Reporter:  bo0od|  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS
 |  Everywhere
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 When someone visit website , and that website configured TLS to be useless
 and vulnerable to MITM (not checking  if there is "Protocol Support" and
 "Cipher Strength") then this is real flaw of HTTPS-Everywhere to pass this
 as secure connection.

 E.g to make this very clear:

 https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=zu.ac.ae

 This is an F website and allows MITM due to insecure renegotiation. But
 when you visit the website while HTTPS-Everwhere enabled it will not read
 it as insecure connection or even showing yellow sign that the connection
 is not encrypted (by the lock browser).

 So whether this HTTPS-Everywhere flaw or TBB , something is wrong here.

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[tor-bugs] #30334 [Applications/Tor Browser]: build_go_lib for executables?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30334: build_go_lib for executables?
-+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Is there a reason that build_go_lib (from the go project in tor-browser-
 build) is only used for libraries and not executables?  At first glance,
 it seems to me that using it (or something very similar) for executables
 as well would cut down on boilerplate / code duplication.  Would a patch
 be accepted that adapted the meek/obfs4/snowflake projects in tor-browser-
 build to use build_go_lib (or an executable-focused analogue of it)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30262 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30262: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Gotcha. Exceptions are not reserved for unexpected issues in python (or
 most languages). When you provide an invalid input methods **should**
 raise a ValueError...

 {{{
 >>> int('hello')
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "", line 1, in 
 ValueError: invalid literal for int() with base 10: 'hello'
 }}}

 When file or network issues arise you **should** receive an IOError...

 {{{
 >>> open('/no/such/path', 'r')
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "", line 1, in 
 IOError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/no/such/path'
 }}}

 ... and similarly, if the descriptor you request is unavailable or cannot
 be received you should receive an exception telling you that. In this
 particular case Stem is being uncommonly hands-off with its exception
 handling because I don't want to mask underlying network problems.

 I could be talked into raising a "NoSuchDescriptor" or some other
 exception type instead, but it's definitely expected that we should raise
 something.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30262 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30262: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by starlight):

 Didn't realized that exceptions were the API mechanism for all errors,
 including known typical errors.  Avoid it myself, reserving exception
 throwing for arrival of the unexpected.

 Have to repeat, not graceful.  If you are satisfied it's working "to
 spec," then feel free to close the ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30262 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30262: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi starlight. Could you please describe from an API perspective what you
 mean by "gracefully returning an error code"? These methods are documented
 as returning the requested descriptor, and raising an exception if unable
 to do so, so I'm unsure what precisely you'd like for this method to do
 differently.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30262 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30262: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by starlight):

 My idea is more that Stem should handle two very common, unexceptional
 failure cases without throwing an exception, but rather by gracefully
 returning an error code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:24 dcf]:
 > I have just a few further changes to recommend.
 Updated branch: https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/compare/geoip
 >
 > *
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/fb01c2d1c9d402cc4d96f01df2e6fb6cb37bc9a6/broker/broker.go#L221
 >   {{{
 > strings.Split(r.RemoteAddr, ":")[0]
 >   }}}
 >   This will fail for IPv6 addresses. Better to use net.SplitHostPort and
 check the error return. The host–port splitting could also happen inside
 of `Metrics.UpdateCountryStats`.
 Ack >.< thanks. Done!
 > *
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/fb01c2d1c9d402cc4d96f01df2e6fb6cb37bc9a6/broker/geoip.go#L196
 >   {{{
 > _, err = io.WriteString(hash, scanner.Text())
 >   }}}
 >   A better way to do this may be to do `hashedFile :=
 io.TeeReader(geoipFile, hash)` and then `scanner :=
 bufio.NewScanner(hashedFile)` so that the hash is calculated as a side
 effect of reading the file. There's no need to handle errors when writing
 to a `hash.Hash` because it is documented to never error.
 Done
 > *
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/fb01c2d1c9d402cc4d96f01df2e6fb6cb37bc9a6/broker/geoip.go#L14
 >   {{{
 > Recognized line formats for IPv4 are:
 > INTIPLOW,INTIPHIGH,CC
 > and
 > "INTIPLOW","INTIPHIGH","CC","CC3","COUNTRY NAME"
 >   }}}
 >   It looks like the code doesn't recognize the 5-element syntax, so it
 should be omitted here, or, if it's a common format, documented as not
 being supported.
 Documented as unsupported so we know what our line of thought was in case
 we want to support it later
 >
 > Okay. Let's replace the panic with a `log.Fatal` so the failure gets
 logged.
 >
 Done
 > > > * The `parseEntry` functions need error checking on
 `geoipStringToIP` and `net.ParseIP`, or else they will store a `nil` that
 will result in a panic later on.
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/4de81ed039ce28264a98a040a0fde2237844e779/broker/geoip.go#L93
 This error] will be more useful if it includes a line number. Let me
 suggest a different factoring of the geoip parsing code. Have `parseEntry`
 be a plain function, not a method on `GeoIPv4Table`, and have it return
 `(GeoIPEntry, error)` rather than inserting into the table itself.
 GeoIPLoadFile can do the entry insertion, count lines and annotate the
 error result from `parseEntry`.
 > > The difficulty in refactoring it this way is that ipv4 and ipv6 tables
 have differently formated entries that need to be parse differently.
 > > I added error checking to parseEntry and have it return `(GeoIPEntry,
 error)` as suggested, but leave it as a method on GeoIPv4Table and
 GeoIPv6Table.
 >
 > I didn't explain this well. I meant that there should be separate
 functions for the two formats e.g. `parseEntryIPv4` and `parseEntryIPv6`.
 The existing `parseEntry` methods never refer to `table`, so they don't
 need to be methods. But leaving them as methods is fine too.
 Okay, I'm going to leave them as methods to avoid having two different
 LoadFile functions for the different types of table.
 >
 > IMO annotating the error message with the problematic line should be
 done in `GeoIPLoadFile`, not in `parseEntry`. This will eliminate the
 duplication of the common `"Provided geoip file is incorrectly formatted"`
 string and ensure that all the error paths get annotated. What I mean is,
 in the `scanner.Scan()` loop, you can replace `return err` with `return
 fmt.Errorf("Provided geoip file is incorrectly formatted: %s. Line is:
 %+q")`.
 Done, is there a better way of handling the error stubs in `parseEntry`
 other than returning `fmt.Errorf("")`?

 Replying to [comment:25 dcf]:
 > Oh and it looks like country stats don't get incremented whenever
 `GetCountryByAddr` doesn't find a match. I'm afraid this will make
 analysis difficult if a large fraction of proxies aren't covered by the
 geoip database, or the database is improperly installed, or something.
 Could we count them with a country code of `"??"` or something?
 >
 >
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/fb01c2d1c9d402cc4d96f01df2e6fb6cb37bc9a6/broker/geoip.go#L213
 > `GetCountryByAddr` returns `(string, error)`, but failure to find an
 entry in a database is not really an "error". It makes it seem like there
 are three return stats possible (found, n

Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30314 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relay became Guard with less than 2 weeks of existence

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30314: Relay became Guard with less than 2 weeks of existence
--+---
 Reporter:  crimson_king  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 guard probability 0%!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29307: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 for some reason current tor mingw builds are not built with
 {{{
 Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 }}}
 please remind to configure
 {{{
 --enable-lzma   --enable-zstd
 }}}
 them with both libs.

 {{{
 [notice] Tor 0.3.5.7 (git-9beb085c10562a25) running on Windows 8 [or
 later] with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2q, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma
 N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 }}}

 say was even available for mingw package very long time...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30136 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for mobile stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30136: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for 
mobile
stable
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 "Tor Browser" is valid for all other platform. make it "Tor Browser" on
 mobile too

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 does this mean, we can no longer cheat bandwidth tokens by spamming
 {{{
 SendMe
 }}}
 's ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7707 [Core Tor/Tor]: Impose a minimum write size for TLS writes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7707: Impose a minimum write size for TLS writes
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, performance, bwbug,   |  Actual Points:
  bandwidth sponsor8-maybe tls nagle,|
  032-unreached, sponsor8-removed|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 nagling is not good for low latency OR interactive streams

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30213 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove sudo: false from Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30213: Remove sudo: false from Travis
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 rl1987]:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/977
 Thanks! Looks good.

 I would feel better if there were a pull request for each supported
 release, though. wiki:org/teams/NetworkTeam/CoreTorReleases

 Would you be willing to do that? Another team member might also be willing
 to do that when they have time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30331 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30331: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by yawning):

 > I'm tempted to call this a Tor ticket then

 That's what I would propose.  Instead of passing extra information (that's
 not needed for anything other than this ticket) to each PT provider, it
 makes more sense to me to do it at a place where all of the information
 already exists.

 > and Tor should write the whole bridge line to a log entry, or to a state
 file, or some other smart place?

 Maybe follow the obfs4 model and write all of the bridge lines to
 `$DATADIR/pt_state/bridgelines.txt` perhaps.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14389 [Core Tor/Tor]: little-t-tor: Provide support for better TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14389: little-t-tor: Provide support for better TBB UI of hidden service client
authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:
  auth   |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:  14-24
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:46 asn]:
 > Thanks for digging into this! From the above issues, only this one about
 proxy bypass seems to be blocker to me. All the others are things that can
 be solved with some moderate engineering efforts IIUC. However, if we
 can't guarantee that we have no proxy bypass we can't really proceed with
 HTTP CONNECT, right? What do you think?

 I think there are a bunch of issues that add up to a lot of work, and each
 one carries some associated risk.  Obviously potential proxy bypass would
 be a very important risk to address.

 Over the past few days, Kathy and I have been thinking in general terms
 about the implications of a switch from SOCKS to HTTP CONNECT. There is an
 architectural difference inside the browser network code that seems
 important: the SOCKS layer in Firefox is located near the bottom of the
 networking stack, but HTTP CONNECT is a special thing that is supported
 for HTTP and WebSockets only. And HTTP CONNECT previously has only been
 used for WebSockets and proxying of https:// requests inside Firefox.

 To us, the big issue is that if Tor Browser uses HTTP CONNECT in a way
 that the Firefox networking engineers did not design for and/or do not
 expect, we will have trouble now and in the future.  It seems like a
 risky change, and it may take a lot of time for the browser team to
 resolve all of the issues associated with it.  Patching the Firefox code
 to meet our needs will also add to our ongoing maintenance burden
 (although we would try to get Mozilla to accept our patches). Finally,
 this is the kind of work we should defer until after we transition the
 browser to an ESR68-based codebase, and that work won't be finished until
 approximately October 2019. For all of these reasons, Kathy and I would
 prefer to find a way to continue to use SOCKS and find a different way to
 pass additional error information from tor to the browser (either via
 control port events or via additional SOCKS error codes, or some
 combination of the two).

 Georg reminded me earlier today that the browser already successfully
 associates asynchronous control port events with browser tabs for the
 circuit display. Kathy and I will take a fresh look at that code to see
 how it works.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30280 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Wrong SHA-256 sum for j2objc-annotations-1.1.jar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30280: Wrong SHA-256 sum for j2objc-annotations-1.1.jar
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must
 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Branches fixed and force-pushed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 whoops, doesn't compile. half a moment...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
-+-
 Reporter:  special  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > I'd actually like to some exploration of initial throttling or dropping
 or queueing at the intro point as well. That was originally meant to be
 the first line of defense here.

 Here's my concrete proposal on this one: the intro point should see if the
 package window for the intro circuit is empty, and if so, it should nack
 the intro1 cell. That way there are at most 1000 intro2 cells in flight at
 once from that intro point.

 This design is reasonable because it takes a long while for an onion
 service to process 1000 intro2 cells, so if we queue later ones and send
 them 'eventually', they're going to arrive much later, and the client will
 likely have timed out and moved on from that rendezvous point. So we're
 not harming legitimate clients who end up in this situation, because the
 current behavior is already harming them plenty.

 The benefits are that (a) the onion service doesn't receive the excess
 intro2 cells that it wasn't going to be able to rendezvous with anyway,
 (b) clients get a much faster feedback that things aren't going to work so
 they can move to another intro point, and (c) when a DoS stops, the pain
 stops soon after: there isn't a huge queue of waiting intro2 cells that
 have to slowly drain, for no value.

 We could imagine an extension on this idea, where the intro point silently
 drops the excess intro1 cells, rather than explicitly nacking them. This
 variant will force the client to time out rather than immediately try the
 next intro point, thus slowing down attacks by clients that follow the
 protocol. (Modified clients could still use a smaller timeout, or not even
 care whether they get a response.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks Nick! For what it's worth looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30331 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30331: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by arma):

 I'm tempted to call this a Tor ticket then, and Tor should write the whole
 bridge line to a log entry, or to a state file, or some other smart place?

 (I imagine some people will be nervous about the idea of putting it in the
 log file, "because what if the operator accidentally reveals it to
 somebody", but I think usability trumps risk here.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26673 [Metrics/Onionperf]: Record download times of smaller file sizes from partial completion times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26673: Record download times of smaller file sizes from partial completion 
times
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionperf|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  user-experience, |  Actual Points:
  acute-2019-q1-planned  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by acute):

 Some feedback required;
 I've made a pull request which adds support for recording partial
 completion timestamps, both in json and torperf produced analysis files.
 The data is recorded the same way as the percentile data, and only in case
 where there are no errors. An example of the resulting fields in the
 torperf file (in the case of a 5m download) are:
 PARTIAL1048576=1555678482.70 PARTIAL51200=1555678479.75
 PARTIAL5242880=1555678495.97

 For a 1m download, only values PARTIAL1048576 and PARTIAL51200 are
 recorded, and similarly, for a 50k download, only PARTIAL51200 will be
 recorded.
 We could only record PARTIAL values smaller than the total size of the
 download (we already record DATAPERC100, which is the same
 timestamp/value, equivalent to 100% download), however having the field
 might help process things in an automated fashion further down the
 pipeline - happy to make changes if this is not the case.

 Finally - the names of the fields may be changed to PARTIAL{50k,1m,5m}
 although I've noticed all the other fields in the tpf file use the value
 in bytes and not the human readable version. Suggestions welcome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+

Comment (by antonela):

 Hi, I working back on this ticket. I listed some user stories to make sure
 that we are handling these various user flows with the implementation:

 **As a user, I want to access to an authenticated .onion. I type the
 .onion address at the URL bar, and I get a user/password prompt. I fill
 the user/password field to access the onion website. I succeed.**

 This UI will looks like

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30237/30237-1.png, 700px)]]

 **As a user, I want to access to an authenticated .onion. I type the
 .onion address at the URL bar, and I get a user/password prompt. I fill
 the user/password field to access the onion website. I fail.**

 For users who cancel the prompt or fail with the credentials,
 [https://superuser.com/questions/770897/firefox-does-not-prompt-for-
 password-for-http-authenticated-sites-how-to-make-i, the default ux is
 very sad]. Could we think together about how we can allow users to recover
 from those situations? Is a password error message like "Enter a valid
 password" doable? What happens if users enter a non-existent user name in
 the user field? Are these situation able to validate? Is that part of this
 scope?

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30237/30237-2.png, 700px)]]

 **
 As a recurrent user, I want to save the authenticated .onion credentials.
 I type the .onion address at the URL bar, and a get a password prompt. I
 succeed. I want to save these credentials in the browser password
 manager.**

 As suggested in
 #[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14389#comment:25,
 14389], we could explore how to use default Firefox save password flow to
 allow users to save these credentials. After the user succeed on accessing
 the .onion, the password saving will prompt.

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/30237/30237-3.png, 700px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "30237-3.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "30237-2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "30237-1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 See my branch `bug30316_035`.

 0.3.5 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/987
 0.4.0 PR: [fixes conflict and also moves bandwidth-file-digest]
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/988

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "30237-3.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "30237-1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30261 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "How do I find bug or feature versions?" to doc/HACKING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30261: Add "How do I find bug or feature versions?" to doc/HACKING
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:   => 035-backport
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30261 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "How do I find bug or feature versions?" to doc/HACKING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30261: Add "How do I find bug or feature versions?" to doc/HACKING
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 Works for me too; merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30316 [Core Tor/Tor]: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30316: Vote's 'bandwidth-file-headers' is in wrong order
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30331 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30331: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by yawning):

 > no side easily knows both.

 The tor daemon, knows everything because it's what generates and uploads
 the descriptor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30261 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add "How do I find bug or feature versions?" to doc/HACKING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30261: Add "How do I find bug or feature versions?" to doc/HACKING
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/972
 Looks good! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30333 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: tbb-testsuite: fix the download_pdf test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30333: tbb-testsuite: fix the download_pdf test
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-testsuite, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27105   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I temporarily disabled this test with commit
 5b6e16f8c9f7b00d12c0ca19da633a4af39345a9.

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[tor-bugs] #30333 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: tbb-testsuite: fix the download_pdf test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30333: tbb-testsuite: fix the download_pdf test
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:   |Version:
  Applications/Quality Assurance |
  and Testing|   Keywords:  tbb-testsuite,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201904
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #27105
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The `download_pdf` test currently fails with the error:
 {{{
 Traceback (most recent call last):
 File "/home/tbb-testsuite/tbb-testsuite/virtualenv-
 marionette-4.3.0/local/lib/python2.7/site-
 
packages/marionette_harness-4.3.0-py2.7.egg/marionette_harness/marionette_test/testcases.py",
 line 156, in run
 testMethod()
 File "/home/tbb-testsuite/tbb-
 testsuite/marionette/tor_browser_tests/test_download_pdf.py", line 24, in
 test_download_pdf
 m.set_window_size(1024, 300)
 File "/home/tbb-testsuite/tbb-testsuite/virtualenv-
 marionette-4.3.0/local/lib/python2.7/site-
 packages/marionette_driver-2.5.0-py2.7.egg/marionette_driver/marionette.py",
 line 2063, in set_window_size
 return self._send_message("setWindowSize", body)
 File "/home/tbb-testsuite/tbb-testsuite/virtualenv-
 marionette-4.3.0/local/lib/python2.7/site-
 packages/marionette_driver-2.5.0-py2.7.egg/marionette_driver/decorators.py",
 line 23, in _
 return func(*args, **kwargs)
 File "/home/tbb-testsuite/tbb-testsuite/virtualenv-
 marionette-4.3.0/local/lib/python2.7/site-
 packages/marionette_driver-2.5.0-py2.7.egg/marionette_driver/marionette.py",
 line 740, in _send_message
 self._handle_error(err)
   File "/home/tbb-testsuite/tbb-testsuite/virtualenv-
 marionette-4.3.0/local/lib/python2.7/site-
 packages/marionette_driver-2.5.0-py2.7.egg/marionette_driver/marionette.py",
 line 764, in _handle_error
 raise errors.lookup(error)(message, stacktrace=stacktrace)
 UnknownCommandException: setWindowSize
 stacktrace:
 WebDriverError@chrome://marionette/content/error.js:178:5
 UnknownCommandError@chrome://marionette/content/error.js:518:5
 despatch@chrome://marionette/content/server.js:286:13
 execute@chrome://marionette/content/server.js:267:11
 onPacket/<@chrome://marionette/content/server.js:242:15
 onPacket@chrome://marionette/content/server.js:241:8
 _onJSONObjectReady/<@chrome://marionette/content/transport.js:500:9
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28798 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: tbb-testsuite: fix the svg-disable and svg-enable tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28798: tbb-testsuite: fix the svg-disable and svg-enable tests
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-testsuite, boklm201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:  #27105   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 In commit 2e971faa9f2818f489853f8384794a24fbc519ef I temporarily disabled
 those tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  pidgin   |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Status update:

 asn and I have setup an environment to reproduce this `INTRODUCE2` DDoS
 for which we were successful at reproducing the max CPU utilization on the
 service. However, we haven't figured out just yet how can the service
 still receives `INTRODUCE2` cells 30+ minutes after the circuit has been
 closed (found from the logs given in private).

 Ticket #30291 has been opened regarding a reason of the high CPU usage.
 And nickm already worked on improvements so we expect these upstream soon.

 We'll be working on the DoS master ticket #2, especially #15516 and
 #26294 in the coming weeks. Improvements will be coming to master
 incrementally thus expect more updates about the situation as we progress
 in this work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30326 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove yasm from the list of dependencies for the firefox android build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30326: Remove yasm from the list of dependencies for the firefox android build
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Good catch and I indeed only tested `android-armv7`. Sorry for the noise,
 my bad. I agree we should just keep one container here for both builds.
 That single package does not seem to be worth two different containers.

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[tor-bugs] #30332 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create tor-browser-build repository for cohosh

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30332: Create tor-browser-build repository for cohosh
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hi,
 Can you please create the following git repositories for cohosh?

 `cohosh/tor-browser-build`

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option to build without using containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29981: Add option to build without using containers
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:25 boklm]:
 > So it seems yasm is not needed for the android-armv7 build, but still
 needed for the android-x86 one.
 >
 > In branch `bug_29981_v8` I added a new commit mentioning that in the
 README:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29981_v8&id=1959d1c9dbe993b8fb4732b333892cb04f7ccfae

 The previous `apt-get install` comment does not talk about `android-armv7`
 specifically, thus starting now talking of `android-x86` seems a bit weird
 to me. I think *if* we go with just installing `yasm` everywhere to not
 create an extra container (I agree with that idea) then we should treat it
 as a first-class citizen here and just add it to the other packages.
 Otherwise we are starting to divert regarding installed packages between
 container/non-container builds (think of folks thinking "I only want to
 build `android-armv7` packages, thus no yasm for me`) which might fall
 onto our feet at some point.

 Maybe a note in the commit message would be enough to help us remembering
 in case we stumble over that again in the future? Otherwise I could think
 of "This can be done
 with the following command (note: yasm is only needed for android-x86
 builds):" to make our point clear while minimizing the risk for deviating
 from the packages installed in our container builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drop FTE related bits in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30319: Drop FTE related bits in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 In commit adaffbf1c2b49761c44e90f04e6939f0dab9cbba, I removed the FTE
 tests from the Tor Browser testsuite.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30262 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30262: stem.descriptor.remote not handling 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found' gracefully
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi starlight. Stem's descriptor.remote module propagates its underlying
 exception. When downloading through a DirPort this is a
 urllib2.HTTPError...

 {{{
 atagar@morrigan:~/Desktop/stem$ python download_descriptor.py -t server -f
 7FE6E24BF6058EA55717C18D34FCD049307D8D2C
 Downloading server descriptor from 128.31.0.34:9131...

 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "download_descriptor.py", line 131, in 
 main()
   File "download_descriptor.py", line 113, in main
 endpoints = [args.download_from],
   File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/descriptor/remote.py", line 487, in
 run
 return list(self._run(suppress))
   File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/descriptor/remote.py", line 498, in
 _run
 raise self.error
 urllib2.HTTPError: HTTP Error 404: Servers unavailable
 }}}

 Whereas with an ORPort it is the same stem.ProtocolError...

 {{{
 atagar@morrigan:~/Desktop/stem$ python download_descriptor.py -t server -f
 7FE6E24BF6058EA55717C18D34FCD049307D8D2C --orport 171.25.193.9:80
 Downloading server descriptor from 171.25.193.9:80...

 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "download_descriptor.py", line 131, in 
 main()
   File "download_descriptor.py", line 113, in main
 endpoints = [args.download_from],
   File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/descriptor/remote.py", line 487, in
 run
 return list(self._run(suppress))
   File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/descriptor/remote.py", line 498, in
 _run
 raise self.error
 stem.ProtocolError: Response should begin with HTTP success, but was
 'HTTP/1.0 404 Not found'
 }}}

 What are you hoping for Stem to do? I suspect your concern might be the
 verbosity of exception chaining in which case that is an artifact of
 python3...

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16348

 > stem.descriptor.remote also has a problem with empty documents

 Could you please re-try with the git codebase? I suspect this is already
 fixed - I get a 404 when I run the command you provided.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30291 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize our path selection code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30291: Optimize our path selection code
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-performance tor-hs path- |  Actual Points:
  selection refactoring tor-dos  |
Parent ID:  #30221   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [ticket:30291 dgoulet]:
 >This is in theory `O(n) + O(n) + O(n)` actually theoretically being
 `O(n)` but reality is far from the theory here in CPU consumption ;).

 For the record, it's actually worse.  `smartlist_subtract(l1, l2)` is not
 linear, but quadratic: it runs in `O(smartlist_len(l1) *
 smartlist_len(l2)`.  Fix (for this case of it) in #30307

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:36 nickm]:
 > lgtm now; let's squash & rebase, then re-run all the tests we can think
 of :)

 Here we go! New PR based on latest master (`206d28ff152f2df5`). Branch has
 been squashed also thus free of fixups:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/986
 Branch: `ticket26288_041_03`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30330 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: When do we upgrade to 16?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30330: When do we upgrade to 16?
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  micah
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by micah):

 I like to wait a week after a major release before upgrading, just to not
 be the first out of the gate who gets to eat all the bugs. For a project
 like nextcloud, new major versions are not released just for security
 fixes, so it seems safe to me to plan to do this upgrade this weekend
 after reviewing other people's experiences with 16 and making sure there
 aren't any breaking issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm now; let's squash & rebase, then re-run all the tests we can think of
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30331 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30331: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by arma):

 Thanks! I agree this is an important thing to do for usability for bridge
 operators.

 I would guess the hard part here might be that obfs4 knows some of the
 info, and Tor knows others of it, and no side easily knows both.

 So it seems like we should have one side send the other side what it
 needs, so some side knows everything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26288 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26288: prop289: Implement authenticated SENDME
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, 035-roadmap-master, 035 |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, prop289-assigned-|
  sponsor-v, 041-proposed-on-roadmap, network-   |
  team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-spec   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:34 nickm]:
 > Okay! I have some tiny requests about function names, and I still think
 that code outside relay_crypto shouldn't access its fields.

 All fixed!

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[tor-bugs] #30331 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30331: obfs4_bridgeline.txt file should contain complete bridge line
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  obfs4,
 |  bridge
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19|
-+-
 When setting up an obfs4 bridge, the user has to perform extra steps to
 fill in the missing values to construct the full bridge line from
 `/var/lib/tor/pt_state/obfs4_bridgeline.txt`.

 Specifically in:
 `Bridge obfs4 :  cert= iat-
 mode=0`
 only `cert` is populated automatically

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option to build without using containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29981: Add option to build without using containers
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option to build without using containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29981: Add option to build without using containers
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 So it seems yasm is not needed for the android-armv7 build, but still
 needed for the android-x86 one.

 In branch `bug_29981_v8` I added a new commit mentioning that in the
 README:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29981_v8&id=1959d1c9dbe993b8fb4732b333892cb04f7ccfae

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30326 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove yasm from the list of dependencies for the firefox android build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30326: Remove yasm from the list of dependencies for the firefox android build
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 So we could install yasm for all the builds, except the android-armv7
 build. However this means we will create two separate containers images
 for the android-armv7 and android-x86 firefox builds, with the only
 difference being the yasm package. I am not sure it is worth it, so I
 think we should just keep the yasm package installed during the android-
 armv7 build to keep things more simple.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30326 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove yasm from the list of dependencies for the firefox android build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30326: Remove yasm from the list of dependencies for the firefox android build
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I made a patch for this in branch `bug_30326`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_30326&id=d5be2bbbae4709b42d6520b5b632bf10904e3268

 A build for android-armv7 was successful with this patch. However the
 build for android-x86 fails with:
 {{{
  0:06.96 checking for Android lint classpath...  /var/tmp/dist/android-
 toolchain/android-sdk-linux/tools/lib/lint-26.0.0-dev.jar /var/tmp/dist
 /android-toolchain/android-sdk-linux/tools/lib/lint-checks-26.0.0-dev.jar
 /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-sdk-
 linux/tools/lib/sdklib-26.0.0-dev.jar /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain
 /android-sdk-linux/tools/lib/repository-26.0.0-dev.jar /var/tmp/dist
 /android-toolchain/android-sdk-linux/tools/lib/common-26.0.0-dev.jar
 /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-sdk-linux/tools/lib/lint-
 api-26.0.0-dev.jar /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-sdk-
 linux/tools/lib/manifest-merger-26.0.0-dev.jar
  0:06.98 configure: error: yasm is a required build tool for this
 architecture when webm is enabled. You may either install yasm or
 --disable-webm (which disables the WebM video format). See
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/YASM for more details.
  0:06.99 DEBUG: 
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:10347: checking for zipalign
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:10399: checking for Android platform-tools
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:10409: checking for adb
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:10461: checking for Android tools
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:10471: checking for emulator
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:10539: checking for Android lint classpath
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure:11315: /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-
 ndk/toolchains/llvm/prebuilt/linux-x86_64/bin/clang -std=gnu99
 --target=i386-linux-android -c -fno-short-enums -fno-exceptions   -fno-
 strict-aliasing -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -fno-math-errno
 -Qunused-arguments -isystem /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-
 ndk/platforms/android-16/arch-x86/usr/include -isystem /var/tmp/dist
 /android-toolchain/android-ndk/platforms/android-16/arch-x86/usr/include
 -gcc-toolchain /var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-
 ndk/toolchains/x86-4.9/prebuilt/linux-x86_64 -D__ANDROID_API__=16
 conftest.c 1>&5
  0:06.99 DEBUG: In file included from configure:11309:
  0:06.99 DEBUG: /usr/include/linux/ethtool.h:1220:8: error: fields must
 have a constant size: 'variable length array in structure' extension will
 never be supported
  0:06.99 DEBUG: __u32
 queue_mask[__KERNEL_DIV_ROUND_UP(MAX_NUM_QUEUE, 32)];
  0:06.99 DEBUG: ^
  0:06.99 DEBUG: 1 error generated.
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure: failed program was:
  0:06.99 DEBUG: #line 11308 "configure"
  0:06.99 DEBUG: #include "confdefs.h"
  0:06.99 DEBUG: #include 
  0:06.99 DEBUG: int main() {
  0:06.99 DEBUG:  struct ethtool_cmd cmd; cmd.speed_hi = 0;
  0:06.99 DEBUG: ; return 0; }
  0:06.99 DEBUG: configure: error: yasm is a required build tool for this
 architecture when webm is enabled. You may either install yasm or
 --disable-webm (which disables the WebM video format). See
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/YASM for more details.
  0:06.99 ERROR: old-configure failed
  0:07.01 *** Fix above errors and then restart with\
  0:07.01"/usr/bin/make -f client.mk build"
  0:07.01 client.mk:146: recipe for target 'configure' failed
  0:07.01 make: *** [configure] Error 1
 }}}

 Looking at `old-configure.in`, it seems we need yasm for all x86 builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29279 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Reach out to NGOs to test obfs4 reachability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29279: Reach out to NGOs to test obfs4 reachability
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  NGO, community |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "obfs4-reachability-2019-04-29.pdf" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Release: https://dist.torproject.org/metrics-lib/2.6.0/

 Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30218 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add bandwidth files archiving to CollecTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30218: Add bandwidth files archiving to CollecTor
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => irl


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30217 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Extend CollecTor filesystem protocol for bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30217: Extend CollecTor filesystem protocol for bandwidth files
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => irl


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30330 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: When do we upgrade to 16?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30330: When do we upgrade to 16?
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  micah
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ln5):

 * owner:  nextcloud-admin@… => micah
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30330 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: When do we upgrade to 16?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30330: When do we upgrade to 16?
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ln5):

 One particular thing about 16 is that Calendar 1.7.0 has implemented
 https://github.com/nextcloud/calendar/pull/602 which should make it
 possible to share calendars with circles as well as groups. This has been
 requested at least twice from what I've heard.

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[tor-bugs] #30330 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: When do we upgrade to 16?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30330: When do we upgrade to 16?
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Internal Services/Service -
 |  nextcloud
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 https://nextcloud.com/blog/nextcloud-16-introduces-machine-learning-based-
 security-and-usability-features-acl-permissions-and-cross-app-projects/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 [√] Release version is set
 [√] Changelog looks sane
 [√] Tarball created with "ant tar" is same size (not byte-for-byte due to
 timestamps)
 [√] Tests pass
 [√] Checks pass

 I have signed the git tag metrics-lib-2.6.0/irl in my repository
 https://github.com/irl/metrics-lib.git which can be merged into the
 metrics-lib repository. This tag was created with:

 {{{
 git tag -a -s -m "Tor Metrics' metrics-lib Release 2.6.0" metrics-
 lib-2.6.0/irl
 }}}

 You should then be able to make a tag metrics-lib-2.6.0/karsten with a GPG
 signature from you, and then one unsigned tag in the repo as usual. It's
 not possible to do multi-signature-tags in a standard way unfortunately.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30263 [Core Tor/Tor]: make shellcheck expects scripts in the build directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30263: make shellcheck expects scripts in the build directory
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  shellcheck, 040-backport, 040-must,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  tor-ci-might-fail-on-upgrade, regression   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30263 [Core Tor/Tor]: make shellcheck expects scripts in the build directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30263: make shellcheck expects scripts in the build directory
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  shellcheck, 040-backport, 040-must,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  tor-ci-might-fail-on-upgrade, regression   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.0 and forward

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Same links, please take another look. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29862 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Update Tor Browser manual for 8.5 release about Security Settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29862: Update Tor Browser manual for 8.5 release about Security Settings
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  wayward
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks waywayd!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30263 [Core Tor/Tor]: make shellcheck expects scripts in the build directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30263: make shellcheck expects scripts in the build directory
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  shellcheck, 040-backport, 040-must,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  tor-ci-might-fail-on-upgrade, regression   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ACK.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30308

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30308 by dgoulet:
reviewer to ahf

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30261

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30261 by dgoulet:
reviewer to catalyst

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27251

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #27251 by dgoulet:
reviewer to asn

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30213

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30213 by dgoulet:
reviewer to catalyst

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by karsten):

 Ah, good point about the change log. Hang on, I'll prepare a new branch
 and tarball...

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #30307, #30294

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #30307, #30294 by dgoulet:
reviewer to dgoulet

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 [√] Release version is set
 [×] Changelog looks sane
 [√] Tarball created with "ant tar" is same size (not byte-for-byte due to
 timestamps)
 [√] Tests pass
 [√] Checks pass

 We should mention in changelog that we are no longer signing jars.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remove pingsender from Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28369: remove pingsender from Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-proxy-bypass,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:8 acat]:
 > Patch here https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/28369.
 >
 > Tested that it builds Linux, Windows, Mac without pingsender executable.

 Looks good to me. Cherry-picked to `tor-browser-60.6.1esr-8.5-1` (commit
 c1262822e77cf26780d240646bacd14a67e6c301).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => irl


Comment:

 Branch: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-30329

 Tarball: https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/metrics-
 lib-2.6.0.tar.gz

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[tor-bugs] #30329 [Metrics/Library]: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30329: Release metrics-lib 2.6.0
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Let's put out a new metrics-lib release for #30216. I'll prepare a branch
 and tarball shortly.

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[tor-bugs] #30328 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix Coverity CID 1444769

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30328: Fix Coverity CID 1444769
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should fix CID 1444769.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30216 [Metrics/Library]: Add bandwidth file parser to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30216: Add bandwidth file parser to metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great, thanks! Merged. Opening a new ticket for releasing metrics-lib
 2.6.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30136 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for mobile stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30136: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for 
mobile
stable
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must,   |
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must,
 GeorgKoppen201904
 =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201904R, tbb-8.5-must,
 GeorgKoppen201904
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_30136` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30136&id=4d8409b3689d6def15540e766c3df2a2919023a2)
 in my `tor-browser repo has the changes for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28277 [Webpages]: 2018 donation banner at torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28277: 2018 donation banner at torproject.org
---+
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  sstevenson, steph  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yes, is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: fte pluggable transport is not working in Tor Browser nightly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18469: fte pluggable transport is not working in Tor Browser nightly
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing, as we are going to drop FTE soon: #30319.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29049 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport JS Poison Patch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29049: Backport JS Poison Patch
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201903,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201903, ff68-esr-will-have  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903, tbb-8.5
 =>
 tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903, ff68-esr-will-
 have


Comment:

 Whatever we do in the meantime we'll get this with ff68-esr

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30136 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for mobile stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30136: Decide whether to use "Tor Browser" or "Tor Browser for Android" for 
mobile
stable
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must,|
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201904, tbb-8.5-must,
 GeorgKoppen201904


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30069 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security slider and about:tor strings are untranslated in Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30069: Security slider and about:tor strings are untranslated in Tor Browser 
for
Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R, GeorgKoppen201904,  |
  tbb-parity |
Parent ID:  #26782   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 `bug_30069` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_30069&id=7e0bbadea033996f24cd8a33a3b9bf34e0beb317)
 in my tor-browser repo has the additional fix so that everything is
 localized now according to the system default locale on start-up (assuming
 it matches one of the locales we ship).

 The key idea here was to check Mozilla's en-US .apk (they ship that in
 addition to a -multi one) and realizing that that one shows similar
 symptoms to our bundle. Decompiling both .apks and diffing the result
 showed the preference being set in the -multi .apk but not in the other.

 While I see why we don't set that preference (we don't run the installer)
 I am not sure why large parts of the UI are in fact properly localized
 without it being set.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28277 [Webpages]: 2018 donation banner at torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28277: 2018 donation banner at torproject.org
---+---
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  sstevenson, steph  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information


Comment:

 Are we done here and this ticket can get closed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30327 [Webpages/Website]: https://newsletter.torproject.org overlaps text as width is too small on my phone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30327: https://newsletter.torproject.org overlaps text as width is too small 
on my
phone
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "newsletter.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #30327 [Webpages/Website]: https://newsletter.torproject.org overlaps text as width is too small on my phone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30327: https://newsletter.torproject.org overlaps text as width is too small 
on my
phone
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Testing on a Samsungs Galaxy S5 mini I realized there is overlapping text
 on https://newsletter.torproject.org in the Archive section (the dates
 overlap with text so that the result is hardly readable). See attachment
 for how this looks like.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30216 [Metrics/Library]: Add bandwidth file parser to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30216: Add bandwidth file parser to metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth,tor-dirauth,metrics-  |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-q2|
Parent ID:  #21378   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Checks and tests OK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29319 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29319: Remove FTE support in Windows bundles
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201902,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904R  |
Parent ID:  #29307   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Please re-check if you are still fine with my changes. There are two
 commits now for this bug on `bug_29307_v7`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_29307_v7): b8c497a4eb16f8ea80914d6def714115977b6c11
 and 0c23af0c8c287a79a195de3df97bb70488e6ab23.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27290, #25405, #27905, #29028

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #27290, #25405, #27905, #29028 by gk:


Comment:
We don't plan any 8.0.x builds anymore, thus nothing to backport for that 
series.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29307 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29307: Use Debian Stretch for cross-compiling our Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201904  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I created a rebased version against latest `master` for review
 `bug_29307_v7` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_29307_v7). It contains commit
 cfcb23a66e3ebd34b4df298f9e7550f1e0c97702 for this bug and two commits
 (b8c497a4eb16f8ea80914d6def714115977b6c11 and
 0c23af0c8c287a79a195de3df97bb70488e6ab23) for #29319.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option to build without using containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29981: Add option to build without using containers
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201904R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the detailed analysis! The new branch looks good to me. I've
 merged it to `master` (commits 9072578261fc2e4198e39b81313683bf2674c5b4
 and 0fc15a39f2adcf029676810c2ec37c566886879e).

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