Re: [tor-bugs] #30532 [- Select a component]: font FP reveals different Windows releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30532: font FP reveals different Windows releases
--+
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Thorin):

 ^^ Thanks. That's interesting. I just checked my Win10 64bit VM winver. It
 is `1809` build `17763.503`. I downloaded it the iso from Microsoft about
 6 months, never activated it or anything. Maybe it's a test version of
 something - I forget exactly.

 The difference between yours and mine is you have `Arial Narrow`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30531: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported
--+--
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `6992168724b997c74fc89f1e4a9301ce` on Microsoft Basic Render Driver
 Direct3D11 vs_5_0 ps_5_0 :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30532 [- Select a component]: font FP reveals different Windows releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30532: font FP reveals different Windows releases
--+
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Win 10 1809 64 bit: `77ee9c373e698fe9c8b381446a380389914ff294` (37 fonts)
 Arial, Arial Black, Arial Narrow, Cambria Math, Courier, Courier New,
 Georgia, Helvetica, Lucida Console, MS Gothic, MS PGothic, MV Boli, Malgun
 Gothic, Microsoft Himalaya, Microsoft JhengHei, Microsoft YaHei, Microsoft
 YaHei UI, Noto Sans Buginese, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans
 Myanmar, Noto Sans Yi, Segoe UI, Segoe UI Light, Segoe UI Semibold, Segoe
 UI Semilight, SimSun, Sylfaen, Tahoma, Times, Times New Roman, Verdana, Yu
 Gothic UI, 宋体, 微软雅黑, ＭＳ ゴシック, ＭＳ Ｐゴシック

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30491 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move our macOS builds to Debian Stretch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30491: Move our macOS builds to Debian Stretch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #30323   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 ELF targets only ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create APK signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26536: Create APK signing keys
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, I think we're done with this (again). I'll open another ticket for
 documenting the process in tor-browser-spec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create APK signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26536: Create APK signing keys
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:22 eighthave]:
 > Now that I think about it, it would probably be easier to pin to the
 version in Debian/buster, then there it would get security support for
 free, as long as the security.debian.org deb source is there for buster
 too:
 >
 > {{{
 > Package: opensc opensc-pkcs11
 > Pin: release a=buster
 > Pin-Priority: 400
 > }}}

 Thanks! I'll try that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create APK signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26536: Create APK signing keys
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I created a new certificate that expires in 5475 days (using the same key
 material). Now it's valid until `May 14 21:58:42 2034 GMT`.

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 $ pkcs15-tool -r 3 | openssl x509 -noout -text -fingerprint
 Using reader with a card: Nitrokey Nitrokey Pro (3961)
 00 00
 Certificate:
 Data:
 Version: 3 (0x2)
 Serial Number:
 ba:2d:f6:13:08:4d:2b:fd
 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
 Issuer: CN = Tor Browser, O = The Tor Project, L = Seattle, ST =
 WA, C = US
 Validity
 Not Before: May 18 21:58:42 2019 GMT
 Not After : May 14 21:58:42 2034 GMT
 Subject: CN = Tor Browser, O = The Tor Project, L = Seattle, ST =
 WA, C = US
 Subject Public Key Info:
 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
 Public-Key: (4096 bit)
 Modulus:
 00:f3:ee:23:1d:69:ce:43:5f:32:4a:d4:aa:39:8a:
 ef:31:31:87:6a:e7:45:63:42:8b:61:f6:ad:8c:65:
 c5:22:fd:df:6e:dc:c2:4f:6e:61:5a:d9:78:59:8f:
 8c:59:5c:63:2f:2d:51:df:82:25:ec:26:74:2a:f7:
 47:9d:8b:45:ee:a3:79:ac:7c:21:e8:66:5b:df:b2:
 ac:8f:00:08:c0:b4:7a:2b:a8:9c:aa:39:c5:81:c0:
 82:7d:35:59:9d:a3:d6:e0:fd:40:45:dd:4e:bd:ee:
 de:39:79:0b:e6:dd:63:0b:6b:a7:90:8b:eb:39:e2:
 0e:aa:9c:42:db:cc:5b:b7:b4:f7:a4:3f:0e:2f:9d:
 d9:1e:07:6e:2c:7c:dc:c2:f8:f9:b6:26:62:8f:36:
 68:31:eb:91:7d:2e:54:de:f8:59:df:04:20:84:46:
 0a:ad:cb:1d:53:ff:81:14:f8:d6:66:49:49:92:b2:
 60:af:2b:7f:4c:dd:80:b7:73:32:96:b7:9e:88:31:
 cb:c8:ba:54:b0:28:cf:32:02:df:da:84:85:55:40:
 56:7c:62:ae:d8:13:f3:2b:ae:e1:37:ce:3f:c1:49:
 a1:09:b0:a3:6e:32:fc:b2:8a:2a:8d:2e:7c:2f:67:
 d9:b1:89:ff:d2:e5:3f:ff:8e:dd:ad:e9:d0:5d:3e:
 33:56:0e:73:ec:bf:1f:8c:58:20:77:27:2a:e7:b5:
 e9:d1:6e:03:76:a0:ab:39:60:6b:20:89:e7:8c:bc:
 4a:37:da:4d:85:f5:96:5d:b4:20:cb:6d:77:71:73:
 48:a2:1b:49:35:8f:0c:34:74:2d:a7:4b:69:f6:74:
 6a:29:88:eb:81:5e:29:10:a7:f4:92:f5:2e:14:dc:
 c1:74:14:be:73:55:94:e6:b6:ad:62:bf:0a:70:1d:
 3a:3d:d2:74:57:05:01:01:e5:68:cf:32:53:6a:4e:
 7f:d0:69:90:8b:ac:cf:21:97:bb:9c:4c:25:85:44:
 6d:f2:bd:a2:3c:4e:dd:a6:71:cf:1a:88:18:03:95:
 99:51:07:1f:8d:03:ac:8d:ff:38:ab:00:ab:f8:8c:
 87:cd:37:83:81:50:32:f9:28:81:69:19:4e:ad:8e:
 a0:a2:8a:51:8c:d8:ec:0a:0c:d5:c6:08:00:de:16:
 83:a0:43:6b:09:a0:26:52:4a:be:df:f9:4e:0d:7a:
 c6:ef:3e:06:f8:86:5c:78:0b:c1:81:8c:64:13:43:
 89:ff:30:d4:33:10:53:ea:25:91:d6:58:08:21:5c:
 68:78:d1:fb:3e:4f:e7:62:7b:92:6f:b9:c1:03:1a:
 77:8f:6f:fe:87:bb:fe:35:14:1b:36:f2:71:b0:50:
 75:e7:5f
 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
 X509v3 extensions:
 X509v3 Basic Constraints:
 CA:FALSE
 X509v3 Key Usage:
 Digital Signature
 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
 6D:96:FB:E7:BE:D0:BD:62:CB:B0:C2:60:7B:6E:DA:93:ED:B6:94:55
 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
 keyid:6D:96:FB:E7:BE:D0:BD:62:CB:B0:C2:60:7B:6E:DA:93:ED:B6:94:55

 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
  27:c7:e9:40:53:3a:85:4a:ef:ce:95:54:38:a5:34:4b:d3:66:
  cd:2d:d8:c2:4e:8d:dc:99:0d:31:d3:ad:5c:53:31:ea:bc:b2:
  f0:1e:d5:51:7a:19:cc:5a:d5:43:9d:d8:19:3f:94:d5:47:4d:
  76:13:17:62:64:7d:ae:91:ed:b5:9e:e9:0a:84:ce:c2:df:c6:
  

Re: [tor-bugs] #26536 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create APK signing keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26536: Create APK signing keys
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tbb-8.5-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 I forgot Google Play requires the signing cert have a long lifetime.

 https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#considerations
 {{{
 If you plan to publish your apps on Google Play, the key you use to sign
 your app must have a validity
 period ending after 22 October 2033. Google Play enforces this requirement
 to ensure that users can
 seamlessly upgrade apps when new versions are available.
 }}}

 The above key is only valid until 2023.

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[tor-bugs] #30533 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Bandwidth Unmeasured in Testing Tor Network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30533: Bandwidth Unmeasured in Testing Tor Network
-+-
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core
 |  Tor/DirAuth
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.8 |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Bandwiidth, Testing Tor Network  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 I have run the Testing Tor Network based on docker, however, the bandwidth
 of relays in consensus is 0, and they are labeled as unmeasured.
 like

 {{{
 r tor21 AXeRGqg59zZ0JOyocxlonwk84Qg zv7cbbO1TcuYfwhzA/VjeE/u9UY 2019-05-18
 15:49:03 172.25.0.121 5000 0
 s Exit Fast Running V2Dir Valid
 v Tor 0.3.5.7
 pr Cons=1-2 Desc=1-2 DirCache=1-2 HSDir=1-2 HSIntro=3-4 HSRend=1-2
 Link=1-5 LinkAuth=1,3 Microdesc=1-2 Relay=1-2
 w Bandwidth=0 Unmeasured=1 (The bandwidth is labeled as unmeasured)
 p reject 25,119,135-139,445,563,1214,4661-4666,6346-6429,6699,6881-6999
 }}}

 The torrc file of my authority server is listed as following:

 {{{
 Log info file /root/log/info.log
 DisableDebuggerAttachment 0

 SocksPort 0
 OrPort 5000
 Address 172.25.0.10
 DirPort 7000

 AuthoritativeDirectory 1
 V3AuthoritativeDirectory 1
 ContactInfo a...@test.test
 ExitPolicy reject *:*


 ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
 DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
 EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
 AssumeReachable 1
 AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
 AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
 ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
 ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
 CountPrivateBandwidth 1
 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
 ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
 V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
 V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
 V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
 MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
 TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
 TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
 TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
 TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
 TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
 TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds
 TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds
 TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1
 TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1

 }}}

 The version of tor is 0.3.3.8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13018 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Math routines are OS fingerprintable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13018: Math routines are OS fingerprintable
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os-version,   |  Actual Points:
  ff31-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 I have done more testing, and improved the output in my test: including a
 red info if I haven't seen the hash before. I have now found that TB on
 Linux actually has more entropy than originally thought. After testing 5
 distros (a mix of flavors and architecture) I have 3 distinct Linux
 buckets (it's not enough to distinguish the actual platform, at least not
 in all cases, yet). I will be adding more distros to investigate further.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by s7r):

 I like 'a' as a short term plan as well. Proof of work solutions are non
 trivial engineering challenges, consume time and it eventually still gets
 down to the simple question how much resources/work/time/bandwidth is the
 attacker willing to give to pull this of.

 what if we add a time based lifetime for each intro point, which will be a
 random value chosen at intro point selection between n and m hours, along
 with a ALLOW_RESET_CACHE parameter which will be a random number between o
 and p and also maintain the intro requests lifetime rand(16384, 16384*2)
 which will be combined with ALLOW_RESET_CACHE, and rebuild descriptor when
 the first from these two is reached. This way we don't have to increase
 the cache but only reset it.

 For example:
 An onion service selects Z as intro point. It also chooses these random
 values and remembers them for this intro point:
 - time based lifetime = 5 hours (let's pretend n = 1; m = 6)
 - ALLOW_RESET_CACHE = 1400 (let's pretend ALLOW_RESET_CACHE = rand(100,
 7000))
 - intro requests lifetime = 20122 (rand(16384, 16384*2)

 Now, this intro point will be rotated either after 5 hours, if the onion
 service is not under attack, either after 20122 * 1400 = 28,170,800 intro
 requests.

 If high values would have been chose for ALLOW_RESET_CACHE and intro
 requests lifetime, indeed we will be getting many introduction requests
 through the same introduction point, but we still have the time based
 lifetime parameter as a safety precaution that will eventually move us
 from this introduction point.

 We can go even go more crazy about this and use the introduction point
 measured bandwidth  or consensus weight so we choose parameters based on
 how much the intro point is actually able to support in terms of
 bandwidth, so we don't end up with maintaining an introduction point that
 is hammered and can't process the requests because it's too slow.  Or find
 another way to check if the intro point is actually responding to intro
 requests. But even without these smarter computations the presented
 solution still has to be better than what we have now.

 All 3 parameters must be randomized as described, otherwise we open the
 door for easier analysis and predictability for attackers, like estimate
 with high probability when will the intro point change occur, etc.
 (outside the scope of this ticket).

 The numbers for time based lifetime and ALLOW_RESET_CACHE don't have any
 analysis behind, they are just from top of my head and only to illustrate
 and example about the logic we need to code. We need to evaluate and
 choose good parameters for these values, if we think this is a good idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor 8.0a won't let me log in to Disqus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27249: Tor 8.0a won't let me log in to Disqus
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-8.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mwolfe):

 @pariksheet
 I checked, and I can access Disqus, but it's not easy. It looks like all
 Tor exit nodes have been marked as Spam by the site, so one must get past
 a Captcha, sometimes possible, sometimes not. Captcha can be set to waste
 the time of those believed to be Spammers by demanding more and more
 solving of images but never admitting the suspected Spammer to the site.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28322 [Metrics]: Deploy better notification system for operational issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28322: Deploy better notification system for operational issues
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  project  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 I took a go at deploying this on AWS. I had heard about this new fancy
 Lightsail and deployed it there. This was a mistake and ended up being a
 waste of time for a number of reasons.

 Instead this is going to need to use EC2 (which Lightsail is based on
 anyway) so that we have better control over the firewall (ICMP is blocked
 on Lightsail) and so that it is possible to use the metadata service for
 AWS credentials (which will allow us to use SNS for alerting).

 In good news though, the Ansible playbook works well for deploying the
 software and configuration.

 As this is going to involve an EC2 instance, a couple of SNS topics, an
 IAM role and some glue I would like to see if I can get a CloudFormation
 template for this together so that we don't have AWS resources scattered
 and forgotten (and billed for) when we change this in the future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5304 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5304: Obfsproxy should respect OutboundBindAddress in torrc
-+-
 Reporter:  korobkov |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change needs-tor- |  Actual Points:  0.2
  change,sponsor19-can   |
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * points:   => 1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 Added a spec patch here:
 https://github.com/ahf/torspec/commit/c5ed6c20a9c38c15bae61821d81a97bc79e59b9c

 Asking phw and dcf on IRC if one of them is up for reviewing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30532 [- Select a component]: font FP reveals different Windows releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30532: font FP reveals different Windows releases
--+
 Reporter:  Thorin|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Thorin):

 windows font results

 ***Windows 7 32bit***
 Arial, Arial Black, Batang, Cambria Math, Courier, Courier New, Euphemia,
 Gautami, Georgia, Gulim, GulimChe, Helvetica, Iskoola Pota, Kalinga,
 Kartika, Latha, Lucida Console, MS Gothic, MS Mincho, MS PGothic, MS
 PMincho, MV Boli, Malgun Gothic, Mangal, Meiryo, Meiryo UI, Microsoft
 Himalaya, Microsoft JhengHei, Microsoft YaHei, MingLiU, Noto Sans
 Buginese, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Yi,
 Nyala, PMingLiU, Plantagenet Cherokee, Raavi, Segoe UI, Segoe UI Light,
 Segoe UI Semibold, Shruti, SimSun, Sylfaen, Tahoma, Times, Times New
 Roman, Tunga, Verdana, Vrinda, 宋体, 微软雅黑, 新細明體, 楷体, 細明體, 굴
 림, 굴림체, 바탕, ＭＳ ゴシック, ＭＳ 明朝, ＭＳ Ｐゴシック

 **Windows 7 64bit**
 Arial, Arial Black, Arial Narrow, Batang, Courier, Courier New, Euphemia,
 Gautami, Georgia, Gulim, GulimChe, Helvetica, Iskoola Pota, Kalinga,
 Kartika, Latha, Lucida Console, MS Gothic, MS Mincho, MS PGothic, MS
 PMincho, MV Boli, Malgun Gothic, Mangal, Meiryo, Meiryo UI, Microsoft
 Himalaya, Microsoft JhengHei, Microsoft YaHei, MingLiU, Noto Sans
 Buginese, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Myanmar, Noto Sans Yi,
 Nyala, PMingLiU, Plantagenet Cherokee, Raavi, Segoe UI, Segoe UI Light,
 Segoe UI Semibold, Shruti, SimSun, Sylfaen, Tahoma, Times, Times New
 Roman, Tunga, Verdana, Vrinda, 宋体, 微软雅黑, 新細明體, 細明體, 굴림, 굴
 림체, 바탕, ＭＳ ゴシック, ＭＳ 明朝, ＭＳ Ｐゴシック

 **Windows10 64bit**
 Arial, Arial Black, Cambria Math, Courier, Courier New, Georgia,
 Helvetica, Lucida Console, MS Gothic, MS PGothic, MV Boli, Malgun Gothic,
 Microsoft Himalaya, Microsoft JhengHei, Microsoft YaHei, Microsoft YaHei
 UI, Noto Sans Buginese, Noto Sans Khmer, Noto Sans Lao, Noto Sans Myanmar,
 Noto Sans Yi, Segoe UI, Segoe UI Light, Segoe UI Semibold, Segoe UI
 Semilight, SimSun, Sylfaen, Tahoma, Times, Times New Roman, Verdana, Yu
 Gothic UI, 宋体, 微软雅黑, ＭＳ ゴシック, ＭＳ Ｐゴシック

 You can compare them. For example, the diff between 32 vs 64 Win7 is
 - win7 32 has `Cambria Math` and `楷体`
 - win7 64 has `Arial Narrow`

 As for win7 vs win10, use your fav IDE.

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[tor-bugs] #30532 [- Select a component]: font FP reveals different Windows releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30532: font FP reveals different Windows releases
+--
 Reporter:  Thorin  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 based on Arthur's work [1], I have been looking at the enumerate fonts FP
 for TB 8 and 8.5a and various platforms.

 [1] https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html#fonts
 ^^ just click run tests, and the only test I have actually added is the
 one we're concerned about

 - Linux distros all seem to be the same - I will test more
 - I do not have a Mac, but I do have one result, should anyone like to
 contribute, and I don't think Macs would vary
 - But I found Windows (so far in three out 3 cases) is revealing the major
 version and maybe the architecture. I believe this might be fixed by
 looking at the font whitelist, but Windows 10 is a rather drastic change
 (at least from Win7).
 - I will try and get Win10-32bit, Win8.1 32+64bit results to build a
 complete picture of Windows font entropy. **If you can provide it instead
 of me trying to find isos and setting up more VMs, then please do**

 So here are some results (8.0.9, 8.5a12)
 - Win 7  32bit: `9e5d39b4542cd5e2a19f73b8fa566e679fa561e5` (62 fonts)
 - Win 7  64bit: `ad4ccd607603041d3e89aa8e03e2e203fc184653` (61 fonts)
 - Win8.1 32bit: please help
 - Win8.1 64bit: please help
 - Win 10 32bit: please help
 - win 10 64bit: `1389aaf4c97027b8157c5fb9ef5ed6f141a6b8a1` (36 fonts)

 also, FYI
 - mint (32/64bit), ubuntu, debian:
 `09a4ee037c9082b9b8f0b7ae981c656d517faffa`
 - mac 10.14: `4094aedc000205c711385fad32827e60462976dc`

 Note that the 1 font difference between Win7 32 and 64 bit is just the
 count, there are actually three changes. I will post the font lists for
 the three windows results in the next post

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30516 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please hook tor-android-service and tor-browser-bundle-testsuite commits to tbb-commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30516: Please hook tor-android-service and tor-browser-bundle-testsuite 
commits to
tbb-commits
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is done. The new repo is called tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git and
 boklm has RW access. There is a group that could have RW access:

 {{{
 @tor-browser = arthuredelstein boklm brade
 gk mcs mikeperry
 }}}

 or otherwise users could be specifically added. This would take a GPG
 signed ticket from boklm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30491 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move our macOS builds to Debian Stretch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30491: Move our macOS builds to Debian Stretch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #30323   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It's a bit weird, though, that we are seeing `ld: unknown option:
 --compress-debug-sections=zlib-gnu` in the error output. The problematic
 linker flag is there in the first place, it seems, because ld is
 supporting it now (and assuming that's indeed the linker we use). But
 suddenly it claims to not know it. Hrm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30491 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move our macOS builds to Debian Stretch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30491: Move our macOS builds to Debian Stretch
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #30323   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: dcf, cohosh (added)


Comment:

 Everything seems to compile fine (with similar small changes as those for
 Windows). However, `snowflake` is failing now:
 {{{
  0.44 host link: "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/clang/bin/clang++" "-m64"
 "-Wl,-headerpad,1144" "-Wl,-no_pie" "-Wl,-pagezero_size,400" "-o"
 "/tmp/go-build136535071/b001/exe/a.out" "-Qunused-arguments" "-Wl
 ,--compress-debug-sections=zlib-gnu" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/go.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/00.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/01.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/02.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/03.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/04.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/05.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/06.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/07.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/08.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/09.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/10.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/11.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/12.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/13.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/14.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/15.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/16.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/17.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/18.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/19.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/20.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/21.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/22.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/23.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/24.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/25.o"
 "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/26.o" "/var/tmp/go-link.tmpdir/27.o"
 "-target" "x86_64-apple-darwin11" "-B" "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-
 toolchain/cctools/bin" "-isysroot" "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/SDK/"
 "-stdlib=libc++" "-mmacosx-version-min=10.7" "-target" "x86_64-apple-
 darwin11" "-B" "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/cctools/bin" "-isysroot"
 "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/SDK/" "-stdlib=libc++" "-mmacosx-version-
 min=10.7" "-L/var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc/lib"
 "-L/var/tmp/dist/gopath/src/github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc/lib"
 "-lwebrtc-darwin-amd64-magic" "-framework" "AppKit" "-framework"
 "CoreAudio" "-framework" "AudioToolbox" "-target" "x86_64-apple-darwin11"
 "-B" "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/cctools/bin" "-isysroot"
 "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/SDK/" "-stdlib=libc++" "-mmacosx-version-
 min=10.7" "-lpthread" "-target" "x86_64-apple-darwin11" "-B"
 "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/cctools/bin" "-isysroot" "/var/tmp/dist
 /macosx-toolchain/SDK/" "-stdlib=libc++" "-mmacosx-version-min=10.7"
 "-framework" "CoreFoundation" "-framework" "Security" "-target" "x86_64
 -apple-darwin11" "-B" "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/cctools/bin"
 "-isysroot" "/var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/SDK/" "-stdlib=libc++"
 "-mmacosx-version-min=10.7" "-nopie"
 /var/tmp/dist/go/pkg/tool/linux_amd64/link: running /var/tmp/dist/macosx-
 toolchain/clang/bin/clang++ failed: exit status 1
 ld: unknown option: --compress-debug-sections=zlib-gnu
 clang-3.9: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see
 invocation)
 }}}
 Yes, `-Wl,--compress-debug-sections=zlib-gnu` was not an issue with Jessie
 as there binutils 2.25 got shipped, but that linker option got added to
 2.26. Stretch ships with binutils 2.28.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29921 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29921: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  hiro => anarcat
 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 actually, this is just about the static component...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29921 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29921: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 ... so this can be closed! irl will open another ticket for jenkins
 when/if relevant.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29921 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29921: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  anarcat => hiro


Comment:

 it looks like there was some cruft leftover from a previous onionperf
 deployment. i have cleaned that up and made
 staticiforme.torproject.org:/srv/onionperf.torproject.org/htdocs/ the
 source for the static component.

 the next step is to setup jenkins. i'm even less familiar with that than
 the static site setup, so I'll politely decline to followup with this at
 this stage and instead punt this back in my colleagues backyard. :)

 i will, however, learn how that stuff works and will be happy to help you
 again next time!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29921 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29921: Please create new static component onionperf.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28849: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-proposed  |  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dcf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * points:   => 3
 * actualpoints:   => 2.5


Comment:

 Added
 https://github.com/ahf/torspec/commit/af7539f6590726e496c6bb6a49a506233ed10a7f
 and
 https://github.com/ahf/torspec/commit/acdc9cf5cd11e89636d69e515c0f40d23bc48c16

 I try to make 3.3 more general and I think i fixed the itemized list too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30531: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported
--+--
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  AffectsTails => AffectsTails, tbb-fingerprinting


Comment:

 Or maybe we should give `true` back. However, I wonder whether any of that
 would help anyway a website could probably test whether anti-aliasing is
 available by rendering some content.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No input prompt in Browser Console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30530: No input prompt in Browser Console
--+
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  AffectsTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 For anyone coming to this ticket: the pref to toggle is
 `devtools.chrome.enabled` which is set to `false` is `MOZILLA_OFFICIAL` is
 specified and to `true` otherwise.

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[tor-bugs] #30531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30531: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported
--+--
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  AffectsTails
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 With Tor Browser 8.5-build2, we see 2 different WebGL fingerprints on
 panopticlick: 2ef68bcd75e09a41aea04bae556f3ecc on bare metal and in VMs
 that support OpenGL acceleration, f9a0f737691a9b57f5294121fc58a2df in VMs
 that don't support OpenGL acceleration.

 Quoting segfault (from
 https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/16337#note-61) who investigated
 this further:

 "I looked at the JS code used by panopticlick to calculate this hash, and
 printed the values which go into the hash. The only difference I could
 find is that antialiasing is enabled iff OpenGL is enabled. (That's
 exposed via the antialias bool of gl.getContextAttributes(), see
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/API/WebGLRenderingContext/getContextAttributes)."

 Impact: 1 bit of fingerprinting; risk: nowadays I would assume the huge
 majority of bare metal systems that can run TB have OpenGL, but most VMs
 haven't (unless geeky configuration is done, which is a minority). So it's
 roughly equivalent to splitting the anonymity set between VMs and bare
 metal, I'd say.

 GeKo says:

 > i guess we could think about making the antialiasing info uniform
 > like, just saying "no"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No input prompt in Browser Console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30530: No input prompt in Browser Console
--+
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  AffectsTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by intrigeri):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 GeKo says it's an intended consequence of building with MOZILLA_OFFICIAL.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30528 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: please create a l10n mailing list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30528: please create a l10n mailing list
-+
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  l10n, dev, mailing lists, community  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Added the list with default settings and sent the information to emmapeel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10632 [Applications/Tor Browser]: add environment variable that causes the "Open Network Settings" menu item to be hidden or disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10632: add environment variable that causes the "Open Network Settings" menu 
item
to be hidden or disabled
--+---
 Reporter:  proper|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
  Sponsor:|
--+---

Comment (by BrooklynFeeney):

 Adding environment variable seems like adding calendar variable in any
 project. I have done similar project with [[https://essay-writing-
 services.reviews/essayshark-com-review/|essayshark]] help which was quite
 interesting. If you need this, I can share it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No input prompt in Browser Console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30530: No input prompt in Browser Console
--+--
 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
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Changes (by intrigeri):

 * keywords:   => AffectsTails


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[tor-bugs] #30530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No input prompt in Browser Console

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30530: No input prompt in Browser Console
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 Reporter:  intrigeri |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
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 In Tor Browser 8.0.9 (both in Tails and outside) there was an input prompt
 line at the bottom of the "Browser Console" window. In Tor Browser
 8.5-build2 (both in Tails and outside, again), I can see no such input
 prompt, which makes it harder to test stuff like the add-ons validation.

 Is this behavior change intended or is that a side-effect regression of
 something else?

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