Re: [tor-bugs] #30635 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sync mobile default bridges list with desktop one

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30635: Sync mobile default bridges list with desktop one
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201905,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201905R, tbb-parity |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `GeorgKoppen201905R` :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29821 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make circuit/channel padding correctly respect dormant mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29821: Make circuit/channel padding correctly respect dormant mode
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad padding dormant dormant- |  Actual Points:
  mode   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


Comment:

 If we do any work on dormancy as part of Sponsor 31, we might fix this
 bug,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad,  |  Actual Points:
  041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 If the relay operator can't do anything to fix these warnings, we should
 downgrade the remaining warnings to protocol warnings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30235 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30235: Tor hangs when asked to change DisableAllSwap over the control port
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #29437 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  0.2 => 0.3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30234 [Core Tor/Tor]: Get a stacktrace from tor processes launched by stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30234: Get a stacktrace from tor processes launched by stem
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  0.1 => 0.2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30592 [Core Tor/Stem]: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30592: How do I make stem log info-level to test/data/tor_log?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30591 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Stem]: test-stem times out intermittently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
---+
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.3


Comment:

 I talked with Gaba and I can use actual points to track my time on
 incomplete tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Hi, here's how you can help us review these changes:

 > For each comment in the review, reply with the commit hash of the new
 commit that fixes the issue.

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[tor-bugs] #30677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move FP_REJECT and similar constants to a header, so we can access them in the tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30677: Move FP_REJECT and similar constants to a header, so we can access them 
in
the tests
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #22029
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should make them private or test-only, so we don't expose them outside
 the module.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I have made the requested changes I could and pushed them.

 I had to include one merge as CI wouldn't run as GitHub said my branch
 conflicts with master. Sorry about that.

 Also, I have many commits but most of them are fixup commits so they
 should be easy to squash.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30644 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add our own base-64 encoded ed25519 public key in dirserv_add_own_fingerprint()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30644: Add our own base-64 encoded ed25519 public key in
dirserv_add_own_fingerprint()
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22029| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  pidgin   |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, security, 041-longterm  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by pidgin):

 Any updates on this problem ??

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > What is the plan here? Any updates? That's still an often reported issue
 on our blog.

 1. We need to understand if this affects all bridge types, or if it is
 limited to obfs4.
 2. In parallel, we should test if the TCP port of all of our obfs4 bridges
 is reachable. For those that aren't, we should contact the operator, or,
 as a last resort, remove them from BridgeDB.
 3. Make it easier for bridge operators to test if their obfs4 port is
 reachable.  #30472 will help with this.

 I'll try to make progress with this in the coming days.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28849: Handle dormant mode in process library and for PT's
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-proposed  |  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dcf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+

Comment (by dcf):

 Sorry, I didn't know you wanted me to look at this more. It  looks fine to
 me. For more comments, I suggest asking the developer of ptadapter, and
 Brandon Wiley (blanu) who worked on the PT2.0 spec and said he was
 interested in this topic.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an ed25519_identity file to the data directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30642: Add an ed25519_identity file to the data directory
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22029| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:29 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:28 teor]:
 > > A failure every 2 weeks doesn't seem that bad. But I agree that we
 should fix this issue if we can.
 > I think it's happening more often. I think sometimes people restart or
 ignore it when it fails. I know I don't always remember to note on the
 ticket when I see a spurious failure, because I don't always remember to,
 or sometimes I intend to look up the ticket number end up not doing so.

 I understand.

 It would be great to have a list of all Travis / Appveyor / Jenkins
 failures in one place, with attribution and ticket numbers. But I'm not
 sure we have time to build something like that right now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:28 teor]:
 > A failure every 2 weeks doesn't seem that bad. But I agree that we
 should fix this issue if we can.
 I think it's happening more often. I think sometimes people restart or
 ignore it when it fails. I know I don't always remember to note on the
 ticket when I see a spurious failure, because I don't always remember to,
 or sometimes I intend to look up the ticket number end up not doing so.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [Core Tor/Tor]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 https://people.torproject.org/~nickm/volatile/coverage-
 stem-20190528.tar.xz has coverage here with "make test-stem", and with
 "make check test-stem".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  2.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => sbws: 2.0.x-final


Comment:

 https://people.torproject.org/~nickm/volatile/coverage-
 stem-20190528.tar.xz has "test-stem" coverage and "test-stem + make check"
 coverage, in gcov format.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  sbws: 2.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 oh no, wrong ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30629 [Core Tor/Tor]: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30629: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, tor-events, regression,|  Actual Points:
  memory-safety, 041-regression, valgrind|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 The problem here appears to be that we are now calling
 tor_libevent_free_all earlier than we did before.  I think I have (famous
 last words!) an easy solution.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [Core Tor/Tor]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * keywords:   => 041-should
 * status:  new => accepted
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30676 [- Select a component]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 (Then tell atagar, along with possibly a list of useful inputs/assertoins,
 and he might write some tests for them :) )

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[tor-bugs] #30676 [- Select a component]: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting covered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30676: From test-stem coverage, infer which events and commands are not getting
covered
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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[tor-bugs] #30675 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add an argument that makes stem TRACE output log to a file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30675: Add an argument that makes stem TRACE output log to a file
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30591
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 In #30591, there is too much TRACE output for the Travis console.

 We can log to a file, and tail instead.

 But it would be nice to still have the test progress on the console.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30674 [Core Tor/Tor]: Find out why ubsan/asan CI didn't catch #30629

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30674: Find out why ubsan/asan CI didn't catch #30629
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should,  memory-safety,  |  Actual Points:
  valgrind   |
Parent ID:  #30629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 041-must, tor-events, regression, memory-safety, 041-regression,
 valgrind
 => 041-should,  memory-safety, valgrind
 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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[tor-bugs] #30674 [Core Tor/Tor]: Find out why ubsan/asan CI didn't catch #30629

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30674: Find out why ubsan/asan CI didn't catch #30629
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  041-must, tor-events, regression,
 Severity:  Normal   |  memory-safety, 041-regression, valgrind
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30629
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  sbws: 2.0.x-final => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30646 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH always returning 512 Bad argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30646: HSFETCH always returning 512 Bad argument
-+-
 Reporter:  csucu|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port hsfetch, regression,|  Actual Points:
  041-regression, 041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 See also #30580, where the same refactor broke POSTDESCRIPTOR.

 What can we do to make sure we haven't broken anything else?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29927 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor protocol errors causing silent dropped cells

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29927: Tor protocol errors causing silent dropped cells
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, diagnostic, mystery, |  Actual Points:
  security   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 FWIW, these protocol errors do not impact vanguard's ability to detect
 that cells were dropped. Also, since Tor is already closing the circuit
 with torprotocol itself, these don't represent a very large side channel
 issue.

 I think taking this out of 0.4.1 and maybe even lowering priority is OK. I
 will just do the 0.4.1 bit now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  2.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => sbws: 2.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30561 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fixed tor_vasprintf on systems without vasprintf.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30561: Fixed tor_vasprintf on systems without vasprintf.
--+--
 Reporter:  paldium   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28793 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Rebuild the fallback list in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28793: Rebuild the fallback list in 2019
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 041-should   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30646 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH always returning 512 Bad argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30646: HSFETCH always returning 512 Bad argument
-+-
 Reporter:  csucu|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port hsfetch, regression,|  Actual Points:
  041-regression, 041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  control-port hsfetch, regression, 041-regression => control-
 port hsfetch, regression, 041-regression, 041-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 A failure every 2 weeks doesn't seem that bad. But I agree that we should
 fix this issue if we can.

 Can we reduce the frequency of this issue by adding a delay in the script?
 Can we bind to localhost, to avoid issues with remote scanners?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:
  regression?, 041-should, 041-regression?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


Comment:

 I'll take a quick look and see if this is easy

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could not create SOCKS args string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29670: Could not create SOCKS args string
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux,  |  Actual Points:
  regression?, 041-should, 041-regression?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport, ux, regression?, 041-should =>
 035-backport, 040-backport, ux, regression?, 041-should,
 041-regression?


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must   |  Actual Points:
  041-regression regression  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Tentatively assigning to dgoulet.  Anything that can be used to repro this
 would be great.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30629 [Core Tor/Tor]: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30629: We seem to be reading some freed events on exit
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must, tor-events, regression,|  Actual Points:
  memory-safety, 041-regression, valgrind|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 I'm tentatively assigning this to myself, but please let me know if you
 can take it instead, David?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30639 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30639: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with 
ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
set
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants, network-team-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  maybe 041-should   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:8 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > > ...
 > > Here's a fix that Tor Browser should implement anyway:
 > > * stop setting DisableNetwork on tor's first connection failure,
 because tor's next connection attempt might work
 >
 > This is an interesting ticket.
 >
 > Tor Launcher does not set `DisableNetwork=1` on tor's first connection
 failure; it is more accurate to say that Tor Launcher displays an error
 message along with a `Reconfigure` button after it receives a bootstrap
 status event that includes `RECOMMENDATION=warn`, and Tor Launcher also
 sets `DisableNetwork=1` at the same time.
 >
 > The problem that Kathy and I see with changing Tor Launcher to not set
 `DisableNetwork=1` when a "warn" level bootstrap event occurs is that in
 many situations that will cause user confusion. In fact, if I remember
 correctly, Tor Launcher used to behave that way. Our current assumption is
 that when a "warn" level bootstrap event occurs, the bootstrap process has
 failed and the user needs to intervene to fix it (e.g., they need to
 modify their Tor configuration to use a bridge or fix their system clock).
 In this case, that may not be true.
 >
 > We count on tor to help us by adhering to this idea from section 4.1.10
 of the control spec:
 >  Currently Tor uses recommendation=ignore for the first nine bootstrap
 problem reports for a given phase, and then uses recommendation=warn for
 subsequent problems at that phase. Hopefully this is a good balance
 between tolerating occasional errors and reporting serious problems
 quickly.
 >
 > But maybe the above does not apply to some types of failures inside tor,
 e.g., "no route to host?" We need to figure out how to avoid interrupting
 tor's bootstrap process inside tor and in the Tor Launcher UI; otherwise,
 Tor Launcher will behave as if a "fatal" error occurred even though one
 did not.

 These numbers do not provide "a good balance". Since our fallback and
 bootstrap changes in Tor 0.2.8, Tor only makes about 7 connections in the
 first 30 seconds. So a safer balance would be the first 5 or 6 problems in
 the "connecting" phase. And with bridges, it would be the first (N-1)
 problems, where N is the number of bridges.

 And then there seem to be log messages which don't go through the
 recommendation filter,

 I think Tor needs to be much smarter here, if Tor Browser is relying on
 this behaviour.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,   |
  041-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, 040-backport, tor-ci-fail-
 sometimes =>
 tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, 040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes,
 041-should


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25791 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25791: test_util_fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD 0.2.9
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, ci-fail, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  ci-fail|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This is an ancient CI-specific bug that only applies to 0.2.9, and the fix
 is not simple.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:8 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > > I left a few questions/comments on github.   Otherwise, this looks
 good to me.
 > Thanks! I responded to the comment about channels, and pushed a couple
 of fixup commits for the copy vs pointer assignment issue.
 Travis error is a spurious failure from test_rebind.sh.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28229 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28229: Possible race condition opening SOCKS Port in test_rebind.py
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, rare?, 035-backport, |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-ci-fail-sometimes|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Another test failure on macOS on Travis:
 https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/538462130/log.txt
 {{{
 FAIL: src/test/test_rebind.sh
 =
 ++uname -s
 ++cut -d_ -f1
 +UNAME_OS=Darwin
 +test Darwin = CYGWIN
 +test Darwin = MSYS
 +test Darwin = MINGW
 +exitcode=0
 +tmpdir=
 +trap clean EXIT HUP INT TERM
 ++mktemp -d -t tor_rebind_test.XX
 
+tmpdir=/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.eMUA561I
 +'[' -z
 
/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.eMUA561I
 ']'
 +'[' '!' -d
 
/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.eMUA561I
 ']'
 +python3 /Users/travis/build/torproject/tor/src/test/test_rebind.py
 ./src/app/tor
 
/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.eMUA561I
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.472 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.470 [notice] Tor
 0.4.1.1-alpha-dev (git-3b5e9a0138329440) running on Darwin with Libevent
 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2o, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.4, and Libzstd
 1.3.4.", waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.473 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.473 [notice] Tor
 can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning;, waiting for "Opened
 Control listener on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.473 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.473 [notice] This
 version is not a stable Tor release. Expect more bugs than usual.",
 waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.473 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.473 [notice]
 Configuration file "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc" not present, using
 reasonable defaults.", waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.481 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.481 [warn]
 ControlPort is open, but no authentication method has been configured.
 This means that any program on your computer can reconfigure your Tor.
 That's bad!  You should upgrade your Tor controller as soon as possible.",
 waiting for "Opened Control listener on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.484 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.483 [notice] Opening
 Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:36475", waiting for "Opened Control listener
 on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.485 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.485 [notice] Opened
 Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:36475", waiting for "Opened Control listener
 on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.485 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.485 [notice] Opening
 Control listener on 127.0.0.1:31888", waiting for "Opened Control listener
 on"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.485 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.485 [notice] Opened
 Control listener on 127.0.0.1:31888"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.486 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.486 [warn] Your log
 may contain sensitive information - you're logging more than "notice".
 Don't log unless it serves an important reason. Overwrite the log
 afterwards.", waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.486 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.486 [info]
 options_act_reversible: Recomputed OOS thresholds: ConnLimit 1000,
 ConnLimit_ 10176, ConnLimit_high_thresh 10112, ConnLimit_low_thresh 7632",
 waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.487 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.486 [debug]
 tor_disable_debugger_attach: Attemping to disable debugger attachment to
 Tor for unprivileged users.", waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.487 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.487 [info]
 tor_lockfile_lock: Locking
 
"/var/folders/nz/vv4_9tw56nv9k3tkvyszvwg8gn/T/tor_rebind_test.XX.eMUA561I/lock"",
 waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.490 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.490 [debug]
 parse_dir_authority_line: Trusted 100 dirserver at 128.31.0.39:9131
 (9695)", waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.490 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.490 [debug]
 parse_dir_authority_line: Trusted 100 dirserver at 86.59.21.38:80 (847B)",
 waiting for "Opened Socks listener"
 2019-05-28 21:51:15.490 Tor logged: "May 28 21:51:15.490 [debug]
 parse_dir_authority_line: Trusted 100 

Re: [tor-bugs] #16564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16564: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge easy intro  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:22 gaba]:
 > Add 'actual points' when the ticket get closed.

 I talked with Gaba, and it is ok to use actual points to track the time I
 spend on a ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30672 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Ask holder of torproject.be to stop serving the zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30672: Ask holder of torproject.be to stop serving the zone
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29390   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by goose):

 Torproject DNS Servers have been removed from torproject.fr, torproject.be
 never had them. I will keep them around as long as i'm willing to pay
 though. Right now they are being redirected via http to
 https://www.torproject.org if that's alright.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30511 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Remove OnIceComplete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30511: Remove OnIceComplete
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 dcf]:
 > I think the go-webrtc change is fine as well.

 Merged as https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/commit/68a6fb1b4353657c205bd7f6eba67630a5702bf2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > I left a few questions/comments on github.   Otherwise, this looks good
 to me.
 Thanks! I responded to the comment about channels, and pushed a couple of
 fixup commits for the copy vs pointer assignment issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30081 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: maintain dropbear authkeys in puppet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30081: maintain dropbear authkeys in puppet
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 i think this is done.

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[tor-bugs] #30673 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Ask holder of torproject.is to stop serving the zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30673: Ask holder of torproject.is to stop serving the zone
+-
 Reporter:  ln5 |  Owner:  ln5
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29390  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 I think Tor Project is the holder of torproject.is.
 I'll figure out who to talk to in order to stop serving it.

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[tor-bugs] #30672 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Ask holder of torproject.be to stop serving the zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30672: Ask holder of torproject.be to stop serving the zone
+-
 Reporter:  ln5 |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29390  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 We've asked the holder of torproject.be to stop serving the zone in ticket
 #27951.
 Tracking progress here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27951 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decide how to handle torproject.be (was: integrate torproject.be into our dns)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27951: decide how to handle torproject.be (was: integrate torproject.be into 
our
dns)
-+
 Reporter:  goose|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by anarcat):

 just for the record, i didn't mean we should send lawyers to members of
 the community. i meant that if we get squatters that take over the domains
 for hostile purposes, we might have a legal recourse.

 apologies if i was misunderstood.

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[tor-bugs] #30671 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Ask holder of torproject.fr to stop serving the zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30671: Ask holder of torproject.fr to stop serving the zone
+-
 Reporter:  ln5 |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29390  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 We've asked the holder of torproject.fr to stop serving the zone in
 #27951.
 Tracking progress here.

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[tor-bugs] #30670 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Ask holder of torproject.se to stop serving the zone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30670: Ask holder of torproject.se to stop serving the zone
+-
 Reporter:  ln5 |  Owner:  ln5
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29390  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
 This happens to be me.
 I'll deal with it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27720 [Internal Services]: New registrar - torproject.fr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27720: New registrar - torproject.fr
---+
 Reporter:  goose  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! And sorry this was ignored for so long.

 As mentioned in #27951, we're not accepting donated torproject.ccTLD's any
 longer.
 I should've reached out to you sooner but wasn't aware of this ticket. My
 apologies.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30669 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: add new sponsor to trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30669: add new sponsor to trac
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27951 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decide how to handle torproject.be (was: integrate torproject.be into our dns)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27951: decide how to handle torproject.be (was: integrate torproject.be into 
our
dns)
-+
 Reporter:  goose|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27951 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decide how to handle torproject.be (was: integrate torproject.be into our dns)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27951: decide how to handle torproject.be (was: integrate torproject.be into 
our
dns)
-+-
 Reporter:  goose|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ln5):

 Thanks for donating time and money to Tor Project. Unfortunately you're
 donating something that we no longer want.

 The decision made in our February meeting is documented here:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2019BrusselsAdminTeamMinutes#Domainportfoliolikeshouldwedrop.is
 The ticket dealing with this is #29390.

 Please stop serving torproject.fr and torproject.be. If possible, please
 keep the domains registered for "some time". Dropping the DNS requests on
 the floor is fine.

 Thanks again for your efforts and please accept my apologies for not
 reaching out to you earlier regarding  the .fr domain.

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[tor-bugs] #30669 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: add new sponsor to trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30669: add new sponsor to trac
--+-
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Add a new sponsor to trac:



  * sponsor28-must
  * sponsor28-can
  * sponsor28

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28890 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: new sponsor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28890: new sponsor
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30511 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Remove OnIceComplete

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30511: Remove OnIceComplete
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I think the go-webrtc change is fine as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem, |  Actual Points:  0.3
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 The pull requests (other than the deliberate failure) seem to exceed the
 Travis max log length limitation. I'm not sure whether we need to try a
 different approach or if we should wait for stem to fix the log spamming
 on control connection close.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30627 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: document how to map a service back to an underlying host

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30627: document how to map a service back to an underlying host
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 is https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/incident-response/ what you had
 in mind?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30565 [Applications/Tor Browser]: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after tor browser bundle upgrade (8.5)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30565: roll back to previous version of TBB - saved logins and tabs lost after 
tor
browser bundle upgrade (8.5)
-+-
 Reporter:  rollback-question|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tw64_pass):

 VERY SIMILAR (& related) ISSUE (seems to be a somewhat deeper root cause
 at work here):
 NO PASSWORDS ARE SAVED AT ALL

 new/clean install of
 torbrowser-install-win64-8.5_en-US.exe

 about:preferences#privacy
 Forms & Passwords
 ON  Remember logins and passwords for websites
 Saved Logins ALWAYS STAY blank/empty
 History
 Use custom settings for history
 OFF Always use private browsing mode
 OFF Remember my browsing and download history
 OFF Remember search and form history
 ON  Clear history when Tor Browser closes (all 7 suboptions ON)

 security.nocertdb = true (box to save the password does not appear at all)
 security.nocertdb = false (box does appear, but password is not saved)

 32-bit version (at least 8.0.8) works properly ...

 Thanks for looking into this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30561 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fixed tor_vasprintf on systems without vasprintf.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30561: Fixed tor_vasprintf on systems without vasprintf.
--+--
 Reporter:  paldium   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30639 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30639: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with 
ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
set
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants, network-team-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  maybe 041-should   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tbb-wants, network-team-roadmap-maybe => tbb-wants, network-
 team-roadmap-maybe 041-should
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 So long as this is a user-facing issue, it seems like 041-should or -must
 to me. Putting it there until/unless we fix it, or decide differently.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30512 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Enable cache for ACME certificates in broker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30512: Enable cache for ACME certificates in broker
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  arlolra cohosh dcf phw   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I'm fine with it. Shall we close this ticket when the new code is deployed
 and we are using a Let's Encrypt cert again?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21315 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: publish some realtime stats from the broker?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21315: publish some realtime stats from the broker?
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29461   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:16 cohosh]:
 > Also noting that mapping unique proxies to IP addresses isn't quite how
 snowflake is supposed to work: we'll probably want some kind of persistent
 identifier later as mentioned in the comments above, but I think it will
 work fine for our purposes now.

 Identifying by IP address is interesting by itself, though. If IP address
 is the expected basis of blocking, then it's interesting to consider a
 proxy's "identity" as IP address because that's the information available
 to a censor. A long-term identity independent of IP address is also
 interesting, but less informative for measuring blocking resistance IMO.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30365 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30365: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop289, sendme,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  arma |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:  nickm => arma


Comment:

 LGTM now. Roger, can you have a look before this merges, if there's time?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Now it's been a week, let's turn the geoip logging off again, and look at
 what we have.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem, |  Actual Points:  0.3
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 If anybody want to have a look at the failing case that I was talking
 about, let's see if there's any info we can get from https://travis-
 ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/538005761 ?  The log-spamming starts around
 line 4550

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30591: Make tor's Travis stem job log controller messages from stem and tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes, stem, |  Actual Points:  0.3
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:10 atagar]:
 > Hi Nick. For what it's worth those errors generally mean that a prior
 test crashed or otherwise buggered up its tor instance, causing future
 tests to be unable to authenticate.
 >
 > What kind of output would you like to have? If it would be helpful I
 could make stem abort its test run when authentication begins failing.
 That would cut down on this kind of 'spam' but when this occurrences the
 proper next step are to look at the test and tor logs.

 I think that the right response might be to abort whatever loop is
 spinning here rather than retrying it over and over?  I wouldn't mind a
 few messages of this kind per test when something is broken, but spamming
 them like this tends to fill up CI logs.  Anything that would make the
 output _shorter_ in this case would be cool with me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30646 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH always returning 512 Bad argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30646: HSFETCH always returning 512 Bad argument
-+-
 Reporter:  csucu|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port hsfetch, regression,|  Actual Points:
  041-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:  control-port hsfetch, regression => control-port hsfetch,
 regression, 041-regression
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30589 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30589: Tor Browser on Windows does not support Hindi or Tamil.
-+-
 Reporter:  clash|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting-os  |
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 There have been reports of problems with Indic scripts on Windows going
 way back, at least to Tor Browser 5.5.

 [https://blog.torproject.org/comment/154202#comment-154202 Tor Browser 5.5
 is released]
 > Using this version, I cannot see Bangla Font nor can't write in Bangla.
 Can you please look this issues?

 [https://blog.torproject.org/comment/154889#comment-154889 Tor Browser
 5.5.1 is released]
 > NEW BROWSER DOES NOT DISPLAY PUNJABI FONT!,,!,,!,,!,,!,,PLEASE HELP

 But I myself haven't ever been able to reproduce it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30550 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove torctl.in from contrib/dist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30550: Remove torctl.in from contrib/dist
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Let's merge this in 0.4.2; I'd rather not remove stuff later than the
 first alpha in a series unless it's really compelling to do so.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
-+-
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must   |  Actual Points:
  041-regression regression  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl => sendme, tor-flowctrl, 041-must
 041-regression regression


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30628 [Core Tor/Tor]: sendme closes client connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30628: sendme closes client connections
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sendme, tor-flowctrl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Does this also happen with 0.4.1.1-alpha?  I would imagine so, but it
 would be good to make sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  pidgin   |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, security, 041-longterm  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Closed #30620 as a duplicate of this, but possibly a useful one: it has
 debug logs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30620 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS DDos on circuits? Can't have access to my hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30620: HS DDos on circuits? Can't have access to my hidden service
+--
 Reporter:  HSdir123|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, circuit-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30620 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS DDos on circuits? Can't have access to my hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30620: HS DDos on circuits? Can't have access to my hidden service
+--
 Reporter:  HSdir123|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, circuit-build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This looks like a duplicate of 29607, but please reopen if I am wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30639 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30639: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with 
ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
set
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants, network-team-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > ...
 > Here's a fix that Tor Browser should implement anyway:
 > * stop setting DisableNetwork on tor's first connection failure, because
 tor's next connection attempt might work

 This is an interesting ticket.

 Tor Launcher does not set `DisableNetwork=1` on tor's first connection
 failure; it is more accurate to say that Tor Launcher displays an error
 message along with a `Reconfigure` button after it receives a bootstrap
 status event that includes `RECOMMENDATION=warn`, and Tor Launcher also
 sets `DisableNetwork=1` at the same time.

 The problem that Kathy and I see with changing Tor Launcher to not set
 `DisableNetwork=1` when a "warn" level bootstrap event occurs is that in
 many situations that will cause user confusion. In fact, if I remember
 correctly, Tor Launcher used to behave that way. Our current assumption is
 that when a "warn" level bootstrap event occurs, the bootstrap process has
 failed and the user needs to intervene to fix it (e.g., they need to
 modify their Tor configuration to use a bridge or fix their system clock).
 In this case, that may not be true.

 We count on tor to help us by adhering to this idea from section 4.1.10 of
 the control spec:
  Currently Tor uses recommendation=ignore for the first nine bootstrap
 problem reports for a given phase, and then uses recommendation=warn for
 subsequent problems at that phase. Hopefully this is a good balance
 between tolerating occasional errors and reporting serious problems
 quickly.

 But maybe the above does not apply to some types of failures inside tor,
 e.g., "no route to host?" We need to figure out how to avoid interrupting
 tor's bootstrap process inside tor and in the Tor Launcher UI; otherwise,
 Tor Launcher will behave as if a "fatal" error occurred even though one
 did not.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16564: Reject bridge descriptors posted to non-bridge authorities
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
---+
Changes (by gaba):

 * actualpoints:  0.5 =>


Comment:

 Add 'actual points' when the tickets get closed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29437 [Core Tor/Stem]: test-stem times out intermittently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29437: test-stem times out intermittently
---+
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.8-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by gaba):

 * actualpoints:  0.2 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28793 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Rebuild the fallback list in 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28793: Rebuild the fallback list in 2019
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 041-should   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:12 cohosh]:
 > Updated this ticket with recent test results. I've changed the tests to
 measure which stage the ICE protocol got to on the client side. I switched
 to using stun.ekiga.net in China since the Google STUN servers started
 getting blocked. It seems once they blocked those stun servers, all
 snowflake bridges became reachable again. I've confirmed that
 stun.l.google.com is still being blocked.

 Oh wow. This is really interesting. I wonder if there was any collateral
 damage as a result of the Google STUN servers being blocked.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30668 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mobile: Favicon is not used when making a shortcut on Home screen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30668: Mobile: Favicon is not used when making a shortcut on Home screen
--+--
 Reporter:  torlove   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30654 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: please add pili to the tracadm group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30654: please add pili to the tracadm group
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 signature verified, confirmed that the tracadm group has sudo access to
 the tracadm account, added pili to the group, all done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30365 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30365: prop289: Update tor-spec.txt with authenticated SENDME spec
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop289, sendme,   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  041-should |
Parent ID:  #26288   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > This mostly lgtm but I would like Roger to have a look at it before we
 merge, since he's likeliest to remember anything that it gets wrong about
 the flow control algorithm.
 >
 > There are a few points where I would like clarification:
 >
 > 1.
 > {{{
 > +   Note that these limits do NOT apply to cells that tor receives from
 one
 > +   host and relays to another. Circuit-level flow control is end-to-end
 so
 > +   both ends track these windows, never the middle points.
 > }}}
 > This text above is a little misleading. Because of our leaky pipe
 topology, ''every'' relay on the circuit has a pair of windows, and the OP
 has a pair of windows for every relay on the circuit.  These windows do
 not apply to relayed cells, however, and a relay that is never used for
 streams will never decrement its window or cause the client to decrement a
 window.

 Good catch! I've actually re-used this paragraph your wrote which I think
 explains it great!

 >
 > 2.
 > {{{
 > +   An OR or OP (depending of the stream direction), is willing to
 receive more
 > +   cells when its deliver window goes down below a full increment
 (100). For
 > +   example, if the window started at 1000, it should send a
 RELAY_SENDME when
 > +   it reaches 900.
 > }}}
 > Instead of saying "is willing" I'd suggest saying "sends a RELAY_SENDME
 cell to indicate that it is willing".

 Fixed.

 >
 > 3.
 > {{{
 > + The DIGEST is the rolling digest value from the cell that
 immediately
 > + preceded this RELAY_SENDME. This value is matched on the other
 side
 > + from the previous cell sent that the OR/OP must remember.
 > }}}
 > When you say "the cell that immediately preceded", let's clarify what
 kind of cell. I think you mean "the RELAY cell on the same circuit from
 the same sender that immediately preceded", but maybe you mean only
 RELAY_DATA?

 Yes, it is `RELAY_DATA` cell. I've clarified.

 >
 > 4.
 > Does anything in this text say that if you get a RELAY_DATA cell when
 your deliver window is 0, you should kill the circuit?  If not, it should.

 Added!

 >
 > 5.
 > Also, a suggestion:
 > {{{
 > -Author: Rob Jansen, Roger Dingledine
 > +Author: Roger Dingledine, David Goulet, Rob Jansen
 > }}}
 > Sometimes people in academia try to send important social signals
 through author ordering. Please check with Rob and Roger before re-
 ordering the authors here.

 Wow! that is true lol, ordering matters for them... Ok I went in
 alphabetical order, I'll just put my name at the end, will save us all the
 troubles :). For me, this is mostly useful to know "who to contact" if any
 questions ;).


 See the fixup commit `b8b6bb938f3238e5`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
--+---
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201905  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * cc: pospeselr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30631: Blurry Tor Browser icon on macOS app switcher
--+---
 Reporter:  vjur  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.5-issues   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:

 Seems like the png2icns tool used by my icon generation script doesn't
 actually output all the requested sizes. I asked antonela to update the
 source icns to include the padding needed to fit in with other circular
 macos icons and we'll just put it over the existing firefox.icns in the
 branding dir.

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[tor-bugs] #30668 [- Select a component]: Mobile: Favicon is not used when making a shortcut on Home screen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30668: Mobile: Favicon is not used when making a shortcut on Home screen
-+--
 Reporter:  torlove  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 - Tor Browser and Tor Broswer (Alpha):
 - Press the three dotted button in the top right,
 - Select "Page >",
 - Select "Add to home screen".
 - A button on the home screen appears, but is missing the favicon.

 Would the proper behaviour be to download the largest favicon possible and
 then resize it down on the client-side to avoid resquesting an icon dize
 that might identify the client os?

 NOTE: Old Orfox appears to function correctly, in that the icon is used
 and it appears brilliant and sharp (ie. high-resolution).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30654 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: please add pili to the tracadm group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30654: please add pili to the tracadm group
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 taking a look to see if i can figure this out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:116 cypherpunks]:
 > Tor Browser 8.5 has completely broken the browsing experience.  Many
 websites on "standard" mode still break--but with the removal of the
 NoScript widget from the toolbar, users have absolutely no obvious way to
 fix things.  Further, "safer" and "safest" mode are so thoroughly broken
 they might as well be removed entirely.  I understand design is an
 iterative process.  I also understand the destination will be better than
 the status quo.
 >
 > This update was botched.  Many websites still break in standard mode,
 but there is no obvious way to un-break them.  Most websites totally break
 in safest mode, but this essential un-breaking control is suddenly buried
 deep within menus and hidden from the user.
 >
 > It's ironic that an issue titled, "Improve user understanding and user
 control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features" results in a Tor
 Browser release that confuses users by removing a key user control over
 Tor Browser security features.  The icing on the cake is Georg's last
 comment, "We'll postpone site-specific permissions for 9.0. Taking this
 ticket off of our 8.5 radar for now.".  Re-read the issue title for added
 comedic effect.

 Thanks. It seems #30600 is the ticket you wanted to comment on. (I'd still
 be curious to see answers to my questions there, actually, given that
 those sites mentioned in that bug work on standard level in my Tor Browser
 and I don't have seen any website broken on standard in 8.5 yet which got
 then fixed by some NoScript modifications via the toolbar icon)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30519 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deterministic coverage on 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30519: Deterministic coverage on 0.4.1
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 041-should, dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in 041!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201904   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Seems we got all the information we need.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => ir


Old description:

> https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?graph
> =userstats-relay-country=ir

New description:

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-01-01-2019-06-01-off.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2019-01-01=2019-06-01=ir link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-01-01-2019-06-01.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2019-01-01=2019-06-01=ir link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-01-01-2019-06-01.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2019-01-01=2019-06-01=ir link]

--

Comment:

 > Woops, wrong component, my apologies.

 What component did you intend? I was thinking Censorship/Censorship
 Analysis, but possibly this is not related to censorship.

 I [[/wiki/doc/MetricsTimeline?action=diff=322|added an entry]] on
 the Metrics Timeline.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30639 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort set (was: Tor tries so connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with ClientAutoIPv6ORPort set)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30639: Tor tries to connect over IPv6 in IPv4 networks with 
ClientAutoIPv6ORPort
set
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants, network-team-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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