Re: [tor-bugs] #30733 [Core Tor/sbws]: SBWS does not detect changes in descriptor bandwidth values

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30733: SBWS does not detect changes in descriptor bandwidth values
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by starlight):

 * Attachment "longclaw_sbws_unchanged_bw_descriptors.txt" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30733 [Core Tor/sbws]: SBWS does not detect changes in descriptor bandwidth values (was: SBWS does not detect changes in max advertised bandwidth)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30733: SBWS does not detect changes in descriptor bandwidth values
---+---
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:  sbws: 1.1.0
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-majority-blocker  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by starlight):

 between 2019-05-25 16:00 and 2019-06-12 03:00 longclaw sbws shows
 descriptor bandwidth max/burst/observed for 4138 relays with values that
 match perfectly, out of 5593 relays present at both times

 74% of relays with no update whatsoever to descriptor information for 17
 days

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30861 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create an LDAP account for gus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30861: Create an LDAP account for gus
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30785   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Yes please!

 Also, note that Gus has an alias right now in the virtual file, so we
 should remove that alias when we make this ldap account, and also we
 should use the forwarding address in the virtual file when making his ldap
 account.

 (The above text requests a forwarding address of gus@tpo, which would just
 produce a loop, so let's not do that. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30785 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Give Gus access to the fallback-scripts repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30785: Give Gus access to the fallback-scripts repository
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > I opened #30785 to get gus an LDAP account.

 Oops, #30861.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30785 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Give Gus access to the fallback-scripts repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30785: Give Gus access to the fallback-scripts repository
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I opened #30785 to get gus an LDAP account.

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[tor-bugs] #30861 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create an LDAP account for gus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30861: Create an LDAP account for gus
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30785
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Hi,

 Please create an LDAP account for gus, so he can get push access to the
 fallback-scripts git repository. gus is one of the maintainers, because he
 is the relay operator advocate.

 Name
 Gustavo Gus

 Initial forwarding email address
 g...@torproject.org

 OpenPG Key fingerprint
 427F 2D71 7664 D215 378C B412 8BDC 87FB 7215 E189

 desired username
 gus

 I have not signed this key, but  I have verified that IMike Tigas, Roger,
 and Micah Anderson have signed this key, and I have signed their keys.

 teor, Wed 12 Jun 2019 01:12:22 UTC
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEo9HIo7IdGQ1wBWG3EP6qDnB1ZyoFAl0AUXwACgkQEP6qDnB1
 Zyq6iw/+Ju3D0DarsMtHArqqPzYROo5B2+iG0eUUgDkwhtrhB/r3mHPJt2CvcILN
 0XsUkJhG8wj0wJIrSU9duNOB6pqiIuqhnm8cuWd/iWxnhki+dPb+EQSZ+uJZnh44
 sTtNlI13LGHt8x1MeZuhp88K3g60Z4wn+csxEiWHuDxgIPSH+yqi06wPiEsHNrni
 /zc4HScO/bBKYwdHj68CMBauyoetI4JDvnCxV9cO67FHdrfaye7irEkJ+aYAr1Zw
 SdBEdSmUCgGKuYu7QCxCdDDgIVCtmYApxxw9afrx/w7HjSMBWCPG0NDzHrIJVyIv
 OgJf36ZbL0oll9hDMKmhLw1fHhHTKFrpNPsDmySOkF8DtAjmtChHkni5u9yupxsG
 rNs+zDSEEW+gndQeVyHG6t4kmdiAp67IbtcAz4WdCFr2dLt8J4OHlxd4o66K8wET
 IudG/pGnftNhvelLxk0S8EbJu16jqo3HenGxIo7g3nfWR1efVet+icLuh6X7sc7t
 rNzSx52XGx3jd6bB14hQbm3eMHADtjN01+/ghOMSJP/Qy/kzG1/qzvP4oy9PyKwG
 Ef0+M6lX+EKZsi1U5vWibPa3q8fk55p6/QWqL/GJaJlxOTb0JUdyrBXgg6DiTtiI
 YOgkDjoS9TCUdkDClJGmKQJo1acApU3+9ljQ+GkeNTx7wyRjkEQ=
 =sNQD
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30660 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor does not run while sandboxed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30660: Tor does not run while sandboxed
--+---
 Reporter:  Nanon |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by lior):

 I'm the one who posted the same sandboxing problem on the Tor blog. I
 first noticed a problem running the Tor Browser with Sandboxie when you
 released Tor Browser v. 8.0.9. At that time, I would get the same error
 messages reported in this ticket, but if I repeatedly exited and
 relaunched Tor, it would eventually run in the sandbox. It wasn't until I
 updated to v 8.5 that the Tor Browser would not run in the sandbox at all.

 I downloaded Firefox ESR Portable v 60.7.0 (from portableapps.com) because
 I did not have time to install Firefox to test it with Sandboxie. This
 Firefox portable version does run in the sandbox without giving any error
 messages.

 If it matters, I'm running Windows 10 Home Edition, Version 1803, OS Build
 17134.765. Sandboxie is version 5.60.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29263 [Core Tor/Chutney]: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29263: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  2
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I expect CI to fail on obsolete Tor versions due to #30826.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29024 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29024: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, 041-accepted-20190115,   |  Actual Points:  1
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci,|
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I expect CI to fail on obsolete Tor versions due to #30826.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30827 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem CI: remove 0.3.4 builds; add 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30827: Stem CI: remove 0.3.4 builds; add 0.4.1
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30835 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Here's the current list of dists, there might be more later, see #30836.

 https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30826 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney travis: remove 0.3.4, add 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30826: Chutney travis: remove 0.3.4, add 0.4.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30835| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Here's the current list of dists, there might be more later, see #30836.

 https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30836 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: Build debs for tor's 0.4.1 branch, and stop building tor's 0.3.4 and 0.3.3 branches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30836: Build debs for tor's 0.4.1 branch, and stop building tor's 0.3.4 and 
0.3.3
branches
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-should   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30835   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 0.3.3 and 0.3.4 have been removed.

 I think the remaining work in this ticket is:
 * add nightly-0.4.0, it's the latest stable
 * add experimental-0.4.1, it's the latest alpha

 You can keep 0.3.5 and 0.2.9, they're both LTS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29263 [Core Tor/Chutney]: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29263: prop289: add bidirectional data transfers to chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop289, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  2
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 About a month ago, chutney CI was unstable. This failure pattern looks
 familiar: older releases and newer pythons.

 Since then, I've fixed a bunch of bugs, and merged to master.

 I closed and re-opened the pull request to get the latest merge, let's see
 how it goes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29280 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use Chutney in Tor's CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29280: Use Chutney in Tor's CI
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, 029-backport,   |  Actual Points:  1
  035-backport, 040-backport, network-team-  |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, reviewer-was-   |
  teor-20190422, tor-ci, 041-deferred-20190530   |
Parent ID:  #29267   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I talked to nickm on IRC today, here's how we're going to move forward:

 In this ticket:
 * start on 0.2.9
 * add a Linux job with CHUTNEY_ALLOW_FAILURES=2 make test-network-all
 * implement SKIP_MAKE_TEST for the chutney job
 * create merge branches from 0.2.9 to master
 * merge to master and see how it goes, then backport all the way

 In #30859:
 * start on 0.3.5
 * SKIP_MAKE_TEST for stem jobs
 * create merge branches from 0.3.5 to master
 * merge to master and see how it goes, then backport all the way

 In #30860:
 * start on 0.2.9
 * add a macOS job with CHUTNEY_ALLOW_FAILURES=2 make test-network-all
 * implement SKIP_MAKE_TEST for the chutney job
 * create branches from 0.2.9 to master
 * merge to master and see how it goes
 * if it's taking too much time, stick it on the end of one of the other
 macOS jobs instead
 * backport all the way

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[tor-bugs] #30860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30860: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:   | Status:  assigned
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  CI, PTs, 029-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  035-backport, 040-backport, network-team-
 |  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29280
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Travis Linux doesn't support IPv6, so we should add a macOS chutney job to
 Tor's CI.

 If that's too slow, we can:
 * add the chutney tests to the end of an existing macOS job
 * change the chutney job to macOS

 Remember: each build has a limit of 2 concurrent macOS jobs.

 We can do this task after #29280 merges.

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[tor-bugs] #30859 [Core Tor/Tor]: Skip "make test" in Travis stem builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30859: Skip "make test" in Travis stem builds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  CI, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tor-ci
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29280
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Once #29280 merges, we want to write a separate branch that skips "make
 test" in stem builds.

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[tor-bugs] #30858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Load geoip and geoip6 files during the unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30858: Load geoip and geoip6 files during the unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  technical-debt, geoip, fast-fix?,
 Severity:  Minor|  easy?
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We don't run any tests on the contents of the geoip and geoip6 files.

 We should write a test that loads the files, and fails if they fail to
 parse, are empty, or have an unexpected number of entries. (+-25% of the
 current number of entries?)

 We might want a #define that skips the test, so that people can build and
 test without geoip. (We might eventually want geoip to be an optional
 module, but that's out of scope.)

 Maybe karsten can tell us how much the number of entries in the geoip
 files varies?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add extra chutney networks to Tor's CI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30212: Add extra chutney networks to Tor's CI
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, network-team-|  duplicate
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2-maybe, ex-sponsor19  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29280   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 We decided to use "make test-network-all" in #29280.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+ (was: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-01-01-2019-06-01-off.png,600px)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2019-01-01=2019-06-01=ir link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-01-01-2019-06-01.png,600px)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> country.html?start=2019-01-01=2019-06-01=ir link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-01-01-2019-06-01.png,600px)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> combined.html?start=2019-01-01=2019-06-01=ir link]

New description:

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11-off.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir link]

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11.png"
 added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.png?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11.png"
 added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.png?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11-off.png"
 added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.png?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13510 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Master password can't be changed from default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13510: Master password can't be changed from default
--+--
 Reporter:  User11|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:14 etienne]:

 > Where is that security.nocertdb ?
 >
 > I can't find it in about:config

 Try this:

 {{{
 about:config?filter=security.nocertdb
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9316 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should export statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9316: BridgeDB should export statistics
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics, bridgedb, prometheus, ex-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor-19, anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #19332   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 We just heard back from Tor's Research Safety Board. You can find the
 response below. The reviewer writes that our proposal wouldn't be an issue
 in a one-off setting but could be problematic in the long run. I think a
 reasonable way forward would be to implement the proposal, run it in a
 one-off setting for, say, a week, and then evaluate if we should change
 data collection. In the long run, we should also transition to PrivCount
 as the reviewer mentions.

 {{{
 Tor Research Safety Board Paper #20 Reviews and Comments
 ===
 Paper #20 Collecting BridgeDB usage statistics


 Review #20A
 ===
 * Updated: 11 Jun 2019 6:02:53pm EDT

 Overall merit
 -
 4. Accept

 Reviewer expertise
 --
 3. Knowledgeable

 Paper summary
 -
 The document proposing collecting a new set of usage statistics through
 data
 available from the operation of BridgeDB. The statistics would be useful
 for
 better prioritizing development tasks, to improve reaction time to bridge
 enumeration attacks and blockages, to reduce failure rates, and to help
 promote
 censorship circumvention research.

 Comments for author
 ---
 If this was a short term study, I would say go for it, no questions asked.
 The
 benefits are clear and I agree that they outweigh the risks.

 However, I think it was implied (although not explicitly stated) that the
 new
 statistics would be regularly collected and published on an ongoing basis.
 I
 think there are more risks associated with such an ongoing collection as
 opposed
 to a one-off or short term study, so we should carefully consider the
 trade-offs
 between cost/effort of safer collection methods with the privacy benefits
 of
 such methods.

 The most concerning statistics to me are the per-country statistics and
 the
 per-service (gmail, yahoo, etc.) statistics. I think it is clear from
 Sections 3
 and 4 that you understand the risks associated with collecting these
 statistics:
 a single user from an unpopular country could be identified because the
 1-10
 bucket suddenly changed from a 0 count to a 1 count. This issue might also
 exist
 if unpopular email service providers are selected. This issue is already
 present
 in Tor's per-country user statistics, and I believe there is a plan to
 transition away from these statistics because of the safety concerns. The
 bucketing proposal (round to the nearest 10) does provide some
 uncertainty, but
 it's hard to reason about what protection it is providing.

 In an ideal world, we would collect these statistics with a privacy-
 preserving
 statistics collection tool. In fact, I think most if not all of these
 could be
 collected with PrivCount (assuming it was extended to support the new
 event
 types).

 One useful thing about PrivCount is secure aggregation, meaning that if
 you have
 multiple data collectors, you can securely count a total across all of
 them
 without leaking individual inputs. In this case, it seems like there is
 only one
 BridgeDB data source, so we woud not benefit from PrivCount's secure
 aggregation.

 The other useful thing that PrivCount provides is differential privacy.
 This is
 where you could get most of the benefit. Rather than rounding to 10 and
 not
 knowing how much privacy that provides, you instead start by defining how
 much
 privacy each statistic should achieve based on your operational
 environment
 (these are called action bounds), and then PrivCount will add noise to the
 statistics in a way that will guarantee differential privacy under those
 constraints. If these constraints add too much noise for the resulting
 statistics to be useful, then you have to consider if the measurement is
 too
 privacy-invasive for the given actions you are trying to protect and
 therefore
 you possibly shouldn't collect them.

 Tor has PrivCount on the roadmap (I believe), so one option could be to
 implement the 

Re: [tor-bugs] #30743 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a coccinelle script to catch increment/decrement calls inside log_debug().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30743: Write a coccinelle script to catch increment/decrement calls inside
log_debug().
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Here's a script that catches one case, and the other 3 cases are easy
 enough to infer...
 {{{
 @@
 expression E;
 @@
 *log_debug(... , <+... E-- ...+>, ... );
 }}}

 The problem, though, is that a lot of our files don't parse for coccinelle
 right now, because of our macro madness. We'll need to extend
 `scripts/coccinelle/tor-coccinelle.h` till everything works.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: boklm (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30847 [Core Tor/Stem]: Failed unit tests with Python 3.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30847: Failed unit tests with Python 3.8
---+
 Reporter:  miceliux   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing easy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * keywords:   => testing easy


Comment:

 Hi miceliux. Gu1nness offered to write a patch for this earlier but hasn't
 looped back to make the adjustment I requested...

 https://github.com/torproject/stem/pull/15

 This is s simple one to fix. I'll whip up a patch in a bit if nobody else
 gets to it first.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi anarcat. Why is 10 GB impractical? In terms of disk storage that's
 pretty tiny. Is there something about the content that makes that size
 problematic?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30469 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship romanian Tor Browser in alpha series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30469: Ship romanian Tor Browser in alpha series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201905,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906R  |
Parent ID:  #29935   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I added the ro locale to the alpha download page on the website with
 commit 12e576c0f3b1eb26e450a8f371df11ab9dbbbcaa.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 Update: Fossilization seems less and less possible. The archivebot jobs
 are yielding large results, with an archive of only the tickets
 (`https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/\d+`) at 400MB after
 6000 tickets (1/5th of the tickets), which would yield around 2GB,
 excluding the wiki. The full crawl is close to 1GB with at least less than
 10% of the crawl done.

 Therefore a full static copy of the Trac website would be at least 10GB,
 quite impractical. It might be worth looking into proper redirects or
 whether it's acceptable to have those links broken. Alternatively, we
 could simply redirect to IA or assume people will look there for missing
 bits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 i reached out to the software heritage folks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 there are three possible ways to go forward here:

  1. status quo: no or piecemeal migration. dip/gitlab exists and teams
 migrate organically or not at all, when/if they want, and we keep trac
 forever. probably not acceptable.

  2. migrate team by team: a) pick a team. b) convince team to migrate. c)
 migrate all issues, code and wiki pages to gitlab d) move on to next team
 e) congrats, you're done. seems like the ideal plan to me, because it can
 be done incrementally and allows for progressive testing and ironing out
 of issues. might be difficult to automate.

  3. migrate in one shot. we just bite the bullet and migrate everything
 and everyone all at once, with a flag day when Trac becomes readonly.
 radical solution. might be faster and easier to perform than the other
 solution (less labor) but is much riskier because, if things break, we
 need to fix them VERY FAST NOW and people will/may be upset

 In the parent ticket, I mentioned [https://github.com/tracboat/tracboat
 tracboat] as a tool that might be used to migrate from Trac to GitLab. I
 am not sure it supports migrating one project/component at a time, at
 least it's not obvious how to do so in the documentation.

 Another problem is how to deal with Trac in the long term. A complete
 migration wouldn't be complete if Trac still requires maintenance. For
 this, I see those options:

  1. the golden redirect set: every migrated ticket and wiki page has a
 corresponding ticket/wiki page in GitLab and a gigantic set of redirection
 rules makes sure they are mapped correctly. probably impractical, but
 solves the maintenance problem possibly forever.

  2. read-only Trac: user creation is disabled and existing users are
 locked from making any change to the site. only a temporary or
 intermediate measure.

  3. fossilization: Trac is turned into a static HTML site that can be
 mirrored like any other site. can be a long term solution and a good
 compromise with a possibly impossible to design and therefore failing
 (because incomplete) set of redirection rules.

  4. destruction: we hate the web and pretend link rot is not a problem and
 just get rid of the old site, assuming everything is migrated and people
 will find their stuff eventually. probably not an option.

 As a safety precaution, I have already started step 3, in a way. I am
 working with [https://archiveteam.org/ Archive Team] to send a copy of the
 Trac website into the internet archive, thanks to
 [https://archivebot.readthedocs.io/ archivebot]. This will also allow us
 to build a good "ignore set", a list of patterns to ignore to avoid
 getting lost in the website when/if we decide to create a static HTML
 copy. It's also a good practice to have a backup of all of our stuff in
 the internet archive.

 This currently consists of two crawl jobs:

  * https://trac.torproject.org/ - just feed the site into `wpull` (this is
 what archivebot does, basically) and tweak the ignores to skip the nastier
 stuff. Ignore set currently includes:
*
 `^https?://trac\.torproject\.org/projects/tor/wiki/.*[?&]action=diff(&|$)`:
 diffs covered by previous revisions
* `^https?://trac\.torproject\.org/projects/tor/timeline\?`: requires
 login
*
 `^https?://trac\.torproject\.org/projects/tor/query.*[?&]order=(?!priority)`:
 tries to avoid cardinality explosion in sorted results
  * a single pull of each ticket, from 1 to the latest ticket (#30856 at
 the time of writing, [https://transfer.notkiska.pw/yJMSY/trac.torproject
 .org-tickets full list])

 This is being coordinated on the `#archivebot` channel in efnet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by xhdix):

 Yeah :D
 The number of users is now more than 1 million. (1067335)

 All Iranian people are grateful to the members of the Tor Project.

 [[Image(https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.png?start=2019-05-13=2019-06-12=ir=off,100%)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29400   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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[tor-bugs] #30857 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30857: migrate (some projects? everything?) from trac to gitlab
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services   |Version:
  Admin Team |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29400
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 having both Trac and GitLab for TPO might not be desirable in the long
 term, both for maintenance and consistency. if GitLab is okay for people,
 we should consider migrating to it and turning off (or turning into a
 static website) this Trac instance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29400 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Set up a Gitlab instance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29400: Set up a Gitlab instance
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i believe LDAP integration is complete now, thanks to hiro. LDAP accounts
 are automatically created (and removed?) based on LDAP, but not passwords
 - users use the normal gitlab password resets for that part.

 i'll create a new subticket for the migration issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30804 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30804: util/socketpair_ersatz test requires configured network
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-tests, tor-ci, 041-should, asn-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  merge  |
Parent ID:  #30409   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-tests, tor-ci, 041-should => tor-tests, tor-ci,
 041-should, asn-merge
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM. Agree with no backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30806 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a subsystem for evloop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30806: Make a subsystem for evloop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 One small comment. If that was on purpose, just go to merge_ready!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Title should be edited as the figure is now much more spectacular. To all
 our Farsi friends: thanks for making it happen, we love you! <3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 400K

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
400K
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by xhdix):

 Also, according to a query from people, messages similar to the screenshot
 below were published in telegram groups.
 In this message, installing and using Tor is trained to work on Telegram.
 https://imgur.com/RqyjccN

 [[Image(https://i.imgur.com/RqyjccNl.jpg)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30778 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Not able to remove projects in dip.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30778: Not able to remove projects in dip.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gitlab   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * owner:  (none) => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30273 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: improve inventory of hardware resources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30273: improve inventory of hardware resources
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29304   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i've started an effort to document the hardware used by all teams in a
 private Nextcloud spreadsheet.

 there's also an effort to regroup *services* (not hardware) per "vegas
 team", see #21235

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21235 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Try dividing up services by vegas teams

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21235: Try dividing up services by vegas teams
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i'm not sure it would be redundant with what? :) i think it's still
 relevant - i've been trying to expand the inventory of hardware, per team
 (#30273), but that's a different effort than the service inventory.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23007 [Webpages/Blog]: Get a second blog maintainer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23007: Get a second blog maintainer
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 couldn't we host the blog within the new static website? a lot of those
 shiny static site generators (SSG) are built for blogs. there's always the
 problem with comments, but that's usually solved with externalizing those
 to another entity, like a forum (e.g. discourse) or disqus or whatever...
 do we have such a place now?

 in any case, I should mention i don't have contacts or access to the
 Pantheon folks although I have met them in the past and might be able to
 uncrunch things in a pinch. it would be great to document that process in
 any case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29005 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29005: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  unreached-2019-Q1Q2|
Parent ID:  #27908   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  SponsorV =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29004 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29004: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  unreached-2019-Q1Q2|
Parent ID:  #27908   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  SponsorV =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android: Downloads are confusing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30854: Android: Downloads are confusing
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Created child tickets, this can be a parent.

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[tor-bugs] #30856 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android: Downloads are forgotten

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30856: Android: Downloads are forgotten
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30854
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Parent: #30854

 When the app is restarted after downloading a file, the file is not listed
 in Tor Browser's Downloads list anymore. This is very confusing,
 especially because the file is still saved in the shared storage.

 I suspect this is because private browsing mode doesn't save state
 (including recent downloads). Because we don't remember what we
 downloaded, we can't differentiate between our files and other files in
 the shared storage, so it shows nothing.

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[tor-bugs] #30855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android: Downloads are saved in the shared storage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30855: Android: Downloads are saved in the shared storage
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #30854
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Parent: #30854

 Downloads are saved in the shared storage. See #26574 for more information
 about this and downloading files into the app's internal storage.

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[tor-bugs] #30854 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android: Downloads are confusing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30854: Android: Downloads are confusing
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Downloading files in Tor Browser on Android is sometimes confusing and not
 safe. There are two separate but related issues.

 Problems:

 1. Downloads are saved in the shared storage. See #26574 for more
 information about this and downloading files into the app's internal
 storage.
 2. When the app is restarted after downloading a file, the file is not
 listed in Tor Browser's Downloads list anymore. This is very confusing,
 especially because the file is still saved in the shared storage. I
 suspect this is because private browsing mode doesn't save state
 (including recent downloads).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21315 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: publish some realtime stats from the broker?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21315: publish some realtime stats from the broker?
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29461   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 After looking at #30731, I want to change the proposed collected metrics
 to match the data shown in
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30693#comment:3 these
 graphs]. I modified the Rscript in those tickets slightly to bin to the
 nearest multiple of 8 and the results are almost identical (due to how
 often proxies are polling). We can get away with even coarser binning but
 I think the multiple of 8 method does enough to disguise individual client
 traffic.

 In addition to this I think it would be interesting to collect geoip data
 on the '''available proxies'''. I don't want to bin snowflake proxies at
 this time because we have too few for this count to be useful at the
 moment, maybe we'd want to add it later but I don't think we need to from
 a client safety perspective. The overall proxy count won't leak client
 information because it only measures whether a proxy has polled at all in
 a 24 hour period and '''not''' whether it was given out (which would leak
 client usage data).

 So I'll propose the following metrics (gathered at a granularity of every
 24 hours):

 {{{
 "snowflake-stats-end" -MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NL
 [At most once.]

 -MM-DD HH:MM:SS defines the end of the included measurement
 interval of length NSEC seconds (86400 seconds by default).

 "snowflake-ips" CC=NUM,CC=NUM,... NL
 [At most once.]

 List of mappings from two-letter country codes to the number of
 unique IP addresses of snowflake proxies that have polled.

 "proxy-idle-count" NUM
 [At most once.]

 A count of the number of times a proxy has polled but received
 no client offer, rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8.

 "client-denied-count" NUM
 [At most once.]

 A count of the number of times a client has requested a proxy
 from the broker but no proxies were available, rounded up to
 the nearest multiple of 8.

 "client-proxy-match-count" NUM
 [At most once.]

 A count of the number of times a client successfully received a
 proxy from the broker, rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8.
 }}}

 I'm going to start implementing these metrics and meanwhile put this in
 needs_review for the metrics team to look at.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: THE Torbutton clean-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28745: THE Torbutton clean-up
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: THE Torbutton clean-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28745: THE Torbutton clean-up
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 There is some work in
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/compare/10760...10760+1. Adding it
 here instead of #10760, and assuming this is a next step. Commit for
 #30851 needs tor-browser changes from https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/30851.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29976 [Core Tor/Tor]: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29976: rework bootstrap reporting to use pubsub
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bootstrap network-team-  |  Actual Points:  5
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 042!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29738 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate RecommendedPackages torrc option, and remove the code for voting for packages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29738: Deprecate RecommendedPackages torrc option, and remove the code for 
voting
for packages
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28465  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged into 042.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26164 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Create HS network in chutney with client-auth enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26164: Create HS network in chutney with client-auth enabled
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney tor-hs client-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29024  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: nickm (added)
 * parent:   => #29024


Comment:

 Nick has a nice 2-phase design for pluggable transports in chutney.
 Maybe we can work out a way to do 2-phase HS auth as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30780: Return a distinct was_router_added_t when formatting annotations fails
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, intro, technical-debt, tor-|  Actual Points:  0.3
  bridge, dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master (042)!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30686 [Core Tor/Tor]: Better warnings when minherit/madvise fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30686: Better warnings when minherit/madvise fails
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-should diagnostic dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged! There was a conflict on a comment, fixed it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30847 [Core Tor/Stem]: Failed unit tests with Python 3.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30847: Failed unit tests with Python 3.8
---+
 Reporter:  miceliux   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 I think some errors like this were fixed in a recent commit to stem
 master?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29024 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29024: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, 041-accepted-20190115,   |  Actual Points:  1
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci,|
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The CI failed because 0.3.4 no longer exists, and the tests fail on 0.2.9
 (which is installed when 0.3.4 is not available).
 We have an open ticket to remove 0.3.4 from chutney's CI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30500 [Circumvention/Censorship analysis]: Can the GFW still do DPI for "new" vanilla Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30500: Can the GFW still do DPI for "new" vanilla Tor?
---+--
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gfw, china |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by phw):

 The research team I've been in touch with could not trigger active probing
 with tcis as the client and a netcat listener as the server. I suggested
 to use a bridge instead of a netcat listener, which resulted in active
 probing. This suggests that the GFW is also considering some information
 that's sent from the server to the client.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29310 [Core Tor/Tor]: control-spec: "limits/max-mem-in-queues" appears to be undocumented

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29310: control-spec: "limits/max-mem-in-queues" appears to be undocumented
+--
 Reporter:  nusenu  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  doc, 041-should, dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:  0
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop hard-coding the bash path in the git scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30840: Stop hard-coding the bash path in the git scripts
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, git-scripts, nickm-merge,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  asn-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29024 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29024: Add pluggable-transport support to Chutney
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, 041-accepted-20190115,   |  Actual Points:  1
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, tor-ci,|
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've made a change to fix that formatting error; should be pretty simple.
 Let's see if there are any other errors.

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[tor-bugs] #30853 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser for Android is screenshottable using the Google Assistant

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30853: Tor Browser for Android is screenshottable using the Google Assistant
+--
 Reporter:  clash   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Given FLAG_SECURE is true, a screenshot cannot be taken by normal means.
 However if you hold down the home button to activate the inbuilt Google
 Assistant and click on the 'Share Screenshot' button, a screenshot can be
 captured successfully.
 [[Image(https://i.imgur.com/tc13MFt.jpg)]]

 This totally circumvents the privacy protection of not being able to
 capture screen while in Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 041-should, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 ok, please see branch `ticket28453_v2_merged`, which resolves the
 conflict. PR at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1102

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30852: Update to June GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30852: Update to June GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30852: Update to June GeoIP2 database
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #30852 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30852: Update to June GeoIP2 database
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:  teor
  Sponsor:|
--+
 ​[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/tor.git/log/?h=geoip-2019-06-10
 My geoip-2019-06-10 branch] contains the updated `geoip` and `geoip6`
 files with IPv4 and IPv6 ranges and is supposed to be merged into
 maint-0.2.9 and other branches that are still maintained.

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[tor-bugs] #30851 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move torbutton default prefs to 000-tor-browser.js

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30851: Move torbutton default prefs to 000-tor-browser.js
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28745
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Now they are loaded manually from several places in torbutton components
 and modules (via `torbutton/modules/default-prefs.js`). We should move
 these to tor-browser `000-tor-browser.js` prefs file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Exposed chrome:// resources allow browser version and OS detection [Bug 1534581]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29745: Exposed chrome:// resources allow browser version and OS detection [Bug
1534581]
--+--
 Reporter:  flngerprlnt   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Not sure if it's worthwhile opening a new ticket: but the default
 proportional font (serif or sans-serif) is (semi-)detectable and it seems
 as if `zh-TW` is the only one to return `sans-serif`

 Is this something that was missed: For example: the default proportional
 font in `ja` and `he` is sans-serif, but the PoC returns `serif`


 {{{
 window.getComputedStyle(document.body,null).getPropertyValue("font-
 family")
 }}}

 [1] PoC:
 https://ghacksuserjs.github.io/TorZillaPrint/TorZillaPrint.html#fonts

 On the plus side: all 30 packs return sizes `16` (proportional) and `13`
 (monospace) regardless of the settings in Language & Appearance > Advanced

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[tor-bugs] #30850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move not UI-related torbutton.js code to XPCOM component/service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30850: Move not UI-related torbutton.js code to XPCOM component/service
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28745
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 `torbutton_init()` is the entry point: we should start there, find out
 which code does not need to be loaded for every window and move it to a
 new or existing component.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30781 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30781: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  local-file-crash, tor-bridge,|  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |
  040-backport, 041-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 local-file-crash, tor-bridge, 029-backport, 035-backport,
 040-backport, 041-backport
 =>
 local-file-crash, tor-bridge, 029-backport, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged PR 1082 to maint-0.4.1 and forward.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26787, #27331, #28183, #28356, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #26787, #27331, #28183, #28356, #29034, #29280, #29645, 
#30454, #4363, #6623, #22453, #24857, #26460, #26469, #27066, #27130, #27190, 
#27191, #27194, #27201, #27315, #27722, #27802, #28081, #28113, #28378, #28509, 
#28510, #28511, #28512, #28514, #28525, #28611, #28659, #28795, #29528, #29780, 
#29824, #30041, #30184, #30781, #28522, #30561 by nickm:


Comment:
Removing 034-backport from all open tickets: 034 has reached EOL.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30781 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30781: Stop crashing when encountering an unknown router annotation
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  local-file-crash, tor-bridge,|  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 034-backport, 035-backport,  |
  040-backport, 041-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good. Thanks for the very easy per-branch PR overview, Tim!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22029 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22029: Allow ed25519 keys to be banned in the approved-routers file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I am using the same PR for the child tickets. I have added #30691 to the
 same branch, and will also add #30644, #30677, and #30692.

 I have a copy of the pre-child tickets branch on GitHub as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor decoding outside the if expression in dirserv_load_fingerprint_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30691: Refactor decoding outside the if expression in
dirserv_load_fingerprint_file()
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22029  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/970 with commit `8c0a166`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor decoding outside the if expression in dirserv_load_fingerprint_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30691: Refactor decoding outside the if expression in
dirserv_load_fingerprint_file()
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22029  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30789 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B and ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30789: Fallback details changed for FC9AC8EA0160D88BCCFDE066940D7DD9FA45495B 
and
ACD889D86E02EDDAB1AFD81F598C0936238DC6D0
---+
 Reporter:  ph3x   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback-change|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28793 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad,  |  Actual Points:
  041-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Seems reasonable. Please see my commit in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1101.

 I added a log for receiving a legit STOP command, and also promoted a
 protocol warn for receiving a padding from the wrong hop to a normal warn.
 I think if this happens we want to learn about it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fixes for bug 1552627 and 1549833

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30849: Backport fixes for bug 1552627 and 1549833
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201906  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Changesets in question are:

 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/29d9eb1276a7
 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/6fefc560ddc4
 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/465fa362c702

 `bug_30849` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_30849) does contain the last two changes as they
 are simple preference settings. I am not sure about the first one as it is
 more a fix to make social engineering harder and it seems to require some
 work to get it properly applied to esr60...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27530: Configure: Use AC_TRY_RUN() to check that --enable-gcc-hardening works
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fast-fix, postfreeze-ok, 041-can,|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-should, asn-merge  |
Parent ID:  #28611   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 042.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename one of the two sendme.h files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30769: Rename one of the two sendme.h files
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-should asn-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 042.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a generic counter token bucket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30687: Implement a generic counter token bucket
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15516| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 042.

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[tor-bugs] #30849 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fixes for bug 1552627 and 1549833

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30849: Backport fixes for bug 1552627 and 1549833
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201906
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Not sure if they are as easily exploitable in Tor Browser as they are in
 Firefox but we should be better safe here than sorry and backport the pref
 changes coming with bug 1552627 and 1549833.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a generic counter token bucket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30687: Implement a generic counter token bucket
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15516| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Pushed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a generic counter token bucket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30687: Implement a generic counter token bucket
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15516| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Missing a changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30148 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix infrequent, unlikely memory leak on failure to create keys directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30148: Fix infrequent, unlikely memory leak on failure to create keys directory
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-no-backport 035-backport |  Actual Points:
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:  #30146   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  034-no-backport 035-backport 040-backport asn-merge => 034-no-
 backport 035-backport 040-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22619 [Core Tor/Tor]: SessionGroup = Reading config failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22619: SessionGroup = Reading config failed
-+-
 Reporter:  acceleraTor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SessionGroup configuration   |  Actual Points:  0
  SocksPort option 032-unreached 035-backport|
  040-backport 041-can   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:
 SessionGroup configuration SocksPort option 032-unreached 035-backport
 040-backport 041-can, asn-merge
 =>
 SessionGroup configuration SocksPort option 032-unreached 035-backport
 040-backport 041-can


Comment:

 Merged to 041 and forward. Leaving open for backports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28453: Create a EndOfLifeTor.md document
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc, release-management, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, 041-should, asn-merge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 I'm getting merge conflicts with master here. This should be merged on
 master right, not 041, correct? Marking as needs_revision becasue of the
 conflicts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30843 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [TBA] Add an option to disable bundled Tor from "Tor Browser Android".

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30843: [TBA] Add an option to disable bundled Tor from "Tor Browser Android".
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #28786.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28786 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow to disable Tor in Tor Browser on mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28786: Allow to disable Tor in Tor Browser on mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  dimqua   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  user-feedback, blog|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 #30843 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop hard-coding the bash path in the git scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30840: Stop hard-coding the bash path in the git scripts
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, git-scripts, nickm-merge,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  asn-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  fast-fix, git-scripts => fast-fix, git-scripts, nickm-merge,
 asn-merge


Comment:

 Great stuff!

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[tor-bugs] #30848 [- Select a component]: Top Essay Writing Service Available In UK

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30848: Top Essay Writing Service Available In UK
+--
 Reporter:  William_VRiley  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 In a majority of cases, the reason for students turning to a
 [https://www.essaystigers.co.uk/UK top essay writing service] for their
 essay needs is a tight deadline or lack of time. Hence, punctuality is an
 important expectation of such services. It’s fortunate then that a service
 which prides itself on punctuality such as Essays Tigers exists.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30822 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update git scripts to remove 0.3.4, include 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30822: Update git scripts to remove 0.3.4, include 0.4.1
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  asn-merge, 041-should  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #30835 | Points:  .1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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[tor-bugs] #30847 [Core Tor/Stem]: Failed unit tests with Python 3.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30847: Failed unit tests with Python 3.8
--+---
 Reporter:  miceliux  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Stem
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
 There are some errors when running unit tests on Python 3.8:

 + /usr/bin/python3 run_tests.py --unit
 ==
  INITIALISING
 ==
   stem version...  1.7.1
   python version...3.8.0a4
   operating system version...  failed
 module 'platform' has no attribute 'linux_distribution'
 BUILDSTDERR: /builddir/build/BUILD/stem-1.7.1/test/output.py:150:
 SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence \(
 BUILDSTDERR:   m = re.match('.*( \(test\..*?\)).*', line_content)
 BUILDSTDERR: /builddir/build/BUILD/stem-1.7.1/test/output.py:163:
 SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence \.
 BUILDSTDERR:   m = re.search('(test\.[^)]*)', line_content)
 BUILDSTDERR: /builddir/build/BUILD/stem-1.7.1/test/output.py:264:
 SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence \(
 BUILDSTDERR:   module_match = re.match('.*\((test\.\S+)\.\S+\).*',
 line_content)
 BUILDSTDERR: /builddir/build/BUILD/stem-1.7.1/test/task.py:140:
 SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence \S
 BUILDSTDERR:   test_match = re.search('^class
 (\S*)\(unittest.TestCase\):$', file_contents, re.MULTILINE)
 BUILDSTDERR: /usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/pep8.py:110: FutureWarning:
 Possible nested set at position 1
 BUILDSTDERR:   EXTRANEOUS_WHITESPACE_REGEX = re.compile(r'[[({] |
 []}),;:]')

 Full log here:

 https://copr-be.cloud.fedoraproject.org/results/@python/python3.8/fedora-
 rawhide-x86_64/00917176-python-stem/build.log.gz

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[tor-bugs] #30846 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit activity-stream for network requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30846: Audit activity-stream for network requests
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In ff68 there are some snippets network requests coming from activity
 stream (`resource://activity-stream/lib/ASRouter.jsm`). We should make
 sure to disable these and any other related background requests.

 Some relevant prefs: https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-
 user.js/blob/a92c4086bbf8c4324c4369d1dc8a39338334af45/user.js#L109

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[tor-bugs] #30845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure default Firefox themes are enabled on ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30845: Make sure default Firefox themes are enabled on ESR68
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 With current `000-tor-browser.js` prefs default theme extensions are not
 installed. `AddonManager.maybeInstallBuiltinAddon` is used to install
 these, which requires enabledScopes to have flag 4 (application scope). So
 changing `extensions.enabledScopes` from 1 to 5 fixes this.

 My understanding is that this should only allow installing extensions from
 application directory, which we control. Is there any reason not to do
 this change?

 Also, some related prefs seem obsolete:

 {{{
 extensions.bootstrappedAddons
 extensions.enabledAddons
 extensions.enabledItems
 }}}

 We could also use this to clean them up.

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