Re: [tor-bugs] #30933 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Get rid of CoffeeScript from the JS proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30933: Get rid of CoffeeScript from the JS proxy
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dcf  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * reviewer:   => dcf


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19408 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Tor cannot work in China

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19408: Tor cannot work in China
---+---
 Reporter:  sam1275|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport  |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  user
   |  disappeared
 Keywords:  block  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 Closing because the questions #comment:3 are still unanswered.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30833 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Update BrideDB's requirements.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30833: Update BrideDB's requirements.txt
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closing because we already have #29484.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29484 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Update the requirements.txt and freeze them on release

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29484: Update the requirements.txt and freeze them on release
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb, ex-sponsor-19  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
-+---
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  (none) => phw
 * cc: gaba (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30441 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30441: Stop BridgeDB from handing out offline bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  user-feedback, blog, anti-   |  worksforme
  censorship-roadmap |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Closing because BridgeDB is still working as intended.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker: usability improvements from May retrospective

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30752: Practracker: usability improvements from May retrospective
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > Practracker failures are a bad and confusing experience for new
 contributors (and researchers).
 I agree.
 >
 > Maybe it should be off by default? Or warn unless you set an env var
 that makes it fail?
 I think maybe the stricter options should only run on cron builds? As
 could the option that warns about exceptions that either could be lowered
 or deleted.

 I think we might still want to have a (small?) tolerance that practracker
 will use when run from `make check`. But maybe we also want reviewers to
 look at small regressions in practices that are within the tolerances but
 that show up as warnings in the pull requests?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker: usability improvements from May retrospective

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30752: Practracker: usability improvements from May retrospective
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Practracker failures are a bad and confusing experience for new
 contributors (and researchers).

 Maybe it should be off by default? Or warn unless you set an env var that
 makes it fail?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31109 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31109: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension
--+---
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-extension, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor28
--+---
Changes (by arma):

 * keywords:  snowflake-extension => snowflake-extension, ux-team


Comment:

 The interface is where we gamify running the extension. That is, where we
 involve the user in knowing that they're being helpful, and knowing what
 being helpful actually means.

 To start, giving me some solid indication that it's working would be
 great. Right now I have only one metric -- whether the number changes from
 0. So if there is something else we can check, and display, like whether I
 am successfully telling the broker that I exist, that could be useful. Or
 a "self-test" button that I press if I'm worried, and it checks some stuff
 and tells me I'm good to go.

 More broadly, whatever we show the users is our chance to steer them
 toward prioritizing what we want them to prioritize. That is, if we give
 them a number, they will naturally want that number to go up as high as
 possible. So let's try to give them some things that can show that they're
 being valuable. And the corollary is that if we show them a number that
 they can't influence and makes them depressed and feel unuseful, we're
 doing it wrong.

 Taking a step back: I suggest making a list of the behaviors that we want
 in our extension users ("install the extension and leave it alone", "tell
 their friends to install it", etc), and then making a list of what
 understanding and intuitions we want to reinforce ("the more snowflakes
 running, the better", "it's ok if your snowflake doesn't have a user right
 now", "the more total censored people using snowflakes, the better", etc),
 and then figure out what data we have that we can show the user to
 reinforce these understandings and get them to do the actions we want
 most. (And if we don't have data for something, that's ok too -- a picture
 or whatever with little spinning things could conceivably be just as
 good.)

 tagging as ux because this is totally a ux ticket

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31106 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31106: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31106 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31106: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31109 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31109: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-extension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 From teor:
  - on relay search, we highlight consensus weight and bandwidth. And most
 other tools and ISPs make it easy to measure bandwidth. So relay operators
 try to maximise those numbers. No matter how many times we tell them that
 latency and reliability are also good for users.

 From arma:
  - giving me some solid indication that it's working would be great. right
 now i have only one metric -- whether the number changes from 0. so if
 there is something else, like whether i am successfully telling the broker
 that i exist, that could be useful.
 - whatever we show the users is our chance to steer them toward
 prioritizing what we want them to prioritize. that is, if we give them a
 number, they will naturally want that number to go up as high as possible
 - for example, showing them how many other people are running snowflakes
 right now. that's a number that could go up, and represents...something
 relevant here.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31083 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31083: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 reading up on https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/upgrades/buster, it
 looks like this was triggered by the upgrade as well, right?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31108 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Need php-gd extension installed on crm-ext-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31108: Need php-gd extension installed on crm-ext-01
-+-
 Reporter:  peterh   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 done, apache reloaded.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31080 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31080: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must 041-regression  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31080 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31080: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must 041-regression  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+

Comment (by teor):

 I did a quick review on this patch, I had some questions about using u64
 some places, and log_domain_t in others.

 Replying to [ticket:31080 teor]:
 > We'll also need to change the corresponding type in Rust to u64. Maybe
 we should define a type, rather than using u64 everywhere.

 This patch does not fix the Rust type, and it needs to. See the tor_log
 Rust module.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31108 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Need php-gd extension installed on crm-ext-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31108: Need php-gd extension installed on crm-ext-01
-+-
 Reporter:  peterh   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services Admin |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => anarcat


Comment:

 checking

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31109 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31109: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-extension  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---
Description changed by cohosh:

Old description:

> How do we make sure that users don't uninstall the extension if it seems
> like it isn't being used?
>
> Sometimes usage is low due to bugs but other times it could be due to
> very few clients using the system. Is there a way to reassure people that
> the extension is still working or will be useful in the future?

New description:

 How do we make sure that users don't uninstall the extension if it seems
 like it isn't being used?

 Sometimes usage is low due to bugs but other times it could be due to very
 few clients using the system. Is there a way to reassure people that the
 extension is still working or will be useful in the future?

 Related comments:
 - https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31100#comment:6

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31109 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31109: Better gamify the UX for snowflake extension
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  snowflake-extension
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor28|
-+-
 How do we make sure that users don't uninstall the extension if it seems
 like it isn't being used?

 Sometimes usage is low due to bugs but other times it could be due to very
 few clients using the system. Is there a way to reassure people that the
 extension is still working or will be useful in the future?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31103: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: gaba (added)


Comment:

 Gaba, this seems important, should we put it in the PT sponsor?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31108 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Need php-gd extension installed on crm-ext-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31108: Need php-gd extension installed on crm-ext-01
-+-
 Reporter:  peterh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Component:  Internal Services/Services
 |  Admin Team
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 We're adding a captcha to the donation form and for that we need the php
 GD extension installed.

 This is urgent because we Stripe will suspend the account if we don't cut
 down on the carding.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29607 [Core Tor/Tor]: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29607: 2019 Q1: Denial of service on v2 and v3 onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  pidgin   |  Owner:  pidgin
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2, security, 041-longterm, |
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by pidgin):

 it's a beautiful sunny day today.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31094 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first time) and in DispVMs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31094: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first
time) and in DispVMs
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > If you take the Tor Browser as we ship it (by downloading it from our
 website and extracting it) and run that inside your environment, does this
 happen as well?

 https://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-in-whonix-blocks-javascript-only-
 when-started-for-the-first-time-and-in-dispvms/6843/11:
 I don’t think this is a vanilla torbrowser bug since it only happens in
 whonix - never with vanilla torbrowser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:6 arma]:
 > As another data point, I'm using the Firefox extension (on Debian's
 firefox -- looks like it's called "60.7.2esr-1") (I've set auto update to
 enabled, so about:addons says I'm on Snowflake 0.0.4 now), and I've never
 seen anything other than "0" in the user count.
 >
 > This is part of why I've been pushing for more feedback to the user of
 the extension -- there's no way for me to know if it's working or not, and
 as an ordinary user I would have uninstalled it by now figuring it's
 broken (even if it isn't).
 >
 > So, we should both figure out whether it's broken and fix it as needed,
 and also figure out a better UX for me as a volunteer to know whether I'm
 being helpful. :)

 Yep, I'd kind of like to eventually get the broker statistics we're
 collecting published into constantly updating graphs of the sort
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30693#comment:3 here].
 Perhaps we can add a link to these graphs from the webextension which will
 give users an idea of whether the low usage they're seeing is due to lack
 of clients or possibly something else.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:4 arlolra]:
 > > You're using the addon store version 0.0.4? I'm also on Firefox 67.
 >
 > Yes, same.
 >
 > I'm not sure what's up with the CORS blocking yet but the ice failure
 might just be specific to the network you're on.  Is that the network you
 usually use?  Does it work in Chrome there?
 Yep, it's my home network and the Chrome version works fine from here.
 >
 > Note that in the [https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commits/coffee
 coffeescript removal branch] I discovered that we aren't actually setting
 ice servers in the proxy,
 >
 >
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/7f5cd81f94c530d0142f7caec90581d56a65bafb
 >
 > since it's trying to use `@config` but `config` was a global.
 >
 > But also note that after fixing that, it would get some weird
 datachannel disconnect bug,
 >
 >
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/d1af00da676094a6842501f87faf2367f679cf02
 Ah interesting, I think I was seeing this bug as well but in the Chrome
 version.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31107 [Core Tor/Tor]: channel: channel_tls_handle_cell() CELL_VERSIONS code reached

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31107: channel: channel_tls_handle_cell() CELL_VERSIONS code reached
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-channel
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Relay operator reported this 2 days ago:

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-July/017486.html

 This code has been reached in `channel_tls_handle_cell()`:

 {{{
 case CELL_VERSIONS:
   tor_fragile_assert();
   break;
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 As another data point, I'm using the Firefox extension (on Debian's
 firefox -- looks like it's called "60.7.2esr-1"), and I've never seen
 anything other than "0" in the user count.

 This is part of why I've been pushing for more feedback to the user of the
 extension -- there's no way for me to know if it's working or not, and as
 an ordinary user I would have uninstalled it by now figuring it's broken
 (even if it isn't).

 So, we should both figure out whether it's broken and fix it as needed,
 and also figure out a better UX for me as a volunteer to know whether I'm
 being helpful. :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open already

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30573: TBA: open with Tor Browser does not work if Tor Browser is not open 
already
--+
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:16 gk]:
 > Okay, I know it's late but I finally found time to test that with the
 9.0a4 release candidate. It does not seem to work for me. :( The URL shows
 up in the URL bar but nothing happens. Interestingly, the number of open
 tabs is 0, which seems to indicate that there is no private tab available.

 Yes. This is concerning. I saw this bug during my testing too, and I
 thought it was solved by correcting how it detects "Sanitize Tabs" is
 enabled.

 The cause of the bug was the "requested url" was put into the url bar at
 the beginning of the  startup process, but this is only for UX. The page
 is not actually requested and loaded until later in the startup process.
 The patch for this ticket delays page load further by waiting until
 sanitization is complete, tor is bootstrapped, and Gecko is loaded (or if
 sanitizing tabs is disabled, then it only waits until tor is bootstrapped
 and Gecko is loaded).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > Reason: CORS request did not succeed

 Points to https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS/Errors/CORSDidNotSucceed

  The HTTP request which makes use of CORS failed because the HTTP
 connection failed at either the network or protocol level. The error is
 not directly related to CORS, but is a fundamental network error of some
 kind.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31106 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31106: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * Attachment "6AB6AEE9776E782723C8ACE83E39CEABFC69F6F7.asc" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31106 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31106: Update boklm's gpg key in ldap
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please update boklm's gpg key in ldap to include latest sub-keys.

 I will attach to this ticket the file
 6AB6AEE9776E782723C8ACE83E39CEABFC69F6F7.asc
 containing the key. The sha256sum of the file is:

 cb8a6152c3555edbe12f3d433e5985faacea85082a0399149fa53ba80ece90c2
 6AB6AEE9776E782723C8ACE83E39CEABFC69F6F7.asc

 Thanks!
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEgi/K/VIf0JfzR9ABfnZAu6U1iIAFAl0joZYACgkQfnZAu6U1
 iIAhkA/+NAmsCBRiKrhNm1cXLZy3n8I3w5MJlYag0iq7i8VPBgZXtri6aO8gwPie
 adVOYjOEoAwNIrV8fxlU7P5yd4WsZ6PNGujev5Ou5fPHNjaKByQJ1fcUrpadNKbU
 U571P8Vx4f9L03gHSnFfnGzhYEU45DHSLVozAAt+PNmTiANNCnWCG3RleCneCaal
 Va2H9KvdjdjqxcVNXwylTY7D+/xzhS6PH1kP8dxmPPpRQymROX91ziQnWQg1f9zV
 0x7Fh1XpvgQLmOUVSm8yyk8P3GFkGLh31i4p0JsruycKD0UBkk3ruyLxTjSDY4gQ
 S6L6gk+aIrni0ih8tRKgAvem0+Clg2Vu/upCKTPpWBL4QZDBcr4a81Z+q+jpLSWd
 ExKPjnMOeJXh9q2mnTlGrKvxsYbC78FzZpmBvNxNFCzpZSZG9VuHVtWLUFc/Wuda
 9Ye5G9SpaZ5pHclnzYhUx2OdqsjSTzaV6nSFbED/yCqOWc6KbyewoRBiSinG7fzP
 OxY5gw9Y8NS7+hRu/aOuKCN12/MICgjBFSh0s47uPIGzw0+GKAx0Qa0CO12wO0d9
 rxqeljWVDy2zyOtQQmlSVLoSNtTTWhcfFExcJH8r2tdUbeKig6BX15gmZ2rYums3
 H/xuyrTrhcDl5oHd1V1lj7lHBfAj+s+G8IPkCY817Ksxis0d7Q8=
 =lTI2
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > You're using the addon store version 0.0.4? I'm also on Firefox 67.

 Yes, same.

 I'm not sure what's up with the CORS blocking yet but the ice failure
 might just be specific to the network you're on.  Is that the network you
 usually use?  Does it work in Chrome there?

 Note that in the [https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commits/coffee
 coffeescript removal branch] I discovered that we aren't actually setting
 ice servers in the proxy,

 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/7f5cd81f94c530d0142f7caec90581d56a65bafb

 since it's trying to use `@config` but `config` was a global.

 But also note that after fixing that, it would get some weird datachannel
 disconnect bug,

 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/d1af00da676094a6842501f87faf2367f679cf02

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Give TBA alpha users a link to stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30540: Give TBA alpha users a link to stable
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 antonela]:
 > Based on what we talked last week, I made two options to handle this
 issue.
 >
 > 1. Dialog Box - https://www.material.io/design/components/dialogs.html
 >
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/30540/1.png
 >
 > hellais suggested to do it in two steps by first asking users if they
 are developers and if they reply NO, then recommend them to download the
 stable app. I approached this version to solve this with one step. In this
 way, when users click [download stable], we open the Tor Browser stable
 download page.
 >
 > 2. First Screen
 >
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/30540/2.png
 >
 > If we consider that we should block the entire screen for this action,
 we could use a full-screen option. It should show before the onboarding on
 new users and one/two times on recurrent users.

 Thanks. I like option 1, I think. I am not sure about he full-screen
 option. Is that a thing an Android user would expect?

 >
 > We should update the description at Google Play too, so we don't have
 new users downloading the Alpha version by error. It is most urgent, imo.
 I'm adding steph because we need wording for this.

 Agreed.

 > Also, Google Play calls developer versions as `Beta`. Should we attach
 to gplay standards and replace `Alpha` for `Beta` in mobiles?

 I am not sure yet, but we could think about it. Nevertheless, this would
 be a new ticket and we should not try to solve that here, too.

 > We need a funnel for this and define which releases will contain this
 prompt. Also, what is the % of users we expect to move? Will we remove the
 prompt once we achieve it?

 I don't know what % we would expect. I think we should ship it for quite
 some time and we should design the feature in a way that the user gets
 prompted after the first update to a version with the feature under
 discussion here. Subsequent updates should not trigger it. I think users
 that download the alpha now-ish should not get it either given that we
 have the stable around for a while now.

 > If we succeed on the moving, users will still have two versions of TBA
 installed in their devices. Can we do something to prevent users to
 successfully download the stable app but still use the alpha one as
 default?

 Good question. Maybe, I guess?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31105 [- Select a component]: Extremely slow connection speeds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31105: Extremely slow connection speeds
+--
 Reporter:  resistance17|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.3-alpha  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  slow connection |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Hi, I've been experiencing extremely slow connection speeds today. Even
 when I use a new identity or circuit. This doesn't happen on other
 browsers, only Tor. I'm a targeted individual and I've been posting some
 content recently so I'm guessing it has something to do with that. Or
 maybe I'm not the only one experiencing it. I rely on Tor for privacy so I
 hope this will be looked into.

 Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31094 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first time) and in DispVMs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31094: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first
time) and in DispVMs
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Simmer down gk, adrelanos wasn't contesting those things but merely
 reminding the OP about them :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31015 [Applications/Tor Browser]: svg.disabled = 'true' hides the the UI icons in extensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31015: svg.disabled = 'true' hides the the UI icons in extensions
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > I cannot create an account at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org
 >
 > When I enter an email address and click "Create Account" it tells me:
 >
 > > Account Creation Restricted
 >
 > > User account creation has been restricted.
 > > Contact your administrator or the maintainer (bmo-m...@mozilla.com)
 for information about creating an account.
 >
 > Must I go through that (IMO complicated) route or can you handle it
 yourself?

 I opened https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1564208.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30708 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Create a docker image for obfs4proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30708: Create a docker image for obfs4proxy
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task| Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap, sponsor28  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30777  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 I made some improvements to the container creation progress starting in
 commit `deeb0c83`. The tor process now drops privileges and I removed the
 ugly `sed` string replacement hack. Could you please review these changes
 too?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31083 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31083: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 at least ud-replicate breaks, because ACLs and fw rules and what not
 assume that kvm5 comes from its published address

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31094 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first time) and in DispVMs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31094: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first
time) and in DispVMs
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 adrelanos]:
 > > Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the
 first time) and in DispVMs
 >
 > > There is a long standing issue with Tor Browser that I reported to
 Whonix, but they say that it is an upstream issue.
 >
 > Citation required.
 >
 > "blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first time)" - No, I don't
 think this is an issue caused by Tor Browser which Tor Project could fix.
 Except, if
 >
 > > If you take the Tor Browser as we ship it (by downloading it from our
 website and extracting it) and run that inside your environment, does this
 happen as well?
 >
 > above quote was the case.

 Could you make your point a bit clearer here? I was trying to figure out
 whether the Tor Browser as we offer it from our website is giving the same
 behavior as the software Whonix is shipping (which I don't know anything
 about), but I am still not sure what the answer here is.

 > There are other recent changes and decisions by Tor Project which often
 cause questions. List of things up to The Tor Project having decided for
 now at the time of writing:
 >
 > * not enable to set noscript to blocking of all scripts globally by
 default,

 That's not a recent decision or change but has been that way forever, see
 our FAQ entry: https://support.torproject.org/#tbb-34

 > * not persist noscript per-site settings by default,

 Per-site permissions saved by default would risk making you linkability
 across different website because you probably have a non-generic
 whitelist. But if someone really wants that then there is a pref you can
 flip. See: #27175 for the full discussion.

 > * remove noscript from Tor Browser menu bar by default.

 #25658 is the ticket you want and proposal 101
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser-spec.git/tree/proposals/101
 -security-controls-redesign.txt) for more background. You can follow the
 tbb-dev list for proposal discussions like that one. This feature has been
 in the works for months.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201907 => tbb-mobile,
 tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201907R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1563631#c5 seems relevant
 here:
 {{{
 According to the WWDC presentation[1] around 8:00, all software "signed on
 built after June 1st" must be Notarized.
 }}}
 The presentation itself is at
 https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2019/701/.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove use of TOR_APP_USERNAME

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31104: Remove use of TOR_APP_USERNAME
--+
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201906
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #31042
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 TOR_APP_USERNAME is no longer used in Orbot but used in tor-android-
 service. We can eliminate its use in our service as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31080 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31080: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must 041-regression  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 See my branch `bug31080_041`.  It renumbers the domain, makes the mask 64
 bits wide, and adds a compile-time assertion to prevent recurrences of the
 bug.

 PR at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1171

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31094 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first time) and in DispVMs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31094: Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first
time) and in DispVMs
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by adrelanos):

 > Tor Browser in Whonix blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first
 time) and in DispVMs

 > There is a long standing issue with Tor Browser that I reported to
 Whonix, but they say that it is an upstream issue.

 Citation required.

 "blocks JavaScript (only when started for the first time)" - No, I don't
 think this is an issue caused by Tor Browser which Tor Project could fix.
 Except, if

 > If you take the Tor Browser as we ship it (by downloading it from our
 website and extracting it) and run that inside your environment, does this
 happen as well?

 above quote was the case.

 There are other recent changes and decisions by Tor Project which often
 cause questions. List of things up to The Tor Project having decided for
 now at the time of writing:

 * not enable to set noscript to blocking of all scripts globally by
 default,
 * not persist noscript per-site settings by default,
 * remove noscript from Tor Browser menu bar by default.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 a2121e2a7ee8a6c0f3b5edd150b38eaae8bef304
 Yes I think they are out of place. We can modify the commit log.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 f3b3df4e66630a68c9987d52d93580549a0acaf4

 Orbot project is no longer using BROWSER_APP_USERNAME. So this will also
 be eliminated from our code. I'll open an issue for this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31054 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Add android aarch64 nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31054: Add android aarch64 nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is fixed by commit `c705352fa1e043b5659548633dccaa468903e0f9` in
 `tor-browser-bundle-testsuite.git`, and
 `7bee08d921c147712a69140c44b506eaf19d57d6` in `tor-browser-build.git`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31081 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETCONF allows zero arguments, contrary to spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31081: GETCONF allows zero arguments, contrary to spec
---+--
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+--

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:

 > We talked about rejecting GETCONF with no arguments, but we decided it
 was easier to update the spec. We were concerned that we might break
 controllers that depend on the incorrect behaviour. And it seems like such
 a trivial issue to risk breaking a controller.
 >
 > We can talk about it again at our next team meeting, if you'd like.
 >
 > If we do decide to reject GETCONF with no arguments, we'll also need to
 change the spec to document the versions that (mistakenly) accepted no
 arguments.
 We should figure out which stakeholders we should consult about this
 behavior change, because I think not all of them regularly attend our team
 meetings.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30199: tor-android-service: Review 2019/04/16
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-8.5, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 45244c49fbe382e97655b8f8d8f482e54f95ed07

 Yes, you are right. In tor-android-service/0628 branch I changed these
 back to ones that Orbot uses. We will now need to add a patch to change to
 our default ports.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Ah well that's easy to change:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/dcea8b74fae5590a2c76d2964b5097be070f0c3a

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31074: Use tor_queue.h macros in config_line_t
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  refactor teschnical-debt => refactor technical-debt


Comment:

 Fix keyword typo.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31082 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decommission arlgirdense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31082: decommission arlgirdense
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 from what i can tell, step two has already been done (the host is down) so
 I have done step one already (removed it from nagios).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Crap, I meant to recommend caret (`^`) semantics instead :(

 Anyways, merge away

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:2 arlolra]:
 > Hmm, is this the logs from `about:debugging` with "Enable add-on
 debugging" checked?
 Yep, and after the ICE failure, I seem to enter a loop where I stay in `At
 client capacity`
 >
 > A quick test here seemed to work.
 Hmm, interesting. You're using the addon store version 0.0.4? I'm also on
 Firefox 67.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 WIP branch in my GitHub repository: [https://github.com/tlyu/tor/tree
 /control-refactor control-refactor]; still needs some memory management
 work.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31103: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by phw):

 * parent:   => #30471


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Undefined behavior in tor_vasprintf()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31001: Undefined behavior in tor_vasprintf()
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must hackerone bug-bounty|  Actual Points:
  security-low unlikely-crash 029-backport   |
  035-backport 040-backport 041-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  needs_revision => accepted


Comment:

 I'll do the backport

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30871 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_mark_for_close_(): Bug: Duplicate call to circuit_mark_for_close at ../src/feature/hs/hs_service.c:3166 (first at ../src/feature/hs/hs_service.c:2385)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30871: circuit_mark_for_close_(): Bug: Duplicate call to 
circuit_mark_for_close at
../src/feature/hs/hs_service.c:3166 (first at
../src/feature/hs/hs_service.c:2385)
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs double-mark 035-backport  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  040-backport 041-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs double-mark 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport
 041-must => tor-hs double-mark 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport, tor-relay, |  Actual Points:
  circuitpadding, wtf-pad|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  040-backport, tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad, 041-must =>
 040-backport, tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Hmm, is this the logs from `about:debugging` with "Enable add-on
 debugging" checked?

 A quick test here seemed to work.

 {{{
 Snowflake: == snowflake proxy == snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: Toggle state not yet saved snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: Starting snowflake snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: Using snowflake.bamsoftware.com:443 as Relay.
 snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: ProxyPair Slots: 0 snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: Snowflake IDs: snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 snowflake.js:1195:13
 XML Parsing Error: no root element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy
 Line Number 1, Column 1: proxy:1:1
 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 snowflake.js:1195:13
 XML Parsing Error: no root element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy
 Line Number 1, Column 1: proxy:1:1
 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 ...
 snowflake.js:1195:13
 XML Parsing Error: no root element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy
 Line Number 1, Column 1: proxy:1:1
 Snowflake: At client capacity. snowflake.js:1195:13
 XML Parsing Error: no root element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/answer
 Line Number 1, Column 1: answer:1:1
 Snowflake: WebRTC DataChannel opened! snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: websocket-relay connected! snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: WebRTC DataChannel closed. snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: websocket-relay closed. snowflake.js:1195:13
 Snowflake: At client capacity.
 snowflake.js:1195:13
 XML Parsing Error: no root element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy
 Line Number 1, Column 1: proxy:1:1
 Snowflake: At client capacity. snowflake.js:1195:13
 ICE failed, add a STUN server and see about:webrtc for more details
 Snowflake: At client capacity. snowflake.js:1195:13
 XML Parsing Error: no root element found
 Location: https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy
 Line Number 1, Column 1:
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Cool, made this change here:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/34b59e1f38604620d4de304c005e390bc356c5b3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31080 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31080: Stop using the same value for LD_NO_MOCK and LD_MESG
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-must 041-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31012 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-print-ed-signing-cert shows local time, without a timezone

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31012: tor-print-ed-signing-cert shows local time, without a timezone
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31103: Support ORPort picking a random port that persists across restarts
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 A bridge's transport port and OR port are semi-secret. We don't want a
 bridge to listen on port 9001 because it would facilitate Internet-wide
 scanning: a censor could scan the entire IPv4 address space for port 9001
 and block all bridges they discover this way. We therefore encourage
 operators to not set `ServerTransportListenAddr`, which makes Tor pick a
 random port and write it to its state file, so it persists across
 restarts. Bridge operators can then whitelist this port in their firewall
 configuration.

 Bridge operators may welcome a similar option for `ORPort`. However, when
 setting `ORPort` to auto, Tor attempts to find a new port each time it
 starts. This means that operators would have to re-configure their
 firewalls after each restart.

 In the short term, we should instruct operators to pick their own ports
 and explicitly set them for both `ORPort` and `ServerTransportListenAddr`
 but in the long term we may want `ORPort` to be able to pick a random port
 and save it to Tor's state file.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31042 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Android Service With Latest Orbot Changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31042: Update Tor Android Service With Latest Orbot Changes
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 Orbot PR 240 was just merged. So the tor-android-service 0628 branch is in
 sync with Orbot master.

 
https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/commit/f1b001579b7d49f88afc51f64e3d12c740dcad80

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Separate VPN Classes into their own module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31043: Separate VPN Classes into their own module
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31042| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Changes: https://github.com/sisbell/tor-android-service/commits/0628

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31047 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resources Should Exactly Match Orbot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31047: Resources Should Exactly Match Orbot
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31042| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Change is in:

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-android-service/commits/0628

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31095 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: crispum appears unused -- decommission

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31095: crispum appears unused -- decommission
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 Replying to [comment:7 anarcat]:
 > >  Maybe keep one backup if it's small, just so we don't lose the config
 files for the setup? Or if you want you can just send me the backup and
 I'll extract what I need and archive them
 >
 > do you have access to the server normally? (I know that you might not
 have now, because it's in shutdown, but normally...) in that case, you
 could perform the archival yourself...
 >
 > what would need to be archived there anyways that's not on git.tpo or
 archive.tpo? crash data? maybe that should be destroyed anyways because
 it's a PII liability?

 No, not the crashes (don't think there are any) rather how the server was
 configured. I looked around for it, but couldn't find it. If we ever get
 this working anyway we'll just redo it, I think the knowledge has been
 lost at this point.  Nuke it all.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31095 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: crispum appears unused -- decommission

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31095: crispum appears unused -- decommission
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 >  Maybe keep one backup if it's small, just so we don't lose the config
 files for the setup? Or if you want you can just send me the backup and
 I'll extract what I need and archive them

 do you have access to the server normally? (I know that you might not have
 now, because it's in shutdown, but normally...) in that case, you could
 perform the archival yourself...

 what would need to be archived there anyways that's not on git.tpo or
 archive.tpo? crash data? maybe that should be destroyed anyways because
 it's a PII liability?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31095 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: crispum appears unused -- decommission

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31095: crispum appears unused -- decommission
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31082 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decommission arlgirdense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31082: decommission arlgirdense
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31095 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: crispum appears unused -- decommission

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31095: crispum appears unused -- decommission
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 Maybe keep one backup if it's small, just so we don't lose the config
 files for the setup?  Or if you want you can just send me the backup and
 I'll extract what I need and archive them

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31095 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: crispum appears unused -- decommission

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31095: crispum appears unused -- decommission
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 should we destroy backups too?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31095 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: crispum appears unused -- decommission

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31095: crispum appears unused -- decommission
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i've scheduled a shutdown for tomorrow, as a first test to see if anything
 will break. then if we can survive without the box for a little longer, i
 will destroy it with fire.

 {{{
 Shutdown scheduled for Tue 2019-07-09 16:34:40 UTC, use 'shutdown -c' to
 cancel.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31083 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31083: kvm5 uses unexpected IP address
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 what's the actual impact of this and why does it matter?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by anarcat):

 > re archive-01: cleaned (removed) /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key* and edited
 the remaining .pub files to correctly have the hostname.

 Is this policy to not have ecdsa keys? They might also be in LDAP, were
 they removed there?

 If it's policy, we should add that to Puppet or the install procedure...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31102 [Metrics/Analysis]: Produce guidelines for safe internet measurement

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31102: Produce guidelines for safe internet measurement
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-pearg-safe-internet-
 measurement/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31082 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: decommission arlgirdense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31082: decommission arlgirdense
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 are we absolutely certain we can destroy this host now?

 i'm going to follow this procedure within 24h unless someone tells me
 otherwise.

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/retire-a-host/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #29697 [Internal Services]: archive.tpo is soon running out of space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29697: archive.tpo is soon running out of space
---+
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  budget_needed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by anarcat):

 for me the "fixed" state here is when archive-01 can and does provide all
 the services arlgirdense provides.

 it seems that's the case, so I'll look at removing all traces of the old
 server in our infrastructure.

 and i was *just* starting to figure out how to spell the damn thing. ;)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31087 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: v0.0.3 is missing icons/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31087: v0.0.3 is missing icons/
-+
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by arlolra):

 I was going to suggest adding a packaging step to avoid this in the
 future, like,

 {{{
 npm run webext-zip
 }}}

 but, please, only after #30933

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 This might looks better as,

 {{{
 "ws": "~3.3.1",
 }}}

 since [https://github.com/npm/node-semver#tilde-ranges-123-12-1 semver
 tilde] semantics shouldn't introduce any breaking changes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Fix:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/9a1a6a3314ec401dcb0de902d5e227638ce03435

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---
Description changed by cohosh:

Old description:

> We should update the node websocket dependency to a newer version.
>
> This involves editing `package.json` to require the newer version, and
> testing the result to make sure the proxy code still performs as
> expected.

New description:

 We should update the node websocket dependency to a newer version.

 This involves editing `package.json` to require the newer version, and
 testing the result to make sure the proxy code still performs as expected.

 This is to defend against a reported DoS vulnerability:
 
https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/c4fe46608acd61fbf7397eadc47378903f95b78a

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31101 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31101: Update websocket version in snowflake proxy
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  .3   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor28|
-+--
 We should update the node websocket dependency to a newer version.

 This involves editing `package.json` to require the newer version, and
 testing the result to make sure the proxy code still performs as expected.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  snowflake-
 |  webextension
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor28|
-+-
 It's unclear to me whether the Firefox addon is working correctly. I've
 gotten no usage out of it and have the following messages/errors in the
 console:
 {{{
 Cross-Origin Request Blocked: The Same Origin Policy disallows reading the
 remote resource at https://snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com/proxy.
 (Reason: CORS request did not succeed).

 ICE failed, add a STUN server and see about:webrtc for more details
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31099 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport bugzilla 1561636 for 26514

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31099: Backport bugzilla 1561636 for 26514
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We can backport https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/98a5a4864b88
 and drop the patch for #26514.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31092 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Specify a location where users can report issues for the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31092: Specify a location where users can report issues for the Snowflake
WebExtension
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30999   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * parent:   => #30999


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31091 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug stracktrace when pluggable transport cannot bind to port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31091: Bug stracktrace when pluggable transport cannot bind to port
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31092 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Specify a location where users can report issues for the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31092: Specify a location where users can report issues for the Snowflake
WebExtension
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 I added a section to the Snowflake documentation about reporting bugs:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake#Reportingbugs

 I added a support site link in both the Mozilla and Chrome webstore pages
 for Snowflake to point to the above section.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31098 [Core Tor/Tor]: transition when we send our first padding packet, not on received

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31098: transition when we send our first padding packet, not on received
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-backport-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 041-backport-maybe


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31098 [Core Tor/Tor]: transition when we send our first padding packet, not on received

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31098: transition when we send our first padding packet, not on received
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31098 [Core Tor/Tor]: transition when we send our first padding packet, not on received

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31098: transition when we send our first padding packet, not on received
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The RP circpad machine, on the relay side, should transition as soon as a
 padding cell is sent to the client according to the code comment. The code
 currently transitions on receiving a padding cell, not sending.

 Copied from:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1167

 Gaba, I think this is Sponsor 2, because it's a circuit padding bug.

 Mike or asn, please add tags.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30534 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy: While TorBirdy running cannot seem to get any Add-ons from the Add-on Manager

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30534: Torbirdy: While TorBirdy running cannot seem to get any Add-ons from the
Add-on Manager
---+-
 Reporter:  torlove|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by torlove):

 As such this ticket can be closed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30534 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Torbirdy: While TorBirdy running cannot seem to get any Add-ons from the Add-on Manager

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30534: Torbirdy: While TorBirdy running cannot seem to get any Add-ons from the
Add-on Manager
---+-
 Reporter:  torlove|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by torlove):

 TorBirdy is now operating as normal, it works when one has Tor Browser
 open at the same time.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31097 [Core Tor]: Semi old-fag wants old stuff he can't find

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31097: Semi old-fag wants old stuff he can't find
+--
 Reporter:  Telgar  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Trivial
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I haven't used TOR in a while and have just come back to find that I
 cannot see the bookmark page for the Wiki that gives a group of onion-
 links to sites as examples. I would just like to see that back, since I
 don't know any onions.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31096 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser missing NoScript on Linux/Ubuntu version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31096: Tor Browser missing NoScript on Linux/Ubuntu version
--+--
 Reporter:  torlove   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by torlove):

 The icon was never there in the first place. Whereas it is for other
 implementations that I've seen. This in theory could create a
 fingerprinting problem based on the os? (Yes I know that using NoScript
 may create it's own fingerprinting problem).

 Is NoScript being dropped from the toolbar?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31092 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Specify a location where users can report issues for the Snowflake WebExtension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31092: Specify a location where users can report issues for the Snowflake
WebExtension
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => cohosh
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs