[tor-bugs] #31192 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Support x86_64 target by August 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31192: TBA - Support x86_64 target by August 2019
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201907, |
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1480834#c0

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31165 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update GPG key for irl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31165: Please update GPG key for irl
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Key is expiring soon, this extends expiry, also adds a couple of
 signatures.

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-

 mQINBFZp8zEBEACxOYriD+tEuc3Wpnbh+GGnyiaLEMABBrfn6JlDQphbBq/YTz9M
 9OPkttjxhLL/yrxlM1nD69XbGKQ9gIL3LEgOz9+OdivPbN+Q5iNMqk/WCQUqd3bC
 Fbbsn1yvoTumFy9S9kYX45Db3jRJoN/Nye6Stf7KKPxHxot14iY+PUR/5Gx5KbeW
 VKfDtQejGnhxQD73KjrX4wdsBAaxnQ7KbjQyUf+IxE+8qSDcyTP+pPqxspVzx+eF
 qsW5+kK1eJMHxJmY/KsAs6IsGf5lvyDJJECc2iE0mFS6vc14lGcD7BAYMPRnvlK3
 OcDlbdJS3ZU0LQu3/AplM7cNcesq2Btm06OUTsbj10ZiyLi7Q0WZRuUbn7t3jOQV
 yOlNfjUpJhKPMMobBL2R0KzcptJbUrKc08wZD/TPaXuHKWAEJuA6kFMXtHhV8Qhx
 z5/d2KUA8ex+zpVd2xSR6q4llcYu1w8zHZtLN+YKSmjjKs+AjiTrCMYsOYxt4cwx
 uaIIhBNvCC9WqZOxHX7YHmpVcSV6K9Wwhk9mVIU3Ii0G2HWs6OQ0vIueCDGMEdVk
 ig/a7cVlfXNz7WuaXuhOJmHz6d6Yk4dFn5mLbEY9cZhBxf5hjCwtp9b6v+ueuptf
 cnOd+38G9KH6NyHKZyS4jcd3E6Dp0+9Isbl/EohjPCujevoW3/DlT08OKQARAQAB
 tCBJYWluIFIuIExlYXJtb250aCA8aXJsQGZzZmUub3JnPokCHAQQAQgABgUCV17R
 JgAKCRC5qB3esZtLFuOfD/9Z2/v17TycSzDLrIdSzUD2LYButnrGfjphVGosUisY
 5ZAhBIO3QhoJfem0Vtq3OtA6+FRNrT1oIpCwaPTfpp0jWK5IqNa7iguZ9CJWXTZm
 02BNpN4oP6M0+nDEzKgOkoQW32gsAZNiswVWCd8ZGXRuIx1I7NtazpuFUjBxl/BZ
 +hegPL4hO6gPy7/QOLMCCIe+5d2EakLqLfIBh//xZUCKQBqgh7nT7eBwlZpMCUY+
 6r7km6GmTutgi5HWjZ1LpvAiS3JDQ83iI1h7BYohNPI0AoKHnGjKez/wYC/L9dgW
 TNjcc/zCcLEdG45SwVDNLrzxGH7ztNrPY2T8WR9bTfNhrVgYDDshUEWQiQKh1Xap
 E7HOAb7jlslpKrCvrelNfpnr0LnVCO0rKi/1+RasuUGLr8KyK+EL9BES1Tc6/xIr
 827ZgyTuzxBseoZMZUgzGDLnWz9xTX9t6XP5XTQ4Z7WyGQ7DLpsmOnw55B3IWDC+
 dNVP3AnpB/FGwjPHt1kbrm/4skD6WMPzMi88qmeNsvsESdHElV80rRJaPDt5URyY
 ctrbjINjO8stbORIiSEy3fd85QktHJL6V2m0tpEWJ7Wtlb1NDcytkyccQBYP4ak5
 fvS/33lfLYbywa7eLsocmf0Ry2Bz4+EqDLOihHnRDKU2roNfOBiqgigGr33ljE0N
 KokCHAQQAQoABgUCVrCAsAAKCRDp4o3qAKpVVhjdEACc+DEdtV1pFB/6TO0sANAt
 3ccLDi3tVqxuvZJtZsJ8idir8xbaIkZyVhj6GeABndSUJG3y5+6faM+zO7/Ws84o
 yQTiqFrhJUBlf/ezRB1QxvvPSdP4uk+wEPgET8r7tMa/NjChLzLOsxguHfTV4OBz
 lC/nrifwDpIX0letgC4iIWHMQQYUjjGYYGS1KtM3kgmOv2MGCS8nInnygvJOekSw
 NP1f0ffp0woEvHGkwu+oAm1czlDbnkPnUcfpKP2Qc4S5oBv9HSxnr3OoD4slw9HS
 LWrg/JSQ1emoQAp2d4Q2FmwtPniUZOwY8Nr+kqm42ODfCnb0w2/nT0CXuNYQWa5t
 6OT/1oSZ/EyR1DIFKspaPcp5TVcbiDJ9V11hNFeVXIibD/Pb+2JiqhxWUMNv8DOW
 we2bk9qGhKNwrb/8zvmfBUjJWU7w5ihpxH/lqgrb4yksNi921Y/YnlMIjQwMJlnm
 MiBUProe/rRWBY2JKI0CJ2jppk+I9oSYDX9ZG4y8C4PKGMGD92noLH9sug5yrTgu
 QtvhVxOKZle3OoFZho0nCJLfD3CeT+3g05J1EKKaJ67nKReEWSZ7m9T1/410/xHQ
 HzM/SFAavDx5404849edEa1DuTqR0aL+8q42atha87qzgehNVQkcXGxFLLmY/kjK
 NpatcpsiOfvDnhMeg5QrS4kCHAQQAQoABgUCVzCuUgAKCRAe71PTijqcZ7R9EACt
 13+4fpiH1RGMTw7yN3slYGiwsWfH/yJGibLrK0PBAPo83XegOHUktIpEp5SyMUw4
 /r5tK7ECPXJpgvR3a/A4/iVWiJseKCuqAareopcfASuDAj+dNjY0A4oCCyQc9yV5
 9YCThjyuh5MveZcChjmI8MAhXMPjh1wfUKynmnLWn90actNh94wd940c/ZrQNOzA
 DygUo2d9X64pUQDB3fKJQCjpL5Va3ZzZIdAGHDtLJBCV1y9LMc/slBDTiHMMv3lA
 UCfCHybo97lxzfIkcr2gG5bnR2QpG3m494mIP6rr3Li+PbbTwqAV0KYb1+qDK17f
 gNldi0P2AtsiB45tcwZBeHLUOkmVmAyYbMAmVAZhLBUrkxdBojurRmFDPjvRmI+6
 cIYfThhi1F+9su+xCD9wBuIjXN+MEEGTG+NVpbTmOeCrcJHajP70fuXbhkbTHsmj
 v6/iOO70uDP0aTJbZIz5EIfl7G4SF4xlWNXO5nbaozGr5k8Een3+GP09PqKMCVXE
 KEEqpnOC2ExoUXqsYHwHoddGNRrxsBR5+iIqi3e261txJ3d3JxvVpNS6TlzuKCm1
 oAP1fUNdVRIdk4Jfgg17QqzxrZmjR47SUe5G+canIfWnFjDOn/k887jkzMzglgEo
 tEAlQWuFGZ0BVwSUkP8HatrueE5Iq/LHL6XwJEY2BYkCIgQTAQoADAUCVyHqPwWD
 B4YfgAAKCRA1cxJVnR4GS1P1EAC2ETyHizCnajfuFvwTmjJG+uica3xczKNEzMvj
 J0OrbMvp4qyW21oIQvnsojxPeNmmn47CT1WSpFvmrzaopY6rQmxw5eSRAs4+bm+E
 wVUfKPwrjT646+Yu8jnsQtN9U79C/SqsPXZ5SmhnbgU0uRBJnJbwrc8+UlveJP1n
 nskM/VGKU0n4ERxmthfdXh9R+wRbziO4LK1xniLZC1qBYbvQQdfZbfskIyyhDyrm
 MOeJgdHd4y/mfoISfVdLlcnIxsk+5copxqHdyphSmevwBy/W4kTaiNXpU/2FduBL
 s/WD9NRuLAwpYf/GgcA6OKZFfTWiVq1fqnjV4o4Bq2+okRJWSPoY7CMQT17RG/8Z
 EpQGen6OcKLnAGzy1M0dv8uhSMGvayLrCqRkNFBFIh/LnZJdCqSGdKI9VeLgNdHd
 0HD1aXDiuxFGr9lxFr3qjmGEC5DCFO8kGdqaw/XlYt4hKOe4alcfFFWZgzGVilRj
 E5ILx2Shb5ZixaPU9xZEyT8dlL8ntx/e0zD7b7/F0MGn0t14RucGVzvJz/G86njN
 SvSwp3A9YhmHmV0nk+mw+N9Y1CNdGmsg9qmk+4kAgPBFmERzLdVcV8Mh7zS9fLrF
 Prkk7wAkgI4p6q/NmNbw07J/bhEA2ITFLcb8eRzBl2wL6wURB1WLhEycb/vB5RuS
 7ztSMokCHAQTAQgABgUCV8MQVgAKCRBYeXlXNEJoTkWdEACkEUapLjJ1Hy/7mspR
 t2UZs+E9eBw65Akjcjuk3ksWN+v8lRXbKLEZnUKmYi/j6dMHEYdUWyRGlYBuS97z
 0lOEYXb6eQoHxZBqU4huyiIdKEL1ygFdO5rF1mUjggfJC2QR2SmU1cQ/Yh+L0o8f
 t+N8Ixg/hlv6pf6uBhRZn0msidKhlBwWH03JYNPKeqs3hEBgdg7phmFUP9XWz2dA
 bNCgPnh6pfxFgOwZ2FdH9aVWsfhPajVWwx/4OmLcV4Hw0vdMLZ5UEzNMB+1xqcZL
 kZdEPq3f+DuqZ/wvOWFZN5RLF/NHBQU81y1rRG3OGZSMbrN46znNlCcaP6wcWChw
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #31191 [- Select a component]: Black windows when app opened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31191: Black windows when app opened
--+
 Reporter:  darkpip   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by darkpip):

 * Attachment "Screenshot 2019-07-18 at 00.46.55.jpg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31191 [- Select a component]: Black windows when app opened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31191: Black windows when app opened
--+
 Reporter:  darkpip   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by darkpip):

 * Attachment "Screenshot 2019-07-18 at 00.46.27.jpg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31191 [- Select a component]: Black windows when app opened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31191: Black windows when app opened
-+--
 Reporter:  darkpip  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 running Mojave, when opening TTB, the 'establishing connection' window is
 black. when the browser loads, the window is also black. if the window is
 resized then the content will appear.
 context windows show nothing too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31187 [Core Tor/Stem]: Fetching a vote made by dirauth a from dirauth b is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31187: Fetching a vote made by dirauth a from dirauth b is broken
---+
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Band-aid pushed for these urls...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=4357e54

 ... and filed a ticket to request a full enumeration of DirPort urls:
 #31190

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31190 [Core Tor/Tor]: List all valid DirPort urls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31190: List all valid DirPort urls
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi network team. Every so often folks stumble on DirPort resources Stem
 doesn't recognize...

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30930
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31187

 Unfortunately section 'B' is the closest enumeration we have, but even it
 doesn't include everything...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3888

 Could we spec a listing of all urls the DirPort supports (similar to the
 GETINFO section in the control-spec)?

 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31189 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential docs update needed for GuardLifetime?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31189: potential docs update needed for GuardLifetime?
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  docs, guardlifetime  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 The documentation for the GuardLifetime torrc option says:

 {{{
 If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before
 picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from
 the
 consensus directory.  No value here may  be less than 1 month or
 greater
 than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0)
 }}}

 In commit hash 385602e9826e79dbf0d8b51abfd925e59f275708 it appears that
 there was a behavior change which allows guard lifetimes of 1 day or
 greater (grep for `get_options()->GuardLifetime >= 86400`). `git blame`
 indicated the docs for the `GuardLifetime` option haven't been touched in
 6-7 years, so I think they need an update after this change.

 Is the expected behavior that setting `UseEntryGuards 1` and
 `GuardLifetime 1 day` will result in guards being used for no longer than
 one day?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30869 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: [Nextcloud] Feedback re: collaborative document editing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30869: [Nextcloud] Feedback re: collaborative document editing
-+-
 Reporter:  alsmith  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nextcloud, migration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29415   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alsmith):

 Having a new issue when attempting to open NextCloud documents in
 OnlyOffice.

  * Navigate to file, double click to open in OnlyOffice.
  * "Loading document" message spins for several seconds.
  * Receive notification that states, "The file cannot be accessed now."
  * Click "OK," page stays blank.
  * Refresh the page.
  * Receive notification that states, "The document could not be saved.
 Please check connection settings or contact your administrator. When you
 click the ‘OK’ button, you will be prompted to download the document."
  * Click "OK" with the assumption that it will prompt a download--doesn't
 happen, page remains blank.

 I've tried this with four documents so far, all the same.

 I *am* able to download the documents if I navigate to the file > click
 "..." > Download.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30869 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: [Nextcloud] Feedback re: collaborative document editing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30869: [Nextcloud] Feedback re: collaborative document editing
-+-
 Reporter:  alsmith  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nextcloud, migration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29415   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by alsmith):

 * Attachment "Screen Shot 2019-07-17 at 1.38.09 PM.png" added.

 The document could not be saved

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30869 [Internal Services/Service - nextcloud]: [Nextcloud] Feedback re: collaborative document editing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30869: [Nextcloud] Feedback re: collaborative document editing
-+-
 Reporter:  alsmith  |  Owner:
 |  nextcloud-admin@…
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service -  |Version:
  nextcloud  |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nextcloud, migration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29415   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by alsmith):

 * Attachment "Screen Shot 2019-07-17 at 1.37.17 PM.png" added.

 The file cannot be accessed now

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30999 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Spruce up the product pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30999: Spruce up the product pages
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 By the way you forgot to add the new screenshots on the Mozilla addon
 page.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31187 [Core Tor/Stem]: Fetching a vote made by dirauth a from dirauth b is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31187: Fetching a vote made by dirauth a from dirauth b is broken
---+
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks Tom, thanks Sebastian! I tried the descriptor file Sebastian
 mentioned on irc and I can easily reproduce the bug...

 {{{
 % python
 >>> from stem.descriptor.remote import _guess_descriptor_type
 >>> _guess_descriptor_type('/tor/status-
 vote/current/49015F787433103580E3B66A1707A00E60F2D15B')
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "", line 1, in 
   File "stem/descriptor/remote.py", line 1143, in _guess_descriptor_type
 raise ValueError("Unable to determine the descriptor type for '%s'" %
 resource)
 ValueError: Unable to determine the descriptor type for '/tor/status-
 vote/current/49015F787433103580E3B66A1707A00E60F2D15B'
 }}}

 For me the root problem here is that our dir-spec doesn't have a clear
 enumeration of all the DirPort urls. Section 'B' is the closest that we
 have to this but these urls are only hinted at in section 3.4.

 Could we please update the following to include everything the DirPort
 vends? That way we won't keep running into this. ;P

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3888

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31188 [Core Tor/Tor]: make[1]: don't know how to make ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31188: make[1]: don't know how to make ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a
--+--
 Reporter:  ng0   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.0.5  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Hi,

 I'm trying to add the option to build tor with Rust to pkgsrc. On NetBSD 9
 (8.99.48) amd64, this fails at the moment:


 ...

   CC   src/trunnel/libor_trunnel_a-socks5.oCC   src/trunnel
 /libor_trunnel_a-netinfo.oCC   src/trunnel/libor_trunnel_a-
 circpad_negotiation.oAR   src/trunnel/libor-trunnel.aCC
 src/lib/trace/trace.oAR   src/lib/libtor-trace.a

 make[1]: don't know how to make ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a.
 Stop

 make[1]: stopped in /usr/work/pkgsrc-ng0/tor/work/tor-0.4.0.5
 *** Error code 2

 Stop.
 make: stopped in /usr/work/pkgsrc-ng0/tor/work/tor-0.4.0.5
 *** Error code 1

 Stop.
 make[1]: stopped in /usr/pkgsrc/pkgsrc-ng0/tor
 *** Error code 1

 Stop.
 make: stopped in /usr/pkgsrc/pkgsrc-ng0/tor


 rust and cargo are available in the build environment, and the crates are
 made available ahead of time and TOR_RUST_DEPENDENCIES points to the
 directory they are in.

 Questions: to verify if I hit an error on tor's side or Rust specifics wrt
 NetBSD, and not on my side, do you support verbose builds?
 If you have seen this kind of error before in to on other platforms, was
 there a resolution (I have seen 3 vaguely similar tickets).

 Disclaimer: I'm a contributor to pkgsrc, but I'm not the pkgsrc maintainer
 for tor, so this is more of a personal exploration to see if I can propose
 it.

 Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31173 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31173: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201907 => tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201907R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30461 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30461: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201907 => tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201907R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30460 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30460: Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907R  |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201907 => tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201907R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31187 [Core Tor/Stem]: Fetching a vote made by dirauth a from dirauth b is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31187: Fetching a vote made by dirauth a from dirauth b is broken
---+
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 In #30930 I reported that vote fetching was broken.  The fix however
 didn't resolve everything.  Specifically, trying to retrieve a vote (and
 probably a consensus) made by dirauth A from dirauth b is still broken.

 Such a vote request looks like /tor/status-vote/current/%s.z (where %s is
 the v3ident key)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31185 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: delete spam comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31185: delete spam comment
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.001
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 you forgot to close this ticket (alternatively give cypherpunks the
 permissions and will deal with that in the future)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31173 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31173: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30460 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30460: Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30461 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30461: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30461 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30461: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch 07017

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/36adde99982fc4792dbdeeed5faccf165b1cc623

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30460 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30460: Update TOPL Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch 07017

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/3687dfaa785ec3cd1344776dff319eb3021c2acb

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31173 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31173: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31173 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31173: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Branch 0717

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/7263cc52efade4a09344014dbaf47954e12afcf9

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: neel (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31185 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: delete spam comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31185: delete spam comment
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.001
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 He's back: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31186

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31186 [- Select a component]: investment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31186: investment
+--
 Reporter:  johnnyblade713  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I would like to purchase credit card numbers along with CVV number or talk
 to someone who can hook me up please trying to learn the trade with a
 little help from some of you thanks so much

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31185 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: delete spam comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31185: delete spam comment
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.001
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31185 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: delete spam comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31185: delete spam comment
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Internal Services/Service -
 |  trac
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.001
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2671#comment:17

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2671 [Company]: Better communication for authority operators, core developers in emergency situations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2671: Better communication for authority operators, core developers in 
emergency
situations
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Company  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #2664| Points:
-+--

Comment (by johnnyblade713):

 I don't know what IAM doing, I am halfway their o. Learning the credit
 card numbers and I have I formation my self but I need corporate credit
 card numbers and cvv who can I talk to IAM a legit criminal named Blade

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 I'm making changes here:
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/compare/ticket31100

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31163 [Core Tor/Tor]: A flag to use hostname than IP as relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31163: A flag to use hostname than IP as relay
--+--
 Reporter:  cyberbot  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cyberbot):

 Is there a way to skip the voting part and just push the relay descriptor
 if it's stable and is providing a good bandwidth ? It's really sad to see
 so many devices not being able to serve as a relay due to dynamic IP.

 > So this relays appear to be offline until the new descriptor with
 changed
 >
 >
 > Address
 > is voted from consensus. Which can take some ours for even stable alive
 relays.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31184 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set up WKD for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31184: set up WKD for torproject.org
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 we have that now -- https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/wkd/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31170 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31170: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.
-+
 Reporter:  knowguy  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by antonela):

 Thanks, dcf! Adding a border will make the icon work better on small
 sizes, yes.

 I cleaned the .svgs and added the -dark version following
 [https://design.firefox.com/photon/visuals/color.html#dark-theme,
 Firefox's suggestions]. You can grab them from the attachments.

 I cannot take the six-fold radial symmetry road to explore options now but
 is a fun path to explore an iteration in the future.

 Also, we maybe want the doorhanger to follow the selected theme for
 consistency.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31170 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31170: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.
-+
 Reporter:  knowguy  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "status-on.svg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31170 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31170: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.
-+
 Reporter:  knowguy  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "status-on-dark.svg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31170 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31170: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.
-+
 Reporter:  knowguy  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "status-off-dark.svg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31170 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31170: Addon Icon looks horrible Firefox Dark Mode.
-+
 Reporter:  knowguy  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "status-off.svg" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31172 [Metrics/Library]: Tests fail on Debian buster on jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31172: Tests fail on Debian buster on jenkins
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  metrics-team => karsten


Comment:

 Looking into this now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31184 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set up WKD for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31184: set up WKD for torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Increased DNS failure rate when using ServerDNSResolvConfFile with tor 0.3.4.9 (as opposed to 0.3.3.x)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28860: Increased DNS failure rate when using ServerDNSResolvConfFile with tor
0.3.4.9 (as opposed to 0.3.3.x)
-+-
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dns, regression, |  Actual Points:
  040-deferred-20190220  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 this s no "bad" exits. This are highest traffic relays. It can have many
 reasons like timeouts. Feel free to keep contact with them:
 https://www.torservers.net/contact.html to investigate issues

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31100 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Firefox addon not reporting any users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31100: Firefox addon not reporting any users
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 Just noting that this high priority. I'm planning on sitting down today
 and working out the proxy-pair state machine to avoid the inevitable
 infinite loop that results in the proxy thinking that it's at full
 capacity. I've been able to reproduce a couple cases in which this happens
 but there might be more:
 - when the proxy takes too long to post their response to `/answer`
 - when the answer is sent to the broker, but the client never opens a
 datachannel

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31163 [Core Tor/Tor]: A flag to use hostname than IP as relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31163: A flag to use hostname than IP as relay
--+--
 Reporter:  cyberbot  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 There is already a large number of relays/bridges on dynamic ips. Mostly
 dynamic relays you can find here:

 http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/rs.html#search/snap

 So this relays appear to be offline until the new descriptor with changed
 {{{
 Address
 }}}
  is voted from consensus. Which can take some ours for even stable alive
 relays.

 Many providers nowadays sadly do still force new IP per 24h.


 Well actually this DNS checks are for exit only. If a relay have broken
 DNSconfig it could fail path-selection for Hostname in
 {{{
 Address
 }}}
 extending.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use external JSocksAndroid dependency

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31045: Use external JSocksAndroid dependency
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31042| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907 => TorBrowserTeam201907R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31183 [Core Tor/Tor]: Situational symlink attacks on ControlPortWriteToFile etc.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31183: Situational symlink attacks on ControlPortWriteToFile etc.
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  hackerone bug-bounty security
 Severity:  Normal   |  041-should?
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Here is a bug report from paldium on hackerone. It's basically a very
 situational and restricted local priviledge escalation against certain
 setups and threat models:

 {{{
 # Summary

 It is possible to change permissions of files through tor or
 gain write access to newly created ones. The target file can be
 chosen by a local attacker if an adjusted configuration is used.

 #How to reproduce

 - Given is a FreeBSD or Mac OS X system.
 - Tor is configured with a torrc file containing this line:
 ControlPortWriteToFile /tmp/control.txt
 - Optionally (race condition) this line is included as well:
 ControlPortFileGroupReadable 1
 - /tmp is a directory with sticky bit, i.e. trwxrwxrwx

 ##or

 - Given is a Unix-like (Linux) system.
 - Tor is configured with a torrc file containing this line:
 ControlPortWriteToFile /tmp/proof/control.txt
 - Optionally (race condition) this line is included as well:
 ControlPortFileGroupReadable 1
 - /tmp/proof is writable by the local attacker

 When tor starts, then it will eventually write all available control
 ports into file configured by "ControlPortWriteToFile". This file is not
 written directly into, but a temporary file is used (the extension
 ".tmp" is added to file name). If this file already exists, then it is
 simply truncated.

 See src/lib/fs/files.c start_writing_to_file for details, especially
 line 321 and following.

 The problem is that an attacker can simply create the temporary file
 before tor gets the chance to. On Mac this attack works by default
 against /tmp, but Linux has a protection against symlink attacks on
 directories with sticky bit like /tmp or /var/tmp. Therefore it takes an
 unusual configuration on Linux or a different (regular) directory.

 Let the attacker create a file which tor, even with dropped privileges,
 can write to:

 `attacker$ install -m 666 /dev/null /tmp/control.txt.tmp`

 The tor process will use this file without adjusting the permissions,
 because O_CREAT was not actually performed. Instead, O_TRUNC simply
 truncated the file to remove existing content.

 Afterwards tor will write content to this file, which the attacker could
 simply override at this point. But there is no real need to, because
 the target file will still keep the permissions of this temporary file
 after rename.

 See src/lib/fs/files.c replace_file for details. Basically it's a
 simple rename() call which therefore removes the target inode and
 renames the temporary file to the target one (in this setup).


 At this point, the first attack is finished. The file /tmp/control.txt
 is under control of the attacker. If "ControlPortFileGroupReadable 1"
 is not given, this exploit code works on Linux systems as well (you
 can skip the proof/ part on Mac due to lack of /tmp protection):

 ```In torrc: ControlPortWriteToFile /tmp/proof/control.txt
 attacker$ install -Dm 666 /dev/null /tmp/proof/control.txt.tmp
 root$ tor -f torrc
 attacker$ ls -l /tmp/proof/control.txt
 -rw-rw-rw- 1 attacker  attacker0 Jun 24 22:59
 /tmp/proof/control.txt```


 ##Second attack

 The second attack uses a race condition. Because /tmp/control.txt is
 under control of the attacker, the file can be deleted and replaced with
 a symbolic link to a target which we want to get group read permissions
 for. This is a possible scenario if "ControlPortFileGroupReadable 1" is
 given.

 In this case, chmod() is called in tor process. See
 src/feature/control/control.c control_ports_write_to_file for more
 details, especially line 149 for more details (chmod).

 The system call chmod() uses a file path as an argument. There is no
 guarantee that the file path still refers to the file which has been
 created by the tor process. Furthermore, chmod() follows symbolic
 links, therefore the referenced target file is adjusted by chmod.

 This is obviously a race condition but can be used to gain read access
 to files which -- even by configuration -- should be private to the
 tor user.

 The attacker still needs group-read permissions, otherwise the newly
 revealed files still cannot be accessed.

 ##Example

 `tor just renamed controlled /tmp/control.txt.tmp to /tmp/control.txt`
 `attacker$ rm /tmp/control.txt`
 `attacker$ ln -s /var/lib/tor /tmp/control.txt`
 `tor calls chmod on /tmp/control.txt and therefore on /var/lib/tor`
 The attacker, if part of tor's 

Re: [tor-bugs] #31045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use external JSocksAndroid dependency

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31045: Use external JSocksAndroid dependency
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31042| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `TorBrowserTeam201907R`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Android toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30324: Adapt Android toolchain for Firefox 68 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201907   |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 The latest work is on branch 0717. This build depends on my branch of tor-
 android-service, rather than the one at torproject.

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-build/commits/0717

 I just did a rebase with latest from master and their were some conflicts.
 I fixed those but now need to do a clean build to make sure everything is
 still working. I'll mark this for review once I verify the build sometime
 today.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31180: Remove deprecated options in 0.4.3.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We have accumulated a handful of deprecated options; Teor intends to
 remove (some of?) them in 0.4.3.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31182 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add more typesafe containers to tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31182: Add more typesafe containers to tor
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 As we migrate slowly towards Rust, we'll want a solution that lets us move
 to type-safe containers like vec and hashmap.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31181 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate more options in 0.4.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31181: Deprecate more options in 0.4.3
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 In 0.4.3, we should look for more options that nobody uses (or nobody
 _should_ use) and deprecate them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31179 [Core Tor/Tor]: Eliminate non tor_queue.h linked lists.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31179: Eliminate non tor_queue.h linked lists.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We should use tor_queue.h in place of anywhere that we currently manually
 manage a next and prev.  (This may be a duplicate.)

 We are planning to only do a couple of these for S31, though we might do
 more, time permitting.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Scripts to help with backport branches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31178: Scripts to help with backport branches
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Teor mentioned wanting to create a helper script for use when backporting
 branches to older versions of Tor.  It would behave like "merge-forward",
 but instead create a set of candidate branches -- and maybe pull requests
 for those branches too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31177 [Core Tor/Tor]: Start conversation about auto-formatting our C code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31177: Start conversation about auto-formatting our C code
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 With #29226 we want to automate our C formatting.  But to do so, we will
 need to come to agreement about our style, and for that, we should start
 the discussion well in advance.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach practracker to apply separate rules for C headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31175: Teach practracker to apply separate rules for C headers
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29746| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31176 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach practracker about .may_include files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31176: Teach practracker about .may_include files
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:   | Status:  assigned
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,
 Severity:  Normal   |  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #29746
   Points:  1.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 We would like to introduce a second category of .may_include rules: those
 that should only apply on an advisory basis.  We would treat violations of
 these rules as a best practices violation rather than an error.  It would
 allow us to start ratcheting down the number of layering violations.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach practracker to apply separate rules for C headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31175: Teach practracker to apply separate rules for C headers
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29746
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We might want to impose stricter limits for length and includes on header
 files than we do on C files.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use external JSocksAndroid dependency

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31045: Use external JSocksAndroid dependency
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31042| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201906 => TorBrowserTeam201907
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 On branch 0716

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-android-
 service/commit/4471410b742ddf771b401bfb8b1d2c10a4e884e3

 This removes jsocks from project and replaces it with the prebuilt one
 from pluggabletransports project.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28942 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Evaluate pion WebRTC

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28942: Evaluate pion WebRTC
-+---
 Reporter:  backkem  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ex-sponsor-19|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:34 cohosh]:
 > I'm going to deploy a proxy-go instance built with pion/webrtc and try
 running a client with pion/webrtc and see how it goes.

 I've started a new proxy-go instance on snowflake.bamsoftware.com named
 `pion-proxy` which runs a pion library version of the proxy-go instance
 located in `/usr/local/bin/pion-proxy-go`. Logs are available in `/home
 /snowflake-proxy/pion-proxy.d`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31174 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: lock account usura

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31174: lock account usura
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The account was created early in 2016 so that usura could access our
 dirauth git.  However, he never submitted any ssh key to the ldap, so the
 account is unused.  Lock it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31174 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: lock account usura

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31174: lock account usura
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31173 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31173: Update android-toolchain project to match firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201907
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #30324
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This includes ndk 17 and android build tools 27.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31172 [Metrics/Library]: Tests fail on Debian buster on jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31172: Tests fail on Debian buster on jenkins
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by weasel:

Old description:

> We will want to move metrics services to the new Debian stable, but
> currently metrics-lib does not pass tests on the new release.
>
> https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/metrics-lib-master/116/console

New description:

 We will want to move metrics services to the new Debian stable, but
 currently metrics-lib does not pass tests on the new release.

 https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/metrics-lib-
 master/ARCHITECTURE=amd64,SUITE=buster/1/console

--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31172 [Metrics/Library]: Tests fail on Debian buster on jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31172: Tests fail on Debian buster on jenkins
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 We will want to move metrics services to the new Debian stable, but
 currently metrics-lib does not pass tests on the new release.

 https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/metrics-lib-master/116/console

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31154 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Ideas for hosting Tor Snowflake bridges with changing residential IP addresses?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31154: Ideas for hosting Tor Snowflake bridges with changing residential IP
addresses?
-+---
 Reporter:  subscriptionblocker  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 cohosh]:
 > He's talking about snowflake proxies and not the hardcoded bridge, he's
 looking for
 >
 > > Ideas for hosting Tor Snowflake proxies with changing residential IP
 addresses?
 In that case, it should just work out of the box for snowflake proxies to
 be run on machines with dynamic IP addresses. The ICE candidate gathering
 happens each time a proxy receives a client offer, and so if the proxy's
 IP address has changed since the last time their local candidates should
 match the new IP without any changes on our side.

 I'm going to wait a few days to hear back from subscriptionblocker before
 closing the ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #31171 [Applications]: GTK user settings overwritten by TOR-browser's File-Chooser Dialog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31171: GTK user settings overwritten by TOR-browser's File-Chooser Dialog
-+--
 Reporter:  schappi  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 I got the issue that whenever I saved a file from the TOR browser, my gtk-
 setting to sort folders before files got changed by the file-chooser
 dialog. This globally affects apps like nautilus as well.

 Actually, the file-chooser seems to ignore the current settings in
 "org/gtk/settings/file-chooser/sort-directories-first" and uses some
 defaults. However, the settings are written-back to the global config,
 thus probably causing the issue.

 Would be good to load settings in the file-chooser dialog in advance or
 discard writing later.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30836 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: Build debs for tor's 0.4.1 branch, and stop building tor's 0.3.4 and 0.3.3 branches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30836: Build debs for tor's 0.4.1 branch, and stop building tor's 0.3.4 and 
0.3.3
branches
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  041-should   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30835   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 fixed as part of #30824

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs