Re: [tor-bugs] #31324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31324: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 I actually tend to agree with cypherpunks here.  I don't think it's
 something we should work on in the short - or even medium term - BUT...

 Mozilla had vaguely discussed the idea of building in roughtime in the
 browser, but then we were stymied on what we would actually *use* it for.
 We thought we could use it for showing an accurate "Your clock is set
 wrong and that may be why you're getting cert errors" error page. But we
 were afraid of using it for anything else - like cert validation or
 Javascript - because people do actually rely on setting their system clock
 back or forward to test cert things or (more commonly) to cheat at online
 Javascript games.

 But I don't think those things would preclude Tor Browser from doing the
 safer thing and a) getting an accurate clock from  and b) using
 it for everything. Under the guise of a) preventing NTP attacks and b)
 preventing fingerprinting based on clock skew.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31324: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 >  do you have a repro?

 I created a test website here https://madaidan.github.io/

 > I suspect we can reasonably assume our users have a working clock.

 It is not uncommon for people to have clocks off by a few minutes or
 seconds even with some form of time sync.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I don't believe a null address will count as internal, but I removed the
 check because in `tor_addr_is_internal_()` at the end of the function on a
 null family (or any non-IPv4/IPv6):

 {{{
   /* unknown address family... assume it's not safe for external use */
   /* rather than tor_assert(0) */
   log_warn(LD_BUG, "tor_addr_is_internal() called from %s:%d with a "
"non-IP address of type %d", filename, lineno, (int)v_family);
   tor_fragile_assert();
   return 1;
 }}}

 So (I guess) it would report as internal anyways.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31323 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add sponsor 44 to trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31323: Add sponsor 44 to trac
--+
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I added

  * Sponsor44
  * Sponsor44-can
  * Sponsor44-must

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28526 [Community/Tor Support]: Document how NGOs can run private obfs4 bridges, and get some doing it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28526: Document how NGOs can run private obfs4 bridges, and get some doing it
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, education, documentation,   |  Actual Points:
  ex-sponsor-19  |
Parent ID:  #31281   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * parent:   => #31281


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31300 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31300: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 I think it looks better (see `patch2.png`). Good enough for the nightly
 for sure :)

 In any case, as you said we can refine later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31300 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31300: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * Attachment "patch2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31324: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 I suspect we can reasonably assume our users have a working clock. Using a
 'random' time (or an unchanging time) will almost certainly break websites
 in fun and interesting ways.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31324: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Replying to [comment:1 pospeselr]:
 > in the browser console:
 >
 > {{{
 > new Date()
 > Date 2019-08-02T17:58:19.300Z // current UTC
 > }}}
 >
 > do you have a repro?

 This isn't about timezone, it's about exposing the time of your system. If
 your clock is off, that offset is potentially unique.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31324: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 in the browser console:

 {{{
 new Date()
 Date 2019-08-02T17:58:19.300Z // current UTC
 }}}

 do you have a repro?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31320 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrc.minimal.in-staging and torrc.sample.in files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31320: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrc.minimal.in-staging and
torrc.sample.in files
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by aliraheem):

 How's this? Also mention the gotchya that you must listen on ipv4

 Using information from
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/IPv6RelayHowto

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31320 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrc.minimal.in-staging and torrc.sample.in files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31320: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrc.minimal.in-staging and
torrc.sample.in files
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by aliraheem):

 * Attachment "0001-Add-IPv6-ORPort-examples.patch" added.

 Diff patch to deal with ticket

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29296 [Circumvention/Pluggable transport]: Look into alternatives for distributing bridge info to clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29296: Look into alternatives for distributing bridge info to clients
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Pluggable transport|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  PT, spec, design, anti-censorship-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-december   |
Parent ID:  #29285   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  PT, spec, design, anti-censorship-roadmap => PT, spec, design,
 anti-censorship-roadmap-december


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31153 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31153: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package
+--
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  project | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor30-can
+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-october => anti-censorship-roadmap-
 august


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31153 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31153: Create a "tor-bridge" Debian meta package
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  project  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-october  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap => anti-censorship-roadmap-october


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30880 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: document backup/restore procedures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30880: document backup/restore procedures
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i dumped some stuff in https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/backup/ after
 doing some tests.

 notable stuff missing:

  * postgres backup setup
  * postgres restore procedure
  * disaster recovery procedure (baremetal recovery)
  * anything else?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26847 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0, noscript pops up a full-browser-size window to warn me about x-site scripting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26847: Tor Browser 8.0, noscript pops up a full-browser-size window to warn me
about x-site scripting
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  noscript, tbb-usability|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 https://github.com/hackademix/noscript/releases/tag/11.0.3rc2

 {{{

 v 11.0.3rc2
 =
 x [Tor] Work-around for prompts being huge when
   resistFingerprinting is enabled
 x [XSS] Fixed false positives due to overzealous HTML
   attribute checking
 x [XSS] Enabled InjectionChecker logging when debugging mode
   is on
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #31325 [Webpages/Website]: Update Sponsors page with "Digital Impact Alliance" entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31325: Update Sponsors page with "Digital Impact Alliance" entry
--+--
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Please add "Digital Impact Alliance" to the sponsors list here
 ​https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors/

 Logo should come from this page: ​https://digitalimpactalliance.org/
 There's a logo on the bottom left of the page.

 Link should point to https://digitalimpactalliance.org/

 For the description, please use this text:
 The Digital Impact Alliance (DIAL) advances digital inclusion to achieve
 the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), so that all women, men and
 children can benefit from life-enhancing, mobile-based digital services.
 DIAL is supporting a project to complete a successful ESR transition for
 Tor Browser to we ensure stability, security, and usability of this core
 privacy technology on both desktop and mobile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30564 [Webpages/Website]: Remove Rose Foundation From Sponsors Page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30564: Remove Rose Foundation From Sponsors Page
--+
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30564 [Webpages/Website]: Remove Rose Foundation From Sponsors Page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30564: Remove Rose Foundation From Sponsors Page
--+--
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pili):

 This is done now :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31249 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: RT account creation to ggus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31249: RT account creation to ggus
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 cool thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31248 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: RT audit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31248: RT audit
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 admins:

 * anarcat
 * pili
 * weasel

 users:

 {{{
 PariParinishtha Yadav
 anarcat
 armaRoger Dingledine
 boklm   Nicolas Vigier
 cy63113 Cybelle
 flexlibris  Alison Macrina
 gaba
 ggusGus
 isabela Isabela
 jason   mk
 jon Jon Selon
 juris   Juris Vetra
 karsten Karsten Loesing
 kateKate Krauss
 katherine   Katherine Bergeron
 katina  Katina
 lunar   Lunar
 nimaNima
 noelNoel David Torres Taño
 phoul   Colin Childs
 phw
 piliPili Guerra
 rootEnoch Root
 shari   Shari Steele
 sstevenson  Sarah Stevenson
 stephw  Stephanie Whited
 steven  Steven Haig
 susan   Susan Abt
 t0mmy   Tommy Collison
 vmonسعید
 wayward Andie E.
 weasel  Peter Palfrader
 xigua9  David S.
 }}}

 Then queue allocation is more complicated... It's group-based, and some
 queues are accessed by some groups, and some by none (in which case
 they're visible only to admins, i think). There are a bunch of groups:

 {{{
 Anti Censorship Group to deal with Bridge queries and other
 censorship circumvention strategies
 Arabic support
 Berlin  Berlin dev meeting queue
 English support
 Farsi support
 French support
 Mandarin support
 Privileged support  Support assistants who can interact with all
 queues
 Spanish support
 donations   Group for people on donations@
 execdir Group for people on execdir@
 office  Group for people on office@
 press   Group for people on press@
 rtadm   rt admin
 }}}

 Most of those match the queues, so I'll spare myself further investigation
 for now, but let me know if you need more information.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31249 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: RT account creation to ggus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31249: RT account creation to ggus
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pili):

 I actually created this account already :) I think this can be closed now

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31248 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: RT audit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31248: RT audit
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31249 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: RT account creation to ggus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31249: RT account creation to ggus
-+-
 Reporter:  ggus |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 > I decided to remove the is_null check and pushed it also.

 What is the reason for not checking for null addresses?  Will a null
 address count as internal?  Do we want it to?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30279 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Test IPv6-only v3 onion services in Chutney's CI, once homebrew tor stable supports them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30279: Test IPv6-only v3 onion services in Chutney's CI, once homebrew tor 
stable
supports them
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  merge-after-041-stable-in-homebrew,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  tor-hs, ipv6, single-onion, fast-fix,  |
  chutney-ci, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,|
  041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 We could revisit this once we merge #30827 and add 041-nightly to
 Chutney's travis.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30826 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney travis: remove 0.3.4, add 0.4.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30826: Chutney travis: remove 0.3.4, add 0.4.1
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-deferred-20190719  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30835 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Right, that seems reasonable.

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[tor-bugs] #31324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31324: Spoof the Tor Browser time displayed to websites
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Javascript can be used to get the system time of a user. This allows for
 fingerprinting via different clock offsets and skews. This also may allow
 websites to determine the user's location by seeing which country has the
 same time as the user.

 Currently, the Tor Browser spoofs the timezone displayed to websites to
 UTC but this doesn't spoof the actual system time which can still be
 gotten with `new Date()`.

 The Tor Browser should spoof the time shown to websites so all Tor Browser
 users have the same time or a random time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31300 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31300: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908 =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908R


Comment:

 Here is a revised patch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug31300-02=1af54380f289426fea9dfa24c4fd6cf171046723

 The only difference is that we replaced the groupbox background-color
 style with a 1px GrayText border. Alex, it would be great if you could
 test this on your Linux system to see how it looks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30987 [Core Tor/Tor]: [PATCH] Add support for seccomp on powerpc64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30987: [PATCH] Add support for seccomp on powerpc64
+
 Reporter:  shawnanastasio  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 This needs somebody to try building and running with it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31305 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add more useful logging to fallback scripts variable config

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31305: Add more useful logging to fallback scripts variable config
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 043-should   |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #30971 | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks plausible to me.  Let's merge it and see if we want to iterate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30942 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30942: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-padding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Should this be an 041 backport, or is it okayto have it in 0.4.2 only?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29217 [Core Tor/Tor]: Script to add new tor files and modules in rust and/or C

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29217: Script to add new tor files and modules in rust and/or C
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor31-can
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Right; add_c_file.py is only a partial implementation of this feature.  We
 also need a way to add new modules, a way to add headers only, a way to
 add rust modules, and more.

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[tor-bugs] #31323 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add sponsor 44 to trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31323: Add sponsor 44 to trac
--+-
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Hi,

 Can someone please add sponsor 44 to trac:

 - sponsor44

 Thanks!

 Pili

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30126 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30126: Make Tor Browser on macOS compatible with Apple's notarization
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201907  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:28 gk]:
 > I suspect you get the same problem with the build 2 in comment:17?

 Yes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31300 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31300: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908R =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > In ESR60, OS styling was used for groupbox. Kathy and I did not realize
 that it is so different on Linux vs. macOS vs. Windows... we just did
 something that is similar to the older macOS look. It looks like on Linux
 there was no styling to "set off" the groupbox contents, while macOS had a
 darkened background, and Windows 10 had a gray line around the contents. I
 like the shading/darkened background but we can revisit this later once
 more people can look at it, e.g., in a nightly build.

 I take back some of what I said. I just looked at your patch.png screnshot
 and it is not pretty.  Maybe we can replace the background color with a
 simple line border that matches the text color. But if we cannot figure
 out how to do that, we will just remove the shading and not replace it
 with anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30566 [Webpages/Website]: Update Sponsors page with "Craig Newmark Philanthropies" entry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30566: Update Sponsors page with "Craig Newmark Philanthropies" entry
--+--
 Reporter:  bekeela   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * cc: antonela (added)


Comment:

 @antonela, I need a website compatible logo for this... I tried to add
 this in staging and it doesn't look good: https://lektor-
 staging.torproject.org/tpo/staging/about/sponsors/

 You can download the logo here:
 https://craignewmarkphilanthropies.org/assets/Logos/dabbf7f058/logos.zip

 Otherwise, commit to add sponsor is here:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/tpo.git/commit/?h=staging=a94f9d81bd7f67fa09c74ba951115cec495a3e9b

 You can send me the new file and I'll replace it there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31300 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31300: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:6 acat]:
 > I also tested the `Request bridge` option (had to add bridges to the
 prefs, otherwise the section does not appear). It fails with `Tor
 unexpectedly closed` for me, but it might be an issue that will not
 reproduce with a properly built nightly, so I'm not sure (I copied the
 esr68 Firefox built files over a release tor-browser folder).

 I forgot to mention that moat (aka "Request a bridge") is currently broken
 due to meek-client-torbrowser's use of an XPCOM extension. Our plan to
 avoid that problem is #29430, although there is also #29347. I added
 keywords to #29430.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29430 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29430: Use uTLS for meek TLS camouflage in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, utls, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  meek, utls, TorBrowserTeam201907 => meek, utls, ff68-esr,
 tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908


Comment:

 Since things are broken in an ESR68-based Tor Browser without this (or
 #29430), I added our ff68-esr and tbb-9.0-must-nightly keywords to this
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31300 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31300: Modify Tor Launcher so it is compatible with ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:5 acat]:
 > Mostly looks good and works fine for me.
 >
 > One small question I have regarding the added css:
 >
 > {{{
 > +groupbox {
 > +  margin-left: 16px;
 > +  padding: 8px;
 > +  background-color: rgba(215, 215, 219, 0.5);
 > }}}
 >
 > Where does the `background-color` come from? I checked in my machine
 with current tor-launcher, and I don't see any background-color difference
 with the background, but after this patch I do (see screenshots).

 In ESR60, OS styling was used for groupbox. Kathy and I did not realize
 that it is so different on Linux vs. macOS vs. Windows... we just did
 something that is similar to the older macOS look. It looks like on Linux
 there was no styling to "set off" the groupbox contents, while macOS had a
 darkened background, and Windows 10 has a gray line around the contents. I
 like the shading/darkened background but we can revisit this later once
 more people can look at it, e.g., in a nightly build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-nightly,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:22 acat]:
 > I realized that the changes for the security slider translations
 deduplication got accidentally lost when moving from 30429+2 to 30429+3.
 But maybe we should actually keep it this way and do the full change in
 #24653 (in tor-browser and torbutton).

 Yes, that's a good idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26847 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0, noscript pops up a full-browser-size window to warn me about x-site scripting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26847: Tor Browser 8.0, noscript pops up a full-browser-size window to warn me
about x-site scripting
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  noscript, tbb-usability|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:9 ma1]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 mikeperry]:
 > > Hrmm, this situation does not seem to have improved. Doubleclick is
 encoding URLs in like all of its ad query params (probably because of the
 referer field not being present for https fetches), and this is getting
 triggered multiple times all over the place.
 >
 > Could you please provide me with some URLs to test for false positives?
 {{{
 NoScript detected a potential Cross-Site Scripting attack

 from https://5756926.fls.doubleclick.net to https://adservice.google.com.

 Suspicious data:
 
https://adservice.google.com/ddm/fls/i/src=5756926;type=emark0;cat=remar0;ord=1;num=3897397787192;gtm=2wg7o0;auiddc=227660113.1564751486;u1=https://www.arla.se/recept/kladdkaka/;_dc_1=1;~oref=https://www.interesting.website.com
 }}}
 (I changed the website name but I assume that should not be a problem)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31316 [Applications/Tor Browser]: macOS 10.15 crash on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31316: macOS 10.15 crash on startup
--+--
 Reporter:  mprogers  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 That's https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1570451 and likely an
 Apple bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31320 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrc.minimal.in-staging and torrc.sample.in files (was: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrcminimal.in-staging and torrc-sam

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31320: Add an IPv6 ORPort example to the torrc.minimal.in-staging and
torrc.sample.in files
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, doc, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30538: Unable to comment on The Independent Newspaper
--+--
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mwolfe):

 * Attachment "independenterrorlog.zip" added.

 partial error log when I try to log in to comment on Independent

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26847 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0, noscript pops up a full-browser-size window to warn me about x-site scripting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26847: Tor Browser 8.0, noscript pops up a full-browser-size window to warn me
about x-site scripting
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  noscript, tbb-usability|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:7 mikeperry]:
 > Hrmm, this situation does not seem to have improved. Doubleclick is
 encoding URLs in like all of its ad query params (probably because of the
 referer field not being present for https fetches), and this is getting
 triggered multiple times all over the place.

 Could you please provide me with some URLs to test for false positives?
 I'd very much want to remove them, but  unfortuntaley, "regular" NoScript
 users (not on the Tor Browser at Medium security settings) are unlikely to
 see and report those because doubleclick is blocked by default (pre-XSS
 filter) and/or adblocked. Is there any reason for the Tor Browser not
 blocking the major tracking / advertising offenders across all its user
 base?

 Beside tackling false positives, a strategy I'm willing to experiment with
 is replacing XSS warning popups with something less obtrusive and
 workflow-interrupting: **what about an in-content placeholder, very much
 like the click-to-play one**?

 Regarding the performance issues, I've already made the filter
 asynchronous in the WebExtensions process, which shouldn't block the UI
 and content processes but unfortunately doesn't help much with mono-core
 processors (poor Intel Atom). I'm not sure WebAssembly would be useful
 either, since most of the CPU time is spent on regular expressions
 matching, but having real-world cases reported would help optimizing
 possibly inefficient ones.

 Thank you all for the cooperation.

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[tor-bugs] #31322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix about:tor assertion failure in esr68 linux debug builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31322: Fix about:tor assertion failure in esr68 linux debug builds
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I found this assertion failure when testing #30429 in linux, debug build.
 It happens when loading `about:tor`:

 `Assertion failure: foundDefaultSrc (about: page must contain a CSP
 including default-src), at /home/user/tor/tor-
 browser/dom/base/Document.cpp:5179`

 We should investigate this, but not sure if it's `tbb-9.0-must-nightly`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10760 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10760: Integrate TorButton to TorBrowser core to prevent users from disabling 
it
-+-
 Reporter:  Rezonansowy  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-parity, ux-team,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201907,   |
  tbb-9.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 > Removing `example A` etc. makes me a bit nervous. It got introduced in
 #15086 back then. I am not sure whether that part has been essential on
 solving the RTL issues but we should double-check that we don't have weird
 regressions, in particular as all the other code surrounding the ``
 elements, like styling is left untouched.
 I tested with current torbutton extension and tor-browser, removing
 example A, B... does not break the RTL with farsi.


 >Yes, regarding your first and second question. I think there is no need
 for a translation repo patch. Just do the patch in Torbutton and it will
 propagate once someone commits the changes to master. The patch could be
 in #24653 which could be on top of the general #10760 patch for review. We
 can squash that one in a later rebasing then if we think that's useful.
 (If you go that route please make #24653 a child bug of this ticket so we
 don't lose track here)
 Ok, tracking this in #24653.

 mcs mentioned there are asserts when building the browser with debugging
 enabled, and these are caused by torbutton, because some `QueryInterface:
 ChromeUtils.generateQI` have nsISupports in it. I removed these in
 https://www.github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commit/10760+1 and verified
 that the asserts disappear. These changes were already present in #28745,
 but perhaps it's worth also having these here for the nightly.

 Apart from this, is anything else needed here, or we are good?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider rate-limiting INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
-+-
 Reporter:  special  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, tor-hs, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-july   |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good to me!

 Unfortunately, I think this is gonna need some revision because of the
 latest practracker changes that caused conflicts. Marking as
 needs_revision, and feel free to put to merge_ready after this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30942 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30942: [warn] Unexpected INTRODUCE_ACK on circuit 3944288021.
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-padding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 dgoulet]:
 > Nice!
 >
 > One LAST tiny thing: `handle_relay_command()`, maybe reflect that it is
 actually handling a relay cell so like `handle_relay_cell_command()`? In
 terms of semantic would be good in the code to pin in the name that the
 function is handling a cell as in taking a cell.
 >
 > Agree or not, feel free to put in `merge_ready` after :).

 Done and pushed a new PR because there were conflicts with master due to
 the recent practracker improvements:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1197

 Moving to merge_ready as requested.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30376 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Rust 1.34 for Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30376: Use Rust 1.34 for Tor Browser 9
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201908R,  |
  tbb-9.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201907, tbb-9.0
 -must-nightly
 =>
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201908R, tbb-9.0
 -must-nightly
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I am proposing the following fixup commit, to squash on top of
 f37ade326575511a6c9f63c4580ae70128d0c98d from branch `gk/linux_esr68_v7`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_30376=fe2d155eff5fcc2340e97fe80f14ea8981ae6b8a

 This cleans up the things we did to support building multiple versions of
 rust, and rebase the `unwind.patch` patch onto the new rust version
 (although I did not check that the Windows build actually works).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30736 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30736: Make sure we have Yasm >= 1.2.0 available on Linux 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R, tbb-9.0-must-nightly|
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201907, tbb-9.0-must-nightly
 => tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201908R, tbb-9.0-must-nightly
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_30736`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_30736=0a8ab5b289753683cf9a5bfae3bd6e24b463eeb1

 This replaces commit 7cc6689388205a04900d4eee49aceb77fb708e52 from branch
 `gk/linux_esr68_v7`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-nightly,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 I realized that the changes for the security slider translations
 deduplication got accidentally lost when moving from 30429+2 to 30429+3.
 But maybe we should actually keep it this way and do the full change in
 #24653 (in tor-browser and torbutton).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24653 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24653: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  security-slider, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * parent:   => #10760


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[tor-bugs] #31321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add cc -> gcc link to projects/gcc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31321: Add cc -> gcc link to projects/gcc
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There are a few places where we add a `cc -> gcc` symbolic link:
 {{{
 projects/clang/build:  ln -s gcc /var/tmp/dist/gcc/bin/cc
 projects/firefox/build:  ln -s gcc /var/tmp/dist/gcc/bin/cc
 projects/llvm/build:  ln -s gcc /var/tmp/dist/gcc/bin/cc
 projects/nasm/build:  ln -s gcc /var/tmp/dist/gcc/bin/cc
 projects/node/build:  ln -s gcc /var/tmp/dist/gcc/bin/cc
 }}}

 Instead of creating this link in each project where it is needed, maybe we
 could create it only one time, during the build of gcc in
 `projects/gcc/build`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30701 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add nodejs project for building Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30701: Add nodejs project for building Firefox 68 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201908R,  |
  tbb-9.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201907, tbb-9.0
 -must-nightly
 =>
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201908R, tbb-9.0
 -must-nightly
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The commit 664e1cd0c7a4bc018cbfedd2e0835bfcd40b2f5f from branch
 `gk/linux_esr68_v7` looks good to me. I cherry-picked it to master as
 commit 2a34a082c587eb21e5880406a5fd6ac8c8425234.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24653 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24653: Apply security slider improvements made on desktop back to mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-torbutton, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  security-slider, tbb-parity|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I'm trying to merge the `securityLevel.properties` file into
 `torbutton.dtd`, and fixing the string duplication there. However, it
 seems that due to this string duplication there are some conflicts
 already. AFAIK for all these cases the translations should be exactly the
 same. I'm not sure what is the best way to proceed here, but these are the
 conflicts (after running `import-translations.sh` script):

 {{{
 ar
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  الصوت والفيديو (HTML5 media), و WebGL هي انقر للتشغيل
  الصوت والفيديو يحتاج للنقر لتشغيله.

 ar
  torbutton.prefs.sec_learn_more_label
  securityLevel.learnMore
  تعرّف على المزيد
  تعرف على المزيد

 bn-BD
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safer.description3
  অডিও ও ভিডিও (এইচটিএমএল৫ মিডিয়া) এবং ওয়েবজিএলসমুহ ক্লিক করে সচল করুন
  অডিও ও ভিডিও (এইচটিএমএল5 মিডিয়া) এবং ওয়েবজিএলসমুহ ক্লিক করে সচল করুন

 bn-BD
  torbutton.prefs.sec_safest_label
  securityLevel.safest.level
  নিরাপদ
  সবচে’ নিরাপদ

 bn-BD
  torbutton.prefs.sec_js_disabled
  securityLevel.safest.description1
  জাভাস্ক্রিপ্ট সব সাইটে ডিফল্ট দ্বারা নিষ্ক্রিয় করা হয়।
  স্বয়ংক্রিয়ভাবে সকল সাইটে জাভাস্ক্রিপ্ট নিষ্ক্রিয়কৃত।

 bn-BD
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  অডিও ও ভিডিও (এইচটিএমএল৫ মিডিয়া) এবং ওয়েবজিএলসমুহ ক্লিক করে সচল করুন
  অডিও এবং ভিডিও (HTML5 মিডিয়া) ক্লিক-টু-খেলা।

 ca
  torbutton.prefs.sec_safer_label
  securityLevel.safer.level
  Més segur.
  Més segur

 ca
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  L'àudio, el vídeo (mitjans de comunicació HTML5) i WebGL són click-to-
 play.
  L'àudio i el vídeo (mitjans de comunicació HTML5) són click-to-play.

 ca
  torbutton.prefs.sec_learn_more_label
  securityLevel.learnMore
  Apreneu-ne més
  Aprèn més

 cs
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Audio, video (HTML5 média) a WebGL se přehrávají po kliknutí.
  Audio a video (HTML5 média) se přehrávají po kliknutí.

 da
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Lyd og video (HTML5-medier) og WebGL er klik-for-at-afspille.
  Lyd og video (HTML5-medier) er klik-for-at-afspille.

 de
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Ton und Bild (HTML5-Medien) und WebGL sind Click-to-Play.
  Audio und Video (HTML5-Medien) müssen zur Wiedergabe angeklickt werden.

 el
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Audio and video (HTML5 media), and WebGL are click-to-play.
  Οι ήχοι και τα βίντεο (μέσα HTML5) παίζουν, αφού γίνει κλικ για
 αναπαραγωγή.

 el
  torbutton.prefs.sec_learn_more_label
  securityLevel.learnMore
  Μάθετε περισσότερα
  Μάθε περισσότερα

 es-AR
  torbutton.prefs.sec_caption
  securityLevel.securityLevel
  Nivel de seguridad
  Nivel de Seguridad

 es-AR
  torbutton.prefs.sec_safest_label
  securityLevel.safest.level
  En extremo seguro
  El más seguro

 es-AR
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Audio and video (HTML5 media), and WebGL are click-to-play.
  Audio y video (medios HTML5) son cliquear-para-reproducir.

 es-AR
  torbutton.prefs.sec_learn_more_label
  securityLevel.learnMore
  Más informacion
  Aprendé más

 es-ES
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Audio y vídeo (HTML5 media), y WebGL son click-to-play.
  Audio y vídeo (media HTML5) son de tipo pulsar-para-reproducir.

 eu
  torbutton.prefs.sec_click_to_play_media
  securityLevel.safest.description3
  Audioa eta bideoa (HTML5 media), eta WebGL erreproduzitzeko klikatu behar
 da.
  Audio and video (HTML5 media) are click-to-play.

 fa
  torbutton.prefs.sec_safer_label
  securityLevel.safer.level
  ایمن تر
  ایمن تر

 fa
  torbutton.prefs.sec_safest_label
  securityLevel.safest.level
  ایمن ترین
  ایمن ترین

 fa
  

Re: [tor-bugs] #30734 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add nasm project for building Firefox 68 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30734: Add nasm project for building Firefox 68 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201908R,  |
  tbb-9.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201907, tbb-9.0
 -must-nightly
 =>
 tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, GeorgKoppen201907, TorBrowserTeam201908R, tbb-9.0
 -must-nightly
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The commit from branch `gk/linux_esr68_v7` looks good to me. I cherry
 picked it to master as commit 460d5ef80d2bb7ebf808574d21ec7fe43dd9dd01.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30901 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port trace logging to tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30901: Add control port trace logging to tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci-fail-sometimes network-team-  |  Actual Points:  0.8
  roadmap-august |
Parent ID:  #29437   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision
 * actualpoints:   => 0.8


Comment:

 I have a work in progress branch here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1196

 I also opened #31319 to merge a control-spec log event documentation
 update.

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