Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem
-+---
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+---

Comment (by teor):

 asn / atagar,

 I'm happy to answer questions about certificate validation.

 Here's what we have already:

 Ed25519 certificate validation in stem's certificate.py.
 Here's how to validate a signed hash using python's cryptography module:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/descriptor/certificate.py#n256

 Ed25519 key blinding in tor's unit tests.
 Here's how we blind a key:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/ed25519_exts_ref.py#n34
 We might be able to rewrite that code better if we have access to some low
 level functions in python cryptography.

 There are also some other useful tor unit tests in python:

 HSv3 hash ring indexes:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/hs_indexes.py

 HSv3 addresses:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/hs_build_address.py

 Maybe the HSv3 ntor or plain ntor implementations could also help:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/hs_ntor_ref.py
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/ntor_ref.py
 ntor uses curve25519.

 Let me know what you're missing, and I'll do my best to help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge, dgoulet-merge, consider-  |  Actual Points:  0.4
  backport-after-authority-test, consider-   |
  backport-after-0421-alpha, 040-backport-   |
  maybe, 041-backport-maybe, ipv6, tor-relay,|
  tor-client, tor-dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-dirauth =>
 asn-merge, dgoulet-merge, consider-backport-after-authority-test,
 consider-backport-after-0421-alpha, 040-backport-maybe, 041-backport-
 maybe, ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-dirauth
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:   => 0.4


Comment:

 Ok, looks good to me.

 Neel, let us know if you have any concerns about Nick's extra commits.

 We might decide to backport this change to our supported authority
 releases 0.4.0 and 0.4.1.
 It's a low-risk change that improves code correctness, and relay operator
 feedback when IPv6 is misconfigured.
 But we should make sure we test master on moria1 first.

 This is not a security issue, because authorities can't reach private
 addresses anyway, so the relay will never be in the consensus.
 So it is also ok not to backport it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201908, ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10760  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor44-can
+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Bridge selection dialog, resizable.

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/31286/request-bridge.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201908, ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10760  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor44-can
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "request-bridge.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem
-+---
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+---

Comment (by atagar):

 > I will be working on the crypto parts of all the other tasks

 Wonderful, thanks asn!

 Unsure if it helps but here's where we validate v2 hidden service
 digests...

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/descriptor/hidden_service.py#n311
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/descriptor/__init__.py#n1036

 If it would be easier for you I'm happy to integrate working demos. I can
 easily make code pretty and add tests - I just need a working example of
 doing the crypto. :P

 > Damian, would you be interested in moving forward with (a) if I give you
 a full unencrypted descriptor to play with, while I'm doing the crypto
 parts above?

 Certainly, delighted to!

 > Also would it be possible to split the hidden_service.py file into two
 files (v2 and v3) so that the two codebases are isolated from each other?

 Sure, we can but honestly I don't think it makes much difference either
 way and imports are nicer as this is...

 {{{
 from stem.descriptor.hidden_service_descriptor import (
   HiddenServiceDescriptorV2,
   HiddenServiceDescriptorV3,
 )

 # ^ these lines above would become the following if we split the modle
 #
 #   from stem.descriptor.hidden_service_v2 import
 HiddenServiceDescriptorV2
 #   from stem.descriptor.hidden_service_v3 import
 HiddenServiceDescriptorV3

 print('=' * 80)
 print('Hidden Service v2 example:')
 print('=' * 80)
 print('')

 print(HiddenServiceDescriptorV2.create())

 print('')
 print('=' * 80)
 print('Hidden Service v3 example:')
 print('=' * 80)
 print('')

 print(HiddenServiceDescriptorV3.create())
 }}}

 > I'd also appreciate any hints about how to handle ed25519 certs and
 ed25519 sig verification in stem.

 Sadly I'm pretty green in this area. You already spotted our
 certificate.py's validate() method, and that's about all I know. Sorry. :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed in `pr1182_squashed_v2`, PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1267

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor config validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31241: Refactor config validation
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Summary of design.

 Previously, there were "validate" functions for config objects, most
 notably options_validate().  There was no generic way to call the
 "validate" function for a given config object -- you would just call it
 directly.

 These functions had a horrible signature, since they were allowed to
 modify the configuration object, compare it to an old object, learn
 whether it came from setconf (!), and compare it to its defaults (!).

 So the old process was:
   * Call options_verify.
   * Call options_transition_allowed.

 Now the configuration verification process follows a more strict multi-
 stage process:
   * Call config_validate()
  * For each config_format_t, call config_validate_single():
* Callback to modifications to the configuration object (early,
 pre-validation)
* Callback to validation function (only sees current object, may
 not change it).
* legacy validation callback (whatever we have not moved out of
 options_validate)
* callback to check transition (can see current and previous
 object, may not change them)
* modifications to the configuration object (final, late-
 validation)

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[tor-bugs] #31533 [Applications/GetTor]: Require Twisted 19.7.0 because it fixes CVE-2019-12855 in jabber

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31533: Require Twisted 19.7.0 because it fixes CVE-2019-12855 in jabber
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Does gettor use the jabber protocol?

 If it does, we need to require Twisted 19.7.0 in gettor:
 http://cve.circl.lu/cve/CVE-2019-12855

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[tor-bugs] #31532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31532: Use ptrdiff_t for struct_member_t.offset, etc
---+-
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+-
 We have several fields in our configuration code that use int for a struct
 offset:
   * `struct_member_t.offset`
   * `struct_magic_decl_t.magic_offset`
   * `config_format_t.config_suite_offset`

 These should all use ptrdiff_t instead.

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[tor-bugs] #31531 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31531: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  technical-debt
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+--
 control_event_conf_changed() currently takes smartlist(k, v, k, v, …),
 which is an unexpected API.

 We should change it so the keys and values are part of a config_line_t
 struct, and the smartlist contains config_line_t.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31510 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem install test errors: cached_tor_manual and arm.* image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31510: Stem install test errors: cached_tor_manual and arm.* image
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi teor. Those files were removed long ago and the test does not fail for
 me.

 {{{
 atagar@morrigan:~/Desktop/stem$ ls docs/_static/arm.png
 ls: cannot access 'docs/_static/arm.png': No such file or directory

 atagar@morrigan:~/Desktop/stem$ ls stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg
 ls: cannot access 'stem/cached_tor_manual.cfg': No such file or directory

 atagar@morrigan:~/Desktop/stem$ git log -- docs/_static/arm.png
 commit 479fd0806af780fe5572acd4427b2d4f1e841d1a
 Author: Damian Johnson 
 Date:   Tue Nov 7 09:10:20 2017 -0800

 Rename arm to nyx on the website

 commit 4d89032ba6f7d1c2babd54c593668c8e74b23f98
 Author: Damian Johnson 
 Date:   Sun Mar 10 22:40:11 2013 -0700

 Adding an examples section to our site

 Example sections containing projects and scripts using stem. Presently
 this is
 pretty small - hopefully it'll grow soon!

 atagar@morrigan:~/Desktop/stem$ ./run_tests.py --integ --test installation
 ==
  INITIALISING
 ==

   stem version...1.7.1-dev (commit 6790035c)
   tor version... 0.4.2.0-alpha-dev (commit
 e57209dc)
   python version...  2.7.12
   operating system...Linux (Ubuntu 16.04)
   cryptography version...2.0.3
   mock version...2.0.0
   pyflakes version...1.5.0
   pycodestyle version... 2.5.0
   checking for orphaned .pyc files...done (0.0s)
   checking for unused tests...   done (0.0s)
   importing test modules...  done (0.0s)
   emptying our tor data directory... done

 ==
   INTEGRATION TESTS
 ==

 Setting up a test instance...
   making test directory (/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data)... done
   configuring logger (/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data/log)... done
   writing torrc (/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data/torrc)... done
 # Configuration for stem's integration tests

 SocksPort 1112
 ORPort 1113

 DataDirectory /home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data
 Log notice stdout
 Log debug file /home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data/tor_log

 AssumeReachable 1
 DownloadExtraInfo 1
 ExitRelay 0
 LogTimeGranularity 1
 ProtocolWarnings 1
 PublishServerDescriptor 0
 SafeLogging 0

 # Torrc options for the RUN_OPEN target

 ControlPort 

 Starting tor...

   Aug 26 16:15:44.674 [notice] Tor 0.4.2.0-alpha-dev (git-
 e57209dc32996d27) running on Linux with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL
 1.0.2g, Zlib 1.2.8, Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
   Aug 26 16:15:44.675 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong!
 Learn how to be safe at
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
   Aug 26 16:15:44.675 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.
   Aug 26 16:15:44.675 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/test/data/torrc".
   Aug 26 16:15:44.679 [notice] Your ContactInfo config option is not set.
 Please consider setting it, so we can contact you if your server is
 misconfigured or something else goes wrong.
   Aug 26 16:15:44.679 [notice] Based on detected system memory,
 MaxMemInQueues is set to 5917 MB. You can override this by setting
 MaxMemInQueues by hand.
   Aug 26 16:15:44.679 [warn] ControlPort is open, but no authentication
 method has been configured.  This means that any program on your computer
 can reconfigure your Tor.  That's bad!  You should upgrade your Tor
 controller as soon as possible.
   Aug 26 16:15:44.680 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:1112
   Aug 26 16:15:44.680 [notice] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:1112
   Aug 26 16:15:44.680 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:
   Aug 26 16:15:44.680 [notice] Opened Control listener on 127.0.0.1:
   Aug 26 16:15:44.680 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:1113
   Aug 26 16:15:44.680 [notice] Opened OR listener on 0.0.0.0:1113
   Aug 26 

[tor-bugs] #31530 [Core Tor/Tor]: Shall we require STMT_BEGIN/STMT_END everywhere?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31530: Shall we require STMT_BEGIN/STMT_END everywhere?
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  0.1|  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We use STMT_BEGIN/STMT_END in some places, and do...while(0) in others.
 Let's pick which we prefer, and make it universal.

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[tor-bugs] #31529 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: fix redundant reset logic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31529: config refactoring: fix redundant reset logic
---+-
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  0  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+-
 We have this block in our code now:
 {{{
 //  This is unreachable, since a CLEAR line always has an
 //  empty value.
 config_reset(mgr, options, mvar, use_defaults); // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
 }}}

 We should fix it by changing it to a nonfatal assertion.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I agree with your summary of the change above.  More specifically, it will
 be like this:

 Final state:
  * configuration manager
 * Toplevel config_format_t
 * (existing config types)
 * Multiple second-level config_format_t objects **
 * (existing config types)

 There will be a similar change eventually, ''but not in this branch'', for
 the corresponding configuration objects.  For example:

 Current state:
   * or_options_t
 * (many option-holding variables)

 Eventual state:
   * or_options_t
 * (variables for all options that have not been ported)
 * config_suite_t **
   * mainloop_options_t (example)
 * (variables for mainloop options)
   * process_options_t (example)
 * (variables for process options)
   * ...

 Note that every second-level config_format_t object in the config_manager
 corresponds to a member of the config_suite_t.  They are linked by their
 indices.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I reviewed nickm's changes in the PR:
 * please fix the routerinfo comment
 * please remove the empty commit "Check for private IPv6 addresses in
 circuit_extend()"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor config validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31241: Refactor config validation
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (Here is a PR with only the changes for #31241 :
 https://github.com/nmathewson/tor/pull/4 )

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor config validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31241: Refactor config validation
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31241 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor config validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31241: Refactor config validation
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 This has a branch (`ticket31241`) based on #31240.  There is a merge-
 branch, `ticket31241_merged_1`.

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1266 is the PR for the merge-
 branch, but note that many of the commits on it are part of #31240.

 I will summarize the changes here below.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31458 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Facilitate getting the widl fixes from wine into mingw and update the mingw-w64 project in tor-browser-build once they are in

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31458: Facilitate getting the widl fixes from wine into mingw and update the
mingw-w64 project in tor-browser-build once they are in
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Jacekc fast-tracked the widl changes to mingw-w64 ( commit
 {{{60d5a66ae51da0e01f3b47de366ae639b01ee189}}} ) so we can test our ESR68
 builds.

 Verified 64-bit windows build on Windows 10 64 bit: NVDA works as expected
 (reads page content, keyboard navigation works) and a brute force IA2 tree
 traversal ( via this tool: https://github.com/pospeselr/ia2_test ) also
 succeeds without crashing on various pages.

 Our 32-bit build isn't quite ready yet, but once it is I'll do the same
 test on both 32-bit windows and on 64-bit WoW before resolving this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh dear, I moved to my next task too quickly. The PR is at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1265

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Where is the new PR?
 I can't find it in:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pulls

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31088: Check IPv4 and IPv6 private addresses in descriptors, first hops, and
extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay, tor-client, tor-|  Actual Points:
  dirauth|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 This is looking better!  I've made a new, squashed PR here, since the
 history of the old branch had grown a bit long to review.

 I've added a couple of fixes to the unit test code; please let me know if
 you agree with them?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 It seems like this is the conversation between tor browser and tor:
 {{{
 $ ./tor-browser_en-US/Browser/start-tor-browser -v
 Gtk-Message: 18:28:44.476: Failed to load module "canberra-gtk-module"
 Gtk-Message: 18:28:44.477: Failed to load module "canberra-gtk-module"
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Torbutton debug output ready
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Component Load 5: New CookieJarSelector
 @torproject.org/cookie-jar-selector;1
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Cookie jar selector got profile-after-
 change
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: domain isolator: set up isolating
 circuits by domain
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Component Load 0: New DragDropFilter.
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Startup Observer created
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: This is a Tor Browser's XPCOM
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher INFO: debug output ready
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher INFO: SOCKS port type: TCP
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher INFO: SOCKS host: 127.0.0.1
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher INFO: SOCKS port: 9150
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Reset socks host to 127.0.0.1
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Reset socks port to 9150
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Synced network settings to environment.
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Listening for message from NoScript.
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Reset socks host to 127.0.0.1
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Reset socks port to 9150
 [08-26 22:28:44] Torbutton INFO: Synced network settings to environment.
 Fontconfig warning: "/home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/fontconfig/fonts.conf", line 145: blank doesn't
 take any effect anymore. please remove it from your fonts.conf
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG: Starting /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   --defaults-torrc
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   -f
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   DataDirectory
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   GeoIPFile
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   GeoIPv6File
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip6
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   HashedControlPassword
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:
 16:4b446c03a1b054976099156ab91beca2c4eab46a864f634587b61b89b4
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   +__ControlPort
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   9151
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   +__SocksPort
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   127.0.0.1:9150 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6
 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   __OwningControllerProcess
 [08-26 22:28:44] TorLauncher DBUG:   12907
 Aug 26 22:28:44.657 [notice] Tor 0.4.2.0-alpha-dev (git-6ba05eea8efcfc1f)
 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1c, Zlib 1.2.11,
 Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.
 Aug 26 22:28:44.657 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Aug 26 22:28:44.657 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.
 Aug 26 22:28:44.657 [notice] Tor is running with Rust integration. Please
 report any bugs you encounter.
 Aug 26 22:28:44.657 [notice] Read configuration file "/home/user/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults".
 Aug 26 22:28:44.658 [notice] Read configuration file "/home/user/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc".
 Aug 26 22:28:44.658 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 Aug 26 22:28:44.658 [notice] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 Aug 26 22:28:44.659 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151
 Aug 26 22:28:44.659 [notice] Opened Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9151
 Aug 26 22:28:44.000 [warn] Your log may contain sensitive information -
 you're logging more than "notice". Don't log unless it serves an important
 reason. Overwrite the log afterwards.
 Aug 26 22:28:44.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file 

Re: [tor-bugs] #31524 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO bw-event-cache spike value(s) in it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31524: GETINFO bw-event-cache  spike value(s) in it
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, security-low  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 042-should, security-low
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Trivial => Normal
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Marking as security-low, because this issue could be:
 * reading uninitialised values,
 * unsigned int underflow, or
 * some other calculation error.

 We do expect some spikes for bandwidth self-tests and consensus downloads,
 but a 3 GB spike is unexpected.

 We recently did a refactor of this code.
 Does the issue occur in 0.2.9 or 0.3.5?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6,  |
  040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I made the necessary changes and pushed it as fixup commits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31427 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Update BridgeDB's documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31427: Update BridgeDB's documentation
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by phw):

 Over at #17626,
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17626#comment:9 cohosh
 pointed out] the following:
 > In my investigations I found this site:
 ​https://bridges.torproject.org/options which doesn't have instructions
 about what to include in the body of the email (and also references
 frontdesk for questions).
 [[br]]
 Let's address this issue here. I'll incorporate it in my branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor31-can => Sponsor31-must


Comment:

 We have merged these commits, so we must make these changes in sponsor 31.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27284: Check IPv6 exit policies on microdescs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-042-stable,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport, ipv6,  |
  040-deferred-20190220, teor-   |
  unreached-2019-03-08   |
Parent ID:  #27248   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've left a few comments on the PR; I believe Teor is correct about the C.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31511 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactor: split mass change commits into automated and manual steps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31511: config refactor: split mass change commits into automated and manual 
steps
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31516 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactor: every function table entry should be unit tested

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31516: config refactor: every function table entry should be unit tested
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-must


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[tor-bugs] #31528 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Get rid of BridgeDB's "chatspeak"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31528: Get rid of BridgeDB's "chatspeak"
+
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 BridgeDB's UI uses a bunch of obscure "chatspeak" references in its UI.
 One example is that it responds with "Uh oh, spaghettios!" if there are
 currently no bridges available. While funny to some, this is difficult to
 translate and shouldn't be part of software that's used by an
 international audience. Let's simplify or remove these references.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31495: cannot configure bridges
---+
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-must


Comment:

 We think this is a bug in #29211, so we need to fix it for sponsor 31.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  tbb-team => nickm
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-must
 * parent:   => #29211


Comment:

 Probably caused by #29211.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R, GeorgKoppen201908   |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Switching to 64bit host for the 32bit builds sounds like a good idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17626 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB's email distributor doesn't work if the "get help" text is quoted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17626: BridgeDB's email distributor doesn't work if the "get help" text is 
quoted
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, ux, bridgedb-ux, |  Actual Points:  0.5
  anti-censorship-roadmap-august |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 cohosh]:
 > This fix looks reasonable to me.
 [[br]]
 Thanks, merged into `develop` and deployed.
 [[br]]
 > In my investigations I found this site:
 https://bridges.torproject.org/options which doesn't have instructions
 about what to include in the body of the email (and also references
 frontdesk for questions).
 [[br]]
 Good catch. Let's fix this in #31427, our BridgeDB smörgåsbord ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10416 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10416: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters
-+-
 Reporter:  iktsuarpok   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode,|  Actual Points:
  win32, tbb-needs, 042-should   |
Parent ID:  #25729   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode, win32, tbb-needs => tor-client,
 windows, unicode, win32, tbb-needs, 042-should
 * points:   => 1
 * severity:  Normal => Major
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 Is there a sponsor that will fund this work?

 If not, how severe is this issue?
 Does it need to be fixed before 0.4.2 stable (December 2019)?
 Should we block the 0.4.2 stable release unit it is fixed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Running this directly doesn't result in any bootstrapping problems:

 {{{
 /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor --defaults-torrc
 /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc-defaults -f
 /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc
 DataDirectory /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor
 GeoIPFile /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip
 GeoIPv6File /home/user/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip6 HashedControlPassword
 16:e7332c020b4455796082d608cebf3e8a15193f0dc14ded66f1ba6a5713
 +__ControlPort 9151 +__SocksPort "127.0.0.1:9150 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6"
 }}}

 torrc-defaults:
 {{{
 # torrc-defaults for Tor Browser
 #
 # DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE
 #
 # This file is distributed with Tor Browser and SHOULD NOT be modified (it
 # may be overwritten during the next Tor Browser update). To customize
 your
 # Tor configuration, shut down Tor Browser and edit the torrc file.
 #
 # If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would
 otherwise.
 AvoidDiskWrites 1
 # Where to send logging messages.  Format is minSeverity[-maxSeverity]
 # (stderr|stdout|syslog|file FILENAME).
 Log notice stdout
 Log debug file debug.log
 CookieAuthentication 1
 DormantCanceledByStartup 1
 ## obfs4proxy configuration
 ClientTransportPlugin obfs2,obfs3,obfs4,scramblesuit exec
 ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy

 ## meek configuration
 ClientTransportPlugin meek exec ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-
 client-torbrowser -- ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/meek-client

 ## snowflake configuration
 ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec ./TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports
 /snowflake-client -url https://snowflake-broker.azureedge.net/ -front
 ajax.aspnetcdn.com -ice stun:stun.l.google.com:19302
 }}}

 torrc:
 {{{
 # This file was generated by Tor; if you edit it, comments will not be
 preserved
 # The old torrc file was renamed to torrc.orig.1 or similar, and Tor will
 ignore it

 DataDirectory /home/multipass/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor
 GeoIPFile /home/multipass/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip
 GeoIPv6File /home/multipass/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/geoip6
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion resources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20212: Tor can be forced to open too many circuits by embedding .onion 
resources
-+-
 Reporter:  gacar|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803, 034-roadmap-proposed,|
  security, tor-hs   |
Parent ID:  #29995   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We might need some fixes in Tor, and some fixes in Tor Browser.

 If we make all (non-single onion service) clients rate-limit onion
 circuits, then some applications may need to rate-limit individual tabs
 (Tor Browser), contacts (Ricochet), or peers (Bitcoin).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30967 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explicitly select the top-level directories that we want to shellcheck

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30967: Explicitly select the top-level directories that we want to shellcheck
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, teor-backlog-ci,   |  Actual Points:
  042-should |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  fast-fix, teor-backlog-ci => fast-fix, teor-backlog-ci,
 042-should
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * points:   => 0.1
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 This issue caused #31519, so I am increasing its priority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31519 [Core Tor/Tor]: git-push-all.sh: shellcheck warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31519: git-push-all.sh: shellcheck warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


Comment:

 This is a bug on a Sponsor 31 ticket

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > Does this happen every time you start tor, or only some times?  Is it
 with 0.4.1.x or 0.4.2.x, or both?  Is it windows-only, or does it happen
 on other platforms?

 It seems this is happening every time tor browser is started - probably on
 all platforms (at least Windows 64-bit and Linux 64-bit). I haven't
 experimented with running tor directly, yet.

 {{{
 Aug 26 21:22:25.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.2.0-alpha-dev (git-6ba05eea8efcfc1f)
 opening log file.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31519 [Core Tor/Tor]: git-push-all.sh: shellcheck warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31519: git-push-all.sh: shellcheck warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I missed these warnings, because I have been ignoring shellcheck due to
 #30967.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * Attachment "debug.log.gz" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21003 [Core Tor/Tor]: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21003: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, ipv6, logging, fast-|  Actual Points:  0.3
  fix, no-backport, asn-merge nickm-merge|
Parent ID:  #31088   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The Named flag is obsolete, so I think it is ok to remove code that uses
 is_named.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Does this happen every time you start tor, or only some times?  Is it with
 0.4.1.x or 0.4.2.x, or both?  Is it windows-only, or does it happen on
 other platforms?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28238: Use mingw-w64/clang toolchain to build Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R, GeorgKoppen201908   |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908,
 GeorgKoppen201908 =>
 tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908R,
 GeorgKoppen201908
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_28238_v14` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_28238_v14) has the patches to get this going.
 pospeselr checked that a 64bit build is working, which is nice!

 The patches are on top for those for #28716 to make testing easier. One
 caveat are the 32bit builds wich are currently failing due to memory
 issues when building `gkrust`. I need to find some configure flags that
 help here or we need to bite the bullet of using a 64bit host for 32bit
 builds as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Applications/Tor Browser]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:   => tbb-needs


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[tor-bugs] #31527 [Applications/Tor Browser]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor Log:

 {{{
 8/26/19, 20:54:01.877 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 8/26/19, 20:54:01.877 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 8/26/19, 20:54:01.878 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or
 accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 8/26/19, 20:54:01.878 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 8/26/19, 20:54:01.878 [NOTICE] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 8/26/19, 20:54:01.878 [NOTICE] Renaming old configuration file to
 "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Tor Browser GeKo
 Test2\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc.orig.1"
 8/26/19, 20:54:02.292 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5% (conn): Connecting to a
 relay
 8/26/19, 20:54:02.622 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 10% (conn_done): Connected to
 a relay
 8/26/19, 20:54:03.285 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 14% (handshake): Handshaking
 with a relay
 8/26/19, 20:54:03.579 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done):
 Handshake with a relay done
 8/26/19, 20:54:03.580 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 20% (onehop_create):
 Establishing an encrypted directory connection
 8/26/19, 20:54:03.863 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 25% (requesting_status):
 Asking for networkstatus consensus
 8/26/19, 20:54:04.155 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 30% (loading_status): Loading
 networkstatus consensus
 8/26/19, 20:54:06.827 [NOTICE] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 8/26/19, 20:54:07.168 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 40% (loading_keys): Loading
 authority key certs
 8/26/19, 20:54:08.289 [WARN] Your configuration excludes 100% of all
 possible guards. That's likely to make you stand out from the rest of the
 world.
 8/26/19, 20:54:08.289 [NOTICE] Switching to guard context "restricted"
 (was using "default")
 8/26/19, 20:54:08.289 [NOTICE] The current consensus has no exit nodes.
 Tor can only build internal paths, such as paths to onion services.
 8/26/19, 20:54:08.289 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 45% (requesting_descriptors):
 Asking for relay descriptors
 8/26/19, 20:54:08.290 [NOTICE] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We need more microdescriptors: we have
 0/0, and can only build 0% of likely paths. (We have 0% of guards bw, 0%
 of midpoint bw, and 0% of end bw (no exits in consensus, using mid) = 0%
 of path bw.)
 8/26/19, 20:54:08.807 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 50% (loading_descriptors):
 Loading relay descriptors
 8/26/19, 20:54:09.210 [NOTICE] The current consensus contains exit nodes.
 Tor can build exit and internal paths.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31494 [Core Tor/Tor]: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31494: config refactoring: follow-ups from merged commits
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > From #30935:
 >
 >   * Convert the "contained" flag to something more like "NOCOPY NOCHECK
 NODUMP".

   * at the higher level, split "contained" into "derived" and "obsolete".
 At the lower level, give both "derived" and "obsolete" the flags "NOCOPY
 NOCHECK NODUMP".
 * even though these concepts may have the same flags right now, we
 don't want to lock them in to having the same flags in future. Because
 they are separate concepts that are quite different. For example,
 "derived" has a (derived) value, but "obsolete" has no value.

 >   * Make the "invisible" flag more like "NODUMP NOREAD".
 >   * Make sure that all low-level flags are orthogonal.
 >   * Make sure that "invisible" vs "hidden" is more clear.
 >

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31526 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: make new bridge-campaign alias for phw

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31526: make new bridge-campaign alias for phw
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 It is done!

 (It should take effect in a few hours.)

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[tor-bugs] #31526 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: make new bridge-campaign alias for phw

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31526: make new bridge-campaign alias for phw
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 phw is about to do a blog post where he was planning to direct new bridge
 relay operators to mail tor-team with their bridge details.

 In the past, when I did a blitz of mails to relay operators and cc'ed tor-
 team, I got a bunch of dirty looks and requests to unsubscribe, from Tor
 people who didn't realize they were part of a volunteer support list.

 So I am going to make a 'bridge-campaign' alias for him, which goes to
 him, me, and cohosh. This way we won't spam tor-team.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17626 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB's email distributor doesn't work if the "get help" text is quoted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17626: BridgeDB's email distributor doesn't work if the "get help" text is 
quoted
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, ux, bridgedb-ux, |  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap-august |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This fix looks reasonable to me.

 In my investigations I found this site:
 https://bridges.torproject.org/options which doesn't have instructions
 about what to include in the body of the email (and also references
 frontdesk for questions).

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[tor-bugs] #31525 [Internal Services/Services Admin Team]: Please create alias apple-ad...@torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31525: Please create alias apple-ad...@torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Services   |Version:
  Admin Team |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We would like to have an alias apple-ad...@torproject.org that send mails
 to pili at torproject dot org and arturo at openobservatory dot org

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31427 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Update BridgeDB's documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31427: Update BridgeDB's documentation
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Looks good, but there's still a reference to frontdesk in `strings.py`:
 
https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/blob/fix/31427/bridgedb/strings.py#L274

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30310 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake localization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30310: Snowflake localization
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  l10n, snowflake-webextension, anti-  |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-august  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 > Okay nice. Looks ready to merge.

 These were merged up to,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=131cf4f8ea0faaa41774e52f5d81878803f45dbc

 > Looks good to me. I'm probably using exclamation marks too much ;)

 That was merged as,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=ea442141db4cf1451870124d9f1cc8916a82853a

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31384 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: localize snowflake website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31384: localize snowflake website
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, anti-censorship-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  september  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * parent:  #30310 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26345 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26345: Disable tracking protection UI in FF67-esr
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-alpha-must,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr => ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-alpha-must, TorBrowserTeam201908


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30310 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake localization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30310: Snowflake localization
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, snowflake-webextension, anti-  |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-august  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:23 arlolra]:
 > > Does call to writeFileSync with data from availableLangs ​R43 do the
 same as copying the translated files in a previous commit: ​R78? Do we
 need to remove the copy logic for the proxy if so?
 >
 > No, the `writeFileSync` in `R43` is concatenating code to the embed.js
 file so that the known `availableLangs` are present there.
 >
 > The copying in `R78` is moving the completed translations to a web
 accessible place, to be fetched based on the `availableLangs`.
 >
 > > Do we need to manually update the submodule when there are new
 translations before they become available?
 >
 > The translation.git repo will be updated automatically when new
 translations are completed.  However, when we're ready to make a new
 release, we do need to manually update the submodule beforehand.  So, `git
 submodule update --remote`, then git add, commit, push.  Followed by
 whatever regular release steps we do.

 Okay nice. Looks ready to merge.

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[tor-bugs] #31524 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO bw-event-cache spike value(s) in it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31524: GETINFO bw-event-cache  spike value(s) in it
-+--
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.4-rc  |   Severity:  Trivial
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Discussing with atagar an issue with the bandwidth graph of Nyx yield into
 the fact, that Tor reports 1 or 2 unusal high values when nyx is started.
 After a minute or so the effect is gone and Nyx can scale the y-axis to a
 reasonable value.

 atagar found out, that there are 1 or 2 spike values in it (look for
 3495411062,3952777936) of the debug out out of Nyx:
 {{{
 08/25/2019 21:18:09 [TRACE] Sent to tor: GETINFO bw-event-cache
 08/25/2019 21:18:09 [TRACE] Received from tor: 250-bw-event-
 cache=1374134393,1426052109 20086925,20125282 21800116,21982023
 21443601,21381953 21284145,21223794 20736818,20840129 20095450,20002302
 20327971,20091436 18481818,18770265 20642518,20484788 17916670,17984439
 21675050,21693959 21112734,20784723 19053526,19193284 19295884,19489502
 21443785,21575604 21134294,21020113 24810387,24663932 21866896,22876759
 22146840,22135880 21265637,21323808 20355415,20195913 22161894,22076797
 23243894,23320227 22162244,22280711 20837266,20883852 21569369,21709237
 19729547,19565307 19509953,19770894 20445427,20681393 21164201,22030989
 23182698,23054018 22427910,22683231 24570368,24540675 23788945,23736745
 24326209,24063010 23491274,23547576 24465451,24291718 23117418,23200615
 22771292,22946982 23969237,23981784 23612713,23562155 23382374,23423884
 20351264,20211681 21590861,21769434 21812207,21644025 23301464,23486635
 23190866,23611494 25596210,25579703 23296743,23781312 24948896,24956987
 25415713,2740 26407789,26504165 25006181,25166607
 3495411062,3952777936 28124111,26406950 26007090,26935060
 26897763,26935089 26866687,27170833 28168859,26699345 25750280,26406950
 27570110,26935089 28007323,26935089 26590862,26935089 28579673,26935089
 112518425,114606735 27113917,27462685 26127629,26406921 79812696,79748989
 25846716,26896706 29074858,26973472 24947719,26935089 27687620,26864938
 25539933,26838674 27171107,27068897 27140138,26879337 26899976,26495460
 25950990,26844241 28442790,27025937 26116568,26829132 27827545,26960905
 27035490,26415775\n250 OK
 }}}

 Just a guess: The 2 affected relays have about 20 - 40 MByte/sec bw. The
 spike values are often above 3,000,000,000, looking like an arbitrary
 unsigned long int.

 Whilst the severity on the Nyx graph is negligible I do wonder about the
 root cause.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30310 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake localization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30310: Snowflake localization
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, snowflake-webextension, anti-  |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-august  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 > Does call to writeFileSync with data from availableLangs ​R43 do the
 same as copying the translated files in a previous commit: ​R78? Do we
 need to remove the copy logic for the proxy if so?

 No, the `writeFileSync` in `R43` is concatenating code to the embed.js
 file so that the known `availableLangs` are present there.

 The copying in `R78` is moving the completed translations to a web
 accessible place, to be fetched based on the `availableLangs`.

 > Do we need to manually update the submodule when there are new
 translations before they become available?

 The translation.git repo will be updated automatically when new
 translations are completed.  However, when we're ready to make a new
 release, we do need to manually update the submodule beforehand.  So, `git
 submodule update --remote`, then git add, commit, push.  Followed by
 whatever regular release steps we do.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31452 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix coverity failures in unit tests as of 19 August 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31452: Fix coverity failures in unit tests as of 19 August 2019
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst   |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * keywords:   => dgoulet-merge
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31452 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix coverity failures in unit tests as of 19 August 2019

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31452: Fix coverity failures in unit tests as of 19 August 2019
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > See branch `bug31452` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1239 .
 Thanks! This looks good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31384 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: localize snowflake website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31384: localize snowflake website
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, anti-censorship-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  september  |
Parent ID:  #30310   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:5 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 emmapeel]:
 > > Please let me know if you can use them to provide a localized version
 of the webpage.
 >
 > I have some process-related questions.
 >
 > How do we know which language to use? In comment:2 you mentioned adding
 a menu to the page. I see such a menu at https://tb-
 manual.torproject.org/, defaulting(?) to English. Should we also look at
 the `Accept-Language` HTTP header (i.e., the user's in-browser configured
 language)? Do other Tor Project pages do that?

 Looks like arlo's most recently changes in #30310 use the
 [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/API/NavigatorLanguage/language navigator.language] property to
 set the translation and default to English if none exist. See
 
https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/da21c6710cd871d931f2eea2a185b78b1907d3db
 #diff-c371ea9d4448f98b3fda1dfca95c925eR93

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31451 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1452041: Use 64-bit literal in parse_log_domain()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31451: CID 1452041: Use 64-bit literal in parse_log_domain()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn-merge |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => asn-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30310 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake localization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30310: Snowflake localization
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, snowflake-webextension, anti-  |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-august  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:19 arlolra]:
 > Great, thanks!
 >
 > Some commits to make use of these translations (and the follow up from
 comment:17) are in,
 > https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commits/translation

 Awesome, this looks good. Just a few clarification questions:
 - Does call to `writeFileSync` with data from `availableLangs`
 
[https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/06eac0bcd659e4038cff675c7a8a373877a4e43a
 #diff-5baf5ab2c66fa7471b434279ecb57da3R43 R43] do the same as copying the
 translated files in a previous commit:
 
[https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commit/c26e1c738ee41bbec46e4752d876883ce333b6fe
 #diff-5baf5ab2c66fa7471b434279ecb57da3R78 R78]? Do we need to remove the
 copy logic for the proxy if so?
 - Do we need to manually update the submodule when there are new
 translations before they become available?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31451 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1452041: Use 64-bit literal in parse_log_domain()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31451: CID 1452041: Use 64-bit literal in parse_log_domain()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > Branch is `bug31451`; pr in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1237
 Thanks! Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12399 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Hash of session info was not as expected" should be log_protocol_warn

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12399: "Hash of session info was not as expected" should be log_protocol_warn
-+
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs easy logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry, dgoulet   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: asn (added)
 * reviewer:  mikeperry => mikeperry, dgoulet
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I think this is the right thing to do. Anyone can send bad cell content
 and trigger warnings by not following the tor protocol.

 This is one of those instance so protowarn is legit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31498 [Core Tor/Tor]: clarify that tor's license is free software / open source

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31498: clarify that tor's license is free software / open source
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nickm-merge asn-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => nickm-merge asn-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31498 [Core Tor/Tor]: clarify that tor's license is free software / open source

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31498: clarify that tor's license is free software / open source
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Arf.. yeah I was not pointing at `user/arma` but the old `arma/` only...

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31498 [Core Tor/Tor]: clarify that tor's license is free software / open source

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31498: clarify that tor's license is free software / open source
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I think I did.

 {{{
 [remote "arma"]
 url = https://git.torproject.org/user/arma/tor
 fetch = +refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/arma/*
 }}}

 {{{
 $ git fetch arma
 remote: Counting objects: 1885, done.
 remote: Compressing objects: 100% (685/685), done.
 remote: Total 1885 (delta 1263), reused 1756 (delta 1200)
 Receiving objects: 100% (1885/1885), 2.09 MiB, done.
 Resolving deltas: 100% (1263/1263), done.
 From https://git.torproject.org/user/arma/tor
  * [new branch]  bug28298   -> arma/bug28298
  * [new branch]  bug29665_029 -> arma/bug29665_029
  * [new branch]  bug29665_034 -> arma/bug29665_034
  * [new branch]  ticket31498 -> arma/ticket31498
 }}}

 Maybe your arma points to the old arma, before the git people moved me?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31482 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid possible overflow when converting between coarse stamp to approx ms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31482: Avoid possible overflow when converting between coarse stamp to approx 
ms
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport, 040-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I don't see any problems in the patch as written, but I do support doing
 the TODO items.

 We should also base this on maint-0.3.5 if the bug is there.

 To try to answer your questions:

 >do I need to do any extra tests for monotime_init_internal()

 Maybe it would be good to extract the computation to a new `STATIC`
 function, and then test that new function.  That way we can make sure that
 the stuff calculated by monotime_init_internal() looks the way we expect
 with different inputs.

 >does anyone run our unit tests on iOS?

 I'm not sure; Guardian might?

 I can easily believe that nobody has tried rate-limiting on iOS.

 >how serious is this bug in rate_per_sec_to_rate_per_sec()? Do we actually
 use token bucket rates close to 230? Is my math on that limit correct?

 I think that if it only affects iOS, it's not that bad, but we should
 backport anyway.  I am not 100% sure on your math on the limit; tests
 there would make me more confident.

 >are there any other callers of
 monotime_coarse_stamp_units_to_approx_msec() or
 monotime_msec_to_approx_coarse_stamp_units() that might trigger this bug?

 There's a safe call in relay.c, and that's all I can see outside of the
 unit tests.

 >Do we need to make a similar change to the Windows code?

 I don't think so, though doing a GCD calculation on init wouldn't hurt.

 For windows, the fraction is "nsec per tick", which is unlikely to need a
 very big denominator.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31455 [Circumvention/meek]: Redeploy meek-server instances using Go 1.11.13+ / 1.12.8+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31455: Redeploy meek-server instances using Go 1.11.13+ / 1.12.8+
+--
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:1 dcf]:
 >  * BridgeDB Moat (run by sysrqb, phw)
 [[br]]
 I just compiled and deployed meek-server from commit
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=23cdaf6a46ebcd26fdaa9dab6d916e2d5e745605
 23cdaf6] using golang version 1.12.9. The binary's SHA-256 checksum is
 `4f18b4793f80a727433a3edfdaa82bb6b278baea6584c4adb3fc5256147dfecf`. The
 update should have worked. I could request a batch of obfs4 bridges over
 moat.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker integration tsts for headers and includes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31477: Practracker integration tsts for headers and includes
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:  #29746   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31518 [Core Tor/Tor]: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31518: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.
--+--
 Reporter:  haxxpop   |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy tcp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => proxy tcp
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31010: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908R  |
Parent ID:  #30429   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: acat (added)
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908 => tbb-
 mobile, tbb-9.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201908R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31010: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0-must-nightly,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201908   |
Parent ID:  #30429   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I'll cherry-pick all of these commits onto a branch based on `tor-
 browser-68.0esr-9.0-3` for the next round of reviews, but this branch is
 based on acat's `30429+5` branch, like the previous one for consistency.

 The new branch for review is: `acat30429+5_tor-browser_android_68esr_54`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29461 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a Snowflake module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29461: Add a Snowflake module
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-august, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Ah I see, should every entry have the `@type` format? I based the spec off
 of how I gathered relays were exporting stats by reading the source code:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/feature/stats/geoip_stats.c#n994

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30310 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake localization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30310: Snowflake localization
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n, snowflake-webextension, anti-  |  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-august  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:20 emmapeel]:
 > please review this little commit for a grammar correction>
 >
 >
 
https://dip.torproject.org/emmapeel/snowflake/commit/21862faa73c99e9026aeda812dd66531a8f67334
 [[br]]
 Looks good to me. I'm probably using exclamation marks too much ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19332 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a BridgeDB module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19332: Add a BridgeDB module
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2, ex- |  Actual Points:
  sponsor-19 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:12 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 phw]:
 > > Replying to [comment:10 karsten]:
 > > > #9316 has been resolved recently which unblocks this ticket, AIUI.
 > > [[br]]
 > > Yes. How would you like me to expose the metrics file on BridgeDB's
 host? Should it be available over HTTPS? Or do you want me to rsync it to
 another host?
 >
 > Is there anything sensitive in the file that would have to be sanitized
 on the CollecTor host? If so, we should rsync it over ssh to
 colchicifolium. But if not, the preferred way would be to expose it on the
 BridgeDB host, so that others can fetch it, too.
 [[br]]
 There's nothing sensitive. We're doing the sanitisation ourselves and have
 [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2019-July/013953.html
 published the data before]. I'll look into exposing the files over our
 apache.
 [[br]]
 > Here's another question, similar to the one about Snowflake stats: Would
 it be possible to expose more than just the latest BridgeDB statistics?
 Something like 7 or 14 days, or if it's not much data, everything until it
 gets too big?
 [[br]]
 Yes, that's definitely feasible. One week worth of data shouldn't be more
 than ~100 KB. I'll look into logrotate, so we can expose multiple weeks
 worth of data at any given time.

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[tor-bugs] #31523 [Circumvention]: Recruit potential default bridges from set of long-running bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31523: Recruit potential default bridges from set of long-running bridges
---+-
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tbb-bridges
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 We would like to set up more default bridges. One way to recruit more is
 to look for non-default bridges that have 1) high capacity, 2) have been
 around for a long time, and 3) have a stable uptime. Ideally, we should
 also know the person who runs the bridge, as stated in our
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/DefaultBridges#Addingnewdefaultbridges
 list of criteria] for setting up a new default bridges.

 Let's have a look at archived bridge data and extract a list of default
 bridge candidates.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31521 [Metrics/Analysis]: Investigate 10-second delay in TTFB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31521: Investigate 10-second delay in TTFB
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  scalability performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:   => scalability performance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29461 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a Snowflake module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29461: Add a Snowflake module
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-august, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:26 cohosh]:
 > I can do that, yes. dcf just commented that it might be easier to do the
 version on a separate line (see
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31493#comment:3). Do you
 have an opinion on that? We're looking for ease of use now and in the
 future if/when the version bumps.

 I was picturing a `@type snowflake-stats 1.0` so that the format is the
 same as other CollecTor formats.
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html#data-formats Data Formats]:
 "Each descriptor provided here contains an `@type` annotation using the
 format `@type $descriptortype $major.$minor`." See for example in
 
[https://github.com/NullHypothesis/zoossh/blob/7ce3729b60488c3418d9ab01bd89126d7dd4b21d/util.go#L48-L50
 zoossh].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31455 [Circumvention/meek]: Redeploy meek-server instances using Go 1.11.13+ / 1.12.8+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31455: Redeploy meek-server instances using Go 1.11.13+ / 1.12.8+
+--
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * owner:  dcf => phw


Old description:

> These versions fix a denial-of-service vulnerability in the HTTP/2 server
> code.
>
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/golang-announce/65QixT3tcmg/DrFiG6vvCwAJ
> > We have just released Go 1.12.8 and Go 1.11.13 to address recently
> reported security issues. We recommend that all users update to one of
> these releases (if you’re not sure which, choose Go 1.12.8).
> > * net/http: Denial of Service vulnerabilities in the HTTP/2
> implementation
> >
> >   net/http and golang.org/x/net/http2 servers that accept direct
> connections from untrusted clients could be remotely made to allocate an
> unlimited amount of memory, until the program crashes. Servers will now
> close connections if the send queue accumulates too many control
> messages.
> >
> >   The issues are CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514, and Go issue
> [https://golang.org/issue/33606 golang.org/issue/33606].
> >
> >   This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20190813141303-74dc4d7220e7 of
> golang.org/x/net/http2.
> >
> > * net/url: parsing validation issue
> >
> >   url.Parse would accept URLs with malformed hosts, such that the Host
> field could have arbitrary suffixes that would appear in neither
> Hostname() nor Port(), allowing authorization bypasses in certain
> applications. Note that URLs with invalid, not numeric ports will now
> return an error from url.Parse.
> >
> >   The issue is CVE-2019-14809 and Go issue
> [https://golang.org/issue/29098 golang.org/issue/29098].
>
> We need to redeploy the following servers:
>  * cymrubridge02 (backend for meek-azure, run by inf0)
>  * BridgeDB Moat (run by sysrqb, phw)
>  * starman (throttled meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)
>  * maenad (unthrottled meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)
>  * GAEuploader (gaeuploader.meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)

New description:

 These versions fix a denial-of-service vulnerability in the HTTP/2 server
 code.

 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/golang-announce/65QixT3tcmg/DrFiG6vvCwAJ
 > We have just released Go 1.12.8 and Go 1.11.13 to address recently
 reported security issues. We recommend that all users update to one of
 these releases (if you’re not sure which, choose Go 1.12.8).
 > * net/http: Denial of Service vulnerabilities in the HTTP/2
 implementation
 >
 >   net/http and golang.org/x/net/http2 servers that accept direct
 connections from untrusted clients could be remotely made to allocate an
 unlimited amount of memory, until the program crashes. Servers will now
 close connections if the send queue accumulates too many control messages.
 >
 >   The issues are CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514, and Go issue
 [https://golang.org/issue/33606 golang.org/issue/33606].
 >
 >   This is also fixed in version v0.0.0-20190813141303-74dc4d7220e7 of
 golang.org/x/net/http2.
 >
 > * net/url: parsing validation issue
 >
 >   url.Parse would accept URLs with malformed hosts, such that the Host
 field could have arbitrary suffixes that would appear in neither
 Hostname() nor Port(), allowing authorization bypasses in certain
 applications. Note that URLs with invalid, not numeric ports will now
 return an error from url.Parse.
 >
 >   The issue is CVE-2019-14809 and Go issue
 [https://golang.org/issue/29098 golang.org/issue/29098].

 We need to redeploy the following servers:
  * cymrubridge02 (backend for meek-azure, run by inf0)
  * BridgeDB Moat (run by sysrqb, phw)
  * ~~starman (throttled meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)~~
  * ~~maenad (unthrottled meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)~~
  * ~~GAEuploader (gaeuploader.meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)~~

--

Comment:

 I deployed these three using go1.12.9 at 2019-08-26 16:42:00:
  * starman (throttled meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)
  * maenad (unthrottled meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)
  * GAEuploader (gaeuploader.meek.bamsoftware.com, run by dcf)

 Now passing the baton to phw and inf0 for:
  * cymrubridge02 (backend for meek-azure, run by inf0)
  * BridgeDB Moat (run by sysrqb, phw)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31449 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31449: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 
release/rev/901e8898075107251203cf181304c12c434bfed4/modules/libmar/tool/moz.build#12

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker integration tsts for headers and includes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31477: Practracker integration tsts for headers and includes
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:  #29746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Done in `ticket31477` with PR in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1264 .

 I found a bug in our header-file dependency-violation checking, and fixed
 it.  Because of that, I had to add some new exceptions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29461 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add a Snowflake module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29461: Add a Snowflake module
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-august, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:25 karsten]:
 > Replying to [comment:24 cohosh]:
 > > Replying to [comment:22 cohosh]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:19 karsten]:
 > > > > cohosh, are you still planning to revise the spec and code to
 include such a `snowflake-stats $version` line?
 > > >
 > > > Yes, I just got back from vacation and I'm going to implement it
 this afternoon.
 > >
 > > Opened #31493 and implemented
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/compare/bug31493 here]. How does that
 look to you?
 >
 > Well, that would work, though I think that introducing a separate line
 for descriptor type and version might be clearer:
 >
 > {{{
 > snowflake-stats 1.0
 > snowflake-stats-end 2019-08-07 19:52:11 (86400 s)
 > snowflake-ips VN=5,NL=26,AU=30,GT=2,NO=5,EG=3,NI=1,AT=22,[...]
 > snowflake-ips-total 937
 > snowflake-idle-count 660976
 > client-denied-count 0
 > client-snowflake-match-count 864
 > }}}
 >
 > If this looks okay to you and if you make this change, do you think you
 could somehow edit the existing stats file on the snowflake broker, maybe
 using some `sed`/`awk` magic?

 I can do that, yes. dcf just commented that it might be easier to do the
 version on a separate line (see
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31493#comment:3). Do you
 have an opinion on that? We're looking for ease of use now and in the
 future if/when the version bumps.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10416 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10416: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters
-+-
 Reporter:  iktsuarpok   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode,|  Actual Points:
  win32, tbb-needs   |
Parent ID:  #25729   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode, win32 => tor-client, windows,
 unicode, win32, tbb-needs


Comment:

 There are confused Tor Browser users showing up from time to time hitting
 this bug, let's add the proper keyword to get it on the network team's
 radar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31493 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Add a version to the metrics output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31493: Add a version to the metrics output
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Just trying to coordinate two tickets here. I made this change based on
 feedback from the metrics team
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29461#comment:24 here].
 The spec says that it does occur "At start, exactly once."

 I could make a separate version line so the spec would be as follows:
 {{{
 "snowflake-stats-end" -MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NL
 [At start, exactly once.]
 -MM-DD HH:MM:SS defines the end of the included measurement
 interval of length NSEC seconds (86400 seconds by default).
 "snowflake-stats-version" V.v
 [Exactly once.]
 V.v defines the major and minor version of the snowflake
 broker stats specification being used.
 "snowflake-ips" CC=NUM,CC=NUM,... NL
 [At most once.]
 List of mappings from two-letter country codes to the number of
 unique IP addresses of snowflake proxies that have polled.
 "snowflake-ips-total" NUM NL
 [At most once.]
 A count of the total number of unique IP addresses of snowflake
 proxies that have polled.

 [omitting rest of spec]
 }}}

 I'll let the metrics team decide if this is easier/better.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31495: cannot configure bridges
---+
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  regression => regression, tbb-needs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31520 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove monthly giving banner from Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31520: Remove monthly giving banner from Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201908  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201908


Comment:

 Planned for the upcoming releases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31449 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31449: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.0a4/mar-tools-linux32.zip no?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31449 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31449: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 boklm]:
 > After looking at this issue, it seems that:
 > - `signmar` is the same as `mar` with some additional features. So if we
 need a 32 bit `mar`, we could probably use `signmar`.

 If we could verify that and/or be sure that `signmar` is not calling `mar`
 under the hood that would be good.

 > - we can use this patch to build `mbsdiff` for linux32:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/projects/firefox/mbsdiff.patch?h=bug_31449_v3
 >
 > However it seems that the only place where `mbsdiff` is used is for
 generating incremental mar files, which we usually do on a 64bit machine,
 so I'm not sure we need a 32bit `mbsdiff`. It seems also that our signing
 script is only using `signmar` and not `mar`. Is there an other reason
 that I'm forgetting for wanting 32bit versions of `mbsdiff` and `mar`?

 Fair enough. I was under the impression that the current state risks our
 `mar` signing AND that we do something wrong with our 32bit builds given
 that the issue did not happen in the past and we already seem to need some
 hacks to get 32bit builds going. If neither is the case, great! We could
 closed this ticket then as WORKSFORME or something similar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31250 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Purchase new snowflake domain to fix "safe browsing" issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31250: Purchase new snowflake domain to fix "safe browsing" issue
-+---
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Since this discussion happened, there are also domains
 snowflake.torproject.net and snowflake-broker.torproject.net reserved for
 this purpose (#31232, #31522).

 Also saint, I think we're waiting on confirmation that Cupcake is using
 the newer domains (i.e. tag [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/commit/?h=webext-0.0.7=b46e7f127a43b9df7ff802c942cb3484c57b0d32
 webext-0.0.7] or later) to close this ticket.
 
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/cupcake/dajjbehmbnbppjkcnpdkaniapgdppdnc
 still says "Version: 2.0; Updated: July 26, 2019", which is the same day
 as webext-0.0.7, so I'm not sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31522 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31522: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 See the discussion at the beginning of,
 http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2019/tor-
 meeting.2019-08-15-16.59.log.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31522 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31522: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31522 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31522: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "0001-bamsoftware.com-freehaven.net-torproject.net.patch"
 added.


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[tor-bugs] #31522 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31522: Update broker/bridge to torproject.net domains in source code
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Tag [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tag/?h=webext-0.0.10 webext-0.0.10] is still
 using bamsoftware.com domains in proxy-go/, and freehaven.net domains
 (from #31250) in proxy/. Is it desired at this point to make them use the
 torproject.net domains from comment:13:ticket:31232 instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31449 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31449: Signing tools for 32bit Linux are 64bit now
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201908,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:  #30321   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 After looking at this issue, it seems that:
 - `signmar` is the same as `mar` with some additional features. So if we
 need a 32 bit `mar`, we could probably use `signmar`.
 - we can use this patch to build `mbsdiff` for linux32:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/projects/firefox/mbsdiff.patch?h=bug_31449_v3

 However it seems that the only place where `mbsdiff` is used is for
 generating incremental mar files, which we usually do on a 64bit machine,
 so I'm not sure we need a 32bit `mbsdiff`. It seems also that our signing
 script is only using `signmar` and not `mar`. Is there an other reason
 that I'm forgetting for wanting 32bit versions of `mbsdiff` and `mar`?

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