[tor-bugs] #31615 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31615: Reorder the early subsystems based on their dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,
 Severity:  Normal   |  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31594
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Part of #31594.

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[tor-bugs] #31614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31614: Implement clean_up_backtrace_handler()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,
 Severity:  Normal   |  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31594
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Part of #31594

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31613 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid a race condition where log and err both try to close the sigsafe fds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31613: Avoid a race condition where log and err both try to close the sigsafe 
fds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31594   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> Part of #31954.
>
> I think we might want a separate ticket and changes file for this.

New description:

 Part of #31594.

 I think we might want a separate ticket and changes file for this.

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[tor-bugs] #31613 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid a race condition where log and err both try to close the sigsafe fds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31613: Avoid a race condition where log and err both try to close the sigsafe 
fds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,
 Severity:  Normal   |  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31594
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Part of #31954.

 I think we might want a separate ticket and changes file for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31612 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31612: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  comment-only, doc, fast-fix, asn-|  Actual Points:  0
  merge, dgoulet-merge, nickm-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready
 * keywords:  comment-only, doc, fast-fix => comment-only, doc, fast-fix,
 asn-merge, dgoulet-merge, nickm-merge


Comment:

 This is a comment-only change, let's just do a quick check and merge:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1288

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[tor-bugs] #31612 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31612: Update the function comment in format_number_sigsafe()
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  comment-only, doc, fast-fix
Actual Points:  0 |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The function comment refers to a calling function that doesn't exist any
 more. Now, multiple functions call format_number_sigsafe().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31571 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add the tor version and a newline to raw_assert()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31571: Add the tor version and a newline to raw_assert()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  diagnostics, 042-should, android,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  macos, 035-backport, 040-backport, |
  041-backport   |
Parent ID:  #31570   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > See my pull request:
 > * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1277
 >
 > The remaining merges are clean, you can see the test branches bug31571_*
 at:
 > https://github.com/teor2345/tor/branches

 It turns out that we can't use strlcpy() in lib/torerr, because strlcpy()
 is defined in lib/string on some platforms, and lib/string depends on
 lib/torerr.

 I added a commit that checks the return values of snprintf() and strncpy()
 instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify what build flags we should be using for security, and use them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21448: Identify what build flags we should be using for security, and use them
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 no-plt - my understanding is that with full relro this is unnecessary
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1359912

 noexecstack - done https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671426

 stack-protector - open issue
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1511073

 safestack - open issue
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1374344

 ftrapv / fwrapv - open issue
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1031653

 -Wl,-z,now - open issue
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1359918

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23591 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Tor and Tor Browser with -mmitigate-rop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23591: Build Tor and Tor Browser with -mmitigate-rop
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21448| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 I think we can close this as we are no longer shipping gcc builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23024 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Flags to increase hardening on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23024: Flags to increase hardening on Windows
---+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201711, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21448 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by tom):

 Werror=format-security - enabled on non-Windows,
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1578619

 _FORTIFY_SOURCE - enabled but mingw-clang doesn't support it (yet. it's a
 WIP)

 -fno-delete-null-pointer-checks
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1578617

 -Wl,--enable-reloc-section - AFAICT unneeded for mingw-clang, since ASLR
 is working

 --image-base - AFAICT not needed on modern systems

 large-address-aware - enabled for mingw-clang

 --forceinteg - not applicablt to clang/lld

 --no-seh - set by lld automatically https://reviews.llvm.org/D41252 (but
 this would be good to confirm manually

 --tsaware - I'm not sure but I really hope that this is completely
 unneeded by now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30716 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30716: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor28, anti-censorship-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  august |
Parent ID:   | Points:  20
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * cc: dcf (added)


Comment:

 Website fingerprinting attacks typically operate on traffic traces that
 are frequently encoded as sequences of the form:
 {{{
 ,+/-
 }}}
 `+` refers to packets going from the client to the server
 and `-` refers to packets going from the server to the
 client. For example:
 {{{
 1567548098,+1500
 1567548098,+800
 1567548099,-1500
 1567548099,-1500
 1567548100,-700
 }}}
 Interestingly, packet lengths may not even be necessary. In their
 [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.02265.pdf CCS'18 paper], Sirinam et al. write
 in Section 5.1.1:
 > However, we performed preliminary evaluations to compare the WF attack
 performance between using packet lengths and without packet lengths, i.e.,
 only packet direction, as feature representations. Our result showed that
 using packet lengths does not provide a noticeable improvement in the
 accuracy of the attack. Therefore, we follow Wang et al.’s methodology and
 consider only the direction of the packets.
 The traffic trace above can therefore be reduced to:
 {{{
 +1
 +1
 -1
 -1
 -1
 }}}
 Note that obfs4 makes no attempt to defend against website fingerprinting
 attacks. Its goal is to escape protocol classification but these two
 problems (and their respective attacks) overlap to some extent, which is
 why obfs4 would be better off with defences against such attacks.

 [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-June/012310.html As
 dcf already pointed out], obfs4 only sends data when the application
 (e.g., Tor) has data to send. Then, depending on what iatMode is used,
 obfs4 may append padding to the application's data and add inter-arrival
 delays. Coming back to the example above, obfs4 can only **extend** a
 packet burst but not **break** a burst. That is, obfs4 can turn the packet
 sequence
 {{{
 +1
 +1
 -1
 -1
 -1
 }}}
 into the sequence
 {{{
 +1
 +1
 +1 (padding packet, which extends a burst)
 -1
 -1
 -1
 }}}
 but not into the sequence
 {{{
 +1
 -1 (padding packet, which breaks a burst)
 +1
 -1
 +1 (padding packet, which breaks a burst)
 -1
 -1
 }}}
 I spent some time looking into ways to fix this issue. It turns out that
 we can add the ability to break packet bursts to obfs4 without losing
 backwards compatibility, allowing a brand-new, burst-breaking obfs4 client
 to talk to an old obfs4 server (however, see below for a caveat). I
 implemented a simple proof-of-concept, for now called
 
[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports/BabyNameBook
 sharknado], in my
 
[https://dip.torproject.org/phw/obfs4/commit/8da050f29866444b9af685d277c20b7ab142593a
 feature/30716 branch]. The idea is simple: instead of having obfs4 write
 directly to its socket, it now writes to the `SharknadoConn` struct, which
 implements the `net.Conn` interface.  After each call to `Read`, there's a
 1 in 10 chance to send padding, regardless of if the application has data
 waiting or not.

 There are several remaining challenges:
 * Effectively breaking bursts may require the client and the server to
 cooperate. For example, when the client receives the beginning of a burst,
 the adversary (who's somewhere between the client and the server) may
 already have seen the entire packet sequence, so we cannot break it
 anymore. We may be able to address this by having the server send only a
 few packets of its burst and then waiting until it received the client's
 burst-breaking packets.
 * We should find a way to make obfs4's packet sequences server-specific by
 incorporating the server's shared secret into the sequence generation
 process, just like it's done for packet lengths and inter-arrival times.
 * We need to build an evaluation framework to understand what works and
 what doesn't.

 Any thoughts?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items stop working
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha (removed)
 * keywords:   => ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > `Cc:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha`?

 Thanks and fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc cross-compilation for 32bit Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28240: Think about using mingw-w64 with dwarf exception support for rustc 
cross-
compilation for 32bit Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Hm. I know that mingw-clang-x86 needs sjlj-exceptions because the default
 SEH exceptions are not supported there.  But I'm confused why Tor needs a
 special case and the Mozilla builds don't.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august, asn-|  Actual Points:  3
  merge  |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august => network-team-roadmap-august,
 asn-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31240: Make confparse able to handle multiple config_format_t objects at once
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Thanks for explaining how everything got fixed, let's merge this, then
 work on the other bugfix tickets under #29211.

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[tor-bugs] #31611 [Core Tor/Tor]: Work out why chutney didn't fail due to #31495 cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31611: Work out why chutney didn't fail due to #31495 cannot configure bridges
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
  Sponsor31-must  |
--+
 In #31495, Tor Browser failed, but our chutney CI job did not fail. Let's
 work out why that happened.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items stop working
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `Cc:ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31527 [Core Tor/Tor]: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31527: In Tor Browser nightly, Tor fails to boostrap, hangs at 50%
--+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Does the #31495 fix also fix this issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Practracker: document new features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31476: Practracker: document new features
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
Parent ID:  #29746   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > Thanks for the review!  I've pushed a commit to fix this.
 >
 > (I went with ".c files and .h files", and not with "C files and header
 files" since technically, C header files are also C.)
 Thanks! Looks good now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24956 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: put labs.tp.o on hiatus?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24956: put labs.tp.o on hiatus?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 last call: i'm removing the DNS record tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31610 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31610: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 The 157 URLs from this list are working:
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/tmp/bug_31610/ok.txt
 The 143 URLs from this list are not working:
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/tmp/bug_31610/not-ok.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31610 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31610: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 In the output from `static-update-component cdn.torproject.org` I notice
 that there is an error with `cdn-backend-sunet-01.torproject.org`:
 {{{
 /usr/local/bin/static-master-update-component: Acquiring lock on
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org.lock...
 /usr/local/bin/static-master-update-component: Got them.
 /usr/local/bin/static-master-update-component: Updating master copy of
 cdn.torproject.org...
 /usr/local/bin/static-master-update-component: Done.  Committing.
 /usr/local/bin/static-master-update-component: Triggering mirror runs...
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] Acquiring lock for
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org.lock(3).
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] All locks acquired.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] Serial is 1567550001.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] Populating
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org-live.new-kENfrJ.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] Renaming
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org-live.new-kENfrJ to
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org-current-push.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] Calling clients...
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] Stage 1...
 [2019-09-03 22:33:21] savii.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-START
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] savii.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] savii.torproject.org: waiting
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-START
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org: waiting
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] saxatile.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-START
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] saxatile.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:22] saxatile.torproject.org: waiting
 [2019-09-03 22:33:23] web-cymru-01.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-START
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-cymru-01.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-cymru-01.torproject.org: waiting
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-START
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE1-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org: waiting
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] cdn-backend-sunet-01.torproject.org >> [MSM]
 STAGE1-START
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] cdn-backend-sunet-01.torproject.org: failed with
 returncode 12
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] Stage 1 done.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] WARNING: 1 clients failed!  Continuing anyway!
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] Committing...
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] savii.torproject.org << go
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org << go
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] saxatile.torproject.org << go
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-cymru-01.torproject.org << go
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org << go
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] savii.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE2-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] savii.torproject.org >>
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] savii.torproject.org: returned 0
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE2-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org >>
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-hetzner-01.torproject.org: returned 0
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] saxatile.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE2-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] saxatile.torproject.org >>
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] saxatile.torproject.org: returned 0
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-cymru-01.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE2-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-cymru-01.torproject.org >>
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] web-cymru-01.torproject.org: returned 0
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org >> [MSM] STAGE2-DONE
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org >>
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] listera.torproject.org: returned 0
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] Moving
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org-current-live aside.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] Renaming
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org-current-push to
 /srv/static.torproject.org/master/cdn.torproject.org-current-live.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] Cleaning up.
 [2019-09-03 22:33:26] Done, with warnings.
 Connection to staticiforme.torproject.org closed.
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #31610 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31610: Some cdn.torproject.org URLs are giving 404 errors
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I have uploaded the mar files for Tor Browser 8.5.5 on `staticiforme` in
 the directory `/srv/cdn-
 master.torproject.org/htdocs/aus1/torbrowser/8.5.5`, and ran `static-
 update-component cdn.torproject.org`.

 After this, some of the .mar files can be downloaded from
 https://cdn.torproject.org/ as expected, however for some of them we have
 a 404 error.

 An example of URL returning a 404 error is:
 https://cdn.torproject.org/aus1/torbrowser/8.5.5/tor-browser-
 osx64-8.5.5_pl.mar
 An example of working URL is:
 https://cdn.torproject.org/aus1/torbrowser/8.5.5/tor-browser-osx64-8.5
 .5_en-US.mar

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  teor-merge, consider-backport-   |  Actual Points:
  after-0415, 040-backport, tor-relay,   |
  circuitpadding, wtf-pad|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 consider-backport-after-0415, 040-backport, tor-relay, circuitpadding,
 wtf-pad
 =>
 teor-merge, consider-backport-after-0415, 040-backport, tor-relay,
 circuitpadding, wtf-pad


Comment:

 Seems good to me.

 Here's what I'll do to merge this backport:
 * check CI
 * release-0.4.1 and cherry-pick to master:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1282
 * maint-0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1174
 * maint-0.4.1: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1283
 * merge forward

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28499 [Webpages/Support]: tb-manual: create redirects for old resources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28499: tb-manual: create redirects for old resources
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ggus):

 Is this fixed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27330 [Applications/GetTor]: @get_tor on twitter not responding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27330: @get_tor on twitter not responding
-+-
 Reporter:  steph|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gettor-roadmap, ex-sponsor-19, ex-   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor19  |
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ggus):

 Hi, we're updating our documentation this week. Should we remove this
 entry from the support portal?

 https://support.torproject.org/gettor/gettor-3/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31518 [Core Tor/Tor]: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31518: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.
--+--
 Reporter:  haxxpop   |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy tcp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I've left some questions and suggestions on the pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30662 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure about:newtab is blank

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30662: Make sure about:newtab is blank
+--
 Reporter:  acat|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor44-can
+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Why not about:tor in new tab?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31425 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31425: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broker   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 > Replying to [comment:9 cohosh]:
 > > I asked before if we hit a transfer limit, which is worth checking
 into but I'll need dcf for that.
 >
 > There is no such limit in place as far as I know. I tried downloading a
 Debian ISO and it went at 7.5 MB/s, so it doesn't look like bandwidth is
 being throttled.
 > {{{
 > $ wget https://cdimage.debian.org/debian-cd/current/amd64/iso-
 cd/debian-10.0.0-amd64-netinst.iso
 > ...
 > 2019-09-03 16:48:54 (7.49 MB/s) - ‘debian-10.0.0-amd64-netinst.iso’
 saved [350224384/350224384]
 > }}}

 Is this machine by any chance running in a VM on a shared host? It could
 be due to the hosting provider de-prioritizing our VM if so.

 I suppose a good next step is to try to narrow down whether this is a
 network issue, but we can't do much until the symptoms start up again. My
 current plan is to wait for sysmon notifications and then run something
 using `time` to see if it's taking a lot longer than usual.

 It might be the case that the issues weren't showing when you did the
 download. I don't have any alerts since the 1st of September so we should
 try that again when we're sure the broker is acting up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28942 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Evaluate pion WebRTC

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28942: Evaluate pion WebRTC
+--
 Reporter:  backkem |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Well I can narrow down that at least one problem I'm having using just
 master versions of pion dependencies from the snowflake
 
[https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/commit/3cc240625cad22db02eca7af41b139606c13147d
 pion branch] is due to ICE not gathering any candidates.

 For me the client isn't even contacting the broker, but stalling in
 `exchangeSDP`
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/pion/client/lib/webrtc.go#L298
 L298] waiting for an offer to be sent from when the ICE gathering is
 completed
 [https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/blob/pion/client/lib/webrtc.go#L174
 L174]. I don't see any log messages from `OnICECandidate`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31608 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is created

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31608: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is 
created
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31609| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:   => #31609


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[tor-bugs] #31609 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN() look at the base magic number

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31609: Make CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN() look at the base magic number
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-circuit
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Currently, `CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN()` actually looks at the purpose, not the
 base magic number:

 {{{
 #define CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c) (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN((c)->purpose))
 }}}

 We should move it to look at the `magic` like `CIRCUIT_IS_ORCIRC()` is
 doing.

 The reason is because I was adding tracing events to the circuit subsystem
 and I kept having state transition event with a circuit global identifier
 of 0 which can't be because that value is set just after allocation.

 But at that point, the purpose has not been set so `CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN()`
 wasn't returning true.

 Furthermore, this made me discover another issue documented in #31608
 where if we do make this change, we _must_ fix this ticket else we have a
 NULL deref.

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[tor-bugs] #31608 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is created

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31608: circuit_state_publish() never triggers when a new origin circuit is 
created
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-circuit
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In `origin_circuit_init()`, we change the circuit state before allocating
 the `build_state` but also before a purpose is set.

 This means that `circuit_state_publish()` located in `circuit_set_state()`
 is never called for a new circuit because `CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN()` doesn't
 return true.

 Which in turn, by chance I believe, made this NULL deref on `build_state`
 to never happen.

 This should be fixed regardless.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29210| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Old description:

> [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11-off.png,600px)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11.png,600px)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> country.html?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-03-01-2019-06-11.png,600px)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> combined.html?start=2019-03-01=2019-06-11=ir link]

New description:

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-04-01-2019-09-03-off.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2019-04-01=2019-09-03=ir link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-04-01-2019-09-03.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2019-04-01=2019-09-03=ir link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-04-01-2019-09-03.png,600px)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2019-04-01=2019-09-03=ir link]

--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:32 xhdix]:
 > and again..
 > The ability to connect directly to Tor was blocked, and it was blocked
 through the list of IPs in the collector.

 How do you know that it was blocked using the CollecTor?

 > It looks like an app (probably an unofficial telegram) uses . (Due
 to a sharp increase and decrease)

 In the recent past, I've seen two large but brief spikes of users from IP
 addresses located in Iran, on two of my vanilla bridges. (In the second
 case, the bridge is actually supposed to be a meek bridge, but the Iranian
 IP addresses were connecting to one of its exposed ORPorts.)

 It would be an interesting experiment to go through CollecTor data and see
 if any other bridges have experienced spikes like this. A hypothesis is
 that a Telegram app, or whatever it is, chooses one bridge to use for a
 day, then changes to another one. If that were the case, we would be able
 to identify spikes rolling temporally across multiple bridges.

 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/272EB44C8992B8088BD8E8A12DB23B56478EB885
 [[Image(history-eRYaZuvY02FpExln-20190903.png)]]

 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8A34
 [[Image(history-starman-20190903.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "history-starman-20190903.png" added.

 bw_months
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8A34

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "history-eRYaZuvY02FpExln-20190903.png" added.

 bw_months
 
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/AA033EEB61601B2B7312D89B62AAA23DC3ED8A34

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2019-04-01-2019-09-03.png"
 added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.png?start=2019-04-01=2019-09-03=ir

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-bridge-country-ir-2019-04-01-2019-09-03.png"
 added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.png?start=2019-04-01=2019-09-03=ir

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30636 [Metrics/Analysis]: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 1M+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30636: Something funky is going in Iran: numbers of relay users flies off to 
1M+
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ir|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "userstats-relay-country-ir-2019-04-01-2019-09-03-off.png"
 added.

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.png?start=2019-04-01=2019-09-03=ir=off

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items stop working (was: App menu items not working)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items stop working
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items not working
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 A little more testing shows that `About Tor Browser` never works, but
 items like `Preferences` do work at first but stop after you try to access
 `About Tor Browser`. I saw the same behavior on macOS 10.14.x.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31491 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: clean up the old meek http helper browser profiles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31491: clean up the old meek http helper browser profiles
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, utls, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909|
Parent ID:  #29430   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * points:   => 4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31564 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31564: Android bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909, GeorgKoppen201909|
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * points:   => 5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29207 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, design, ex-sponsor-19,|  Actual Points:
  anti-censorship-roadmap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-must
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:15 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 serna]:
 > > I suggest changing the status to 204 No Content, it would represent
 that there's no error but it also no one to connect to.
 >
 > I disagree here. It's better not to hide ''any'' necessary information
 in the HTTP layer, because not every way of interacting with the broker
 will have those HTTP features. See for example comment:11:ticket:25985.
 Even assuming HTTP, codes like 204 are probably less likely to pass
 untouched by proxies. I propose to just always use status code 200, unless
 there is a genuine internal server error, and encode ''all'' necessary
 information in the HTTP body. We're not designing a REST interface here.

 Let me slightly amend my statement here. I was mistakenly thinking that
 this was about the client–broker protocol, not the proxy–broker protocol.
 While I do think that it's important to avoid HTTP entanglement in the
 client–broker protocol (#29293), in the proxy–broker protocol there's
 probably no harm in assuming HTTP in the proxy–broker protocol. That said,
 there's also no harm in moving that information into the body, as in
 comment:20.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201909, ff68-esr |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * points:   => 15


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[tor-bugs] #31607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: App menu items not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31607: App menu items not working
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In the ESR68-based Tor Browser on macOS, the App menu items are not
 working. For example, choosing `Quit` or pressing `Cmd+Q` has no effect.
 Same for `Preferences` and `Cmd+,`

 I observed this problem while testing the es-ES and en-US builds from the
 following location on an older macOS 10.11.6 system:
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/builds/9.0a6-build4/

 I will re-test on a 10.14.x system to make sure it isn't specific to macOS
 10.11.x.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31586 [Circumvention/Censorship analysis]: Browser problems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31586: Browser problems
---+--
 Reporter:  fantasy_man59@…|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  legind => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31011 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31011: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when
DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31009 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-can
---+---
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31011 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31011: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when
DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31009 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-can
---+---
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (removed)
 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28942 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Evaluate pion WebRTC

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28942: Evaluate pion WebRTC
+--
 Reporter:  backkem |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  Sponsor28-must
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I tried also with pion-webrtc
 [https://github.com/pion/webrtc/commits/v2.1.3 v2.1.3], released 5 days
 ago. With it, I get the same failure as in comment:43 with v2.1.2: not
 even a `Buffered X bytes --> WebRTC` in the log.

 I'm looking at some possibly relevant commits:
 [https://github.com/pion/webrtc/commit/7f3000d9a6eea38623833b6cac524cbf35b4238d
 Parse DTLS setup in SetRemoteDescription]::
  Take into consideration if remote is running DTLS as a client/server.
 Before we ignored this value and we could enter cases where DTLS would
 never connect. Resolves [https://github.com/pion/webrtc/issues/494 #494]
 [https://github.com/pion/webrtc/commit/4095d2cde9783be9a162765264f0ae1cb9c2ad91
 Fix for Safari and latest Firefox]::
  This fixes the echo program so it works properly on Safari and Firefox,
 where the preferred offered dynamic media type is not 96/VP8. It loads
 MediaEngine with codecs found in the offer and then uses the payload type
 of the offer's preferred video codec in the answer.

 The latter commit rearranges some API-using code in examples/echo/main.go.
 Maybe we need to do the same?

 There must be a problem either in pion-webrtc, or in the way we are using
 it. I think a good debugging step now is to make a minimal reproducing
 example (text chat between a command-line pion-webrtc program and a
 browser) and see where it is failing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31425 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31425: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broker   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:10 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:8 cohosh]:
 > > To add to the information here, starting yesterday I've been getting
 notifications from sysmon that the snowflake broker becomes unreachable
 periodically (I received 3 notifications yesterday that unreachability
 lasted approximately 10-25 minutes.
 >
 > What reachability test does sysmon do? An HTTPS request?
 Just a simple TCP reachability test to port 443.
 >
 > I wondered if there were some pathology in the in-memory data structures
 used to store active snowflakes and clients. But the set of snowflakes
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/broker/snowflake-heap.go?h=webext-0.0.10
 uses a priority queue] and I don't see any obvious bugs. If the problem
 were an inefficient algorithm, I'd expect to see higher CPU usage anyway.

 Another main symptom of sluggishness I was experiencing was that when I
 logged in, it took forever for me to type commands and for the commands to
 run. So for example simply running `top` was a multi-minute affair. Once I
 ran it, I was similarly seeing very low CPU and memory usage.

 So it's not just that the snowflake-broker is running slowly, it seems to
 be all other processes on that machine (or at least from what I could tell
 through an SSH connection). I even stopped the snowflake broker for a few
 minutes and that didn't help at all. The machine was still just as
 sluggish.

 When I logged in again this morning, the sluggishness seems to have
 disappeared for the moment, and I haven't gotten any sysmon notifications
 recently.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31589 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31589: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs easy refactoring tech-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24366 [Core Tor/Tor]: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision resistance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24366: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision
resistance
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, possible-consensus- |  Actual Points:
  failure, needs-proposal, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (removed)
 * owner:  neel => (none)


Comment:

 Don't want to work on this anymore. Releasing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24366 [Core Tor/Tor]: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision resistance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24366: compare_vote_rs() could check more fields for better SHA1 collision
resistance
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, possible-consensus- |  Actual Points:
  failure, needs-proposal, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31425 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31425: Snowflake broker is sluggish and sometimes fails
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broker   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:8 cohosh]:
 > To add to the information here, starting yesterday I've been getting
 notifications from sysmon that the snowflake broker becomes unreachable
 periodically (I received 3 notifications yesterday that unreachability
 lasted approximately 10-25 minutes.

 What reachability test does sysmon do? An HTTPS request?

 I also have been seeing lots of 504 timeouts on the client side.

 I wondered if there were some pathology in the in-memory data structures
 used to store active snowflakes and clients. But the set of snowflakes
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/tree/broker/snowflake-heap.go?h=webext-0.0.10
 uses a priority queue] and I don't see any obvious bugs. If the problem
 were an inefficient algorithm, I'd expect to see higher CPU usage anyway.

 netstat shows about 800 established connections. Compared to about 400
 proxies, with 2 sockets per proxy, that seems reasonable. 800 open sockets
 doesn't seem like it should cause problems in kernel I/O.
 {{{
 $ netstat -n | grep -c ESTABLISHED
 828
 }}}

 Replying to [comment:9 cohosh]:
 > I asked before if we hit a transfer limit, which is worth checking into
 but I'll need dcf for that.

 There is no such limit in place as far as I know. I tried downloading a
 Debian ISO and it went at 7.5 MB/s, so it doesn't look like bandwidth is
 being throttled.
 {{{
 $ wget https://cdimage.debian.org/debian-cd/current/amd64/iso-
 cd/debian-10.0.0-amd64-netinst.iso
 ...
 2019-09-03 16:48:54 (7.49 MB/s) - ‘debian-10.0.0-amd64-netinst.iso’ saved
 [350224384/350224384]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31589 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31589: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs easy refactoring tech-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (removed)
 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22665 [Applications/GetTor]: Use internet archive's wayback machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22665: Use internet archive's wayback machine.
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28231   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by boklm):

 By the way, in #29697 we have also been planning to upload Tor Browser
 releases to Internet Archive.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider disabling AMO search field in add-ons dialog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31582: Consider disabling AMO search field in add-ons dialog
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 BTW don't forget #19508 ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31589 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31589: hs-v3: Simplify decrypt_desc_layer interface
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs easy refactoring tech-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: neel (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31558 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Process bridge pool assignments again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31558: Process bridge pool assignments again
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl|Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/collector.git/commit/?h=task-31558=db2a6bdab1bfc12377c515577589aa67d34fa2ba
 commit db2a6bd in my task-31558 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31538: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "uni_mozglue_analysis" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31538: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "tpo_mozglue_analysis" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31538: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I am adding the files I got while using `peanalyis` for posterity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31518 [Core Tor/Tor]: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31518: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.
--+--
 Reporter:  haxxpop   |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy tcp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh, I misunderstood: this is a new proxy type for tor to use, not for tor
 to implement.  I'll adjust the above questions accordingly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31495: cannot configure bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, tbb-needs, asn-merge,|  Actual Points:  .1
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31518 [Core Tor/Tor]: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31518: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.
--+--
 Reporter:  haxxpop   |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy tcp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Third question: what is the canonical specification for the protocol that
 this implements?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31518 [Core Tor/Tor]: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31518: HAProxy implementation in TCPProxy option.
--+--
 Reporter:  haxxpop   |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  proxy tcp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 First question: on your note above, what do you mean by "the proxy has to
 support DNS resolving in HTTP CONNECT"?  We *want* all the DNS resolution
 to happen in Tor.

 Second question: is it actually a problem in practice that SOCKS5takes two
 round trips?  A Tor client should be installed locally, and not somewhere
 where the latency with the application is significant.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31538 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31538: Windows bundles based on ESR 68 are not built reproducibly
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201909,   |
  GeorgKoppen201909  |
Parent ID:  #30322   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It seems at least the table information is not written reproducibly.
 Taking `mozglue.dll` as an example:
 {{{
 Name: Import symbols table RVA: 802489 (0xc3eb9) Size: 380
 Name: Export symbols table RVA: 792816 (0xc18f0) Size: 9673
 Name: Base relocation table RVA: 937984 (0xe5000) Size: 6172
 Name: Debugging information RVA: 880640 (0xd7000) Size: 28
 Name: Exception table RVA: 901120 (0xdc000) Size: 26388
 Name: Thread local storage table RVA: 746264 (0xb6318) Size: 40
 Name: Resource table RVA: 933888 (0xe4000) Size: 1200
 Name: Import address table RVA: 804752 (0xc4790) Size: 1880
 }}}
 vs:
 {{{
 Name: Import symbols table RVA: 802505 (0xc3ec9) Size: 380
 Name: Export symbols table RVA: 792832 (0xc1900) Size: 9673
 Name: Base relocation table RVA: 937984 (0xe5000) Size: 6176
 Name: Debugging information RVA: 880640 (0xd7000) Size: 28
 Name: Exception table RVA: 901120 (0xdc000) Size: 26388
 Name: Thread local storage table RVA: 746272 (0xb6320) Size: 40
 Name: Resource table RVA: 933888 (0xe4000) Size: 1200
 Name: Import address table RVA: 804768 (0xc47a0) Size: 1880
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0415,|  Actual Points:
  040-backport, tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-  |
  pad|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 I added the entry to `ReleaseNotes` in my `release-0.4.1` branch (PR
 1282).

 Is there anything else that needs to be done?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31554: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-backport, 035-backport, dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31554: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-backport, 035-backport, dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review
 * reviewer:  asn => nickm
 * keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix, 041-backport, 040-backport, 035-backport =>
 tor-ci, fast-fix, 041-backport, 040-backport, 035-backport, dgoulet-
 merge


Comment:

 Setting myself as reviewer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31495 [Core Tor/Tor]: cannot configure bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31495: cannot configure bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, tbb-needs, asn-merge,|  Actual Points:  .1
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  regression, tbb-needs => regression, tbb-needs, asn-merge,
 dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31602 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Pocket indicators in UI and disable it by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31602: Remove Pocket indicators in UI and disable it by default
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 What scary page?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31601 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't let Mozilla recommend extensions again

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31601: Don't let Mozilla recommend extensions again
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha, ff68-esr|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 All new prefs added in FF68

 {{{
 user_pref("extensions.getAddons.discovery.api_url", "");
 user_pref("extensions.htmlaboutaddons.discover.enabled", false);
 user_pref("extensions.htmlaboutaddons.recommendations.enabled", false);
 }}}

 This disables recommendations in about:addons' Extensions and Themes panes
 and removes/hides any leftover UI bits and bobs

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31579 [Core Tor/Tor]: Space out the arguments to the cell functions in rend_process_relay_cell()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31579: Space out the arguments to the cell functions in 
rend_process_relay_cell()
+--
 Reporter:  neel|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy asn-merge nickm-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31554: Restrict "make test-stem" to tests that actually use tor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix, 041-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.2
  040-backport, 035-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23971 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement multi-step progress bar for new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23971: implement multi-step progress bar for new Tor Launcher UI
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by pili):

 Just came across this one... do we want to take this any further?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31561 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31561: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hv-v3  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30200| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Back in needs_review. Answered the PR. One bit I did not change, let me
 know if you agree or not.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29200 [Webpages/Website]: Make more accessible Core Tor documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29200: Make more accessible Core Tor documentation
-+--
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  pili
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, GSoD  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24132   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:  documentation, ux-team, GSoD => documentation, GSoD


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31369 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31369: HSv3 descriptor support in stem
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs onionbalance scaling  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  9
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Hello atagar,

 I have a branch which implements the crypto parts needed to decrypt a
 descriptor. I made a PR just so that you can do a review, but please don't
 merge as this is very dirty and also breaks tests:
 https://github.com/torproject/stem/pull/20

 Some comments:
 - We need to add a mandatory `onion_address` argument to the parsing
 function since we can't decrypt any layers of the descriptor without the
 full onion address.
 - I made an `hsv3_crypto.py` file to store all the various crypto
 utilities but I will move these to the hsv3 file when we make one.

 I also added some `ATAGAR XXX` notes with stem things I need help:
 - There is some pre-processing that needs to happen while parsing some
 objects (e.g. certs and encrypted bodies) which I do inline atm, but we
 need to move them to the parsing layer.
 - I don't know how to parse the resulting plaintext using the stem parsing
 functions, so I made a super dirty `parse_superencrypted_plaintext()`
 which needs to be made more stem-y.

 I'm pretty confident that this can serve as a reasonable basis for more
 decoding work, so I will be moving to encoding work for now so that I do
 the crypto parts there too.

 Thanks for all the help!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript icon is still visible in context menu after the fix for #25658 landed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29886: NoScript icon is still visible in context menu after the fix for #25658
landed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201812, tbb-8.5,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201906   |
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201906 =>
 GeorgKoppen201812, tbb-8.5, TorBrowserTeam201906


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. I cherry-picked them onto `master` (commit
 44866943861e1da1959c06e711c8be4b222eee91 and
 23c956584436ec12795af873aef02a700d49cf20).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27493: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `+ac_add_options --enable-rust-simd`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23922 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: The Uninstalling page does not mention the TorBrowser-Data directory on OSX

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23922: The Uninstalling page does not mention the TorBrowser-Data directory on 
OSX
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docshackathon |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24231| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pili):

 Replying to [comment:14 emmapeel]:
 > maybe we should replace one of the two with a link to the other
 document, to avoid duplicating content.
 +1 to not duplicating content

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should stop listing relays running pre-0.2.9, or running 0.3.0 through 0.3.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31549: Authorities should stop listing relays running pre-0.2.9, or running 
0.3.0
through 0.3.4
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-can 041-backport consider-   |  Actual Points:
  backport-after-authority-test consider-|
  backport-after-0421|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > > Could we drop everything before 0.3.5 with the EOL of 0.2.9?
 >
 > Maybe. If we can convince enough 0.2.9 operators to upgrade,

 I think we could already now start the process of reaching out to them
 tbh. At this consensus hour, there are 777 relays representing ~6.13% of
 the network in bw weight. 4 months before EOL is definitely not too early
 to start doing that. I'll draft an email to try to start coordinating
 this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31579 [Core Tor/Tor]: Space out the arguments to the cell functions in rend_process_relay_cell()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31579: Space out the arguments to the cell functions in 
rend_process_relay_cell()
+--
 Reporter:  neel|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy asn-merge nickm-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * keywords:  easy => easy asn-merge nickm-merge
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.2.x-final


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27493: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Hrm, also look at ​https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr60/source/browser/config/mozconfigs/whitelist
 That's about https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 release/search?q=BUILDING_RELEASE

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909 => TorBrowserTeam201909R


Comment:

 I attached two small patches for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * Attachment "0002-Bug-31606-Fix-instructions-for-updating-the-
 Windows-.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-31606-Don-t-update-Tor-Browser-release-date-
 on-t.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * points:   => 0.1


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[tor-bugs] #31606 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31606: Update website update instructions in Tor Browser release process
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201909
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31603 [Internal Services/Service - github tpo]: GitHub close Support, tpo, community issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31603: GitHub close Support, tpo, community issues
+--
 Reporter:  ggus|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - github tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 I don't think you can close pull requests on GitHub.

 Our experience with tor is that when we close issues, a small number of
 people report them using pull requests instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29211: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  23
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
 >
 > [snip]
 >
 > > But I would like to hear your ideas at the sponsor 31 meeting on
 Thursday.
 > {{{
 > 10:24 <+GeKo> teor4: so, i tried to find out somethign about the s31
 meeting you
 >   mentioned in comment:8 in #29211
 > 10:24 -zwiebelbot:#tor-project- tor#29211: Distribute config.c
 functionality across
 >   more modules - [assigned] - https://bugs.torproject.org/29211
 > 10:24 <+GeKo> are there notes somewhere?
 > 10:24 <+GeKo> i did not see any log from meetbot
 > 10:24 <+GeKo> or was that a sekrit meeting?
 > 10:25 <+GeKo> i'd be interested in the results as it seems this
 refactoring is
 >   breaking a bunch of things
 > 10:25 <+GeKo> which hurts at least tor browser nightly users
 > }}}
 > [snip]

 We rescheduled the meeting to 2300 UTC Tuesday 3 September.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29708 [Core Tor]: Update trac wiki teams page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29708: Update trac wiki teams page
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by ggus):

 I think this is fixed now:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29211: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  23
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:8 teor]:

 [snip]

 > But I would like to hear your ideas at the sponsor 31 meeting on
 Thursday.
 {{{
 10:24 <+GeKo> teor4: so, i tried to find out somethign about the s31
 meeting you
   mentioned in comment:8 in #29211
 10:24 -zwiebelbot:#tor-project- tor#29211: Distribute config.c
 functionality across
   more modules - [assigned] - https://bugs.torproject.org/29211
 10:24 <+GeKo> are there notes somewhere?
 10:24 <+GeKo> i did not see any log from meetbot
 10:24 <+GeKo> or was that a sekrit meeting?
 10:25 <+GeKo> i'd be interested in the results as it seems this
 refactoring is
   breaking a bunch of things
 10:25 <+GeKo> which hurts at least tor browser nightly users
 }}}
 [snip]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27493 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27493: 'mk_add_options' or 'export' MOZILLA_OFFICIAL
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201909, tbb-9.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha  |
Parent ID:  #30320   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #30429 => #30320


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23809 [Community/Tor Support]: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23809: Add instructions for running a relay on a Raspberry Pi
-+-
 Reporter:  (none)   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website
 |  redesign
Component:  Community/Tor Support|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  docs, relays, community, |  Actual Points:
  raspberrypi|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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