Re: [tor-bugs] #32123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32123: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I'm not sure if we should be using "mode" or "module" here. It's going to
 be weird if we disable some features that aren't modes. Like statistics.

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[tor-bugs] #32123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32123: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:   | Status:  assigned
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-
 Severity:  Normal   |  october
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 Add:
 * --disable-relay-mode
   * Build tor with relay mode disabled: tor can not run as a relay,
 bridge, or authority. Implies --disable-dirauth-mode.
   * disable DirPort, DirCache, ORPort, and sets ClientOnly to 1
   * pick one quick module/function to disable

 Update:
 * --disable-dirauth-mode
   * hidden alias --disable-module-dirauth
   * Build tor with authority mode disabled: tor can not run as a directory
 authority or bridge authority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30860 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30860: Add a chutney job that runs on macOS, so that IPv6 chutney tests work
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  CI, PTs, sponsor-28-maybe,   |  Actual Points:  1.5
  consider-backport-after-ci-passes, |
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2,  |
  tor-ci, teor-backlog-ci,   |
  042-deferred-20190918, teor-merge  |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * actualpoints:  1.0 => 1.5
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 teor]:
 > Please review my PRs:
 > * 0.2.9: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1369
 > * 0.3.5: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1370
 > * 0.4.1: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1372
 > * master: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1373
 >
 > Clean merges - testing only:
 > * 0.4.0: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1371

 Merged to 0.2.9 - 0.4.2: the master branch now corresponds to maint-0.4.2,
 and merges cleanly. And maint-0.4.2 merges cleanly to master.

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[tor-bugs] #32122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tests for the git scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32122: Add tests for the git scripts
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29603
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 If we have time, we might want to add tests and CI for the git scripts.
 Here are the ones I used to test #29603:

 {{{
 $ TOR_FULL_GIT_PATH=/tmp/test-origin git-setup-dirs.sh
 $ TOR_FULL_GIT_PATH=/tmp/test-upstream TOR_UPSTREAM_REMOTE_NAME=upstream
 git-setup-dirs.sh
 $ TOR_FULL_GIT_PATH=/tmp/test-wkt TOR_WKT_NAME=. TOR_MASTER_NAME=master
 git-setup-dirs.sh
 }}}

 We might also want to test them with -n, -u, git-pull-all.sh, and git-
 merge-forward.sh.

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[tor-bugs] #32121 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor some common configs and functions out of the git scripts.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32121: Refactor some common configs and functions out of the git scripts.
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  git-scripts
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #29603
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There are a bunch of common configs and functions in the git scripts, we
 should find a nice way of refactoring them out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a script that sets up worktrees for the git-* merge scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29603: Make a script that sets up worktrees for the git-* merge scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a script that sets up worktrees for the git-* merge scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29603: Make a script that sets up worktrees for the git-* merge scripts
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  git-scripts   |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => teor
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 I made a script which works from an empty directory, and from my previous
 directories that were missing maint-0.4.2:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1420

 I'll open some tickets for follow-up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Subsystem "thread_cleanup" is never called

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32103: Subsystem "thread_cleanup" is never called
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by opara):

 I made a [https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1418 PR on Github] with
 some changes that should fix this problem. Feel free to use them if
 they're helpful.

 > This fixes ticket #32103. It extends the threadpool to allow a
 customizable thread spawn function. This allows us to use our own spawn
 function which calls subsystems_thread_cleanup and a new
 subsystems_thread_init. It also calls 'spawn_exit', which negates the need
 for [https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1412 1412]. Finally the above
 two functions are called in the main thread after subsystems_init and
 before subsystems_shutdown respectively.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31730: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R tbb-9.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-must =>
 tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201910R tbb-9.0-must
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 If I was smart, I would've saved the current prefs somehow before we
 overwrote them, but I didn't think about that. Unfortunately, I'm worried
 about changing these. On the one hand, custom prefs aren't recommended but
 they are allowed. If we change this without notifying the user then we
 could be putting them at risk. We should probably include a warning about
 this in the release announcement, at a minimum.

 I think we should set `kCustomPref` as `false` if all the prefs are set as
 level 4. What do you think? Can you add a function
 `isSecurityLevel(index)` that takes an index and iterates through
 `kSecuritySettings`, returns true if they match the expected value and
 false otherwise? Or something like this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31028 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Migrate away from the custom websocket library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31028: Migrate away from the custom websocket library
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Starting something for this in
 https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/commits/trac31028 but haven't
 tested it yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR68 Network Code Review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31144: ESR68 Network Code Review
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I have `bug31144_01` for review. Testing this is a bit difficult. I ran
 some tests, but it will benefit from some more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32105 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: brid...@torproject.org don't respond

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32105: brid...@torproject.org don't respond
+--
 Reporter:  mh828   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:8 phw]:
 > Here's a BridgeDB patch that makes this undocumented OS-level dependency
 explicit:
 
https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/commit/67b9aad067b00d6e618736ab07b6062cddb04543

 Hi phw! That change looks good.

 But, we probably want a bigger change too. It looks like bridgedb relies
 on the .procmailrc contents of the bridgedb user, in order to add the "X
 -DKIM-Authentication-Results: pass" header, without which bridgedb's email
 module won't be pleased with the mail it receives. I think that means the
 mail receiving scripts are part of bridgedb and should be documented, or
 in git, somewhere too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32105 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: brid...@torproject.org don't respond

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32105: brid...@torproject.org don't respond
+--
 Reporter:  mh828   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+--

Comment (by arma):

 Good find, phw!

 For posterity, the previous times this happened were #10003 and, back when
 dkimverify was a perl thing, #4930.

 This time we've registered, in puppet, the need for the python3-dkim
 package on the bridgedb server, so next time puppet makes a bridgedb
 server it should appear.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR68 Network Code Review

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31144: ESR68 Network Code Review
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
  -alpha-must|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:16 mikeperry]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 sysrqb]:
 > > (continuing...)
 > >
 > > Replying to [comment:11 mikeperry]:
 >
 > > >- BrowserApp.java (see also onNewIntent() delegation to
 BrowserAppDelegates list)
 > >
 > > Can you provide a link for this? I'm missing it somehow.
 >
 > In ./mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java search
 for BrowserAppDelegate (sorry, no s). That type is used to create a list
 of things that have Activity related things passed to them. I think it
 might be harmless though.

 Okay, I saw that. Yeah, that is harmless. I don't see any of those
 delegates implementing onNewIntent() (overriding the empty implementation
 they inherit).

 >
 > > > 4. android.content.Intent startActivity() usage (may or may not be
 unsafe depending on circumstance :/)
 > > >- ActivityHandlerHelper - Good candidate to patch for external
 activities, but not everything uses it :/
 > > >- BrowserApp.onUrlOpenWithRefferer () - Might be able to launch
 other apps if OPEN_WITH_INTENT flag is set?
 > >
 > > Caught by forcing above prompt.
 >
 > Wait, both of these call startActivity() directly with an intent.
 Forcing the prompy from IntentHelper will NOT catch these.
 >
 > If ActivityHandlerHelper was patched to call into IntentHelper (or add
 its own prompt), then all the things that us it would prompt, but
 BrowserApp doesn't use either of the Helper classes to handle its Intents.

 Sorry, I should've been more descriptive. I'm patching them like:

 {{{
 iff --git a/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java
 b/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java
 index 5d6f725dc1c5..ab19b78d54e7 100644
 --- a/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java
 +++ b/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java
 @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ import org.mozilla.gecko.util.WindowUtil;
  import org.mozilla.gecko.widget.ActionModePresenter;
  import org.mozilla.gecko.widget.AnchoredPopup;
  import org.mozilla.gecko.widget.AnimatedProgressBar;
 +import
 org.mozilla.gecko.widget.ExternalIntentDuringPrivateBrowsingPromptFragment;
  import org.mozilla.gecko.widget.GeckoActionProvider;
  import org.mozilla.gecko.widget.SplashScreen;
  import org.mozilla.geckoview.DynamicToolbarAnimator;
 @@ -2237,7 +2238,8 @@ public class BrowserApp extends GeckoApp
  if (AppConstants.RELEASE_OR_BETA) {
  Intent intent = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW);
  intent.setData(Uri.parse("market://details?id=" +
 getPackageName()));
 -startActivity(intent);
 +
 ExternalIntentDuringPrivateBrowsingPromptFragment.showDialogOrAndroidChooser(
 +this, getSupportFragmentManager(), intent);
  break;
  }

 @@ -4195,7 +4197,8 @@ public class BrowserApp extends GeckoApp
  if (flags.contains(OnUrlOpenListener.Flags.OPEN_WITH_INTENT)) {
  Intent intent = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW);
  intent.setData(Uri.parse(url));
 -startActivity(intent);
 +
 ExternalIntentDuringPrivateBrowsingPromptFragment.showDialogOrAndroidChooser(
 +this, getSupportFragmentManager(), intent);
  } else {
 }}}

 And I'm forcing `showPromptInPrivateBrowsing` as `true` in
 `ExternalIntentDuringPrivateBrowsingPromptFragment.showDialogOrAndroidChooser`.

 >
 > > > 6. android.app.PendingIntent
 > > >- ChromeCastDisplay.java - probably want to make sure this is
 disabled?
 > >
 > > Disabled.
 > >
 > > >- CustomTabsActivity.performPendingIntent - again, hard to tell
 what is happening here
 > >
 > > These seem like they could be arbitrary actions.
 >
 > Hrmm.. should we patch that somehow, or assume it is handled when the
 Intent is finally delivered?
 >

 I'd rather break this functionality at this point. Someone can change the
 default browser on their device to Tor Browser under the assumption that
 CustomTabs are proxy-safe and other apps will happily use it. I'd rather
 be 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32076 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update goptlib to v1.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32076: Update goptlib to v1.1.0
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  goptlib TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  goptlib => goptlib TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 The build completed without error (after adding the patch for #32061 too).
 I was able to bootstrap linux64 with obfs4 with and without a proxy.
 Running obfs4proxy with a bad proxy string gives the expected PROXY-ERROR,
 not a panic.
 {{{
 $ TOR_PT_MANAGED_TRANSPORT_VER=1 TOR_PT_CLIENT_TRANSPORTS=obfs4
 TOR_PT_STATE_LOCATION=. TOR_PT_PROXY=socks5://127.0.0.1:9
 Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy
 VERSION 1
 PROXY-ERROR proxy URI has invalid host: not a Port string: "9"
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29249 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Assessment of moat for bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29249: Assessment of moat for bridges
+---
 Reporter:  gaba|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat, ex-sponsor-19 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 What exactly should we assess here? Moat works just fine and I'm not sure
 what there is to do.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32105 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: brid...@torproject.org don't respond

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32105: brid...@torproject.org don't respond
+--
 Reporter:  mh828   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  cohosh  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+--
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => cohosh


Comment:

 Here's a BridgeDB patch that makes this undocumented OS-level dependency
 explicit:
 
https://github.com/NullHypothesis/bridgedb/commit/67b9aad067b00d6e618736ab07b6062cddb04543

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32105 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: brid...@torproject.org don't respond

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32105: brid...@torproject.org don't respond
+---
 Reporter:  mh828   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * owner:  (none) => phw
 * status:  needs_information => accepted


Comment:

 BridgeDB uses the binary `dkimverify` in ~/.procmailrc. Here's an excerpt:
 {{{
 :0
 * ^DKIM-Signature:
 {
 :0 HBfw
 * ? dkimverify
 | formail -I "X-DKIM-Authentication-Results: pass"
 }
 }}}

 `dkimverify` used to be provided by the python-dkim package (which is
 installed on polyanthum) but with the upgrade to Debian Buster, it is now
 provided by python3-dkim (which is not installed). Here's an excerpt of
 /usr/share/doc/python-dkim/changelog.Debian.gz:
 {{{
 dkimpy (0.8.0-1) unstable; urgency=medium

   [...]

   * Provide /usr/bin scripts from python3-dkim rather than python-dkim
 - Update package descriptions
 - Python3-dkim Replaces previous versions of python-dkim
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #32120 [Webpages/Website]: Figure out what to do with hidden 'Learn More' link in about:preferences#tor in the 'Advanced' section

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32120: Figure out what to do with hidden 'Learn More' link in
about:preferences#tor in the 'Advanced' section
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The UX mockups for #31286 called for a 'Learn More' link for the
 'Advanced' proxy and firewall settings. However, we do not have any
 documentation surrounding these features in Tor Browser. We either need
 documentation to be written and added to the website for the link to point
 to, or the link should just be removed if we do not want documentation on
 this section.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha, ff68-esr, ux-|  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201910R|
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha, ff68-esr, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201910 =>
 tbb-9.0-must-alpha, ff68-esr, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31286: Include bridge configuration into about:preferences
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must-alpha, ff68-esr, ux-|  Actual Points:
  team, TorBrowserTeam201910 |
Parent ID:  #10760   | Points:  15
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 I've amended the review4 branch to change the last commit to a fixup!
 commit:

 tor-browser: tor-browser fixup:
 ​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31286_review4

 gk: I opted to move the existing strings to the DTD as I gathered from
 acat's changes to securityLevel.js that DTD was what we were using going
 forward (since those strings had originally been in a properties file in
 tor-button).

 Once tor-launcher is gone and its functionality has been completely
 integrated into Tor Browser (9.5?) then the tor-launcher (and maybe also
 tor-button?) can live nicely together in one place and the 'TorStrings'
 module can mostly go away. I think it would make sense to do the string
 merge at that point.

 Given that new tor bootstrapping UX is going to be coming down the pipe
 soonish, do we need --without-tor-launcher support? What dev scenarios
 does that enable? If so, I'll create a bug to track doing that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32105 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: brid...@torproject.org don't respond

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32105: brid...@torproject.org don't respond
+---
 Reporter:  mh828   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30
+---
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I could reproduce this issue. Here are BridgeDB's logs after I requested
 bridges from my gmail address:
 {{{
 22:44:41 DEBUGL373:server.validateTo()  Validating SMTP 'RCPT TO:'
 email address...
 22:44:41 INFO L613:autoresponder.reply()Got an email; deciding
 whether to reply.
 22:44:41 DEBUGL664:autoresponder.runCheck() Canonicalizing client
 email domain...
 22:44:41 DEBUGL673:autoresponder.runCheck() Canonical email domain:
 gmail.com
 22:44:41 ERRORL682:autoresponder.runCheck() SMTP/Email canonical
 domain mismatch!
 22:44:41 DEBUGL685:autoresponder.runCheck() Canonical domain mismatch:
 polyanthum != gmail.com
 22:44:41 INFO  L60:dkim.checkDKIM() Checking DKIM verification
 results...
 22:44:41 DEBUG L61:dkim.checkDKIM() Domain has rules:
 ignore_dots, dkim
 22:44:41 INFO  L72:dkim.checkDKIM() Rejecting bad DKIM header
 on incoming email: u'dunno'
 }}}

 Here's the full email:
 {{{
 Received: from polyanthum ([[scrubbed]] helo=polyanthum)
   by polyanthum.torproject.org with BridgeDB (0.9.0+0.g681963d.dirty)
   for bridges@bridgedb; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 22:55:49 +
 From [scrubbed]  Wed Oct 16 22:55:49 2019
 X-Original-To: [scrubbed].org
 Delivered-To: [scrubbed].org
 Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org
 [IPv6:2a01:4f8:10b:239f:0:ab4:202:1])
   (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
   (Client CN "clientcerts/eugeni.torproject.org", Issuer "auto-
 ca.torproject.org" (verified OK))
   by polyanthum.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46B0B1001CF
   for <[scrubbed].org>; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 22:55:49 + (UTC)
 Received: from localhost (localhost [[scrubbed]])
   by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24E15E198D
   for <[scrubbed].org>; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 22:55:49 + (UTC)
 X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at
 Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([[scrubbed]])
   by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [[scrubbed]]) (amavisd-new, port
 10024)
   with ESMTP id QajNQiO4VjCc for <[scrubbed].org>;
   Wed, 16 Oct 2019 22:55:49 + (UTC)
 Received: from mail-vs1-xe36.google.com (mail-vs1-xe36.google.com
 [IPv[scrubbed]])
   (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits))
   (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "GTS CA 1O1" (not verified))
   by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D10D6E198C
   for <[scrubbed]>; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 22:55:48 + (UTC)
 Received: by mail-vs1-xe36.google.com with SMTP id d3so302626vsr.1
 for <[scrubbed]>; Wed, 16 Oct 2019 15:55:48 -0700 (PDT)
 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
 d=gmail.com; s=20161025;
 h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to;
 bh=ngRdnins9CRptXBut2wpGkSCNfH0hUIw7lj/EkgMSE0=;
 b=clpdZk8NzD3i9cKiuDgzqJSSmCS0hdf0LTyXfSB0+8c5595EdbGEInR9CuZ+MOjzKC
 nWQQeZgTt4ZLcIrA1BqKYxMfZc5eRFkyKmyh3Pq8T5aHf2n+NsyAlaX94RSg7YS+B5Rh
 6TSXG6DmVZPtarYZriOHEfyXovkdHX9Pr56/wOBOepjNsy0Z1H1PwKMLyIKcCZi4aWRf
 K40IZpSr2iHmcM4AUtPQyj85tRk12hbP5hvfYoNmR7j5lBUhXqKcpGofxOQtPusgUqM3
 6hZJkFdsLPtizjOWQLWvBwQWdtlDhQOveovsHReZAVL6p8BLPbuJ9wdeuAVQO9Ws4Fey
  CEwQ==
 X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
 d=1e100.net; s=20161025;
 h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to;
 bh=ngRdnins9CRptXBut2wpGkSCNfH0hUIw7lj/EkgMSE0=;
 b=la81DfjtXqYcs7zHkDTgdvcTPyJ8hFkLTYU1E6wKpzH8CXdI30YNIvVJ1979loi/20
 eYq7bLjp2A2+SdJOio+gYLz0bXr/sFyuOx09uP5/oXuh2Dvj2DAaxejaSpTBOcxvKZn+
 ud77fUBBEKE9256gSFeQm0YMz099mjIpSJLwycCG7iHEJXnn2Px/e3lqrIbt9ce+NjNi
 L8zyp5qcd2VJFVM5lk940kWNqthsh164ZmVDXDN6QyMPXpi8VkqXw0CgHLL6SBUsAmhU
 6AivgW7x+zGWJN5MJFtt4mJz/3SgcNGUUmdfGau8ksbRG6y6ETYASc+96MSIaNhNoYb3
  x82g==
 X-Gm-Message-State:
 APjAAAWO0amLn5psJwvrlW5Go4jx0NXEhKEOCn2G3ICYtzL2HaCGIzVQ
   G0ldr7O2yR/3fvwcnUYoBdJDDzEbLI2Uvw9ioZlC
 X-Google-Smtp-Source:
 
APXvYqzSyJE2SxcmnFJOhPjk/JFjPTf+MJHfpcT/ueP1Jv0/4J67w2iaW9lL+77mWdlZRb+VkhWEK7qw24343s2E2Pk=
 X-Received: by [scrubbed] with SMTP id y13mr170018vso.96.1571266545303;
  Wed, 16 Oct 2019 15:55:45 -0700 (PDT)
 MIME-Version: 1.0
 From: Philipp Winter <[scrubbed]>
 Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 15:55:34 -0700
 Message-ID: 
 Subject:
 To: [scrubbed]
 Content-Type: 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32107 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ruleset updates in HTTPS-Everywhere complain sometimes about blocked cookie/storage access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32107: Ruleset updates in HTTPS-Everywhere complain sometimes about blocked
cookie/storage access
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by alexishan):

 Did the report have a sample page where this error occurs?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix tor-browser's .mozconfig so that ./mach configure succeeds on Linux by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32116: Fix tor-browser's .mozconfig so that ./mach configure succeeds on Linux 
by
default
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * actualpoints:   => 0


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the shield button to stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31920: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the 
shield
button to stop working
+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * points:  0.25 => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31752 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security Slider button stops working sometimes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31752: Security Slider button stops working sometimes
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31748 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Learn More" link in Security Level popup is not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31748: "Learn More" link in Security Level popup is not working
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * points:  0.25 => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31749: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * points:  0.25 => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31748 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Learn More" link in Security Level popup is not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31748: "Learn More" link in Security Level popup is not working
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910 => ff68-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * points:   => 0.25
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Solution was as simple as described above, just needed to update the label
 elements with the is="text-link" attribute.

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31748_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31752 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security Slider button stops working sometimes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31752: Security Slider button stops working sometimes
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Same underlying issue as #31920

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31749: Security level popup should not open with middle or right click
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910 => tbb-
 security-slider, tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed this behavior, now we correctly mirror the behavior of Downloads et
 al with respect to input events.

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31749_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31920 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the shield button to stop working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31920: Resizing TorBrowser 9.0a7 to its smallest size and back causes the 
shield
button to stop working
+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0, TorBrowserTeam201910 => tbb-9.0,
   TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Removed the caching. Protip for future me and future yous, don't cache
 things you don't control the lifetime of.

 tor-browser : https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31920_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31874 [Circumvention]: Automatically test the PTs of bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31874: Automatically test the PTs of bridges
---+
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280 | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
---+

Comment (by phw):

 Here are some thoughts on building a new service that would allow both
 BridgeDB ''and'' bridge operators to test bridges:

 * The service should expose a web interface and an API: The web interface
 is meant for bridge operators who want to test their new bridges, and can
 replace our [https://bridges.torproject.org/scan/ obfs4 port scan tool].
 The API is meant for BridgeDB, allowing it to test the bridges it knows
 about. We need to be sure that there's no interference that would allow
 web interface users to learn what bridges were tested over the API, so we
 may want to run two instances of this service.

 * The API should be a simple JSON-based REST API. Requests should go to,
 say bridges.torproject.org/api/test, and have the following request body:
   {{{
 {bridge_line: "1.2.3.4:443"}
   }}}
   The service should then respond with something along the lines of:
   {{{
   {functional: true, error: null, time: 4.215}
   }}}
   (Note that these are mere examples.)

 * The web interface
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/31874/bridge-
 test-web-ui.png can look like this].

 * The service can take as input bridge lines (vanilla or pluggable
 transports), spawns a Tor process with the given bridge line, and parses
 Tor's output to determine if the bridge bootstrapped correctly. This has
 the potential to be quite messy. What's a better design?

 * How should BridgeDB use this service? At the very least, it should
 periodically test all its bridges and log the ones that don't work, making
 it easy for BridgeDB's maintainers to contact the respective bridge
 operators.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31874 [Circumvention]: Automatically test the PTs of bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31874: Automatically test the PTs of bridges
---+
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a3  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280 | Points:  10
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-must
---+
Changes (by phw):

 * Attachment "bridge-test-web-ui.png" added.

 Web UI mockup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adding your own custom bridges generates a parsing error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32111: Adding your own custom bridges generates a parsing error
--+--
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910 => TorBrowserTeam201910R


Comment:

 Updated the bridge string parse method to handle strings the same as tor-
 launcher (handling bridge prefix and carriage returns correctly)

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32111_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31740 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31740: Review RemoteSettings usages in esr68
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201910 =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 To give an idea about what these remote-settings requests look like.
 Periodically, or responding to some events (e.g. creating a
 `RemoteSettings(...)` client for a new collection), there will be a GET
 request to
 
`https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/monitor/collections/changes/records`,
 used to obtain a list of available "collections" and metadata about them
 (https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 
esr68/rev/4fc15df791ad4d3ceaf1a958af2bfc1252433ca8/services/settings/Utils.jsm#57).
 Each entry looks like:

 {{{
 id: 8da7db1e-dffb-18c9-2efe-0e9d7459a0f4
 last_modified: 1571184016986
 bucket: main
 collection: normandy-recipes
 host: firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com
 }}}

 For each collection (distinct `RemoteSettings("...")` call), depending on
 the corresponding `last_modified` value returned in the previous request
 another request might be performed to retrieve the records of that
 collection (possibly only the ones that changed since some timestamp). For
 example, for `onecrl` collection
 `https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/security-
 state/collections/onecrl?_expected=1568310941289` would be fetched (with
 possibly different parameters).

 One concern is that the different parameters (etag, timestamps...) might
 be leaking enough info about the user state that it allows linking
 together requests done over time as belonging to the same user. In
 principle, the request parameters depend on the values returned in
 previous responses, and these seem not to change very often. I did not do
 a deep analysis, but I feel like we would not lose too much by doing the
 same requests without parameters (as if there was no previous state in the
 browser). I don't see the responses being so big, nor the requests done so
 often. But this would probably require a bit more time to make sure the
 changes are not breaking the `RemoteSettings` functionality. Perhaps on a
 different ticket?

 For now, I think we can disable the `RemoteSettings("...")` calls that we
 do not need, if only for sparing some unnecessary requests. The currently
 active `RemoteSettings` instances are:

 * `toolkit/components/search/SearchService.jsm` (hijack-blocklists)
   * I think we don't want this one, it allows mozilla to blacklist search
 extensions.
 * `browser/components/preferences/browserLanguages.js` (language-
 dictionaries):
   * I think we need this one if we allow changing language via
 `about:preferences`.
 * `netwerk/url-classifier/UrlClassifierSkipListService.jsm` (url-
 classifier-skip-urls):
   * We don't need this one until we enable enhanced tracking protection
 (content blocking).
 * `services/common/blocklist-clients.js` (onecrl, pins):
   * OneCRl and certificate pinning blocklist? I think we want to have
 these.

 Note that the previously mentioned `RemoteSettings` instances in
 `toolkit/mozapps/extensions/Blocklist.jsm` are actually currently disabled
 because of `extensions.blocklist.useXML = true`, see
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16931#comment:8.

 So here is a patch disabling `hijack-blocklists` and `url-classifier-skip-
 urls`: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser/commit/31740. If it's ok
 to disable the latter, we could update #30939, as we will need to reenable
 if we decide to enable Firefox Enhanced Tracking Protection.

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[tor-bugs] #32119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32119: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux, onboarding
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I recently upgraded to 9.0a8 and tried to follow the onboarding screens.

 The "How to Request a New Identity" button seems to register the click and
 release, but not do anything obvious. Only after a while did I notice that
 the "broom" icon seemed to be outlined in pale turquoise and pulsing. (on
 macOS 10.12.6; on Linux it seems to be a slightly more visible pale
 turquoise with a non-pulsating but more visible turquoise border)

 I think this is because the location of the "How to Request a New
 Identity" button is too far away from the actual browser toolbar, so maybe
 some more obvious animation or a doorhanger should be used?

 Also the graphic on the right hand side of that onboarding screen seems to
 be missing a few elements from the toolbar, such as the bookmark star, the
 Security Level shield, and the search box. It's also not obvious to me
 what the onion icon in the yellow circle is supposed to represent.

 For some reason, on Linux but not macOS, clicking on text in the
 onboarding screen activates a blinking vertical bar text insertion cursor
 (but doesn't allow editing text).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32091 [Core Tor/Tor]: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32091: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android, iOS, tbb-mobile, orbot, |  Actual Points:
  vpn|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10+
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by eighthave):

 @tla, @n8fr8, and I do not know the guts of the existing TUN
 implementations, so we're open to how this might be implemented.  I
 imagine pulling in some parts of TCP will be a requirement since TUN is
 all about providing a TCP network interface.  As far as I know, this could
 also be implemented in Rust.  That should be workable on Android and iOS,
 though C would be easier to integrate.

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[tor-bugs] #32118 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Identity button icon could be more legible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32118: New Identity button icon could be more legible
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 On upgrading to 9.0a8, I had trouble identifying what the new "New
 Identity" button was supposed to represent. I can't tell if it's supposed
 to be a broom with sparkles around it, or a rocket in flight against a
 starfield.

 Relatedly, the "New Identity" button also seems lower resolution and
 blockier than the other icons in the toolbar. (I'm on macOS 10.12.6 on a
 new-ish MacBook Pro with a Retina screen, if that matters.)

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[tor-bugs] #32117 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Understand and document BridgeDB bot scraping attempts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32117: Understand and document BridgeDB bot scraping attempts
+
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 We are aware of automated attempts to enumerate bridges in BridgeDB, but
 lack a more rigorous understanding of the problem.

 We have detected bot requests from bridgeDB's web interface and deployed
 some defences by forbidding requests with headers that are commonly
 associated with bots, and handing out fake bridges to suspected bot
 requests (#31252), and

 We also suspect that these bots are solving our CAPTCHAs more accurately
 than users (#24607).

 After a recent campaign to get more volunteer bridges, we set up an
 experiment to test the reachability of a subset of these new bridges from
 a probe site in Beijing and found all new bridges in our sample to be
 blocked (most were blocked from the very start of the experiment): #31701

 This ticket is for documenting bot behaviour and brainstorming ways to
 detect and analyze the automatic scraping of BridgeDB from censor-owned
 bots.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Escaping & character creates weird string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32112: Escaping & character creates weird string
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201910R  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201910 => tbb-9.0-must,
 TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Escaping & character creates weird string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32112: Escaping & character creates weird string
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 `bug_32112` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug_32112=53fd49865ef9794a319582ad7cd4b551d8e89051)
 is the proposed fix. pospeselr ack'ed it on IRC and I merged it to
 `master` (commit 53fd49865ef9794a319582ad7cd4b551d8e89051).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unify handling of command-line option parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32003: Unify handling of command-line option parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .4
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unify handling of command-line option parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32003: Unify handling of command-line option parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-august  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:  .4
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've made the requested changes.  For the quiet levels, I think I can do
 that, but what do you mean by "mode"?

 I'd hoped that the existing tests might be enough for this patch, since
 they cover 100% of affected lines; I'd be okay with writing more, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28726 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Loosen restrictions on message sizes in WebSocket server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28726: Loosen restrictions on message sizes in WebSocket server
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31028   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > A good solution would be to rewrite our WebSocket library to provide a
 streaming interface without message buffering, so to investigate whether
 other WebSocket libraries like
 ​https://godoc.org/github.com/gorilla/websocket can do it.

 [https://github.com/gorilla/websocket/issues/19#issuecomment-37834461 This
 comment] seems to suggest that there's no stream API in the package but
 that one can be created based on the following code,
 https://github.com/zhangpeihao/gowebsocket/blob/master/conn.go#L78-L123

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31310 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Refactor/remove proxy-pair state machine in webextension

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31310: Refactor/remove proxy-pair state machine in webextension
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake-webextension   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor28


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29864 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: consider replacing nagios with prometheus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29864: consider replacing nagios with prometheus
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 if we end up writing alerting rules, it might be important to design tests
 for the rules too:

 https://prometheus.io/docs/prometheus/latest/configuration/unit_testing_rules/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: End of Year Fundraising Campaign Banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30783: End of Year Fundraising Campaign Banner
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201910   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Hi brade! Thanks for working on this. I made a quick markup here

 https://glitch.com/~take-back-the-internet

 I'm still thinking about the [x]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Print summary of features at end of configure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31373: Print summary of features at end of configure
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  configure, build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks okay to me now!  Please add a changes file?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15948 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Can we do away with public SVN?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15948: Can we do away with public SVN?
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17202   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by anarcat):

 static component created, ready to populate. i don't think we can point
 svn.tpo there before internal and corp are migrated, however, as they live
 on the same FQDN (even if invisible).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32031 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make new svn.tpo static component

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32031: Make new svn.tpo static component
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15948   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 i created the static component, under https://svn-archive.torproject.org

 it just lists "forbidden" for now, because there's nothing in there, but i
 guess that's step two. :)

 arma, i'll let you deploy step two if that's alright with you. reopen
 otherwise.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32091 [Core Tor/Tor]: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32091: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android, iOS, tbb-mobile, orbot, |  Actual Points:
  vpn|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10+
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 If I'm understanding this code right, it would apparently require adding a
 TCP stack to the inside of Tor; I'd like to look for ways not to do that,
 if possible -- at least in C.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32058 [Core Tor/Tor]: mainloop: make periodic events restartable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32058: mainloop: make periodic events restartable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, regression?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport, BugSmashFund |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 >   * Make `periodic_event_disconnect()` itself call
 `periodic_event_disable()`, so that we can't forget to do so.

 I prefer this approach.

 I've updated 035 PR with a fixup commit. With this, it merges nicely
 forward up to master :) (as in PR 1410 can be ignored now).

 PR: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1409
 Branch: `ticket32058_035_01

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32091 [Core Tor/Tor]: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32091: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android, iOS, tbb-mobile, orbot, |  Actual Points:
  vpn|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10+
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:   => 10+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29746 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve Tor best practices tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29746: Improve Tor best practices tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
  042-can|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor, ahf|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I believe so; all child tickets are closed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32051 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Nyx unable to read tor's authentication cookie

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32051: Nyx unable to read tor's authentication cookie
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hi atagar,

 I've added CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 1 to the torrc file however I'm not
 sure how to run nyx with the same user as tor.

 Thanks

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32116 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix tor-browser's .mozconfig so that ./mach configure succeeds on Linux by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32116: Fix tor-browser's .mozconfig so that ./mach configure succeeds on Linux 
by
default
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201910R
 * points:   => 0
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


Comment:

 Added --with-tor-browser-version=dev-build and commented out --enable-tor-
 browser-update

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32116

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28764: OpenSSL Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Of course the same issues are still a problem, but just including the
 commit for reference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28764 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OpenSSL Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28764: OpenSSL Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 This is a really old commit from Dec 7th (branch 1219) so I'll need to
 update and test with what we have now but the following was working at the
 time.

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/c00bf3abba168b3462b2f93ed95e2ad1b530ec87

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31786 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: move dictyotum off moly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31786: move dictyotum off moly
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29974   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 new director seems to be fully online and operational.

 dictyotum now shutdown, will wait until tomorrow to see if anything break,
 then finish the decom process.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32091 [Core Tor/Tor]: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32091: optional TUN interface to tor for mobile
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Android, iOS, tbb-mobile, orbot, |  Actual Points:
  vpn|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32102 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add build information to binary

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32102: Add build information to binary
--+--
 Reporter:  willbarr  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32115 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden Service in TestingTorNetwork connected to non-Exit Nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32115: Hidden Service in TestingTorNetwork connected to non-Exit Nodes
--+---
 Reporter:  lewis85   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Hidden services do _not_ connect specifically to Exit nodes. They stay
 inside the network.

 They can use Exit nodes as a "Regular" node of the hidden service
 connection process. But there is no concept of "exiting the network" with
 an hidden service.

 Also remember, tor client (which includes hidden service) will pick a
 Guard node and keep it for a while so you will always see the first
 connection to be the same node over and over again.

 With `TestingTorNetwork`, many many timings are changed within tor to
 accelerate many interactions between tor nodes so it is not like the real
 public network where for instance you would keep your Guard for around 3
 months.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31561 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31561: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, hv-v3, 042-should  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #30200 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  asn, mikeperry |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-must
---+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 A related question to comment:17: Why do we try hard to hold on to
 specific intropoints at all? If their circuit collapses, fails, or stops
 carrying data, why do we try to build a new circuit to the old intropoint
 as opposed to just picking a whole new intropoint?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28766: Tor Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201812, tbb-parity   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:10 eighthave]:
 > That ''configure.ac'' patch is now here for #31882:
 > * https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1408
 >
 > I just got the gitlab-ci job for r17b working, so I can confirm that tor
 with my changes builds with NDK r17b, but this job does not include lzma
 or zstd.

 I'm assuming we need to open new tickets for building these libraries? Or
 is this something we can live without for now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30461 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30461: Update tor-android-service Project to Use Android Toolchain (Firefox 68)
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must- |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201910|
Parent ID:  #30324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:39 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:38 sisbell]:
 > > I'm agreeing with you, let's move mavenLocal to tor-android-service.
 I'll open the issue on tor-android-service and then remove the patch.
 >
 > #32043 got merged. Could you fix the remaining issue (I think the
 tickets got filed as children of #32069) in `tor-browser-build` and then
 we can close the whole Android toolchain upgrade bug, too.
 I'm not clear which issue you are referring too. Is it related to this
 bug?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Separate VPN Classes into their own module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31043: Separate VPN Classes into their own module
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32069| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 It looks like we should hold off until the work is done in the new tor
 service. There are a bunch more changes in Orbot since this time so I
 suspect that latest version of Orbot wouldn't be compatible with these
 changes (although tor-browser would be compatible).

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > sisbell: I guess the patch in comment:1 is still up-to-date? And, please
 add the respective review keyword to your tickets when done otherwise we
 might easily lose track of them. It's TorBrowserTeamMMR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29650 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29650: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gaba):

 that is starting as soon as metrics is wrapping up what they are doing
 right now

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31373 [Core Tor/Tor]: Print summary of features at end of configure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31373: Print summary of features at end of configure
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  configure, build  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Addressed it all nickm! Great suggestions, I hope the new output pleases
 you :).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19839 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB website: In firefox page shows titles in English and text in the language preferred by the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19839: BridgeDB website: In firefox page shows titles in English and text in 
the
language preferred by the user
-+-
 Reporter:  sebalis  |  Owner:
 |  traumschule
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug, anti-|  Actual Points:
  censorship-roadmap-september, s30-o22a3|
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 I may have run into the same (or a similar) problem while implementing
 #26543. Here's how I could reproduce the issue:
 * Set your "preferred language for displaying pages" in Firefox to, say,
 German.
 * Go to bridges.torproject.org and override the German translation by
 adding `?lang=en` to the URL.
 * Parts of the page will still use the German translation even though
 English translations are available.

 I believe I fixed the issue in commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?id=28a7e8016a8b647bd802cd44994ed245d7fbb163
 28a7e80]. Apparently the `fuzzy` tag prevents BridgeDB's Babel library
 from re-compiling languages that are marked as `fuzzy`. This can result in
 translations not being used even though they are available.

 emmapeel, do you still see the same issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29650 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29650: Rewrite exit scanner to produce exit lists according to new format
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-roadmap-2019-q2  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by anarcat):

 so, what was the result of the discussion? :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support Tor Running on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30607: Support Tor Running on Android Q
+--
 Reporter:  sisbell |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff68-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 I closed it. Android 10 devices have been released and are better for
 testing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android Q Arm Testing on Emulator

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30666: Android Q Arm Testing on Emulator
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30607| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this. Using an arm device for Android 10 testing so don't need
 this. In general arm builds in emulator are too slow these days to be
 usable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28726 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Loosen restrictions on message sizes in WebSocket server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28726: Loosen restrictions on message sizes in WebSocket server
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31028   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => arlolra
 * parent:   => #31028


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32077 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Compile Time Dependencies Between Tor Service and VPN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32077: Remove Compile Time Dependencies Between Tor Service and VPN
+--
 Reporter:  sisbell |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32069  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by eighthave):

 The VPN stuff is the part that will probably be touched the least, so
 perhaps it makes sense to merge those changes sooner rather than later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32072 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix Field Name For Tor Binary to Match Orbot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32072: Fix Field Name For Tor Binary to Match Orbot
+--
 Reporter:  sisbell |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32069  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 I think we likely will be just importing the binaries from somewhere. In
 the case of tor-browser-build this would come in from the projects/tor
 dependency. But yes hard-coding in a Java field is not good. I think we
 can pull that version info from file name or some metadata within the
 file.

 Replying to [comment:3 eighthave]:
 > Seems like a good solution would be to do this via the `BuildConfig`
 class.  In ''build.gradle'', its possible to add things to `BuildConfig`,
 then its statically available.  So there could be some `BuildConfig` value
 based on that `getVersionName()`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29583 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive onionbalance for v3s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29583: HSv3: Faulty cross-certs in introduction point keys (allows naive
onionbalance for v3s)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, scaling, onionbalance,   |  Actual Points:
  040-backport, 035-backport, needs-proposal,|
  security, 041-longterm, 041-deferred-20190530  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 tor-hs, scaling, onionbalance, 040-backport, 035-backport, needs-
 proposal, network-team-roadmap-september, security, 041-longterm,
 041-deferred-20190530
 =>
 tor-hs, scaling, onionbalance, 040-backport, 035-backport, needs-
 proposal, security, 041-longterm, 041-deferred-20190530


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32077 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Compile Time Dependencies Between Tor Service and VPN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32077: Remove Compile Time Dependencies Between Tor Service and VPN
+--
 Reporter:  sisbell |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32069  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:2 eighthave]:
 > Looking at decoupling commits like this makes me think that decoupling
 work like this should be put on hold, since I'm just about to start making
 major changes to the tor service aspect of Orbot.  The current approach is
 deprecated, and will only be maintained for security releases.  We're
 going to integrate the new `TorService` into Orbot, and release the new
 "Orbot mini" based on that.  That will be our first big test of all this.

 +1 It makes sense holding off until orbot mini is out. The biggest changes
 revolved around removing VPN code from service code. The rest of the
 commits are easy enough to redo when we are ready.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29746 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve Tor best practices tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29746: Improve Tor best practices tracker
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  practracker, tech-debt,  |  Actual Points:  .1
  refactoring, easy, 041-deferred-20190530,  |
  network-team-roadmap-july, dgoulet-merge   |
  042-can|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  teor, ahf|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by gaba):

 Can we close this ticket now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31028 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Migrate away from the custom websocket library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31028: Migrate away from the custom websocket library
-+--
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * owner:  (none) => arlolra
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29125 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Make websocket server tolerant of HTTP/2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29125: Make websocket server tolerant of HTTP/2
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31028   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * owner:  (none) => arlolra
 * status:  new => assigned
 * parent:   => #31028


Comment:

 > I'm not sure if WebSocket connections from browsers use HTTP/2 yet or
 not

This would only be used for secure WebSockets requests, and only if
 there is already an HTTP/2 connection where the server has already
 advertised support for WebSockets over HTTP/2 via the HTTP/2 SETTINGS
 parameter defined in the specification.

 From https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6251293127475200

 > but in any case we should handle it gracefully.

 {{{
 h, ok := w.(http.Hijacker)
 if !ok {
 return u.returnError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError,
 "websocket: response does not implement http.Hijacker")
 }
 }}}

 From
 
https://github.com/gorilla/websocket/blob/7e9819d926e9f51e09eabe119b6d78f94e058c44/server.go#L173-L176

 > My first inclination is to see if porting to ​gorilla/websocket fixes
 this

 Seems like it would ...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26543 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Provide a language switcher menu on BridgeDB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26543: Provide a language switcher menu on BridgeDB
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september,   |  Actual Points:  1.4
  s30-o22a3  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by phw):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 1.4


Comment:

 I merged the patch and
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?id=681963de8219777b035244df9b51b2c8ab549ee0
 released version 0.9.0].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23332 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Change Trac Username

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23332: Change Trac Username
--+
 Reporter:  bkerensa@…|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29911 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update HelpfulTools.md once we have some experience with practracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29911: Update HelpfulTools.md once we have some experience with practracker
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, postfreeze-ok,  |  Actual Points:
  041-deferred-20190719, 042-should  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23332 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Change Trac Username

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23332: Change Trac Username
--+--
 Reporter:  bkerensa@…|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Should work now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19569 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: DataChannel-only libwebrtc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19569: DataChannel-only libwebrtc
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 No longer necessary after #28942

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24845 [Webpages/Webtools]: update Limesurvey theme and logo to follow styleguide.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24845: update Limesurvey theme and logo to follow styleguide.torproject.org
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team => Webpages/Webtools


Comment:

 this is not TPA, trying another approximation

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Indicate that Gitian is no longer used in https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/BuildingWithGitian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25406: Indicate that Gitian is no longer used in
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/BuildingWithGitian
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/BuildingWithGitian?action=diff=28

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31807 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update outdated documentation note for "bridge-distribution"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31807: Update outdated documentation note for "bridge-distribution"
--+
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  BugSmashFund 042-can  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23007 [Webpages/Blog]: Get a second blog maintainer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23007: Get a second blog maintainer
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 it seems I am becoming that person, so let's make it official, even if I
 don't quite like it. ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32109 [Internal Services/Schleuder]: tor-community-coun...@torproject.org email alias does not exist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32109: tor-community-coun...@torproject.org email alias does not exist
-+--
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Schleuder  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  anarcat => dgoulet
 * component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team => Internal
 Services/Schleuder


Comment:

 fix is in eb3e915c and will propagate in a few hours.

 i'm leaving this open for the schleuder folks to consider adding the UID
 to the key.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32109 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: tor-community-coun...@torproject.org email alias does not exist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32109: tor-community-coun...@torproject.org email alias does not exist
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 > Rather than going through the process to amend the Community Council
 Policy, would it be possible to create an email alias to point tor-
 community-council 'at' torproject.org to tor-community-council 'at'
 lists.torproject.org?

 Makes sense, and will do shortly.

 > Also, does anyone know if there would there be any implications when
 encrypting messages to this list given that the email alias does not match
 the uids on the gpg key?

 Yes, there are. Most email clients will not find the right key and will
 refuse to send an encrypted mail.

 There are a few solutions for this:

  1. client-side solutions: some clients will allow you to pick an
 arbitrary key for encryption (not great, requires user knowledge)
  2. "server-side" solutions: the other UID could just be added to the key

 > Also, not sure if I've created this under the correct component, so
 please feel free to move to the correct one.

 Since this is an encrypted list, i think schleuder might be a better
 place, especially for the UID change. But this is a good start. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32031 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make new svn.tpo static component

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32031: Make new svn.tpo static component
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15948   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32100 [Core Tor/Tor]: Resolve all doxygen warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32100: Resolve all doxygen warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november,   |  Actual Points:  .2
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29214   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adding your own custom bridges generates a parsing error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32111: Adding your own custom bridges generates a parsing error
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor30
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor30


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31384 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: localize snowflake website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31384: localize snowflake website
-+-
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  l10n, anti-censorship-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:  2.5
  september  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged at https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=da8b98d09089e32d53573a1cabcb450aa290b4c8

 Let's wait to update the website until we get some translations... merging
 this should update the files at Transifex but all the text will be English
 until we start translating the strings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32115 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden Service in TestingTorNetwork connected to non-Exit Nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32115: Hidden Service in TestingTorNetwork connected to non-Exit Nodes
--+---
 Reporter:  lewis85   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Why do you expect a hidden service only to connect to exit relays?  Exit
 relays are ones that allow connections outside the Tor network; they are
 not relevant for hidden services.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32058 [Core Tor/Tor]: mainloop: make periodic events restartable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32058: mainloop: make periodic events restartable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-should, regression?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport, BugSmashFund |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks valid, but I would like to suggest a change for future safety.

 Let's do one of the following:
   * Document, in `periodic_event_disconnect()`, that you must first call
 `periodic_event_disable()`.
   * Make `periodic_event_disconnect()` itself call
 `periodic_event_disable()`, so that we can't forget to do so.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31965 [Webpages/Webtools]: dev portal git repo and lektor instance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31965: dev portal git repo and lektor instance
---+--
 Reporter:  pili   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
---+--
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  (none) => hiro
 * component:  Internal Services/Services Admin Team => Webpages/Webtools


Comment:

 shouldn't this be in the webpages component? thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #32115 [- Select a component]: Hidden Service in TestingTorNetwork connected to non-Exit Nodes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32115: Hidden Service in TestingTorNetwork connected to non-Exit Nodes
-+--
 Reporter:  lewis85  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Hi folks,

 I set up a testing environment made of lxd containers on Ubuntu 18.04.
 Each container is based on the Ubuntu 18.04 image and runs Tor version
 0.4.1.6.
 Specifically, I have the following running machines:

  * 3 Authorities (named as !TorAuthoritity[01,02,03])


  * 3 Exit Relays (named as !TorRelay[01,02,03]Exit)


  * 3 non-Exit Relays (named as !TorRelay[04,05,06])


  * 1 Hidden Service (named as TorHs01)


  * 1 Client (named as TorClient01)



 The torrc file has the "TestingTorNetwork 1" configuration value.

 Moreover, only the torrc of Exit Relays has the following configuration
 values:

 !ExitRelay 1 !ExitPolicy accept *:*

 whereas all the other torrc files (i.e., Authorities and non-Exit Relays)
 have the following configuration values:

 !ExitRelay 0 !ExitPolicy reject *:*

 All the Tor relays and hidden service are configured in order to use the
 three Authorities

 However, I noticed that the Hidden Service is always connected to one or
 more non-Exit Relays whereas I expected to see only connections to Exit
 Relays.
 For example, by running the command `lsof -i` on the container providing
 the Hidden Service, I get the following result:

 root@TorHs01:~# lsof -i COMMAND   PID            USER   FD   TYPE DEVICE
 SIZE/OFF NODE NAME systemd-n 180 systemd-network   14u  IPv4 128314
 0t0  UDP !TorHs01.lxd:bootpc  systemd-r 182 systemd-resolve   12u  IPv4
 52219      0t0  UDP !localhost:domain  systemd-r 182 systemd-resolve   13u
 IPv4  52240      0t0  TCP !localhost:domain (LISTEN) sshd      251
 root    3u  IPv4  77216      0t0  TCP *:ssh (LISTEN) sshd      251
 root    4u  IPv6  77314      0t0  TCP *:ssh (LISTEN) apache2   260
 root    4u  IPv6  81261      0t0  TCP *:8050 (LISTEN) apache2   272
 www-data    4u  IPv6  81261      0t0  TCP *:8050 (LISTEN) apache2   273
 www-data    4u  IPv6  81261      0t0  TCP *:8050 (LISTEN) apache2   274
 www-data    4u  IPv6  81261      0t0  TCP *:8050 (LISTEN) apache2   275
 www-data    4u  IPv6  81261      0t0  TCP *:8050 (LISTEN) apache2   276
 www-data    4u  IPv6  81261      0t0  TCP *:8050 (LISTEN) tor       396
 tor    9u  IPv4 116948      0t0  TCP !localhost:9050 (LISTEN) tor
 396             tor   14u  IPv4 117902      0t0  TCP
 !TorHs01.lxd:54948->!TorAuthority03.lxd:5000 (ESTABLISHED) tor       396
 tor   15u  IPv4 117904      0t0  TCP
 !TorHs01.lxd:41538->!TorRelay02Exit.lxd:5000 (ESTABLISHED)

 where the last two lines represent connections to TorAuthority03 (which is
 configured as a non-Exit Relay) and TorRelay02Exit (which is configured as
 an Exit Relay) respectively.
 Generally, the Hidden Service is always connected at least to a non-Exit
 Relay (e.g., TorRelay04, TorAuthority03, etc) whereas I expected that the
 Hidden Service was only connected to Exit Relays (in my lxd environment,
 TorRelay01Exit, TorRelay02Exit, TorRelay03Exit).
 Looking at the network traffic through Wireshark, it looks like the Hidden
 Service is using a non-Exit Relay as an exit node, although the consensus
 already includes the three Exit Relays in my testing environment.
 Is this behavior related to the testing environment only? If yes, do you
 already know why this happens? Is it possible to avoid this behavior?

 Sincerely,
 lewis85

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