Re: [tor-bugs] #31684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31684: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  control-port easy extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32171 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add a stem test for GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32171: Add a stem test for GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #31684 =>


Comment:

 Tor code and spec are done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc to the control spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31762: Add GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc to the control 
spec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  control-port easy tor-spec  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #31684  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to torspec master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc to the control spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31762: Add GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc to the control 
spec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port easy tor-spec  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #31684  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc to the control spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31762: Add GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc to the control 
spec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port easy tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31684  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => merge_ready


Comment:

 See my PR:
 * torspec: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/92

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31684: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port easy extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 The torspec PR is https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/92
 They should merge at the same time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31684: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port easy extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 I also tested the new GETINFO with tor-prompt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31684: Add control port GETINFO support for dumping the local consensus
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  control-port easy extra-review  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  control-port easy extra-review nickm-merge dgoulet-merge =>
 control-port easy extra-review
 * type:  task => enhancement
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 I did some fixes:
 * standard whitespace
 * typos
 * standard error handling
 * remove unnecessary test code

 Here is the branch with all the fixes:
 https://github.com/teor2345/tor/commits/ticket31684
 There is a description of each fix in my review on PR 1328.

 Here is the squashed PR for merging:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1434
 I squashed the whitespace fixes with the rest of the code, to minimise the
 diff.

 Since these are obvious fixes on already reviewed code, any maintainer can
 merge after CI passes.

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[tor-bugs] #32171 [Core Tor/Stem]: Add a stem test for GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32171: Add a stem test for GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  control-port easy
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #31684
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 After #31684 and #31762 merge, we should add a stem test for:
 {{{
 GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31111 [Core Tor/Tor]: Properly support two padding machines per circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3: Properly support two padding machines per circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  pulls|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-want |  Actual Points:
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * keywords:  wtf-pad circpad-researchers-want => wtf-pad circpad-
 researchers-want BugSmashFund
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32058 [Core Tor/Tor]: mainloop: make periodic events restartable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32058: mainloop: make periodic events restartable
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0424,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  042-should, regression?, 035-backport, |
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport,  |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 042-should, regression?, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,
 042-backport, BugSmashFund
 =>
 consider-backport-after-0424, 042-should, regression?, 035-backport,
 040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport, BugSmashFund
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.2 and later, leaving open for backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32022 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: buffers_tls.c:73: buf_read_from_tls: Non-fatal assertion !(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX - at_most) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32022: Bug: buffers_tls.c:73: buf_read_from_tls: Non-fatal assertion
!(buf->datalen >= INT_MAX - at_most) failed.
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  assert, BugSmashFund  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Somebody on Windows hit this in comment:8 of #25957.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25957 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.3.5-rc died: Caught signal 11

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25957: Tor 0.3.3.5-rc died: Caught signal 11
+---
 Reporter:  Pine64ARMv8 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, openssl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:8 cypherpunks]:
 > Hi this is not my ticket, but i can give this info in my case where it
 just happened with latest stable again:
 > {{{
 > Oct 17 07:09:24.000 [warn] {BUG} tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 buffers_tls.c:73: buf_read_from_tls: Non-fatal assertion !(buf->datalen >=
 INT_MAX - at_most) failed. (Future instances of this warning will be
 silenced.) (on Tor 0.4.1.6 )
 > }}}

 That one looks like #32022.

 Did your relay die with a segfault after writing that log message, or was
 the log message the extent of the problem?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27655 [Core Tor/Tor]: TB 8.5a1 fails to load reachable onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27655: TB 8.5a1 fails to load reachable onion services
--+---
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arma):

 Wonder if this one is resolved now that Tor 0.3.4.x relays are mostly off
 the network, plus the other fixes. There are other known onion service
 reachability tickets open still too. I don't know that this one adds
 anything to them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > We haven't implemented bridge guards yet, so bridges also have another
 similar vulnerability: all the middle nodes chosen by bridge clients can
 learn that the previous hop is a bridge. (Client-Bridge-Middle has
 different timings and node selections than Client-Guard, OnionService-
 Guard and SingleOnionService-guard.)

 Good point. A bridge's current guard barely sees anything at all from it,
 other than fetching directory stuff.

 Almost makes me want to propose that bridges should build their path to
 Serge and then extend from there back to themselves. :)

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[tor-bugs] #32170 [Core Tor/Tor]: update geoip && geoip6 to October 15 2019 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32170: update geoip && geoip6 to October 15 2019 database
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:   | Status:  assigned
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  extra-review, tor-geoip,
 Severity:  Normal   |  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 |  041-backport, 042-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We've had a first-time contributor submit a GeoIP update pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1428

 But we just had one a few weeks ago, so I am not sure if it is needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Scripts to help with backport branches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31178: Scripts to help with backport branches
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Actually, if we ever decide to do that work, it should be in another
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32169 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32169: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken
--+--
 Reporter:  rustybird |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Scripts to help with backport branches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31178: Scripts to help with backport branches
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-deferred-20190918  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  network-team-roadmap-october, 042-deferred-20190918 =>
 042-deferred-20190918
 * sponsor:  Sponsor31-must => Sponsor31-can


Comment:

 The remaining work on this ticket is automatically creating pull requests:
 that's not urgent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32169 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32169: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken
--+--
 Reporter:  rustybird |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rustybird):

 * Attachment "Bug-32169-Fix-TB9-Wikipedia-address-bar-search.patch" added.

 v2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32169 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32169: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken
--+--
 Reporter:  rustybird |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rustybird):

 Okay, here's the one-liner patch. I verified that it works by rezipping
 the updated Wikipedia `manifest.json` into `tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/browser/omni.ja`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32169 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32169: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken
--+--
 Reporter:  rustybird |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rustybird):

 * Attachment "Bug-32169-Fix-TB9-Wikipedia-address-bar-search.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21397 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor TransparentProxy documentation: add IPv6 support / port to nftables

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21397: Tor TransparentProxy documentation: add IPv6 support / port to nftables
-+-
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc wiki nftables ipv6   |  Actual Points:
  transproxy tor-client  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by NonaSuomy):

 Added an nftables ruleset to the wiki from duclicsic #netfilter.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32169 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32169: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken
--+--
 Reporter:  rustybird |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rustybird):

 I notice that [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/browser/components/search/extensions/wikipedia/manifest.json?h
 =tor-browser-68.2.0esr-9.0-1 wikipedia/manifest.json] is the only enabled
 search provider that neither specifies a
 `search_url_get_params`/`search_url_post_params`, nor hardcodes the params
 in the `search_url`. (They ''are'' hardcoded in `search_form`. I guess
 Firefox does not use this anymore?)

 Working on a patch...

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[tor-bugs] #32169 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32169: TB9: Wikipedia address bar search broken
---+--
 Reporter:  rustybird  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  ff68-esr   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Using the TB9 address bar to search for anything on Wikipedia, the browser
 just makes a GET request to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Search
 without any parameters.

 Tested with https://people.torproject.org/~gk/builds/9.0-build2/tor-
 browser-linux64-9.0_en-US.tar.xz

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32060 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1454761: wrong type passed to unlock_cb_buf()?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32060: CID 1454761: wrong type passed to unlock_cb_buf()?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-must, regression, fast-fix,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.2 and later: obviously correct fixes to already reviewed
 code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test_rebind.py more robust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31837: Make test_rebind.py more robust
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0423,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  BugSmashFund 042-can, asn-merge|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.2 and later: obviously correct fixes to already reviewed
 code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32167 [Core Tor]: Documentation error on app/config/config.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32167: Documentation error on app/config/config.c
--+
 Reporter:  willbarr  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable Fuzzyfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28709: Enable Fuzzyfox
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R,   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  GeorgKoppen201910  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Thorin):

 FWIW: I tried this a few days ago in FF68 on Windows and got hung
 processes on shutdown, so it's not necessarily a Linux thing
 [https://github.com/ghacksuserjs/ghacks-
 user.js/issues/816#issuecomment-543711633 here]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable Fuzzyfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28709: Enable Fuzzyfox
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R,   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  GeorgKoppen201910  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * actualpoints:  0.1 => 0.5


Comment:

 Okay, I was still not able to track the reason for the startup hangs down.
 I don't hit any assertions in a debug build and trying to figure out
 preferences we set and which could interfere was futile as well.

 For a while it seemed as if Tor Launcher related preferences could have
 played a role here but that was with bundles that were not freshly
 extracted. Restricting myself to only clean, new bundles showed that even
 removing all of our default preferences (besides
 `privacy.fuzzyfox.enabled`) did not solve the problem. And removing all
 Tor Launcher bits from `omni.ja` did not change things either.

 I guess the next thing we could do would be bisecting our patches to
 figure out which Firefox change is actually causing this problem. However,
 depending on where the problem actually is, this is currently not trivial.
 #31918 should help with that.

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[tor-bugs] #32168 [Webpages/Webtools]: Add CORS wildcard to check API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32168: Add CORS wildcard to check API
---+---
 Reporter:  monroeclinton  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Webpages/Webtools
  Version: |   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
 Hello,

 The check API doesn't have CORS set, specifically this URL:
 https://check.torproject.org/api/ip
 If "Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *" could be added that would be great.

 Monroe Clinton

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31063 [Community/Relays]: GoodBad ISPs should move to community portal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31063: GoodBad ISPs should move to community portal
--+---
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bluemoon):

 I came here after seeing the note "Note: This page is currently being
 revamped. If you would like to help out please see #31063."
 https://community.torproject.org/relay/community-resources/good-bad-isps/,
 but it looks like this ticket is about moving the content from Trac to the
 community portal, which seems to be done. Can the ticket be closed and the
 text be removed from the community page?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable Fuzzyfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28709: Enable Fuzzyfox
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  GeorgKoppen201910  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It seems even the earliest nightly with FuzzyFox support is affected by
 the shutdown issue. I've filed
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1589958 for it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable Fuzzyfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28709: Enable Fuzzyfox
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  GeorgKoppen201910  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Hrm. I'm not sure if Fuzzyfox is starving the event loop, or Fuzzyfox is
 somehow preventing other events triggering.

 This is the stacktrace from attaching gdb on the child process. It doesn't
 tell us much.

 {{{
 Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
 0x7f259a59a670 in __GI___nanosleep
 (requested_time=requested_time@entry=0x7ffe6ca70540,
 remaining=remaining@entry=0x0) at
 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/nanosleep.c:28
 28  ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/nanosleep.c: No such file or directory.
 (gdb) bt
 #0  0x7f259a59a670 in __GI___nanosleep
 (requested_time=requested_time@entry=0x7ffe6ca70540,
 remaining=remaining@entry=0x0) at
 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/nanosleep.c:28
 #1  0x7f259a5cd894 in usleep (useconds=) at
 ../sysdeps/posix/usleep.c:32
 #2  0x7f25942c8572 in mozilla::Fuzzyfox::Run (this=0x7f258cecca40) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/components/fuzzyfox/Fuzzyfox.cpp:215
 #3  0x7f25915ff82a in mozilla::SchedulerGroup::Runnable::Run
 (this=0x7f258b1304c0) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/xpcom/threads/SchedulerGroup.cpp:295
 #4  0x7f259160cdc6 in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent (this=0x7f258d071b80,
 aMayWait=, aResult=0x7ffe6ca706d7) at /var/tmp/build
 /firefox-81d2d351b4c9/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1175
 #5  0x7f259160ea16 in NS_ProcessNextEvent (aThread=0x7ffe6ca70540,
 aMayWait=) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:486
 #6  0x7f2591a2baf7 in mozilla::ipc::MessagePump::Run
 (this=0x7f259a29f560, aDelegate=0x7ffe6ca70800) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/ipc/glue/MessagePump.cpp:88
 #7  0x7f25919f8088 in MessageLoop::RunInternal (this=)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315
 #8  MessageLoop::RunHandler (this=) at /var/tmp/build
 /firefox-81d2d351b4c9/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308
 #9  MessageLoop::Run (this=0x0) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290
 #10 0x7f25935bc766 in nsBaseAppShell::Run (this=0x7f258ceef520) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/widget/nsBaseAppShell.cpp:137
 #11 0x7f2594432d60 in XRE_RunAppShell () at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp:926
 #12 0x7f25919f8088 in MessageLoop::RunInternal (this=)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:315
 #13 MessageLoop::RunHandler (this=) at /var/tmp/build
 /firefox-81d2d351b4c9/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:308
 #14 MessageLoop::Run (this=0x0) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/ipc/chromium/src/base/message_loop.cc:290
 #15 0x7f2594432bea in XRE_InitChildProcess (aArgc=,
 aArgv=, aChildData=) at /var/tmp/build
 /firefox-81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/xre/nsEmbedFunctions.cpp:764
 #16 0x55a79de5deb9 in content_process_main (bootstrap=0x7f259a22a690,
 argc=18, argv=) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/browser/app/../../ipc/contentproc/plugin-container.cpp:56
 #17 main (argc=, argv=0x7ffe6ca71ba8, envp=0x7ffe6ca71c48)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:268
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32155 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Please create tor-moderators email list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32155: Please create tor-moderators email list
---+
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I created the list with the settings. Please double-check if everything is
 set up as needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable Fuzzyfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28709: Enable Fuzzyfox
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  GeorgKoppen201910  |
Parent ID:  #28707   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I think the reason shutting down hangs is because Fuzzyfox doesn't stop
 dispatching an event for itself, so it continues (effectively) looping.

 I don't know why the browser window isn't rendered, yet.

 {{{
 0x7f1443d6b670 in __GI___nanosleep
 (requested_time=requested_time@entry=0x7ffcc25d0320,
 remaining=remaining@entry=0x0) at
 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/nanosleep.c:28
 28  ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/nanosleep.c: No such file or directory.
 (gdb) bt
 #0  0x7f1443d6b670 in __GI___nanosleep
 (requested_time=requested_time@entry=0x7ffcc25d0320,
 remaining=remaining@entry=0x0) at
 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/nanosleep.c:28
 #1  0x7f1443d9e894 in usleep (useconds=) at
 ../sysdeps/posix/usleep.c:32
 #2  0x7f143da7b572 in mozilla::Fuzzyfox::Run (this=0x7f1437c09780) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/components/fuzzyfox/Fuzzyfox.cpp:215
 #3  0x7f143adbfdc6 in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent (this=0x7f1438814040,
 aMayWait=, aResult=0x7ffcc25d0447) at /var/tmp/build
 /firefox-81d2d351b4c9/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1175
 #4  0x7f143adbe68e in NS_ProcessPendingEvents (aThread=0x7f1438814040,
 aTimeout=4294967295) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/xpcom/threads/nsThreadUtils.cpp:434
 #5  0x7f143add8050 in mozilla::ShutdownXPCOM (aServMgr=0x7f143882f168)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp:625
 #6  0x7f143dbddb52 in ScopedXPCOMStartup::~ScopedXPCOMStartup
 (this=0x7f1443ae7580) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:1249
 #7  0x7f143dbe4305 in
 mozilla::DefaultDelete::operator()
 (aPtr=0x7f1443ae7580, this=)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/dist/include/mozilla/UniquePtr.h:486
 #8  mozilla::UniquePtr >::reset (this=,
 aPtr=0x0)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/dist/include/mozilla/UniquePtr.h:323
 #9  mozilla::UniquePtr >::operator=(decltype(nullptr))
 (this=)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/dist/include/mozilla/UniquePtr.h:296
 #10 XREMain::XRE_main (this=0x7ffcc25d05b0, argc=,
 argv=, aConfig=...) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:4972
 #11 0x7f143dbe4775 in XRE_main (argc=0, argv=0x0, aConfig=...) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp:5026
 #12 0x55cdb79fc050 in do_main (argc=0, argv=,
 envp=) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 81d2d351b4c9/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:217
 #13 main (argc=, argv=, envp=0x7ffcc25d1868)
 at /var/tmp/build/firefox-81d2d351b4c9/browser/app/nsBrowserApp.cpp:296
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32167 [Core Tor]: Documentation error on app/config/config.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32167: Documentation error on app/config/config.c
--+
 Reporter:  willbarr  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by willbarr):

 * Attachment "doc.patch" added.


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[tor-bugs] #32167 [Core Tor]: Documentation error on app/config/config.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32167: Documentation error on app/config/config.c
+--
 Reporter:  willbarr|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha  |   Severity:  Minor
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/app/config/config.c#n25

 The or_options_t structure in or.h, where the options are stored.

 The documentation is out-of-date, or.h should be or_options_st.h

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[tor-bugs] #32166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser (and Firefox) clobber my clipboard when I return to the window in certain ways

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32166: Tor Browser (and Firefox) clobber my clipboard when I return to the 
window
in certain ways
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 1) click-click the url in the url bar, so the url is highlighted
 2) go to another application, highlight something new with your mouse, and
 then alt-tab back to the browser.
 3) the browser will re-highlight the url for you, clobbering whatever you
 highlighted in the other application.

 This behavior is really frustrating because I have two common workflows:

 a) highlight a thing in my browser and then paste it onto irc or into a
 terminal
 b) highlight a thing from irc or a terminal and then go back to the
 browser, ctrl-t to get a new window, and paste it into the url bar of the
 browser

 and if I have done action 'a' as my most recent browser interaction (which
 is common because one of the ways I finish a browser interaction is by
 wanting to paste a url into another application), then later when I try
 action 'b', I end up instead pasting the original url from my earlier
 browser interaction.

 This is a change in the browser behavior compared to a year or two ago --
 specifically, I believe step 3 didn't used to happen.

 The bug impacts me on both Tor Browser (8.x and 9.x) and Firefox (60esr on
 Debian).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31341 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TorBirdy does not support Thunderbird 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31341: TorBirdy does not support Thunderbird 68
--+-
 Reporter:  ozozoz|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBirdy, Thunderbird 68  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 I closed #31773 as a duplicate.

 Alas, I think it might be a while until torbirdy gets an update -- it
 involves somebody looking at Thunderbird 68 to see what new privacy
 invasive problems they put into it.

 Maybe you, yes the person reading this ticket, want to take this on?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31773 [Applications/TorBirdy]: update torbirdy compatibility to work with Thunderbird 68.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31773: update torbirdy compatibility to work with Thunderbird 68.1.0
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I'm closing this ticket as a duplicate of #31341.

 Alas, I think it might be a while until torbirdy gets an update -- it
 involves somebody looking at Thunderbird 68 to see what new privacy
 invasive problems they put into it.

 Maybe you, yes the person reading this ticket, want to take this on?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:15 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > > Bridges already do reachability checks via a random relay's ORPort: so
 we have accepted a similar risk in the past.
 >
 > Agreed, we already have that "enumeration by relays" risk with our
 current orport reachability testing.
 >
 > ...
 >
 > Speaking of bridges doing reachability checks via a random relay, thus
 letting relays enumerate bridges: a potential mitigation is for the bridge
 to ask its guard to extend to its ORPort. That way the guard learns that
 it's a bridge, but maybe it could have learned that anyway through timing
 or other characteristics, and nobody else in the network gets to see the
 reachability test. (I could have sworn I had already opened a ticket for
 this idea, but I can't find it. If you find it, please note it here. :)

 We haven't implemented bridge guards yet, so bridges also have another
 similar vulnerability: all the middle nodes chosen by bridge clients can
 learn that the previous hop is a bridge. (Client-Bridge-Middle has
 different timings and node selections than Client-Guard, OnionService-
 Guard and SingleOnionService-guard.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32086 [Core Tor/Tor]: Try Visual Studio 2019 image in appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32086: Try Visual Studio 2019 image in appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, consider-backport-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  immediately, 035-backport, 040-backport,   |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,
 042-backport
 =>
 tor-ci, consider-backport-immediately, 035-backport, 040-backport,
 041-backport, 042-backport
 * points:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Here's the PR for review and merge:
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1433

 The merge forward is clean, here are the branches:
 * https://github.com/teor2345/tor/branches/all?query=32086

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19068 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write and run a clique reachability test.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19068: Write and run a clique reachability test.
---+---
 Reporter:  yawning|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  stem, tooling, network-health  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by arma):

 * keywords:  stem, tooling => stem, tooling, network-health


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november, s30-o23a3|
Parent ID:  #30471   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > Bridges already do reachability checks via a random relay's ORPort: so
 we have accepted a similar risk in the past.

 Agreed, we already have that "enumeration by relays" risk with our current
 orport reachability testing.

 I'm ok with either choice here -- I think we need to get robust testing
 going of both PT ports and ipv6 ports, and whether we get it going first
 on the bridge side, or first on the bridgedb side, I'm ok with either
 choice.

 My first thought is that we eventually want to have the testing happen in
 both places -- on the bridge side for improved usability and quick
 feedback to the operator, and on the bridgedb side so we can control the
 quality of bridges we're giving out. That said, if we have to pick only
 one, I'd pick the bridgedb side, because that's the only logical place to
 do quality control that we can trust. And maybe given that, if we want to
 minimize exposure, it's worth exploring some way for bridgedb to do its
 first check really quickly, and get that feedback back to the bridge
 operator quickly, and then there's no need for the bridge to be doing its
 own checks?

 Speaking of bridges doing reachability checks via a random relay, thus
 letting relays enumerate bridges: a potential mitigation is for the bridge
 to ask its guard to extend to its ORPort. That way the guard learns that
 it's a bridge, but maybe it could have learned that anyway through timing
 or other characteristics, and nobody else in the network gets to see the
 reachability test. (I could have sworn I had already opened a ticket for
 this idea, but I can't find it. If you find it, please note it here. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 For renaming them, I would propose "present" -> "ready", and "usable" ->
 "listed". If we like these better names, I or somebody could go through
 and make a new commit changing them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 I added a second commit because there was a nearby log_debug() line that
 was printing the wrong parameters.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Bug went into Tor 0.2.6.2-alpha in commit 9b2d106.

 My branch {{{bug32165}}} resolves this bug.

 teor would be a good reviewer, because #27236 and because #13814.

 I based my branch on maint-0.4.2 since I don't think there's a need to go
 earlier than that -- it is just a "misleading log" problem so far as I can
 tell.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test_rebind.py more robust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31837: Make test_rebind.py more robust
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0423,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  BugSmashFund 042-can, asn-merge|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > See my pull request:
 > * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1354
 >
 > The merge forward is all clean.

 I deleted `l.strip(), `, amended the commit, and force-pushed.

 Anyone can merge this branch to master after CI passes.

 Since it's a CI stability fix, it should get some testing in master, so I
 will backport after 0.4.2.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32060 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1454761: wrong type passed to unlock_cb_buf()?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32060: CID 1454761: wrong type passed to unlock_cb_buf()?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must, regression, fast-fix,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 (No changes file required, because this fix isn't in 0.4.2.2-alpha.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32060 [Core Tor/Tor]: CID 1454761: wrong type passed to unlock_cb_buf()?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32060: CID 1454761: wrong type passed to unlock_cb_buf()?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  042-must, regression, fast-fix,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  042-must, regression => 042-must, regression, fast-fix,
 042-backport
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-must
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 See my PR, it's a quick type fix:
 * 0.4.2: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1432

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32086 [Core Tor/Tor]: Try Visual Studio 2019 image in appveyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32086: Try Visual Studio 2019 image in appveyor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-ci =>
 tor-ci, 029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,
 042-backport
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 Here's a test branch on master:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1431

 Here's the Appveyor image reference:
 https://www.appveyor.com/docs/windows-images-software/#operating-system

 If the branch passes, we should cherry-pick to maint-0.2.9, create test
 branches for every maint branch, check CI, and then merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32123: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  1.7
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  1.5 => 1.7


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32123: Implement minimal --disable-relay-mode
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:  1.5
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Rebased to resolve conflicts, and added fixups in:
 * https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1429

 Squashed fixups so we can merge this PR:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1430

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 (I noticed this log line in Tor Browser's new "View Logs..." feature,
 which means other people will be noticing it and wondering what's up too.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 It looks like compute_frac_paths_available() prints that line as a
 log_notice whenever it is called and count_usable_descriptors() returns
 "np" (number present) of 0.

 Specifically, count_usable_descriptors() counts up how many of the exit
 relays in the consensus are "present" and how many are "usable". At the
 beginning, when we've gotten the consensus but no microdescriptors, many
 of the exit relays are "usable" but none of them are "present" yet. But!
 The logic inside count_usable_descriptors() uses the opposite meaning: it
 says to itself that many of the exit relays are "present" in the consensus
 but none of them are "usable" by this Tor yet (because we don't have a
 microdescriptor for them yet).

 So the simple fix is that it needs to check if nu > 0, not np.

 And the broader fix is that maybe we need better words for these two
 notions.

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[tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Starting up 0.4.3.0-alpha-dev (git-71daad1692bc3f24) without any cached-*
 files in my DataDirectory, I get:
 {{{
 Oct 20 04:44:56.026 [notice] Bootstrapped 30% (loading_status): Loading
 networkstatus consensus
 Oct 20 04:44:56.636 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 Oct 20 04:44:56.758 [notice] Bootstrapped 40% (loading_keys): Loading
 authority key certs
 Oct 20 04:44:56.936 [notice] The current consensus has no exit nodes. Tor
 can only build internal paths, such as paths to onion services.
 Oct 20 04:44:56.936 [notice] Bootstrapped 45% (requesting_descriptors):
 Asking for relay descriptors
 Oct 20 04:44:56.936 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We need more microdescriptors: we have
 0/5841, and can only build 0% of likely paths. (We have 0% of guards bw,
 0% of midpoint bw, and 0% of end bw (no exits in consensus, using mid) =
 0% of path bw.)
 Oct 20 04:44:57.337 [notice] Bootstrapped 50% (loading_descriptors):
 Loading relay descriptors
 Oct 20 04:44:57.592 [notice] The current consensus contains exit nodes.
 Tor can build exit and internal paths.
 Oct 20 04:44:58.178 [notice] Bootstrapped 58% (loading_descriptors):
 Loading relay descriptors
 }}}

 It's that "The current consensus has no exit nodes." line that is out of
 place.

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[tor-bugs] #32164 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "View the Tor logs" puts an extra space at the end of each log line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32164: "View the Tor logs" puts an extra space at the end of each log line
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I'm using the new Tor Browser 9.0 build2 on Linux 64-bit.

 When I go to edit->preferences->Tor and go to the bottom and click "View
 Logs..." I get to see the Tor logs. Cool!

 But there's a minor weirdness: every line has an extra space at the end.

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[tor-bugs] #32163 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH inside functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32163: Stop using HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH inside functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-
 Severity:  Normal   |  october
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-
 In doc/HACKING/Modules.md, we say that we don't use module macros inside
 functions. But HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH is used inside a few functions.

 We should stop using HAVE_MODULE_DIRAUTH inside functions, or update the
 documentation to say "avoid using".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32162 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make router.c relay-only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32162: Make router.c relay-only
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  october|
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Description changed by teor:

Old description:



New description:

 In #32123, we disabled one function in router.c when the relay module is
 disabled.

 But we should disable the whole file.

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[tor-bugs] #32162 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make router.c relay-only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32162: Make router.c relay-only
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-
 Severity:  Normal   |  october
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #31851
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor31-can  |
-+-


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