Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  nDe15o   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nDe15o):

 And this is what happens in Policy.js parse function:
 it goes to this if
 {{{
 if (Sites.onionSecure && url.protocol === "http:" &&
 url.hostname.endsWith(".onion")) {
   url.protocol = "https:";
 }
 }}}
 but skips it, because Sites.onionSecure is undefined.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  nDe15o   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: ma1 (added)
 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201912 => tbb-9.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  nDe15o   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nDe15o):

 I tried to debug NoScript. This is what happens when I reload the tab
 where http://archivecaslytosk.onion/ is opened. It goes to Policy.js#448
 and siteMatch is null, so it return the default permission (which is only
 perm.capabilities: Set(2) of 0:"frame" 1: "other"):

 {{{
 get(site, ctx = null) {
   let perms, contextMatch;
   let siteMatch = !(this.onlySecure && /^\w+tp:/i.test(site)) &&
 this.sites.match(site);
   if (siteMatch) {
 perms = this.sites.get(siteMatch);
 if (ctx) {
   contextMatch = perms.contextual.match(ctx);
   if (contextMatch) perms = perms.contextual.get(ctx);
 }
   } else {
 perms = this.DEFAULT;
   }

   return {perms, siteMatch, contextMatch};
 }
 }}}

 it is null because this.onlySecure is undefined. Why it's undefined I
 don't know.


 Stack trace:
 {{{
 get (Policy.js#448)
 fetchChildPolicySync (main.js#167)
 onSyncMessage (main.js#207)
 notifyListeners (SyncMessage.js#138)
  (SyncMessage.js#28)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201911R
 =>
 tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-
 backport


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:

 [snip]

 > pospeselr: could you open a ticket for that discussion including your
 idea to generally apply letterboxing to privileged sites, too?

 #32411 it is.

 Marking the fix for a possible backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Systemd problem with ExecReload and CAP_KILL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32218: Systemd problem with ExecReload and CAP_KILL
--+
 Reporter:  sunova|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by weasel):

 It's not clear what the problem is or the use-case that is restricted by
 the current CapabilityBoundingSet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  nDe15o   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nDe15o):

 I've updated Tor Browser to version 9.0.1. I tested several .onion sites
 and this problem happens for all of them (e.g.
 http://archivecaslytosk.onion/.) This time it happened after 12 hours.
 There's the screenshot of how it looks like:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/32362/trusted.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  nDe15o   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nDe15o):

 * Attachment "trusted.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by liberat):

 Sorry I didn't explain what's going on there.

 If the client specifies a ''binary'' IPv4 or IPv6 address in the SOCKS
 request, it is converted into an ASCII string before any further
 processing is done.  This conversion is done by
 parse_socks5_client_request, regardless of whether the request is a
 CONNECT, RESOLVE, or RESOLVE_PTR.

 In the case of a binary IPv6 address, it is converted to a string by
 calling tor_addr_to_str with the 'decorate' parameter set to 1, which adds
 brackets around it.

 Later on, process_socks5_client_request is called, and the above check
 takes place.  string_is_valid_ipv6_address only accepts addresses
 ''without'' brackets, so the bracketed string is rejected.

 So, no, the above patch should address both "binary" and "ASCII" client
 requests.

 I'll try to write some tests and make a pull request this weekend.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32314 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't connect to literal IPv6 address containing double colon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32314: Can't connect to literal IPv6 address containing double colon
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by liberat):

 > This isn't quite right. Addresses and ports in Tor cells are binary. So
 the string parsing all happens on the client.

 I could be wrong.  But according to the spec, the payload of the
 RELAY_BEGIN cell is:
 {{{
  ADDRPORT [nul-terminated string]
  FLAGS[4 bytes]

ADDRPORT is made of ADDRESS | ':' | PORT | [00]

where  ADDRESS can be a DNS hostname, or an IPv4 address in
dotted-quad format, or an IPv6 address surrounded by square brackets;
and where PORT is a decimal integer between 1 and 65535, inclusive.
 }}}

 If the SOCKS client encodes the address in one ASCII format, Tor is able
 to connect.  If the SOCKS client encodes exactly the same address in a
 slightly different ASCII format, Tor is not able to connect.  When it
 fails, it seems to be that the exit node reports an error.  So I am
 assuming that the ASCII string supplied by the client is indeed what is
 transmitted in the RELAY_BEGIN cell.

 And I assume the fact that this sometimes ''works'' when the client
 supplies an address without brackets is a lucky accident, due to the
 permissive behavior of tor_addr_port_split.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I pushed branch `bug32303_04` for review. In the `tor-onion-proxy-library`
 project, this overwrites the obfs4proxy binaries bundled in `pluto` with
 the obfs4proxy binaries we build (instead of overwriting the file in the
 `tor-browser` project).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32412 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser - error on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32412: Tor browser - error on startup
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32412 [- Select a component]: Tor browser - error on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32412: Tor browser - error on startup
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Generic 64bit Firefox works just fine inside this Sandbox.

 Also, Sandboxie is now a free product, which should make
 testing/replicating this issue easier
 https://www.sandboxie.com/AllVersions

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32412 [- Select a component]: Tor browser - error on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32412: Tor browser - error on startup
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Furthermore, no antivirus software is installed.

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[tor-bugs] #32412 [- Select a component]: Tor browser - error on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32412: Tor browser - error on startup
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Windows 7 x64 SP1 english with all windows updates
 Tor browser 64bit 9.0.1 english
 Sandboxie 64bit 5.31.6

 When starting up Tor Browser, the following error appears:

 ""
 firefox.exe - DLL Initialization Failed

 Initialization of the dynamic link library C:\Program
 Files\Sandboxie\SbieDll.dll failed. The process is terminating abnormally.
 ""

 The issue does not occur when launching the 32bit version of Tor Browser
 on the same machine.

 The issue has occurred for many versions of Tor Browser now, and the
 workaround of using 32bit instead of 64bit Tor Browser always worked - but
 I would prefer to use the 64bit version.

 Perhaps related, but much older issue
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30660

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32412 [- Select a component]: Tor browser - error on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32412: Tor browser - error on startup
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "Untitled.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32410 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32410: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  0.1 => 0.2


Comment:

 A bunch of the relay parsing tests acted differently after this change, I
 think it's an improvement.

 Except that tor-no-relay sets ClientOnly in all torrcs. So I changed the
 ClientOnly default to 1, just like I changed the DirCache default to 0.

 I made that fix, updated the tests, and force-pushed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21961: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 The downside is it will display legitimate IDN's punycoded, which might be
 undesirable for users of non-latin alphabets. From a usability
 perspective, this should be a no go: but maybe if could be flipped with
 `privacy.spoof_english` - but that's mixing privacy and security up. If
 anything, it would fit better being flipped in the slider.

 Personally: I think this is an end-user problem, and there is no magic
 solution: of course better solutions upstream or at the domain registering
 level etc are always welcome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32287 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32287: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?
--+---
 Reporter:  rexkzhfbhgyc  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 I don't think the concern is metadata: it's the actual content of the
 thumbnail may reveal something unintentional (e.g your user name on the
 site: e.g if I bookmarked this page, it says "logged in as Thorin"). If
 the thumbnail in the confirmation/cancel dialog is memory only, then I
 think we're good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32411 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider adding about:tor to the list of pages that do not need letterboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32411: Consider adding about:tor to the list of pages that do not need
letterboxing
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 I quite like it being LB'ed as it shows something is off with the rounding
 on new windows (all those quirks with toolbar showing, DPI not at 100%,
 etc) - i.e. before you load web content. Note that new tabs can grab the
 non-LB'ed size before it renders (see TZP or use this -> https://thorin-
 oakenpants.github.io/testing/newwinLB.html )

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 We should also try to work out how old this bug is: if it goes back to
 0.2.9 or 0.3.5, we are still maintaining those branches. So it should be
 based on maint-0.2.9 or maint-0.3.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I'll review this ticket on Monday, I don't have a lot of time left this
 week.

 Can you submit a GitHub pull request to https://github.com/torproject/tor
 ?
 And write a changes file:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md#n95

 If not, that's ok, I can do them on Monday.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I merged #32407 to 0.4.2 and later, and added a fix to #32410 for you to
 review.

 I had some questions about the required engines feature, feel free to
 resolve them however you like, and then merge this ticket. You should
 probably squash and rebase first, there are some fixups and merge
 conflicts, and I merged #32407 to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0425,|  Actual Points:  .1
  035-backport 040-backport 041-backport |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * keywords:  035-backport 040-backport 041-backport 042-backport =>
 consider-backport-after-0425, 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport
 042-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Merged to 0.4.2 and later.
 Marking for backport to 0.3.5 and later, once it has been tested in
 0.4.2.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32410 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32410: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 nickm and I spoke about this issue on IRC.

 Here's what the code already does:
 * remove all direct references to the DirCache option outside disabled
 relay code: except for routermode and relay_config, everywhere else uses
 dir_server_mode()
 * interpret DirCache as "become a directory cache if we are also a relay":
 dir_server_mode() is `DirPort_set || (server_mode() &&
 router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver())`

 Here are the changes in this ticket:
 * change the default to `DirCache 0` when tor is built with the relay
 module disabled
   * but keep the default `DirCache 1` when we're building the unit tests
 * add a comment to the DirCache option that tells developers to use
 dir_server_mode() instead

 See my PR:
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1515

 I tested this fix by building with relay mode disabled, and then running
 `src/app/tor DisableNetwork 1`. Before the fix, it failed with a config
 error. After, it starts up with a valid config.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november, extra-review |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 `make test-stem` passed for me. It was failing consistently before this
 fix.
 Merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > I've made and pushed the other change. Thanks for the review!

 (which is to say: I've done a fix for the documentation issue and pushed
 it to the branch here pending your approval.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32386 [Core Tor/Tor]: Doxygen: Make output more C-like

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32386: Doxygen: Make output more C-like
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november, extra-review |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Stem has known intermittent failures, see #30901 and related tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Systemd problem with ExecReload and CAP_KILL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32218: Systemd problem with ExecReload and CAP_KILL
--+
 Reporter:  sunova|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 This ticket is unlikely to make 042-rc, unless the fix is done in the next
 few days.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32314 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't connect to literal IPv6 address containing double colon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32314: Can't connect to literal IPv6 address containing double colon
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:32314 liberat]:
 > However, if the address is abbreviated using double-colon notation, it
 only works if enclosed in brackets: "[2a00:1450:4001:800::200e]" works,
 but "2a00:1450:4001:800::200e" does not.  On the other hand, the
 unabbreviated form "2a00:1450:4001:800:0:0:0:200e" does work.
 >
 > The problem appears to be:
 >
 > - The destination is transmitted to the exit relay as a string of the
 form ":".
 >
 > - The exit relay tries to parse this string by calling the function
 tor_addr_port_split.
 >
 > - The string "2a00:1450:4001:800::200e:80" is a valid IPv6 literal, so
 tor_addr_port_split interprets it as an address with no port number.
 >
 > - The relay refuses to connect to an address with no port number.

 This isn't quite right. Addresses and ports in Tor cells are binary. So
 the string parsing all happens on the client.

 > Note that if the application uses the binary form (address type 4), this
 is internally converted into a string enclosed in brackets.  However, it
 seems to be more common for applications to use the ASCII form, without
 brackets.  For example, if you try to visit
 http://[2a00:1450:4001:800::200e]/ in Tor Browser, it will fail, whereas
 http://[2a01:4f8:fff0:4f:266:37ff:fe2c:5d19]/ succeeds.
 >
 > So there are a few ways this could be fixed:
 >
 > (a) applications could be changed to use either the binary form or wrap
 the address in brackets;
 >
 > (b) the Tor proxy could automatically add brackets around IPv6
 addresses;
 >
 > (c) the exit relay could be smarter about parsing IPv6 addresses.
 >
 > It seems to me that (b) would be the most sensible option, but it might
 be reasonable to do (c) as well.

 So these fixes both have to happen on the client.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32315 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32315: Can't perform reverse DNS lookup for a (binary) IPv6 address
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, dns |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Just to be clear, this fix doesn't allow binary addresses. It just allows
 IPv6 strings.

 And we should also write tests for this feature, so we don't accidentally
 break it in future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32165 [Core Tor/Tor]: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no exit nodes"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32165: On first boot, Tor mistakenly tells me "The current consensus has no 
exit
nodes"
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, BugSmashFund, 042 |  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 041-backport-maybe, 040   |
  -backport-maybe, 035-backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  bootstrap =>
 bootstrap, BugSmashFund, 042-backport-maybe, 041-backport-maybe, 040
 -backport-maybe, 035-backport-maybe
 * points:   => 1
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 This ticket is unlikely to make 0.4.2-rc, but we can backport it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  6
  roadmap-august, security   |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I don't think this fix is going to make 0.4.2-rc. Let's merge it in 0.4.3,
 then backport?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7164 [Core Tor/Tor]: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still referenced 1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7164: microdesc.c:378: Bug: microdesc_free() called, but md was still 
referenced
1 node(s); held_by_nodes == 1
-+-
 Reporter:  jaj123   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.19
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, 025-backport, nickm- |  Actual Points:
  should-review, review-group-24,|
  033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, |
  BugSmashFund   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-client, 025-backport, nickm-should-review, review-group-24,
 033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, 042-should, BugSmashFund
 =>
 tor-client, 025-backport, nickm-should-review, review-group-24,
 033-triage-20180320, 033-removed-20180320, BugSmashFund


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30917 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and rename the file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30917: Add instructions for making a new maint branch to EndOfLifeTor.md, and
rename the file
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor31-maybe, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-?  |
Parent ID:  #30839   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  sponsor31-maybe, network-team-roadmap-september =>
 sponsor31-maybe, network-team-roadmap-?
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32386 [Core Tor/Tor]: Doxygen: Make output more C-like

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32386: Doxygen: Make output more C-like
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks OK with me (assuming I understand the consequence of the chance
 correctly).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31524 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO bw-event-cache spike value(s) in it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31524: GETINFO bw-event-cache  spike value(s) in it
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  042-should =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Subsystem "thread_cleanup" is never called

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32103: Subsystem "thread_cleanup" is never called
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, extra-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  042-should, extra-review => 043-should, extra-review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 This fix is unlikely to make our 0.4.2 release.

 Feel free to open a new PR, and put the link in this ticket.

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[tor-bugs] #32411 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider adding about:tor to the list of pages that do not need letterboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32411: Consider adding about:tor to the list of pages that do not need
letterboxing
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Currently about:tor is letterboxed when resized, despite being a built-in
 'systemy' page (like about:preferences or about:config). We can remove the
 letterboxing for this page with this patch:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32220_v2=733e4014dc0a10c375c70070ec7ee9f468ea73e2

 However, we may not want to do that and perhaps we want letterboxing for
 all content, regardless of whether it is a system page or not to avoid
 confusing users about different behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32400 [Community/Tor Support]: Cannot obtain GPG keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32400: Cannot obtain GPG keys
---+--
 Reporter:  amgems |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gpg|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by amgems):

 No I did not.  I see now that it has all I would have needed if I was able
 to follow instructions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november, extra-review |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:  043-regression, network-team-roadmap-november =>
 043-regression, network-team-roadmap-november, extra-review
 * reviewer:  catalyst =>


Comment:

 Thanks. Looks good, maybe? At least one failure condition that reliably
 occurs on master and seems related to OwningController stuff seems to no
 longer occur.

 I still get intermittent failures that I think might be spurious. Maybe
 someone who's better at reading the tea leaves from stem should take a
 closer look?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:19 pospeselr]:
 > Ok I've updated the patch with a fixup commit which makes the tabpanel
 color change conditional to letterboxing being enabled, and I've removed
 the redundant addition of "letterboxing" to the browser element class list
 and am now only doing it on one place.
 >
 > tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32220_v2=b0bd271086e6d727d74d63dddaf13cc73f456ecb

 Thanks this looks good now. The fixup idea is good (and confused me at
 first because I was not used to it from you ;) ) as it makes reviewing
 eas(y)(ier). I squashed it (please do that the next time as this saves
 some time on the reviewer's/merger's side) and applied it to `tor-
 browser-68.2.0esr-9.5` (commit ff8083901a19421e9a3f0dba5346bd6873fee956).

 > And here's a followup/optional commit which adds about:tor to the set of
 pages that do not need letterboxing (like about:blank). It's our built-in
 page, so I don't see any reason why it needs to be letterboxed, but I left
 it out of the fixup commit just in case we do want it letterboxed.
 >
 > tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32220_v2=733e4014dc0a10c375c70070ec7ee9f468ea73e2

 I am a bit reluctant here and think we should discussing how we want to
 deal with privileged pages and `about:tor` in particular. Here is my
 concern I had:
 {{{
 18:46 <+GeKo> for the about:tor page exemption
 18:47 <+GeKo> i had been thinking about mentioning that in my review
 18:47 <+GeKo> but then thought it might be confusing to users when the
 window is
   suddenly starting "to do" things
 18:47 <+GeKo> while they just tried to visit a page
 18:48 <+GeKo> users don't have the concept of priviledged vs. non-
 priviledged pages
 }}}
 pospeselr: could you open a ticket for that discussion including your idea
 to generally apply letterboxing to privileged sites, too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've made and pushed the other change. Thanks for the review!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (I'll make the other change now.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 > Also, I noticed the following Doxygen error when manually running make
 doxygen:

 This is one I fixed separately in 2ab5b7520ec6d3a45923c9e5a61c3c6ddfb22c43

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks! This mostly looks good. I left a minor suggestion on the pull
 request.

 Also, I noticed the following Doxygen error when manually running `make
 doxygen`:
 {{{
 /Users/tlyu/src/tor/src/core/or/core_or.dox:63: error: Reached end of file
 while still inside a (nested) comment. Nesting level 1 (probable line
 reference: 1) (warning treated as error, aborting now)
 }}}
 which looks like it was introduced by
 e1cdca2e4f58c108539fe4c36205b16caca8d44f. I'm not sure whether we should
 fix it as part of this ticket or open a new one. I think it's not the only
 warning, though, because at least one more pops up if I fix core_or.dox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I forgot to mention I pushed a new branch for this. It's on `bug32303_02`.

 I pushed another commit that bumps the go version to `1.12.13` so we pick
 up the latest security patches (I haven't tested a full build with this
 yet).

 GeKo asked if we can exclude the original obfs4proxy binary instead of
 simply overwriting it in the tor-browser build stage. It turns out this is
 an interesting question and reveals I should re-think this patch.

 obfs4proxy comes from [https://github.com/guardianproject/pluto pluto],
 which is imported as a git submodule in `tor-onion-proxy-library`. The
 submodule uses `64faf224a90ec3ef8a806f9ec45c1caffafea768` which was
 commited in October 2018. So, this is a mess. `pluto` is not maintained
 anymore, and now TOPL should use
 https://github.com/guardianproject/AndroidPluggableTransports (with
 obfs4proxy coming from https://gitlab.com/eighthave/goptbundle, which is a
 fork of obfs4proxy). We shouldn't change this in this ticket, however.

 I'll create another branch where we add `obfs4proxy` in the `tor-onion-
 proxy-library` project instead of `tor-browser`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, so before I speculate further I double-check your results using
 `-opt-bisect-limit` at least figuring out which optimization is the
 culprit for the tests I am currently running.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30683: Properties in dom/locales/$lang/chrome/ allow detecting user locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-locale|  Actual Points:  1
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged to `tor-browser-68.2.0esr-9.5-1` (commit
 cb255f2504b37916160e886a181f1a02f85dba7c and
 79d87f543224b0e9d69a7520e25d9179d4f2c2bc).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32383 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32383: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  anarcat => weasel


Old description:

> there are three boxes in our infra that are just too slow to provide the
> service they were designed for. they are the build-
> arm-0[123].torproject.org boxes and should be retired.

New description:

 there are three boxes in our infra that are just too slow to provide the
 service they were designed for. they are the `build-
 arm-0[123].torproject.org` boxes and should be retired.

--

Comment:

 retirement checklist:

  1. hosts have long been unusable, ack'd (requested, even) by weasel
  2. N/A - will leave running so weasel can wipe the machines if needed
  3. N/A - not a VM
  4. N/A - will let weasel wipe the machine or destroy the hardware
  5. removed the hosts from ldap
  6. remove the records from the 172.30.0.0/16 zone (30.172.in-addr.arpa)
 and associated sbg namespace (commit 593b1a6 in tor/dns)
  7. remove the three hosts from puppet (`for host in build-arm-01 build-
 arm-02 build-arm-03; do puppet node clean $host.torproject.org && puppet
 node deactivate $host.torproject.org; done`)
  8. removed build-arm* traces from the puppet repo (2dcfd012 and
 da0b4daf])
  9. removed from tor-passwords
  10. removed from the spreadsheet and slight fix in wiki
  11. removed from nagios
  12. N/A hosts not on the backup server
  13. nothing in letsencrypt
  14. ping'd weasel for physical retirement and deletion
  15. not handling mail

 those are the LDAP records removed in step 5, in case that's important:

 {{{
 419 host=build-arm-01,ou=hosts,dc=torproject,dc=org
 host: build-arm-01
 hostname: build-arm-01.torproject.org
 objectClass: top
 objectClass: debianServer
 l: weasel's, Austria
 access: restricted
 admin: torproject-ad...@torproject.org
 description: arm build system
 ipHostNumber: 172.30.115.11
 distribution: Debian
 architecture: arm64
 purpose: buildbox
 purpose: porterbox
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-rsa
 
B3NzaC1yc2EDAQABAAABAQC0nCJTls+EUO2I68O2PkHprbeNeTN0BNY3HJa1OEywsLs3/VaTKQmTaJRuVagvu6yaZqEivxa5Uu5I5zSF6PqE+pQeYhH13UGIcuz4UMaPIDozBjsxAf3YgOWxsWMEmGp/VTT/UGajicsdbf2EvU+eAmxAIJ2O2GeC100+9QkcEy5ztaqjb0NrpnDWZEq5Y7h9KZcJm6TKwTvVnSLxW62nwMMlMEtD0UlOfGpvv+eB/g4zBAZ78lYo6m4tBXkjNCIcw8VgxDtpFNSMD+CrxUQyA8mTXY3SB4n60OV7cWHrw2ERIY15/uO8wSdMuesrhEasO1pdxQGY6jofE0M7cZxZ
 root@build-arm-01
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-ed25519
 C3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5IA52bCa08CAPN2ud7TRY1XPFZFsqvwppFUh3PVk95I7e root
 @build-arm-01
 machine: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
 allowedGroups: jenkins

 420 host=build-arm-02,ou=hosts,dc=torproject,dc=org
 host: build-arm-02
 hostname: build-arm-02.torproject.org
 objectClass: top
 objectClass: debianServer
 l: weasel's, Austria
 access: restricted
 admin: torproject-ad...@torproject.org
 description: arm build system
 ipHostNumber: 172.30.115.12
 distribution: Debian
 architecture: arm64
 purpose: buildbox
 purpose: porterbox
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-rsa
 
B3NzaC1yc2EDAQABAAABAQCXuRZZPgwbYm82jSZvyQAz+0RtrrYZGYzdn/aX5r76GnM7Oq98/QwaKYl0oOdmn1ZASc+7XLJpNyB2acUpPLn9vhl6xh9WqBkN79dBJo6sHObSAooWn2LaXfWSPBer4njrnHHT6cGqb8iD8wQBXTctF9Smu8rSRuA7XxVfe6sFeoLDz3wz3IfmIdFB+x0h1xA/BFoLgntJb9mdZv30KUEObOb2yKVO2944gCcFyzO21z285mghFoQkyHeQDNotjXmKmDuf402/XKkBeY8IZ9v2HJhjp9wMtpifaNBH8WWhbbqACAjvq6ZszOR1rm00HojT5NjuT45RFK11JfKYdGy5
 root@build-arm-02
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-ed25519
 C3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5INzK47M11Ls4bTbBqsBPf71fwradRT7yg4QmblBTbnPe root
 @build-arm-02
 machine: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
 allowedGroups: jenkins

 421 host=build-arm-03,ou=hosts,dc=torproject,dc=org
 host: build-arm-03
 hostname: build-arm-03.torproject.org
 objectClass: top
 objectClass: debianServer
 l: weasel's, Austria
 access: restricted
 admin: torproject-ad...@torproject.org
 description: arm build system
 ipHostNumber: 172.30.115.13
 distribution: Debian
 architecture: arm64
 purpose: buildbox
 purpose: porterbox
 sshRSAHostKey: ssh-rsa
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32399 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32399: Fix "make test-stem" after merging #32339 and #32344
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-regression, network-team-|  Actual Points:  0
  roadmap-november   |
Parent ID:  #29211   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:29 alexcrichton]:
 > The bug seems to be in the `-jump-threading` pass which I suspect is
 included in the O1 optimizations, yeah, but this technically only arose
 during O3 when presumably enough inlining had happened to then trigger the
 bug. I'm not really sure what the best way to avoid this bug would be
 unfortunately, but I suspect that an `-O1` build should be reproducible
 (albeit slow).

 Actually O2 is already enough. I can't trigger the issue with O1 nor with
 just `jump-threading` (and I tried pretty hard today). So, from those
 results I would say "something in O2 is the problem" which brings me to
 the thought that we might hunt different bugs. :) But on the positive side
 of things I think I have a setup ready now for actual bisecting LLVM which
 I will pick up tomorrow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 results already look quite promising:

 [[Image(snap-2019.11.06-15.13.06.png​)]]

 the three hosts down are the three ARM build boxes that live behind ipsec,
 so that's normal and should go away after #32383.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.11.06-15.13.06.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 just turned off ipsec on that host to see if that affects it.

 before, ping:

 {{{
 --- hetzner-hel1-01.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1296649 packets transmitted, 1261574 received, 2% packet loss, time
 1299266373ms
 rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 23.358/24.190/7731.164/37.891 ms, pipe 8
 }}}

 noping:

 {{{
 --- hetzner-hel1-01.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1298788 packets transmitted, 1262968 received, 2,76% packet loss, time
 30172995,2ms
 RTT[ms]: min = 23, median = 24, p(95) = 24, max = 34

 --- macrum.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1298788 packets transmitted, 1258030 received, 3,14% packet loss, time
 3645717,0ms
 RTT[ms]: min = 3, median = 3, p(95) = 3, max = 10

 --- bungei.torproject.org ping statistics ---
 1298788 packets transmitted, 1298338 received, 0,03% packet loss, time
 30554619,0ms
 RTT[ms]: min = 23, median = 24, p(95) = 24, max = 33
 }}}

 restarted both pings after the change, just now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 FWIW, one of the CI tests is failing, but I think that isn't caused by
 this.  It's caused by the fact that we reject `DirCache 1` when running
 with the relay module disabled, but DirCache 1 is the default.
 I've opened #32410 for this issue.

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[tor-bugs] #32410 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32410: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must  |
+
 The default value for DirCache is 1.  But when we build with --disable-
 module-relay, we reject that default, and so reject our default
 configuration.

 I think it is reasonable to allow DirCache 1 in this case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, this is working well (it seems). I tested `aarch64`. Unfortunately,
 it seems the `runtime/cgo: pthread_key_create failed` error is only
 triggered on Android Q emulators, so real devices are the only way we can
 test this right now, I think.

 I split it into two patches: part 1 builds obfs4proxy for Android, and
 part 2 backports the patch for go.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:33 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:30 sisbell]:
 >
 > > It looks very close, I'm still investigating why I get the following
 error in tor-browser project when using apksigner.
 > >
 > > {{{
 > >   inflating: tmp/removed-files
 > > Error: Unable to access jarfile /usr/share/apksigner/apksigner.jar
 > >
 > > }}}
 >
 > The path to apksigner in buster is `/usr/lib/android-sdk/build-
 tools/debian/apksigner.jar`.

 So I think removing the install_jdk and getting the apksigner path updated
 should do the trick to get everything building. I'll get this building
 today and test out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32331: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.1.0-can, TorBrowserTeam201912|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:1 sysrqb]:
 > There's a new orbot release candidate upgrading the tor version to
 `0.4.1.6` with the hope this fixes it. We can try picking this up, too.

 Are we looking at adding this to tor-android-service as a binary or using
 the newest build for Android tor in the browser build?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by kromek):

 Replying to [comment:5 sysrqb]:
 > Did this only begin in Tor Browser 9? Did you upgrade from Tor Browser
 8.5 or is this a new installation?
 Yes, it began in Tor Browser 9. Previously the issue was non-existent. It
 remains a bug in 9.0.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32152 [Webpages/Website]: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32152: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Zarko_Gjurov):

 The problem still exist in Tor Browser version 9.0.1.

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[tor-bugs] #32409 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32409: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 All the people who we want to give access to the Tor repository already
 have LDAP accounts. It's three people: resgue...@giantrabbit.com,
 skirti...@giantrabbit.com, and j...@giantrabbit.com.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32409 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32409: Add giantrabbit devs to donate repository
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by alexcrichton):

 The bug seems to be in the `-jump-threading` pass which I suspect is
 included in the O1 optimizations, yeah, but this technically only arose
 during O3 when presumably enough inlining had happened to then trigger the
 bug. I'm not really sure what the best way to avoid this bug would be
 unfortunately, but I suspect that an `-O1` build should be reproducible
 (albeit slow).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32259 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to start on some Linux systems without libatomic being installed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32259: Tor Browser fails to start on some Linux systems without libatomic being
installed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can => tbb-9.0-issues,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201912


Comment:

 It seems Icecat is still on 60esr, so any older systems that only have
 Icecat (or similar) installed won't have libatomic installed as a
 dependency yet (sigh).

 https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gnuzilla.git

 `build/autoconf/toolchain.m4`:
 {{{
  92 AC_DEFUN([MOZ_CXX11],
  93 [
  94 dnl Updates to the test below should be duplicated further below for
 the
  95 dnl cross-compiling case.
  96 AC_LANG_CPLUSPLUS
  97 if test "$GNU_CXX"; then
  98 AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether 64-bits std::atomic requires -latomic],
  99 ac_cv_needs_atomic,
 100 dnl x86 with clang is a little peculiar.  std::atomic does not
 require
 101 dnl linking with libatomic, but using atomic intrinsics does,
 so we
 102 dnl force the setting on for such systems.
 103 if test "$CC_TYPE" = "clang" -a "$CPU_ARCH" = "x86" -a
 "$OS_ARCH" = "Linux"; then
 104 ac_cv_needs_atomic=yes
 }}}

 I guess we can either bundle it (as a fallback) or try detecting this at
 run-time and notify the user they should install it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32408 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32408: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I'd like a general design review on the ideas and names in this ticket's
 description before I get too far ahead on this work.

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[tor-bugs] #32408 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32408: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29211
   Points:  1.5|   Reviewer:  teor
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 Our new configuration system needs to handle options_act_reversible too.

 But on further examination, there are only two actual "reversible" pieces
 of options_act_reversible:

* Adjusting the logs.
* Adjusting the listeners.

 The remainder of the function is all about handling "irreversible",
 immutable options that need to be handled before we can mess with the logs
 or listeners.

 I think this means that we want to split this function into two pieces:
 one part that handles startup-only initialization, and one that handles
 truly reversible option changes.

 I think that the callback for the startup-only initialization should be
 called options_set_init(), options_set_onece(), options_set_early(), or
 something like that.

 The callbacks for truly reversible options should look something like
 this:
 {{{
 int act_reversible(const void *old_options, void *new_options, void
 **transaction_state_out);
 int commit(const void *old_options, void *new_options, void
 *transaction_state);
 int rollback(const void *old_options, void *rejected_options, void
 *transaction_state);
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * actualpoints:   => 4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32287 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32287: bookmark save a screenshoot for bookmarked page?
--+---
 Reporter:  rexkzhfbhgyc  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I'm not sure this is a bug (or that we should fix it). Bookmarks are
 already tagged with the date they were last modified. We can go down the
 rabbit-hole of scrubbing all timestamps associated with bookmarks and any
 other information that may indicate when the bookmark was created/updated
 - but that is a much larger issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32289 [Applications/Tor Browser]: feedback on a website‏

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32289: feedback on a website‏
-+-
 Reporter:  superislam   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  linkability, TorBrowserTeam201912  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-linkability => tbb-usability-
 website, tbb-linkability, TorBrowserTeam201912
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Do you know if this recently broke? Do you know if it worked in older
 versions of Tor Browser?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce Letterboxing to users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32324: Introduce Letterboxing to users
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues => ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam201912


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I've done some more work here to make it better.  I've done #32406
 so that we can mark an accelerator as required, which lets us test
 failures in options_set().

 And wouldn't you know it, there was a bug in options_set()!  If
 options_act() failed while we did not have an event loop initialized, we
 would crash in tor_shutdown_event_loop_and_exit(). That's #32407: I've
 done a separate branch for that against 0.3.5.

 I've squashed the fixups on the branch, rebased it on master, and added
 the #32407 fix.  The new branch is `config_subsys_v3`. Its PR is
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1514.

 I'm going to wait for CI to pass here, at least.  I think that #32406 and
 #32407 are enough of a change that I should wait for review on them before
 I merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop inner letterbox jiggling as border is dragged

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32308: Stop inner letterbox jiggling as border is dragged
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-fingerprinting-  |  Actual Points:
  resolution TorBrowserTeam201912|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution =>
 tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution TorBrowserTeam201912


Comment:

 Maybe next month.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31992 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove apktool workaround in #31564

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31992: Remove apktool workaround in #31564
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30025 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor27-must
---+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21961: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201912
 * priority:  Immediate => High
 * status:  needs_review => needs_information
 * severity:  Major => Normal
 * cc: ux-team (added)


Comment:

 We should think about and understand the usability implications of simply
 flipping the pref. How do other browsers handle this and what should the
 user do when they see the url rewritten? How do we make sure people
 actually notice something is (possibly) wrong while not scaring them or
 confusing them when it is a false-positive?

 (To be clear, I haven't investigated this at all, these are simply
 questions I have from skimming this ticket)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Branch is `bug32407` with PR in
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1513. It merges forward cleanly to
 master.  Let's take it in master as part of #30866, which needs it to fix
 its tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport 040-backport|  Actual Points:  .1
  041-backport 042-backport  |
Parent ID:  #30866   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 035-backport 040-backport 041-backport 042-backport
 * actualpoints:   => .1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30678 [Webpages/Website]: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30678: remove hardcoded capitalization from tpo css and templates
--+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30027| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * cc: emmapeel (added)
 * keywords:   => l10n
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 passing it to hiro so she does her css mojo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31899 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Hook .onion with URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31899: Hook .onion with URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY?
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21728| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32325 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow Letterboxing opt-in/out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32325: Allow Letterboxing opt-in/out
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:  #32324   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues => ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32329 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After upgrading Tor Browser 8.5.1 -> 9.0, history contains place:sort=8=10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32329: After upgrading Tor Browser 8.5.1 -> 9.0, history contains
place:sort=8=10
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202002  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-update => tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam202002


Comment:

 I agree. I see this in the Tor Browser installation I am using, as well.
 It upgraded from `8.5.5`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ok I've updated the patch with a fixup commit which makes the tabpanel
 color change conditional to letterboxing being enabled, and I've removed
 the redundant addition of "letterboxing" to the browser element class list
 and am now only doing it on one place.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32220_v2=b0bd271086e6d727d74d63dddaf13cc73f456ecb

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32331: Tor Browser 9 on Lineage OS 14.1 stalls during start-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.1.0-can, TorBrowserTeam201912|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.0.1-can =>
 tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.1.0-can, TorBrowserTeam201912
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 There's a new orbot release candidate upgrading the tor version to
 `0.4.1.6` with the hope this fixes it. We can try picking this up, too.

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[tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30866
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 It appears that our cleanup code hits an assertion failure when we have
 been called with --dump-config and a set of options that fails in
 set_options().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Repurpose block-malicious-sites-checkbox on TLS error page in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19119: Repurpose block-malicious-sites-checkbox on TLS error page in Tor 
Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202002   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  network-health => network-health, TorBrowserTeam202002


Comment:

 Setting this at some time in the future. I can see us prioritizing this as
 it could leak onion addresses in self-signed certs (if I'm understanding
 this error case correctly). The exit-node-mitm situation is an interesting
 case, and Tor Browser providing a mechanism for people to report this is a
 neat idea.

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[tor-bugs] #32406 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add ability to make an accelname required.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32406: Add ability to make an accelname required.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #30866
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 This will help test #30866.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32330 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about providing a UI for global cookie settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32330: Think about providing a UI for global cookie settings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team => tbb-9.0-issues, ux-team,
 TorBrowserTeam202001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32038 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor-browser-build license is unclear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32038: tor-browser-build license is unclear
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201911
 * cc: boklm (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: apt-win-crt*dll files are missing on some Windows 8 and Windows 7 systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32327: apt-win-crt*dll files are missing on some Windows 8 and Windows 7 
systems
-+-
 Reporter:  bob121   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression => tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-
 regression, TorBrowserTeam201912


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21483 [Applications/Tor Browser]: DuckDuckGo Onion should be the default instead of DuckDuckGo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21483: DuckDuckGo Onion should be the default instead of DuckDuckGo
--+
 Reporter:  lolscreen |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs, TorBrowserTeam202001


Comment:

 Do we know if DDG are using a SOS or anonymous circuits? We should discuss
 this with them before we make a change like this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've run into a hitch with "nickm will add some tests for crypto NSS using
 test_parseconf.sh".  There is no way to make crypto_openssl_late_init()
 fail.  When it gets a nonexistent engine, it warns, but does not consider
 it an error.  This behavior is probably reasonable, so I don't think we
 should change it.

 I've added the test nonetheless, but I don't think the behavior will
 change for NSS: it is a success in both cases.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32220: Change letterboxing color when dark theme is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, ux-   |  Actual Points:  5
  team, TorBrowserTeam201911R|
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1594455

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript, TorBrowser201911 => tbb-9.0-issues,
 noscript, TorBrowserTeam201911


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowser201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => tbb-9.0-issues, noscript, TorBrowser201911
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * severity:  Major => Normal


Comment:

 Did this only begin in Tor Browser 9? Did you upgrade from Tor Browser 8.5
 or is this a new installation?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32333 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32333: NoScript remembers settings on browser quit
-+-
 Reporter:  kromek   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, noscript,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowser201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32297 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked by a website firewall

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32297: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked 
by a
website firewall
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression => tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-
 regression, TorBrowserTeam201911


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