Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:13 alecmuffett]:
 > > It seems to me the user agent could sent this header with the first
 request and if the server does not want to react to that, that's cool, but
 then the header could get omitted as it seems the content provider does
 not want to act on that .onion offer.
 >
 > Thought experiment: Why do we not do that with the entire User-Agent?

 There are a number of reasons. Let me just name two (both of them do not
 apply to adding the onion capability bit):

 1) The user agent has been around for a long time on the web and services
 check that one for a variety of reasons. Dropping it suddenly after
 sending it in the first request would very likely break setups in the
 sense that the whole site gets non-functional.

 2) The user agent is sometimes used for deciding which *content* is shown
 to the user. If you sent a desktop string in the first request but then
 dropped it and the server decides to suddenly deliver you content designed
 for your mobile you would probably be quite unhappy about it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32425 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32425: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting
--+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 original upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1216893
 for `svg.disabled` with links to other relevant bugzillas
 - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409253
 - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1409251
 - https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1330675

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[tor-bugs] #32428 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add backend ID when exposing circuitid with HiddenServiceExportCircuitID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32428: Add backend ID when exposing circuitid with HiddenServiceExportCircuitID
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.3-alpha  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Currently Tor can expose a circuitid to backends with directive
 HiddenServiceExportCircuitID using the HAProxy proxy protocol, but because
 there could be multiple Tor instances accessing the same backend (e.g.
 onionbalance) circuitids could collide.

 I propose a config directive HiddenServiceExposeInstanceID, which enables
 users to specify a tor instance ID which can be placed instead of
 dead:beef:4dad.

 If this seems ok, I’ll whip up a simple patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32427: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #32408| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Branch is `reversible` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1519.

 This does not yet integrate add support for options_act_reversible() to
 the new system: instead it just splits the function into comprehensible
 parts.

 Not yet ready for review; probably needs more tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32427: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #32408| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (I mean, you _could_ review it, but I bet it isn't ready for merge till
 the test coverage is higher.)

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[tor-bugs] #32427 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32427: Refactor options_act_reversible into manageable chunks
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  .3 |  Parent ID:  #32408
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26294 [Core Tor/Tor]: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26294: attacker can force intro point rotation by ddos
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  6
  roadmap-august, security   |
Parent ID:  #2   | Points:  7
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.2.x-final => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 Yes this is not gonna make 042 indeed. Not even sure if it's gonna make
 043 either. Seems to need design work first.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32423 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Attempts to use location services silently fail with no user feedback as to why

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32423: Attempts to use location services silently fail with no user feedback 
as to
why
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 That would be `permissions.default.geo` where  `0`=always ask (default),
 `1`=allow, `2`=block.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i tweaked the cache so it keeps inactive entries for more than the default
 (10m) and to cache 404s and redirects (which isn't done by default).

 there are pages that return "bad" headers like this one:

 {{{
 anarcat@angela:~(master)$ curl -sSLI https://blog.torproject.org/new-
 release-tor-browser-90a5 | grep -i cache-control
 cache-control: must-revalidate, no-cache, private
 }}}

 that's a problem on the drupal side of things.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:33 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:32 gk]:
 > > Let's test -O1 in our upcoming alpha build to get a feeling whether
 that would be an acceptable workaround or not and to check whether it
 actually resolves our build issues: `bug_32053_workaround`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 
browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32053_workaround=f1f9fa0286982d1fa486880ad6037e1e7a46457d)
 has a patch for review.
 >
 > That sounds like a good idea to test this in the next alpha. And the
 patch looks good to me.

 That strategy does not fly, alas, as using -O1 is causing build bustage on
 Linux at least (due to the current defense we have against proxy bypasses
 of Rust code), see: #32426.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build of tbb-9.5a2-build5 fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32426: Build of tbb-9.5a2-build5 fails
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201911
 * points:   => 0.1
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 boklm]:
 > I am wondering if it related with the workaround for #32053.

 It is, alas. Backing out the workaround solves the problem. This is done
 in commit b223504c86b01d2e8d80daad4efe8f009e6b8879 on `tor-
 browser-68.2.0esr-9.5-1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911R => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201911


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:35 sisbell]:
 >
 > Fixed
 > * added correct apksigner path for debian
 > * removed use of install_jdk flag (override pre_pkginst)
 >
 > https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/da928c8cc046ad71e718ddd1eb2c4690af8097dd

 in `var/pre_pkginst`:
 {{{
   sha256sum
 04f35746d85ea065a06a79a0ffb95825bd591a1b3a0f7cc641d06e7d263bbef5
 openjdk-8-jdk_$JDK_VERSION.deb | sha256sum -c
   sha256sum
 92b4f8fb77d793a86e0b03b3b0750592b40a26a5d75956d10dd984a7b3aad4c9 openjdk-8
 -jdk-headless_$JDK_VERSION.deb | sha256sum -c
   sha256sum
 84bf52b6cce20ead08b0d5b9fd9b81b4aa3da385ca951b313fe11d5cb1aa4d17 openjdk-8
 -jre-headless_$JDK_VERSION.deb | sha256sum -c
   sha256sum
 75057205b56791edbc4dd0358cb56efd7d20ce0cb730d6ecba38e37267d72b9b
 openjdk-8-jre_$JDK_VERSION.deb | sha256sum -c
 }}}

 This is wrong, we could replace the checksum in those lines by anything,
 and it will never fail. Running `sha245sum checksum some-file | sha256sum
 -c` will complain that the file `checksum` does not exist, but it is
 basically equivalent to running `sha245sum some-file | sha256sum -c` which
 is equivalent to doing nothing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 this is how it looks on pantheon's side:

 [[Image(snap-2019.11.07-17.00.49.png, 700px)]]

 ie. it went from 15841 to 4957 visits in a day, a 30% reduction, which
 roughly matches the overall hit ratio (70%) we're seeing. a 70% reduction
 should bump us from the current "extra large" (300k visits per month
 1000$/mth) down to "medium" (50k, 300$) or more likely "large" (150k,
 600$) because we'd still hit 90k visits per month, or more - 5k visits per
 day is about exactly 150k visits per month, depending on the month.

 so if we want to get back to the 300$/mth, we need to work on that hit
 ratio, bit time. there are probably a few things we can do to work on
 that, but that will need more investigation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 Aside: I think you answered your own question when you said:

 >the user agent could sent this header with the first request

 ...because that word "first" means state-maintenance; as with the "link
 onion-enabling stuff with the first dropping of a session cookie" model,
 there are three issues:

 - not all sites want to use cookies / track their users; what then, re:
 state-tracking?

 - by linking the onion-enablement to "first drop", there is no opportunity
 to revisit or "nudge" the user towards onion

 and thirdly

 - by eliding the six bytes of {{{Tor/1}}} from the header, you make it
 somewhat harder for people to implement stuff like:

 '''You are not Onion-Capable! We recommend that you run TorBrowser for
 access to this site! '''

 ...which is potentially desirable for brand awareness :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.11.07-17.00.49.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #32206, #32207, #32208, #32209, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #32206, #32207, #32208, #32209, #32211 by catalyst:
type to task

Comment:
these are tasks not defects

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sisbell):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201911R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed
 * added correct apksigner path for debian
 * removed use of install_jdk flag (override pre_pkginst)

 https://github.com/sisbell/tor-browser-
 build/commit/da928c8cc046ad71e718ddd1eb2c4690af8097dd

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 at first glance, our hit ratio is not great. i used the following lnav log
 format parser:

 {{{
 {
 "cache" : {
 "title" : "Tor Nginx cache Log Format",
 "description" : "Log format used by the Tor Project for its Nginx
 cache servers.",
 "url" : "http://example.com/log-format.html;,
 "regex" : {
 "basic" : {
 "pattern" : "^(?[\\w\\d:.-]+) -
 (?[\\w\\d:.-]+)
 \\[(?\\d{2}/\\w{3}/\\d{4}:\\d{2}:\\d{2}:\\d{2}(?:\\.\\d+)?(?:
 [+-]\\d{4}))?\\] \"(?\\w+) (?\\S+) (?\\S+)\"
 (?\\d+) (?\\d+|-) \"(?[^\"]+)\" \"-\"
 (?\\S+) (?[\\d.-]+)
 (?\\S+) (?[\\d.-]+)$"
 }
 },
 "level-field" : "upstream_cache_status",
 "level" : {
 "error" : "MISS",
 "warning" : "BYPASS|EXPIRED|STALE|UPDATING|REVALIDATED",
 "info" : "HIT"
 },
 "value" : {
 "client" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true,
 "collate": "ipaddress" },
 "user" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true },
 "method" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true },
 "path" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true },
 "transport" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true },
 "status_code" : { "kind" : "integer", "identifier" : true },
 "resp_size" : { "kind" : "integer", "identifier" : true },
 "referer" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true },
 "upstream_addr" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" : true,
 "collate": "ipaddress" },
 "upstream_response_time" : { "kind" : "float", "identifier" :
 true },
 "upstream_cache_status" : { "kind" : "string", "identifier" :
 true },
 "request_time" : { "kind" : "float", "identifier" : true }
 },
 "sample" : [
 {
 "line" : "0.0.0.0 - - [07/Nov/2019:21:28:09 +] \"GET
 /blog/feed HTTP/2.0\" 200 483311 \"-\" \"-\" - - HIT 0.373",
 "level" : "info"
 },
 {
 "line" : "0.0.0.0 - - [07/Nov/2019:21:28:10 +] \"GET
 /new-release-tor-browser-90 HTTP/2.0\" 200 26764
 \"https://www.google.com/\; \"-\" [2620:12a:8000::2]:443 0.416 MISS
 0.420",
 "level" : "error"
 },
 {
 "line" : "0.0.0.0 - - [07/Nov/2019:21:28:10 +] \"GET
 /robots.txt HTTP/1.1\" 200 1594 \"-\" \"-\" [2620:12a:8001::2]:443 0.020
 MISS 0.020",
 "level" : "error"
 }
 ]
 }
 }

 }}}

 and then ran lnav on the access logfile, then ran the following query
 (after hitting the `;` key):

 {{{
 select count(*), upstream_cache_status from logline where status_code <
 300 group by upstream_cache_status;
 }}}

 which gave the following results:

 {{{
 count(*) upstream_cache_status
 │
6│-
 │
7│EXPIRED
 │
 2925│HIT
 │
  680│MISS
 │
5│REVALIDATED
 }}}

 That's an 80% hit ratio, and that's when ignoring any status code above
 2xx. If those are included, our hit ratio is around 72%.

 So there is still some work to be done to improve the hit ratio.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 > It seems to me the user agent could sent this header with the first
 request and if the server does not want to react to that, that's cool, but
 then the header could get omitted as it seems the content provider does
 not want to act on that .onion offer.

 Thought experiment: Why do we not do that with the entire User-Agent?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:11 alecmuffett]:
 > Trying to wrap this essay up into a sentence:
 >
 > > Putting {{{Tor/1}}} or similar into the User-Agent will enable site
 owners to get clients to the proper onion, to the onion they want to serve
 the user through, via the means they are best equipped to serve the client
 - direct connection, alt-svc - with a minimum of cost, technical debt,
 state-maintenance or fuss.

 Yeah, I get the idea of signalling a server onion capabilities, say, by
 using a UA. I am not opposed to that. What I am not convinced of yet is
 why this needs to get included into _every_ request, e.g. for fetching an
 image on a website. Why should the user agent do that if the server it
 talked to did not react to the onion capability information in the *very
 first request*. Should it hope that while all the other resources are
 loaded over the "regular" Internet that particular image is loaded over
 .onion? It seems to me the user agent could sent this header with the
 first request and if the server does not want to react to that, that's
 cool, but then the header could get omitted as it seems the content
 provider does not want to act on that .onion offer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 Trying to wrap this essay up into a sentence:

 > Putting {{{Tor/1}}} or similar into the User-Agent will enable site
 owners to get clients to the proper onion, to the onion they want to serve
 the user through, via the means they are best equipped to serve the client
 - direct connection, alt-svc - with a minimum of cost, technical debt,
 state-maintenance or fuss.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 Re: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32256#comment:9

 Hi George!

 I've thought about this a lot in the past few days, and this is my
 considered response.

 Before I get into it, I am going to standardise my terminology in order to
 make things a bit clearer and more consistent:

 - "client" means TorBrowser in the hands of a user

 - "site" means a large and sprawling (typically: multiple-onion) site,
 such as Facebook, the BBC, NYTimes, or any of several others which exist.

 - "estate" means a distinct "chunk" of a site, probably with one or more
 separate onion addresses; for instance "bbc.com" and "bbc.co.uk" are
 separate estates within the "BBC site", not least because of content
 licensing concerns.  In the cleartext internet, Facebook, Messenger,
 Instagram and WhatsApp are all separate "estates" of "[the] Facebook
 [Site]"

 - "CDN" means a (usually: third-party) estate which serves part of a site,
 e.g. Fastly

 - "server" means one specific machine within a site.

 My particular interest is in sites which often comprise one or more
 estates - typically: CDNs; the BBC site in particular comprises at least 4
 distinct BBC estates (.com, .co.uk, BBCi, and something-i've-forgotten)
 plus two separate third-party global CDN estates.

 I believe that the BBC is by far the most complex onion site on the
 planet; Facebook by comparison has only onionified its core site + its
 CDN; partly for the reasons that I outline below.

 With this glossary established, I'll begin; and I will number my
 paragraphs in case you wish to reference them:

 [1] First: I am glad that we agree that consumption of bandwidth does have
 a cost associated with it. The questions we must determine are:

 - who should bear that cost?

 - how often?

 - under what circumstances?

 - and how great a cost is it?

 [2] I believe that we've established above that it's not economic nor
 environmentally aware for a large site to issue "Onion-Location" headers
 with every response, merely in the hope that 0.05% of users might make use
 of them

 Scary Maths : (1 million Tor users / 2.7 billion FB users ) * 100 =>
 0.037%

 [3] I also believe that the commentary from Privacy International, and
 elsewhere, describes both the imperfections and tragedy-of-the-commons
 issues relevant to treating Tor exit nodes as a geography to be "tracked".

 [4] As such: it's neither economic nor robust for a server in a site to
 somehow "know" that a request has arrived from an onion-capable browser,
 without employing considerable effort; and when attempting to grow Onion
 adoption it's much harder to pitch fiddly, specialist, complex solutions
 which require specialist realtime databases (etc) to function, with the
 ability to deliver that information across several estates and possibly
 into third parties.

 [5] One could posit an architecture where "when the client tries to log
 in" (nb: the BBC do not operate login over their onion site, the NYT do
 not offer POST functionality at all) then the browser offers an Onion-
 Location header, thereby reducing the cost?

 [6] Yes, one could do that, but then you're in the realm of custom
 engineering to support an onion site, which (again) is a barrier to
 adoption.

 [7] Onion sites are simply HTTP/HTTPS via an alternative network stack
 with a different domain name; setting them up shouldn't require custom re-
 engineering of a site's login page, nor any more effort than would
 establishment of "www.bbc.co.nz" or some other top-level domain.

 [8] In other words: such a proposition would be a kludge, and (again) it
 might be a kludge to support as few as 0.05% of users, so would dissuade
 site adoption of onions.

 [9] Ergo: if the server cannot "know" that the request comes from an
 onion-capable client, then the server needs to be "provoked" into action.
 The client must proactively "tell" the server that the client is onion-
 capable, and then that capability should be expressed to the entire site,
 across all estates, to support the best experience.

 [10] Can that onion-capability be expressed to the backend, via out-of-
 band means - eg: setting a flag in a backend Redis instance? Possibly, but
 practically "no", especially where third-party CDNs in other estates are
 involved.

 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build of tbb-9.5a2-build5 fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32426: Build of tbb-9.5a2-build5 fails
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I am wondering if it related with the workaround for #32053.

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[tor-bugs] #32426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build of tbb-9.5a2-build5 fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32426: Build of tbb-9.5a2-build5 fails
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While building `tbb-9.5a2-build5`, the Android build worked, however the
 linux64 build failed with the following error:
 {{{
 23:42.07Compiling gkrust v0.1.0 (/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 f1f9fa028698/toolkit/library/rust)
 23:42.07  Running `CARGO_PKG_VERSION=0.1.0 CARGO_PKG_HOMEPAGE=
 CARGO_PKG_REPOSITORY= CARGO_PKG_VERSION_PRE= CARGO_PRIMARY_PACKAGE=1
 CARGO_PKG_VERSION_PATCH=0 CARGO=/var/tmp/dist/rust/bin/cargo
 CARGO_PKG_NAME=gkrust CARGO_PKG_AUTHORS='nob...@mozilla.org'
 CARGO_PKG_VERSION_MINOR=1 CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR=/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 f1f9fa028698/toolkit/library/rust CARGO_PKG_VERSION_MAJOR=0
 LD_LIBRARY_PATH='/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 
gnu/release/deps:/var/tmp/dist/rust/lib:/var/tmp/dist/gcc/lib64:/var/tmp/dist/gcc/lib32'
 CARGO_PKG_DESCRIPTION='Rust code for libxul' /var/tmp/dist/rust/bin/rustc
 --crate-name gkrust toolkit/library/rust/lib.rs --color never --crate-type
 staticlib --emit=dep-info,link -C opt-level=1 -C panic=abort -C codegen-
 units=1 -C lto --cfg 'feature="bindgen"' --cfg 'feature="cubeb-remoting"'
 --cfg 'feature="cubeb_pulse_rust"' --cfg 'feature="gecko_profiler"' --cfg
 'feature="gkrust-shared"' --cfg 'feature="moz_memory"' --cfg
 'feature="moz_places"' --cfg 'feature="quantum_render"' --cfg
 'feature="servo"' -C metadata=dcd4ffc931c663f1 -C extra-
 filename=-dcd4ffc931c663f1 --out-dir /var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698
 /obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/deps --target
 x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -C linker=/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 f1f9fa028698/build/cargo-linker -C incremental=/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-
 gnu/release/incremental -L dependency=/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698
 /obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/deps -L
 dependency=/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/release/deps --extern gkrust_shared=/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/deps
 /libgkrust_shared-bcf6be2ebeec79e5.rlib --extern
 mozilla_central_workspace_hack=/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698/obj-
 x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/deps
 /libmozilla_central_workspace_hack-cc0cdad8c05e6c62.rlib -C opt-level=1 -C
 debuginfo=2 --cap-lints warn -L native=/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698
 /obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/build/lmdb-rkv-
 sys-322a9df1118f6bca/out`
 28:02.89 Finished release [optimized] target(s) in 27m 30s
 28:02.94 /var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/_virtualenvs/init/bin/python -m mozbuild.action.check_binary --target
 --networking /var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/libgkrust.a
 28:04.66 TEST-UNEXPECTED-FAIL | check_networking | libgkrust.a |
 Identified 1 networking function(s) being imported in the rust static
 library (getsockname)
 28:04.70 make[4]: *** [/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698/obj-x86_64-pc-
 linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/libgkrust.a] Error 1
 28:04.70 make[4]: *** Deleting file `/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698
 /obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/libgkrust.a'
 28:04.70 make[4]: Leaving directory `/var/tmp/build/firefox-f1f9fa028698
 /obj-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/toolkit/library/rust'
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31573: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  regression, tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged to `tor-browser-68.2.0esr-9.5-1` (commit
 739c353b91d30238977a20b31b7ecf624c17006b).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32425 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32425: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting
--+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nDe15o):

 * Attachment "player_no_buttons.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32424 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make digitalocean@ alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32424: Make digitalocean@ alias
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i just had an idea: how about making a gitlab@ alias instead?

 we have, after all, a git-admin alias...

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[tor-bugs] #32425 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32425: SVG icons are blocked in the video player in Safest security setting
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Check the screenshot.
 Tor Browser 9.0.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31573: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  regression, tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Looks good to me!

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[tor-bugs] #32424 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make digitalocean@ alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32424: Make digitalocean@ alias
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Hello,

 David Goulet have gotten us some monthly credit on DigitalOcean to run a
 CI builder or two for our Gitlab setup.

 I would like to create an account there, but I'd like it to be with an
 alias such that other people can get access to the system too, in case
 there is some issue.

 I would like to have: ahf, hiro, and gaba added to the alias, if possible
 please :-)

 (another name than digitalocean@ is fine for me as well)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nDe15o):

 Replying to [comment:11 ma1]:
 > Please check [https://noscript.net/getit#devel NoScript 11.0.8rc1],
 which should fix this issue.
 Just checked, yes, it fixes it. Thanks.

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[tor-bugs] #32423 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Attempts to use location services silently fail with no user feedback as to why

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32423: Attempts to use location services silently fail with no user feedback 
as to
why
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201910
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Clicking 'Try It' on this page (
 https://www.w3schools.com/html/html5_geolocation.asp ) should result in
 the location services permission prompt, but instead nothing seems to
 happen.

 Currently, Tor Browser completely disables location services via the
 {{{geo.enabled}}} preference.  However, there is no way through the
 about:preferences UI to enable location preferences for users who want it.

 The {{{Settings - Location Permissions}}} dialog (via
 {{{about:preferences#privacy -> Permissions -> Location Settings}}}) has a
 checkbox to **"Block new requests asking to access your location"**. Given
 Tor Browser's current behavior, we would expect that to be checked, but it
 is unchecked and toggling does not affect the behavior surrounding
 location services.

 We should look into what that checkbox is actually doing, and possibly tie
 it to the {{{geo.enabled}}} pref, or possibly revert the pref to true and
 use the settings this checkbox controls instead.

 The end result is that users should be able to enable location services
 without delving into about:config

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Hm,
 {{{
 +if (!currentOrgin.EqualsIgnoreCase(origin.get()) &&
 +StringEndsWith(potentialOnionHost, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".onion")))
 {
 +  origin.Truncate();
 +}
 +  }
 +
rv = http->SetRequestHeader(nsDependentCString(net::nsHttp::Origin),
 origin, false);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 +if (!origin.EqualsIgnoreCase(currentOrigin.get())) {
 +// Origin header is suppressed by .onion
 +return;
 +}
 +}
  }

  rv = mRequestHead.SetHeader(nsHttp::Origin, origin, false /* merge
 */);
 }}}
 does not even seem to be the same behavior depending on whether the code
 takes the `nsHttpChannel` or the `nsCORSListenerProxy` path or am I
 missing something here?

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[tor-bugs] #32422 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add boklm as a gitolite admin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32422: Add boklm as a gitolite admin
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Like #32420, boklm volunteered to be part of the gitolite admin group.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, and that seems to be the same behavior in the `fetch` spec:
 https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#origin-header: If we omit the Referer, send
 `Origin: null`. But it seems to me the patch in 1503736 is outright
 omitting it which does not seem to be compliant with the spec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32385 [Core Tor/Tor]: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32385: doxygen: respect --enable-fatal-warnings
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doxygen   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > > I've made and pushed the other change. Thanks for the review!
 >
 > (which is to say: I've done a fix for the documentation issue and pushed
 it to the branch here pending your approval.)
 Thanks! I commented on the pull request about a minor wording issue/typo.
 Feel free to merge after fixing.

 Note: also, as far as I can tell, none of our CI runs `make doxygen`
 (yet?). So we might want to start doing that in CI when we have everything
 fully documented from Doxygen's perspective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:12 acat]:
 > BTW, I mentioned this issue in the uplift meeting, and tom did not see
 any problem with just reverting the
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1503736 patch and go to the
 previous esr60 behaviour. It's not clear why that change was done.

 Maybe the authors of the path
 [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6454#section-7.3 read]
 {{{
 Whenever a user agent issues an HTTP request from a "privacy-
 sensitive" context, the user agent MUST send the value "null" in the
 Origin header field.
 }}}
 and arguably .onion sites could be seen as a privacy-sensitive context.
 Now, the question is whether we could just avoid stripping the header and
 set it to "null" instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 BTW, I mentioned this issue in the uplift meeting, and tom did not see any
 problem with just reverting the
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1503736 patch and go to the
 previous esr60 behaviour. It's not clear why that change was done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sega01):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 sega01]:
 > > This is breaking
 doublemixwcfx4wadeuvuygpxej5jpu7uleesh3yptopnbj5kshnlrid.onion for me.
 > >
 > > Do you know of any workarounds?
 >
 > What does break mean? I just loaded the .onion and it works fine for me.

 Try to do a mix and watch the network tab. It will retry OPTIONS over and
 over. Just enter a Bitcoin address like 1xm4vFerV3pSgvBFkyzLgT1Ew3HQYrS1V
 and click on mix.

 The Bitmix API requires the Origin header to return the correct CORS
 response. Foxmixer is fine because it returns for *. Bitmix is selective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32408 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32408: Handle options_act_reversible() in new config system.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


Comment:

 Okay, this needs to be more tricky than I had thought at first.  The
 problem is that for some of these "early irreversible" options, they need
 to happen before _any_ reversible options... and some need to happen
 _after_ opening ports but _before_ opening logs.

 This needs a better pair of names than "early" + "reversible". Maybe
 "early" and "transaction" or something.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32383 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32383: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 build-arm-02 and build-arm-03 seemed to have returned in puppet somehow
 during the night (21:26 UTC) so i cleaned the nodes up again in puppet and
 they have disappeared again.

 weird.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32420 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add ahf with RW permissions on gitolite admin repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32420: Add ahf with RW permissions on gitolite admin repository
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * cc: ahf (added)
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32421 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team mail aliases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32421: Add ahf to git team mail aliases
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: ahf (added)


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[tor-bugs] #32421 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team mail aliases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32421: Add ahf to git team mail aliases
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 There is at least one mail alias for the git team, and then I think we use
 + addresses for different services. If there are aliases that have at
 least me and hiro on them, please add ahf to that list.

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[tor-bugs] #32420 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add ahf with RW permissions on gitolite admin repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32420: Add ahf with RW permissions on gitolite admin repository
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 For trac.torproject.org, 2019-11-07, afternoon:

 I'm going to do this myself shortly, but here is a ticket as this
 is a non-trivial action.

 ahf is joining the git team.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/ps4MHN0fw3t6AudF4mIfdjVvF0FAl3ERbUACgkQF4mIfdjV
 vF2EQQ//bqHg+ILygE0abVy1hX8VuPuUHTWs3N0RFJVExBpeKAgI9zlYkf2AepxJ
 Ham/8tRq5QKGBywG6ZAJ1DjTNZiHoxzsKWQ2ELHlWeExuS+4v/mruqqmnZ/wi0qT
 F1ALbRTAmoOFOgowMAxv7/9KZg9Rag8ViCdQuFdhbpfYLvKOD2QhQxU38uxDpSAv
 tCivbi+h7UtZTknyRLFLHOSzRGsFvMFPJbSvdOxO5pU+7NfeKVJYwVVTHEaDVFeC
 jxjTMi56MovP+7hYTJDinru99WI5VrhoFIwWB26oi1ovOiLEAjnDKYIzmYBycVMf
 TOhYV1buMNkhpmqrZYgkA/hGcmWQ4S+E18tanfIJI7wA/31mrvF4IOGWLccmxbkE
 vvUhIK39Re0iVD6JJFqWwSpZHZ9ZdhaGKimySUaU21fCD4ao7nu84iJ+PQDZeiBX
 ktn+T57Rgt+rF7zfdi+xZacSdZOjZMScufh0YXYFLLLYjSCcmA3900vNYNCdJrAm
 zk2wBM5rhmkG5IWeVz0dvQYZwT/7UvostaQrjn/SiFZ3yWru9sEjibeW95lAYkHH
 xZ4Q3d6SAv3tQcgnrtMYrtei8mZW+0Xbd/xWqbEnmusux/8JFHBSJA3G9Z2tegFJ
 9HjB8MbmPTa+6uXTtFn/TrpCV5Nc0NmL28Icq7xp3qAlEl6iooQ=
 =uLHP
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #32419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team LDAP groups and provide access to the GitHub admin account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32419: Add ahf to git team LDAP groups and provide access to the GitHub admin
account
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 For trac.torproject.org, 2019-11-07, afternoon:

 Please add ahf to the LDAP groups: gitweb and gitolite.

 Please also give ahf access to the external-services-git passwords in
 tor-passwords.git by re-encrypting that file.

 I would believe that the fingerprint for ahf's GPG key is:

   1C2A7A3D5A8548B4ADEFD52AF9BC2FE22B08CE8F

 though I have not verified this myself, enough people I trust to verify it
 that
 I have verified myself have.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/ps4MHN0fw3t6AudF4mIfdjVvF0FAl3ERM0ACgkQF4mIfdjV
 vF1Evw/+MVT1gbP3Pk7K9xUhQxq4z6sWfK5EEuL/9ehdkJ940n67hfIZPoxItcgz
 0WhkesqQ/SGcGwIhjzH8WvNBxiRywemM/A0NvF4dk61487b2p5gJXkCky3fVaGLP
 d1mc92d+4+PoI+6Fd3/giFbMJX9ZYEWT3nAqyz9eZBsXK/OIJkH12gug9IgqUVpX
 G7IySc5qQFTWALhHl5c4ype2TJefYkVgUpYER1R46+DS3Qb5o+u2lgTCzpfpZY6x
 PqIWtjZdBeCDgE57bdnkU1bXjIz5CgVqV8+xb0nYsfJKKCJWBjdLY7T9Pk7iqsUX
 iz0ekj/ObvAPCpV/dooA5rqyn0NMG9w/0nJmuuBtNPhbJzJgQ3csInB5VHtHbcCb
 irbrDZ0vETQWFgvZIFMIDtj2vXQA72Q9oD0tLsfJcDk8wtJSmQHjlyUrpUM0UYI2
 WBvFdKFSiq49IcDJcQywF65seBhPq+F3tj3IN2Xf163uLNkpNcGn1SNCboEXq9Su
 0Ge7ymrGTtS4dIn9x0RSsUiXXeNxXVuIxCPZ8sGfMXCE16HA2oaRp3T6p3J29CmZ
 aTY6VoOQCIgI2qfBm9vnNp7iAPbGZEVFBp6YYoXdQvAfPJEWBbU2Z7OQwptYKtBP
 h1HzUwQ5KuGhnX7T9FGdV/XOOFGqYgpEkiTyhQSCPiWuFP6tJGw=
 =KKdn
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32418: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is 
newest
--+--
 Reporter:  Yeti  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Yeti):

 * Attachment "tor.png" added.

 message on startup

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[tor-bugs] #32418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32418: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is 
newest
+--
 Reporter:  Yeti|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Torbrowser 9.01/Windows 7 x86

 Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is
 newest

 (I try to attach a screenshot, this seems to be difficult)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32119: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-onboarding, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.1.0-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by diogosergio):

 * Attachment "NewIdentity_Update.2.png" added.

 Fixed version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32119: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-onboarding, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.1.0-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by diogosergio):

 Hi everyone,

 I've attached a mockup I've created for this ticket. I look at the flow
 and it seemed pertinent to keep the same functionality that is present on
 the normal onboarding e.g.: New Circuit.

 What do you think?

 This was my first ticket, so I don't use any template, so I'm just posting
 here a .png of the Artboard, the copy used to explain the New Identity was
 from the Support pages.

 Cheers,
 Diogo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32119 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32119: onboarding for "Goodbye Onion Button" could be better
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-onboarding, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.1.0-can, |
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by diogosergio):

 * Attachment "NewIdentity_Update.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #32417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cannot connect with tor via obsf4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32417: Cannot connect with tor via obsf4
--+--
 Reporter:  Pink Panther  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 dont know why i cant even connect to tor via obsf4, i can connect when i
 dont mark "tor is cenzored in my country"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:9 sega01]:
 > This is breaking
 doublemixwcfx4wadeuvuygpxej5jpu7uleesh3yptopnbj5kshnlrid.onion for me.
 >
 > Do you know of any workarounds?

 What does break mean? I just loaded the .onion and it works fine for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32255: Missing ORIGIN header breaks CORS in Tor Browser 9.0
-+-
 Reporter:  complexparadox   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sega01):

 This is breaking
 doublemixwcfx4wadeuvuygpxej5jpu7uleesh3yptopnbj5kshnlrid.onion for me.

 Do you know of any workarounds?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31573 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31573: Uncaught exception in SessionStore.jsm with Tor Browser based on ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  regression, tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911,  |
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.0.1-can =>
 ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-9.0.1-can,
 GeorgKoppen201911, TorBrowserTeam201911R
 * points:   => 0.1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 We have a patch that landed and should get backported. `bug_31573`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_31573=739c353b91d30238977a20b31b7ecf624c17006b)
 has a possible fix up for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32404 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag, and handle it at the confvar layer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32404: Add a CFLG_OBSOLETE flag, and handle it at the confvar layer
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.4.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #29211 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor31-must
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => teor
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 Here's my first attempt: `ticket32404` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1518

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:9 nDe15o]:
 > I just installed a fresh Tor Browser 9.0.1. NoScript version was 11.0.4.
 > I changed Security Level to Safest.
 > I opened http://archivecaslytosk.onion/ and made it TRUSTED.
 > Then after some time it automatically updated to 11.0.7 and the problem
 appeared.
 > So the act of updating resets Sites.onionSecure to undefined.

 Thank you very much for the detailed reporting and debugging.
 The same effect without changing version should be reproducible by
 disabling and re-enabling the extension.
 Please check [https://noscript.net/getit#devel NoScript 11.0.8rc1], which
 should fix this issue.
 Thanks again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 CI is happy; merged to master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32407: Fix crash when calling --dump-config with failing set_options
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-0425,|  Actual Points:  .1
  035-backport 040-backport 041-backport |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:  #30866 =>


Comment:

 Removing parent relationship so parent can close.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32406 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add ability to make an accelname required.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32406: Add ability to make an accelname required.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30866| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged with parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32319 [Core Tor/Tor]: Macros and definitions for declaring per-module configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32319: Macros and definitions for declaring per-module configuration
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #30866| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged with parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32382 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop messing with HardwareAccel option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32382: Stop messing with HardwareAccel option
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #30866| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged with parent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 Okay, that was fun.  See branch `ticket32415` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1517 .

 This is a mostly automated branch, with a couple of special cases that
 needed to be done by hand.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * Attachment "rename.2.sh" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32400 [Community/Tor Support]: Cannot obtain GPG keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32400: Cannot obtain GPG keys
---+
 Reporter:  amgems |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  gpg|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by ggus):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * Attachment "rename.sh" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Here is a list:

 {{{
 src/app/main/ntmain.c:struct service_fns {
 src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c:typedef struct worker_state_s {
 src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c:typedef struct cpuworker_job_u {
 src/core/or/channel.c:typedef struct channel_idmap_entry_s {
 src/core/or/channel.h:struct channel_s {
 src/core/or/channel.h:struct channel_listener_s {
 src/core/or/channeltls.h:struct channel_tls_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux.c:struct circuit_muxinfo_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux.h:struct circuitmux_policy_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux.h:struct circuitmux_policy_data_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux.h:struct circuitmux_policy_circ_data_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux.h:struct circuitmux_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h:struct cell_ewma_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h:struct ewma_policy_data_s {
 src/core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h:struct ewma_policy_circ_data_s {
 src/core/or/circuitstats.h:struct circuit_build_times_s {
 src/core/or/relay.h:typedef struct address_ttl_s {
 src/core/or/scheduler.h:typedef struct scheduler_s {
 src/core/or/scheduler.h:typedef struct socket_table_ent_s {
 src/core/or/scheduler_kist.c:typedef struct outbuf_table_ent_s {
 src/feature/client/entrynodes.h:struct guard_selection_s {
 src/feature/control/control_events.c:typedef struct queued_event_s {
 src/feature/control/control_events.c:static struct cached_bw_event_s {
 src/feature/dirauth/bwauth.c:typedef struct mbw_cache_entry_s {
 src/feature/dirauth/dircollate.c:typedef struct ddmap_entry_s {
 src/feature/dirauth/dircollate.h:struct dircollator_s {
 src/feature/dircache/dircache.c:typedef struct url_table_ent_s {
 src/feature/dircommon/fp_pair.c:struct fp_pair_map_entry_s {
 src/feature/dircommon/fp_pair.c:struct fp_pair_map_s {
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct a { int foo; int bar; } x;
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct base { ... };
 src/lib/cc/compat_compiler.h: *   struct subtype { int x; struct base b; }
 x;
 src/lib/container/handles.h: * struct walrus {
 src/lib/container/map.c:  struct maptype {
 \
 src/lib/crypt_ops/aes_openssl.c:struct aes_cnt_cipher {
 src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand_fast.c:  struct cbuf {
 src/lib/evloop/compat_libevent.h:typedef struct tor_libevent_cfg {
 src/lib/evloop/timers.c:struct timeout_cb {
 src/lib/evloop/workqueue.c:struct threadpool_s {
 src/lib/evloop/workqueue.c:struct workqueue_entry_s {
 src/lib/evloop/workqueue.c:struct replyqueue_s {
 src/lib/evloop/workqueue.c:typedef struct workerthread_s {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:* struct foo {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct dist_ops {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct geometric {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct genpareto {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct weibull {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct log_logistic {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct logistic {
 src/lib/math/prob_distr.h:struct uniform {
 src/lib/net/inaddr_st.h:struct sockaddr_in6 {
 src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c:#define SCMP_CMP(a,b,c) ((struct
 scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(c),0})
 src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c:  ((struct scmp_arg_cmp)
 {(a),(b),(intptr_t)(void*)(c),0})
 src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.c:#define SCMP_CMP4(a,b,c,d) ((struct
 scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(c),(d)})
 src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.h:typedef struct smp_param {
 src/lib/sandbox/sandbox.h:struct sandbox_cfg_elem {
 src/lib/thread/threads.h:typedef struct tor_threadlocal_s {
 src/lib/time/compat_time.h:struct timeval {
 src/test/test-memwipe.c:static struct testcase {
 src/test/test_addr.c:  static const struct loopback_item {
 src/test/test_dispatch.c:struct coord { int x; int y; };
 src/test/test_link_handshake.c:typedef struct certs_data_s {
 src/test/test_link_handshake.c:typedef struct authchallenge_data_s {
 src/test/test_link_handshake.c:typedef struct authenticate_data_s {
 src/test/test_threads.c:typedef struct cv_testinfo_s {
 src/test/test_workqueue.c:typedef struct state_s {
 src/test/test_workqueue.c:typedef struct rsa_work_s {
 src/test/test_workqueue.c:typedef struct ecdh_work_s {
 }}}

 I made it with the command:
 {{{
 git grep 'struct *[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[^t ] *{' \
   src/{app,core,feature,lib,test,tools} |grep -v '^static '
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #32416 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add some documentation about building go libraries/programs with build_go_lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32416: Add some documentation about building go libraries/programs with
build_go_lib
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As `build_go_lib` template is getting more complex, we should add some
 documentation about how to use it, probably into 'README.HACKING'.

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[tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  .1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 Per our style poll, we prefer this:

 typedef struct foo_t foo_t;

 over this:

 typedef struct foo_s foo_t;

 So let's replace all the cases where we do the latter.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Per your last review, I will merge this once CI has passed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30866 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30866: Teach config.c to work with options configured in other modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #29211| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, I've rebased once more as `config_subsys_v4`, and taken both of your
 suggestions on #32406. New PR is
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1516

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32410 [Core Tor/Tor]: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32410: --disable-module-relay causes us to reject default options
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-must
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 lgtm, merged to master

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[tor-bugs] #32414 [Applications/Tor Browser]: window.external.AddSearchProvider request goes through catch-all-circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32414: window.external.AddSearchProvider request goes through catch-all-circuit
--+-
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-linkability
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Calling `external.AddSearchProvider(someURL)` does a request that does not
 follow FPI and goes through the catch-all circuit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nDe15o):

 And I suspect even your
 {{{
 if (UI.local.isTorBrowser) {
   Sites.onionSecure = true;
 }
 }}}
 in ui.js (which is called when NoScript is pressed) doesn't help because
 probably ui has a separate process or thread idk
 (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Electrolysis), and its Sites is not the same.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nDe15o):

 I just installed a fresh Tor Browser 9.0.1. NoScript version was 11.0.4.
 I changed Security Level to Safest.
 I opened http://archivecaslytosk.onion/ and made it TRUSTED.
 Then after some time it automatically updated to 11.0.7 and the problem
 appeared.
 So the act of updating resets Sites.onionSecure to undefined.

 I've just managed to reproduce it again, but instead of waiting, you can
 press "Check for updates" on about:addons page. You can check it yourself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911
 => tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911R
 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Alright, commit 878a3855c2b7fc5146cd8c38d2b25a7ed427c7e9 has the final fix
 just for this particular bug. The other two fixes can be found in their
 respective tickets (#28803, #32413). The fixup branch I made, before
 merging it and adjusting the commit messages where needed, is
 `bug_32303_fixup` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/log/?h=bug_32303_fixup).

 Thanks to boklm for helping with the review. We realized it's not clear
 why we need the mobile (cross-)compiler for some projects and not others
 (why in `gobsaes` and not `ed25519`). And why don't we need that on
 desktop platforms?

 boklm will file a follow-up ticket to figure that out + write some
 documentation for our Go build setup into `README.HACKING` to make that
 and similar Go-specific things clear for those working on Go parts.
 Additionally, he will file tickets to track the upstreaming of the
 go(mobile) patches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nDe15o):

 I don't know why but it says that I have version 11.0.7 of NoScript.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28803 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate building pluggable transports for Android into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28803: Integrate building pluggable transports for Android into 
tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-|
  backport   |
Parent ID:  #32303   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-pt, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201911 =>
 tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-pt, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-backport
 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is solved with commit eee5d30a9ab1d727caac262cb62f72aaab75e0a0 on
 `tor-browser-build`'s `master`. We might want to backport it at some
 point, though, given #32303.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28803 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate building pluggable transports for Android into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28803: Integrate building pluggable transports for Android into 
tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:  #32303   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-pt, tbb-parity,
 TorBrowserTeam201906 => tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-pt, tbb-
 parity, TorBrowserTeam201911
 * parent:   => #32303


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29003 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create Go PT Bundle Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29003: Create Go PT Bundle Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, tor-|  Actual Points:
  pt, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201906   |
Parent ID:  #28803   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think there is no specific PT bundle projects needed (anymore), closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32413 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump Go to the latest version in the 1.12 series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32413: Bump Go to the latest version in the 1.12 series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-backport
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 That's fixed on `tor-browser-build`'s `master` (commit
 d71e357c70606afd1c3bbbc41161be833ed62c93) and something we should
 backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-9.0-must, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911
 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911
 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 That made it onto `tor-browser-68.2.0esr-9.5-1` (commit
 f1f9fa0286982d1fa486880ad6037e1e7a46457d) and will hopefully available in
 9.5a2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:32 gk]:
 > Let's test -O1 in our upcoming alpha build to get a feeling whether that
 would be an acceptable workaround or not and to check whether it actually
 resolves our build issues: `bug_32053_workaround`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 
browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32053_workaround=f1f9fa0286982d1fa486880ad6037e1e7a46457d)
 has a patch for review.

 That sounds like a good idea to test this in the next alpha. And the patch
 looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19407 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Support FD passing on Unix socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19407: Support FD passing on Unix socket
---+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sarataylor123):

 After 8 years as a sleep expert in a couple of mattress stores and seeing
 thousands of people experiences with many brands, he decided to write and
 put all of these years of experience into help guides so others can make
 the right decision when buying sleep products without having to suffer
 sleepless nights as a result of choosing the wrong mattress. regards
 https://topnaturalmattresses.com/best-weighted-blankets/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript =>
 TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript


Comment:

 I don't think this is related to 9.0 but rather to NoScript's 11.0.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-must, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911
 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201911R, tbb-9.0-must, tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,
 tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Let's test -O1 in our upcoming alpha build to get a feeling whether that
 would be an acceptable workaround or not and to check whether it actually
 resolves our build issues: `bug_32053_workaround`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 
browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32053_workaround=f1f9fa0286982d1fa486880ad6037e1e7a46457d)
 has a patch for review.

 FWIW: It might have been enough to just patch `toolchain.configure` but
 that would result in different `opt-level` options passed to `rustc` and I
 was not exactly sure what would happen in that case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32303 [Applications/Tor Browser]: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32303: obfs4proxy incompatibility on Android Q
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201911|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 There is
 {{{
 +  patch -p2 < $rootdir/90a3ce02dc25adcf1598faf11a66b151ada3f637.patch
 }}}
 in commit ba3958be0dc37f019a56f46847e2d453fb5e6010 but no patch added for
 that in the `config` file. In fact, the patch is added in the next commit
 properly (and that is the right place anyway). Thus, we need to remove the
 line.

 The commit message for the Go version bump contains a wrong bug number. I
 just created #32413 for that to not mix the different things up.

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[tor-bugs] #32413 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump Go to the latest version in the 1.12 series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32413: Bump Go to the latest version in the 1.12 series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We ship an older Go version in the 1.12 series and should pick up a newer
 one with all the security fixes.

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