Re: [tor-bugs] #32438 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h in the past

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32438: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h 
in
the past
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, usability,|  Actual Points:
  ux, s8-errors, AffectsTails|
Parent ID:  #23508   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by intrigeri):

 * Attachment "tor-launcher-clock_skew.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32438 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h in the past

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32438: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h 
in
the past
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, usability,|  Actual Points:
  ux, s8-errors, AffectsTails|
Parent ID:  #23508   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by intrigeri):

 * Attachment "tor-launcher-clock_skew.log" added.


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[tor-bugs] #32438 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h in the past

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32438: Inconsistent failure-then-success bootstrap behavior with clock set 24h 
in
the past
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Launcher   |   Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew,
 Severity:  Normal   |  usability, ux, s8-errors,
 |  AffectsTails
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23508
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Context: I'm investigating which part of Tails' crazy clock fixing dance
 we can remove thanks to
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24661. Corresponding Tails
 ticket: https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/16471.

 Environment: Tor Browser 9.0.1 x86_64 on Debian unstable, clock set 24h
 before UTC. Tested both with direct connection to the Tor network and with
 bridges.

 The first time I click "Connect" in Tor Launcher, I see a bootstrapping
 error (see attached screenshot and Tor logs):

 {{{
 Tor failed to establish a Tor network connection.

 Loading authority certificates failed (Clock skew -81944 in microdesc
 flavor consensus from CONSENSUS - ?).
 }}}

 I guess that's kind of expected despite the improvements implemented as
 part of https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24661.

 But then, if I click "Reconfigure" and then "Connect", tor bootstraps
 successfully. This surprises me and feels inconsistent: the way I see it,
 either the clock is skewed enough for tor to fail bootstrapping, and then
 it should not succeed on second try; or tor can somehow deal with skewed
 clock, and then it should succeed on first try.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get RLBox code integrated into Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32381: Get RLBox code integrated into Tor Browser
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 `bug_32381` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_32381) has all the changes to RLBox that landed on
 `mozilla-central` so far.

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[tor-bugs] #32437 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include wasi-libc project into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32437: Include wasi-libc project into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32434
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 For compiling things to wasm during the build process of `tor-browser` we
 need to have a sysroot. The `wasi-libc` project would provide that one.
 This ticket reflects Mozilla's
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1582192.

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[tor-bugs] #32436 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include lucetc project into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32436: Include lucetc project into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32434
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need to create a `lucetc` project to build a modificed `lucetc`
 version, which  is currently needed for RLBOx (this ticket corresponds to
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1582195)

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[tor-bugs] #32435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compile clang for Linux x86_64 with WASM support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32435: Compile clang for Linux x86_64 with WASM support
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32434
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need to provide WASM support in our clang build (this ticket
 corresponds to Mozilla's
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1579870).

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[tor-bugs] #32434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get build changes needed for RLBox into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32434: Get build changes needed for RLBox into tor-browser-build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32379
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need to apply some build changes to our `tor-browser-build` to be able
 to compile RLBox and related code later on. This is the parent ticket
 tracking all of them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32365 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Localization is broken in Tor Browser 9 on Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32365: Localization is broken in Tor Browser 9 on Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-9.0-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 sysrqb]:
 > > Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > > > I wonder whether this issue is actually related to #28196, but maybe
 not.
 > > It seems all chrome content is correctly localized, but the Java
 strings are not localized. Hopefully there is a simple fix.
 >
 > Not sure if you are seeing the same bug as I but for me essentially the
 whole browser chrome is *not* localized. The exception here is UI coming
 from Torbutton which *is* localized. So, e.g. the whole Settings menu
 items are only in English.
 Right, sorry, "chrome" wasn't the correct description. I should've said
 something like "privileged-chrome content". For example, `about:firefox`
 is correctly localized, but I see the menu and and preferences are not
 localized.

 It seems the reason for this is Mozilla changed how they create multi-
 locale packages. We have two options.

 1) I have a patch for this in my tor-browser-build repo,
 `bug32365_00`.Unfortunately, the firefox build is broken using this method
 because apparently we broke `./mach android archive-geckoview`, and this
 is called as the final step in `./mach package-multi-locale`. I created a
 tor-browser patch that comments-out calling `./mach android archive-
 geckoview`, as a workaround.

 2) Another alternative is we re-implement `./mach package-multi-locale` in
 the firefox build file. It is relatively straight-forward, see
 `package_l10n` in `python/mozbuild/mozbuild/mach_commands.py`. I have
 another branch with only this tor-browser-build patch, `bug32365_01`.

 Considering option (2) is a small change, that seems like the better
 solution. I'm building a small variant of (2) now, as well - using `./mach
 package` instead of `make package`. It's possible `./mach android
 assemble-app` is the only missing piece.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement per-site security settings support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30570: Implement per-site security settings support
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201911,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.5|
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor9
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Here is a mockup from last year of what per-site permissions could look
 like: https://marvelapp.com/a66fg97/screen/50307973

 == Current Settings

 Here's a summary of the settings affected by the Security Level by both
 NoScript and our general prefs.

 **Default**:
 **Safer**:
 TorButton
 JavaScript JIT (slower JS speed)
 SVG
 MathML
 WebAudio
 NoScript (Default HTTP)
 Fetch
 Media
 Script
 WebGL
 NoScript
 Media
 WebGL
 **Safest**:
 TorButton
 JavaScript JIT (slower JS speed)
 SVG
 SVG OpenType Fonts
 MathML
 WebAudio
 NoScript (HTTP and HTTPS)
 Fetch
 Font
 Media
 Object
 Script
 WebGL

 Without having delved too deeply into the prefs set by torbutton, I think
 we can safely assume that it will not be easy to modify Firefox to have
 per-tab scope for these globals, so for this ticket they can probably be
 safely ignored for now.

 The remaining settings are controlled by NoScript and already have some
 level of per-domain scope. We should in theory be able to access whatever
 functionality exists in NoScript (or modify it to export said
 functionality) to set the 'custom' permissions.

 The combined list of NoScript capabilities that we potentially block are:
  - fetch (XMLHttpRequests and similar)
  - font (Web Fonts)
  - media (HTML5 audio/video)
  - object (Plugins)
  - script (JavaScript)
  - webgl (WebGL)

 I think that 'Fetch' and 'JavaScript' could probably be joined together as
 a meta capability for the purposes of our UX, which would bring us down to
 5:
  - JavaScript + Fetch
  - Web Fonts
  - Media
  - Plugins
  - WebGL

 == Per Domain Control

 One big conflict between UX and security here is that NoScript provides
 very fine-grained control over each domain, so users can pick and choose
 which domains get which capabilities (for instance enabling scripts from
 website.com but not from tracker.com).

 However, if we're going the permissions route via the info (i) icon we
 will need to decide ''which'' domain that a custom setting would apply to.
 To 'just make a website work' and enable JavaScript for example, we would
 probably have to enable it for every domain used in a page, otherwise we
 end up with frustrated users.

 We could split up each of the NoScript capabilities to differentiate
 between the first-party domain (youtube.com) and all of the 3rd party
 domains (gstatic.com, google-tracker.com, etc) to give users ''some''
 fine-grained control, without going crazy and listing every single 3rd
 party domain like the NoScript menu currently does.

 The worse case scenario here of course is a web-page with 10 different
 possible permissions to toggle. In reality I ''suspect'' most websites
 would have a requested permissions list something like this:
  - JavaScript (1st Party)
  - JavaScript (3rd Party)
  - Web Fonts (3rd Party)
  - Media (3rd Party)

 == No First-Party Isolation

 One downside of this fine-grained control is that NoScript's per-domain
 settings have no concept of first-party isolation. If I enable scripts
 from gstatic.com while visiting youtube.com, they are automatically
 enabled when visiting other google properties. This problem would quickly
 balloon if we go the route mentioned above in enabling a capability for
 all domains in a page. For instance, a user enabling 'JavaScript' on
 facebook.com would mean whitelisting Facebook's tracking domains
 everywhere.

 My hunch here is that double-keying domain permissions with the first-
 party domain is a good idea so that enabling a 3rd party script necessary
 for some first-party does not automatically load them everywhere.

 == Typical-User and Power-User Segregation / Conflict

 Regardless of what we end up doing here technically, we are going to end
 up with two different places to modify these new permissions: in the (i)
 dialog (or in 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 Integrated the mtail metrics in prometheus, which should record the hit
 ratio (and other performance information from nginx logs). Cooked up a
 quick and dirty grafana dashboard to show the hit rate which is, according
 to those metrics, now more around 87%:

 [[Image(snap-2019.11.08-18.13.15.png, 700px)]]

 very satisfying!

 next step is to pipe the logs directly into mtail, instead of writing them
 to disks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.11.08-18.13.15.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: setup a cache frontend for the blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32239: setup a cache frontend for the blog
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32090   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 this change seems to have pushed the hit ratio from 80 to 85% with status
 codes < 300 and from 70 to 75% for all hits.

 next step is to hook this up in prometheus to get proper monitoring of the
 hit ratio.

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[tor-bugs] #32433 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Suggestion] Per-page security

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32433: [Suggestion] Per-page security
--+--
 Reporter:  iqwerwas  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 Can we set security settings for specific pages? For example, if I want to
 allow javascript on ProtonMail but not allow it on other sites.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team LDAP groups and provide access to the GitHub admin account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32419: Add ahf to git team LDAP groups and provide access to the GitHub admin
account
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 > Please add ahf to the LDAP groups: gitweb and gitolite.

 Done.

 > Please also give ahf access to the external-services-git passwords in
 tor-passwords.git by re-encrypting that file.

 also done, although i suspect you might have been able to do so yourself.
 :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32419 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add ahf to git team LDAP groups and provide access to the GitHub admin account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32419: Add ahf to git team LDAP groups and provide access to the GitHub admin
account
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 24h without an outage, a first!

 [[Image(snap-2019.11.08-14.37.09.png, 700px)]]

 and now that the arm boxes are retired, everything is clean too.

 there's an underlying problem with ipsec that's not really solved, but we
 don't need ipsec to do this monitoring, so we'll consider this fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31916 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31916: reliability issues with hetzner-nbg1-01
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * Attachment "snap-2019.11.08-14.37.09.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27632 [Community]: Get in contact with operators / supporters of hackspaces possibly interested in running a relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27632: Get in contact with operators / supporters of hackspaces possibly
interested in running a relay
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  relay community  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gaba):

 There are team meetings for the community team  every Monday at 1600 UTC.
 That is the best way to get involved.

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27632 [Community]: Get in contact with operators / supporters of hackspaces possibly interested in running a relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27632: Get in contact with operators / supporters of hackspaces possibly
interested in running a relay
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  relay community  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: ggus (removed)
 * owner:  phoul => ggus


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27632 [Community]: Get in contact with operators / supporters of hackspaces possibly interested in running a relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27632: Get in contact with operators / supporters of hackspaces possibly
interested in running a relay
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  relay community  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by samurai_ronin):

 I want help in this project. Please send more information?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Subsystem "thread_cleanup" is never called

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32103: Subsystem "thread_cleanup" is never called
--+
 Reporter:  opara |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, extra-review  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by opara):

 The 'defect' status should probably be removed from this ticket. When I
 made the ticket I didn't realize that threads in tor never exit, so there
 is no reason to clean up any memory in these threads. It might be best
 just to remove the `thread_cleanup` function altogether.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31070 [Community/Relays]: Add information about SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31070: Add information about SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay
---+--
 Reporter:  crimson_king   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  selinux, capabilities  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31070 [Community/Relays]: Add information about SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31070: Add information about SELinux boolean tor_can_network_relay
---+
 Reporter:  crimson_king   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  selinux, capabilities  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30900 [Community/Relays]: Add a section or link to instructions about NAT in the tor relay guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30900: Add a section or link to instructions about NAT in the tor relay guide
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30900 [Community/Relays]: Add a section or link to instructions about NAT in the tor relay guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30900: Add a section or link to instructions about NAT in the tor relay guide
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30445 [Community/Relays]: some suggestions to the tor relay guide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30445: some suggestions to the tor relay guide
--+--
 Reporter:  caioau|  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30312 [Community/Relays]: Tor Relay Guide / DebianUbuntu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30312: Tor Relay Guide / DebianUbuntu
--+--
 Reporter:  siggi |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28993 [Community/Relays]: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28993: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on
debian
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28993 [Community/Relays]: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28993: Document pkg-config is required to compile tor with --enable-systemd on
debian
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27710 [Community/Relays]: How often do relays upload their descriptor per day?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27710: How often do relays upload their descriptor per day?
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27710 [Community/Relays]: How often do relays upload their descriptor per day?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27710: How often do relays upload their descriptor per day?
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26562 [Community/Relays]: I think that is a part of the relay guide that we can improve (teor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26562: I think that is a part of the relay guide that we can improve (teor)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25168 [Community/Relays]: create relay troubleshooting page and link to it from the TorRelayGuide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25168: create relay troubleshooting page and link to it from the TorRelayGuide
--+
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26562 [Community/Relays]: I think that is a part of the relay guide that we can improve (teor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26562: I think that is a part of the relay guide that we can improve (teor)
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25168 [Community/Relays]: create relay troubleshooting page and link to it from the TorRelayGuide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25168: create relay troubleshooting page and link to it from the TorRelayGuide
--+
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25168 [Community/Relays]: create relay troubleshooting page and link to it from the TorRelayGuide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25168: create relay troubleshooting page and link to it from the TorRelayGuide
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * owner:  nusenu => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31835 [Community/Relays]: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31835: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian
--+
 Reporter:  crimson_king  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nusenu):

 https://community.torproject.org/relay/

 is the new location of the relay guide

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31835 [Community/Relays]: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31835: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian
--+--
 Reporter:  crimson_king  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31835 [Community/Relays]: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31835: Update instructions to setup automatic updates for Ubuntu and Debian
--+
 Reporter:  crimson_king  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


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[tor-bugs] #32432 [Webpages/Website]: update the relay-guide HTTP redirect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32432: update the relay-guide HTTP redirect
-+--
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Webpages/Website
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 The relay guide is now maintained on the community page and
 maintained by other people.

 Please replace the redirect

 torproject.org/relay-guide ->
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide

 with:

 torproject.org/relay-guide -> https://community.torproject.org/relay/

 and remove 'nusenu' from the auto assigning Community/Relays trac tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21961: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by adrelanos):

 Chrome and other browsers fixed this vulnerability. Just Firefox refused.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security settings (Medium-High)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23719: Make sure WebExtensions are spared from JIT disabling in higher security
settings (Medium-High)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, GeorgKoppen201911,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 gk]:
 > > Do we have a good test making sure the WASM part is actually working
 as expected?
 >
 > I found some "test": On mobile I get a warning now due to an
 unresponsive WASM script. That's pretty bad because users can start
 surfing while HTTPS-E is not ready yet and it gets our fundraising banner
 in a weird shape (not everything is positioned correctly). I am afraid we
 can't ship this as-is.
 >
 > Interestingly, though, we *do have* WASM enabled on the standard level
 in our alpha and nightly builds and I don't have that issue on that level
 on that device. Thus, the problem here is not wasm-on-android per se.

 I could reproduce the https everywhere wasm script warning in Fennec with
 `javascript.options.ion = false` and `javascript.options.baselinejit =
 false`. Without having profiled the extension it looks like the JS code in
 the wasm path is slower than before when JIT is disabled.

 I also tested with a wasm bench function that takes a while (at least 15
 seconds) and just receives an integer as argument and the performance
 seems to be the same independently of `ion` or `baselinejit`, as long as
 `wasm` is enabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32418: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is 
newest
--+---
 Reporter:  Yeti  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-update|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:   => tbb-update


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32429: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  pf.team   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  about:blank noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Old description:

> Tor Browser: 9.0.1 (based on Mozilla Firefox 68.2.0esr) (64-bit) (Linux)
>
> NoScript displays the following weird behavior on *.onion sites when the
> home page is changed from its default "about:tor" to "about:blank":
>
> * Impossible to forbid scripts on the Standard security level
> * Impossible to allow scripts on the Safest security level by setting
> TRUSTED/Temp. or TRUSTED/Custom. Scripts can only be enabled by disabling
> restrictions for this tab or disabling restrictions globally.
>
> The first issue misleads the user about actual security settings, the
> second breaks functionality on sites.
> We suspect that other functions or extensions of the browser may be
> broken when "about:tor" is replaced with "about:blank" as the default
> home page.
>
> These issues do not affect clearnet sites and local files. They are also
> absent if the default home page is changed do some URL or any other
> special page like "about:logo" or "about:library".
>
> These issues were absent in versions 8.5.* and 9.0
>
> How to reproduce:
>
> # Preferences => Home => Homepage and new windows => Blank Page
> # Open one of these URL to demonstrate:
> ** http://mysecret7rirx6ip.onion/test-js.html
> ** http://mysecretvrujzo2k.onion/test-js.html
> # Restart browser
> # Try to disallow scripts Standard or allow on Safest
>
> Example HTML/JS code:
>
> 
> 
> 
> Tor Browser 9.0.1 NoScript bug demonstration
> 
> 
> 
> 
> document.write("Java Script works")
> Java Script doesn't
> work
> 
> 
> 
> 

New description:

 Tor Browser: 9.0.1 (based on Mozilla Firefox 68.2.0esr) (64-bit) (Linux)

 NoScript displays the following weird behavior on *.onion sites when the
 home page is changed from its default "about:tor" to "about:blank":

 * Impossible to forbid scripts on the Standard security level
 * Impossible to allow scripts on the Safest security level by setting
 TRUSTED/Temp. or TRUSTED/Custom. Scripts can only be enabled by disabling
 restrictions for this tab or disabling restrictions globally.

 The first issue misleads the user about actual security settings, the
 second breaks functionality on sites.
 We suspect that other functions or extensions of the browser may be broken
 when "about:tor" is replaced with "about:blank" as the default home page.

 These issues do not affect clearnet sites and local files. They are also
 absent if the default home page is changed do some URL or any other
 special page like "about:logo" or "about:library".

 These issues were absent in versions 8.5.* and 9.0

 How to reproduce:

 # Preferences => Home => Homepage and new windows => Blank Page
 # Restart browser
 # Open one of these URL to demonstrate:
   * http://mysecret7rirx6ip.onion/test-js.html
   * http://mysecretvrujzo2k.onion/test-js.html
 # Try to disallow scripts Standard or allow on Safest

 Example HTML/JS code:

 {{{
 
 
 
 Tor Browser 9.0.1 NoScript bug demonstration
 
 
 
 
 document.write("Java Script works")
 Java Script doesn't
 work
 
 
 
 
 }}}

--

Comment (by Thorin):

 > Sorry, the "Restart browser" step must be before the demonstration step

 I edited it for you

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32431 [- Select a component]: Reduced webpage display area

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32431: Reduced webpage display area
--+
 Reporter:  secureyourself|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by secureyourself):

 * Attachment "Untitled.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #32431 [- Select a component]: Reduced webpage display area

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32431: Reduced webpage display area
+--
 Reporter:  secureyourself  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I use the latest version of Tor Browser for Windows, and since
 installation I noticed something strange. Please see the screenshot. The
 height of webpage area is 500px, it looks like a bug on Windows than
 undermines the fingerprinting protection.
 I don't use any add-ons (only pre-installed NoScript and HTTPS
 Everywhere).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32429: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  pf.team   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  about:blank noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pf.team):

 Sorry, the "Restart browser" step must be **before** the demonstration
 step.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32423 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Attempts to use location services silently fail with no user feedback as to why

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32423: Attempts to use location services silently fail with no user feedback 
as to
why
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 FYI: here's a site that you can use for other permission tests as well as
 location: https://permission.site/ - it's designed for chromium but seems
 to work with FF/TB

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get RLBox code integrated into Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32381: Get RLBox code integrated into Tor Browser
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1566235 is a good starting
 point.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cannot connect with tor via obsf4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32417: Cannot connect with tor via obsf4
--+---
 Reporter:  Pink Panther  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi,

 Can you please confirm what Tor Browser version you are using and your
 operating system? Did this work previously and has suddenly stopped
 working?

 It seems strange, but it could be that the bridge is blocked whilst
 connecting to Tor directly isn't.

 Can you share your tor logs or check whether you see any errors there?

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is newest

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32418: Torbrowser tells on every start, that it can't update although it is 
newest
--+---
 Reporter:  Yeti  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pili):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi,

 Can you please enable update logging (visit about:config and update
 app.update.log preference to true.) You should then be able to see the
 update check logs in the browser console.

 It would be helpful if you can send those on or let us know if you see any
 errors there.

 Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #32430 [- Select a component]: website not working properly since update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32430: website not working properly since update
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a
 |  component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Images for videos not|  Actual Points:
  loading porndig|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 Images not loading for videos since update on android for porndig.com

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[tor-bugs] #32429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32429: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites
+--
 Reporter:  pf.team |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  about:blank |  Actual Points:
  noscript  |
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Tor Browser: 9.0.1 (based on Mozilla Firefox 68.2.0esr) (64-bit) (Linux)

 NoScript displays the following weird behavior on *.onion sites when the
 home page is changed from its default "about:tor" to "about:blank":

 * Impossible to forbid scripts on the Standard security level
 * Impossible to allow scripts on the Safest security level by setting
 TRUSTED/Temp. or TRUSTED/Custom. Scripts can only be enabled by disabling
 restrictions for this tab or disabling restrictions globally.

 The first issue misleads the user about actual security settings, the
 second breaks functionality on sites.
 We suspect that other functions or extensions of the browser may be broken
 when "about:tor" is replaced with "about:blank" as the default home page.

 These issues do not affect clearnet sites and local files. They are also
 absent if the default home page is changed do some URL or any other
 special page like "about:logo" or "about:library".

 These issues were absent in versions 8.5.* and 9.0

 How to reproduce:

 # Preferences => Home => Homepage and new windows => Blank Page
 # Open one of these URL to demonstrate:
 ** http://mysecret7rirx6ip.onion/test-js.html
 ** http://mysecretvrujzo2k.onion/test-js.html
 # Restart browser
 # Try to disallow scripts Standard or allow on Safest

 Example HTML/JS code:

 
 
 
 Tor Browser 9.0.1 NoScript bug demonstration
 
 
 
 
 document.write("Java Script works")
 Java Script doesn't
 work
 
 
 
 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the User-Agent: string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32256: TorBrowser should advertise Onion Networking capability in the 
User-Agent:
string
--+--
 Reporter:  alecmuffett   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:14 alecmuffett]:
 > Aside: I think you answered your own question when you said:
 >
 > >the user agent could sent this header with the first request
 >
 > ...because that word "first" means state-maintenance;

 I am not sure whether "state-maintenance" is the proper term here given
 that it is coming with some connotations that are probably not applying
 here. The *browser* knows whether a request is a first request when
 surfing to foo.com (or if that's too hand-wavy for you then it should not
 be hard to get the browser into a state to make it known). And "first"
 does not necessarily mean "first" in the whole browsing session but rather
 something like "the first request to foo.com after entering 'foo.com' into
 the URL bar and hitting RETURN". That means if you revisit foo.com later
 on the first request to it will contain the onion capability bits again.
 The server knows whether it's a first request or not by seeing the onion
 capability bit or not (because the server admin *knows* that Tor Browser
 is sending that bit on a first request or if a user has not denied to
 visit that site over .onion (see below)) and can act accordingly, e.g. by
 adding Alt-Svc headers or a Location header pointing to the .onion or by
 adding an Onion-Location header etc.

 > as with the "link onion-enabling stuff with the first dropping of a
 session cookie" model, there are > three issues:
 >
 > - not all sites want to use cookies / track their users; what then, re:
 state-tracking?

 There is no need for that as I said above. If you for some reason really
 have the need to track the user on a site as to whether they are in a
 .onion context you should be easily able to use the Referer header. But
 that should *not* be necessary.

 > - by linking the onion-enablement to "first drop", there is no
 opportunity to revisit or "nudge" the user towards onion

 Sure there is, see above: anytime the user visits foo.com there is a
 chance to revisit the decision as the onion capability bit is sent again
 in the first request.

 > and thirdly
 >
 > - by eliding the six bytes of {{{Tor/1}}} from the header, you make it
 somewhat harder for people to implement stuff like:
 >
 > '''You are not Onion-Capable! We recommend that you run TorBrowser for
 access to this site! '''
 >
 > ...which is potentially desirable for brand awareness :-)

 That actually depends. Because if the server sent back an Onion-Location
 header and the user declined to visit the onion and does not want so in
 the future (for whatever reason) I expect the server to comply with that
 wish and not throw a "You are not Onion-Capable" in the user's face every
 time they visit that website. So, this use-case works perfectly well with
 the idea of not sending the onion capability bit in every request with the
 user agent: one could easily omit that bit entirely if the user made the
 decision to not wanting to load that website (or any website, that is)
 over .onion.

 So, I think using the onion capability bit for *that* idea is not
 necessarily a thing we should encourage.

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