Re: [tor-bugs] #32508 [Applications/Tor Browser]: opening about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button leads to adding about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32508: opening about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button 
leads to
adding about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Hm, so the patch is not working for me. I still see the network settings
 on the security/privacy pane after applying your patch. Here is what I
 did:

 1) Take a clean, new 9.5a2 Linux bundle (64bit) and extract it
 2) Go tor tor-browser_$$/Browser/browser
 3) `unzip -d test omni.ja`
 4) `cd test/chrome/browser/content/browser/torpreferences/`
 5) `patch -p5 < /path/to/your/patch`
 6) `cd ../../../../../`
 7) `rm ../omni.ja`
 8) `zip -r9 ../omni.ja *`
 9) start the so modified bundle for the first time and click on the shield
 icon so the security settings show up

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32508 [Applications/Tor Browser]: opening about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button leads to adding about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32508: opening about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button 
leads to
adding about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32265 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: MS: Format an exit list from a previous exit list and exitmap output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32265: MS: Format an exit list from a previous exit list and exitmap output
--+
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29654| Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Glad to see that the rewrite is progressing so quickly!

 Couple remarks/questions:
  - Why 48 hours and not 24 hours? Doesn't the current exit scanner keep
 scan results for 24 hours? I might be wrong, though. Let's use whatever
 the current scanner does.
  - Rather than downloading exit lists from CollecTor, wouldn't it be
 sufficient to just read the latest exit list previously written by this
 scanner? And if there's none, just assume that no previous scans have
 happened. In theory, this should be all we need to learn.
  - It seems that `LastStatus` is only taken from exit lists downloaded
 from CollecTor but never set by new measurements. We should make a plan
 what to do with this field. Take it out? Populate it with consensus valid-
 after times?
  - Does exitmap with the plugin use previous scans as input to decide
 which relays to scan? I believe that it uses some logic to avoid scanning
 relays too frequently. This has two effects: it doesn't generate more load
 on the network and on single relays than necessary, and it ensures that
 new relays are scanned sooner. As a result, the new scanner could be run
 once or twice per hour, rather than every 2 or 3 hours (at 45 minutes
 runtime).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32265 [Metrics/Exit Scanner]: MS: Format an exit list from a previous exit list and exitmap output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32265: MS: Format an exit list from a previous exit list and exitmap output
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Exit Scanner  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29654| Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten   |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Reviewing now...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32516 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Write Methods Clearer in TorConfigBuilder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32516: Make Write Methods Clearer in TorConfigBuilder
---+---
 Reporter:  sisbell|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201911R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  .25
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201911 => tbb-mobile,
 TorBrowserTeam201911R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31971 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31971: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
 > I don't think there's any problem with my connection, I can get decent
 speeds.

 by UDP?

 (https://superuser.com/questions/1242830/online-udp-speed-test
 (https://iperf.fr/iperf-servers.php))

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+--
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 > There are very few commits since the last released version.

 Few? There are 354 unreleased commits, comparable to the 1.7 release...

 {{{
 % git rev-list --count  1.7.0..master
 354

 % git rev-list --count  1.6.0..1.7.0
 432
 }}}

 I just merged
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=91973b00077f9aba0d3064355838c8f8ace6e206
 HSv3 descriptor creation support] this morning. Releasing when this branch
 has barely had a chance to breath would be rather irresponsable. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+--
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This bug also effecting upstream projects.  I found this ticket via
 [https://github.com/erdiaker/torrequest/issues/10 this issue].
 Recommending using the git version is unrealistic for upstream projects or
 package managers.

 There are very few commits since the last released version. Are there
 uncommited changes that are planed for 1.8?  I can understand wanting to
 wait to wrap up python 2 support, but waiting for EOL support for the
 current release does not make sense.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31341 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TorBirdy does not support Thunderbird 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31341: TorBirdy does not support Thunderbird 68
--+-
 Reporter:  ozozoz|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBirdy, Thunderbird 68  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Similar situation here, it seems just now all Debian stable (Buster)
 installations have received the upgrade to TBird 68, leaving many many
 former TorBirdy users at risk, myself included.

 How will Tails handle the situation? They've always relied on TorBirdy and
 they are now on Buster, maybe they can fix it in no time and make it
 available to all of us?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32415: Rename every struct we declare to end with _t.
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-november  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID: | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => network-team-roadmap-november
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add features improving onion services' interaction with Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32511: Add features improving onion services' interaction with Tor.
--+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 There is a patch to look at here

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31691 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Go ldflags should set static build ID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31691: Go ldflags should set static build ID
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Correction to the above: what I said above is accurate for GNU/Linux
 targets.  For macOS targets, even some of Namecoin's executable Go
 projects have nonreproducible build ID's with current `tor-browser-build`;
 setting a static build ID as described in this ticket makes Namecoin's
 executable Go projects reproducible for macOS targets.  It's not clear to
 me why macOS behaves differently from GNU/Linux; nor is it clear to me why
 Tor hasn't run into this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: allow more than 3 bridges in android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32528: allow more than 3 bridges in android
--+--
 Reporter:  big1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * component:  Circumvention/Obfs4 => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 I'm guessing this meant to be a Tor Browser ticket.

 Matt/GeKo, what's the current story with Tor Browser Android and the
 ability to put in your own bridge addresses manually?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31823 [Core Tor/Stem]: HSv3 descriptor support in stem [encoding]

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31823: HSv3 descriptor support in stem [encoding]
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs scaling onionbalance  |  Actual Points:  2
  network-team-roadmap-september tor-spec|
Parent ID:  #26768   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi asn, **finally**
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=91973b00077f9aba0d3064355838c8f8ace6e206
 merged HSv3 descriptor creation support]. Many thanks for all the help!

 Blinding is disabled by default to avoid its lengthy runtime. I'd be
 delighted to re-enable this default once we have a performant
 implementation. To create a descriptor with blinding simply supply a
 nonce...

 {{{
 HiddenServiceDescriptorV3(blinding_nonce = os.urandom(32))
 }}}

 Is there anything you'd care to have adjusted?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+--
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Ahhh, thanks cypherpunks.

 I plan to release Stem 1.8 in December, which will be the last in the 1.x
 series and the [https://pythonclock.org/ final with Python 2.x support].
 In the meantime if you encounter this I'd suggest using Stem from git.

 Sorry for the bug!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31010: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I gonna have a closer look when reviewing #31918. Everyone who worked on
 patches, please add your actual points spent.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:91 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:90 gk]:
 > > {{{
 > > 3) Check whether/why 7d0bb93e5c4b can actually get dropped
 > > }}}
 > > is still open but I don't have time to investigate why this can get
 dropped now. If someone wants to dig a bit that would be highly
 appreciated, though.
 > Because it was a fix for your workaround for #24052, no? Now that
 Mozilla fixed that bug in esr68, and you removed any ability to run plug-
 ins, it is no longer needed.

 Yeah, that's right. I was actually mentioning the wrong commit, sorry. I
 meant commit 65bbebea18a8 which is the patch for #14716.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+---
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I am having the same issue as wiri with stem 1.7.1.  I was able to fix the
 issue by manually applying
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=b5aecb7 this commit].
 Any chance we could get an updated version in PyPI?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+---
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hi wiri, what version of stem are you using? Our get_conf_map() method
 doesn't have the problematic line ("for key in reply:") so this was
 probably already fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28214 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TOR DOESNT WORK

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28214: TOR DOESNT WORK
---+-
 Reporter:  Sparky1959 |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 This ticket is 13 months old and has no useful info in it. I'm going to
 close it.

 "Sparky1959", if you are still having issues, consider using the
 appropriate support avenues:
 https://support.torproject.org/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31971 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31971: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:16 cypherpunks]:
 > @cypherpunks
 >
 > https://www.tenforums.com/network-sharing/2806-slow-network-throughput-
 windows-10-a.html
 > https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/network/using-
 registry-values-to-enable-and-disable-task-offloading
 I don't think there's any problem with my connection, I can get decent
 speeds.

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[tor-bugs] #32528 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: allow more than 3 bridges in android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32528: allow more than 3 bridges in android
---+-
 Reporter:  big1   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4
  Version: |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
 because you put default bridges that are not working this has resulted in
 tor not working via android in a country where tor is otherwise
 inaccessible

 even if you change default bridges from your side it will only work for
 some time until they get blocked again !!

 this happened several times before in previous versions so this means the
 concerned country is now systematically targeting default bridges and bans
 them by creating blocking rules which is easy to implement country wise
 because default bridges dont change

 the immediate solution is to allow manual input of more than 3 bridges in
 torbrowser just like orbot, otherwise torbrowser will not work in an
 entire country for android users !

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30334 [Applications/Tor Browser]: build_go_lib for executables?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30334: build_go_lib for executables?
+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 > I'm not certain whether the patch in this ticket exposes reproducibility
 issues, but if it does, #31691 and #31688 are the most likely culprits.

 Further investigation suggests that the changes in this ticket's patch
 won't expose any new reproducibility issues.  (I was wondering if the
 usage of `go install` instead of `go build` will expose build paths, but
 testing confirms that this isn't a problem.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31691 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Go ldflags should set static build ID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31691: Go ldflags should set static build ID
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by JeremyRand):

 Further investigation seems to support my above hypothesis that Namecoin
 is running into this because we exercise cgo-related code paths that Tor
 currently doesn't.  (Specifically, Namecoin's executable Go projects are
 reproducible within rbm, while our Go project that produces a C ABI shared
 library exposes nonreproducibility in the build ID when built in rbm.)
 Usage of `go install` versus `go build` doesn't seem to have any effect on
 whether the build ID is reproducible.  In any event, fixing this is still
 a good idea for Tor since it improves reproducibility between rbm and non-
 rbm build usage.

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[tor-bugs] #32527 [Applications/rbm]: rbm downloads 0B sig file if network drops; rejects sig on next run

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32527: rbm downloads 0B sig file if network drops; rejects sig on next run
+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/rbm
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Instructions to reproduce:

 1. Build Tor Browser via `tor-browser-build`.
 2. Right before rbm tries to download a `.sig` file, shut off the network
 connection.

 Expected results:

 rbm should not write a `.sig` file.  Future invocations of rbm once
 network connection is restored should download the `.sig` file.

 Observed results:

 rbm writes a `.sig` file with size 0B.  When the network connection is
 restored and rbm is run again, rbm does not retry downloading the `.sig`
 file, and instead says something like `Error: File llvm-8.0.0.src.tar.xz
 is not signed with a valid key`.  Manually deleting the 0B `.sig` file
 allows rbm to function properly again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, 029-proposed, tor-control, |  Actual Points:  0.5
  easy, spec-conformance, review-group-31,   |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by maurice_pibouin):

 Created pull request as suggested :
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1549

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12997 [Core Tor/Tor]: More specific warning than "Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR or non-edge circuit."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12997: More specific warning than "Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR or 
non-
edge circuit."
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 B/c I do still get this warning every few hours at a 0.4.2.3-alpha I do
 wonder what shall I do as a relay operator?

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[tor-bugs] #32526 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enhance wasi-sysroot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32526: Enhance wasi-sysroot
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #32434
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 It seems we need to enhance our`wasi-sysroot` (#32437) for RLBox, see:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1566286.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32436 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include lucetc project into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32436: Include lucetc project into tor-browser-build
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32434   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 After some searching I decided to use a newer Rust compiler (1.36.0)
 instead re-introducing our `tor` hack from earlier where we already used a
 more modern Rust version than 1.26.2 when compiling Rust code.

 `bug_32436_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32436_v4=29b10882d320522938ed09f8989bec722fc92465)
 has a patch which allows me to build `lucetc`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32437 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Include wasi-libc project into tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32437: Include wasi-libc project into tor-browser-build
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32434   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 `bug_32436_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_32436_v4=42e042558263732b5f3d6fc6d1c6b7b5c1c6a66c)
 has a patch for this bug included as it turns out `lucetc` needs a sysroot
 dir when running `make install` as we do.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31971 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31971: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 @cypherpunks

 https://www.tenforums.com/network-sharing/2806-slow-network-throughput-
 windows-10-a.html
 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/network/using-
 registry-values-to-enable-and-disable-task-offloading

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:90 gk]:
 > {{{
 > 3) Check whether/why 7d0bb93e5c4b can actually get dropped
 > }}}
 > is still open but I don't have time to investigate why this can get
 dropped now. If someone wants to dig a bit that would be highly
 appreciated, though.
 Because it was a fix for your workaround for #24052, no? Now that Mozilla
 fixed that bug in esr68, and you removed any ability to run plug-ins, it
 is no longer needed.

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