Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+--
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by wiri):

 I have the 1.7.1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i started getting a bunch of errors from cron like this:

 {{{
 Subject: Cron  /home/ircbouncer/bin/znc-ssl-copy.sh
 To: ircboun...@chives.torproject.org
 Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 02:49:01 +

 /home/ircbouncer/bin/znc-ssl-copy.sh: line 3:
 /home/ircbouncer/.znc/znc.pem: Permission denied
 }}}

 not sure what you're doing here, but something is not working. :)

 i have changed the role's forward to point to you instead of TPA so we
 stop receiving those errors, but it's probably something you'd want to
 fix.

 it would also be great if you could document your setup here or
 somewhere...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 - [x] systemd.service config (pastly)

 Extremely basic service file to run znc. Plus unfortunately fell back to
 copying the certs out of /etc and putting them in ~/.znc/znc.pem once a
 week with a cron job due to what seems like a systemd security thing
 preventing me from reading /etc/ssl/private/ files.

 - [x] znc configuration (pastly)
 - [x] web interface configuration (pastly)

 Uhh ... done I think. I have IRC and HTTP on 2000 as well as IRC-over-TLS
 and HTTPS on 2001. I have an account for myself and can make/migrate
 additional accounts later without help.

 Speaking of the nginx proxy and these ports ...

 We can probably skip nginx. Our users can be expected to use Tor Browser
 in the rare instance they want to access the web interface. Thus
 `HiddenServicePort 80 2000` gets them secure access to the web interface.

 For their IRC client, opening 2001 in the firewall gets them IRC over TLS.
 I guess for completeness we should open 2000 for plaintext IRC. Finally,
 for the cool kids `HiddenServicePort 2000` gets them IRC over Tor.

 PS: why not v3 onion service? :p

 If what I'm saying sounds reasonable, then in lieu of the "nginx proxy"
 step, I would request the following lines in the torrc:

 {{{
 HiddenServiceVersion 3
 HiddenServicePort 80 2000
 HiddenServicePort 2000
 }}}

 And the firewall to allow inbound 2000 and 2001.

 And to be notified about what the new onion service is if you actually
 bump to v3.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32538 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Detect package manager in case of not finding pkg python-stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32538: Detect package manager in case of not finding pkg python-stem
--+
 Reporter:  bounteous17   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks bounteous17!
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/commit/?id=adbc54b Merged with some
 revisions].

 This patch was great, but just for future reference forking with git is
 done by running...

 {{{
 # clone your github repository locally

 % git clone https://github.com/bounteous/nyx.git
 % cd nyx

 # get the official repository too

 % git remote add upstream https://git.torproject.org/nyx.git
 % git fetch upstream

 # create a branch for you to do your work on

 % git checkout -b my_feature upstream/master
 [do your work]

 # push it back to github so you can share it

 % git push origin my_feature:my_feature
 }}}

 This bases your commit upon the history of the repository you're working
 on, so it merges cleanly.

 Sorry, I know git is pretty beginner unfriendly. ;)

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[tor-bugs] #32540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship some build with debug logs enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32540: Ship some build with debug logs enabled
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeamTriaged
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 There are safety concerns with enabling highly verbose logging on clients,
 and there are some additional questions we'll need to answer such as
 whether we disable safe logging (I suspect we should leave it enabled).

 The goal is providing a build that allows easier debugging of connectivity
 problems. Maybe we should provide another bundle, as a troubleshooting
 build, instead of re-purposing nightly or alpha.

 I can see this being useful for all platforms, but this is specifically
 needed on Android because it isn't possible to customize the torrc (see
 #29031).

 In this build imagine setting tor INFO logging, and configuring obfs4proxy
 with `-enableLogging`. Somehow we'll need to give easy access to
 `obfs4proxy.log`, as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32533 [Core Tor/Stem]: Incompatibility with Python 3.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32533: Incompatibility with Python 3.8
---+---
 Reporter:  nafen  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python3.8  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Hi nafen, sorry this nailed ya! Oddly we got another report about this
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32525 exact same issue
 yesterday]. This has already been fixed within the git codebase.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32508 [Applications/Tor Browser]: opening about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button leads to adding about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32508: opening about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button 
leads to
adding about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 gk: I speculated in IRC that you might have a startupCache issue:

 {{{
 (2019-11-18 11:38:44 AM) pospeselr: GeKo: I'm not sure why you're not
 seeing any change after applying the patch (regarding #32508 )
 (2019-11-18 11:38:47 AM) zwiebelbot: (notice) tor#32508: opening
 about:preferences#privacy from the security toolbar button leads to adding
 about:preferences#tor items at the end of about:preferences#privacy -
 [needs_information] - https://bugs.torproject.org/32508
 (2019-11-18 11:39:10 AM) pospeselr: perhaps you need to nuke your
 startcupCache ?
 (2019-11-18 11:39:38 AM) pospeselr: doing a full build, and copying
 $out/dist/firefox/* over /Browser gives the right behavior
 (2019-11-18 11:39:57 AM) pospeselr: I could do a full tor-browser-build to
 verify if you like
 }}}

 I did a nightly tor-browser-build using this patch just to be sure and the
 behaviour is as expected:

 https://people.torproject.org/~richard/builds/bug_32508/tor-browser-
 linux64-tbb-nightly_en-US.tar.xz

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+--
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 No worries in the least! I figured it was something like that. :P

 Again, sorry for the hassle of this bug. Hopefully 1.8 isn't too far off!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32359 [Webpages/Website]: unecessary heavy image asset

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32359: unecessary heavy image asset
+--
 Reporter:  htor|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website performance  accessibility  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * cc: pospeselr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32359 [Webpages/Website]: unecessary heavy image asset

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32359: unecessary heavy image asset
+--
 Reporter:  htor|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website performance  accessibility  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Given how this image is used (on the main page at least) it looks like it
 can be reduced to grayscale/alpha (trims off a bit: down to 435 kb) and
 reduced in size by half in each dimension (trims off more, but not as much
 as you'd expect: down to 264 kb).

 We can replicate the effect using a grid of divs with various
 border/margin/bg color if we want to avoid SVG (tor-browser has a similar
 pattern in about:tor) but it would require a bit of refactoring of the
 footer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32359 [Webpages/Website]: unecessary heavy image asset

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32359: unecessary heavy image asset
+--
 Reporter:  htor|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website performance  accessibility  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "circle-pattern-grayscaleAlpha-halfSize.png" added.

 grayscale+alpha channels 1/2 length and width

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32359 [Webpages/Website]: unecessary heavy image asset

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32359: unecessary heavy image asset
+--
 Reporter:  htor|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website performance  accessibility  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "circle-pattern-grayscaleAlpha.png" added.

 grayscale+alpha channels

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32383 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32383: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  reopened => accepted
 * owner:  weasel => anarcat


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32383 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32383: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 still need to do:

  1. removing torsbg from hoster.yaml
  2. removing sbg from ferm.erb
  3. removing sbg from hosts-extra-info
  4. removing ipsec configuration from other peers (that is *basically* 20
 -local-peers.conf everywhere)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31718 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31718: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i updated the documentation on how to remove a static component here:

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/static-component/

 the only thing remaining is to remove the user/group, and the actual files
 on staticiforme (and mirrors?)

 @hellais, can i remove the actual site? how about the users? shouldn't i
 be removing users that were created just for the purpose of managing this
 website?

 thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32424 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make digitalocean@ alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32424: Make digitalocean@ alias
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 i ended up creating gitlab-admin@tpo to respect the existing convention
 (e.g. git-admin@ nextcloud-admin@ etc). the members of the alias are based
 on the `dip` group in ldap, which is currently ahf, dgoulet, hiro.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32424 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make digitalocean@ alias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32424: Make digitalocean@ alias
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 agreed with ahf on irc about gitlab@tpo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  anarcat => pastly
 * status:  accepted => assigned


Comment:

 i have created the ircbouncer role (user) and group on chives. the user
 has the rights to keep persistent user-level services running through
 systemd, also known as "lingering". the documentation on how to use that
 to run services is detailed here:

 https://help.torproject.org/tsa/doc/services/

 it is your responsibility to start the service and keep it running, our
 systemd things will just run whatever the service file says. :)

 so `sudo -u ircbouncer` to get to the privileged account. i've made you
 part of the group which should give you that privilege, let me know if
 that doesn't work.

 i've also added the `ircbouncer` user to the `ssl-cert` group so it can
 access the X509 certificates. those certs are the following files:

 {{{
 root@chives:~# ls -al /etc/ssl/private/ircbouncer.torproject.org.*
 /etc/ssl/torproject/certs/ircbouncer.torproject.org.crt*
 -r--r- 1 root ssl-cert 7178 nov 18 20:42
 /etc/ssl/private/ircbouncer.torproject.org.combined
 -r--r- 1 root ssl-cert 3244 nov 18 20:42
 /etc/ssl/private/ircbouncer.torproject.org.key
 -r--r--r-- 1 root root 2286 nov 18 20:42
 /etc/ssl/torproject/certs/ircbouncer.torproject.org.crt
 -r--r--r-- 1 root root 1649 nov 18 20:42
 /etc/ssl/torproject/certs/ircbouncer.torproject.org.crt-chain
 -r--r--r-- 1 root root 3934 nov 18 20:42
 /etc/ssl/torproject/certs/ircbouncer.torproject.org.crt-chained
 }}}

 Those are basically:

  * `.key`: the private key
  * `.crt`: the public key
  * `.crt-chain`: the "chain" bits that might be required in some browsers
  * `.crt-chained`: the above two together
  * `.combined`: all of the above

 Usually, the `.key` and `.crt` are enough, but sometimes you need the
 `.crt-chained` instead of the `.crt`.

 The onion service is also up and running, under (i believe)
 `eibwzyiqgk6vgugg.onion`. It currently points at
 ircbouncer.torproject.org:80 which of course is not listening. That's the
 next step: we need to figure our how to give you access to port 80 here.
 My suggestion would be that you start by setting up the bouncer and its
 web interface on whatever (stable) port you can, and access it over an SSH
 tunnel for now. Once you're happy with this (or if you can't use SSH
 tunnels for some reason), let me know what the port number is, and I'll
 setup an Nginx forward, reusing those nice little X509 certs as well.

 TL;DR: checklist status:

  * [x] znc install (anarcat)
  * [x] ircbouncer role account and group (anarcat)
  * [x] sudo access (anarcat)
  * [x] enable-linger (anarcat)
  * [x] x509 certs (anarcat)
  * [x] hidden service (anarcat)
  * [ ] systemd.service configuration (pastly)
  * [ ] znc configuration (pastly)
  * [ ] web interface configuration (pastly)
  * [ ] nginx proxy (anarcat)

 let me know if you have any questions!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32281 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set up new IRC box to replace iranicum

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32281: set up new IRC box to replace iranicum
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 the following users still have screen sessions, actually. i pinged each
 one over IRC today:

 {{{
 # ps -e -o user:256,comm | grep screen | cut -f1 -d' ' | sort -u
 erinn
 hiro
 karsten
 mikeperry
 nickm
 nima
 qbi
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32539 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'Security Level' heading in about:preferences#privacy is not styled correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32539: 'Security Level' heading in about:preferences#privacy is not styled
correctly
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911 => TorBrowserTeam201911R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Pushed a fixup commit over the original Security Level patch (
 a1e112cb40e909a029eb3551fa141b7ce33bee13 )

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_32539

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32494 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add "Send websites a “Do Not Track” signal that you don’t want to be tracked" back to Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32494: Add "Send websites a “Do Not Track” signal that you don’t want to be
tracked" back to Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 i use this browser to signal websites “Do Not Track” me please. please
 enable “Do Not Track”

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:  30
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:93 cypherpunks]:
 > > I meant commit 65bbebea18a8 which is the patch for #14716.
 > Oh, that one. Maybe, because `nsLoginManager.js` was removed in Firefox
 68? :)

 More "moved": https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 esr68/source/toolkit/components/passwordmgr/LoginManager.jsm has still
 almost all the code we patched for #14716. Yet, still...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-location: increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: Onion-location: increasing the use of onion services through automatic
redirects and aliasing
-+-
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  acat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  2.5
  roadmap-november, TorBrowserTeam201911,|
  tbb-9.5|
Parent ID:  #30024   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 global redirect would be the safest way to browse?

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[tor-bugs] #32538 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Detect package manager in case of not finding pkg python-stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32538: Detect package manager in case of not finding pkg python-stem
-+--
 Reporter:  bounteous17  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Nyx
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 If the python-stem package is not found in the system, an attempt will be
 made to detect the system package manager.

 
https://github.com/bounteous/nyx/commit/96a02d85f108538e3abf8efda43f5daa01a99cc8

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[tor-bugs] #32539 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'Security Level' heading in about:preferences#privacy is not styled correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32539: 'Security Level' heading in about:preferences#privacy is not styled
correctly
--+
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201911
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.25  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Looks like the h2 style elements in about:preferences now need to be
 actual html:h2 child nodes of the root label element. Prior to ESR68 it
 seems like just using a label element was sufficient.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32519 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: improve user onboard/offboarding procedures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32519: improve user onboard/offboarding procedures
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22460 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link handshake trouble: certificates and keys can get out of sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22460: Link handshake trouble: certificates and keys can get out of sync
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-relay certs handshake ed25519|  Actual Points:  1
  needs-analysis 030-backport 029-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 i still receiving this for my relays running Tor 0.4.1.6


 {{{
 Nov 17 03:32:04.000 [warn] {PROTOCOL} Received a bad CERTS cell: Link
 certificate does not match TLS certificate
 Nov 17 03:32:04.000 [warn] {PROTOCOL} Received a bad CERTS cell from
 130.149.80.199:9001: Invalid certificate chain!

 }}}
 seems i got bad cells from this node:
 
http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/rs.html#details/E91905CFEB230B1BEA6B0309816F9EE9C1A1A83A

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5915: Write patch to make socks handshakes succeed instantly
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  performance, application, experiment, tbb- |
  wants?, performance?, ux,  |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 the patch works since patched against tor stable for testing this poc.
 only negative thing noticed so far, is the following line:


 {{{
 [warn] {BUG} connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(): Bug: (Harmless.)
 duplicate calls to connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply. (on Tor 0.4.1.6 )
 }}}
 i believe its a race condition from SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT
 but without log lines wouldn't noticed this either

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16682 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deploy TCP Fast Open at exits (and maybe inter-node?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16682: Deploy TCP Fast Open at exits (and maybe inter-node?)
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance tor-relay exit needs-|  Actual Points:
  analysis term-project  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 so not only exit node can benefit but all nodes when talking inter-node.
 because tcp is not keepalive kept connected very long. less for clients
 that do single tcp multiplex through guards.
 but clients extenting with TFO enabled hops get faster circuitbuildtimes!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32515 [Webpages]: Keep Good Summaries From Reliable Sources. Example: Tor's CODEC Strategy, zlib, lzma, zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32515: Keep Good Summaries From Reliable Sources. Example: Tor's CODEC 
Strategy,
zlib, lzma, zstd
--+
 Reporter:  werd  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  zlib, lzma, zstd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 further, compression algo is unused if compiled with older version since
 libs upgrade.

 {{{
 Nov 17 02:10:36.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.1.6 opening new log file.
 Nov 17 02:10:36.669 [warn]
 }}}

 Tor was compiled with zstd 1.4.2, but is running with zstd 1.4.3. For
 safety, we'll avoid using advanced zstd functionality.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: allow more than 3 bridges in android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32528: allow more than 3 bridges in android
--+---
 Reporter:  big1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 you can add them manually via orbot setting "custom torrc"
 add each


 {{{
 Bridge 0.0.0.0:9050
 }}}


 on seperate line

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[tor-bugs] #32537 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Update marionette version used in tor browser testsuite, for ESR68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32537: Update marionette version used in tor browser testsuite, for ESR68
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance   |Version:
  and Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The version of marionette that is used by the tor browser testsuite needs
 to be updated in order to support esr68 versions of Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32536 [Applications]: Security level set to "Safest" but JavaScript still Enabled.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32536: Security level set to "Safest" but JavaScript still Enabled.
--+
 Reporter:  tor70001  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tor70001):

 * Attachment "js.png" added.

 screenshot

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[tor-bugs] #32536 [Applications]: Security level set to "Safest" but JavaScript still Enabled.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32536: Security level set to "Safest" but JavaScript still Enabled.
---+--
 Reporter:  tor70001   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Component:  Applications
  Version: |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 TorBrowser 9.0.1 on Whonix.

 Everything worked fine before. When level was set to "Safest" JS was
 disabled.But now from thin air it started lying. Set to "Safest" but don't
 block JS. I don't update or somehow mess with torbroswer config. It just
 started this.
 I try restarting TorBrowser, Whonix, same issues. Tested on several sites,
 all says JS enabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25099 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update nightly version number

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25099: Update nightly version number
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-update, TorBrowserTeam201911 => tbb-rbm, tbb-
 update, TorBrowserTeam201911R


Comment:

 There are two patches for review in branch `bug_25099_v10`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25099_v10=0f019cf3aa17c6b77bb8126a9c4bdf47886238cb

 One of them remove the `alpha_nightly` target, for simplification, as I
 think it was not really used. The other sets the version to `tbb-
 nightly.$year.$month.$day`, and also use that version number as the
 directory name in `nightly/`.

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[tor-bugs] #32535 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Android: Cleanup Cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32535: Android: Cleanup Cache
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This feature has not yet been implemented. Reported issue:


 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/285556#comment-285556

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31130: Use Debian 10 for our Android container images
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31127  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 Yes, we need these components. Removing them results in

 {{{
 dpkg: dependency problems prevent configuration of openjdk-8-jdk:amd64:
  openjdk-8-jdk:amd64 depends on openjdk-8-jdk-headless (=
 8u232-b09-1~deb9u1); however:
   Package openjdk-8-jdk-headless is not installed.

 dpkg: error processing package openjdk-8-jdk:amd64 (--install):
  dependency problems - leaving unconfigured
 }}}

 Similar errors occur if removing the JRE packages.


 Replying to [comment:40 gk]:
 > How much of OpenJDK do we really need? That is, do we really need jdk,
 jdk-headless, jre, and jre-headless? If not, please remove the parts that
 are not needed (together with dependencies not needed).

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[tor-bugs] #32534 [Applications/Tor Browser]: settle on one canonical jtorctl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32534: settle on one canonical jtorctl
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor
 |  Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  Android, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  jtorctl|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
 @n8fr8 recently switched Orbot to use the Briar jtorctl.  So if Tor
 Browser and Thali also use that, then we have one canonical jtorctl again.
 With the new native Android ''TorService'', it'll work best if jtorctl is
 embedded in the service, providing an API for consumers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32281 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: set up new IRC box to replace iranicum

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32281: set up new IRC box to replace iranicum
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i pinged nickm and cohosh on irc today, and helped asn migrate. i also
 ping'd nima in a "write" message. gk, cohosh, asn and more have now
 migrated. so this is progressing well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30381: Provide control port commands to ADD/REMOVE/VIEW v3 client-auth
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, ux-team, hs-  |  Actual Points:  4.5
  auth, network-team-roadmap-september,  |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 OK now that #30382 is merged upstream, here is the #30381 branch rebased
 to latest master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1550

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31718 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31718: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i removed the nagios check and let's encrypt cert, then also cleaned this
 up in puppet:

 {{{
 From b8e3ebc8f10c9b2e6654c84e85291c277b861637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: =?UTF-8?q?Antoine=20Beaupr=C3=A9?= 
 Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 12:08:12 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] remove remaining traces of ooni.tpo mirror (#31718)

 ---
  modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_onion.pp | 3 ++-
  modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_web.pp   | 2 +-
  .../roles/templates/static-mirroring/vhost/static-vhosts.erb   | 1 -
  modules/sudo/files/sudoers | 2 --
  4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

 diff --git a/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_onion.pp
 b/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_onion.pp
 index d9c15fce..706783cd 100644
 --- a/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_onion.pp
 +++ b/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_onion.pp
 @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ class roles::static_mirror_onion {
'nyx.torproject.org',
'onion.torproject.org',
'onionperf.torproject.org',
 -  'ooni.torproject.org',
'openpgpkey.torproject.org',
'rbm.torproject.org',
'research.torproject.org',
 @@ -56,5 +55,7 @@ class roles::static_mirror_onion {
ensure => 'ifstatic';
  'spec.torproject.org':
ensure => 'present';
 +'ooni.torproject.org':
 +  ensure => 'absent';
}
  }
 diff --git a/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_web.pp
 b/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_web.pp
 index 997140b7..73859c41 100644
 --- a/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_web.pp
 +++ b/modules/roles/manifests/static_mirror_web.pp
 @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class roles::static_mirror_web {
ssl::service { 'nyx.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic', notify  =>
 Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
ssl::service { 'onion.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic', notify  =>
 Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
ssl::service { 'onionperf.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic', notify
 => Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
 -  ssl::service { 'ooni.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic', notify  =>
 Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
 +  ssl::service { 'ooni.torproject.org': ensure => 'absent', notify  =>
 Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
ssl::service { 'openpgpkey.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic',
 notify  => Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
ssl::service { 'rbm.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic', notify  =>
 Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
ssl::service { 'research.torproject.org': ensure => 'ifstatic', notify
 => Exec['service apache2 reload'], key => true, }
 diff --git a/modules/roles/templates/static-mirroring/vhost/static-
 vhosts.erb b/modules/roles/templates/static-mirroring/vhost/static-
 vhosts.erb
 index a49d64b5..30fd426b 100644
 --- a/modules/roles/templates/static-mirroring/vhost/static-vhosts.erb
 +++ b/modules/roles/templates/static-mirroring/vhost/static-vhosts.erb
 @@ -152,7 +152,6 @@ vhost(lines, "newsletter.torproject.org")
  vhost(lines, "nyx.torproject.org")
  vhost(lines, "onion.torproject.org")
  vhost(lines, "onionperf.torproject.org")
 -vhost(lines, "ooni.torproject.org")
  vhost(lines, "openpgpkey.torproject.org", :extra => true)
  vhost(lines, "rbm.torproject.org")
  vhost(lines, "research.torproject.org")
 diff --git a/modules/sudo/files/sudoers b/modules/sudo/files/sudoers
 index 39156276..90b2bcbc 100644
 --- a/modules/sudo/files/sudoers
 +++ b/modules/sudo/files/sudoers
 @@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ letsencrypt   nevii=(dnsadm)
 NOPASSWD: /srv/dns.torproject.org/bin/update
  %metrics   meronense=(metrics) ALL
  %onionoo   ONIONOOHOSTS=(onionoo)  ALL
  %onionoo   ONIONOOHOSTS=(onionoo-unpriv)   ALL
 -%ooni  STATICMASTER=(ooni) ALL
  %stem  STATICMASTER=(stem) ALL
  %nyx   STATICMASTER=(nyx)  ALL
  %rtfolks   rude=(rtstuff)  ALL
 @@ -89,7 

Re: [tor-bugs] #30382 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop304: Implement SOCKS new HS error code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30382: prop304: Implement SOCKS new HS error code
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tbb-usability, hs-auth,  |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-september, tor-spec,  |
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:  #14389   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 OK great! Merged! Now action moves to #30381.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32525 [Core Tor/Stem]: problem with authenticate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32525: problem with authenticate
---+--
 Reporter:  wiri   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  python 3.8 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I am fairly embarrassed about a silly mistake.  While fumbling through the
 cgit web interface, I thought I was looking at the log for the whole
 project not just the control.py file. 臘 Armed with laughable incorrect
 information, I came to equally laughable conclusions.

 With correct information, I would agree that rushing a new version is
 irresponsible.  Please accept my  apology, as I do not want to minimalize
 the efforts of you and the other developers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31718 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31718: Update DNS records for .ooni.torproject.org domains
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 this has now been deployed, with the following three patches, in
 `dns/domains.git`:

 {{{
 From 471f529240673d324a66a1258f6acc257857f964 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: =?UTF-8?q?Antoine=20Beaupr=C3=A9?= 
 Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 11:50:50 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] add ooni.tpo CNAME (#31718)

 ---
  torproject.org | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

 diff --git a/torproject.org b/torproject.org
 index 8e62797..87623f1 100644
 --- a/torproject.org
 +++ b/torproject.org
 @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ rsync.media IN  CNAME   listera
  metricsIN  CNAME   meronense
  munin  IN  CNAME   schmitzi
  nagios IN  CNAME   hetzner-hel1-01
 +ooni   IN  CNAME   ooni.io.
  get.ooni   IN  CNAME   get.ooni.io.
  measurements.ooni  IN  CNAME   measurements.ooni.io.
  explorer.ooni  IN  CNAME   explorer.ooni.io.
 @@ -168,7 +169,6 @@ helpIN  CNAME
 static
  lektor-staging IN  CNAME   static
  newsletter IN  CNAME   static
  nyxIN  CNAME   static
 -; ooni A/ records via services-auto
  openpgpkey IN  CNAME   static
  rbmIN  CNAME   static
  rpmIN  CNAME   static
 --
 2.20.1
 }}}

 in `dns/auto-dns.git`:

 {{{
 From 7a1229bc1d0e4b92ee75712942eba146db9adee9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: =?UTF-8?q?Antoine=20Beaupr=C3=A9?= 
 Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 11:48:59 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] retire ooni.tpo, will be a CNAME (#31718

 ---
  services/ooni.torproject.org.service | 7 ---
  1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
  delete mode 100644 services/ooni.torproject.org.service

 diff --git a/services/ooni.torproject.org.service
 b/services/ooni.torproject.org.service
 deleted file mode 100644
 index ec2a1f2..000
 --- a/services/ooni.torproject.org.service
 +++ /dev/null
 @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 
 -ttl: 150
 -hosts:
 -  default:
 -- hetzner-hel1-03.torproject.org
 -- listera.torproject.org
 -# vim:syn=yaml:
 --
 2.20.1
 }}}

 ... and `tor-puppet.git`:

 {{{
 From 9cc7af7889ba9b7fd9b167591c30e5baa395acf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: =?UTF-8?q?Antoine=20Beaupr=C3=A9?= 
 Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2019 11:44:10 -0500
 Subject: [PATCH] retire ooni.tpo, will be a CNAME (#31718)

 ---
  modules/roles/misc/static-components.yaml | 3 ---
  1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

 diff --git a/modules/roles/misc/static-components.yaml
 b/modules/roles/misc/static-components.yaml
 index 9151c5f6..a810c5bd 100644
 --- a/modules/roles/misc/static-components.yaml
 +++ b/modules/roles/misc/static-components.yaml
 @@ -47,9 +47,6 @@ components:
help.torproject.org:
  master: staticiforme.torproject.org
  source: staticiforme.torproject.org:/srv/help-
 master.torproject.org/output
 -  ooni.torproject.org:
 -master: staticiforme.torproject.org
 -source: staticiforme.torproject.org:/home/ooni/website
openpgpkey.torproject.org:
  master: staticiforme.torproject.org
  source:
 alberti.torproject.org:/srv/db.torproject.org/keyrings/openpgpkey
 --
 2.20.1
 }}}

 @hellais renewed the domain with netlify and the new site seems to be
 online and working.

 i still have my own cleanup to do, but the synchronous, "OMG IS THIS GOING
 TO WORK" step is over, i believe.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Dead obfs4 Bridges on Tor Browser Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32485: Dead obfs4 Bridges on Tor Browser Android
--+---
 Reporter:  torify|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Apparently some networks (country? countries?) are blocking this bridge.

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[tor-bugs] #32533 [Core Tor/Stem]: Incompatibility with Python 3.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32533: Incompatibility with Python 3.8
---+---
 Reporter:  nafen  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Core Tor/Stem
  Version: |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  python3.8  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
 Python 3.8 changed the semantic restrictions on dictionary modifications
 during iterations:

 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/12596

 thus causing any users of 'stem' to fail with the following exception
 (example taken from 'nyx'):

 {{{
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/usr/bin/nyx", line 11, in 
 load_entry_point('nyx==2.1.0', 'console_scripts', 'nyx')()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/nyx/__init__.py", line 176, in
 main
 nyx.starter.main()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/util/conf.py", line 289, in
 wrapped
 return func(*args, config = config, **kwargs)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/nyx/starter.py", line 90, in main
 controller = init_controller(
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/nyx/__init__.py", line 325, in
 init_controller
 TOR_CONTROLLER = stem.connection.connect(*args, **kwargs)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/connection.py", line 291, in
 connect
 return _connect_auth(control_connection, password, password_prompt,
 chroot_path, controller)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/connection.py", line 375, in
 _connect_auth
 return controller(control_socket, is_authenticated = True)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/control.py", line 1057, in
 __init__
 super(Controller, self).__init__(control_socket, is_authenticated)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/control.py", line 585, in
 __init__
 self._post_authentication()
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/control.py", line 3902, in
 _post_authentication
 owning_pid = self.get_conf('__OwningControllerProcess', None)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/control.py", line 2170, in
 get_conf
 entries = self.get_conf_map(param, default, multiple)
   File "/usr/lib/python3.8/site-packages/stem/control.py", line 2273, in
 get_conf_map
 for key in reply:
 RuntimeError: dictionary keys changed during iteration
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> I think I want to migrate the TPO people who use my bouncer off my server
> and onto TPO infra. If possible.
>
> Initial discussion with anarcat suggested that chives.tpo would be the
> box. Okay cool.
>
> **Q1**: Can it get a valid TLS certificate? Both for the web interface
> and also for protecting the IRC traffic.
>
> **Q2**: Can Tor get installed on the box? Right now I also have an onion
> service pointing to my ZNC and it'd be cool to keep that.
>
> If desired, I can talk more about how I have accomplished Q1 with Let's
> Encrypt, nginx, and a cron job. Q2 is just because it's easy and cool. No
> big deal.

New description:

 I think I want to migrate the TPO people who use my bouncer off my server
 and onto TPO infra. If possible.

 Initial discussion with anarcat suggested that chives.tpo would be the
 box. Okay cool.

 **Q1**: Can it get a valid TLS certificate? Both for the web interface
 (**edit** for account management, NOT CHAT) and also for protecting the
 IRC traffic.

 **Q2**: Can Tor get installed on the box? Right now I also have an onion
 service pointing to my ZNC and it'd be cool to keep that.

 If desired, I can talk more about how I have accomplished Q1 with Let's
 Encrypt, nginx, and a cron job. Q2 is just because it's easy and cool. No
 big deal.

--

Comment (by pastly):

 (Edit description to make explicit that ZNC's web interface is for admin
 stuff, not chat.)

 Sure ircbouncer.torproject.org. Doesn't make much difference to me :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R, network-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-september |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:37 gk]:
 > The torbutton changes look good to me. While reading over the browser
 changes and thinking about upcoming releases: what `tor` version do we
 need for this feature? In case there is no released version yet, what
 happens if the code changes in this bug land in a Tor Browser that does
 not have the corresponding features in `tor` it ships yet? What is the
 user experience then? Do things break?

 Good question. Things should not break. Because an older `tor` will not
 send any new SOCKS error codes, the browser will continue to exhibit the
 "old" behavior (unknown site) when the user tries to connect to a v3 onion
 that requires client authentication.

 And I keep forgetting that the `tor` patches have not been merged yet. The
 necessary patches are in review and #14389 is the tracking bug. I hope
 they land soon.

 Finally, your comment reminded me that Kathy and I forgot to post the Tor
 Launcher patch that is needed to enable the extended SOCKS errors feature.
 Here it is:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug30237-03=7821bd58b69ed99c1a9bf86e102279c5bc0472c2

 We should not ship this Tor Launcher patch until we start to ship a `tor`
 that includes the #14389 fixes. It should be OK to merge the Torbutton and
 Tor Browser patches earlier, but maybe we should wait until the #14389
 patches are available on tor master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Dead obfs4 Bridges on Tor Browser Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32485: Dead obfs4 Bridges on Tor Browser Android
--+---
 Reporter:  torify|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I just tested that bridge, and it is working now. Maybe there was
 maintenance?

 {{{
 11/18/19, 16:13:29.863 [NOTICE] Switching to guard context "bridges" (was
 using "default")
 11/18/19, 16:13:30.184 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: No running
 bridges
 11/18/19, 16:13:31.332 [NOTICE] new bridge descriptor 'griinchux' (fresh):
 $011F2599C0E9B27EE74B353155E244813763C3E5~griinchux at 85.31.186.98
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Dead obfs4 Bridges on Tor Browser Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32485: Dead obfs4 Bridges on Tor Browser Android
--+--
 Reporter:  torify|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * severity:  Major => Normal
 * component:  Circumvention => Applications/Tor Browser
 * priority:  Very High => High
 * keywords:  dead obfs4 bridge => TorBrowserTeam201911
 * version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6 =>
 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team


Comment:

 The logs refer to https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/tree/projects/tor-browser/Bundle-
 Data/PTConfigs/bridge_prefs.js#n11

 {{{
 WARN: Proxy Client: unable to connect 85.31.186.98:443 ("general SOCKS
 server failure")
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 > > > Q1: Can it get a valid TLS certificate? Both for the web interface
 and also for protecting the IRC traffic.
 > >
 > > Yes. I wonder which domain it should be however?
 >
 > chives.torproject.org

 I was thinking something more like `ircbouncer.torproject.org`. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32327 [Applications/Tor Browser]: apt-win-crt*dll files are missing on some Windows 8 and Windows 7 systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32327: apt-win-crt*dll files are missing on some Windows 8 and Windows 7 
systems
-+-
 Reporter:  bob121   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeamTriaged  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > You get the dlls with an update directly in your Windows. We strongly
 recommend going that route instead of installing random dlls.

 I am not a Windows person, but for people who cannot or do not want to
 install all available updates via the Windows automatic update mechanism,
 it looks like it may be possible to download targeted installers from
 Microsoft's website. They are not easy to find because some articles on
 their site include broken links (404). But you can find the installers by
 using your favorite search engine to look for something like `KB2999226
 Windows  download`, e.g., `KB2999226 Windows 8.1 download`. On
 DuckDuckGo that search leads me to https://www.microsoft.com/en-
 us/download/details.aspx?id=49071, which looks promising (warning: I have
 no way to test whether this is the correct patch).

 Adding `x64` to the search phrase should help find patches for people who
 are using a 64-bit Windows installation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide custom bridges in a multiline form

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30130: Provide custom bridges in a multiline form
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, fenix-   |  Actual Points:
  migration  |
Parent ID:  #31284   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:  tbb-8.5, tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201905 => tbb-
 mobile, tbb-parity, fenix-migration


Comment:

 Keyword cleanup, and setting expectations.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30130 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide custom bridges in a multiline form

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30130: Provide custom bridges in a multiline form
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.5, tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201905   |
Parent ID:  #31284   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-can
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Closed #32528 as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: allow more than 3 bridges in android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32528: allow more than 3 bridges in android
--+---
 Reporter:  big1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * keywords:   => tbb-mobile
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I'm a little confused, because #30767 should prevent you from using
 pluggable transport bridges. If you are not using pluggable transports,
 then this may be one reason the connections are being blocked with such
 ease.

 In any case, the ticket should be #30130. The goal of this is that you can
 add an arbitrary number of bridges. We encountered some UX problems while
 implementing the original bridge configuration interface.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31971 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31971: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---

Comment (by cohosh):

 Okay I was able to reproduce the 10-20KB/s download speed by looking at
 the transfer rate in `about:downloads`.

 I also ran a speed test using `iperf -u` and found the performance to be
 fine:
 [[Image(iperf.png,100%)]]

 I tried a download on linux and found that I'm getting the same 10-20KB/s
 in `about:downloads` when I use snowflake. I'm starting to doubt this is a
 windows-specific problem. In any case, 20KB/s is very slow. I'll look into
 whether there are good reasons why it's so slow on all platforms.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 Replying to [comment:1 anarcat]:
 > > **Q1**: Can it get a valid TLS certificate? Both for the web interface
 and also for protecting the IRC traffic.
 >
 > Yes. I wonder which domain it should be however?

 chives.torproject.org

 My users currently use ircbouncer.system33.pw, and I ''could'' made DNS
 for that point to chives.torproject.org, but I'd rather rip the bandaid
 off and make them updates their host.

 If you were thinking the certificate would have to be valid for
 irc.oftc.net, no. ZNC terminates the TLS and pretends to be a regular ol'
 IRC server to the clients.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31971 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31971: Snowflake is *consistently* extremely slow when using the Windows build
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "iperf.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 > **Q1**: Can it get a valid TLS certificate? Both for the web interface
 and also for protecting the IRC traffic.

 Yes. I wonder which domain it should be however?

 > **Q2**: Can Tor get installed on the box? Right now I also have an onion
 service pointing to my ZNC and it'd be cool to keep that.

 Sure, that shouldn't be a problem either.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add features improving onion services' interaction with Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32511: Add features improving onion services' interaction with Tor.
--+-
 Reporter:  moonsikpark   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32209 [Core Tor/Tor]: write description of config subsystem architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32209: write description of config subsystem architecture
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september,  |  Actual Points:  1
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29215   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => teor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32207 [Core Tor/Tor]: write description of pub-sub architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32207: write description of pub-sub architecture
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september,  |  Actual Points:  .2
  s31-docs   |
Parent ID:  #29215   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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[tor-bugs] #32532 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32532: Install ZNC on Chives, make pastly admin it
-+-
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I think I want to migrate the TPO people who use my bouncer off my server
 and onto TPO infra. If possible.

 Initial discussion with anarcat suggested that chives.tpo would be the
 box. Okay cool.

 **Q1**: Can it get a valid TLS certificate? Both for the web interface and
 also for protecting the IRC traffic.

 **Q2**: Can Tor get installed on the box? Right now I also have an onion
 service pointing to my ZNC and it'd be cool to keep that.

 If desired, I can talk more about how I have accomplished Q1 with Let's
 Encrypt, nginx, and a cron job. Q2 is just because it's easy and cool. No
 big deal.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:  30
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:   => 30


Comment:

 > acat, et.al.: please add your points spent here (I know it's hard :) ).

 It is :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some webm videos not working on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32530: Some webm videos not working on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 FYI: Windows 7 here, new identity between slider tests, NS is 11.0.8, nine
 tests, working as expected
 - **8.5.5** and **9.0.1** and **9.5a2**
   - `standard` (works), `safer`/`safest` (works after click to play via
 NS)

 If you download the video and inspect it, it is vp9 (video) opus (audio)

 IANAE.. http://dmlinking.net/~pe1rxq/video.html : `video/webm;
 codecs="vp9"` is green for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28325 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use go 1.11 module versioning support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28325: Use go 1.11 module versioning support
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by boklm):

 It seems this issue is similar to #31588.

 One option to fix this would be to add a special build step where we allow
 network access in the container, and run `go mod vendor` and create a
 vendor tarball that we later use in the build.

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[tor-bugs] #32531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back out the backport for bug 1534339

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32531: Back out the backport for bug 1534339
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201911
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Mozilla [https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/9f6892c03bd8 backed
 their patch out]. We should do the same for our alpha builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32318 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport support for IPv6 addresses in firstparty domain isolation (bug 1534339)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32318: Backport support for IPv6 addresses in firstparty domain isolation (bug
1534339)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  GeorgKoppen201910  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201910R, GeorgKoppen201910, tbb-backport =>
 TorBrowserTeam201910R, GeorgKoppen201910


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Before backporting we need to make sure
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1595179 is addressed.

 We actually should back out the backport done in this ticket as Mozilla
 backed it out as well. I opened a new ticket for that: #32531. Clearing
 backport flag.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31588 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Be smarter about vendoring for Rust projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31588: Be smarter about vendoring for Rust projects
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 If we trust that `cargo vendor` will provide reproducible output, and is
 correctly checking downloaded files, then maybe we could add some step in
 the build where we allow network access in the container, in order to run
 `cargo vendor` and generate a vendor tarball.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some webm videos not working on Windows 7 (was: Some webm videos not working on Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32530: Some webm videos not working on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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[tor-bugs] #32530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some webm videos not working on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32530: Some webm videos not working on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201911
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Some users are reporting that the following video does not work for them,
 on Windows 7, in any security level:
 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/transcoded/2/22/Volcano_Lava_Sample.webm/Volcano_Lava_Sample.webm.360p.vp9.webm

 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/285108#comment-285108

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30558: Namecoin support for onion sites in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  JeremyRand
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTesm201911R => TorBrowserTeam201911R


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[tor-bugs] #32529 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor transparent IPv6 destination_from_socket(): Bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32529: Tor transparent IPv6 destination_from_socket(): Bug
---+--
 Reporter:  avengermsoft   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6   |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  Tor Transparent Proxy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Configuration file torrc
 {{{
 User root
 PidFile /opt/var/run/tor.pid
 #Log info file /opt/var/log/tor.log
 Log notice file /opt/var/log/tor.log
 ExcludeExitNodes {RU},{UA},{AM},{KG},{BY}
 StrictNodes 1
 TransPort 192.168.97.97:9151
 TransPort [::]:9151
 ExitRelay 0
 GeoIPFile /opt/share/tor/geoip
 GeoIPv6File /opt/share/tor/geoip6
 DataDirectory /opt/var/lib/tor
 VirtualAddrNetwork 10.192.0.0/10
 VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6 [fc00::]/7
 DNSPort 127.0.0.1:9153
 DNSPort [::1]:9153
 AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
 ClientUseIPv4 0
 ClientUseIPv6 1
 }}}

 Redirecting traffic to the port 9151 goes through ip6tables.
 {{{
 ip6tables -t filter -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9040 -j ACCEPT
 ip6tables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -d fc00::/7 -j REDIRECT --to-port
 9151
 ip6tables -t nat -A OUTPUT -p tcp -d fc00::/7 -j REDIRECT --to-port 9151
 }}}

 I start {{{curl -6 -v http://www.flibustahezeous3.onion/}}} and get an
 error
 {{{
 Nov 18 01:04:06.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.1.6 opening new log file.
 Nov 18 01:04:06.589 [notice] Tor 0.4.1.6 running on Linux with Libevent
 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1d, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma N/A, and Libzstd N/A.

 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opened Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opening DNS listener on 127.0.0.1:9153
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opened DNS listener on 127.0.0.1:9153
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opening DNS listener on [::1]:9153
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opened DNS listener on [::1]:9153
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 192.168.97.97:9151
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opened Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 192.168.97.97:9151
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 [::]:9151
 Nov 18 01:08:27.257 [notice] Opened Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 [::]:9151
 Nov 18 01:08:38.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done

 Nov 18 10:23:58.000 [warn] destination_from_socket(): Bug: Received
 transparent data from an unsuported socket family 10 (on Tor 0.4.1.6 )
 Nov 18 10:23:58.000 [warn] Fetching original destination failed. Closing.
 }}}

 I start {{{curl -4 -v http://www.flibustahezeous3.onion/}}} and everything
 is fine. IPv4 IS OK.

 How to fix?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: allow more than 3 bridges in android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32528: allow more than 3 bridges in android
--+--
 Reporter:  big1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by big1):

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30767

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/timeline?from=2019-11-14T21%3A53%3A26Z=second

 this does not propose the suggested change in this ticket which is
 increasing the limit of allowed bridges

 @gk

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31010: Rebase Tor Browser mobile/ patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 If we don't count reviews, I think I just did the fix for
 b7abcc2f4062fd56869827ecc181e93782ea8127.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32383 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32383: retire build-arm-* raspi boxes
-+
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 disks zeroed, hw removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R, network-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-september |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by acat):

 > So, if I had my way, very little apart from init/uninit's and
 module+script includes would need to be added to vanilla Firefox sources
 to get the additional Tor-Browser functionality. That said I don't
 actually know if this pattern is a good idea or not in practice.

 > Do you have any opinions on this acat, sysrqb, gk?

 I think in this case it made sense to move it out to a separate module and
 just have `init` and `uninit`. Probably it always make sense to do this
 when the new code is a reasonably self-contained component.

 Not so sure about having a general rule, I think there are many cases
 where the changes are fairly small and doing includes might be a bit
 "artificial". For example: https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-68.2.0esr-9.5-1=15738bd0be40f8ee3f33b5da7d548c2b9066bce4. Here
 I think it makes more sense to have these two new `toolbarbutton` inline
 rather than putting them on a separate file and include it. For me it's
 more readable this way. Same for the new code in `CustomizableUI.jsm`, you
 can see that there is a `kTorVersion` variable which is analogous to
 Firefox's `kVersion` because it's next to it, and then the migration code
 for Tor Browser is next to the other Firefox's migration code. I just
 think there are cases where it's more readable to not do includes, but
 perhaps what I'm saying is obvious and pospeselr didn't actually mean
 these cases.

 Anyway, I think it's a good idea to try to keep modifications to Firefox
 sources as minimal as possible, and use includes and imports whenever it
 feels "natural" to do so. It's a bit vague, but I guess there will always
 be subjectiveness in code reviews :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30429: Rebase Tor Browser patches for Firefox ESR 68
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor44-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > I meant commit 65bbebea18a8 which is the patch for #14716.
 Oh, that one. Maybe, because `nsLoginManager.js` was removed in Firefox
 68? :)
 The last related change was https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/f52b086cbd9d
 If "no prompt after cancelling it 3 times" from STR of #14716 is a desired
 behavior, then we are good here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32460 [Webpages/Website]: download page has confusing flow, especially with donate banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32460: download page has confusing flow, especially with donate banner
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by emmapeel):

 I think maybe the 'download' buttons in the footer and the banner should
 not appear on the download page, as those are links useful only on other
 pages.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Think about using `const` as much as possible in Torbutton code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26184: Think about using `const` as much as possible in Torbutton code
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 > Is Mozilla doing this?

 I think most of the Firefox JS code uses `let` for declarations, but I did
 not see any general guidelines for this. Some components seem to be
 enforcing `const` though, like `devtools`:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1454696.

 I think using `const` as  much as possible does add value if it's clear
 what it means, like pospeselr said: `when the reference is used it is
 pointing to the same object throughout the block`. It does not mean that
 the object of a `const` declaration cannot change. So I would say +1 to
 the idea of using `const` whenever it's possible and `let` otherwise.

 

 I read the article mcs mentioned, I think it has some interesting points.
 Giving my opinion about some of them:

 ...

 > It adds an extra distraction to the process of programming...

 I think this is true, but I also think that the additional distraction is
 quite small.

 ...
 > ...and results in code difficult to understand and change.

 I don't see how it's more difficult to understand, but I guess this is
 subjective. I think being able to easily see whether the value of a
 variable will remain the same for the whole function cannot make the code
 more difficult to understand. It probably does make the code more
 difficult to change, but not sure that's a bad an idea. You're changing a
 "this variable will never be reassigned" to "this variable might be
 reassigned later in this function (probably depending on some condition)".
 I think the small difficulty added by using `const` is justified here.

 ...

 > ... aggressive use of const devalues the operator

 The writer suggested usage of `const` is: `Constants should be declared at
 the top of modules and only in module scope`. I don't see how the value of
 those `const` declarations decreases by allowing other `const`
 declarations inside functions or blocks. I think it's quite easy to
 distinguish the case of "const declarations which are at the start of a
 file" from the rest `const` usages.

 ...

 > By const being the default declaration, let rises as the more visible
 style of declaration. The idea is that let flags where something funny is
 happening.

 I think the premise (`let` flags where something "funny" is happening) is
 wrong. It just means what it means, that this variable might be reassigned
 later in the function, (probably) depending on some condition.

 ...

 > However, function arguments like function(a,b,c) { are also allowed re-
 assignment, so it is a false sense of security to suggest no let means no
 funny business is happening.

 Again, I think no one is saying `no let means no funny business is
 happening` in the first place. From the point of view of what JavaScript
 allows, I think we should consider function arguments to be `implicit let
 declarations`, although I think it's bad practice to reassign them (and
 that can be enforced via style rules). But I don't see how this affects
 the `const` vs `let` discussion.

 ...

 > What is “expressed” by const itself when used this way? Since you are
 intended to refactor the declaration to let if the situation requires it,
 it can only express “this variable wasn’t being re-assigned when I wrote
 this code, but feel free to change that”. This is basically meaningless.

 I don't think `const` necessarily expresses "feel free to change that",
 and "when I wrote this code" is redundant. It just expresses "this
 variable is not reassigned".

 ...

 >Second, choosing const first really means choosing to think about every
 declaration. Will the next line of code change this assignment? How will I
 use this variable? Choosing let first eliminates this intellectual load,
 helping developers focus on more important problems.

 As I said before, it's hard to argue against the idea that there is "some"
 additional intellectual load. My opinion is that this added intellectual
 load when developing is fairly small, and that it's justified. I also
 think the examples chosen by the author do not do a good job at showcasing
 this added intellectual load. It should be quite obvious that a variable
 storing the array length before a loop should be `const`, and the variable
 of the classical `for` loop a `let`.

--
Ticket URL: 

Re: [tor-bugs] #32515 [Webpages]: Keep Good Summaries From Reliable Sources. Example: Tor's CODEC Strategy, zlib, lzma, zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32515: Keep Good Summaries From Reliable Sources. Example: Tor's CODEC 
Strategy,
zlib, lzma, zstd
--+
 Reporter:  werd  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  zlib, lzma, zstd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pili):

 This looks like something that should go in the new dev or docs portal

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32460 [Webpages/Website]: download page has confusing flow, especially with donate banner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32460: download page has confusing flow, especially with donate banner
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pili):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


Comment:

 Seems like a UX issue that we need to investigate further to me.

 Would removing the arrow icon help matters? Or not making it look like a
 button? I guess users are expecting us to automagically know their
 operating system and download the correct version... or don't realise that
 there are OS specific versions of software.

 How do other popular pieces of software do it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32297 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked by a website firewall

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32297: Version 9 problem (regular and alpha) when some Exit Nodes are blocked 
by a
website firewall
-+-
 Reporter:  mwolfe   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:11 mwolfe]:
 > Replying to [comment:10 mwolfe]:
 > > Replying to [comment:7 acat]:
 > > > Unfortunately I can't reproduce (tested in Linux and Windows with
 Tor Browser 9). For me the circuit display is working correctly when there
 is an
 > > >
 > > > mwolfe: does it happen only with www.dilbert.com or with any page
 that has a network error (e.g. can you try with something like
 www.arandomdoma
 > >
 > > Fixed in latest update. Now I see the New Tor Circuit when I click the
 (i) after Tor cannot conect! Thanks.
 > Sorry, fixed in OSX Capitan, still not working in Windows 10 ver 1903

 Just to be on the same page here: with 9.0 this was an issue for both
 macOS and Windows but with 9.0.1 this is no issue any longer for macOS but
 Windows still remains? If so, can you re-test 9.0 now on your macOS so we
 can rule out some macOS related software update that fixed this. (old
 bundles are at: https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-
 archive/torbrowser/9.0)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32053 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM optimization issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32053: Tor Browser bundles based on Firefox 68 ESR are not reproducible (LLVM
optimization issue)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911, tbb-9.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-9.0-issues, tbb-regression,|
  tbb-9.0.1-can, GeorgKoppen201911   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, some status update. Bisecting gets hard. I am down to building stylo
 with Rust 1.30.0 and am at LLVM's b1546da0e8849d58fcdcf17fa1f2fab0cdae70a4
 and have not reached the bottom yet. While exploring ways to move further
 here I'll investigate whether we can just move the `jump-threading`
 optimization out of `-O1`, say, into `-O3` so the we are actually do not
 use that one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32429 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32429: Issues with about:blank and NoScript on .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  pf.team   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  about:blank noscript  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Thanks. I bumped Noscript to 11.0.8 (commit
 a750c9303469cd524c9091bbebca95a7905de912 and
 a8066f0972088860ac44ebb66da5b3c036f47135 on `tor-browser-build`'s `master`
 and `maint-9.0`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32362: NoScript TRUSTED setting doesn't work
+--
 Reporter:  nDe15o  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. I bumped Noscript to 11.0.8 (commit
 a750c9303469cd524c9091bbebca95a7905de912 and
 a8066f0972088860ac44ebb66da5b3c036f47135 on `tor-browser-build`'s `master`
 and `maint-9.0`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32475 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reduce the number of locales we provide updates for in nightly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32475: Reduce the number of locales we provide updates for in nightly
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201911, tbb-update,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201911, ux-team  |
Parent ID:  #18867   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor9
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 pili]:
 > > Could this somehow be configured/configurable?
 >
 > Yes, I think we can have this list of locales in `rbm.conf`, and we can
 update it as needed.
 >
 > >
 > > I'm thinking of the example where we want to test a feature with a
 particular audience and we want to be sure to have the right locale for
 the audience.
 > >
 > > Or does it make sense to use a different system other than the
 automatic nightly builds for this?
 >
 > We would still be building all locales, so they can still all be tested.
 This ticket is only about automatic updates, so only some locales could be
 used with automatic updates. If we want a particular audience to use
 nightly builds every day, we can add that locale to the list, so I don't
 think we need a different system.

 Great. It seemed I actually mis-read the ticket first, but reducing the
 locales just for testing purposes first would have been a good plan
 anyway. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30237: Tor Browser: Improve TBB UI of hidden service client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201911R, network-  |  Actual Points:
  team-roadmap-september |
Parent ID:  #3   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 The torbutton changes look good to me. While reading over the browser
 changes and thinking about upcoming releases: what `tor` version do we
 need for this feature? In case there is no released version yet, what
 happens if the code changes in this bug land in a Tor Browser that does
 not have the corresponding features in `tor` it ships yet? What is the
 user experience then? Do things break?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32520 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Output of go project contains nonreproducible datetime values

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32520: Output of go project contains nonreproducible datetime values
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32523 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider building tor-browser-build containers with Bitcoin Core's Guix-based system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32523: Consider building tor-browser-build containers with Bitcoin Core's Guix-
based system
--+--
 Reporter:  JeremyRand|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-security |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm, tbb-security


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: allow more than 3 bridges in android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32528: allow more than 3 bridges in android
--+--
 Reporter:  big1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > I'm guessing this meant to be a Tor Browser ticket.
 >
 > Matt/GeKo, what's the current story with Tor Browser Android and the
 ability to put in your own bridge addresses manually?

 #30767 is the ticket to track for that. We have patch now which is up for
 review.

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